Scandinavian Immigrant Integration Politics: Varieties of the Civic Turn

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Today, all West European nation states face multicultural populations and cannot avoid answering new and challenging questions about social cohesion. By the early 1990s, this awareness began to grab hold of national debates, following successive waves of immigration beginning with the import of foreign labour during the economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s and, subsequently taking the form of primarily family reunification and refugees in 1980s and 1990s (Castles and Miller 2009, chap. 5). Whether or not true, a common perception gradually developed throughout the liberal democracies of Western Europe that the integration of immigrants and their children had failed; an understanding that continues to dominate today. Statistics and stories of unemployment, residential segregation, crime, illiberal cultural practices, and Muslim radicalisation have routinely filled national media, and many politicians continue to struggle to formulate good answers to what went wrong, how to remedy it, and how to stop it being reproduced among new immigrants and the second generation. In this process, especially multiculturalism—although the meaning attached to the term varies—has received bad press and been widely pictured as furnishing poor, if not downright destructive, solutions (Ossewaarde 2014; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010).

According to how and which phenomena are framed as problematic from the perspective of integration, policy responses will vary in both design and which spheres of societal life are targeted most adamantly. Immigrant integration is something that potentially cuts across most areas of society, from access to citizenship, how schooling is arranged, anti-discrimination law, church-state relations, workfare programmes to civil society organisations and sport clubs. However, it is arguably the requirements guarding access to permanent residence and citizenship that have received most attention in recent integration policy research.[1] One particularly strong tendency has been the increased use of so-called 'civic integration' policies since the late 1990s (Goodman 2010; 2014). The defining feature of these policies is that they

[1] This is evident in the boom of citizenship and integration policy indices that have been developed over the past 15 to 20 years. As Goodman (2015) states in a review of these indices, 'While all indices include citizenship policy, it is easy to discern exclusive citizenship measures (CPI, BNI, CITLAW, and Fitzgerald et al., 2014) from broader integration measures (legal obstacles to inclusion [LOI], MIPEX, ICRI, multicultural policy index [MCP]), in which citizenship is but one component' (2005, 1912).

condition entry, permanent residence, citizenship, and family reunification on speaking the language of the host country, having knowledge of liberal values and the country's history, culture, and institutions, or being economically self-sufficient.[2] Instruments such as tests, courses, and contracts have proliferated to make good, self-sufficient citizens out of immigrants. Christian Joppke, who popularised the concept of civic integration, argues that West European countries are in fact converging, not just around these policies but also around what they express; that is, a certain liberal, non-nationalistic philosophy of integration, which he occasionally terms 'repressive liberalism' because of its disciplining character and perfectionist view of the good liberal citizen (Joppke 2007a; 2007b). As a result, national differences are disappearing and, with them, the imprint of nationalism and 'old' national models of immigrant integration on policy-making. Obviously, one cannot infer from policy developments within one policy area of immigrant integration to how they develop within others. Indeed, Joppke also argues that convergence is taking place within anti-discrimination law (Joppke 2007b, 254-67; 2010, 106-10).[3]

Against this, Per Mouritsen (2008; 2013) has argued that the turn towards civic integration—the 'civic turn' as he terms it—represents a broader *culturalisation* of politics that reproduces old differences, although know restated within particular national vocabularies of civic nationalism. Moreover, other authors have argued that the civic conditioning of permanent residence and naturalisation is not a paradigmatic shift away from nationalism and multiculturalism but should instead be understood as something layered on top of how immigration and cultural diversity have traditionally been approached through other kinds of policies related to, for example, the labour market, schooling or the civil society (Banting and Kymlicka 2013; Neer and Modood 2009; Kostakopolou 2010; Mouritsen and Olsen 2013). Because civic integration policies are simply instruments that can be designed and put to use in a range of different ways, there is no inherent tension between them and different nationalist variants of multiculturalism, republicanism, or assimilationism. The strong variation in how countries have actually used and

[2] Whether the concept of civic integration is seen to include requirements about economic self-sufficiency varies. Christian Joppke stresses the economic aspect as central (2007a, 268-69) whereas Sarah Wallace Goodman, who has in many ways carried the torch further, leaves out economic requirements of her definition (2014: 1). Stadlmair (2015) details the increased use of requirements regarding employment and unemployment benefits.

[3] Joppke also briefly mentions a 'neoliberal-cum-cosmopolitan' trend in public school curricula (2008, 536). Ove K. Pedersen (2010) tells a similar story about developments within the Danish educational system.

designed civic integration policies, including the underlying political intent, suggests that this claim is, at the very least, equally plausible (Goodman 2012, 688-89). Nationalism and national models might very well have retained, or perhaps even reconquered, a strong presence in national policy-making—albeit now veiled by nationhood being almost uniformly expressed in a liberal universalist register.

This sets the stage for the research question of this thesis; namely: Why have Denmark, Sweden and Norway[4] diverged in their policy responses to cultural pluralism and the general sense of integration failure? Since the late 1990s, the three countries have gone in different directions regarding their use of civic integration requirements and how they publicly debate questions of immigrant integration. Regardless of which index we consult—MIPEX, CIVIX, MCP or ICRI—the same picture emerges (see Table 1.1). In a West European context, Denmark has developed one of the most restrictive integration regimes; Sweden has barely changed its (now) exceptionally permissive policies, while Norway has taken a middle road. Besides investigating permanent residence and naturalisation policies in all three countries, the study takes a closer look at Danish and Swedish citizenship education policies for primary and lower secondary schooling. Including more policy areas of immigrant integration enables a deeper appreciation of whether a certain coherence and character can be ascribed to the civic turn in a country.

Comparing the Scandinavian countries presents us with a puzzle. How can it be that three countries who share rather similar comprehensive, universal welfare states, political systems[5] and traditions of political consensus, and a commitment to being culturally progressive in matters of sexuality, gender equality, and life style[6] have approached immigrant integration so differently? Throughout the world, the Scandinavian welfare states are praised as models of progress and modernity. At least that is what citizens of

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[4] In this thesis, the term 'Scandinavia' is used to denote Denmark, Sweden and Norway. This is the normal use of the term in these three countries. In English-speaking countries, the term often also includes Finland and Iceland. However, when these two countries are included, the group is referred to as the 'Nordic countries' in Danish, Swedish and Norwegian terminology.

[5] Despite being challenged by new far-right parties, green parties, and Christian parties in the last 30 to 40 years, the major established parties of the Scandinavian party system remain dominant (Sundberg 2002). These 'are organized around three poles: labor (social democratic parties), capital (conservative parties), rural periphery and urban center (agrarian parties = center parties)' (Sundberg 1999, 221).

[6] See, for example, Borchhorst and Siim (2008), Lappi-Seppälä (2007), and Merin (2002, chap. 3).

the three countries have heard reiterated for many years in one national debate after the other. The ability of the Scandinavian welfare state to combine economic growth, high levels of social mobility, and low levels of class and gender inequality is portrayed as a unique historical accomplishment,[7] almost in disregard of nature as when economists compare it to the bumblebee that ought to be incapable of flight given its weight and wing size. However, just as more sophisticated aerodynamic analysis has by now explained why the bumblebee can fly, so have economists and political scientists argued that the Scandinavian welfare state rests on a foundation of high levels of trust and solidarity, low levels of unemployment, and high levels of taxation (Andersen 2004). Especially trust and solidarity have been emphasised as the secret ingredients that make citizens accept a strong, interventionist state that requires a large portion of the national income to help secure a large work force, employment, and equality (Bergh and Bjørnskov 2011; Svendsen and Svendsen 2016). However, it is far from settled what the main source of trust and solidarity actually is. Broadly speaking, there are two sides to the debate: those who stress cultural homogeneity and those who believe that well-functioning institutions, low unemployment, and equality can cultivate trust and solidarity by themselves (Borevi forthcoming; Delhey and Newton 2005; Kumlin and Rothstein 2005; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). However, since the Scandinavian countries both have a history of culturally homogeneity and have developed well-functioning, comprehensive welfare states without much corruption, this debate remains unsettled for now.

The very real fear is that the globalisation of markets and immigration is slowly but surely eroding the ground beneath the pillars of the welfare state. Immigration has introduced considerable ethno-cultural heterogeneity into the Scandinavian societies as well as an increase in low-skilled labour. At the same time, globalisation has increased the mobility of capital and goods, which is pushing low-skilled jobs towards countries with low wages as well as high-skilled jobs and companies towards countries with low taxes. Thus, there is reason to be alarmed regardless of whether or not one believes that cultural homogeneity lies at the heart of the robustness of welfare state institutions. It goes without saying that the structural squeeze of globalisation and immigration is to some extent felt by most Western economies; yet, the Scandinavian welfare states are particularly vulnerable because of their comparatively strong redistributive schemes and high wages.

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[7] This also corresponds with the three countries clustering in a European context when it comes to low poverty rates, high gender equality, comprehensive social and unemployment policies and expenditure on activation measures (Jochem 2011; Johansson and Hvinden 2007; Kautto et al. 2001).

Did Denmark—and less so Norway—simply succumb to this structural pressure, while Sweden was able to withstand it? This thesis argues that it did not. Instead, the argument developed throughout these pages—and in the five papers of the dissertation—is that these differences in large part follow different ideas about nationhood and social cohesion that tie in with the perception of the capacity of the welfare state to integrate newcomers *but also* party politics. Explaining national policy differences with different conceptions of the nation is common within research on immigrant integration politics; often, as part of theoretical national models of immigrant integration. Immigration and a growing group of non-European residents without citizenship quite naturally catalyse reflections on the character of the nation, when newcomers have deserved naturalisation, and what room there is for their cultural differences in society. In this process, old notions of nationhood might be challenged (especially by universal liberal values) or, what this part of the literature claims, reaffirmed. Especially the distinction between ethno-cultural (often just termed ethnic) and civic nationhood has been pervasive part of discussions within the field. For example, Roger Brubaker's seminal book *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* from 1992, which most regard as a founding book of the field, argued that Germany's restrictive naturalisation policies relied on an ethno-cultural understanding of the nation, while France's more permissive policies expressed a civic assimilationist idea of nationhood. This distinction also guides most comparative studies of the Scandinavian countries. Here, Danish policies are described as based on a mainly ethno-cultural conception of nationhood, Swedish policies on a mainly civic conception and Norwegian policies as reflecting an ambivalent conception of the nation somewhere in between (Borevi 2010; Brochmann and Hagelund 2010; Brochmann and Seland 2010). This distinction is just as criticised as it is used. One particularly salient problem is that it fails to capture how civic and liberal any talk about the nation really is in any of the three countries—in all of Western Europe for that matter. The horrific acts of the Second World War, the increasing institutionalisation of human rights, and the celebrated fights for equality by civic rights movements have pushed ethno-cultural homogeneity as a public policy goal to the fringes of the radical right. There simply is no legitimate room for an overt ethno-cultural idiom of nationhood in contemporary liberal-democratic politics (Hansen and Koehler 2005; Joppke 2010, chap. 4; Soysal 1994). Case in point, several studies conclude that successful far-right parties predominantly appeal to the defence of Western and national liberal values instead of ethno-cultural homogeneity when calling for exclusionary measures—typically individualism, secularism, and gender equality (see, e.g., Akkerman 2005; Betz and Meret 2009; Halikiopoulou, Mock and Vasilopou-

lou 2013). Consequently, the ethnic-civic distinction does not provide us with the tools to build an adequate explanation of Scandinavian differences. If we still want to contend that the widespread trumpeting of liberal-democratic values actually hides important national differences connected to different conceptions of nationhood, then at least we need to show one of two things: *either* that these liberal-democratic values are understood or prioritised differently *or* that there are other dimensions of nationhood. This thesis argues that the Scandinavian differences can in large part be attributed to different ideas about the socialisation processes that individuals and collectivities have to undergo in order to cultivate strong national identities and cohesion; ideas that relate to a process dimension of nationhood that is independent of a content dimension that denotes the specific values and norms attached to nationhood. The separation of these two ideational dimensions of nationhood is inspired by Oliver Zimmer's (2003) critique of the ethnic-civic distinction and Adrian Favell's (2001; 2006) concept of national philosophies of integration.

The overall argument is that Swedish integration politics has predominantly been structured by a (individually and collectively) voluntarist notion of nationhood that imagines national identity formation as a process of collective negotiation, institution-building, and individual choice. This has and continues to be a controversial view in Danish politics, which has mainly been structured by a (individually and collectively) deterministic notion of nationhood in which the national identity is pictured as a historically determined construct only accessible to newcomers by being embedded in a normal Danish everyday life. This continues to be a controversial argument in Swedish politics. Norwegian integration politics, on the other hand, has been more ambivalent—perhaps even confused—giving expression to more moderate versions of both kinds of arguments.

These ideological differences are quite stable and do cut across the left-right divide to some extent. Still, the stabilisation of policy-making around these ideas also owes a certain amount to the dynamics of party competition. Often, such stabilisation is argued to follow from the strategic interaction of parties. The concern for votes have a centripetal force on especially the major bloc parties, while a concern for office necessitates some level of agreement with coalitional partners and the parliamentary supporters. Yet, the argument here—inspired by the work of Pontus Odmalm (2011; 2014)—is that it can have just as much to do with ideology. Parties that experience ideological tension or blindness on immigrant integration issues will tend to de-emphasise the issue in order not to risk internal fragmentation and publicly exposing themselves, whereas parties who are ideologically clarified and

committed cannot deviate from that path without risking their trustworthiness and internal fragmentation.

Specifically, the Danish Social Democrats (*Socialdemokraterne*), the major party of the left, have been troubled by ideological blindness (a novel concept that describes one kind of ideological tension) on questions of nationhood. This has left them with little room or ability to counter a right-wing bloc in concert on a deterministic notion of nationhood. However, their ideological blindness also expanded their strategic space to adopt the policies of the centre-right parties in order to try to defuse the prominence of integration issues in the political debate. Conversely, the Swedish Social Democrats (*Socialdemokraterna*), along with the rest of the left-wing parties, have been rather ideologically clarified and committed, while the centre-right parties have largely abstained from contesting this ideological standpoint and politicise immigrant integration issues. Especially the Conservative Party (*Moderaterna*), the major party of the Swedish right, have shown signs of ideological tension. In Norway, most mainstream parties have developed a consensus around a public philosophy of integration that displays an inherent tension where the culturally inclusiveness of nationhood has to be actively developed, *while* the same nationhood is pictured as difficult to access for newcomers who have not been raised in the Norwegian nation state. This ideological tension has helped to defuse certain immigrant integration issues, such as permanent residence and naturalisation, and deter policy-making.

The chapters to come will spell out this argument in more detail. Before we get so far the following sections will discuss the civic integrationist turn and give an overview of recent developments in the Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish policies before outlining the dissertation.

1.1 The civic integrationist turn

As touched upon, it is not entirely clear what civic integration denotes. Is it a certain kind of policy instrument that condition immigrant access to various legal statuses on meeting specific requirements, or is it a liberal perfectionist, non-nationalistic philosophy of integration—or is it both? It is clear that since the late 1990s, there has been an increased use of formalised integration requirements among West European countries pertaining to language, knowledge, and employment that guard access to entry, permanent residence, citizenship, and, in some cases, also family reunification. However, the problem with just making it about the use of certain policy instruments is that they can be designed in different ways and embody a range of different intentions. Goodman (2010; 2014) has meticulously documented how countries vary in the type of requirements they introduce, if any, and how intro-

duced requirements differ considerably in terms of which legal statuses the requirement covers, how early and how many times in the integration process it is used, and how demanding it is to fulfil.[8] Stadlmair (2015) provides a similar overview for the use of economic requirements.

A language requirement, for example, can be constructed in many ways. It could be set at either permanent residence or citizenship, or both. It could be nothing more than a mandatory course or a test that must be passed, or both. The test could demand different levels of proficiency, and finally, whether it is the immigrant or the state that pays for language courses could differ. The array of ways in which an integration requirement can be constructed makes it apparent that it is untenable to assume that a language requirement automatically expresses a specific kind of reasoning; especially, considering the often strong spill-over effect between the different spheres of integration— economic, cultural, social, and political. Being employed can also facilitate interaction that brings the person in question in closer contact with or to a better understanding of the cultural, social, and political life of the community—and vice versa; that is, even an integration requirement concerning employment can embody cultural, social, and political considerations.

In fact, if we restrict our focus to civic integration requirements, it is not clear that we can even talk of convergence. As Goodman (2014) demonstrates, before the turn towards such instruments in the mid-to-late 1990s, most countries had no formalised civic integration requirements attached to permanent residence and citizenship. Therefore, the turn has not been a move towards increasing similarity. The West European states were already highly similar in not having civic integration requirements. At most, it has been a move from one type of similarity to another. However, when we study the many ways in which civic integration requirements have been put to use in different states, then we could also make the argument that divergence is a more correct description of how West European states have come to approach immigrant integration over time.

Conversely, if the civic integrationist turn is only about convergence around a specific philosophy of integration, then we should expect it to have an effect on all policies trying to further the integration of immigrants. Consequently, analyses arguing that liberal convergence is taking place should expand their focus and look beyond the citizenship trajectory that immi-

[8] Similar overviews of national civic integration policies are provided by Rea and Jacobs (2007) and van Oers, Ersbøll, and Kostakopoulou (2010).

grants face. Unfortunately, only few studies have taken this road so far.[9] Hence, almost all talk about civic integration refers to rules guarding the attainment of residence and citizenship. Interestingly, if civic integration is defined as purely ideational, then it could quite well be consistent with the different uses and designs of integration requirements that we witness considering that such relatively abstract notions have to be filtered through the historical, institutional, and party-political peculiarities of different national contexts before they are expressed in concrete policies. The argument then is that the basic ideas and intentions behind these policies are what earn them the label 'civic integration', not their more specific design. Consequently, any policy instrument could in theory be civic integrationist if the intentions behind its use correspond to the civic integrationist philosophy of integration.[10]

Christian Joppke, at least, stresses the ideational aspect of civic integration. He claims that recent integration policy developments owe little to nationhood and, instead, reflect a citizenship construct that 'is liberal, individual-centred rather than group-centred, and non-discriminatory' (Joppke 2008b, 3). However, civic integration exposes a fundamental tension within liberalism between the tolerance of religious and cultural diversity and the cultivation of good, autonomous citizens who can withstand illiberal practices. Joppke (2007a; 2007b) terms the first Rawlsian liberalism and the second Foucauldian liberalism, while Triadafilopoulos (2011) prefers to talk about Reformation liberalism and Enlightment liberalism. The turn to civic integration reflects a shift of emphasis towards Enlightment or Foucauldian liberalism, according to which the state increasingly takes it upon itself to discipline immigrants into becoming autonomous, liberal-minded, and self-sufficient citizens. Consequently, the illiberal, restrictive impulse of civic integration policies originates from within liberalism itself, 'which may be depicted in terms of the liberal state as one for liberal people only' (Joppke 2007a, 15). Joppke points to several factors pushing this ideational convergence: a broad modernisation of Western societies, the codification of hu-

[9] Two exemptions are Joppke (2007b; 2010) who also focuses on anti-discrimination policies, and Mouritsen and Olsen (2013) include school policies in their analysis of Denmark

[10] A possible counter-argument would be that there is a certain civic integrationist essence to policies that condition access to residence and citizenship, meaning that such policies can express something else than the political intentions behind them. This could make sense along the lines of distinguishing the consequences of policies from their intentions. Yet, what we want to understand when analysing integration politics is *why* certain policies are chosen over others. If, e.g., conceptions of nationhood drive states to choose different policies, then those differences express different conceptions of nationhood.

man rights and EU soft law, but perhaps most importantly, the pressure of globalisation that keeps the eyes of West Europe firmly focused on the economy of immigration (Joppke 2007a; 2007b; 2008a). Above all, integration requirements are introduced to facilitate the transition of newcomers into the national labour market in order to lessen the financial strain on the welfare state.

Joppke (2008a) concedes that civic integration policies are often proposed and implemented in a public debate concerned with national belonging and identity. However, national identity is inevitably imagined around the same set of universal, liberal-democratic values and norms. This he terms the 'paradox of universalism' because abstract, universal values cannot be used to single out the particularity of a nation and, hence, be the basis of national cohesion and belonging.[11] Instead, what is really being promoted is a liberal identity. Although Joppke recognises that there are still significant policy differences between countries, he argues that this cannot be because of how national politicians *today* differ in their understanding of nationhood. Instead, he points to incoherent and hodge-podge decision-making, coalition bargaining, government ideology, and a successful radical right party (Joppke 2008b).

Although sympathetic to Joppke's analysis, Sarah Wallace Goodman (2010, 2012, 2014) presents a different story. In her thorough study of the EU-15 states, she argues that national approaches to immigrant integration are indeed resilient and that civic integration policies are perpetuating differences that also existed before the late 1990s. That is, states tend to use and design civic integration policies in ways that reflect and fortify their citizenship legacies or what Goodman terms 'the effects of citizenship policy starting points' (2014, 8). These legacies affect the aim of conditioning citizenship. In countries such as Denmark and Austria, the policies have an exclusionary aim, while the UK has used them to maintain and promote an inclusive, liberal citizenship (Goodman 2012, 688-89). So where Joppke sees convergence, Goodman sees path dependence. However, to Goodman, this path dependence reflects an early institutionalisation of more distinct conceptions of nationhood that is largely absent from recent political debates. However, they keep influencing current decisions indirectly through the existing policies that sets the parameters of the debate. It is an argument about the causal role that previous rules have on subsequent rules (Goodman 2014, 78), and as such, it is not an ideational explanation. This, she claims, is evidence of the resilient, yet, adaptive nature of nation states. In her view, im-

[11] This argument appears in much of Joppke's work. See, e.g., Joppke 2005, 56–57; 2007c, 44–46; 2008a; 2010, 113–137; 2013, 599–601.

migration has created ethnically diverse European societies, disrupting any myths of cultural homogeneity, and catalysed states to rethink what it means to be part of the nation. Similar to Joppke, she argues that national identity is becoming an obsolete notion in West European immigrant integration policies and that what politicians concern themselves with is in fact a liberal *state* identity (as she terms it). To her, civic integration 'articulates new expectations for belonging' that are similar to the sense of belonging that Jürgen Habermas' constitutional patriotism prescribes. That is, the identity that unites persons residing within the state territory must be based on attachment to the core norms and values of liberal democracy as they have been institutionalised through the unique history of the nation state in question. This is a type of collective identity that it based on a logic of togetherness, unlike national identity, which she describes as based on a logic of sameness that significantly narrows the space for cultural diversity (Goodman 2014, 30). Only out of lack of better terms does she, with regret, resort to calling it nation-building. However, she adds that 'it is nation-building in the least "national" way imaginable' (Goodman 2014, 35).

The second part of Goodman's argument is that against the backdrop of existing rules, the ideological orientation of government produce changes in different directions. The political left will pursue more inclusive policies, while the political right will pursue more restrictive policies. These policy changes will have an incremental character because politicians orient themselves within the existing rules. Consequently, the main difference between Joppke and Goodman is the emphasis on existing institutional structures for how civic integration policies are designed.

Goodman's contribution to the field is without question important. She has provided the discussion with strong evidence of the empirical variation of civic integration policies and, not least, how this variation tends to coincide with the exclusiveness of how nationhood has historically been conceived in different states. However, the claim by both her and Joppke that civic integration policies represent a break with nationalism is questionable. They both seem to have an understanding of nationalism as necessarily ethno-cultural—that is, as essentially about ascriptive attributes—and therefore do not engage with its civic or republican variants. It is simply unclear why civic integration policies cannot reflect a form of civic nationalism. The argument that civic integration is about commitment to universal values open to everyone regardless of ethnic or religious background does not bring them very far. Civic nationalism and republican patriotism, by most accounts, bases national unity on identification with a territorially delimited civic culture that is highly bounded by liberal-democratic values (Laborde 2002; Miller

1995; Viroli 1997).[12] Moreover, the fact that they are universal values does not disqualify them as socially effective markers of national identity (Lægaard 2007). We have little reason to think that citizens have more trouble identifying themselves with a nation because it defines itself in civic terms; even if it makes it hard to distinguish it from other nations.[13] Moreover, it is not hard to theorise or empirically find different versions of such civic nationalism, just as it is no secret that liberalism itself comes in many shades varying in how the good, liberal citizen is conceived (Freeden 2005). Joppke himself seems well aware of such differences as he usefully distinguishes a 'soft' tolerance-and-equal treatment liberalism, found in Britain, from a more civic perfectionist version, found in republican France, and an individualist and modernist 'hyper liberalism', found in Denmark and the Netherlands (Joppke 2010, 140). This might reflect different understandings of liberal values but also prioritisation. Liberal values can stand in a tense relationship, and sometimes outright conflict, resulting in their prioritisation against each turning out differently in different contexts. Finally, and this is part of the central argument of this study, we can also try to look below the liberal-democratic values and norms used to define national belonging and investigate the empirical assumptions about national identity formation prevalent in national politics.[14] There might be broad agreement across Western nation states about the prioritisation and understanding of liberal-democratic values and, at the same time, highly different views on how demanding it is for an individual to take on the image of the good citizen or whether it is possible to collectively renegotiate this ideational state if need be. One might even say that this more clearly relates to how feasible the politicians of a country thinks it is for a nation state to change newcomers and the national collective in order to maintain a sense of national cohesion.

The preceding discussion has sketched where this study places itself in the larger debate within the field. The following provides a brief overview of how the Scandinavian countries have developed their policies towards immigrants and their children within the two policy areas that this thesis focuses on; first, permanent residence and naturalisation in all three countries and then, citizenship education in Denmark and Sweden.

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[12] On some accounts, civic nationalism is an attempt to put nationalism beyond the reach of government and 'depoliticise matter of national identity' (Levey 2014: 178). This is not how it is used in this thesis.

[13] This argument is spelled out in detail in the article *Paradox* (see section 1.4).

[14] Similarly, Elaine R. Thomas argues, in her study of France, Germany, and Britain, that we should supplement 'existing accounts with greater attention to the shared objectives and *causal beliefs* that increasingly influence citizenship policies (2006, 237; my emphasis).

1.2 Comparing Scandinavian policy developments

Since the late 1990s, the Scandinavian countries have diverged in their use of integration requirements for permanent residence, citizenship, and family reunification. As illustrated by four different indices in the table below, Danish policies as a whole can be argued to constitute the most restrictive in Western Europe today. Since the introduction of the Integration Act in 1998, the Danish integration requirements have only developed in a more restrictive direction through a long succession of more or less incremental policy changes; especially from 2001 to 2010, when a centre-right coalition governed. In the same period, Sweden has barely changed its policies despite shifting governments, leaving them with probably the most permissive set of policies in Western Europe today. Norway is found somewhere in between, having made a few adjustments to their policies and rejected dual citizenship legislation.

Table 1.1: Scores on four different indices of immigrant integration policy[a]

	Denmark	Sweden	Norway
MIPEX, Access to Nationality (2014, 33 countries)	33.00 (23)	79.00 (2)	41.00 (16)
CIVIX (2014, 16 countries)*	8.25 (16)	0.00 (1)	1.00 (2)[b]
ICRI (2008, 10 countries)	-0.17 (8)	0.51 (1)	0.12 (5)
MCP (2010, 21 countries))	0.00 (21)	7.00 (2)	3.50 (9)

a. Inside the parentheses is the position in relation to the other countries' scores (a top position indicating comparatively open and accommodating policies); outside the parentheses is the index score.
b. In Goodman (2014), only the score for the EU-15 countries is calculated. The score for Norway has been calculated and included here.
Sources: MIPEX (www.mipex.eu), CIVIX (Goodman 2014), ICRI (Koopmans et al. 2012), and MCP (http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/home).

The four indices in the table, although overlapping to some extent, also cover some different aspects of immigrant integration policy. The CIVIX and MIPEX both measure how demanding it is to reach naturalisation after entry, although only MIPEX includes years of residence and dual citizenship in its score, while CIVIX is solely focused on civic integration requirements. This explains why Norway scores differently. Although it requires seven years of residence and dual citizenship is not allowed (although a range of exemptions exist), Norway has not introduced any integration requirements besides making permanent residence conditional upon participation in an integration programme in 2004. The ICRI and MCP are more broad indexes.

The MCP focuses on school policies, cultural and religious rights and affirmative action policies, while the ICRI *also* includes rules for naturalisation, expulsion, and family reunification. Even with these more broad indices, the same picture emerges with Denmark at the bottom, Sweden at the top and Norway in between. Hence, on the face of it, there seems to be significant coherence in how immigrant integration is approached in the three countries—keeping in mind that the ICRI and MCP are highly aggregative.

Looking at how requirements for permanent residence and naturalisation have developed since the late 1990s, Sweden and Norway can be summarised quite quickly in contrast to Denmark, which has undertaken numerous and mostly restrictive policy changes. The following spells out the differences in more detail, while Tables 1.2 and 1.3 provide an overview of three countries' policies in 1995, 2005 and 2015, respectively.[15]

To this day, Sweden has not introduced any civic integration requirements. In fact, permanent residence has been granted automatically to refugees and often also to family members being reunited,[16] which is a stark contrast to the residency requirements in Denmark and Norway, which are five and three years, respectively. After residence has been permitted, a person only has to reside for five years in Sweden before being eligible for naturalisation. Sweden, as Denmark and Norway, does have a comprehensive integration programme that is offered to newcomers.[17] However, unlike Denmark and Norway, participation is voluntary and not tied to access to permanent residence.[18] In fact, Sweden was the first of the three to introduce a comprehensive, formalised integration programme for newcomers in 1991. Denmark followed suit in 1999 and Norway in 2004 (Djuve and Kavli 2007). The most significant policy change in Sweden has been the right to dual citizenship that parliament passed in 2001 (Gustafson 2002). Infrequently, civic

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[15] Some rules are not covered here; specifically, those regarding public debt, expulsion and extension of the residence requirement if convicted of a crime.

[16] However, new temporary measures are close to be passed in parliament, which introduces three-year temporary residence permits for refugees and their family members. This is a reaction to the overwhelming number of refugees that Sweden has received recently. The concluding chapter will take this up for discussion.

[17] Migrants have a *right* but no duty to language and civic orientation courses (for up to a year) and a right to be offered activities and support to improve their ability to become self-sufficient and active members of society (for up to two years).

[18] In practice, however, there is a certain *de facto* mandatory element. If a person has made use of their right to these courses and activities, a lack of participation can be economically sanctioned. Furthermore, migrants can only obtain access to an establishment benefit and a housing benefit if they participate (Wiesbrock 2011: 51-53).

integration requirements have been discussed in Sweden; particularly, a language requirement for naturalisation. The Conservatives have occasionally argued for such a requirement, and the centre-right Liberal Party (*Liberalerna*) successfully made it part of their election campaign in 2002. Moreover, the centre-right government from 2006 to 2014 discussed the possibility of a language bonus in which passing a language test would reduce the number of years of residence required for naturalisation. Still, no law proposal has ever made it to parliament, and the language requirement remains a highly controversial proposal.

What distinguishes Norway from Sweden is that permanent residence is conditioned on completing the integration programme[19], there is no right to dual citizenship and permanent residence requires three years of residence, while naturalisation requires seven years. Permanent residence and naturalisation have not been tied to language tests, civic tests, or economic self-sufficiency.[20] Since the passing of the Introduction Act in 2003 (Ot.prp. nr. 28 2002-03) and the rejection in 2005 of an expert committee's proposal to allow dual citizenship (NOU 2000:32), no significant changes have been made to the rules guarding permanent residence and naturalisation.

The few policy changes in Norway and Sweden stand in sharp contrast to Denmark. Through a long succession of law changes, Denmark has introduced all the different kind of civic integration requirements both at the stage of permanent residence and naturalisation. Moreover, the Danish requirements have become particularly demanding, making it difficult for many newcomers to even achieve permanent residence, let alone citizenship. The requirements for permanent residence were strengthened, first in 1998,

[19] It is a full-time qualification programme that lasts for up to two years (possibility for three years in special cases). Only refugees and reunited family members to refugees and Nordic citizens have both a right and duty to participate in the introduction programme. Labour migrants and their reunited family members from outside the ECC and EFTA have a duty to participate but no right, meaning that they must finance the programme themselves. Migrants staying on ECC and EFTA terms do not have a right or a duty to participate. The programme consists of three components: language, civic orientation and the labour market. In 2005, it was determined that 300 hours of the programme must be assigned to language teaching and civic orientation (local municipalities can assign more). 50 of these hours must be civic orientation in a language that the participant understands. In 2010, it was raised to 600 hours for refugees and reunited family members to refugees (Brochmann and Hagelund 2010, 270-73).

[20] However, in January 2016, a law was proposed that will make naturalisation conditional on passing a language test at the A2 level and a civics test. The law proposal is supported by a strong majority of the parliament.

and then in 2002, 2005, 2006 and 2010. At first, in 2002, the residency requirement was raised from three to seven years and an integration contract and a language requirement at the B1 level were introduced.[21] In 2005, it was made mandatory to sign a Declaration on Active Citizenship and Integration. In 2006, the level of the language test was raised to between B1 and B2, and applicants had to have had ordinary full-time employment for at least 2½ years within the last eight years. In 2010, a demanding point system was introduced according to which one could also receive points for completing a citizenship test. Although the residency requirement here was lowered to four years, the point system with its strong focus on employment, higher education and language proficiency would, in all likelihood, have had the effect of making the waiting period even longer than seven years for most immigrants (LOV nr 572 31/05/2010). The point system, however, was removed again in 2012 by a centre-left government. The residence requirement was raised to five years, the citizenship test was removed, the language requirement was lowered to B1, while the self-sufficiency requirement was changed to three years of full-time education or employment within the last five years.

Turning to the Danish naturalisation requirements, these were strengthened in 2002, 2003, 2005 and 2008, respectively, before also being reduced in 2013 by the centre-left government, only to see them being increased again in 2015 by the new centre-right government (with the support of the Social Democrats). In 2002, the residency requirement was raised from seven to nine years, a language requirement at the B1 level was introduced and subsequently raised to slightly above the B2 level in 2005 and with an additional requirement of a grade average of at least 4.[22, 23] In 2005, a citizenship test was also introduced, which was made more difficult in 2008.[24] Moreover, a self-sufficiency requirement was introduced in 2008, requiring that the applicant must not have received unemployment benefits for more than six months within the last five years. In 2013, these requirements were

[21] In 2003, it was possible to achieve permanent residence after five years if the applicant had been employed for the last three years and had not received any unemployment benefits in that period.

[22] This is 4 on the new 7-scale system in which 4 is the middle grade and 7 is considered an average grade (the scale: -3, 0, 2, 4, 7, 10, 12). In the ordinary school system, you pass the exam if you receive at least 2.

[23] The language test consists of four separate tests; a written, oral, reading and listening test.

[24] Passing the test requires a minimum of 32 correct answers out of 40 questions within 45 minutes. The questions are about society, history, and culture.

slightly reduced,[25] only to be increased again in 2015. Interestingly and seemingly counter to the general direction of policy changes, Denmark implemented a right to dual citizenship in 2015. However, this was done from an emigrant perspective, which was more acceptable in a context of already highly restrictive naturalisation rules.

Table 1.2: Requirements for permanent residence

	Mandatory integration programme			Language test			Citizenship test			Employment or benefits			Years of residence		
	DK	NO	SW	DK	NO	SW	DK	NO	SW	DK	NO	SW	DK	NO	SW
1995	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	0
2005	Yes	Yes	-	B1	-	-	Yes	-	-	-[a]	-	-	7	3	0
2015	Yes	Yes	-	B1	-	-	-	-	-	Yes[b]	-	-	5	3	0

a. From 2006, it was required to have been full-time employed for at least 2½ years within the last eight years.

b. Three years of full-time education or employment within the last five years.

Sources: the legislative acts have been found via the parliamentary websites: www.folketinget.dk, www.riksdagen.se, and www.stortinget.no.

Table 1.3: Requirement for naturalisation

	Language test			Citizenship test			Employment or benefits			Dual citizenship			Years of residence[a]		
	DK	NO	SW	DK	NO	SW	DK	NO	SW	DK	NO	SW	DK	NO	SW
1995	Informal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7/6	7	5/4
2005	B2	-	-	Yes	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Yes	9/8	7	5/4
2015	B2	-	-	Yes	-	-	Yes[b]	-	-	Yes	-	Yes	9/8	7	5/4

a. The number after the slash is the number of years required if you are a refugee.

b. Since 2008, the applicant must not have received unemployment benefits for more than six months within the last five years.

Sources: the legislative acts have been found via the parliamentary websites: www.folketinget.dk, www.riksdagen.se, and www.stortinget.no.

It is important to note that the three countries' requirements are quite similar in 1995. Only Denmark had an informal language test at the naturalisation stage, meaning that a police officer interviewed the applicant to assess

[25] The self-sufficiency requirements were reduced to no more than two and a half years within the last five and the language level was reduced to between B1 and B2 with a grade average of 2.

whether the person had sufficient Danish skills to participate in simple, everyday conversation. Now, this was not a foreign requirement for Norway or Sweden. Both had a similar test that they abandoned in the 1980s because of problems of verification (Brochmann 2010, 49). Apart from that, the only difference between Denmark and Norway on the one hand and Sweden on the other was the duration of the residency requirement. Sweden did not have such a requirement while Denmark and Norway both had a three-year requirement. At the naturalisation stage, seven years of residence were required in Denmark and Norway and five years in Sweden. Now, according to Goodman (2014, 78, 82), these policy differences reflect the previous understandings of nationhood, which have now, implicitly, driven the three countries down different civic integrationist paths. She argues that prior to the civic integrationist turn, rules about the required residency duration, dual citizenship, and the possibilities of *ius soli* can be used as proxies of the earlier, now displaced, understanding of membership in the national community. However, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway had similar rules on dual citizenship and *ius soli*[26] in 1995. Accordingly, they had very similar citizenship orientations or starting points before the turn but have diverged to a striking degree. Following Goodman's framework, this means that the initial citizenship orientation could only have had a strong effect in one of the countries—if at all. This takes us away from a historical institutionalist explanation focused on how existing rules define the political solutions discussed and, as this thesis suggests, towards the actual ideas about nationhood and social cohesion applied by policy-makers in the process of finding solutions. In other words, such ideas have played an active role in the policy-making of the three countries instead of just being historical residue working through the existing rule structure.

The above outline could give the impression that Sweden has been standing resolutely outside the civic integrationist turn. However, that is not the case. An understanding of civic integration requirements as symptoms of a broader *culturalisation* of integration politics entails that they are but one kind of answer to the concerns about nationhood, cultural diversity, and social cohesion that immigration have induced. Different ideas about how these concepts intersect guides policy-makers to formulate different solutions within different policy areas. Indeed, if we expand our analysis to include citizenship education, we can see that Swedish politics has also grown more concerned with how to form good, liberal citizens in the wake of immi-

[26] Ius sanguinis—with some possibilities for naturalisation through notification—have historically been the common principle in Scandinavian citizenship law (Bernitz 2010: 10-12; Brochmann 2010: 8-9; Ersbøll 2010: 12, 24-25).

gration. The predominantly voluntarist perception of the national community widespread in Swedish politics is much more prone to look to schools for solutions—or other areas that are characterised by the interaction between immigrant minorities and the majority—than integration requirements that only target immigrants.

Generally, Swedish school politics has seen a rising concern with society's value foundation since the early 1990s. Early on, cultural continuity was stressed, but already from the mid-1990s, a more pluralist approach came to dominate, when the value foundation became the subject of deliberation, negotiation, and change. This later on led to a stronger focus on ethnic discrimination and (structural) racism as well as human rights and individualism. Sweden, unlike Denmark, has strengthened mother-tongue instruction and bilingual instruction in primary and lower secondary schooling, implemented a secular and cosmopolitan approach to teaching religion, and systematically reduced the lessons assigned to teaching history and, instead, increased lessons in civics with emphasis on democratic literacy. Denmark has gone in the opposite direction and strengthened what can only be termed a monocultural approach: no right to mother-tongue instruction, strong priority to Christianity in teaching religion (in fact, the subject is called 'Christianity Studies' (*Kristendomskundskab*)), and a mandatory History canon—to name the most central elements.

No comparative studies have so far analysed the politics of citizenship education in Denmark and Sweden. Hence, the explanations proposed for the Scandinavian integration policy differences tend to analyse the politics of permanent residence and naturalisation. The next section turns to these studies.

1.3 Existing studies, alternative explanations, and their limitations

Logically, comparative studies of two or all three Scandinavian countries quickly dismiss similarities between the three as possible explanations of their divergence. First, all three economies are small, open and built around similar comprehensive, universal welfare states, subjecting them to similar financial pressures from the migration of low-skilled labour and the globalisation of production (Andersen 2004; Óskarsdottir 2007). Moreover, the three countries constitute some of each other's main trading partners—both regarding export and import—and outside Scandinavia, they all mainly trade

with Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium and China. [27] Not surprisingly, all three have experienced similar developments in their GDP growth since immigration became a more salient issue; albeit Norway's fluctuations are more controlled (see Figure 1.1). Consequently, the economy in itself cannot account for their policy differences.

Figure 1.1: Annual GDP growth (in percentage)



Source: World Development Indicators (The World Bank).

Second, several studies have argued that there is a significant anti-immigrant sentiment in all West European publics and that it is the mobilisation of this sentiment by a political party, not its mere existence, that affects integration policies (e.g., Howard 2009; 2010). Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup (2008) conclude on their discussion of public opinion data that in both Denmark and Sweden, 'significant parts of the population express negative and critical attitudes to further immigration as well as to immigrants' and that the 'only significant difference relates to the higher saliency of the issue in Denmark' (2008, 618-19). Other public opinion studies using data from the European Social Survey supports this conclusion. Although the Swedish public generally displays a comparatively more positive attitude towards immigration and support for equal rights, the Danish and Norwegian publics typically cluster with Sweden in a European perspective (Gorodzeisky & Semyonov 2009;

[27] Trade statistics are available from the UN Comtrade Database at http://comtrade.un.org/.

Nagayoshi & Hjerm 2015; Sides & Citrin 2007). Looking at data from the Comparative Manifesto Project from 1993-2011, it is clear that the question of integration and cultural diversity has been largely absent from the election manifestos of the two large bloc parties in Norway and Sweden, while it has been a central issue for the two large Danish bloc parties (see Figure 1.2).

Figure 1.2: Percentage of manifesto quasi-sentences devoted to negative and positive statements about multiculturalism, respectively, 1993-2011



Note: 'Multiculturalism +' is defined as 'favourable mentions of cultural diversity and cultural plurality within domestic societies.' 'Multiculturalism –' is defined as 'the enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration. Appeals for cultural homogeneity in society.'
Source: The Manifesto Project Dataset (https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/)

Moreover, multiculturalism has mainly been perceived as negative or problematic in the Danish manifestos. This supports the conclusion that it is the politicisation of the issue that is related to the Scandinavian policy differences, not the differences in the public opinion. This politicisation, however, is not simply caused by a successful radical right party. True, it was first with the 2010 and 2014 elections that Sweden experienced a radical right party in parliament for more than one term.[28] However, both the Danish People's Party (*Dansk Folkeparti*) and the Norwegian Progress Party (*Fremmskritspariet*) have received significant shares of the votes since immigration

[28] The only other time that a radical right party has won seats in parliament was in 1991, when the party New Democracy (*Nyt Demokrati*) won 6.7 percent of the vote. The party did not gain seats in the following elections.

issues began to be more publicly debated in the mid-1990s. Instead, as many point to, it is rather a question of how the centre-right parties choose to react to a successful radical right party (Bale 2008; Bale et al. 2009; Green-Pedersen & Odmalm 2008).

Finally, all three countries have similar histories of ethnic homogeneity and immigration (Brochmann and Kjeldstadli 2008; Wadensjö and Orje 2002). Before the 1960s, the countries had little experience being immigration countries. Since then, the types of immigrants who have entered have been quite uniform, with labour migrants in the early phases and refugees and reunited families after labour migration was tightly restricted during the economic recession in the 1970s. However, the percentage that immigrants and their descendants constitute of the total population is almost twice as high in Sweden as in Denmark and Norway (see Figure 1.3 below). Because of Sweden's more permissive naturalisation rules, a larger percent of these have also been naturalised and received voting rights for the national elections. The fact that a larger part of the electorate in Sweden has a foreign background might have contributed to the lack of politicisation of integration issues from a simple supply and demand perspective. This thesis does not provide an answer to this question. Still, comparing to Norway, which has had numbers comparable to Denmark as well as an equally strong radical right party, would suggest that it can, at most, only be part of the answer.

Figure 1.3: Foreign born persons and domestic born persons with two foreign born parents (as percentage of population)



Sources: Danmarks Statistisk (www.dst.dk), Statistiska centralbyrån (www.scb.se), and Statistisk sentralbyrå (www.ssb.no).

Instead of the above explanations, existing comparative studies of Scandinavian integration policy has mainly sought recourse in two types of explanation: national identity and party competition. As this thesis, the former line of research suggests that these policy differences can be traced back to differences in how national identity and social cohesion are generally understood. Comparative studies following the latter line of research emphasises the importance of mobilisation of anti-immigrant sentiment in the public opinion by a successful radical right party and the issue strategy of particularly the centre-right parties. These two literatures rarely speak to each other. The following two sections discuss each of them separately.

1.3.1 National identity

Most of the comparative studies stressing the importance of conceptions of nationhood and social cohesion fall back on the ethnic-civic distinction to explain how the three countries differ. The comprehensive 2010 book *Velferdens Grenser* details the historical development of integration policy in the three countries and concludes that Sweden's approach reflects a highly civic understanding of the national community, the Danish approach reflects a more ethno-cultural understanding of the national community, while Norway is somewhere in between (Brochmann and Hagelund 2010: 353). Brochmann and Seland (2010), Borevi (2010), Hedetoft (2006), and Midtbøen (2015) reach a similar conclusion. This quite neatly corresponds to their policy differences.

The distinction between ethnic and civic nationhood has for long been a common reference point for studies investigating the role of nationhood in policy-making—if not directly applied then as a necessary context for the development of new or modified analytical frameworks. The distinction has a long history in nationalism studies stretching back to the contrasting views of the political community espoused by Rousseau and the German romanticists, through the famous lecture by Ernest Renan in 1882, *What is a Nation?*, and the work of Friedrich Meinecke in the early 1900s, and again, further popularised by particularly the historian Hans Kohn in the 1940s and 1950s and more recently in the historical work of Anthony D. Smith. As typically understood, ethnic nationalist thought is characterised by a genealogical concern with ethno-cultural homogeneity, while civic nationalism seeks unity in the voluntary adherence to certain political values and institutions (Smith 2000: 15-20; Zimmer 2003). Ethnic nationhood is entirely closed off to persons not born into families firmly rooted within the national culture, while civic nationhood is open as long as the newcomer assimilates into the political values and norms defining the community. However, few claim that

these are anything more than ideal-types.[29] Instead, the Scandinavian studies, like most, work from the uncontroversial assumption that no nations are completely sealed off and that all nations have a cultural component. Whether it is historical studies or analyses of contemporary decision-making, however, it mostly phrased as a question of how much a given conception of nationhood borrows from the ethnic and civic repositories, respectively.

The distinction, however, does not provide a good understanding of the Scandinavian differences. Almost all politicians in the three countries define nationhood in terms of shared *values* in public debates. Among parliamentary parties, ethno-cultural notions occasionally show themselves in outbursts from radical right politicians. But even these parties predominantly speak the language of shared values. When a civic or political conception of the nation has become the norm in all three countries, it is within these conceptions that we should search for ideational differences that could drive policies in different directions. This could be differences in how political values are understood or which values are prioritised over others. However, if we consult case studies investigating the values dear to the three Scandinavian countries, they provide very similar lists a strong or deep sense of individual autonomy, egalitarianism, consensual democracy, humanitarianism, and cultural progressiveness (e.g., Berggren and Trägårdh 2006; Eriksen 1993; Gullestad 2002; Heinö 2009; Mouritsen and Olsen 2013; Stråth 2000; 2004; Østergaard 1992; 2007). This thesis suggests that instead of tracing the normative content of political debates, we must look towards causal ideas regarding how demanding the integration process is believed to be for immigrants and the receiving societies. Chapter two presents this analytical framework.[30]

1.3.2 Party competition

The handful of comparative studies emphasising party competition as the explanation of the Scandinavian differences stress that it is not the presence of a strong radical right party in itself that changes government policies. Instead, it is contingent upon how the centre-right parties react to integration issues rising on the societal agenda; and how the centre-right parties respond will depend on the views of the coalitional partners they must work with to form a viable government alternative (Boréus 2010; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008; Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 2008). Consequently,

[29] See Yack (1996) and Nielsen (199) for strong normative and analytical critiques of the ethnic-civic distinction

[30] Borevi (forthcoming) also takes this perspective in her comparative study of Denmark and Sweden.

the policy differences between Denmark, Sweden, and Norway are caused by only the Danish centre-right parties choosing to politicise integration issues and pursue highly restrictive policies. Their Norwegian counterparts instead chose a strategy of defusing integration issues in concert with the centre-left (Bale et al. 2009). The Swedish centre-right parties have also chosen a defuse strategy. This, however, seems more of a response to disagreements between the centre-right coalition partners. Hence, politicising integration would risk deteriorating the coalition by publicly exposing their disagreements.

This thesis does not question that the competition for votes and office have not affected policy developments. However, acknowledging these mechanisms does not in itself provide a sense of how far in either direction policy developments could go. Arguably, political parties do to some extent adapt their policies to shifts in the societal agenda and what policies other (pivotal) parties within their bloc want to pursue. Still, parties often have ideological commitments that they cannot just lose for the gain of votes and office without risking internal fragmentation and loss of trustworthiness (Odmalm 2011; 2014). The simple competition for votes and office does not tell us which ideas that policy-making stabilises around. The explanation proposed in this thesis incorporates the ideological commitments—or lack hereof—in the analysis of the political developments.

1.4 Outline of the dissertation

The dissertation consists of this small monograph and five articles of which two are single-authored. This monograph presents the overall analytical framework and argument of the thesis. It summarises central elements from the five articles and situates them within the overall framework. However, it also contributes with independent theoretical discussions and empirical results in order to elaborate on some of the article's assertions and to reinforce the overall argument. The five articles are listed below. The first two (*Willed* and *Paradox* mostly attends to the theoretical framework of the thesis, while the remaining three articles are empirical analyses of naturalisation politics in all three countries (*Naturalisation*), citizenship education politics in Denmark and Sweden (*School*), and the role ideology has played for the adopt strategy chosen by the Danish Social Democrats (*Blind*).

> Jensen, Kristian K. 2014. "What Can and Cannot Be Willed: How Politicians Talk about National Identity and Immigrants." *Nations and Nationalism* 20(3): 563–83 (henceforth *Willed*).

Jensen, Kristian K., and Per Mouritsen. n.d.. "Nationalism in a Liberal Register: Beyond the "Paradox of Universalism" in Immigrant Integration Politics." Resubmitted to *British Journal of Political Science* (henceforth *Paradox*).

Brochmann, Grethe, Christian Fernandéz, and Kristian K. Jensen. n.d. "Nationhood and Scandinavian Naturalisation Politics: Varieties of the Civic Turn." Manuscript under review (henceforth *Naturalisation*).

Fernandéz, Christian, and Kristian K. Jensen. n.d. "The Civic Integrationist Turn in Danish and Swedish School Politics". Manuscript under review (henceforth *School*).

Jensen, Kristian K. n.d. "'In the Land of the Blind, the One-Eyed Man is King': the Danish Social Democrats and Immigrant Integration Politics". Manuscript under review (henceforth *Blind*).

The first article, *Willed*, focuses on developing a conceptual framework that can capture the national differences in how nationhood is conceptualised in Scandinavian politics. The article *Paradox* situates this framework within the larger West European debate about the (continued) causal significance of nationalism in the recent turn towards civic integration policies. Many of the theoretical arguments in these two articles are summarised in chapter two, especially section 2.3. Chapter two further tackles some of the criticisms of the so-called 'national models' approach which tend to focus on nationhood as an explanation; these criticisms are not confronted explicitly in the articles.

The article *Blind* is the only article to explicitly use Pontus Odmalm's concept of ideological tension. Section 2.4 summarises how this thesis understands it and argues that it can deepen our understanding of the political dynamics behind the ideational stabilisation of policy-making. Compared to the articles, this monograph is overall more attentive to the political dynamics that ideological commitments (or lack hereof) create. The analysis in chapter four aims to align this aspect more explicitly with the analyses in *Naturalisation* and *School*, to show the tension and political manoeuvring behind the dominant public philosophies of integration. *Blind* is a single-case study which argues that the ideological blindness of the Danish Social Democrats on the relationship between nationhood, cultural diversity, and the universal welfare state, is a central factor behind the entrenchment of a highly exclusive, civic assimilationist philosophy in Danish immigrant integration politics.

Naturalisation and *School* are more focused on showing how ideas about nationhood, social cohesion, and the welfare state are predominantly tied together in the political imagination. This monograph supplements the analy-

sis in *Naturalisation* by presenting a qualitative content analysis of parliamentary debates in the three countries from the late 1990s to the early 2010s. This content analysis applies the conceptual framework from *Willed* and is not part of any of the articles. It is presented in section 4.1. *School* is summarised in section 4.2.

To sum up, the analysis in chapter four ties together the analyses in the articles with the content analysis of parliamentary debates, and presents a more overall argument about the Scandinavian policy differences that is more attentive to the ideological tension behind the dominant public philosophies of integration.

The remainder of this monograph is structured in the following way: Chapter two presents the overall analytical framework. Chapter three describes the general research design, the methodological approach in the articles, and how the parliamentary debates have been coded. Chapter four summarises the analyses in the articles and situates them within the content analysis of parliamentary debates. And, finally, chapter five presents the concluding remarks.

Chapter 2: Public philosophies, nationhood, and party politics

This thesis follows a common thread within the field of immigration and integration research. Since the publication of Roger Brubaker's seminal book *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* from 1992, which is often credited with igniting research into citizenship policy, nationhood has been a stable in any discussion on national policy differences. Not least, it has inspired further theoretical developments of what has been termed (national) models of citizenship. The basic assumption behind such modelling is, as Adrian Favell puts it, that policy-making follows 'a set of consensual ideas and linguistic terms held across party political lines' (2001, 2) that are intimately connected to certain notions of nationhood and national cohesion.[31] In the same vein, Brubaker argued that France's more open access to citizenship for immigrants embodied a civic or republican notion of nationhood, while Germany's comparatively restrictive citizenship policies followed an ethno-cultural conception of the nation. These different conceptions of nationhood 'framed and shaped judgments of what was politically imperative' (Brubaker 1992, 16). Both Favell and Brubaker stress that the politics of citizenship is characterised by ideational consensus among mainstream political actors and a certain ideational inertia or path dependency.

Subsequent studies have also argued that the restrictive citizenship policies in, for example, Denmark, Austria and Switzerland reflect a largely ethno-cultural understanding of nationhood according to which access to membership in the national community requires an assimilation that goes well beyond political values (e.g., Koopmans et al. 2005; Perchinig 2010). Other studies of particularly Britain, Sweden, and the Netherlands have found that policy-making here is structured by a multiculturalist variant of civic nationhood (e.g., Borevi 2013; Koopmans et al. 2005; Meer and Modood 2009). This latter model differs from the 'French' civic assimilationist model by promoting equality through the public recognition and accommodation of cultural differences instead of stressing the ethno-cultural and religious neutrality of the public sphere. Consequently, it *appears* as the most open and culturally inclusive model, and the three countries listed above have indeed

[31] Others scholars speak of national models in more institutionalist than ideational terms (e.g., Freeman 2006 and Soysal 1994). As this thesis is interested in the ideas driving integration policies, the institutionalist typologies are not further discussed.

had historically inclusive citizenship policies—although Sweden now emerges as the only of the three that has not added new naturalisation requirements in the last 15 years (Goodman 2014). Later research has distinguished other models[32], but it is particularly the above three models—ethno-cultural assimilationist, civic assimilationist, and civic multiculturalist—that have had a strong impact on comparative studies of national policies.

It is noticeable, however, that key studies within the 'national models' tradition do not talk in these terms. Instead, Brubaker (1992) talked about 'idioms of nationhood', Favell (2001) about 'public philosophies of integration', while Koopmans et al. (2005) actively distanced themselves from 'static categories of typological "models"' and instead talked about 'conceptual spaces' of citizenship to stress that we cannot implicitly assume that all or most political actors share a certain set of ideas or that citizenship regimes are stable. Arguably, it is unnecessarily confusing to add the terminological layer of 'national models' if different conceptions of nationhood are the only ideational explanation of interest. With a model terminology, there seems to be a greater risk of neglecting internal complexity, intended or not, regarding how different ideas might experience varying societal and political acceptance over time. For reasons that will become apparent, this thesis focuses its attention on Favell's concept of public philosophies of integration. However, because it is common to refer to this line of research as the 'national models' approach—especially among critics—this term will still appear interspersed throughout this chapter.

More recently, the use of these so-called models (or conceptions of nationhood) to explain national policy differences have received a good share of criticism resulting in several special issues alternately defending and criticising the use of models (Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012; Loch 2014; Finotelli and Michalowski 2012; van Reekum, Duyvendak and Bertossi 2012). The critique is two-fold, targeting both explanatory and analytical inadequacy.[33] The first kind of critique argues that recent convergence in policies and public debates cannot be accounted for from a model perspective. The latter kind of critique argues that models are too static and simplistic to be analytically useful. The following section describes these two critiques in more detail,

[32] For example: The segregationist model (Koopmans et al. 2005), the imperial model (Castles and Miller 2009), and the transnational model (Castles and Miller 2009).

[33] They have also been accused of being normatively problematic by reifying national fictions (Favell 2003, 9). However, this part of the critique is not taken up here.

while the remainder of the chapter responds to this critique in describing the analytical framework of the thesis.

2.1 The critique of national models

Starting with the explanatory critique, Christian Joppke (2007a; 2007b; 2010), in particular, has argued that the model approach, with its tendency to stress path dependency, cannot explain why West European states converge around similar ideas about immigrant integration and, not least, similar civic integration policies. He stresses that both an ethno-cultural notion of nationhood and multiculturalism have been widely discredited in West European politics. Today, more or less all politicians—even those on the far-right—trumpet a largely similar and, to Joppke, paradoxical conception of nationhood based on the same universal liberal-democratic values (Joppke 2008a; 2010, 131-140). After the experiences of the Second World War and subsequent human rights treaties and anti-discrimination law, ethnicity and religion have been taken completely out of the equation of national cohesion in mainstream narratives. More recently, multiculturalism seems to have suffered a similar fate. By the early 2000s, if not before, a sense of integration failure had settled in most national debates. Depending on the country, this sense of failure or even crisis was fuelled by statistics and stories of increasing immigration, ethnic residential segregation and socio-economic disparities, urban unrest, overrepresentation in crime statistics, illiberal beliefs and cultural practices within immigrant communities as well as radicalism in the wake of Islamic terrorism. In the process of discussing what went wrong, multiculturalism was singled out by many—including state leaders such as Nicolas Sarkozy, Angela Merkel and David Cameron—as an unproductive if not outright destructive ideology that separates people more than it brings them together (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010).

What we are left with is that any talk about national identity is taking place within the same liberal universalist register, which, according to Joppke, cannot *name* national distinctiveness, because it delivers no sense of how the Western state in question is unique and differs from other liberal democracies. Whether they set out to or not, all mainstream politicians end up promoting a liberal identity that emphasises autonomy and self-sufficiency. However, the promotion of such an identity is just as much, if not to a greater extent, based on reducing the fiscal pressure on the welfare state by disciplining newcomers into becoming productive and flexible workers. This is the non-nationalist ideational core that Western states are converging on and that lies behind the widespread adoption of civic integration policies.

This indeed raises a serious challenge to those who still believe that nationhood is a driving force behind the increasing use of civic integration requirements. How to show and argue that different conceptions of nationhood continue to shape national policy developments, when it seems to be the same kind of nation that is imagined and treasured in public debates throughout Western Europe? Rising to this challenge involves a closer look at the liberal or civic conceptions of nationhood being promoted. Why can liberal-democratic values not be the basis of a conception of nationhood? Is it really the same values that are being promoted? Are there perhaps other influential dimensions of nationhood along which the nation is imagined in public discourse? Particularly the article *Paradox* examines these questions. Section 2.3 summarises some of this discussion.

Turning to the analytical usefulness of models of citizenship, the basic critique is that when these models are treated as relatively 'dense, coherent, stable and homogenous [ideational] structures' (Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012, 240), they cannot account for change, and they circumscribe (the possibility of) national political disagreements and conflicts over ideas and policies (Finotelli and Michalowski 2012, 234; Joppke 2010, 17-20)—or that they can be strategically used to curb outside influences (Favell 2003). It is similar to the critique directed at sociological institutionalists for positing a stable equilibrium based on cultural frames and norms (Hall and Taylor 1996, 954; Schmidt 2010). Consequently, we are presented with a rather static and depoliticised view of the world that makes change incomprehensible and cannot but fall when examined slightly more closely. However, this critique is more a note of precaution than it is an argument for not using models at all. Scholars working within the models tradition are themselves highly aware of this and try to incorporate it into their analyses (see, e.g., Bonjour and Lettinga 2012; Brubaker 1999; Favell 2001: 21; Hansen and Koehler 2005). Brubaker himself stresses that understandings of nationhood 'have been more fluid, plastic, and, internally contested than I have suggested' (1992, 13) and rejects a 'naively culturalist account' (1992, 16). We should not treat conceptions of nationhood as all-encompassing or totalising normative structures but always leave the possibility open that key political actors may disagree about what it means to belong to the nation, about the more exact meanings of central concepts within the national debate, and also about what national values actually entail in practice (Duyvendak and Scholten 2011; van Reekum, Duyvendak and Bertossi 2012, 421-22). This should further sensitise us to the possibility of cherished models being used strategically to fulfil policy goals, and the range of policies that can actually be legitimised in the name of some broadly accepted notion of nationhood.

Some level of dissensus might very well be 'endemic' to policy-making.[34] However, despite all this internal complexity, national policy-making might still display what Veit Bader (2007) terms 'minimal internal coherence'. Which political disagreements arise within one national context might very well differ from those within another national context in a way that is structured by *bounded* disagreements on nationhood and national cohesion. Moreover, we cannot exclude that a high degree of consensus can emerge, and we have little reason to think that this is highly uncommon. Ultimately, these are empirical questions concerning the degree of stabilisation of national policy-making at a given point in time around particular understandings of nationhood.

In addition, we cannot assume that the stabilisation of political disagreement (or agreement) around particular meanings of nationhood and national cohesion takes place because political parties and other actors actually internalise them; that is, firmly believe them to be true. This is certainly a possibility, but political parties might also act strategically and adopt a certain idea because it is politically opportunistic for them to do so. Favell emphasises that such stabilisation should not be understood as 'an example of some timeless political 'tradition' imposing itself' (2001, 21), but as the product of a political process. It might be perceived as popular among voters or serve to depoliticise issues that damage the party. Parties might also find it difficult to abandon ideas they have committed themselves to earlier because of the risk of loss of credibility, public criticism, and internal fragmentation. Alternatively, political parties might also engage in genuine problem-solving by drawing on the available ideational resources to try to craft solutions but simply lack the capacity to work with new ideas. As Carstensen (2011) explains, political actors do not necessarily work creatively with ideas as long as they can sustain a necessary degree of meaning to move forward using the ideas that they already have experience working with. When national models are treated as dense, coherent and stable, it is on the basis of an image of the political actor as a *paradigm man*; that is, someone who cannot escape interpreting the world through the lens of a set of interconnected ideas going from the most abstract philosophical level to the concrete policy level (Hall 1993). However, leaving behind such an understanding of the political actor does not touch on something essential to a models approach.[35] As listed, there are a range of other reasons why politics can stabi-

[34] Even on an individual level, we might reasonably think that doubt or uncertainty is endemic to the formation of political opinions.

[35] In fact, scholars within the national models tradition rarely work with such an understanding of the political actor—at least not explicitly.

lise around particular ideas. However, this thesis is disinclined to lose it altogether. It seems uncontroversial to have as an analytical starting point the *possibility* that some political actors are locked into specific notions of nationhood and national cohesion, and that a certain amount of anomalies have to accumulate before this world view is put into question. [36] There is no need to decide on one specific conception of how political actors use ideas when they can all be equally true.[37]

The precaution that this critique leaves us with is the following: Do not assume that political disagreement is structured by shared notions of nationhood and national cohesion; show it. This thesis takes this precaution seriously by including a strong focus on the dynamics of party politics as well. The following sections spell out the public philosophy perspective of the thesis and how it relates to party politics.

2.2 A public philosophy perspective

National models are typically used to argue that there is a strong resilience or path dependency in how states approach immigrant integration. However, it is generally unclear how researchers within the tradition understand the concept of a national model. Is it solely an ideational construct on the level of a public philosophy or is it (also) associated with a specific policy approach or institutional arrangement? This distinction is rarely made clear. Most often, models of immigrant integration are defined as specific conceptualisations of nationhood and national cohesion. This leaves the impression that they are only ideational constructs on the level of public philosophy; that is, ideas about the purpose of government and public policy based on assumptions about society that are formulated at a high level of generality (Heclo 1986). Below, at the ideational level of public philosophy, we can distinguish two other levels; namely, problem definitions and policy solutions (Mehta

[36] In this regard, Vivien A. Schmidt's distinction between 'background ideational abilities' and 'foreground discursive' is relevant. She paraphrases John Searle in defining the former as 'human capacities, dispositions, and know-how related to how the world works and how to cope with it' (Schmidt 2010, 14). It is the agents ability to make sense in a given meaning context and to use new ideas to create new meaning. Unsurprisingly, political actors will differ in how able they are in this regard. Foreground ideational abilities refer to people's ability to communicate and deliberate institutions and ideas with others (Schmidt 2010, 169.

[37] However, it is obviously interesting to understand *how* political actors relate to certain influential ideas in contemporary politics in order to have a sense of how entrenched those ideas really are.

2010).[38] A problem definition is a particular way of framing a political or social phenomenon as problematic that schematises and reduces informational complexity, while policy solutions provide the means for solving what is regarded as problematic. How a problem is defined affects what policy solutions appear as suitable and, above that, public philosophies serve as a kind of meta-problem definition that provides a heuristic to the understanding of more specific problems.

Importantly, a translation process is taking place between each of these ideational levels as a political debate or policy-making process moves from the abstract to the concrete. A public philosophy limits how a problem can be defined, just as a problem definition will limit the policy solutions considered. Still, each step leaves substantial room for varying interpretations and other factors—material, institutional, or ideational—might influence which interpretation a political actor chooses. Again, this is a way of theorising national models that does not preclude internal complexity. This picture changes if we begin to include specific problem definitions and policy solutions in our definition of a national model. Then, we risk approaching the dense, coherent, and stable notion of a national model that is criticised as analytically poor. The influential approach to national models in Koopmans et al. (2005) is quite ambiguous in this regard. It recognises the critique and stresses that national models must be understood as ideal types within a conceptual space where different national political actors can be differently situated (2005, 9). At the same time, it argues that conceptions of nationhood are tightly linked to certain policies. For example, an ethno-cultural assimilationist conception implies high barriers to naturalisation and few, if any, differential rights based on membership in a cultural group. Not that this does not seem highly plausible, but the approach entails that the dominant conception of nationhood can be inferred by examining the configuration of public policies—and that is indeed one of the methods the book uses. This bypasses the possibility of internal complexity in terms of political disagreements and the influence of other factors on how a public philosophy is translated into specific problem definitions and policy solutions.

The above understanding is that public philosophies produce path dependency or resilience of national policies by limiting the range of policy so-

[38] Within policy solutions, Peter Hall further distinguishes between 'instrument settings' and 'the instruments themselves' (Hall 1993: 279). The former denotes the level at which the policy solution is set; for example, whether a language requirement is set at a low or high proficiency level. Talk of different policy solutions in this thesis can cover both of these meanings. When necessary, the distinction is made clear.

lutions considered. Institutional reproduction of national policies is thus a consequence of actors being more or less 'stuck' within a certain public philosophy; what James Mahoney (2000) has termed a legitimation explanation of path dependency. However, the path dependency of policy solutions might also originate in the solutions themselves as well as in more abstract notions of nationhood and national cohesion. Here, we enter a more classical historical institutionalist type of argument.[39] Historical institutionalists argue that institutions reinforce themselves by structuring the strategic orientation of agents and forming asymmetric power relations (Hall and Taylor 1996; Mahoney 2000; Thelen 1999: 392-96). Institutions are external to agents and shapes public policy by defining the process of policy-making, who obtains access to the process and when as well as effecting how agents orient themselves and their actions.

Recently, Sarah Wallace Goodman has proposed such an institutionalist explanation of national differences in the use and design of civic integration policies. She argues that existing citizenship policies 'defines the parameters of the debate in which policy actors propose and implement change' (Goodman 2014, 6), but that civic integration policies do not express national identity (2014, 30-31). So, although West European citizenship policies might have been shaped by different conceptions of nationhood before the civic integrationist turn in the 1990s, contemporary policy-making revolves around similar notions of a liberal state identity, as Goodman terms it. 'Old' conceptions of nationhood primarily shape national differences in the use and design of civic integration policies *indirectly* through their role in shaping earlier citizenship policies.[40] The citizenship law in place orients current policy-making by defining 'the standard of inclusion that *civic* integration strives to promote' (2014, 79); that is, how well-integrated one must become in order to be qualified for permanent residence or citizenship. She argues that a certain habitual thinking settles around the existing rules that affect the government's perception of how far it can legitimately go in terms of introducing, strengthening, or loosening integration requirements. This is an argu-

[39] In the following, the concepts of policies and institutions are used interchangeably. It is an almost wicked theoretical issue within institutionalist discussions whether these two concepts should be separated or whether the concept of institution covers both formal rules of policy-making and the policies themselves. Making this distinction is not important for the theoretical argument made in this thesis.

[40] Her 2014 book, however, displays strong ambiguity on this. She also talks about citizenship policies as a 'proxy for national belonging', as reflecting 'implicit understandings of nationhood' and as 'constraining discourse' (2014, 78-79). This makes it unclear whether or not she believes that different conceptions of nationhood continue to play a much more direct causal role.

ment for policy change taking place incrementally. Goodman argues that within the context of existing citizenship policies, the ideological orientation of government will determine whether policies are (incrementally) pushed in a more restrictive or permissive direction—if changed at all: 'Membership policy does not merely produce change or continuity, but a specific kind of change or continuity that ultimately preserves nation-state differences' (Goodman 2014, 77). However, this is also an argument that implies that the political horizon or imagination in terms of viable polices adjusts itself with each step in one or the other direction.[41] As such, it does not preclude that national policies can diverge or converge.

Goodman's work is a major contribution to the field—especially her meticulous detailing of variation in civic integration policies and attempts to bring the field more in line with the historical institutionalist tradition.[42] Still, the lack of national public philosophies in her theoretical framework seems unnecessary. Why assume that they primarily work indirectly through existing institutional arrangements and not directly as dominant ideas within national policy-making? The one does not exclude the other, and it might differ between national contexts. Furthermore, why assume that the civic integration policies resemble Habermasian constitutional patriotism? After all, they are policy solutions that can be put to work to further a number of policy goals which Goodman herself acknowledges.[43]

The overall framework of this thesis incorporates public philosophies of integration into a more historical institutionalist setting in a way that retains a strong resemblance to Goodman's framework. The argument is that substantially different national public philosophies of integration still assert their influence on national policy-making—at least in a Scandinavian comparison—but the translation of these public philosophies into concrete policies is influenced by the existing policies. Public philosophies are found at a level of abstraction that typically needs to be concretised with the help of other concepts and ideas in order to find concrete expression in policies. The existing policies are an obvious resource to draw on in this translation process. They have already achieved a certain degree of public legitimation and may have been the result of an earlier similar translation process that has grounded 'actors' subjective orientation and beliefs about what is appropri-

[41] This again seems to imply that politicians have a short memory span in terms of policies.

[42] It supposedly emerged from this tradition in the first place but rarely engages it.

[43] For example: 'A right government in a liberal citizenship context may adopt the same civic integration policy as a left government in a liberal citizenship context, but to address entirely different problems' (Goodman 2014, 85).

ate or morally correct' (Mahoney 2000, 523). They further orient action by setting the standard by which a policy change can be deemed permissive or restrictive; a purely rhetorical division that, nonetheless, is often strategically important for belittling your opponents. These are similar observations to those of Goodman.

Other factors might also affect how a public philosophy is translated into problem definitions and policy solutions. For example, political actors can try to look beyond the boundaries of their nation state towards the policy approaches of other countries to find inspiration. Arguably, this is what has been the case with the diffusion of civic integration policies. However, it is also evident that these policies have been used and designed differently in different countries as they have been refracted through national politics and/or public philosophies. Strategic considerations might also influence this translation process if political parties have an interest in politicising the issue by promoting different policies than their opponents. Often, right-wing parties have an interest in placing immigration and integration issues at the centre of public debate because they are generally perceived as being more capable of solving the problems discussed—which is termed issue ownership in the party politics literature (e.g., Bélanger and Meguid 2008; Petrocik 1996). A public philosophy approach retains its usefulness despite such internal variation in national politics as long as it can be shown to significantly limit how problems are defined and which policy solutions are considered.[44] This understanding of the public philosophy approach is more about arguing that there is a certain structure or minimal internal coherence with the kind of political disagreements that the public debate results in that stabilises policy-making.[45] What this approach sacrifices in terms of the parsimony of earlier conceptualisations of national models, it gains in richer descriptions of cases (Sartori 1991).[46]

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[44] This implies that a public philosophy increases its significance for policy-making to the extent that it delimits the problem definitions and policy solutions considered in national public debate. Consequently, a public philosophy may also be widely shared by national politicians but remain largely insignificant because it is so poorly defined that it leaves open a wide range of interpretations.

[45] One can also imagine a situation where there is disagreement on the level of public philosophy between major political parties, but that a certain path dependence shows itself, nonetheless, because the final policy effect will be mediated and reduced by how the existing policies orient the translation process of the, otherwise disagreeing, political parties.

[46] Moreover, one could reasonably argue that more aggregated models blur the lines between descriptive and prescriptive analysis as they often end up being used simultaneously by political actors to impact public debates and comparatists to de-

It is critical to once again stress that this approach does not subscribe to the 'paradigm man' conceptualisation of the political actor. The stabilisation of public philosophies in national policy-making does not imply that political actors are necessarily so 'locked in' that these ideas totalise the perspective of the actor, so to speak. Sociology has moved well beyond the understanding that culture and ideas are necessarily internalised by actors (Carstensen 2011). Instead, ideas should be understood as resources that political actors employ creatively and pragmatically in order to schematise informational complexity and comprehend the world and also strategically to satisfy their political preferences. However, when searching for ideas to comprehend certain phenomena, the process may be constrained by time-pressure and/or lack of creative ability; which Schmidt (2010) terms background ideational abilities. This serves as a possibly strong bias towards the ideas that actors are already experienced in applying, which, in some instances, might even come to resemble how the 'paradigm man' relates to ideas.

Consequently, this thesis concurs with Adrian Favell's assertion that path dependency should largely be seen as resulting from normal political calculations and puzzling and not as a question of an 'irrational reproduction of inherited conventions' (Favell 2001, 27)—as Favell accuses Brubaker and others of perceiving national identity and citizenship policies. Still, Favell talks the language of historical institutionalism when arguing that critical junctures enable the introduction of new ideas into national policy-making, but beyond these times of political crisis, 'normal' politics re-establishes itself around a mainstream consensus on the public philosophy that came out dominant (2001, 21, 27.). The stability of this consensus, he argues, follows from political parties investing themselves publicly and internally in the public philosophy. Once political actors have thoroughly invested themselves, they lock themselves in because of the electoral cost of rethinking their ideological commitments. These costs will be connected to the perceived credibility in the electorate and the uncertainty that arises from having to develop a new consensus both within the party and between parties in a coalition. This implies that how much time political parties actually spend 'talking up' a certain idea or policy will be connected to how risky it is to leave it behind.

To sum up, both cognitive and strategic mechanisms can work to stabilise policy-making around both public philosophies and particular translations of these into policy solutions. However, the above theorisation of the national models approach retains room for internal complexity and change through agency. It resembles Vivien A. Schmidt's description of discursive

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scribe national differences. They become normatively charged in a way that more disaggregated models are less prone to given their greater complexity.

institutionalist scholars who engage with the historical institutionalism tradition: '[they] speak the language of institutional rules and regularities, critical moments and incremental change. It is just that they infuse these "structures" with "agency", by focusing on the ideas of real actors that help explain changes or continuities in institutions, at critical moments or incrementally over time' (Schmidt 2010, 17).

The following two sections flesh out the central dimensions of public philosophies of integration and how the emerging ideological turn within research on the party politics of immigration can strengthen the understanding of how public philosophies take root.

2.3 Public philosophies of integration, liberalism, and nationhood

As previously described, any talk about national identity by mainstream political actors in Western Europe is taking place within a similar liberal universalist register (Joppke 2008a). It is clear that there has been a narrowing of the terms of the political discourse since the end of the Second World War that has inspired different post-nationalist visions of immigrant integration politics in the 1990s. Yasemin Soysal's esteemed book from 1994 tells the story of how the institution of citizenship is being reconfigured as particularistic nationhood gradually gives way to a universalistic idea of personhood based on human rights. Consequently, national membership becomes increasingly irrelevant for the political and legal contestation and extension of rights. This expands rights beyond membership in a national community and makes it untenable to base citizenship on ascriptive criteria concerning ethnicity or religion; an argument that was given a stronger legal foundation in Jacobson (1997). More recently, Christian Joppke has reiterated that this normative diffusion has effectively decoupled citizenship and nationhood through the decline 'of the notion of the state as property and instrument of self-realisation of a particular group' (2008a, 543). Hereby, asking for more than respect for human rights and democracy amounts to 'the imposition of a particular culture or way of life that contemporary liberal-constitutional states are set to avoid' (2008a, 541). Other authors have also argued that macro-structural, globalising changes regarding the flow of capital, goods, services, labour, and information—especially between big cities—are crowding out particularistic concerns for national culture and cohesion (Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 1999; Sassen 1998; 2003); tendencies that have only increased in West European countries as the EU have gradually removed barriers for the establishment of an internal free market.

It would be misguiding to deny that die-hard ethnic exclusionism is not a thing of the past in the policy-making of West European *liberal* democracies, and that the command of human rights has not exerted influence on citizenship acquisition policies and administrative discretion. It would be another thing, however, to argue that this has caused old national differences to vanish. Yes, West European states have increasingly adopted a similar language akin to that of political liberalism and constitutional patriotism when trying to come to terms with cultural pluralism. Indeed, the national models typically used to describe national differences appear outdated when most politicians trumpet the same liberal-democratic values and norms and proclaim multiculturalism a failed model. From this perspective, they do seem to converge. However, this convergence seems more about semantics than actual policies, which is demonstrated by two indisputable facts; one, no nation state within the EU has been willing to transfer substantial power to the EU on matters regarding the economic, social and political integration of immigrants once they have been granted legal residence (Schain 2009); and two, the EU-15 countries vary greatly in their integration requirements for permanent residence and citizenship, as demonstrated by Goodman (2014). As explained in the introduction, this is only more striking in a Scandinavian comparison.

Still, the distinction between ethno-cultural and civic nationalism is a wholly misleading basis on which to draw up the different conceptions of nationhood influencing contemporary politics (*Willed* argues this more thoroughly). Instead, the concept of public philosophies of integration, as proposed by Adrian Favell, is a more promising starting point (see also *Paradox*). He introduced the concept of national philosophies of integration in his book on French and British citizenship politics from 1998. However, his most concise definition of the concept is found in later work:[47]

> Nation-states … universally conceive of their social unity and historical continuity in terms of a what might be called an "amateur" public theory or philosophy of integration, that combines a kind of functionalist social theory of what it is that holds nations together, with a normative political philosophy that expresses nationhood in terms of abstract civic values (usually citizenship) (Favell 2006: 51).

[47] In his book, he defines a public philosophy of integration as 'a set of consensual ideas and linguistic terms held across party political lines' (2001, 2) that 'describe and conceptualize the basic facts; … make assumptions about the causality of political and social processes; … [and] embody some kind of core value or values which spell out the ideal end-goal of the policies' (2001, 15).

He argues that globalising markets and human rights treaties have not moved political thinking beyond the notion that social integration and unity is premised on a 'culturally shared, territorially bounded and historically rooted notion of society' (Favell 2006, 51). Favell himself recognises that one can easily over-exaggerate how strong this nationalist component affects national political responses to immigration (Favell 1998, 230), but it is far too early to discount its significance.[48] The usefulness of the concept, compared to other approaches within the national models tradition, is that it distinguishes between a (normative) content aspect and a (functionalist, sociological) process aspect of national identity conceptions.[49] The former refers to the 'abstract civic values' that are used to express national distinctiveness and that propose the ideal end goal that policies must work towards. The latter concerns the empirical claims about the functioning of individuals and society that influences which policies are necessary in order to move closer to the expressed societal ideal in the context of immigration (Favell 2001, 15). Treating these as different independent dimensions of nationhood allows for a more refined understanding of ideational continuity and change in national integration politics. The reason for this is that change in the civic values does not necessarily accompany change in how political actors are used to imagine what the national community requires of its members in order to reproduce social unity and move forward. Consequently, one might find convergence or divergence on one dimension while old national differences persist on the other. Losing sight of one or the other dimension impoverishes analyses of the influence of nationhood in national integration politics.

Oliver Zimmer draws a similar distinction in his process-oriented critique and re-conceptualisation of the ethnic-civic framework. He argues that the 'symbolic resources' that political actors call upon when invoking the nation in public debate need not correspond to a specific 'boundary mechanism' of national identity construction. Here, symbolic resources resemble Favell's content aspect of public philosophies of integration, while boundary mechanisms resemble the process aspect. In common use, ethnic nationhood conflates 'cultural factors' (e.g., language and history) with an organic boundary mechanism based on a deterministic logic, while civic nationhood conflates 'political factors' (e.g., political values and institutions) with a vol-

[48] Consequently, it could make sense to develop a public philosophy of integration concept that is not defined in terms of nationhood. Civic integration, as Joppke defines it, could perhaps be reconstructed as a non-nationalistic public philosophy of integration.

[49] Favell also refers to these two dimensions as explanatory and normative, respectively.

untarist boundary mechanism based on voluntarist logic. The argument, which is further developed in *Willed*, is that public redefinitions of nationhood might very well combine civic values with either boundary mechanism. Hence, two conceptions of national identity working with the same cultural content may still differ substantially in their inclusionary/exclusionary tendencies according to the logic of boundary construction accompanying this cultural content.

The distinction between deterministic and voluntarist logic of boundary construction is helpful in developing the process aspect of public philosophies of integration. The next section addresses this, but first, it is important to note that, unlike Zimmer, there is no need to downplay the importance of the normative content of nationhood. Even though Western states converge around similar liberal values in their self-understanding, these values still allow for different interpretations and prioritisations—as any political theory textbook will tell you (see *Paradox*). Indeed, the comprehensive state modernism of the Scandinavian countries with its strong emphasis on fostering individual independence from the normative pressures of families and traditional communities is quite alien to either Britain or Germany (Mouritsen 2013).

Nonetheless, it is a common argument that national identities in Western Europe are 'thinning' and losing explanatory power because they have all come to resemble the same precepts of political liberalism or constitutional patriotism. However, we have little reason to believe that 'thin' national identities cannot be just as powerful in mobilising national sentiment in the public (see *Paradox* for this argument) *and*, as argued above, differences in the processual assumptions regarding the cultivation of social unity can very well persist despite talk about nationhood converging around a liberal universalist register. Regardless of whether Denmark, Sweden, and Norway only have 'thin' national identities, they convene around similar comprehensive state modernisms and consensus-oriented democracies. Still, politicians and commentators from Denmark and Sweden regularly argue that they are worlds apart in their views of the national communities—even when talking about minor differences in policies or practice. Indeed, they are far apart in how they approach immigrant integration. This thesis argues that the main ideational differences influencing these policy differences are instead to be found at the process level of national identity formation, which we turn to now.

2.3.1 The process of national identity formation

The article *Willed* in this thesis builds on the insights of Zimmer's article from 2003. This section gives a brief summary of the main theoretical developments of the article. As mentioned, Zimmer describes how all cultural content can be discursively processed through both the deterministic logic associated with ethnic national identity and the voluntaristic logic associated with civic national identity. The fundamental question regarding these two logics is the possibility of influencing identity formation through the power of human will and action. Voluntaristic logic states that we are capable of intentionally managing the sense of national identity that we acquire. Hence, there is nothing static or inalterable about the parameters of national self-identification. Conversely, deterministic logic states that national identity is the product of factors outside the reach of intentional reconstruction. By way of naturalisation, national identity is placed beyond personal or political decision-making (Zimmer 2003: 179). Treating these two logics as opposite ends of a continuum, we move closer to one of the ends when we change our perception of the role that free can play in national identity formation.

The article *Willed* introduces the distinction between an individual and collective dimension at which these two logics can operate.[50] Answering whether an individual has the ability to choose his or her national identity is different from answering whether the national collective can choose to intentionally reconstruct how it identifies itself. The *individual* dimension concerns the degree of socialisation needed to acquire the national identity of the country or, in other words, the degree of *self*-control that newcomers are believed to possess. From a purely deterministic perspective, national culture is deeply rooted in the individual and follows an extensive socialisation that involves being raised within the institutional and cultural confines of the nation state. Conversely, voluntaristic logic assumes that individuals can intentionally and critically reflect on their personal history and social and political context in order to decide who they want to be. The *collective* dimension concerns the extent to which the self-understanding of the national community is believed to be closed or open for re-negotiation and further development through a public process of democratic deliberation and political action. From a deterministic perspective, national identity is treated as a phenomenon that emerges organically, outside the bounds of political action, while a voluntaristic perspective sees national identity as largely politically constructed and, hence, changeable through political action.

[50] The article uses a slightly different terminology than here and instead talks about two different dimensions at the level of logic of boundary construction.

There is no necessary relationship between how political actors perceive the scope of agency on these two dimensions, and together, they constitute a conceptual space distinguishing different frames on the process level of national identity construction.

When the collective self-understanding is considered fixed, leaving no room for change, only newcomers are expected to change in the integration process. On the other hand, if national identity is perceived as amenable to democratic deliberation and public policies, the integration process is not restricted to newcomers but potentially involves the whole population. On the individual dimension, the capacity of newcomers or the majority to change affects what the state can do within its means. If losing one's cultural baggage is highly strenuous, state policies needs to generate a strong, protracted push towards participation in the relevant arenas of socialisation. To sum up, as we move towards the voluntaristic end on both dimensions, the immigrant and the collective are increasingly seen as capable of mutual adaptation. Consequently, the national identity simultaneously becomes potentially more inclusive of immigrants and their descendants.

Figure 2.1: The two dimensions at the process level of national identity construction



The figure is reproduced from *Willed*.

2.4 Party politics and public philosophies

Studies often build on the assumption that, all else equal, leftist governments will favour increasing the rights of immigrants and ease access to citizenship,

while rightist governments will seek to resist such liberalising impulses and entrench a more restrictive, culturally conservative approach to immigrant integration (an argument found in Bale 2008; Howard 2009; Joppke 2003; Goodman 2014). The 'all else equal' qualification here is central. The argument typically is that the effect of the ideological orientation of government on integration policies will often be mediated by the mobilisation of anti-immigrant sentiment in the public opinion, inter-party competition for votes and office, and coalition building. It is common wisdom that particularly Social Democratic parties are vulnerable to successful, welfare chauvinist far-right parties—especially if centre-right parties also choose to politicise immigration and integration issues (Bale et al. 2009). Equally, right-wing parties may come to downplay integration issues, if they need to work together with more progressive, centrist parties in order to form government (Green-Pedersen & Odmalm 2009).

A national public philosophy argument does not assume such political disagreement and party competition dynamics out of existence. As described earlier, public philosophies consist of quite abstract notions about individuals and society that need to be translated into concrete policies. Even if a public philosophy is widely shared by mainstream political parties, it does not preclude that the political left and right choose to pursue different policy solutions or that a party adapts its policy solutions in order to defuse the integration issue. There is still plenty of room for strategic manoeuvring and ideational differences. Instead, what it does argue is that despite the dynamics of party competition, a comparative outlook will reveal significant national distinctiveness in terms of policy solutions considered and the kind of arguments that support them. An approach that restricts its focus to party politics will tend to implicitly assume that leftist and rightist governments in every Western country by default subscribe to different contrasting public philosophies of integration and, consequently, attribute similarity in their policy positions to the dynamics of party competition for votes and power.

However, as have been touched upon earlier, we cannot assume that there is political agreement in national politics on the philosophy of integration that should structure the policy-making *or* that mainstream political parties necessarily subscribe to and promote a certain, clear-cut public philosophy of integration. Regarding the latter, several scenarios might exist. There could be internal party fractions with conflicting integration philosophies; there might be internal ideological tension stemming from incoherence in the public philosophy of integration developed; the philosophy of integration might be incompletely developed, leaving itself open-ended on certain questions; or the party might simply not have developed commitment to any philosophy of integration.

The possibility of ideological disagreements, incoherence, or even blindness within a party opens up for some new perspectives on how a national philosophy of integration might come to dominate integration politics within a country. For example, a philosophy of integration promoted by one or more political parties might come to dominate national politics because of the inability of other political parties to oppose central elements in it. In other words, the reason why policy-making stabilises around some public philosophy of integration might have less to do with a strong ideational consensus across mainstream party lines and more to do with only some parties having managed to develop a comprehensive and relatively coherent ideological answer to questions of integration.

In his analysis of EU and immigrations politics, Pontus Odmalm (2011; 2014) draws attention to how ideological tension within a party will lead to a strategy of trying to shift attention away from the issue. Odmalm describes how different ideological elements or 'streams' within mainstream political parties can pull them in different directions on an issue hereby challenging them to balance these opposing concerns. If a party cannot negotiate this ideological tension they will try to shift public attention to other issues in order not to risk intra-party fragmentation, loss of credibility among voters, and unwanted criticism from other political actors (Odmalm 2011: 1077). Analysing Swedish immigration politics, he shows how largely unresolved ideological tension within the two major bloc parties (the Social Democrats and the Conservatives) have caused both parties to be dismissive of immigration (not integration) issues and thus kept it off the political agenda.

The argument proposed in this thesis is that behind the entrenchment of a civic assimilationist philosophy of integration in Danish integration politics is a Social Democratic party that experienced ideological blindness on the relation between a multicultural society and the universal welfare state. This allowed, maybe even propelled, them to respond to a right-wing bloc largely in ideological agreement on a highly deterministic philosophy of integration by pursuing an adopt strategy that ultimately showed itself as far-reaching (this is analysed in *Blind*). This is in contrast to Swedish politics, where the left-wing bloc has rallied around an inclusive, voluntaristic philosophy of integration that the right-wing bloc tends to agree with, although some moderate ideological tension surfaces at times. Lastly, Norwegian integration politics is characterised by an ideological tension between multicultural nationhood and cultural 'sameness' cutting across mainstream party lines. This tension has created a highly ambivalent relationship to integration requirements that, so far, has resulted in their dismissal.

To sum up, the public philosophy approach is a relevant approach to understand the differences between Danish, Swedish and Norwegian integra-

tion policies, but a deeper understanding of the dynamics behind these differences requires that one does not apply a simplified version but allows for internal complexity and the strategic concerns of political parties.

2.5 One country, one model?

The approach to national models developed here is purposely more complicated. It has been necessary to decompose the ethic-civic distinction to develop a more relevant and applicable framework. This raises the question of whether it makes sense to talk about only a handful of different models, or whether it is more correct to treat each country as a more or less its own model. When we have two dimensions of public philosophies of integration—content and process—each with their own sub-dimensions, then we start to drift away from the purpose of model-building: to locate only a few, central dimensions in order to create a relatively small number of categories that eases comparison between cases (Bader 2007). This thesis has no good answer to this. More modestly, however, it is argued that the framework is suitable for a comparative study of the Scandinavian cases. Hopefully, time will show whether it can bring any value to other comparative studies. The analysis in chapter four demonstrates the usefulness of the analytical framework, but before we get so far the next chapter introduces the overall research design of the study.

Chapter 3: Research design

This study is comparative-historical. It compares policy-making across three relatively similar cases and investigates why each case have developed their policies differently over time (Collier 1993, 110; Gerring 2007, 28). The overall study combines the Millian method of difference with more in-depth case studies refining and testing likely explanations. The relevant similarities of the three Scandinavian countries were described in the introduction. Their relatively similar economies, welfare states, political systems, public opinions, and histories of immigration and cultural progressiveness would lead us to expect convergence in their integration policies, *if* globalisation and the fiscal pressure on the welfare state produced by immigration were the main drivers of integration policy. Hence, researchers have turned their explanatory focus towards conceptions of nationhood and party politics to explain policy differences. A focus shared—and further developed—in this thesis. This thesis concentrates on how mainstream parties argue and behave. It does so for two reasons. Firstly, we already know that anti-immigrant far-right parties represent the nation as deterministically bounded on both the individual and collective dimension (Rydgren 2007). Secondly, recent studies show that the contagion effects of successful far-right on the policy preferences of mainstream parties is rather limited (Akkerman 2015; Carvalho 2013; Mudde 2013). In response, there has been a growing interest in the strategic interaction of mainstream parties (Bale et al. 2009, Green-Pedersen & Odmalm 2009), but also how previous ideological commitments might limit the viable strategies that mainstream parties can choose from (Bale 2008; Bucken-Knapp et al. 2014; Hinnfors, Spehar, and Bucken-Knapp 2012; Odmalm 2014).

Of course, one can reasonably question the representativeness or external validity of immigrant integration policy-making in these three, rather unique, universal welfare states with a long history of cooperation (Anckar 1993; Gerring 2007, 43). Hence, this thesis makes no attempt to argue that conceptions of nationhood and party politics are the main explanations of policy developments in other, more different Western countries. However, the article *Paradox* does present theoretical arguments for why we should not discount the importance of nationalism in the West European turn towards civic integration policies.

The use of the method of difference (or most-similar systems design, as it is also known) has some well-known pitfalls concerning “false positives”,

"false negatives" and equifinality (George and Bennett 2005, 155-57). The first two are related to a central weakness of the logic of elimination employed: The hard fact that the investigator 'cannot be sure that all of the possibly relevant independent variables have been identified or that the study has included a sufficient variety of cases of the phenomenon' (George and Bennett 2005, 156). Consequently, inferences may be spurious or invalid. However, by comparing the three Scandinavian countries, we are able to control for some of the independent variables that existing research on civic integration policies emphasise, particularly the economy and welfare state.

"False negatives" arise because of complex phenomena where it is the combination of different conditions that explain some phenomenon. Here we risk eliminating certain conditions when not all conditions of the combination are included. Lastly, the comparative method cannot account for "equifinality" or "multiple causality", where 'the same type of outcome can emerge in different cases' as the result of different causal paths (George and Bennett 2005, 157).

For these reasons, the method of difference is used here as a way of suggesting hypotheses that are then assessed using more in-depth case studies inspired by recent work on process tracing. This *potentially* ameliorates the limitations of the methods of difference (George and Bennett 2005, 215). Indeed, this is also the approach applied by previous studies—some more explicitly than others—arguing that different notions of nationhood or party-political dynamics explain the Scandinavian policy differences (particularly Brochmann and Hagelund 2010, 351-67; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008). Hence, these studies have already helped to narrow down the most probable explanations.

Initially, this study developed a conceptual apparatus capable of detecting relevant variation in how politicians in the three Scandinavian states talk about nationhood. This was done by engaging with the theoretical reflections of others, the shortcomings of existing empirical studies, and more inductive analyses of key parliamentary debates, and government publications. This iterative process created several new ideas that were consecutively tested through repeated coding of key documents. This process resulted in the conceptual framework presented in the article *Willed*.

This conceptual framework is applied in the content analysis of parliamentary debates that is presented in chapter four. Section 3.2 and the appendix describe how it was operationalised for this purpose. The articles *Naturalisation*, *School*, and *Blind* also draw on the framework in their comparisons and case studies, although at times more implicitly. These articles both aim to provide more accurate descriptions of the ideas about nationhood that dominates policy-making *and* how these ideational differences are

causally linked to policy differences. Regarding the latter, the approach builds on insights from process-tracing. The process-tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal process between an independent variable and the outcome of the dependent variable. This might be done in an inductive, theory-generating manner, or in a more deductive, theory-testing manner (Beach and Pedersen 2012, chap. 2). But in this study it has been a process of going back and forth between theory, data collection, and analysis. In this endeavor every kind of evidence, or 'causal-process observations' (Mahoney 2012), can be employed to upgrade our confidence in the explanation. It is often likened to detective work in it tries to collect bits and pieces of evidence to the point where the explanation has attained sufficient credibility (Gerring 2007, 173).

Process-tracing involves the use of different kinds of empirical tests. Van Evera (1997, 31-32) distinguishes four such tests of which so-called *hoop tests* and *smoking gun tests* are the most relevant (see also Mahoney 2012, 571-72 and Bennett 2010, 210-11). A hoop test proposes that if a given piece of evidence is not present our confidence in the hypothesis is severely downgraded, while its presence only slightly upgrades our confidence. Conversely, smoking gun tests propose that if a given piece of evidence is present we strongly upgrade our confidence in the hypothesis, while it only slightly downgrades our confidence if it is not present. The kind of data used in this thesis—parliamentary debates, government publications, committee reports, party manifestos, and newspaper articles—only lends itself to developing a series of hoop tests that, taken together, strengthens our confidence in the public philosophy explanation proposed. These kinds of data concern *public* statements and arguments and does not provide unfiltered access to why policy-makers in key political situations perceived certain phenomena as problematic and why they regarded certain solutions as justified. The use of ideas may well be instrumentally and post-hoc justificatory in an effort to frame public debate to one's advantage. Consequently, it is difficult to formulate good smoking gun tests that unambiguously disclose the meaning political actors themselves invested their actions with, and the extent to which they felt constrained by the particular political dynamics of the policy area.

The table below summarises the kind of empirical tests that are (often implicitly) employed in the different articles and in chapter four—although the articles do not phrase it in the process-tracing language. They concern the timing, distinctiveness, and stability of nationalist arguments and policy changes. A strong analytical narrative is constructed by tracking consistency along these dimensions over time.

Table 3.1: The kind of empirical tests employed in the different papers and in chapter four

Timing	Distinctiveness	Stability
1. Mainstream parties do not change their notions of nationhood when the material circumstances change. 2. Notions of nationhood are present within at least some mainstream parties before politicisation. 3. At least some mainstream parties present nationalist arguments to support or reject integration policies.	1. The within-case variation in how the nation is conceptualised by mainstream political parties is distinct. 2. The within-case variation in the kind of policy solutions considered (policy area and instrument) by the government and opposition is distinct.	1. Policy proposals are aligned with previous ideological commitments. 2. Policy changes are incremental. 3. The *kind* of policies considered does not fluctuate with the party-ideological orientation of government. 4. The dominant notion of nationhood does not change with the policy area or venue.

The following two sections further discuss the weaknesses and strengths of the data sources employed and the design of the quantitative content analysis of parliamentary debates.

3.1 Data sources

The analyses in this thesis both benefit from analysing primary sources and the findings of existing research. As mentioned, the primary sources used are parliamentary debates, government publications, committee reports, party manifestos, and newspaper articles. However, differences in policy-making and the degree of politicisation of integration issues affect the kind of documents mainly analysed in the three Scandinavian countries. Regarding integration requirements for permanent residence and naturalisation, political initiation in Norway and Sweden has been followed by the creation of government-appointed commissions that independently reports on what is problematic about the existing rules and possible solutions. Especially in Norway, these commission reports have resulted in comprehensive government white papers on the broad principles and goals of immigration integration policy. Such white papers were published in 1997, 2004, and 2012, and were received with broad support from all mainstream parties. The Swedish commissions often include representatives from parliamentary parties which arguably help to maintain the strong Swedish political consensus on immigrant integration issues.

In Denmark there is no tradition of using expert commissions to discuss and fashion such policies (Jørgensen 2011). In fact, the Danish government,

as a consequence of the constitution, has power to decide on naturalisation requirements without it being discussed and passed by parliament. Instead, Danish immigrant integration politics is characterised by political parties themselves developing policy proposals and then presenting them for public debate. Consequently, the analysis of Denmark is more oriented towards parliamentary debates and newspaper articles; the Norwegian analyses focuses more on policy documents/commissioned reports, while the Swedish analyses falls in between. This is less so when it comes to the analysis of Danish and Swedish citizenship education policies for public schools (article *School*). Within this policy area, Danish governments have also, like Sweden, appointed commissions to report on policy solutions—although the mandate of the Danish commissions typically defines beforehand the kind of policy solutions to consider.

Public statements, from parties or governments, might exhibit systematic bias between the ideas they promote, and the ideas they most believe in. Systematic bias will often be connected to strategic considerations regarding the positions of other political parties (maintaining consensus or dissensus), earlier commitments, and perceptions of how certain kind of statements and arguments are generally received by the public or the party's constituency. This does not necessarily affect the evidential value because a public philosophy explanation, as argued in chapter two, does not depend on ideas being internalised by political actors. The stabilisation of policy-making around a certain set of ideas might well be caused by more strategic calculations of political parties.

Public statements might also exhibit implicitness 'in the sense that much information is not expressed, but only understood to be implied or presupposed' (van Dijk 2000: 91). This mostly concerns parliamentary debates and newspaper articles, because they are more immediate reactions than comprehensive white papers and reports that has several authors and have been many months, if not years, in the making. Ideas about nationhood may have a weak presence in the documents analysed, if those ideas are a widely shared premise of the discussion, and therefore no one feel the need to express them explicitly. This can especially be a problem, if they are widely shared in the form of cultural frames that political actors employ unreflectively to make sense of social and political phenomena.

Finally, parliamentary debates are often not a good venue to find a sufficient representation of the ideological underpinnings of new legislation. It is not uncommon that such debates are reduced to political opponents trying to expose each other's inconsistencies and opportunistic behavior, dissatisfaction with the policy-making process, minor technicalities in the legislation, and the actual consequences of the law proposal. Conversely, a white paper

presents a rather coherent, negotiated story and does not provide insight into the disagreements that arose in the process of its making.

Consequently, the problems of bias, implicitness, and venue require that this study uses a range of different types of public statements and documents to uncover the ideologically distinct character of national immigrant integration politics. Public statements and documents associated with different kinds of venues, media, and policy areas might differ in the degree and kind of bias and implicitness they show. However, if there is a certain ideational consistency and stability across different kinds of public statements and documents, we can be fairly confident that national immigrant integration politics operate within a bounded conceptual space. Comparison to other similar case studies will reveal if it is also a *nationally* distinct conceptual space.

3.2 Qualitative content analysis

The thesis includes two content analyses. The first concerns the way nationhood is presented in Danish newspaper articles that are either lengthy interviews with or authored by leading party members. It is presented in the article *Blind*. The second is a content analysis of parliamentary debates on the general principles of integration policy and the rules for permanent residence and naturalisation. This is presented in chapter four. Regarding the first content analysis, it followed a deductively formed coding scheme inspired by the conceptual framework developed in the article *Willed*. However, the aim was *also* to uncover the extent to which the Danish Social Democrats and the Liberal Party presented indefinite or vague notions about nationhood—that is, statements that mention nationhood as important without specifying its relation to the integration process. The second analysis also applies the conceptual framework developed in *Willed* and contributes to the overall analysis by tracing whether there are relatively consistent national differences in how nationhood has been conceptualised in national parliamentary debates since the late 1990s. This analysis only concerns more definite references to nationhood and its relation to the integration process. Because the content analysis of parliamentary debates is not presented in a separate article, the methodology behind it is described in detail below.

The analysis covers parliamentary debates within three selected time periods between 1997 and 2014. The time periods were chosen according to which years important policy changes and parliamentary debates occurred, and to make sure that the time periods overlap in order to give some control for possible effects of major international events—particularly the shock of the 9/11 terrorist attack, and the financial crisis in the late 2000s. The table

below shows the selected time periods including the ideological leaning of government (centre-left or centre-right) and number of relevant parliamentary debates within the time period. For a complete list of the parliamentary debates analysed see the appendix.

Table 3.2: Time periods covered by the content analysis of parliamentary debates

	Time period 1	Time period 2	Time period 3
Sweden	Mar 1997 – Dec 1997 Government: centre-left 2 parliamentary debates	Jun 2000 – Mar 2003 Government: centre-left 4 parliamentary debates	Mar 2013 – May 2014 Government: centre-right 2 parliamentary debates
Denmark	Nov 1997 – Apr 1998 Government: centre-left 4 parliamentary debates	Mar 2001 – Feb 2004 Government: centre-right 7 parliamentary debates	Mar 2010 – Apr 2012 Government: centre-right → centre-left (Nov 2011) 4 parliamentary debates
Norway	Feb 1997 - Jun 1997 Government: centre-left 1 parliamentary debate	Apr 2002 – May 2005 Government: centre-right 6 parliamentary debates	Nov 2011 – Mar 2013 Government: centre-left 4 parliamentary debates

The documents were initially approached using a deductively formed coding scheme based on the conceptual framework from *Willed*. In the coding process, the coding scheme was adjusted several times, as the material gave rise to new considerations on the kind of arguments that expressed a voluntaristic or deterministic logic on the individual or collective dimension. The final coding scheme is described in the appendix.

The unit of analysis is political statements and arguments. Only arguments that can reasonably be argued to relate to one or both of the two dimensions of boundary construction are coded. The coding scheme is rather crude. On both dimensions, arguments are coded as either mainly deterministic or mainly voluntaristic. A more fine-grained coding scheme that tried to distinguish statements as moderately or highly to one side would increase the difficulty of the interpretive choices made and, hence, decrease the transparency of the analysis.

A statement or argument is considered nationalist if it relies on an politically valorises a sense of nationhood. It does so when it explicitly or implicitly refers to the societal importance of citizens sharing a sense of commonality. However, nationalist statements may be too indeterminate to be placed within the conceptual framework. For example, a statement such as 'a common political culture is necessary to hold society together', says nothing about whether the norms and values of this political culture are difficult to

adopt for the individual or fixed and unsusceptible to collective action. In other words, a nationalist statement may refer to certain cultural content but remain silent on the logic of nation-building. The opposite can also be the case. For example, stating that 'descendants of immigrants will find it easier to adapt to Danish society, as they will probably have been brought up by Danish norms to a greater extent' does not say anything about the cultural content of nationhood, but it clearly builds on a deterministic logic on both the individual and collective dimension: Adapting to society requires a sense of its foundational norms that can only be achieved by deep socialisation.

The following chapter begins by presenting the content analysis of parliamentary debates. The results of the content analysis structure the subsequent analysis of immigrant integration politics in the three Scandinavian countries. The analysis both summarises findings from *Naturalisation*, *School*, and *Blind* as well as introduces some new elements.

Chapter 4: Nationhood and Scandinavian Immigrant Integration Politics

This chapter is partly a summary of the analysis in four out the five papers of this thesis, but it also presents some a new content analysis of parliamentary debates to support the overall argument. The analysis is structured in three main parts. The first summarises the content analysis (see Table 4.1). This analysis does not appear in any of the five papers and is thus given more attention here. This is followed by three short case analyses that both summarise results from the papers and show how they relate to the content analysis of the parliamentary debates. The third part is a short summary of the article *School* on Swedish and Danish citizenship education politics. The chapter ends with a summary of the overall argument of the thesis.

4.1 Permanent residence and naturalisation

Within the time period covered in this thesis, mid-to-late 1990s to early 2010s, Swedish and Norwegian politics on permanent residence and naturalisation have been characterised by a high degree of stability and consensus among the mainstream parties. In Denmark, these issues have been heavily politicised by the centre-right parties. This has resulted in new legislation on almost a yearly basis since the centre-right government (consisting of the Liberals and the Conservatives) took office in November 2001.

In the parliamentary debates from the three selected time periods between 1997 and 2014 (see Table 3.2), two strong, expected similarities appear across debates and the three countries. First, all parties are highly concerned with getting immigrants employed, not just to make them economically self-sufficient and lessen the pressure on state finances, but also because being part of a workplace is pictured as the most important driver of social, cultural, and sometimes even political integration. This is no surprise in the deep society-penetrating, universal Scandinavian welfare states, where 'the provision of paid work takes precedence over social assistance as a means of helping citizens to obtain a livelihood' (Ketscher 2007, 144). Above all, the good citizen is a taxpayer who does not unnecessarily burden the public finances (Borevi 2014, 4; Mouritsen 2013, 101). Hence, all three states have comparatively high expenditures on activation measures and have developed some of the most comprehensive introduction programmes for im-

migrants (Breidahl 2012; Djuve and Kavli 2007). At the same time, the workplace is a place of socialisation, learning, and empowerment. Earning your own income is linked to self-respect, and the workplace is presented as the most effective societal site to foster interaction between immigrant groups and the majority and to further both learning the language and understanding the cultural differences. However, the exact emphasis on cultural socialisation and individual empowerment differs between especially Denmark and Sweden, where it is far more often linked to cultural socialisation in Danish politics.

Second, all nationalist statements from mainstream political parties express the national self-understanding in terms of liberal-democratic values. Not least, the same values are typically mentioned: democracy, equality, tolerance, and freedom. Again, this is by far a surprise—one might even say a non-starter in a Western context—that mainstream political argumentation circumscribes religion and ethnicity as relevant when concerned with the end-goal of the integration process. Consequently, how national mainstream politicians talk about immigrant integration in the three Scandinavian states appears to correspond to Christian Joppke's diagnosis of a liberal convergence, according to which nationhood is ineffectively expressed in a liberal universalist register, while economic self-sufficiency becomes the overriding policy goal. Still, the three states have diverged in their integration requirements for permanent residence and citizenship. Given their highly similar starting points in terms of institutions, policies, and understanding of the good citizenry, it seems natural to direct attention to party political dynamics to understand this divergence (Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup 2008).

However, ideational differences do appear if instead of looking at the normative content of nationhood, we look towards the processual level of nationhood described in *Willed* and *Paradox*. Coding the parliamentary debates according to the individual and collective processual dimensions of nationhood, some stark contrasts emerge between the frequency and kind of nationalist arguments found among Danish, Swedish, and Norwegian mainstream parties. Table 4.1 below summarises the results of this content analysis for all selected parliamentary debates (see the Appendix for a full list of the debates analysed).

Table 4.1: Arguments in parliamentary debates coded according to party and the processual dimensions of nationhood

	Collective dimension (deterministic/voluntaristic)			Individual dimension (deterministic/voluntaristic)		
	Time 1	Time 2	Time 3	Time 1	Time 2	Time 3
Norway[a]	*0 / 5*	*6 / 8*	*4 / 16*	*0 / 1*	*7 / 1*	*3 / 5*
Conservative Party	0 / 0	5 / 1	0 / 1	0 / 0	2 / 0	0 / 0
Christian Democratic Party	0 / 1	1 / 2	2 / 2	0 / 0	3 / 0	0 / 1
Centre Party	0 / 2	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 1	0 / 0	0 / 0
Liberal Party	0 / 0	0 / 2	0 / 2	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0
Labour Party	0 / 2	0 / 2	2 / 8	0 / 0	2 / 0	3 / 1
Socialist Left Party	0 / 0	0 / 3	0 / 3	0 / 0	0 / 1	0 / 3
Denmark[b]	*14 / 1*	*21 / 6*	*9 / 0*	*6 / 0*	*23 / 6*	*10 / 2*
Conservative Party	4 / 0	1 / 0	3 / 0	3 / 0	8 / 0	1 / 0
Liberal Party	10 / 0	19 / 0	6 / 0	3 / 0	15 / 0	9 / 0
Social Liberal Party	0 / 0	0 / 3	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 3	0 / 0
Social Democrats	0 / 0	1 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 1	0 / 0
Socialist People's Party	0 / 1	0 / 3	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 2	0 / 2
Sweden[c]	*2 / 27*	*2 / 31*	*0 / 16*	*1 / 10*	*2 / 7*	*0 / 12*
Conservative Party	2 / 3	2 / 3	0 / 4	0 / 2	0 / 0	0 / 3
Christian Democrats	0 / 3	0 / 4	0 / 0	1 / 1	1 / 2	0 / 0
Centre Party	0 / 4	0 / 5	0 / 2	0 / 1	0 / 2	0 / 3
Liberal Party	0 / 2	0 / 2	0 / 5	0 / 2	0 / 1	0 / 2
Social Democrats	0 / 15	0 / 11	0 / 3	0 / 4	0 / 1	0 / 3
Green Party	0 / 0	0 / 6	0 / 2	0 / 0	1 / 1	0 / 1

a. Conservative Party (*Høyre*), Christian Democratic Party (*Kristelig Folkparti*), Centre Party (*Senterpartiet*), Liberal Party (*Venstre*), Labour Party (*Arbeiderpartiet*), and Socialist Left Party (*Sosialistisk Venstreparti*).

b. Conservative Party (*Det Konservative Folkeparti*), Liberal Party (*Venstre*), Social Liberal Party (*Radikale Venstre*), Social Democrats (*Socialdemokraterne*), and Socialist People's Party (*Socialistisk Folkeparti*).

c. Conservative Party (*Moderaterna*), Christian Democrats (*Kristdemokraterna*), Centre Party (*Centerpartiet*), Liberal Party (*Liberalerna*), Social Democrats (*Socialdemokraterna*), and Green Party (*Miljöpartiet*).

In Denmark, the centre-left parties only infrequently argue in nationalist terms, while the centre-right parties—albeit mostly the Liberal Party—quite consistently promote a collectively and individually deterministic notion of nationhood. Striking is the lack of nationalist arguments from the Social

Democrats. Indeed, throughout the debates analysed, the Social Democrats do not at any point try to contest the deterministic image of nationhood presented by the centre-right parties. Only the Social Liberal Party and the Socialist People's Party occasionally challenge this notion of nationhood.

In contrast, the Swedish debates are quite uniformly dominated by a collectively and individually voluntaristic notion of nationhood, although with a stronger emphasis on the collective dimension. Especially in the first two time periods, the Social Democrats stress the negotiability and active development of Swedish nationhood in the face of increasing cultural pluralism, and their arguments clearly resonate with those of the other parties. More deterministic notions of collective nationhood are voiced a few times by the Conservative Party, which early on appears more uneasy with a voluntaristic idea of nationhood.

In the Norwegian debates, the picture is less clear. The debates contain fewer nationalist statements, but there is also less consistency in the statements. On the collective dimension, the centre-right parties are more skewed towards a deterministic viewpoint, while the centre-left parties present more voluntaristic arguments. Arguments on the individual dimension are fewer. Here, the second time period stands out as a point when deterministic arguments were more emphasised. Despite this more confusing appearance of Norwegian politics, this was not something that aroused the political parties. The different political parties did not provoke each other with their different arguments. In fact, the debates were characterised by a high degree of consensus. This consensus has manifested itself in three government white papers from 1997, 2004, and 2012, respectively, setting out the government's broad philosophy of integration in terms of principles and goals, and the different policies it would pursue in the years to come. Each white paper received broad support from all political parties except the far-right Progress Party.

These ideational differences are not mainly a product of party political dynamics. Instead, they are ideas that are more ingrained in the political systems, deciding if and how mainstream parties compete on issues of immigrant integration. In both Denmark and Sweden, rather clear opposite notions of what the integration process entails culturally have come to dominate. This is not because these ideas constitute elements of a public philosophy that all mainstream parties believe in equally, but because there is no strong opposition to them; no parties that had publicly committed themselves to contrasting notions of nationhood. The lack of opposition from especially the Social Democrats in Denmark and the Conservatives in Sweden is central to understanding the different policy developments. The difference is that while the Swedish Conservatives occasionally openly support the

dominant voluntaristic notion of nationhood, the Danish Social Democrats have never committed themselves to the deterministic notion of nationhood promoted by the centre-right parties. The paper *Blind* argues that they, in fact, have never committed themselves to a more definite, ideological position on nationhood. Between the relatively clear visions in Danish and Swedish politics is the tension of Norwegian integration politics. Behind the strong mainstream consensus is an ambiguous notion of Norwegian nationhood that has helped to keep integration requirements a rather depoliticised issue. The following three sections give a fuller description of the three cases.

4.1.1 Denmark

Unlike in Sweden and Norway, Danish governments have never attempted to formulate comprehensive white papers detailing the principles and goals of immigrant integration policy. Instead, public discussion is characterised by political parties formulating policy proposals on their own without reference to some larger, thorough committee work.

Immigration and integration issues have been high on the political agenda in Denmark since the mid-1990s (Holm 2007, 21; Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup 2008) and, not least, been a defining issue of several national parliamentary elections, including the most recent in 2015. In the same period, immigrant integration policies have almost exclusively been developed in a more restrictive direction. Although the success of the far-right Danish People's Party has affected the saliency of immigration and integration issues, it is mainly the decision in the early to mid-1990s by the two centre-right parties, the Liberal Party and the Conservatives to politicise immigration issues and more openly and persistently promote a deterministic notion of nationhood that has pushed policies in a more restrictive direction. Green-Pedersen and Odmalm (2008) argue that the coalitional opportunity structure changed for the centre-right parties with the centrist Social Liberal Party choosing to form government with the Social Democrats (SD) in 1993 *and* the increasing success of the Danish People's Party with their founding in October 1995. The Social Liberal Party, a more diversity- and immigration-friendly party, had traditionally, with success, cooperated with both left-wing and right-wing coalitions. However, by the mid-1990s, pursuing a government alternative with the Social Liberal Party was becoming increasingly unrealistic.

Still, this strategical change by the centre-right parties did not constitute a change in or a rebalancing of the ideological commitments of the party. Instead, it appeared more as if a restraint was lifted by not having to cooperate with a centrist, progressive party. The change was not associated with signif-

icant internal disagreements, and already before the early 1990s, several members of especially the Liberal Party opposed the (lack of) government policy by increasingly arguing in public for more restrictive immigration policies without any consequences for their positions within the parties (Jørgensen 2006, 231-32). Moreover, in the few parliamentary debates in the 1980s, there was always an expectation that immigrants would to some extent adapt to Danish norms and traditions (Holm 2007, 93-101).

Since then, the centre-right parties have never really looked back and have continued politicising integration issues, arguing for increasingly more restrictive policies. The articles *Naturalisation* and the latter half of the paper *Willed* describe the deterministic notion of nationhood that the centre-right parties built many of their policies around—which is also evident in Table 4.1. This philosophy of integration is based on a bottom-up understanding of how nationhood, social cohesion, and the welfare state are causally tied in together. Both for the individual and society, the production of nationhood and social cohesion—the foundation of a well-functioning welfare state—is based on a slow, organic socialisation process whereby everyone becomes embedded in the same kind of societal experiences.

The Social Democrats have gradually accepted most of the policy proposals presented by the centre-right parties. The paper *Blind* argues that the reason for this is not that they were actually committed to the philosophy of integration of the centre-right parties, or indeed had an ambiguous relationship to it. Instead, the party never developed an ideological commitment to any notion of nationhood that speaks to the relationship between a multicultural society and the universal welfare state. This ideological blindness actually allowed them strategic space to adapt their policies in an attempt to defuse integration issues because it reduced the risk of party fragmentation as long as the party remained ideologically uncommitted. This also shows in Table 4.1, in which it is clear that the party avoids arguing in terms of culture and nationhood.

The Social Liberal Party and the Socialist People's Party do take offense by a deterministic notion of nationhood. Especially the latter has infrequently argued for a more voluntaristic understanding. However, on most occasions, these two parties have opposed restrictive integration policies on humanitarian grounds or because they believe them to counter-act the integration of immigrants by creating uncertainty and misrecognition. Still, the two parties support language, knowledge, and employment requirements but argue that they should be far less demanding to accommodate.

In conclusion, a deterministic notion of nationhood promoted by the centre-right parties and the Danish People's Party quickly came to dominate Danish integration politics because it has not met a firm counter-image of

the nation from the centre-left parties. In fact, the Social Democrats appear to remain in the blind on what cultural integration actually entails. The lack of opposition has created a situation today in which a civic assimilationist and deterministic notion of nationhood is deeply ingrained in Danish integration politics.

4.1.2 Sweden

Already in 1975, Sweden developed a comprehensive 'immigrant and minority policy' (Prop. 1975/76:26) oriented towards affirming and supporting immigrants' ethnic identities (Borevi 2002, 89-96). Immigrants and their children were to be given a 'real possibility to retain their own language, practice their cultural activities and maintain contact with the country of origin' (Prop. 1975/76:26).[51] However, these multicultural ambitions were downplayed in the mid-1980s following two critical government-appointed investigations (Borevi 2002, 105-08) and, again, in the 1997 integration policy (Prop. 1997/98:16), when it was incorrectly portrayed as a paradigmatic shift (Borevi 2014). However, this did not affect many of the policies already in place, such as the right to mother-tongue instruction and support for immigrant organisations.

What did remain from the initial formulations of the integration policy was a strong focus on a top-down, welfare state integration logic according to which the extension of rights—particularly social rights—is believed to be a necessary condition for the fostering of individual empowerment and a sense of national belonging (Borevi 2014). The paper *Naturalisation* argues that citizenship continues to be perceived mostly as a vehicle for the extension of rights and is in itself largely vacuous of national sentiment. Still, the Conservative Party opposed dual citizenship as a right in 2001, stressing the need to create a strong sense of belonging. Moreover, since the late 1990s, the Conservative Party have supported a language requirement for citizenship, which the Liberal Party also began to support with success in the 2002 parliamentary election. In government, the two parties initiated a revitalisation of citizenship by appointing a commission to deliver a report on, among other things, potential ways of using citizenship as an incitement for further integration (SOU 2013:29). However, the report discouraged the use of a language requirement, and the ensuing law proposal only introduced a new voluntary citizenship ceremony that received broad support from the opposition parties. The law proposal emphasised the symbolic value of citizenship but was also void of any reference to a fixed notion of nationhood, stressing

[51] Translation from Borevi (2014: 711).

instead that 'the ceremonies must express the notion that Swedish citizenship is proof that a person is Swedish' (Prop 2013/14:143, 15).

In the analysis of parliamentary debates, summarised in Table 4.1, the Conservative Party in the late 1990s (first time period) and early 2000s (second time period) also appear ambiguous on the notion of nationhood that should inform citizenship policies. Especially in the 1997 debates, the Conservative Party talked about a rooted Swedish culture being the foundation of a multicultural society:

> The Swedish profile, its particularity, is very important and a source of pride and belonging for native Swedes. Our common cultural heritage and history must not be relativised. It must provide the foundation as we build our future together in a new era (Riksdagsprotokoll 1997/98:38).

Furthermore, they stressed the importance of the Swedish language to create a deeper relation to the nation and proposed a language requirement. Still, they simultaneously appreciated that cultural pluralism was inevitable and positive and that society at large must open itself up and accept cultural diversity in order to flourish in a globalised world. For example, in the 2003 parliamentary debate on the principles of Swedish integration policy, the Conservatives' spokesperson unambiguously stated that 'if you are participating in society, then you are Swedish' (Riksdagsprotokoll 2002/03:79), distancing the party from any notion of Swedish nationhood as culturally fixed and unnegotiable.

Turning to the Social Democrats, we find a much more clear idea of nationhood as something that is *created* both by the collectivity and the individual. In the parliamentary debates in the late 1990s, the government made it clear: 'Integration is ultimately intended to create a "we" of the ethnic and cultural diversity' (Riksdagsprotokoll 1997/98:38) and 'on the individual level, integration ought to be regarded as a life project, the content and goals of which is up to the individual' (Prop. 1997/98:16). The government proposition for a new integration policy spelled out the dialogical character of this intentional reconstruction of the national identity:

> In order to develop society together, we must create a new national community. Mutual respect and tolerance are the cornerstones of such a task, but also creativity and fearlessness and a desire from all to dare to meet the different and the unknown. (Prop. 1997/98:16, p. 24).

This view manifests itself in two broadly held beliefs, especially among the centre-left parties. First, it is important to include immigrants in politics and the public sector in order to provide a multicultural perspective on basic universal values and on how to realise them in policy and practice. Second, it is

indeed possible to actively (albeit slowly) shape the public opinion. The responsible politician is portrayed as taking on a special obligation to steer the public opinion towards appreciating the multicultural society as a precondition for developing a just national identity.

Throughout the parliamentary debates analysed, all political parties point to structural discrimination as the single-most significant hindrance to the inclusion of immigrants and their descendants into society and the development of a more shared, inclusive national identity. Therefore, particularly the majority ethnic group and state institutions are in need of adjustment, not minority immigrant groups. Ethnic Swedes must learn to become more open and tolerant in the sense of accepting cultural diversity as something positive and becoming sensitised to the different forms that discrimination may take (this point is also stressed in *Naturalisation*). State institutions must develop multicultural competence and supply a more culturally flexible service, making it easier for immigrants to both identify with and use state institutions and services.

Swedish citizenship policies are generally characterised by broad political consensus and stability. It is an area of politics with a low degree of societal and political salience. Occasionally, ideological tension has surfaced within the Conservative Party. This, along with the need to cooperate with other centre-right parties more clearly oriented towards a voluntaristic notion of nationhood, has helped to keep the Swedish citizenship policies the most permissive in Western Europe.

4.1.3 Norway

Initially, when Norway began to develop their approach to immigrant integration in the early to mid-1970s they proposed multicultural ambitions similar to those of Sweden. However, they quickly retreated from these notions again in the late 1970s (Brochmann and Hagelund 2010, 231). During the 1980s, a strong political consensus was forged against the influence of the far-right Progress Party (Brochmann and Hagelund 2010, 244-47), which continues to characterise integration politics to this day—even with the Progress Party now in government.[52] Consequently, citizenship policies have also been remarkably stable in Norway.

Similar to Sweden in both timing and content, the Norwegian government also published a white paper on immigrant integration in 1997. This was followed by a new white paper in 2004 and again in 2012. Each white paper is comprehensive, planned years ahead, and have been preceded by

[52] Following the 2013 parliamentary elections, the Conservative Party formed a government with the Progress Party.

one or more expert commissions discussing aspects of immigrant integration. Moreover, all mainstream political parties have supported the broad principles and goals of the white papers.

The three white papers present similar arguments but also has marked differences. Each white paper clearly describes cultural pluralism as something that enriches and strengthens society (St.meld. 17 1996-97, 7-8; St. meld. 49 2003-04, 18-20; St.meld. 6 2012-13, 50, 104). Each argues that cultural diversity is economically beneficial in an ever more changing and globalised world where old responses and solutions are becoming inadequate. Diversity facilitates the creativity and communicative skills to develop new ideas. Each white paper also stresses the right of immigrants to retain their cultural identity and that society's institutions should accommodate this basic right. However, all three white papers also argue that liberal-democratic values limit the kinds of cultural practices and traditions that can be accepted; that there are certain societal ground rules, as they express it (St. meld. 17 1996-97, 9; St. meld. 49 2003-04, 30-34; St. meld. 6 2012-3, 11, 105-08). In discussing these values, both the majority population and immigrant groups are targeted. Immigrants are expected to leave behind any cultural practices that are harmful or diminish the opportunities of particularly women to participate in society. On the other hand, the majority is asked to change old conceptions of what it means to be a Norwegian and enter a broad societal dialogue on nationhood to open it up to cultural differences. A voluntaristic approach to the collective self-understanding is centre stage in all three white papers. 'Everyone who lives in Norway must be able to see themselves as part of the Norwegian community' (St. meld. 6 2012-13, 103), as the 2012 white paper succinctly sums it up.

However, ideational shifts are also seen between each white paper. In 1997, a more one-sided focus is seen on anti-discrimination measures and the removal of barriers for equal participation in society, which, in the following white papers, is supplemented by a strong focus on how to build national belonging and trust in a multicultural society. The article *Willed* shows how the 2004 white paper has a highly deterministic view of individual national identity formation. Only the children of immigrants are expected to be able to form a Norwegian identity because their experiences of childhood and early adulthood will be shaped by the institutional confines of the Norwegian state: public kindergarten and school. The same cannot be expected of immigrants because their formative years have been lived out within another state and with another culture and institutional set-up. Hence, only the children have the potential to form a strong basis for social cohesion in a multicultural society according to the 2004 white paper. This distinction between what can be expected of adult immigrants and their children is not

present in the 2012 white paper. Although it still emphasises the building of trust—not least how Norway stands out as a society that has historically produced comparatively high trust levels. However, the important underlying mechanisms of trust building are located in the economic and social equality of residents, meeting respect from others and, generally, a large degree of interaction between different groups and individuals in society (St. meld. 6 2012-13, 103-04). Although strongly present in all three white papers, the 2012 white paper exhibits a more pure form of the top-down, universal welfare state logic according to which the broad inclusion of individuals into the labour market and just and well-functioning welfare state institutions are enough to bring about positive and sufficient cultural integration processes.

Comparing to the parliamentary debates, we see that the Conservative Party stands out on the collective dimension in the debates 2002-2006 by emphasising a more deterministic perspective not present in the 2004 white paper. However, this was not noticed or challenged by the other parties. Indeed, none of the deterministic statements on the collective dimension resulted in remarks from the other parties. Although the white papers do not present an equally clear and coherent understanding of the *individual* processes of cultural integration, none of the parliamentary statements on this dimension was met with opposition. Disagreement only regarded specific policy proposals or the lack hereof.

The fact that consensus between the mainstream parties has been kept intact despite ideational shifts (of emphasis) in the white papers and the presence of seemingly oppositional views in the parliamentary debates point to the conclusion that the ideological tension that the 2004 white paper displays is at the heart of Norwegian integration politics. The paper *Naturalisation* also argues this to be the case and points to the rejection of a right to dual citizenship in 2005 as another incident where this tension surfaces. The tension stems from wanting to create a new, more culturally inclusive notion of what it means to be Norwegian at the same time as national identity is understood as something deeply rooted in the individual that can only be cultivated or altered by extensive socialisation processes. How to balance a need to push immigrants and their children towards extensive participation in important arenas of socialisation such as kindergarten, schools, work-places, sport clubs and so on, while simultaneously shaping these arenas to be more inclusive of cultural diversity? Integration requirements are an ambiguous policy instrument to use in order to strike this balance. They may well incentivise societal participation, but it could be at the cost of developing a sense of inclusiveness among immigrants.

The paper *Blind* (briefly) argues that this ideological tension has contributed to the de-politicisation of citizenship policies. Unable to resolve this

tension and provide unambiguous answers, the mainstream parties seem to have settled on delaying discussions by delegating them to internal and external commissions. This change of venue helps to minimise and postpone public debate and, later on, legitimise political (in)action (Hansen and Koehler 2005).

4.2 Citizenship education in Denmark and Sweden

The article *School* examines how Denmark and Sweden have responded to increasing immigration and cultural diversity in their citizenship education policies (concerning primary and lower secondary schooling). Both countries have indeed responded by trying to alter citizenship education in order to promote national cohesion and belonging. Sweden, unlike Denmark, has strengthened mother-tongue instruction and bilingual instruction, implemented a secular and cosmopolitan approach to teaching religion and systematically reduced the lessons assigned to teaching history and, instead, increased lessons in civics with emphasis on democratic literacy. Denmark has gone in the opposite direction by removing the right to mother-tongue instruction, giving strong priority to Christianity in teaching religion and a mandatory History canon—to name the most central elements. The article *School* argues that this reflects how the deterministic notion of nationhood present in the Danish politics of permanent residence and citizenship also dominates school politics, while a voluntaristic notion of nationhood dominates Swedish school politics.

On these matters, Danish school politics have been slightly more contentious than Swedish school politics, which is generally highly consensual (although there are differences of emphasis). Still, as the paper *Blind* argues, the Danish Social Democrats have not challenged the nationalist re-orientation of school politics pushed forward by the centre-right parties. Similar to how they have acted on issues regarding permanent residence and citizenship, they mostly accept the policy proposals of the centre-right parties without adopting their nationalist rhetoric; instead, choosing to remain highly agnostic on issues of nationhood and cultural integration. Instead, it is mainly the centrist and minor Social Liberal Party who challenges this approach to citizenship education.

In the concluding discussion, the article *School* argues that 'a civic assimilationist philosophy such as the Danish is more likely to transcend many policy areas than a civic multiculturalist philosophy such as the Swedish, which largely relies on voluntary and mutual adaptation.' The argument is that Sweden has also taken part in a broad West European civic turn but that

their approach to immigrant integration and national cohesion has turned them to largely denounce civic integration policies and, instead, direct their attention towards other policy areas such as citizenship education and anti-discrimination.

4.3 Summary

The overall argument of this thesis is that Danish, Swedish, and Norwegian immigrant integration politics has been dominated by different philosophies of integration that have greatly influenced the policies that governments have chosen to pursue. However, this is not because all mainstream parties are equally supportive of them. Instead, the stabilisation of policy-making around different notions of nationhood and national cohesion is influenced by the dynamics of party competition. In Denmark and Sweden, only one side of the political spectrum has been able to concertedly provide an ideologically clear answer—although more pronounced in the Danish case. Because the Danish centre-right parties largely agreed on an individually and collectively deterministic notion of nationhood—both internally and with each other—they could politicise integration issues and push for restrictive policies without risking fragmentation within the party or in the government coalition. The ideological blindness of the Social Democrats on issues of nationhood and cultural integration gave them room to adapt their policies without risking internal party fragmentation. Conversely, in Sweden, the centre-left parties are the ones who have been ideologically clarified in supporting an individually and collectively voluntaristic notion of nationhood. Instead, especially the Conservatives have experienced moderate ideological tension. This also gave the Conservatives a strategic interest in not politicising issues of nationhood and cultural integration. The centre-left parties have also been concerned with avoiding discussing such issues, but mainly because they wish to avoid activating the anti-immigrant sentiment in the population that they know is there. Lastly, the Norwegian immigrant integration politics has been characterised by a strong but confused and ambivalent consensus among the mainstream parties. This has resulted in quite stable policies but with no clear sense of direction. Table 4.2 summarises the overall argument.

Table 4.2: Summary of the overall argument of the thesis

	Political centre-right	Political centre-left	Dominant philosophy	Policy outcome
Denmark	Individually and collectively deterministic	Ideological tension (mainly the Social Democrats)	Individually and collectively deterministic	Restrictive direction Focus: citizenship and schooling
Norway	Ideological tension	Ideological tension	Ambivalent	Stable with no clear sense of direction
Sweden	Moderate ideological tension within Conservative Party	Individually and collectively voluntaristic	Individually and collectively voluntaristic	Inclusive direction Focus: schooling and anti-discrimination

This overall argument does not deny or preclude the importance of party competition for votes and office or coalitional politics. Public opinion, agenda-setting, and the distribution of votes and power between parties obviously affect how parties act strategically. However, the ideological commitments of parties also matter, and when it comes to immigrant integration politics in Scandinavia, national ideational differences have had a strong influence on the policy divergence that has taken place. Of course, the presence of progressive centre-right parties in Sweden and Norway that the Conservative parties have to cooperate with in order to form a viable government alternative affects how the Conservatives behave and which policies can be pursued. The choice of the Danish Social Liberal Party in the 1990s to form a more strong cooperation with the centre-left clearly influenced the choice of the Liberal Party and the Conservatives to politicise immigration and integration issues. Still, the strong ideological differences between the three countries cannot be explained by this party competition for votes and office and should instead be understood as a central part of the explanation. Denmark had never seen the ideological commitment to more voluntaristic notions of nationhood that we see in both Norway and Sweden. Thus, the turn to restrictive civic integration policies in Denmark does not represent a turn towards new ideas. Instead, it was a refashioning of old ideas somewhat suppressed by inter-party relationships and dependencies. Similarly, it is no coincidence that the Swedish Conservatives experience ideological tension. A voluntaristic notion of nationhood has been prevalent in Swedish politics, and even the Conservatives have at times supported it openly despite it not serving any strategic purpose. The same is seen in Norway, where all mainstream parties have a strong consensus on the rules for permanent residence and citizenship. They emphasise the multicultural character that Norwegian identity must try to reach while valuing the strong social trust that the existing na-

tional identity has produced. It is a tenuous position that they have, nonetheless, openly committed themselves to over the last 20 years.

Chapter 5: Concluding remarks

The civic turn has matured very differently in the otherwise comparatively similar Scandinavian countries. From the early 1990s, after the fall of the Berlin wall, all three countries experienced a heightened concern with nation-building. Increasingly, worries surfaced about the centrifugal forces that globalisation could unleash. This was particularly evident in school policies.[53] As the article *School* demonstrates, Danish and Swedish school policies diverged in their responses to nation-building concerns, similar to how they also gradually diverged in their requirements for permanent residence and naturalisation. Despite their many similarities, their different approaches to immigrant integration are routinely pictured by politicians and commentators as reflecting national self-understandings highly removed from each other. Especially politicians from the Danish centre-right are prone to single out Sweden as a telling example of how not to approach cultural integration, while particularly the Swedish centre-left parties do the same with Denmark. In between this battle for national superiority—which often turns into narcissism of (really) minor differences (Ignatieff 1999)—stands Norway, uncertain and uneasy about how to open up their beloved nation to (non-Western) immigrants.

Still, there is something to this characterisation of Denmark and Sweden, as the analyses in this thesis show. When analysed according to the conceptual framework developed in *Willed*, it is revealed how Danish and Swedish integration debates tend to employ highly different conceptions of nationhood. While Danish politics is dominated by an individually and collectively deterministic conception, Swedish politics centers on an individually and collectively voluntaristic conception. The differences pertain to the social processes behind cultural, not the normative content of nationhood. Hence, it flies under the radar of the diagnosis of liberal convergence and retreat of nationalism that different scholars argue describes recent developments within West European immigrant integration politics. These scholars tend to focus on the ideational convergence on liberal values. As the article *Paradox* argues, this 'thinning' of national identification, in the sense that national

[53] In Norway, this is evident in the analysis of school curricula in Briseid (2012). The article *School* describes how such concerns were elevated in Danish and Swedish school politics in the 1990s.

differences are weakening, does not in itself impede the continued political significance of national sentiment.

Instead, the ideational differences that have shaped the different civic turns in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway concern how nationhood, social cohesion, and the welfare state are *causally* tied together in the political imagination. All mainstream parties in each country tend to agree that a sense of national identity and belonging is important and should be a central goal of integration policies. However, in Denmark there is a predominance of a kind of bottom-up thinking where a strong national identity—individual or collective—is seen as a product of a slow, organic process at the same time as it is argued to be the foundation of solidarity and trust in the welfare state. Becoming integrated in the national community is seen to presuppose a deep, prolonged socialisation process towards a historically fixed notion of nationhood. Consequently, a strong sense of deservingness have governed policy-making on permanent residence and naturalisation, and emphasis has been put on the so-called 'culture-carrying subjects' in primary and lower secondary schooling to maintain and reproduce a definite sense of national identity. These ideas have pushed integration requirements and citizenship education in a more exclusive direction since the late 1990s, but especially between 2001 and 2011 under changing centre-right governments.

Conversely, Swedish integration politics combines a strong tradition of state-intervention—what some might term social engineering—with a voluntaristic notion of nationhood. This results in a kind of top-down thinking, where nationhood and cultural commonality is perceived as evolving through a process of voluntary, mutual adaptation that the state can support, if not navigate, by extending rights to newcomers and bringing them into a broad national dialogue on the character of the national community. Here, equal inclusion into the welfare state is seen as necessary to foster social cohesion and a shared sense of national identity. Consequently, naturalisation is seen as a rather administrative and non-sentimental step in the integration process, and integration requirements are generally perceived to be counterproductive and unfair. Instead, the Swedish civic turn is more focused on other policy-areas such as citizenship education in primary and lower secondary schooling. In schools civic integration is furthered by accommodating cultural differences and instituting intercultural education within a comprehensive, public school system. The goal is to make everyone take part in developing a more pluralist national self-understanding.

In between we find Norwegian politics with its ambiguity and uncertainty. Both the bottom-up and top-down perspective is present, although in more moderate versions. There seems to an acknowledgment that a strong, shared sense of nationhood can only develop slowly, at the same time as

changing governments have all stated that it is a goal of integration policy to develop a new, pluralist notion of nationhood. Norwegian governments encourage immigrants to naturalise but are increasingly concerned about their cultural integration. This ideological tension seems to have contributed to discussions about permanent residence and naturalisation being delegated to ministerial and expert commissions. This helps to reproduce a strong consensus between the mainstream parties.

When we look towards historical studies, it is indeed possible to find merit for distinguishing particularly Danish and Swedish national identity along the lines of processual assumptions. Numerous scholars have pointed out how notions of modernity and progressiveness have forcefully entered the Swedish national self-understanding in the post-war era (e.g., Andersson and Hilton 2009; Daun 1996; Heinö 2009). Some trace this back to the mass emigration to North America from the mid-1800s to the early 1920, where approximately 1.5 million persons left Sweden. This sparked a widespread self-reflection on national cohesion and character. A weak national identity and a slow modernisation process were emphasised as the drivers of emigration. This led to a new union of Swedishness and modernity. The dream of greatness was relocated to a bright future were Sweden would become a model industrial country for the rest of the world; the native land of modern values and the vanguard of social progress (Ruth 1984: 85). The experiences of the Second World War solidified the understanding that Sweden had (and should) left nationalism behind, and embraced modernity in a way that rendered history uninteresting (Johansson 1997). Heinö (2009, 311) even argues that 'anti-nationalism to some extent constitutes a part of contemporary national identity in Sweden.' These observations appear highly aligned with the Swedish voluntaristic conception of nationhood described in this thesis. The notion that it is possible for the national collective and the individual/newcomer to intentionally, mutually adapt with the help of the state's institutional engineering corresponds quite well to the rationalist, self-reflexive, and forward-looking national identity described in historical and sociological studies.

Danish historians invariably return to the events of the nineteenth century in order to shed light on the Danish self-understanding (e.g., Brincker 2003; Østergaard 1992; 2000; Hansen 2002). The loss of the better part of Danish territory in the Napoleonic Wars and Slesvigian Wars reduced Denmark to a small linguistically homogenous state. In between these wars democratic reform took place in 1849 which resulted in a highly liberal constitution. In the battle to define the new democratic people, the 'national liberals' prevailed. Denmark developed a self-understanding based on identity between language, people (*folk*), nation, and state. After the loss of Slesvig in

1864 an inward-looking, nationalist re-awakening inspired by romanticism and based on the rural society and peasant virtues took root in the masses—spearheaded by the priest N.F.S. Grundtvig (Østergaard 1992). These popular movements were highly opposed to the ruling elites. This romanticist, populist struggle against the state laid the groundwork for a Danish organic nationalism with the state elite as (one of) its defining other (Knudsen and Rothstein 1994). To this day politicians refer to 'the People' as *the* source of national authenticity and stay clear of any statement that might suggest that it is the People who need to change to make policies work instead of the policies. All in all, this seems to align with the analyses of Danish integration politics in this thesis, and the argument that a highly deterministic notion of nationhood has influenced policy-making.

Turning to Norway, it is more difficult to pin-point possible historical sources to the ideological tension charaterising integration policy-making. Norway became an independent nation state in 1905 after first 400 years of Danish rule followed by almost 100 years of Swedish rule. Gullestad (2006) claims that this is central to understanding how nationalism in Norway is generally considered "a positive, liberating and democratizing force" (2006, 71; see also Grimnes 1997, 142). The resistance of the Norwegian people during Second World War has equally been inscribed into this myth of Norwegian nationalism as a force for good (Grimnes 1997). The tension seem to lie in legitimating more *restrictive* integration requirements with a national self-understanding that most find is and should be a positive and liberating force.

Lastly, it is important to stress that the thesis has not suggested that the reason the public philosophies of integration described above have become dominant in national politics is that they have been internalised by most mainstream political parties. This appears particularly evident in Norway, where the stressful ideological position, that changing governments have all subscribed to, does not lend itself to crafting an unequivocal outlook on the world of immigration. Arguably, some political actors truly believe them, other seem to merely accept them as a premise of public debate.

In Danish politics, it is almost single-handedly the centre-right parties—in concert with the far-right Danish People's Party—that have explicitly promoted the highly deterministic view of the nation that dominates. It is rarely challenged by the other centre-left parties which have largely left the debate on nationhood and immigration aside. Especially the Social Democrats have been noticeably silent. This reflects their difficulties in finding an ideological stand-point on the relation between cultural pluralism and the universal welfare state. At the same time, the Social Democrats have gradually adopted

the policies of the centre-right parties; a strategic move that has been available to them because of their lack of previous ideological commitments.

In Swedish politics, it is particularly the centre-left that has promoted the highly voluntaristic perception of the nation that dominates. However, the centre-right parties do not shy away from expressing support for it. Still, in the late 1990s to early 2000s some ideological tension was visible; especially within the Conservative Party which showed a more ambiguous relationship to the voluntaristic vision of the nation. If this ambiguity has indeed been resolved today, it has been in favour of the voluntaristic notion of nationhood which keeps commanding the argumentation in the highly consensual Swedish integration politics.

Admittedly, Denmark is the only of the three countries where the centre-right government coalition does not depend on more centrist parties with strong humanitarian profiles. In Norway, the Conservative Party continues to depend on the Liberal Party and the Christian Democrat Party to form government, while the Conservative Party in Sweden depends on the Centre Party and the Christian Democrats. Has this difference caused the Conservatives in Sweden and Norway to constrain themselves? Would they otherwise have pursued more restrictive policies and promoted a more conservative understanding of the nation? The answer to this counter-factual question can only remain speculative. Starting with Sweden, both the Conservatives and the Liberal Party had proposed a language requirement for naturalisation, before they took office in 2006 as part of a coalition with the Centre Party and the Christian Democrats. Since, it has not made is way to a law proposal. Even if it is the presence of these two minor parties that have kept a language requirement off the table, little would leave us thinking that a situation in which the Conservative Party together with the Liberal Party made up a parliamentary majority would lead to *increasingly* restrictive integration requirements. In fact, the Liberal Party has a long history of vehemently opposing the far-right's proposals for more restrictive immigration and integration policies. Odmalm (2011, 1083) argues that it was indeed this history that allowed the party to propose a language requirement in the 2002 election without being branded as xenophobic. Moreover, although the Conservative Party might be a little uneasy about a voluntaristic notion of nationhood, they have supported it. That they feel some degree of ideological commitment to this approach to cultural integration is also evident in their strong reactions to the recent success of the far-right Sweden Democrats, which have been completely isolated since entering parliament in 2010.

Norway is a wholly different situation because of the ideological tension that pervades the strong mainstream consensus. It is a tenuous ideological position that could be negotiated in both a more restrictive and permissive

direction depending on the context. In many ways, it appears as if it is the value of a strong mainstream consensus in itself that keeps the public philosophy intact and policies stable. This might change if the Conservative Party had a parliamentary majority together with the far-right Progress Party. The question is how whole-heartedly their commitment to the multicultural ambitions in the 1997, 2004, and 2012 government white papers have actually been—and whether they can deviate from them without losing trustworthiness and risking internal fragmentation. Interestingly, the current refugee crisis is pushing policies in a more restrictive direction, but it is still happening on the basis of a broad political consensus.[54]

Finally, in Denmark there has never been multicultural ambitions anywhere near the ones we find in Sweden and, lesser so, Norway. Could the Social Liberal Party have restrained the strong nationalist elements within the Liberal Party and the Conservatives by keeping the door open for future coalitions? It seems highly questionable. It is telling how quickly these nationalist elements came into the open after the Social Liberal Party joined the centre-left government in 1993—not least, how little internal friction it caused.

This discussion leaves one wondering what it would take for Danish policies to start moving in a more inclusive direction and for Swedish policies to start moving in a more exclusive direction. There is little to suggest that this will happen anytime soon. If anything, the current refugee crisis is a critical juncture; a situation marked by 'heightened contingency, or increased causal possibility' (Soifer 2012, 3). Still, it only seems to be pushing Denmark and Sweden further apart, as they adamantly stay on the path they have started on. Denmark continues to be skeptical of immigrants and (too much) cultural diversity, while Sweden continues to try to blame and shame Europe and the world into action. And where is Norway? They are seemingly starting to lean more towards Denmark, frightened by the outlook to increasing numbers of refugees. Indeed, Norway is the only one of the three Scandinavian countries where the refugee crisis is actually starting to look like a critical juncture for future integration policies.

[54] In January 2016, a law was proposed that will make naturalisation conditional on passing a language test at the A2 level and a civics test.

Appendix

Qualitative content analysis of parliamentary debates

Coding scheme

On the *collective dimension* of boundary construction, deterministic logic is used when politicians treat national identity as a fixed end-point of individual change. This can take different argumentative forms: It can follow from an understanding of the national identity as having an essential core (essentialisation), from a functionalistic understanding in which a specific national identity is vital for upholding valued social arrangements (holism), such as a comprehensive welfare state, or from the idea that nation-building is a lengthy, organic bottom-up process unsusceptible to political action (historicism).[55] Arguments based on essentialisation and historicism will treat national identity as an emergent property that cannot be controlled by political action (nominalisation), while holistic arguments may only recognise that national identity is *de facto* uncontrollable, if we are unwilling to give up our societal ideals. Key words that indicate the presence of such reasoning are words that help to situate the newcomer as the only one who changes in the integration process (see Table A.1).

Conversely, statements based on voluntaristic logic perceive the collective self-understanding as a process of becoming, in which political actors can intentionally affect the outcome. This kind of nationalistic statements orients the discussion of national identity towards reinterpreting or replacing cultural content in order to foster unity. This can follow from recognition of the political character of nation-building (non-essentialisation), the possibility of politically instantiating new ways understanding the nation (developmental), and recognition that national identity can come in many shapes and sizes (pluralisation). For example, the open-ended nature of political values may be stressed or history may be called to be rewritten in order to multiply points of identification. Key words that indicate the presence of such reasoning are words that help to situate the newcomer as part of a process of nation-building (see Table A.1).

[55] Noticeably, the two latter perspectives are compatible with the idea that national identity is a social construct, albeit an enduring or necessary one.

Table A.1: Operationalisation of the collective dimension of boundary construction

	Operationalisation	Key argumentative forms (non-exhaustive)	Indicative words (non-exhaustive)
Mainly deterministic	Emphasis on a fixed end-point of individual identity formation	Essentialisation Holism Historicism Nominalisation	Non-negotiable, must, respect, the will of the people, we are, we decide, adapt, core, basic, foundation, master
Mainly voluntaristic	Emphasis on creating new end-point(s) of individual identity formation	Non-essentialisation Developmental Pluralisation	Create, become, change, discuss, dialogue, dynamic, develop, build, guide, imagine, influence, discover

On the *individual dimension* of boundary construction, statements will implicitly or explicitly concern the degree to which an individual's context of upbringing and lived experiences determines that individual's possibilities for self-identification. Using deterministic logic, the individual is pictured as someone who will have difficulty seeing beyond the norms and values of the cultural milieu he was raised in. Some key argumentative forms are, firstly, only expecting something of descendants, since these will grow up within the institutional and cultural confines of the nation-state. Secondly, to stress involvement in the labour market, schooling, politics, and volunteering from the point of view of socialisation instead of empowerment and democratic inclusion. Thirdly, to treat newcomers as passive objects of socialisation processes. Finally, being fearful that cultural diversity will lead to tension because of the cultural embeddedness of individual's world view. Key words that indicate the presence of such reasoning are words that help to situate the newcomer as rooted in a particular world view (see Table A.2).

Contrary, statements using voluntaristic logic regard national identity formation as a question of personal choice. Some key arguments are, firstly, that people can work creatively with their identities and even create hyphenated identities. Secondly, to stress participation in central arenas for socialisation, such as schooling, politics, and the labour market, as a way to encourage the creative process of national identity formation. Thirdly, to stress that there are many ways of being a member of the nation. Generally, mere participation in society is what becomes critical in terms of membership of the nation. Key words that indicate the presence of such reasoning are words that help to establish the newcomer as master of his own identity (see Table A.2).

Table A.2: Operationalisation of the individual dimension of boundary construction

	Operationalisation	Key argumentative forms (non-exhaustive)	Indicative words (non-exhaustive)
Mainly deterministic	Emphasis on the individuals national self-identification being a product of extensive socialisation	Formative years Societal connectivity as socialisation Newcomers as 'passive' objects of socialisation Diversity as tension	Learn, instill, socialise, patience, process, takes time, rooted, tension, deep, grounded, experience
Mainly voluntaristic	Emphasis on national identity being a personal choice one can make regardless of background	Creativity Societal connectivity as empowerment Pluralisation	Choice, creative, empower, work with, you decide, many ways of being,

It should be stressed, that subscribing to a particular logic on one of the dimensions does not necessarily commit you to all types of arguments that might fall within that category.

List of parliamentary debates coded

If a legislative proposal results in more than on parliamentary debate, only the first debate is coded.

Denmark:
1997-98, 1. samling - B 64 (oversigt): *Forslag til folketingsbeslutning om skærpede kriterier for tildeling af dansk indfødsret.*
1997-98, 1. samling - L 58 (oversigt): *Forslag til lov om afholdelse af vejledende folkeafstemning om Danmarks omdannelse til et multietnisk samfund.*
1997-98 - L 154 (oversigt): *Forslag til lov om ændring af udlændingeloven, straffeloven og ægteskabsloven. (Tidsubegrænset opholdstilladelse, asyl, familiesammenføring og udvisning m.v.).*
1997-98, 2. samling - L 60 (som fremsat): *Forslag til lov om integration af udlændinge i Danmark (integrationslov).*
2000-01 - B 161 (som fremsat): *Forslag til folketingsbeslutning om kasseeftersyn af udlændingelovgivningen*
2001-02, 2. samling - L 152 (oversigt): *Forslag til lov om ændring af udlændingeloven og ægteskabsloven med flere love. (Afskaffelse af de facto-flygtningebegrebet, effektivisering af asylsagsbehandlingen, skærpede betingelser.*

2001-02, 2. samling - L 160 (oversigt): *Forslag til lov om ændring af indfødsretsloven. (Ændring af reglerne om nordiske statsborgeres erhvervelse af dansk indfødsret ved erklæring og begrænsning af retsvirkningerne efter.*
2002-03 - L 174 (som fremsat): *Forslag til lov om ændring af integrationsloven og udlændingeloven (Lovens formål, udmelding af landstal, visitering, introduktionsprogrammet, tilbud, rådighedsforpligtelse, finansiering m.v. og tidligere tidsubegrænset opholdstilladelse til velintegrerede udlændinge m.v.).*
2003-04 - L 6 (som fremsat): *Forslag til lov om ændring af udlændingeloven. (Ændring af reglerne om tilknytningskrav ved ægtefællesammenføring og styrket indsats mod ægteskaber, der indgås mod eget ønske).*
2003-04 - L 138 (som fremsat): *Forslag til lov om ændring af indfødsretsloven. (Ændring af reglerne om erhvervelse af dansk indfødsret ved erklæring samt indførelse af ny bestemmelse om frakendelse af dansk indfødsret).*
2003-04 - L 171 (som fremsat): *Forslag til lov om ændring af udlændingeloven og integrationsloven. (Ændring af reglerne om familiesammenføring med børn, skærpelse af betingelserne for opholdstilladelse til udenlandske religiøse forkyndere m.v., begrænsning af adgangen til ægtefællesammenføring for personer, der er dømt for vold mod en tidligere ægtefælle eller samlever, m.v.).*
2009-10 - L 188 (som fremsat): *Forslag til lov om ændring af udlændingeloven. (Skærpede udvisningsregler, samkøring af registre med henblik på styrket kontrol, reform af reglerne om tidsubegrænset opholdstilladelse, inddragelse af studieopholdstilladelser ved ulovligt arbejde, skærpede regler om indgivelse af ansøgning om opholdstilladelse efter indrejse her i landet og opsættende virkning, m.v).*
2011-12 - L 104 (som fremsat): *Forslag til lov om ændring af udlændingeloven og forskellige andre love. (Ny balance i reglerne om ægtefællesammenføring, gebyr, fravigelse af persondatalovens § 7, stk. 8, i visse sager i forbindelse med overgang til elektronisk sagsbehandling, repræsentationsaftaler i medfør af visumkodeksen m.v).*
2011-12 - L 180 (som fremsat): *Forslag til lov om ændring af udlændingeloven. (Revision af reglerne om tidsubegrænset opholdstilladelse, ændring af kravene til herboende udlændinge for opnåelse af ægtefællesammenføring, udvidelse af Flygtningenævnet, ændring af udvisningsreglerne, langtidsvisum til adoptivbørn).*

Sweden:
Riksdagens snappprotokoll 1996/97:106, *Svar på interpellation om åtgärder mot rasism och främlingsfientlighet*
Riksdagens snabbprotokoll 1997/98:38, *Socialförsäkringsutskottets betänkande 1997/98:SfU6 Sverige, framtiden och mångfalden - från invandrarpolitik till integrationspolitik (prop. 1997/98:16)*
Riksdagens snabbprotokoll 2000/01:70, *Socialförsäkringsutskottets betänkande 2000/01:SfU8 Lag om svenskt medborgarskap (prop. 1999/2000:147)*
Riksdagens protokoll 2001/02:117, *Socialförsäkringsutskottets betänkande 2001/02:SfU15 Integrationspolitik för 2000-talet (prop. 2001/02:129)*
Riksdagens snabbprotokoll 2002/03:25, *Särskilt anordnad debatt om integrationspolitiken*
Riksdagens protokoll 2002/03:79, *Socialförsäkringsutskottets betänkande 2002/03:SfU7 Integrationspolitik*
Riksdagens protokoll 2012/13:82, *Arbetsmarknadsutskottets betänkande 2012/13:AU7 Utvidgad målgrupp för samhällsorientering, m.m. (prop. 2012/13:63).*
Riksdagens protokoll 2013/14:116, *Socialförsäkringsutskottets betänkande 2013/14:SfU17 Ett medborgarskap som grundas på samhörighet (prop. 2013/14:143)*

Norway:
Stortinget – Møte den 12. juni 1997, sak nr. 3: *Om innvandring og det flerkulturelle Norge*
Stortinget - Møte torsdag den 18. april 2002, sak nr. 5: *Om å unnta imamene fra regelen om spesialkompetanse for opphold og arbeidstillatelse*
Odelstinget - Møte onsdag den 4. juni 2003, sak nr. 1: *Om lov om introduksjonsordning for nyankomne innvandrere (introduksjonsloven)*
Ot.prp. nr. 28 (2002-03), Introduksjonsloven
Odelstinget - Møte tirsdag den 14. desember 2004, sak nr. 6: *Om endringer i introduksjonsloven*
Odelstinget - Møte fredag den 16. desember 2005, sak nr. 4: *Om lov om endringer i introduksjonsloven*
Stortinget - Møte tirsdag den 31. mai 2005, sak nr. 3: *Om mangfold gjennom inkludering og deltakelse*
Odelstinget - Møte tirsdag den 31. mai 2005, sak nr. 1: *Om lov om norsk statsborgerskap (statsborgerloven)*
Stortinget - Møte tirsdag den 29. november 2011, sak nr. 6: *Om å oppnevne en bredt sammensatt kommisjon som skal utarbeide forslag til en bedre integrering*

Stortinget - Møte torsdag den 1. desember 2011, sak nr. 12: O*m å avgrense rett til kontantstøtte ut fra statsborgerskap*
Stortinget - Møte torsdag den 21. mars 2013, sak nr. 2: *Om innstramminger i grunnlaget for å gi utenlandske stats- borgere permanent oppholdstillatelse i Norge*
Stortinget - Møte torsdag den 21. mars 2013, sak nr. 1: *Innstilling fra kommunal- og forvaltningskomiteen om en helhetlig integreringspolitikk – mangfold og fellesskap*

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English summary

This thesis investigates how ideas concerning nationhood and social cohesion have informed and legitimised the divergence of Danish, Swedish and Norwegian immigrant integration policies in the last 15 to 20 years. Besides examining the politics of permanent residence and naturalization in all three countries, the thesis also takes a closer look at the politics of citizenship education in Denmark and Sweden. Within both of these areas of integration policy, the countries have diverged. Since the late 1990s, the Danish integration requirements for permanent residence and naturalisation have almost exclusively been developed in a more restrictive direction through a long succession of more or less incremental policy changes. In the same period, Sweden has barely changed their (now) exceptionally permissive policies, while Norway has taken somewhat of a middle road. A similar story can be told about citizenship education policies. While Denmark has refrained from changing an officially monocultural approach to common schooling that relies on the assimilation of minorities, Sweden has moved in the opposite direction through an officially intercultural school approach that actively accommodates diversity.

Comparing the Scandinavian countries presents us with a puzzle. How can it be that three countries who share rather similar comprehensive, universal welfare states, political systems and traditions of consensus, and a commitment to being culturally progressive in matters of sexuality, gender equality, and life style, have approached immigrant integration so differently? The overall argument in this thesis is that policy-making in the three countries has stabilised around different public philosophies of integration, but that this also owes a certain amount to party-political dynamics. Swedish politics is highly premised on a voluntarist notion of nationhood that imagines national identity formation as a process of collective negotiation, institution-building, and individual choice. Danish politics mainly follows a deterministic notion of nationhood in which the national identity is pictured as a historically determined construct only accessible to newcomers by being embedded in a normal Danish everyday life. Norwegian integration politics, on the other hand, has been more ambivalent—perhaps even confused—giving expression to both visions albeit more moderately.

The thesis situates the Scandinavian comparison within the broader discussions about the civic turn in West European immigrant integration policies. Against the diagnosis of liberal convergence, the thesis maintains that there has not been a retreat from nationalism within Scandinavian politics. However, the commonly used typologies of nationhood or national models

cannot adequately capture how Scandinavian politicians think differently about nationhood. The thesis aims to alleviate this conceptual shortage by decomposing the ethnic-civic distinction and distinguish a (normative) content dimension from a (functionalist or sociological) process dimension of national identity conceptions. It is within the latter dimension that we primarily find the ideational differences between the Scandinavian countries.

Dansk resumé

Denne afhandling undersøger, hvordan ideer om national identitet og social sammenhængskraft har påvirket og legitimeret de sidste 15 til 20 års divergens i dansk, svensk og norsk integrationspolitik. Foruden at se på politikken omkring permanent ophold og statsborgerskab i alle tre lande analyserer afhandlingen også politikudviklingen indenfor medborgerskabsundervisning i den danske og svenske folkeskole. På begge policy-områder har landene divergeret. Siden slutningen af 1990'erne har de danske integrationskrav for permanent ophold og statsborgerskab nærmest kun udviklet sig i en mere restriktiv retning gennem en lang række af mere eller mindre gradvise ændringer. I den samme periode har Sverige nærmest ikke ændret deres i dag exceptionelle lave krav, imens Norge har taget en mellemvej. En lignende historie kan fortælles om medborgerskabsundervisning i skolen. Imens Danmark kun har forstærket en i forvejen monokulturel tilgang til folkeskolens fag, så har Sverige rykket sig længere i retning af en interkulturel tilgang, som aktivt akkommoderer forskellighed.

Man kan med rette undre sig over hvorfor de skandinaviske lande har divergeret på denne måde. De har udviklet forholdsvis ens universelle velfærdsstater, lignende politiske systemer og traditioner for politisk konsensus og deler et stærkt engagement i at nedbryde kulturelle barrierer når det kommer til seksualitet, køn og livsstil. Alligevel er deres tilgange til integrationen af indvandrere og deres børn nogen af de mest forskellige i Vesteuropa. Det overordnede argument i denne afhandling er, at politikudviklingen i de tre lande har stabiliseret sig omkring forskellige nationale integrationsfilosofier, og at dette til dels skyldes partipolitiske dynamikker. Sveriges politikudvikling baserer sig hovedsagligt på en voluntaristisk forståelse af national identitet. Her forstås dannelsen af national identitet som en proces bundet op på kollektiv forhandling, institutionsopbygning og individuelt frie valg. Dansk integrationspolitik følger i høj grad en deterministisk forståelse af national identitet, hvor Danskhed forstås som en historisk determineret størrelse, der kun er tilgængelig for indvandrere gennem deres indlejring i en normal dansk hverdag. Norsk integrationspolitik er mere ambivalent, måske endda forvirret, og giver plads til mere moderate udgaver af begge forståelse af national identitet.

Afhandlingen placerer sammenligningen af de skandinaviske lande indenfor rammerne af diskussionen om en vending mod medborgerskab ('civic turn') i vesteuropæisk integrationspolitik. Mod påstanden om liberal konvergens fastholdes det, at der ikke har været nogen retræte fra nationalisme i skandinavisk integrationspolitik. Imidlertid er de eksisterende typologier i

litteraturen over national identitet og nationale modeller mindre anvendelige. De kan ikke indfange forskellene i, hvordan skandinaviske politikere forestiller nationen. Afhandlingen forsøger at afhjælpe denne begrebsmæssige mangel ved at dekomponere distinktionen mellem etnisk og politisk ('civic') nationalisme. Dette muliggør sondringen mellem en (normativ) indholdsdimension og en (funktionalistisk eller sociologisk) procesdimension i forestillinger om national identitet. Det er i den sidstnævnte dimension, vi finder de primære idemæssige forskelle mellem de skandinaviske lande.