

Chapter 5

Van Kersbergen's law? The magical disappearance of Dutch social democracy

Frans Becker and René Cuperus

Let's start with a confession: This is not an international comparative analysis of the predicament of social democracy in Western Europe, the kind of contribution you would expect in a *Festschrift* for Kees van Kersbergen. On the contrary, we deliberately concentrate on one party in one country. Across the board, social democracy in Europe has lost ground, and explanations may vary from the decline of the traditional working class and class vote to the lack of an appealing answer to globalization, deep European integration, immigration and an unfavourable *Zeitgeist* (Benedetto, Hix and Mastrocchio, 2020; De Waele, Escalona and Vieira, 2013; Wolinetz, 2016). But the national differences are significant, for example between the implosions of the French PS and the Dutch PvdA on one side and the relative survival of the German and Scandinavian parties on the other. We think that for the time being, the best way to get a deeper understanding of the complex situation of social democracy – of both general European trends and particular circumstances – is to start with national experiences. And as we are in the confessional, anyway, we are ready to admit that even explaining the unfortunate fate of one single party – in this case, the Dutch Labour Party, the Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) – is not as easy as it might seem. While we were close witnesses of its recent history, we have trouble unravelling the secret of both its 'magical return' (Cuperus and Kandel, 2001) before and its magical disappearance later. Why has the PvdA done so much worse than other social democratic parties?

To find out what happened to the Dutch Labour Party in the past four decades when the social democratic vote for the Second Chamber elections decreased from 33% in 1986 to 6% in 2021, we use a 'Braudellian' approach to identify developments of different speed and duration in different layers of time. We thus focus mainly on more structural trends instead of short-term processes and events.

Kersbergen's 'double trouble' analysis

In 1995, Kees van Kersbergen published his dissertation *Social capitalism: A study of Christian Democracy and the welfare state* (van Kersbergen, 1995). To put it shortly, this was a correction of the (at that time) current international typologies of the welfare state; they simply didn't distinguish or include the Christian democratic variant. Wrongly so, as van Kersbergen argued, because it was a distinctive model with specific characteristics, to be found in Germany, Holland and Italy. Elsewhere, van Kersbergen actually criticised the PvdA for having given in too much to this model. He preferred the social democratic Scandinavian type (van Kersbergen, 1994).

In his concluding chapter, he predicted that the Christian democrats were facing an unsuccessful future. They had 'double trouble'. Their electorate was dwindling because of the 'declining significance of religion', and they were confronted with 'the decay of what was identified as the politics of mediation', i.e., a 'procedure for moderating societal cleavages while reinforcing social groups and group identities in an attempt to gain as broad a social support as it could possibly obtain'.

However, as he observed, deeper causes of decline played a role, too. A broader societal process affected 'politics in general and Christian democracy in particular'. Van Kersbergen pointed at the general disintegration of traditional politics: the 'collapse of the function of political parties and the decline of conventional political participation', as well as the 'crisis of representation'. As a result of changing cleavage structures and the erosion of political group identities, contemporary political parties found it difficult to explain who they represented. Moreover, the role of parties as intermediaries between society and state had changed fundamentally. While parties used to represent civil society on the level of the state, they had lost their roots and had become more and more dependent on the state (van Kersbergen, 1995: 238-239, 245-246; Mair, 2013).

And some fifteen years later, van Kersbergen pointed out that 'in the raw political reality in the Netherlands there would be no guarantee after 2010 for a Christian democratic resurrection' (van Kersbergen, 2011: 216). Recent events couldn't prove him more right. In the last regional elections (March 2023) in the Netherlands, CDA totally imploded. In its last rural bastions, it was replaced by the

so-called Farmers-Citizen-Movement (*BoerBurgerBeweging* (BBB)), which led a successful campaign against the effects of national climate policies. Out of the blue, the BBB became the dominant party in all Dutch provinces.

The magical disappearance of social democracy

van Kersbergen's analysis of Dutch Christian Democracy, published almost 30 years ago, has some light to shed on the causes of the decline of the other traditional Dutch *Volkspartei*, the PvdA. But first, some data about the general elections of the PvdA between 1986 and 2021.

Two things stand out from this table: a rather up-and-down vote for the PvdA since 1989 and a completely deplorable situation since 2017. With a few exceptions, the situation on local and regional level has not been much better.

Table 1: PvdA % and seats at the general elections

Year	Seats out of 150	%
1986	52	33.2
1989	49	31.9
1994	37	24.0
1998	45	29.0
2002	23	15.1
2003	42	27.3
2006	33	21.2
2010	30	19.6
2012	38	24.8
2017	9	5.7
2021	9	5.73

When we look at the broader picture, five trends stand out: 1. A serious increase in volatility of the voters' behaviour; 2. A squeeze of the traditional *Volksparteien*; 3. A growing fragmentation of the po-

litical landscape; 4. The conservative liberals as the main force of stability; and 5. A strong political dynamic on the centre and radical right.

Since 2002, new political parties on the right succeeded four times to enter the political arena with surprisingly high figures. At the same time, the decline of social democracy was not compensated by better results of other parties on the left, the GreenLeft and the Socialist Party. Overall, the left lost considerable ground during the last decade. To account for the deteriorating position of the PvdA, we must go back to the early 1980's.

'The essence is that you let them down'

One of the first eyewitnesses of the loss of confidence between the core electorate and the Dutch Labour Party was the journalist Gerard van Westerloo. Together with his colleague Elma Verheij, he wrote a series of reportages about 'ordinary people', their day-to-day experiences, and their views on politics. In 1984, he interviewed several tram drivers in Amsterdam, many of them regular PvdA-voters, who had completely lost their faith in the party. While they were confronted with the rapid changes in their city, including the aggression of passengers and the change of ambiance on the tram, the politicians took the moral high ground and accused the drivers easily of racism. As one driver said about them: 'They were hypocritical to the bone. They had their mouth full of immigrants and that you had to be full of understanding for them, but they lived in neighbourhoods where they'd never seen a Turk. [...] If you told them that your tram was made unsafe by a bunch of pickpockets, they'd send you an anthropologist who would tell you about the origins of Caribbean culture.' The driver hated them – and he had ceased to vote for them. And no, he was not a fascist or a racist (van Westerloo, 2003: 10).

Van Westerloo also looked at the other side, the local politicians of the Labour Party, and drew a devastating picture of the PvdA in the Dutch city of Arnhem in 1990. What he saw was a completely closed world where the local politicians were keeping each other busy, playing their game of power and influence. With an average income three times as high as that of the average household in Arnhem, they had completely been alienated from their origins. Years before, the PvdA members of the council used to have a notebook

in which they had to put down who they had talked to in town. That was over. If you gave a party, one of the council members told, ‘those involved in politics were standing on one side talking to each other, while your family and friends were at the other’ (van Westerloo, 2003: 77).

These observations may seem rather impressionistic, but they are the kind of real-life evidence number-crunching political scientists tend to neglect. But in the 1990’s, the gap between core electorate and PvdA became all too visible in local elections. In Arnhem, the PvdA almost lost half of its seats in 1990. In Amsterdam, where the local party leader had been honoured with the name ‘Brezhnev at the Amstel River [where the City Hall is located]’ the PvdA went down from 21 to 12 seats out of 45 that same year. The most dramatic development, however, took place in Rotterdam. Like in other North-Western European countries, city politics had always been a solid base and nurturing ground for the Labour Party, and the PvdA in Rotterdam had held around 20 out of 45 seats since the war—and three times during that period they even attained a majority position. But after 1986, this was over.

The extreme right gained some seats in the city council, but the final blow and sweep-out of the PvdA from the City Hall happened in 2002 when entrepreneur-politician Pim Fortuyn obtained a mas-

Table 2: PvdA seats in Rotterdam City Council

Year	Seats out of 45
1986	24
1990	18
1994	12
1998	15
2002	11
2006	18
2010	14
2014	8
2018	5
2022	4

sive victory with the first break-through populist movement in the Netherlands. Part of the problem for the PvdA was the large-scale arrival of immigrants in some neighbourhoods combined with the lack of successful integration policies. As a former Rotterdam politician said: ‘People just didn’t recognize their city anymore.’ He diagnosed a huge gap between the generation of social democrats that governed the city in the 1990’s and the world of the average Rotterdam population: two worlds that hardly met (Becker et al., 2004: 192).

In the same year, 2002, the PvdA experienced its largest electoral defeat at the general elections since its foundation in 1946, declining from 29% to 15%. We asked van Westerloo to reflect on it as keynote speaker for a large audience of social democrats. He was not easy on them. The essence, he said, was that they had let their voters down (van Westerloo, 2002: 15). You could hear a pin drop in the venue. But the losses in 2002 were peanuts compared to the results in the most recent elections.

The Faustian seduction of neoliberalism

One of the more common explanations, popular among political scientists, for the electoral decline of the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) is that it had sold its soul to a Faust impersonating neoliberalism. Duco Hellema and Margriet van Lith asked the PvdA politicians and ministers who had been directly responsible for the course of the PvdA in the 1990’s why this had happened: ‘It went naturally, we followed the *Zeitgeist*, we were forced in that direction and didn’t have much choice, it was almost self-evident’ (Hellema and Van Lith, 2020). That answer is just a little too evasive. Dissidents, warning signs, and critical comments at that time were not appreciated (Becker, 2021). If it wasn’t for a lack of critical sense, courage, conviction, or competence, it was certainly inspired by a desire for power, by the eagerness to be and remain part of the government again. The mantra was ‘to take managerial responsibility’ in government at nearly any cost.

During the 1990’s social democrats or progressives—not only in Holland—adapted their policies to the neoliberal current in economics and politics that had become dominant in the Western world in the 1980’s. By the time Tony Blair got elected in 1997, they invented

their own label for it, *The Third Way*, after the book of Anthony Giddens. According to Blair, the new project was situated between ‘the free market individualism of the right and the old-left statism. [...] We are taking the historic values of the Left, and we are applying them to our new world of dynamic markets.’ It meant revaluation of markets and the private sector, less state regulation, emphasising the individual responsibility of citizens and transforming the welfare state from a ‘safety net of entitlements to a springboard of opportunities’. In a world of change, change itself became a positive value. ‘We embrace change’ was the motto of the Third Way (Becker, Cuperus and Kalma, 1999).

Van Kersbergen, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, and Anton Hemerijck have stressed the positive side of this approach in the Netherlands and Denmark with active labour market policies, the promotion of high rates of labour market participation, macro-economic stability, and wage moderation at its core. They saw the Third Way as a genuine social democratic response to new economic conditions (Green-Pedersen, van Kersbergen and Hemerijck, 2001). But despite the desirability of a switch in the direction of an activating welfare state, and despite the good intentions of the slogan ‘*flexicurity*’ (flexibility and security), in reality, the new policies turned out to have unbalanced effects, undermining security and making the Netherlands the European champion of flexibility. As Wolfgang Merkel concluded for the Dutch case: ‘Old paradigms were abandoned without recourse to new ones.’ (Merkel et al., 2008)

Although the PvdA leadership – personified by Wim Kok and Ad Melkert – never explicitly identified with the label ‘the Third Way’, it is quite clear that it adopted full-blown Third Way policies. As Bill Clinton once remarked: ‘Prime Minister Wim Kok, from the Netherlands, actually was all doing this before we were.’ Hellema and Van Lith show in detail how the PvdA in coalition governments between 1989 and 2002 embarked on a programme of supply-side economics, financial cuts, tax reforms, outsourcing and privatisation of public services and utilities, liberalisation and deregulation of economic sectors, flexibilisation of the labour market, and reform of welfare state arrangements, moving far away from statism and historical Left values and getting pretty close to dynamic markets and free market individualism. Symbolic for this was Prime Minister Kok’s

notorious statement that ‘shaking off ideological feathers’ can be a liberating experience for social democrats’.

Governing the Netherlands was increasingly considered a managing job, running the ‘BV Nederland’, *Netherlands Inc.* The preference for the shareholders’ economy, further globalisation, and deep market integration in Europe contributed to unchaining capitalist forces in a period where they were already on the move. In a world in flux, social democrats thus failed to provide counterweight to an unleashed capitalism and fuelled the forces of insecurity and inequality instead (Cuperus, 2009: 23-73). Basically, the PvdA – as Arndt and van Kersbergen foresaw – followed the same track again with deep welfare state reforms between 2012 and 2017 in another coalition with the conservative liberals. Again with devastating electoral results (Arndt and van Kersbergen, 2013).

One of the effects was the dismantling of the state and public sector. The introduction of New Public Management (the state should steer, not row) in the 1990’s, promoting market forces and competition in the public domain, undermining the public ethic and the role of public professionals, considering citizens as customers of public services – but treating them with distrust and growing surveillance – all added up to policy disasters, catastrophic failures of essential public services, and state interventions with damaging effects. The decentralisation of essential public functions to the local level under condition of later budget cuts made matters worse. No wonder that trust in political institutions has suffered severely in the Netherlands – bad news for social democrats for whom the state and the collective sector used to be an essential part of their political project.

‘We should never have done so’ was the opinion of quite a few social democratic politicians and economists responsible for PvdA politics in the 1990’s – as reflected in the title of Hellema and Van Lith’s book.

New uncomfortable cleavages

What also affected the position of social democracy was the fact that the political sociology of voting behaviour took its revenge. After the era of pillarisation in Dutch politics and society, electoral researchers came to the conviction that voters now started to behave ‘socially indifferent’. Finally, citizens had the kind of consumer freedom to

choose whatever and whoever they liked. But research of voters' attitudes and behaviour across Europe disclosed new social cleavages decisive for the political landscape in the early 21st century and extremely relevant and uncomfortable for social democracy.

The electoral problems for the PvdA started, as Philip van Praag has rightly pointed out, long before the populist revolt and before the new cleavages came to the surface. When the PvdA was founded in 1946, one of its aims was to appeal to both a working-class electorate and the middle classes, hoping to become a 40% party in the future. The last aim was never reached, but there were times when the Labour Party indeed successfully forged an electoral coalition over class boundaries. In the last decades, however, the PvdA has lost electoral support among an already shrinking traditional working class, and the party has not succeeded in strengthening its position among the middle-class voters (Houtman, Achterberg and Derks, 2017; van Praag, 2016: 122-123). Its position is even more problematic vis-à-vis the new cleavages.

The first time we analysed the Dutch election results in terms of these new cleavages was in 2006, after the disappointing score for the PvdA, in what we called *The lost battle* (Becker and Cuperus, 2007). Hanspeter Kriesi and his colleagues had just published results of their comparative research about the effects of global modernization: 'we assume that the processes of increasing economic (sectoral and international) competition, of increasing cultural competition (which is, among other things, linked to massive immigration of ethnic groups who are rather distinct from the European populations) and of increasing political competition (between nation-states and supra-or international political actors) create new groups of 'winners' and 'losers'. The likely winners include entrepreneurs and qualified employees in sectors open to international competition as well as all kinds of cosmopolitan citizens. The expected losers, by contrast, include entrepreneurs and qualified employees in traditionally protected sectors, all unqualified employees and citizens who strongly identify themselves with their national community. We assume that individuals do not perceive cultural and material threats as clearly distinct phenomena' (Kriesi et al., 2006).

Their conclusion was in line with what van Kersbergen and André Krouwel wrote in 2003 about the new polarisation in politics

between those who felt pretty comfortable with the new world and the political institutions – although rather irrelevant for their personal life – and those who felt threatened by the globalisation, the European integration, immigration, and the loss of trusted social infrastructure (van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2003, in Becker and Cuperus, 2007: 51).

This new polarisation cut straight through the traditional electorate of the PvdA, which was clear at the referendum on the European constitutional treaty when a majority of Labour voters – to the embarrassment of the social democratic leadership – turned against it. The PvdA, so we feared and witnessed, didn't have an answer to this new polarization and would end up losing the 'losers'. The idea of a *Volkspartei* had, in these circumstances, become an illusion. The 'clash between high-educated future optimists and lower educated pessimists about the future' was bad news for Labour (Cuperus, 2009: 73 ff.).

In the following years, the insights in the new cleavages deepened. The level – or rather kind – of education appeared to have become a major dividing line in Dutch society, leading to two separate worlds whose inhabitants seldom meet. The political system had become a 'diploma democracy', and the Labour party found itself on the 'diploma side' of metropolitan academic professionals. The 'practically' educated, as Kjell Noordzij recently recorded in his research project *Revolt of the deplored*, have a deeply felt distance to the incumbent politicians, who 'don't know our world', 'look down upon us', and 'consider themselves above us'. What they experience is arrogance and disdain, and they have the feeling of being regarded as losers or deplorables, at whom Hillary Clinton once turned her nose up. This gap of respect is a more important motive for dissatisfaction than material inequality or lack of political knowledge (NRC, 2023).

Recently, new dimensions of this cleavage have been lined out in *The Atlas of the abandoned citizens*; an electoral-geographic analysis of non-voting and anti-establishment voting in the Netherlands (de Voogd and Cuperus, 2021). Dutch politics is more and more characterised and effected by political-social unease and distrust in government. A growing proportion of the population no longer feels represented nor respected by established politics/The Hague.

There is an education gap, a health gap, and a trust gap. This is reflected in non-voting or voting for protest parties and populist or 'outsider parties', who do not (want to) feel part of the mainstream establishment. There is a short circuit between administrative Netherlands and the region as well as between metropolitan dominance and feelings of backwardness in rural Netherlands. There is also a short circuit between the high-educated and the middle-educated over values and preferences. The Dutch political system has transformed into a so-called 'Diplomademocracy': for and from the urban academic professionals, who are economically comfortable and lean culturally to the left. The *Atlas* is also demonstrating that there is a clash going on over the future course of the Netherlands. Many Dutch people feel that the Netherlands is not heading in the right direction. This feeling is stronger the less educated people are and the further away they live from the Randstad.

The transformation of the political system

Finally, this leads us to 'van Kersbergen's law' of the transformation of the political system. Not only voters have changed; so have the traditional political parties and the political system, with serious consequences for the relationship between the Labour party and its potential electorate. For Dutch politics, the end of the 'pillarisation' era seems a natural turning point, but some of the changes occurred quite independently of this phenomenon.

As social democracy ceased to be a movement with deep and widespread roots and branches in society, a new orientation focused on governance and policy became dominant. As early as in 1985, the Wiardi Beckman Foundation – the think tank of the Dutch Labour party – introduced the concept of the 'cheese dome', which denoted the genesis of a political centre where politicians with a limited view on society locked themselves in full-time: 'They create – together with their public servants and lobbyists – their own world and their own language, which not only isolates them, but makes them powerless as well' (van den Berg, 1985: 8). Tinkering with society's engine with the help of policy, without ever getting away from under the hood, as Anton Hemerijck once called it (Becker and Cuperus, 2003: 39).

Politics was thus reduced to the ‘Bermuda triangle of policy’. Problems and experiences of society were reduced in such a way that they became manageable in terms of bureaucratic and financial rationality. That this implied alienation from the ‘real world’ and a severely limited perspective on the very same seemed to be of secondary importance. The world of policy felt it was sufficient in itself (Cuperus, 1995). What aggravated the problem was the strict separation of policy formulation and policy implementation. The world of policy makers and the world of its objects seem to be kept apart by an impenetrable glass wall; maybe they see each other, but they certainly don’t hear each other.

As a result, the Labour party ended up with a broken relationship with an important part of what used to be the traditional PvdA electorate. In a large WBS research project about the ‘concealed politics of daily life’, we concluded on the basis of personal interviews: ‘political parties are falling short in connecting the personal sphere of life with the public domain, of the daily anxieties and dreams of people with political struggle and ideals’ and ‘that the people’s capacity to translate personal problems in public issues and political solutions has dropped below a critical limit’ (Sie Dhian Ho, 2013: 12).

What hasn’t helped? The fact that the political room to manoeuvre on a national scale has become seriously limited by the deepening of the European Union. As Chatham House has argued in a research paper on ‘The political economy of populism in Europe’, the rise of populism, to the detriment of established parties, is a reaction to the distributional conflicts resulting from ‘hyperglobalization’. It connects its drivers to specific economic and political contexts. ‘Among other factors, it finds that different types of populist protest tend to develop depending on whether the shocks from hyperglobalization are primarily to trade or financial markets, or manifest primarily as sudden increases in immigration’ (Manow, 2021; Rodrik, 2011).

Moreover, the serious challenges that social democracy is facing must be met by a weakened political leadership and representatives that have changed considerably in the past decades. In the period of pillarisation, the best and brightest of the emancipation movements rose to leading positions, rooted in society; afterwards, the recruiting ground has narrowed down to the small circle of high-educated party members, usually with a background in the public sector. The

best and brightest tend to choose career paths outside politics, not inside, resulting in a drop of quality. One of the effects is that parliament is lacking authoritative politicians with profound knowledge of their field. Long-term leadership is out of fashion. Since Den Uyl and Kok, who covered the period from 1967 to 2002 together, the PvdA has changed leadership seven times, recently in 2022 when Attje Kuiken became the leader of the parliamentary group. From Den Uyl to Kuiken: it is *plus qu'un pas*.

A magical future?

Whether it was their attitude towards their core electorate, the content of their policies, the incapacity to recognize and bridge new cleavages, or their isolation under the cheese dome of policymaking, social democrats have neglected the essentials. Together with the Christian democrats they have long been the buttresses of the post-war political settlement in Western Europe. They were the proud pillars of the European welfare states and the European middle-class societies. Their decline is not comforting at a time of multi-speed societal transition with fragmentation, polarisation, post-industrialisation, mass migration, and new inequalities combined with a lack of political leadership able to maintain the balance between tradition and innovation.

The question remains why the PvdA performed so much worse than some of its sister parties. We suggest a few explanations:

1. The Dutch political and electoral system is extremely open. There are no thresholds for parties to be elected and no districts with a first-past-the-post system. The Dutch system is genuinely and completely representative and proportional. The result is a multi-multi-multiparty system with an *embar-rass de choix* for voters and a fierce competition for parties. At the 2021 elections, 17 political parties were represented in the House of Representatives, occupying together the total of 150 seats. In the municipal council of Rotterdam, 14 parties are present. As traditional party affiliation and loyalty have weakened, voters have every opportunity to switch to another party of their liking. Newcomers can easily gain a seat, e.g., in 2021, some 70,000 votes sufficed for a seat in parliament. This

is what we would call fine-tuning on the supply side of party politics.

2. Fragmentation of the political landscape has thus occurred on the right side as well as on the left side. However, the left side of the political spectrum has not grown and has remained in a minority position, making coalition politics unavoidable. In the first decades after World War II, the social democrats and the Christian democrats could reach a compromise over the construction of the welfare state, but since the 1980's, the PvdA only found coalition partners either in Christian democrats or in its traditional opponent, the liberal party VVD – with or without the progressive liberals of D66. Inevitably, coalition politics drew the social democrats to the right in a more neoliberal direction, participating in governments with the CDA from 1989–1994 and 2007–2010, and with the VVD from 1994–2002 and 2012–2019. Especially the ‘purple’ coalitions with the VVD had disastrous electoral results for the PvdA, alienating its traditional electorate and opening political space for populist movements as well.
3. In the third place, and now we're beginning to skate on thinner ice, Holland is a small country with an open economy, economically and mentally situated between the Continent and the Anglo-Saxon world. The political and business world has been inclined to adapt to the forces of globalization – if not to embrace them – rather than to slow down or mitigate the effects of the new economic and financial order. Policy competition became an important instrument to promote and safeguard the national interests in the international arena – and Dutch social democracy followed suit. Could it be that Dutch social democracy has been inclined to follow the liberal Anglo-Saxon-oriented mainstream more than for example the French or the Germans have done? Thereby losing its social-democratic authenticity, a distinctive position – and most of its electorate?

Maybe – the ice is getting even thinner – there is also a more sociological explanation. In Dutch society, there is a strong undercurrent of detraditionalisation. The rigid pillarisation model was

followed by the cultural explosion of the 1960s/70s and the rapid rise of a post-industrial knowledge-based economy, causing a strong liberal-oriented individualism, certainly among the potential PvdA electorate. This, in combination with the emergence of a migration based-multicultural society, seems to have ended attachment to traditional people's parties, the emancipation vehicles of the grandparents.

The severely downsized PvdA now has hopes of political survival or even regaining a substantial power position by close cooperation, even merger, with the GreenLeft. It may be helpful to redress the generational imbalance and to become one of the bigger parties in the Netherlands again (Rekker and De Lange, 2021). The basic question is: will this solve its existential electoral and programmatic problems? It will certainly not bring back the lost voters who feel they have been let down; they have found a destination elsewhere, mostly in the populist camp. Will there be a magical future for Dutch social democracy? Some ten years ago, we had slight hopes that by a Houdini-act, the PvdA would be able to liberate itself and rise again. Now, we're not so sure about it anymore.

References

- Arndt, Christoph and Kees van Kersbergen (2013). Social democracy after the Third Way: restoration or renewal. *Policy & Politics* 43 (2): 203-220.
- Becker, Frans (2021). Kortsluiting. De Partij van de Arbeid en de Wiardi Beckman Stichting, pp. 18-26 in Carla Van Baalen, Alexander Van Kessel, Tom-Jan Meeus, Jan Ramakers and Diederik Smit (eds.), *Wetenschap en politiek. Jaarboek Parlementaire Geschiedenis 2021*. Amsterdam: Boom.
- Becker, Frans and René Cuperus (2003). De partijpolitieke paradox. Partijen tussen onmacht en almacht, pp. 23-62 in Frans Becker, Wim van Hennekeler, Monika Sie Dhian Ho and Bart Tromp (eds.), *Politieke partijen op drift. Het vierentwintigste jaarboek voor het democratisch socialisme*. Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers/Wiardi Beckman Stichting.
- Becker, Frans and René Cuperus (2007). De sociaal-democratische spagaat, pp. 19-66 in Frans Becker and René Cuperus (eds.), *Verloren slag. De PvdA en de verkiezingen van november 2006*. Amsterdam: Mets & Schilt/Wiardi Beckman Stichting.
- Becker, Frans, René Cuperus and Paul Kalma (1999). *Memorandum derde weg*. Amsterdam: Wiardi Beckman Stichting.
- Becker, Frans, Wim Van Hennekeler, Monika Sie Dhian Ho and Bart Tromp (eds.) (2004). *Rotterdam. Het vijfentwintigste jaarboek voor het democ-*

- ratisch socialisme*. Amsterdam: Mets & Schilt/Wiardi Beckman Stichting.
- Benedetto, Giacomo, Simon Hix and Nicolo Mastrococo (2020). The rise and fall of social democracy, 1918-2017. *American Political Science Review* 114 (3): 928-939.
- Cuperus, René (1995). De Bermuda-driehoek van beleid. *Socialisme en Democratie* 52 (11): 493.
- Cuperus, René (2009). *De wereldburger bestaat niet. Waarom de opstand der elites de samenleving ondermijnt*, Amsterdam: Prometheus.
- Cuperus, René and Johannes Kandel (eds.) (2001). *European social democracy: Transformation in progress*. Amsterdam: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung/Wiardi Beckman Stichting/Renner Instituut.
- de Voogd, Josse and René Cuperus (2021). *Atlas van afgehaakt Nederland. Over buitenstaanders en gevestigden*.
- de Waele, Jean-Michel, Fabien Escalona and MathieuVieira (eds.) (2013). *The Palgrave handbook of social democracy in the European Union*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Green-Pederson, Christoffer, Kees van Kersbergen and Anton Hemerijck (2001). Neo-liberalism, the 'third way' or what? Recent social democratic welfare policies in Denmark and the Netherlands. *Journal of European Public Policy* 8 (2): 307-325.
- Hellema, Duco and Margriet van Lith (2020). *Dat hadden we nooit moeten doen. De PvdA en de neoliberale revolutie van de jaren negentig*. Amsterdam: Prometheus.
- Houtman, Dick, Peter Achterberg and Anton Derks (2008). *Farewell to the leftist working class*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschieer and Timotheos Frey (2006). Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Six European countries compared. *European Journal of Political Research* 45 (6): 921-956.
- Mair, Peter (2013). *Ruling the void: The hollowing of Western democracy*. London and New York: Verso.
- Manow, Philip (2021). *The political economy of populism in Europe. Hyperglobalization and the heterogeneity of protest movements*. London: Chatham House.
- Merkel, Wolfgang, Alexander Petring, Christian Henkes and Christoph Egle (2008). *Social democracy in power: The capacity to reform*. London and New York: Routledge.
- NRC (2023). Podcast Sjoerd de Jong interviewt Kjell Noordzij. March 22.
- Rekker, Roderik and Sarah de Lange (2021). De vergrijzing van de PvdA: oorzaken en oplossingen. *Socialisme en Democratie* 78 (6): 14-24.

- Rodrik, Dani (2011). *The globalization paradox: Why global markets, states and democracy can't coexist*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sie Dhian Ho, Monika (2013). *Van waarde. Sociaal-democratie voor de eenentwintigste eeuw*. Amsterdam: Van Genneep.
- van den Berg, J.Th.J. (1985). Democratie onder de kaasstolp. *Socialisme en democratie* 42 (1): 3-11.
- van Kersbergen, Kees (1994). Socialisme, sociaal-democratie en het Den Uyl-socialisme. De Nederlandse sociaal-democratie en het denken over de verzorgingsstaat, pp. 32-55 in Jet Bussemaker et al. (eds.), *De verzorgingsstaat tussen individualisme en solidariteit*. Amsterdam: Wiardi Beckman Stichting.
- van Kersbergen, Kees (1995). *Social capitalism: A study of Christian democracy and the welfare state*. London and New York: Routledge.
- van Kersbergen, Kees (2011). De christendemocratische feniks en de moderne, niet-seculiere politiek, pp. 197-216 in Gerrit Voerman (ed.), *De conjunctuur van de macht. Het Christen Democratisch Appèl 1980-2010*. Amsterdam: Boom.
- van Kersbergen, Kees and André Krouwel (2003). De buitenlanderskwestie in de politiek in Europa, pp. 188-218 in Huib Pelikaan and Margo Trapenburg (eds.), *Politiek in de multiculturele samenleving. Jaarboek Beleid & Maatschappij 2003*. Meppel: Boom.
- van Praag, Philip (2016). Van kiezers en campagnes. De electorale ontwikkeling van de PvdA, pp. 99-125 in Frans Becker and Gerrit Voerman (eds.), *Zeventig jaar Partij van de Arbeid*. Amsterdam: Boom.
- van Westerloo, Gerard (2002). Opstand tegen de Socialen. *Socialisme en Democratie* 59 (10/11): 12-17.
- van Westerloo, Gerard (2003). *Niet spreken met de bestuurder*. Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij.
- Wolinetz, Steven B. (2016). Sociaaldemocratie in tijden van globalisering. De PvdA in internationaal vergelijkend perspectief, pp. 277-308 in Frans Becker and Gerrit Voerman (eds.), *Zeventig jaar Partij van de Arbeid*. Amsterdam: Boom.