Only In It for Power and Wealth? Investigating Dictators’ Motives
Matilde Tofte Thorsen

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PhD Dissertation

Politica
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Popular accounts of dictators\(^1\) often bring forward names such as Mobutu Sese Seko, Ferdinand Marcos, and Kim Jong Il who personify the traits greed, egocentrism, and brutality. However, in the group of dictators, we also find Julius Nyerere, Lee Kuan Yew, Park Chung-Hee, Hugo Chávez, and Pol Pot, who were strongly committed to ideological goals, although not necessarily honorable. The dominant theoretical frameworks and comparative empirical accounts of political dynamics in authoritarian regimes view the former set of dictators as the stereotype, as all dictators essentially are assumed to be rationally self-interested power and wealth maximizers (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003; Olson, 1993; Svolik, 2012; Wintrobe, 1998). In contrast, qualitative research often incorporates more nuanced views on the motives of dictators (Bjerk, 2017, p. 14; Chandler, 1992, p. 187; Jones, 2015; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, p. 5). This discrepancy may not only be a question of different beliefs but also of feasibility. It is much easier to build both theoretical and (quantitative) empirical models when it is assumed that actors are rationally self-interested than when more nuanced motives are introduced.\(^2\) This approach may also be justified if most dictators are in fact predominantly self-interested. But are they? This question is central to this book as I set out to investigate to what extent and when dictators are ideologically motivated and to what extent dictators’ motivation affects policymaking and outcomes in autocracies.

To be clear, all dictators need power to be able to rule, no matter which intrinsic motives they may have. But after the most critical power consolidation, more generally, in times of low constraints, do dictators keep amassing personal power and wealth, or do they have a more sociotropic\(^3\) vision they choose to follow? There is reason to believe that most dictators are not predominantly self-interested, that is, driven by power and wealth maximization. Consider three of the best known dictators of modern times, Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, and Mao Zedong. It is hard to say that they were all predominantly

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\(^1\) I will use dictator and autocrat interchangeably, although I use dictator more often to emphasize agency as opposed to structure and institutionalism.

\(^2\) In this book, self-interest is conceived in narrow sense, i.e., interest in power and/or wealth. This is different from the broad understanding where self-interest implies a wish to maximize utility regardless of the content of the utility function.

\(^3\) I will use the opposing pairs sociotropic/egotropic and other-regarding/self-interested interchangeably as I engage research from different social science disciplines.
self-interested. Note that this is by no means a defense of their actions, nor does it imply that ideological motivation is “good”. As we shall see, ideologically motivated dictators can be as violent and repressive as purely self-interested dictators—and sometimes even more so. While Stalin in many ways resembles the archetypical self-interested dictator, Hitler and Mao do not. Much evidence shows that Stalin may have been motivated by ideology in his youth, although he preferred violent means already back then, but long before Lenin died, he became increasingly interested in power and prepared his takeover. He created a personality cult, and he got rid of all possible contenders, even the ones who installed him in power, and those whose communist work he inherited. Moreover, he did not even try to help his people during famine and other hardship (all casualties of his power hunt); instead he kept maximizing his own personal power (Hingley, 1998; The New York Times, 1953). Yet, parts of Stalin’s behavior, like forced collectivization of agriculture, forced industrialization, and the initiative to prohibit religion, can also be ascribed to ideological motives. Obviously, such an assessment is uncertain, but most evidence still points to personal power being the predominant driver of Stalin’s actions when he entered power and throughout his rule.

In contrast, it is impossible to explain Hitler’s deeds in the absence of sincerely held ideological beliefs. The same goes for Mao. Hitler killed millions of Jews and disabled, which made him one of the worst dictators of our time. Yet, this does not mean that he was only driven by a lust for power. These excessive killings were a highly imprudent strategy if he wanted to maximize his power. It was not even a way to rule by fear because many people at the time did not really know what was happening in the concentration camps, and the horror was directed at specific groups that were largely irrelevant in a power perspective. Holocaust was clearly motivated by radical ideology rather than by power maximization. The expansion of the German empire may be explained by lust for power, but it is also consistent with ideology. Thus, Hitler probably enjoyed power, but much of his behavior was driven by sincerely held ideology and cannot be explained by power and wealth maximization alone.

Mao also likely enjoyed staying in power; he concentrated the power to rule China in his own hands and ended up with a personality cult. However, he strictly adhered to his ideological aims to modernize China through a communist revolution, for instance by introducing the development program the Great Leap Forward and creating the violent Cultural Revolution. Despite being in total control, Mao did not use his power to benefit himself, he did not amass enormous wealth, and he continued to live modestly throughout his incumbency (and life) in total consistency with his own ideological preachings (Butterfield, 1976). Thus, Mao’s rule cannot be explained by self-interest alone either. Sincerely held ideology is an important explanatory factor. Although
power maximization may explain some of the outcomes in these regimes, many of the differences, especially between what happened during Hitler’s rule in Germany and during Mao’s rule in China, can be explained by differences in ideological beliefs.

These three examples illustrate the point that we may draw a too simplistic picture of dictators if we assume that they are all alike and solely interested in power and wealth. There is much these motives do not explain very well. A possible reason is that human beings are not motivated mainly by narrow self-interest. Instead, they are highly motivated by fairness concerns, and these vary across people and with context (Andreoni and Miller 2002; Baumard, André, and Sperber 2013; Dawkins 2006). Fairness does not necessarily encompass equality; it may as well be a special concern for certain groups in society and exclusion of others. Strong fairness concerns can translate into political beliefs and ideology, defined as ideas and conceptions about the good and just world—from the perspective of the person who holds the beliefs (Pinker 2011, 686–87). Thus, ideology as employed here entails sincerely held beliefs and other-regarding motives (i.e., it goes beyond care for oneself, family, and friends, but it may be exclusionary views favoring or excluding specific groups, such as a certain tribe). In this way, ideological motivation opposes self-interest, although the degree and scope of sociotropism depends on the content of the ideology.

When ordinary people are guided by fairness concerns, dictators may also be. However, dictators may not be representative of the average human being—most likely they are not. Dictators may happen to belong to a category of people who are extremely self-interested, or they may actually belong to a category of people who are particularly other-regarding. I argue that the latter is the most likely scenario. Wealth and to some extent power, the two most important conceptions of self-interest in research on authoritarian regimes, can be reached through other means than climbing the extremely costly, risky, and uncertain path towards the top political post in an autocracy. In contrast, the realization of a strongly held belief of changing society cannot. There are many examples of ideologically motivated dictators, and scholars studying specific regimes and dictators in depth often find that dictators have other motivations than pure self-interest. These are additional reasons why ideologically motivated dictators are likely to be significantly more common than normally assumed in predominant research. In this book, I take a first step in the investigation of the prevalence of other-regarding and ideological motivations among dictators in a global context; I explore the patterns of ideological motivation; and I look at the consequences of the dictators’ motivation for socioeconomic development, repression, and the risk of civil war.
I find strong evidence that most dictators are in fact not predominantly self-interested. Their motivations vary. Many dictators are strongly ideologically motivated, while others are mainly egotropic and thus fit the typical view of dictators. Most dictators position themselves in between the two poles. A few dictators change motivation during their time as incumbent. Another group of—often military—dictators does not have strong motives to stay in power but simply take power to “put the country right” and then step down again. In line with the argument that dictators should be particularly ideologically motivated because the road to power is tough, I find evidence that the likelihood of finding an ideologically motivated dictator increases with a tougher road to power. A dictator’s educational background and age are also positively correlated with ideological motivation. Lastly, motivation appears to have an impact on development policies and outcomes, violent repression, and the risk of civil war.

In brief, the central theoretical and empirical claim of this book is that many dictators are motivated by sociotropic motives rather than or in addition to self-interest. Their motivation affects the political dynamics in autocracies and, most importantly, it affects many aspects of the lives of the people. For this reason, it is no longer justified to keep building models assuming exclusively self-interested dictators. To seriously improve our knowledge of and ability to understand and explain political dynamics and outcomes in autocracies, we need to incorporate more nuanced motives into our theoretical and empirical models.

The Argument

Autocracies are not just one kind, but many. Currently, China, Russia, Venezuela, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, and DR Congo are all autocracies, but they are very different from each other. Most autocracy scholars would recognize that their institutions differ; I argue that the objectives of their leaders differ as well. To illustrate, Hugo Chávez adhered to a socialist agenda, and his ideology clearly affected policymaking and societal outcomes in Venezuela (Carroll, 2013; Kozloff, 2007). Similarly, Park Chung-Hee’s developmentalist agenda has undoubtedly affected the South Korean society, not only for the two decades he was in power, but also today, forty years after he was removed from power by assassination (H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011; Lee, 2012). Although some have classified South Korea under Park’s rule as a military dictatorship and not a personalist regime (Geddes, Wright, & Frantz, 2012), in reality, Park was in control, especially the last decade of his rule. Likewise, Chávez had a tight grip on power in Venezuela until his death in 2013. Neither dictator was highly constrained, and hence, the institutional settings in the two regimes
were not the main determinants of policymaking. According to predominant scholarship on authoritarian regimes, Park and Chávez should be exclusively self-interested, i.e., they should only be interested in power and wealth. However, leeway from constraints in Venezuela and South Korea has not led Chávez and Park to just exploit their power for personal gain. Instead, they tried to realize their respective ideologies, to serve their country in the way they found best (Carroll, 2013; H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011; Kozloff, 2007; Lee, 2012). Thus, existing theory has difficulties explaining policymaking in these regimes, whereas ideology seems to be especially good at this.

Despite this, ideology is close to non-existing in predominant comparative research on authoritarian regimes (except when ideology is studied as a tool for power maximization). Two general propositions are prevalent. First, dictators are driven by self-interest; they only care about personal power and wealth. Staying in power and exploiting it for personal gain when possible are their main preferences. Second, because their motivations are constant and identical, the institutional settings, i.e., the constraints the dictators face, determine the political dynamics and outcomes. All dictators have to navigate within different types of constraints to stay in power and maximize their wealth, and thereby, policymaking is mainly driven by the dictators’ need to stay in power.

Two strands are relevant in this regard: one concerned with the consequences of regime type and one focusing on the political dynamics in autocracies only. Regarding the former, most theories in the field build on different versions of the same argument, namely that autocratic leaders are less constrained than democratic leaders, because autocratic leaders’ power depends on a comparably smaller and richer fraction of the population. This implies that they spend fewer resources trying to stay in power and, therefore, have more resources to spend on themselves (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003; Meltzer & Richard, 1981; Niskanen, 2003; Olson, 1993). Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) open the black box of autocracies by arguing that dictatorships come in different variations and are constrained to different extents, depending on the different institutional settings. However, they focus on the size of the constituency and the most efficient way to stay in power. The authors assume that leaders are rationally self-interested but argue that their motives do not matter since staying in power will always be the top priority (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, pp. 21-23; 79-80). However, they also argue that dictators have discretionary resources to spend on whatever they want. How these resources are spent obviously matters for most outcomes. As in the simpler versions of the argument, this is especially the case in autocracies, where the leaders are least constrained. Hence, although motivation is deemphasized (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003) or just assumed to be personal
power and wealth (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003; Meltzer & Richard, 1981; Niskanen, 2003; Olson, 1993), the autocrat’s motivation actually plays an important role in these models.

Regarding the second strand of research, most autocracy scholars also hold on to the assumption about self-interested dictators (Gerschewski, 2013; Svolik, 2012; Wintrobe, 1998, p. 79). The baseline assumption of most theoretical accounts is that dictators are self-interested and willing to do whatever is required to stay in power (and abuse their power for personal gain when possible). Most autocracy scholars deemphasize the impact of motivation as it is assumed to be constant. Instead, the dictators’ incentives and behavior are derived from the variation in autocratic institutions and constraints, which in turn determines policymaking and policies (Gerschewski, 2013; Svolik, 2012). There are many paths to power maximization: Dictators can repress the opposition and the people (Gerschewski, 2013; Svolik, 2012), create a party and introduce elections (Gandhi, 2008; Geddes, 1999; Svolik, 2012), secure economic growth to generate performance legitimacy and afford spoils to supporters (Gerschewski, 2013; Wintrobe, 1998, p. 78), promote an ideology to legitimize their rule4 (Gerschewski, 2013; Linz, 2000; Moghaddam, 2013; Svolik, 2012; Wintrobe, 1998, pp. 78, 222–223), and develop the welfare state and redistribute resources to the poor to win their support (Albertus & Menaldo, 2012; Knutsen & Rasmussen, 2018). Putting away for a moment the assumption of self-interest, all these “tools” to power consolidation could be interpreted as sincere attempts to enhance the well-being of the people (or in other ways follow their ideological beliefs, e.g., exclusion of specific groups) instead of power measures.

There are good reasons to believe that this is often the case. Recent studies in evolutionary psychology and behavioral economics indicate that human beings are often motivated by fairness concerns rather than just self-interested (Baumard, André, & Sperber, 2013; Dawkins, 2006). The conception of fairness varies among people. Examples are equality-based fairness and fairness based on utilitarian concerns, i.e., giving (goods, services, favors etc.) to the people who get the highest benefits (Andreoni & Miller, 2002). Dictators may also be motivated by fairness concerns. Chávez’ and Park’s policies are better explained by the dictators’ beliefs or ideologies, aligned with their conceptions of fairness, than by self-interest.

4 The old autocracy literature on totalitarianism ascribed much importance to ideology (classic ideologies). However, ideology was often viewed as a means to staying in power and creating legitimacy and less as sincerely held beliefs. Yet, ideology has not really been present since at least the end of the Cold War.
The concept of ideology as employed here entails that the ideological views are sincerely held and are not simply a cover for self-interest (for more about this distinction, cf. Gerring (1997, p. 974)). Ideological motivation is an other-regarding motive, which stands in contrast to self-interest, although ideological motivation may contain exclusionary motives, such as Pol Pot’s radical socialism or ethnocentrism. That ideology is sincerely held is distinct from much of the classic literature on ideology and totalitarianism, in which ideologies such as communism and fascism were analyzed largely regardless of this distinction, or viewed as a tool to power consolidation (Arendt, 1951; Linz, 2000; Wintrobe, 1998). Another major point of difference is that the present conception of ideology is significantly broader regarding the content of the ideology and thus goes beyond the classic ideologies, such as communism, fascism, and liberalism, and generally beyond the economic left-right spectrum. This also implies that ideology and pragmatism are not opposites. Pragmatism is about the road towards the goal, and the content of the ideology is the goal and does not necessarily prescribe specific means. Thus, one can concurrently be a pragmatist and ideologically motivated. This may often be the case when an ideology is not that extreme, but that does not mean that beliefs are less important. As I will show later, the former dictator of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, was sincerely interested in the economic (and educational) development of the Singaporean society, but the road to the goal was not important to him, or rather, in his own words, he tried to find the way that works (Plate, 2010, p. 46). In this way, he was strongly ideologically motivated and a pragmatist.

Many more dictators seem to be substantially ideologically motivated. Sometimes, dictators are too kind to the poor or too repressive to be driven exclusively by self-interest. Instead, they seem to hold beliefs beyond self-interest. These may be classic ideological beliefs, like in the case of Vladimir Lenin; or they may be more specific beliefs, like in the case of the Fourth King of Bhutan, whose ideology centered on gross happiness, meaning the people living happily in harmony with nature and Buddhist tradition (Mathou, 2008; Wax, 2008). I argue that existing research attributes too much explanatory power to elite constraints and popular constraints. The dictators’ preferences (on top of staying in power) have significant impact on policymaking and thus on outcomes in autocracies. It is important to incorporate the dictators’ diverging motivations into the theoretical framework when trying to explain policymaking in autocracies. In Chapter 3, I build a theoretical framework that

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5 The Fourth King of Bhutan ended up democratizing the country against the will of his people, as he viewed democratization as the best way to sustain national gross happiness (Page, 2008; Rosenberg, 2008; Schmidt, 2017, p. 22; Sengupta, 2008; Wax, 2008).
incorporates dictators’ diverging motivation on a scale from highly ideologically motivated (or motivated by specific beliefs) to highly self-interested.

If ideological motivation exists among dictators, which I will show that it does, it is useful to know when we are most likely to see a Park and when we are most likely to see a Mobutu. I address the potential patterns in motivation and argue that a strong predictor of the degree of ideological motivation is the dictator’s road to power. Two effects with reverse causal directions cause the correlation. The first is a socialization effect; for example, being a guerilla fighter or serving in the military may enhance other-regarding and ideological values. The other is a selection effect that implies that only highly ideologically motivated people will try to enter politics if the costs are high, because non-ideologically motivated autocrats have less costly alternatives to pursue to satisfy their (economic) interests. I expect dictators with a particularly tough and risky road to power to be the most ideologically motivated, since a rational cost-benefit calculation for a self-interested person would strongly advise against taking this path. Guerilla fighters and dictators rising to power from the opposition are most likely to be ideologically motivated. In addition to the cost-benefit calculation, socialization effects increase the likelihood of being ideologically motivated, as continuous struggle against perceived injustices and repression generated by the incumbent regime will generate grievances that the incoming dictator will be motivated to try to correct. At the other end of the spectrum are dictators who inherit power or rise to power through the governing party. Ideological motivation is also expected to be correlated with the dictators’ background because educated people have higher opportunity costs of climbing the road to power, and they may have been subject to socio-tropic socialization. Moreover, I expect the age of the dictator to be correlated with motivation.

Motivation will have consequences. Especially in times of low constraints, dictators’ motivation should matter for policymaking and outcomes in autocracies. The degree of ideological motivation is likely to matter, but so is the content of the ideology, especially the extent of exclusion prescribed by the ideology, which can be illustrated by comparing Pol Pot in Cambodia to Nyerere in Tanzania. Both had socialist beliefs, but Pol Pot was extremely exclusionary and ended up killing one fourth of the Cambodian population. Nyerere was highly inclusionary, and although he devastated the country economically, he managed to unite the nation, a legacy that is still present in Tanzania today. I elaborate on this comparison in Chapter 5, and in Chapter 9, I globally study the impact of motivation on three important, but diverse, phenomena, namely, development, repression, and civil war.
Studying Dictators’ Motives: The Empirical Strategy

Is it possible to study motivation? Many people would probably answer no because it is unobservable. But so are many other social phenomena, and we do study those. There are rich indications that authoritarian rulers are not predominantly self-interested and that their motivation is likely to matter for the political dynamics, outcomes, and in turn, the people in autocracies. Therefore, it is at least worth trying to study the motivation of the dictators. This book is dedicated to this purpose.

Three Case Studies: Do Ideologically Motivated Dictators Even Exist?

I empirically study the theoretical arguments on three different levels. I begin by providing meticulous evidence that ideologically motivated dictators do exist. For this, I need in-depth case studies. I study three dictators who, if any, would be driven by ideological motivation. I show that dictators sometimes face low constraints, and when they do, their motivation matters a great deal. In addition to solidly showing that ideologically motivated dictators exist, and that in times of weak constraints, their motivation matters, a purpose of this exercise is to show that, and how, it is possible to study motivation in a systematic and transparent manner. In Chapter 4, I further discuss the issues with studying motivation, and I lay out the observable implications guiding the case studies. Chapter 5 contains the detailed case studies of the motivation of three former dictators, Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, and Pol Pot in Cambodia. They appear to have adhered to three different ideologies and to have faced weak constraints in at least part of their incumbency.

I use Bayesian updating as a tool to structure the analysis and assess the impact of observing (and not observing) the empirical implications. By studying biographical readings and historical accounts as well as using interview material collected during fieldwork in Tanzania and Uganda, I find strong evidence that all three dictators were in fact ideologically motivated. This conclusion is based on detecting the presence of several unique implications of ideological motivation (i.e., implications unlikely to be observed if the dictators were not ideologically motivated) in all cases. I further demonstrate that the three dictators’ beliefs and ideologies had a significant impact on policymaking and society in the three countries. Hence, I show that self-interest cannot explain policymaking very well in these cases. In contrast, sincerely held
ideology can. The red ellipses in Figure 1.1 illustrate this part of the empirical strategy.

Medium-N: Studying the Prevalence and Correlates of Ideological Motivation

Having established that some dictators are ideologically motivated, the next step is to study the phenomenon of ideologically motivated dictators more broadly. In Chapter 6, I investigate how widespread the phenomenon is and to what extent it is possible to detect patterns in ideological motivation. To investigate the prevalence of ideological motivation, case studies in a medium-N setting are suitable. It allows for detailed investigation of each of the dictators, which is necessary to generate credible and useful insights on the dictators’ motivation. In addition, there are enough cases to have a representative sample of dictators, which is needed to study the prevalence of the different types of motivation. I do this by randomly selecting twenty dictators from Svolik’s global dataset containing dictators who were in power at some point from World War II until 2008 (Svolik, 2012) and coding the dictators’ motivation (on a scale from ideologically motivated to self-interested). I use the same approach as in the first three case studies by letting the analysis be guided by observable implications and use Bayesian updating as a tool to structure the analysis and make the conclusions transparent and reliable.

This approach enables me to detect the prevalence of ideologically motivated dictators while sustaining high validity, because I am able to study each case in detail. In addition to studying the prevalence of ideologically motivated dictators, the investigation of the twenty dictators’ motives allows me to study potential patterns in the degree of ideological motivation. Correlating motivation with measures of road to power and with the dictators’ background characteristics enables me to explore the patterns in motivation and, thereby, assess when dictators are likely to be ideologically motivated. Detecting patterns is a contribution in itself, but it may also help future research by indicating good proxies for ideological motivation for a large-N study, since motivation on such a large scale is difficult to measure. The yellow ellipses in Figure 1.1 illustrate this part of the empirical strategy.

Large-N Data Based on Obituaries: Ideological Prevalence, Patterns, and Consequences

The third and final empirical part consists of two large-N studies. I create a dataset on the dictators’ motives based on obituaries of deceased dictators who have ruled sometime in the period spanning 1945 to 2008. The dataset contains 297 dictators and is presented in Chapter 7. The dataset serves three
purposes. First, I explore the dictators’ motivation and related behavioral traits in a descriptive manner. I explore the prevalence of ideological motivation, the content of the ideology along with characteristics related to the dictators’ income, lifestyle, and whether the dictator left power voluntarily. Second, I use the data to try to replicate the patterns in ideological motivation from the medium-N setting on a large scale as well as to investigate the relation between motivation and the major institutional factors considered in research on autocracies, namely, type of autocracy. This comprises the content of Chapter 8. Finally, I use the data to study the impact of ideological motivation on development policies and outcomes, violent repression, and civil war, which is the content of Chapter 9.

Although one of the purposes of the medium-N analyses is to enable generalizability to a larger sample, the generalizability significantly increases as the sample size increases with a factor fifteen. Robustness is further secured by triangulation of measurement procedures. Even if the case studies are conducted carefully, and the dictators’ motivation is assessed without directly using the potential effects on motivation as source material, there may be a risk of indirectly influencing the assessments. This may also be the case for the large-N data, as obituary writers may be affected by the outcomes produced by the dictators. Because this risk is inherent and unavoidable, it is important to study motivation in different ways. Another advantage of the large-N study is comparability. As much predominant empirical research is conducted quantitatively on a global scale, this empirical step also makes it easier to compare to existing studies of the political dynamics in autocracies. Moreover, it is a first step in enabling a large-scale investigation of dictators’ motives and their impact. Obviously, there are some drawbacks to relying on obituaries in creating the dataset. I deal with these to the extent possible. For now, I believe it is the best possible way to study dictators’ motivation on a large scale. The large-scale quantitative part of the empirical strategy is illustrated by the green ellipses in Figure 1.1.

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6 The 297 dictators are coded on 23 substantial variables.
Figure 1.1. Overview of the Three Empirical Parts of the Book

Empirical Part I. Three case studies
Empirical Part II. Medium-N study based on case studies of twenty randomly selected dictators
Empirical Part III. Large-N analyses using the dataset created based on obituaries

Evidence of Ideologically Motivated Dictators

This threefold empirical strategy allows me to study dictators’ motivation, its prevalence, its correlates, and its consequences in a valid, systematic, and transparent way. Studying more than twenty dictators’ motives in detail complemented by studying motivation more broadly on a large scale implies that the conclusions drawn generate valuable knowledge about the motivation of dictators. This book presents evidence from the first coherent study of dictators’ motivation.

While the book has no normative claim, it informs our understanding of dictators’ motives and behavior. The thorough case studies credibly show that the behavior of some dictators, for instance, Nyerere, Lee, and Pol Pot, is difficult to explain from a self-interest perspective. The subsequent medium-N study demonstrates that these dictators are not just exceptions to the norm, but that many dictators are driven by ideological motivation and not self-interest alone. In addition to enhancing our understanding of autocrats’ motives and behavior, these studies suggest when it is appropriate to assume self-interest and when to assume sincere ideological motivation. In turn, this will improve our explanations of dictators’ behavior. Lastly, the book presents a global dataset of almost three hundred authoritarian rulers from 1945 to 2008. On this basis, I found evidence that motivation actually matters for important phenomena as diverse as development, repression, and civil war. Thus, we should care about dictators’ motives, and we should try to incorporate them in our theoretical and empirical models as it will enhance our understanding and explanations of how dictatorships work.
Plan of the Book

Chapter 2 presents existing research on autocracies and how they work, demonstrating the predominant focus on the selfish dictator who tries to navigate within institutional constraints. I also discuss evidence of the motivation of human beings more generally. Chapter 3 connects these strands of research by arguing that dictators, like all human beings, are likely to have diverse motives. I lay out my theoretical framework regarding patterns in and consequences of dictators’ motivation. Chapter 4 presents the observable implications of ideological motivation, which guide the case studies in the two first empirical parts of the book. Chapters 5 through 9 contain the empirical analyses. I study the three cases of Nyerere, Lee, and Pol Pot in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 presents the medium-N analysis based on the careful study of the motives of twenty randomly selected dictators (the full analyses of the twenty cases are described in approx. 150 pages in Appendix II). Chapter 7 presents the obituary-based dataset of 297 dictators’ motivation (codebook and reliability tests are available in Appendices IV and V). Chapter 8 explores patterns in motivation based on the obituary dataset. Based on the same data, Chapter 9 investigates the consequences of dictator motivation. Chapter 10 leads a discussion across the evidence found in the entire empirical part of the book and concludes.
Chapter 2: Self-Interested Dictators, Other-Regarding Human Beings

“Alas, the contemporary political scientist is not well equipped to become the new Machiavelli.” This was what Svolik (2012, p. 1) wrote almost a decade ago with reference to our ability to explain how selfish, unscrupulous political leaders try to keep themselves in power, which he sees as the core of explaining political dynamics in autocracies. On the one hand, we have been a great deal wiser since Svolik wrote this; on the other hand, time has run from Machiavelli. A lot has happened in the last half millennium. For instance, we have experienced the Age of Enlightenment, and autocratic rulers are no longer monarchs who are insulated in their castles with no relation to the common people. As I will argue in this book, many modern dictators care about other things besides power and wealth. However, political scientists are not well equipped to explain what this is and when and how it matters. They still understand dictators based on the image provided by Machiavelli.

The Rationally Self-Interested Leader

The dominant literature on political dynamics in autocracies concerns how selfish dictators navigate within different types and degrees of constraints. Two strands are relevant: one concerned with the consequences of political regime type, and one focusing on the political dynamics in autocracies only. I will review these in turn. In addition to focusing on the assumptions behind the models, I direct attention to the impact on policies and outcomes in general, but with a specific focus on outcomes related to socio-economic development.

The Constituency Argument: The Political Leaders’ Constituency, Tax Rates, and Redistribution

The Constituency Argument

Most theories on the consequences of political regimes build on different versions of the same argument, namely that autocratic leaders are less constrained than democratic leaders. This implies that they spend fewer resources on trying to stay in power and therefore have more resources to spend on themselves (discretionary resources). In democracies, the government depends on support from more and poorer people compared to in autocracies.
This constrains the democratic leaders in exploiting their power. They have to distribute more resources to the population—also to the poorer part—compared to autocrats.

In contrast, autocratic leaders’ power depends on a comparably smaller and richer fraction of the population. The leaders extract more resources for their own use, and they only need to share with a small and wealthy group of supporters. It follows that because democratic leaders are more constrained than autocratic leaders, democratic countries should distribute more resources to society, which implies comparably less poverty and more human development (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003; Meltzer & Richard, 1981; Niskanen, 2003; Olson, 1993). Figure 2.1 below shows Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s (2003) version of the argument, coined the selectorate theory. This is the most sophisticated version of the constituency argument, and unlike in other versions, autocracies are not treated as a residual category. I will now take a closer look at the assumptions and details of this theory. Most studies in the field build on it, and I will refer back to it throughout the book.

According to selectorate theory, political leaders are constrained by their winning coalition (W), which is the leader’s actual and necessary supporters. It often consists of both the ruling coalition and a part of the broader population. The winning coalition is more constraining, the smaller the selectorate (S) is (i.e., the people who could potentially be in a winning coalition), compared to the winning coalition (\( \frac{W}{S} \)). The reason is the loyalty norm, which denotes that people in the incumbent’s winning coalition have incentives to stay loyal to the incumbent even if the challenger offers higher benefits to his new winning coalition. No one can be sure whom he chooses in his winning coalition since it is only a subset of the selectorate, and the challenger cannot credibly commit himself before he wins office (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, pp. 59–60). Therefore, leaving the incumbent’s winning coalition implies a risk of losing everything (except public goods). The probability of being included in the challenger’s winning coalition is the ratio of the sizes of the winning coalition and the selectorate (\( \frac{W}{S} \)). This implies that the incumbent can afford to provide relatively few goods when \( \frac{W}{S} \) is small as it takes much more for the challenger to compete since joining him is a large risk for any member of the incumbent’s winning coalition. Thus, the smaller \( \frac{W}{S} \), the more discretionary resources does the leader have. Following a similar logic, the loyalty norm also

\footnote{This ratio is even smaller due to affinities with the incumbent (and lack of affinities with a potential challenger). However, the author only assigns a secondary role to affinities, which, accordingly, do not affect the overall argument substantially (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, pp. 60–65).}
implies that the incumbent can “afford” to set a higher tax rate the smaller \( \frac{W}{S} \) is (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, p. 94).

**Figure 2.1. The Selectorate Theory. Core Variables and Values. Democracy (D), Autocracy (A)**

![Diagram showing relationships between variables: Size of winning coalition, Public-private goods ratio, Tax rate, Poverty, W/S, Tax revenue spent on leader’s discretionary use.]

Note: \( W/S \) = size of winning coalition/size of selectorate.

Hence, the smaller \( \frac{W}{S} \), the more discretionary resources the autocrats have, and the less they spend on the population to secure political survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, pp. 65–68, 93–94, 96). Democratic leaders are the most constrained since \( \frac{W}{S} \) is 50%, and, accordingly, they have the fewest discretionary resources. The constraints vary across different types of autocracies but are generally weaker than in democracies. Autocrats therefore have more discretionary resources than democratic leaders do. This argument is comparable to the simple version of the constituency argument and is illustrated in the lower part of Figure 2.1.

Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) add an additional component to the argument, namely type of distributed goods. They distinguish between public goods, which are provided to the entire population, and private goods that are only provided to the winning coalition (the actual and necessary supporters of the leader). They argue that the relative price of private goods compared to public goods increases as the winning coalition grows so that relatively more public goods are provided (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, pp. 29–31, 87–88, 91–92, 96). This leads to more public goods provided in democracies and thus more redistribution and less poverty. This is illustrated in the upper part of Figure 2.1. Overall, the conclusion concerning outcome is similar to the one
for the simpler versions of the argument: Democracies create more development in general, and in turn less poverty and more human development, than autocracies because more public goods are provided, the tax rate is lower, and less tax revenue is spent on leaders in democracies. However, this will also differ across types of autocracies depending on the sizes of the winning coalition and the selectorate.

**Challenges to the Constituency Argument**

Most empirical studies on the consequences of regime type for poverty, inequality, and economic and human development use some version the constituency argument (Gerring, Thacker, & Alfaro, 2012; Hanson, 2015; Justesen, 2012; Lake & Baum, 2001; Miller, 2015; Ross, 2006; Welander, Lyttkens, & Nilsson, 2015). Even scholars disputing the overall relationship stay within the same paradigm and hold on to the fundamental assumptions. For example, Ross (2006), who is one of the most prominent critics of the theory presented above, argues that eradicating poverty is not in the interest of the median voter (or the majority), and democracies only benefit the middle class to which the median voter belongs (or the majority) and not the very poor minority. This is a strong challenge, but it is not as detrimental to the selectorate theory because a crucial part is the type of goods provided, and this part of the model does not hinge on the preferences of the median voter or the majority.

Other problems challenge the selectorate theory. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) assume that leaders are rationally self-interested but claim that their model allows for political leaders to have any, including altruistic, preferences. They argue that motivation does not matter ultimately because staying in power is always the political leaders' main goal (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, pp. 21-23; 79-80). However, what the discretionary resources are spent on obviously matters for most outcomes, and these are not taken into account when the effects of the models are calculated. In fact, according to the model, the impact of leader motivation would be largest in autocracies, because the amount of discretionary resources is largest. This can be illustrated by comparing Park Chung-Hee (South Korea) and Mobutu (DR Congo). Both dictators centralized power and had plenty of discretionary resources, but the economic and societal consequences were extremely different. While Mobutu ruined his country (Duke, 2003, p. 71; Haskin, 2005, p. 51; Renton, Seddon, & Zeilig, 2007, p. 5; Van Reybrouck, 2014), Park invested in production that, in the long run, made South Korea prosper (C. N. Kim, 2007, pp. 108–119; H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, pp. 95–106, 150–154). The obvious explanation is different motives. Many scholars would claim that Park is an exception to the norm of selfish dictators. Even if this were true (which I will show it is not),
this example illustrates that motivation is in fact important. As the models predict that the least constrained leaders, namely the autocrats, are the leaders with the most discretionary resources, they are best equipped to increase the living standard of the people. Thus, what the discretionary resources are spent on matters for the distribution of goods, and accordingly, reduction of poverty and improvement of human development. Consequently, although motivation is deemphasized (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003) or just assumed merely to be personal power and wealth (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003; Meltzer & Richard, 1981; Niskanen, 2003; Olson, 1993), the leader’s motivation actually plays an important role in these models.

The constituency argument comprises the predominant part of theory in research on consequences of regime type for most outcomes, but other arguments do exist. Particularly predominant in earlier studies is the argument that autocratic leaders have more autonomy than democratic leaders, which they can use to invest in society, enhance economic development and improve welfare for the people. In democracies, the leaders are constrained by the people, which impedes long-term development and welfare, because the people are myopic and demand immediate consumption instead of investment (Knutsen, 2012; Przeworski & Limongi, 1993). This is essentially similar to the constituency argument. Yet, the autocrats’ motives are the opposite: Instead of prioritizing their own wealth and power, they prioritize society. Thus, political leaders’ motivation is crucial for the argument, but yet again, it is deemphasized. One argument subconsciously binds these two arguments together by theorizing that autocracy is good for development in Asia because the leaders care about development (and autocrats are less constrained), and autocracy is bad for development in Africa because the leaders engage in corruption, so constraints on power are more important here. The presentation of this study does not emphasize motives at all but rather structural regional differences (Kriekhaus, 2006). The motives of the leaders are thus crucial for development and other outcomes; yet, they are deemphasized.

In conclusion, the literature on the consequences of regime type agrees that autocrats are the least constrained leaders (this may vary across types of autocracies). The predominant theory, the constituency argument, predicts that this lack of constraints in autocracies implies many bad outcomes, such as less economic growth and human development, and more poverty, because dictators will abuse power. However, the opposite—and less widespread—argument also exists, namely that dictators’ autonomy allows them to make important investments in future development, without the people holding them back in their demand for consumption. In both models, leaders’ motivation is deemphasized (or assumed to be self-interest), although motivation is the crucial component, especially dictators’ motivation.
The Selfish and Constrained Dictator: Political Dynamics in Autocracies

*How Dictatorships Work: The Selfish Dictator*

Most autocracy scholars also hold on to the assumption about self-interested dictators and argue that variations in politics and outcomes are determined by institutions that in turn shape the dictators’ incentives (Brownlee, 2007; Escribà-Folch, 2011; Gerschewski, 2013; Svolik, 2012). However, self-interest does not only mean maximizing wealth—as in the previously discussed model—but also maximizing power for its intrinsic value (Escribà-Folch, 2011; Gerschewski, 2013; Svolik, 2012; Wintrobe, 1998, p. 79). These two types of self-interest are what distinguish Wintrobe’s tinpot and totalitarian dictators. The tinpot “seeks no more power over the minimum needed to stay in office, using the rest of the resources of the state for his or her own purposes (palaces, Mercedes Benzes, Swiss bank accounts, and so on)” and the totalitarian just “maximizes power over the population” (Wintrobe, 1998, p. 79).

In contrast to Wintrobe, most autocracy scholars do not explicitly distinguish these two types of self-interest. The focus is mainly on power maximization, as the starting point is that dictators are selfish and willing to do whatever is required to stay in power (and abuse their power for personal gain when possible). Thus, most autocracy scholars deemphasize the impact of motivation, as it is assumed constant. Instead, the dictators’ incentives and behavior are derived from the variation in autocratic institutions and constraints, which in turn determines policymaking and policies (Brownlee, 2007; Escribà-Folch, 2011; Gerschewski, 2013; Svolik, 2012).

There are three overall tools to power maximization: repression, cooptation, and legitimacy (Gandhi, 2008; Gerschewski, 2013; Svolik, 2012). Repression is mainly used when the other strategies are not viable since repression also includes great risk (Davenport, 2007). The institutional settings are associated with the tools at use. For instance, monarchies often use inherited legitimacy as a tool to secure political survival, whereas single-party regimes are less likely to repress because they have strong institutions for cooptation (Davenport, 2007; Gandhi, 2008; Svolik, 2012). Personalist regimes are the most repressive because often they do not have other options as they tend to be the most politically insulated. Military regimes also tend to be repressive (possibly) because the costs of repression are lower in these regimes than in authoritarian regimes (Davenport, 2007). Generally, repression is an inherent instrument in autocracies, but the institutional settings seem to matter for the choice of power-maximization strategy. Sometimes, changing the institutional setting is perceived as a power-maximizing strategy in itself (Gandhi, 2008; Geddes, 1999; Svolik, 2012). Along these lines, and a further illustration of this
power-maximization perspective is the verdict that personalist dictators emerge systematically when autocrats get the opportunity to fulfill their desire for power (Svolik, 2012, pp. 54–55).

The three overall strategies of power maximization contain many specific tools. A commonly used tool is to create a party and introduce controlled elections (Gandhi, 2008; Geddes, 1999; Svolik, 2012). Securing economic growth to generate performance legitimacy and afford spoils to supporters (Gerschewski, 2013; Wintrobe, 1998, p. 78; Wright, 2008) as well as developing the welfare state and redistributing resources to the poor (Albertus & Menaldo, 2012; Knutsen & Rasmussen, 2018) are other strategies. Promotion of an ideology is also a way to consolidate and maximize power (Gerschewski, 2013; Linz, 2000; Moghaddam, 2013; Svolik, 2012; Wintrobe, 1998, pp. 78, 222–223). Departing from the assumption of self-interest, this behavior could be understood as sincere attempts to enhance the well-being of the people. However, the fact that it is viewed as power-consolidation measures illustrates the predominance of the assumption about the power-maximizing dictator.

**Autocracy and Development**

Unlike the literature on the consequences of regime type, the autocracy literature has a one-eyed focus on political survival and, hence, does not direct much attention to how different types of autocracies affect outcomes such as development and redistribution. Because such outcomes are viewed as means to power maximization, they are endogenous to the model of political survival. However, development has been viewed as an externality of stability, both because it increases the dictator’s time horizon and makes him behave more like a stationary than a roving bandit in Mancur Olson’s (1993) vocabulary and because it enhances the chances of investment. Moreover, similar to the mechanism in the constituency argument, development is higher when the leader is constrained and forced to abstain from predatory behavior (Escribà-Folch, 2011; Magaloni & Kricheli, 2010; Olson, 1993; Wright, 2008). This means that stability and constraints are important for development.

Many autocracies create parties and introduce elections and legislatures, which can be viewed as introducing checks and balances on their power. This prevents the autocrat from being too predatory (parallel to the constituency argument), which in turn leads to more development (Brownlee, 2007; 2011; Magaloni & Kricheli, 2010; Olson, 1993; Wright, 2008). This means that stability and constraints are important for development.

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8 A roving bandit steals everything from the people because he knows that he will not stay for long; a stationary bandit steals less because he will stay longer and needs the people to keep working and producing revenue to steal in the long run. Although both are far from optimal leaders for the well-being of the people, a stationary bandit is preferable to a roving bandit (Olson, 1993).
Charron & Lapuente, 2011; Gandhi, 2008; Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Knutsen, 2012; Magaloni & Kricheli, 2010; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000; Wright, 2008). Multiparty autocracies are not, however, as stable as one-party regimes (Kailitz, 2013; McGuire, 2013). Consequently, development is expected to be lower here. Personalist dictatorships are the least institutionalized, which means that predatory behavior is often most widespread here (Escribà-Folch, 2013; Geddes, 1999; Geddes, Frantz, & Wright, 2014; Kailitz, 2013; Wright, 2008). The ever-illustrative example of Mobutu is fitting yet again. Although some personalist dictatorships are somewhat stable (as long as the dictator is alive), the lack of institutionalization makes both domestic and foreign business as well as ordinary people less willing to invest (Olson, 1993; Wright, 2008). On the one hand, military regimes are short-lived and unstable, so economic growth should be low. On the other hand, they are institutionalized, and the leader is constrained by the military junta and to some extent by the rest of the army, which should lead to the expectation that economic growth is moderately high (Escribà-Folch, 2011; Geddes, Frantz, et al., 2014; Kailitz, 2013; O'Donnell, 1973). Monarchies are difficult to assess because most of them have other sources of power, such as oil money and inherited legitimacy, so development as performance legitimacy is not as necessary as in other autocracies. Thus, the monarchs are often less constrained (Kailitz, 2013; Wright, 2008; Yom, Gregory, & Iii, 2012).

In sum, the autocracy literature takes as point of departure that staying in power is important for all autocrats, and constraints on the dictators are present to varying degrees. The different constraints, created by the different institutions such as parties, elections, and the military, vary across types of autocracies and create expectations about different outcomes. After consolidating power, the dictator's motivation is important, but the dictators' motivation is predominantly assumed to be self-interest (and constant) and is generally deemphasized.

**Alternative Motives**

Ideological and other-regarding motivation for dictators is sometimes mentioned in passing; most often as a hypothetical case that does not exist in reality (Wintrobe, 1998, pp. 95, 104) or as an exception to the norm (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, pp. 22–23). Sometimes, military dictators have been assigned different values, sometimes even other-regarding values like nationalism; but then, military dictators are, of course, an exception to the norm (Geddes, Frantz, et al., 2014; Nordlinger, 1977).

The early autocracy literature on totalitarianism ascribed much importance to ideology (classic ideologies). However, ideology was often viewed
as a means to stay in power and create legitimacy, and less as sincerely held beliefs (Backes & Kailitz, 2016; Dikötter, 2019; Linz, 2000; Wintrobe, 1998). In any case, ideology has not been key to explaining and understanding autocrats’ behavior in recent research. Instead, scholars who assume that dictators are power- and wealth-maximizing have dominated the scientific stage.

In contrast, dictators are often perceived to have more nuanced motives in qualitative case studies of dictators and dictatorships (Bjerk, 2017, p. 14; Gandhi, 2008, pp. 141–142; Jones, 2015; Meredith, 2002; Tripp, 2010), but even here, motivation has not been in focus. Only recently has a study examined dictators’ motivation, or rather one dictator’s and his family’s motivation. In an ethnographic study of the royal elite in the United Arab Emirates, Jones (2015) investigates and finds a variety of motives (different from narrow self-interest) at play in the dictator’s decision-making.

A Way Forward

The major strands of research on autocracies assume that dictators are self-interested wealth and power maximizers. Especially quantitative studies build models on this assumption, whereas many case studies ascribe autocrats much more nuanced motives. This discrepancy is remarkable.

Obviously, dictators would like to and need to stay in power, to follow their beliefs, exploit power for their personal gain, or both; and this imposes constraints on policymaking. However, deemphasizing motivation conceals the potential important impact of motivation that these theories also implicitly assign an important role. Thereby, the predominant autocracy research largely disregards the possibility that dictators are not only self-interested, a possibility that many case studies take into account.

To be fair, many autocracy scholars may assume rational self-interest because it is the simplest assumption and because we need to assume something to build a model (Olson, 1993, p. 574). However, although deemphasized, according to most theory in the field, dictators’ motivation does matter for politics and outcomes in autocracies, especially when dictators face weak constraints. Despite increasing complexity, more nuanced and realistic assumptions are a necessary step to move closer to understanding policymaking in autocracies. If motivation matters, it will also improve our explanations and the empirical fit of our models. The next step in exploring dictators’ motives is a look at research on motivation of ordinary human beings.
Humans Are Not Homo Economicus: Altruism and Fairness

The classic version of homo economicus is (1) exclusively wealth-maximizing (narrowly self-interested), (2) his preferences are exogenous and stable, and (3) he is rational. As outlined in the previous sections, this is how autocrats are generally perceived. Many studies have shown that human beings are not homo economicus as none of the three assumptions hold empirically. As Kahneman (2011, p. 269) has famously stated:

To a psychologist, it is self-evident that people are neither fully rational nor completely selfish, and that their tastes are anything but stable.

This has led to moderations of the assumptions in, for instance, behavioral economics (Akerlof & Kranton, 2010). In psychology and sociology, the assumptions have been abandoned or never been present (Crisp & Turner, 2007; Greene, 2013; Haidt, 2012; Pinker, 2011).

I will discuss the three assumptions of the classic version of homo economicus in turn to inform the discussion of incorporating more realistic motives in models of policymaking in autocracies.

Human Beings Care about Fairness and Have Unstable Preferences

People are not only self-interested as they do not only care about wealth (and power). People's identities affect their preferences, and people have different identities that vary over time and with context, which implies that preferences are not stable either. An example is insider versus outsider identity at a workplace or in the military (Akerlof & Kranton, 2010). Insiders’ preferences are aligned with the norms and values of the organization, whereas outsiders' are often not since outsiders (per definition) do not identify with the organization. A few autocracy scholars have suggested that military dictators should be different from other dictators because they have gone through a socialization process in the military (Geddes, 1999; Nordlinger, 1977) and may have become “insiders”. Their core values are then corporate interest (Geddes, 1999; Nordlinger, 1977) and nationalism (Nordlinger, 1977) instead of (or in addition to) narrow self-interest. An example is the South Korean dictator, Park, who served in the military for about twenty years before he took power in a

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9 Nordlinger does not completely depart from self-interest, as he does not settle to what extent nationalism is just a cover for taking power when their corporate interests are threatened, or whether the nationalism is genuine.
coup d’état. He does not seem to be motivated by corporate interest since spending on military defense actually dropped after Park took power (Moon & Lee, 2010). Instead, he appears to have been driven by nationalist and developmentalist beliefs. After stating the aim of eradicating poverty and creating well-being for the people and the country (H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, pp. 5, 12–13, 89; Lee, 2012, p. 20), he introduced land reforms and industrialized the country through investment in heavy and chemical industry, which was an important source of development (H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, pp. 150–160). Although this may also have created performance legitimacy in the long run, he was extremely unpopular for his investments in the short run. Another argument for why self-interest did not drive him is that he was not corrupt although he had all chances and his country and his administration were (Lee, 2012, pp. 151–152).

Identity, socialization, and beliefs probably matter not only to military dictators but also to other dictators and people in general. In addition to discussing how motives and behavior other than narrow self-interest come about through identity and socialization, scholars have discussed broader categories of motives. A dominant debate concerns the extent to which people are selfish versus altruistic. This has been tested in experiments, such as dictator games and ultimatum bargaining games (Camerer, 2003; Engel, 2011; Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). A dictator game consists of two players, anonymous to each other. One of the players (the dictator) receives a sum of money and has to decide how to share it between himself and the other player. If he chooses not to share, he will get all the money himself. In these experiments, the dictator often gives away some of the money, which has been interpreted as evidence that humans are not entirely selfish but rather altruistic (Baumard et al., 2013; Hindmoor, 2011).

Recently, this debate has taken a new turn. Instead of treating this as evidence of altruism, it may be evidence of different fairness motives. From an evolutionary perspective, it does not make sense that we are altruists; instead, we are reciprocal altruists (but believe the best about other people when we have no information about them). We help and cooperate with other people, unless we discover that they are “cheaters” (e.g., free riders). This is a dominant strategy (trait) for survival, which has led humans to develop a sense of fairness; we help non-cheaters and punish cheaters (Baumard et al., 2013; Dawkins, 2006). Extended versions of the dictator game have shown that knowledge about how the money came about in the first place, and to whom it rightfully belongs, affects how the dictator distributes the money. The dictator gives away more when he is told that the other player rightfully earned the money, whereas if the dictator earned it in a pregame, he often keeps all the money. If the outcome of the pregame is determined by luck, he still shares
with the other player (Baumard et al., 2013). Hence, human beings may not be naïve altruists but instead motivated by fairness concerns.

The conception of fairness varies across people, context, and time. In experiments, not all “dictators” act alike. Some keep everything to themselves, and some share a large proportion of the money with the anonymous other. This has been investigated in another extended version of the dictator game. A sum of tokens, instead of money, are to be shared. Some tokens are more valuable to one of the players than to the other (e.g., after the game, token X may be turned into $5 if the dictator keeps it and $10 if the other player holds it). This has revealed a “new” motive, utility maximization (utilitarianism), which is observed if the dictator gives the token to the person who will get the highest value from it. The experiment shows that people rather consistently act according to this motive or to one of the two “original” ones: equality (sharing the tokens no matter what) and self-interest (keeping all the tokens no matter what) (Andreoni & Miller, 2002). These theories and experiments indicate that people, in addition to being far from purely self-interested, have heterogeneous preferences.

In conclusion, people appear to be motivated not only by self-interest but also by (other) fairness concerns. These may vary according to identity and conceptions of justice, which in turn is a characteristic that distinguishes different ideas and beliefs. Preferences are heterogeneous across time (not stable) and among people (not universal).

Human Beings Use Heuristics

The third assumption of the classic homo economicus, the rationality assumption, does not hold empirically either. Instead, people are “bounded rational” (Simon, 1982) as they have neither full information nor the capacity to rationally assess the consequences of every possible option. People use heuristics to make decisions, which means that actors are influenced by context and framing when assessing options and making decisions. Examples of the more specific findings are that people think of value in relative (not absolute) terms; we tend to overlook opportunity costs and are susceptible to the sunk cost fallacy (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Thaler, 1999; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). However, heuristics are often rational when the goal is sufficiency (as opposed to optimality) because the costs of logical assessment are high. Even when the goal is optimality, using heuristics is sometimes a better option than logical

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10 A highly self-interested person will often see his motivation as fair, e.g., he is especially deserving, or that all people should and would take the opportunities they get to enrich themselves. Therefore, it is fair that he does it too. In this sense, self-interest is a subcategory of a particular interpretation of fairness.
assessment. When the future is uncertain, it is better than logical probability assessments, because trying to predict the future based on experience may lead to “overfitting”. In this regard, using heuristics also makes sense from an evolutionary perspective (Gigerenzer, 2008; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000).

This does not mean that people are completely irrational and unpredictable. We are somewhat rational, but we make mistakes in the decision-making process, and our choices depend on the context and the framing of the options. This implies that in theoretical models, people can still be treated as largely rational, but we need to make space for context to affect decision-making and choices.

What Do We Know?

In this chapter, I have illustrated that dictators are most often modelled as identical, self-interested, and rational individuals who navigate within institutional constraints that thereby determine political dynamics and outcomes. This stands in stark contrast to the nature of ordinary human beings, who are not exactly rational and whose motives vary among individuals and across context.

Whereas it may be a tolerable approximation to reality to assume that people are largely rational, it is not to assume they are exclusively self-interested. But what about dictators? In the next chapter, I develop a theoretical framework of dictators’ motives and behavior building on these insights. In other words, I will be changing dictators’ utility functions.
Chapter 3.
The Dictator’s Motivation: Building an Argument

The Dictator’s Motivation: Self-Interested or Ideologically Motivated?

When ordinary people are not only guided by narrow self-interest but also by other-regarding motives, why should it not be the same for dictators? One answer could be that a self-selection mechanism places dictators in a group of particularly self-interested people. The struggle to reach the top political post is extremely straining and dangerous, and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, p. 22) stipulate that most dictators are driven by the desire to exploit power for personal gain. However, the opposite scenario might be more realistic. Exactly because the climb to power in autocracies is resource demanding—people may risk their lives in the process and may fail to reach their goal—it requires a very strong motivation to go through this. Power, and especially wealth, can be reached elsewhere in ways that are not nearly as costly and risky (Tripp, 2010, pp. 24, 129–130). On various lists comprising the richest people, across the world and in particular regions, surprisingly few politicians show up. Only Isabel Santos, who is not even a politician but the daughter of the former dictator in Angola, along with a couple of Middle Eastern monarchs show up frequently. The lists are dominated by businessmen, including owners of primary-goods production companies, such as mining and agriculture (Alexander, 2014; BusinessTech, 2019; Dolan, 2020; Flannery, 2019; Tersoo, 2020). On lists of billionaire politicians, there are almost no top rulers (except for those just mentioned), and the politicians who appear on the lists are mainly businessmen who built up their wealth prior to entering the political scene, e.g., Russian Mikhail Prokhorov and Georgian Bidzina Ivanishvili (Angulo, 2012; Tognini, 2019). Of course, the wealth of dictators and other politicians in dictatorships is likely to be underreported, as it may be hidden and difficult to estimate, but the lack of dictators on the lists and the corresponding dominance by businessmen still indicate that one can become as least as wealthy and (almost) as powerful as a successful businessman as one could as a politician. It is not easy to become a rich and successful businessman, but there is no reason to believe that it should be easier and less risky to become the leader of an autocracy, quite the contrary.
Consequently, a rational cost-benefit calculation for a self-interested person would strongly advise against taking the path towards the top political post in an autocracy. In contrast, strongly ideologically motivated people are most likely to face the risks and go through the political struggle. This is especially the case when the road to political power is particularly tough, and a potential dictator is resourceful enough to have some chance of obtaining wealth and power elsewhere (to be elaborated later in the chapter). Therefore, ideologically motivated dictators are likely to be significantly more common than normally assumed. Because the image of the self-interested autocrat is omnipresent in research on autocracies, it may be easy to forget that when autocrats increase the wealth of the nation, adhere to an ideology, expropriate land, and help the poor, it does not necessarily stem from the dictators’ self-interest. It might derive from a sincere belief that this would serve the country and the people well.

An example of the theoretical dominance of the selfish dictator is that scholars explain Hugo Chávez’ behavior, which includes the introduction of land reform and other redistribution policies, with the purpose of power maximization rather than with his socialist beliefs. He is often used as good example of a power maximizer, because he turned democratic Venezuela into an autocracy, but rarely as an ideologically motivated dictator who did this to enable implementation of his radical beliefs (Albertus, 2015; Geddes, Wright, & Frantz, 2018). However, a closer look at the case reveals that Chávez sincerely believed in socialism. Long before Chávez became president, he was engaged in socialist organizations, he worked to improve the rights of the Indians and the living standards of the poor (Carroll, 2013; Kozloff, 2007). The fact that his behavior before and after becoming president were strongly aligned indicates that he was sincerely ideologically motivated. Although his power depended on support from the poor in Venezuela, self-interest cannot explain Chávez’ fight for rights and goods for the Indians, since they only constituted 2% of the population (Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2017). What is more, Chávez’s aggressive style against business people and capitalism may have been more harmful than helpful to his staying in power, meaning that also this behavior was unlikely to be driven by rational self-interest. It was completely consistent with his ideology, though. In this light, portraying Chávez as mainly self-interested appears to be an effect of the predominance of the current paradigm, which risks redefining ideologically motivated actions to actions motivated by self-interest.

In discussions of dictators’ motives, a common argument for why dictators cannot be other-regarding is that they do not democratize. The assumption is that they would surely do so if they cared about their people. Again, we may
be blinded by the dominant paradigm, because in fact, democracy is not always viewed as a good thing per se, not even by the people. Moral values and personality are affected by culture and socialization (Grusec & Hastings, 2015, pp. 675–677). In many places outside the Western world, democratization has led to instability (L. E. Cederman, Hug, & Krebs, 2010; Mansfield & Snyder, 2007; Schatzman, 2005). Thus, because of different history and experiences, people with sociotropic preferences outside the West do not necessarily view democracy as a superior or even viable option. For instance, many people in Bhutan did not want the country to democratize after they saw neighboring India, Nepal, and Bangladesh democratize, which arguably led to chaos and corruption (Page, 2008; Rosenberg, 2008; Schmidt, 2017, p. 22; Sengupta, 2008; Wax, 2008). The former dictator in Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew explicitly stated, like Plato, that democracy is rule by the rabble. The idea is that to rule a country, one needs special knowledge and insights unlike the common man’s (Barber, 1978, pp. 195–196; Han, Fernandez, & Tan, 2015, p. 215; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, pp. 6–7, 129). I do not claim that this argument is valid, but although it can function as a cover for self-interest, it can also be, as in the case of Plato, a sincerely held belief.

If a dictator is not exclusively motivated by self-interest, what then motivates the dictator to enter and stay in power? As is the case for human beings, fairness is likely to be a strong motive for autocrats. In a political context, fairness concerns translate into ideological motivation and beliefs as laid out in Chapter 1. What is fair, the content of the ideology, varies among people. Although human beings are similar in many regards, they hold different perspectives on many things in life. Most people care about themselves, their family, friends, and other human beings (Baumard et al., 2013). Yet, how much they care about themselves (and family) compared to other human beings varies across contexts and among individuals (Akerlof & Kranton, 2010; Andreoni & Miller, 2002). Therefore, I also expect this to vary among dictators. For the present purpose, my main interest is the motivation regarding politics and broader worldviews. My focus is the relative weight between concerns for oneself and concerns for the people (or parts of the people) in a political context. People who care strongly for both themselves and others are placed in the middle of the spectrum between caring for themselves and caring for others. I generally expect most dictators to be strongly motivated along this spectrum due to the risk of becoming and being a dictator, as well as the severe consequences of leaving power (Escribà-Folch, 2013; Svolik, 2012). By implication, I do not expect to find many dictators without a strong motivation to be in power.

11 Although I expect that most dictators can be placed on this spectrum, I am aware that in rare cases, they may simply suffer from paranoia or other mental illness.
Following existing research on autocracies, I view wealth maximization or power maximization as the two main types of self-interest among dictators. In contrast to self-interest stands care for others. This is not limited to altruism in a strict sense. For instance, it is possible to care strongly for others while still caring about one’s own survival and having sufficient resources to live a decent life, which is what most people care about. Caring about others does not imply caring for everyone else. In some cases, it may be care for specific groups of people (in addition to family and friends). Neither does caring for others imply unconditional care. Based on the discussion above, I expect that whom a person cares for, and how he cares, is based on his perception of what is fair, which goes beyond pure self-interest. In a political context, these fairness concerns (at least the non-selfish) are translated into ideology in the broad sense employed here.

In sum, I argue that dictators have strong motivations for being in power and that the motivation is likely to vary across dictators on a scale from highly self-interested to highly ideologically motivated. We should expect a substantial part of the world’s dictators to be situated in the ideological end of the spectrum.

**Threats and Constraints Influence Priorities, But Not Core Motives**

Sometimes ideologically motivated dictators appear self-interested or at least very preoccupied with staying in power, which is not necessarily in conflict with being ideologically motivated. First, staying in power is a crucial means to realizing the ideological goals. Second, in autocracies, severe personal consequences follow from losing power. Repression and patronage are often a part of ruling an autocracy, which makes it difficult for the dictator to leave power without repercussions, such as imprisonment, exile, or death (Escribà-Folch, 2013; Geddes, Wright, & Frantz, 2014). Staying in power is necessary to secure the dictator’s own safety—even if the dictator actually wants to step down. This is what Tripp coins the “power paradox” of dictatorships (Tripp, 2010, pp. 1, 4, 24, 127, 194–195). We should expect that the more a dictator has been using violence and has engaged in other (perceivably) illegitimate behavior, the higher the personal costs of leaving power will be. These costs of losing power are especially prevalent if the prospective successor disagrees with the incumbent elite.

The power paradox is present in many autocracies, especially in hybrid regimes, as in the case of Yoweri Museveni in Uganda (Tripp, 2010). This power paradox has also been relevant for other autocrats. One of former Zimbabwean dictator, Robert Mugabe’s main challengers, Roy Bennett, reckons that
the central motive for Mugabe’s holding on to power was that he feared stepping down after the politicide in Matabeleland in the beginning of his incumbency. Accordingly, he believes that Mugabe had become somewhat paranoid towards the end of his rule (Godwin, 2010, pp. 288, 313). Likewise, José Eduardo Dos Santos’ (Angola) change of mind about stepping down in 2001, as promised, coincided with the former dictator of neighboring Zambia being stripped from immunity followed by legal proceedings. This indicates that fear of prosecution was the reason for not stepping down (Vines & Weimer, 2009).

Even highly ideologically motivated dictators care about their own security and well-being. By transferring the economic logic of decreasing marginal utility to the two objectives of one’s own well-being and wealth (egotropic ends), and one’s ideology and beliefs (sociotropic ends), the latter has relatively higher priority the better one is already faring personally (the more the egotropic ends are satisfied). This logic is illustrated in Figure 3.1. Because dictators often face severe consequences if they step down, a higher risk of losing power will lead to increased focus on consolidating power and relatively less on fulfilling their ideologically motivated goals. This mechanism should be distinguished from changes in the basic motivation, i.e., the utility function (illustrated by changes in the shapes of the indifference curves instead of moves on the curves). In this sense, the threat level against the dictator, defined as a combination of the risk and the severity of the consequences of losing power, is a constraining factor, and thus, it conditions the effect of ideological motivation on policymaking and outcomes.

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12 Although it is the perceived risk of losing power that is important, the real risk may be a good approximation.
13 The same logic applies to self-interested dictators. They cannot exploit power for their private economic gain in times of high threat because they will have to focus on staying in and consolidating power.
Figure 3.1. The Impact of Satisfying Sociotropic and Egotropic Ends on Overall Well-Being

Note: The orthogonal arrows indicate that the person's utility increases more if the person spends a certain amount of resources on sociotropic ends than if he spends the same amount of resources on egotropic ends, given that the person has higher satisfaction of egotropic ends than of sociotropic ends in the first place.

Chávez is an example of the expected change in behavior after an increasing threat from the elite. In 2002, he survived a coup attempt. He kept behaving according to his ideology, but he centralized power and invested more resources in his own security (Carroll, 2013; Ponniah & Eastwood, 2011). Park is a similar example. In this case, however, the threat from the people may have been the reason for centralizing power. His popularity declined around 1970, and in 1972, he introduced martial law and became increasingly repressive (H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, p. 36). At the same time, he became less constrained by the elite, which made it possible for him to direct significant attention to his ideological aims (H.-A. Kim, 2004, pp. 139, 165–187, 207; H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, p. 36).

The severity of the consequences of losing power will most likely increase over time. The threat of removal often comes from the ruling coalition or the population (Escribà-Folch, 2013; Gandhi, 2008; Geddes et al., 2018; Gerschewski, 2013; Svolik, 2012). Thus, the dictator needs to spend resources on accommodating the interests of these groups, or control them. Popular constraints are likely to increase over time due to several factors. Many new governments experience a “honeymoon” after coming to power, as was the case for Mugabe, Museveni, Chávez, and Park. The new regime’s priorities and
capacities, and lack thereof, only become clear after some time, and some people will always be disappointed. Autocratic leaders also do not have the same source of legitimacy as democratic leaders, and ruling one-handed requires a lot of legitimacy, which is difficult to obtain from the entire population and increasingly difficult the longer the dictator stays in power. Furthermore, the track of violence and repression is widespread in most autocracies and it increases over time. This makes it even easier for the population to become dissatisfied. As there is no way to channel their frustration, the opposition may engage in disobedience, or revolt, which threatens the dictator’s safety.

The elite constraints are likely to vary in an inverse U-shape over time. Except for the risk of a counter coup just after a successful coup, many new dictators have leeway from elite pressures in the beginning of their incumbency. After the “honeymoon”, the dictator will face increasing pressure from different groups in the elite, because they all want their interests satisfied. If the dictator succeeds in staying in power long enough, he is likely to gain control over the ruling coalition, which will become less constraining. The expected temporal developments in constraints imposed by the people and the elite are illustrated in Figure 3.2.

**Figure 3.2. Developments in Popular Constraints and Elite Constraints over Time**

This illustrates the importance of studying political survival. The threat level is likely to vary over time (and among dictators), and in times of low threat, the dictator is less constrained, and a substantial amount of resources are left
for discretionary use, that is, doing other things than securing political survival. If the people and the elite are equally important for the dictators’ political survival, the dictators are likely to face the lowest threat in the beginning of the incumbency when neither the elite nor the people is likely to be highly constraining. However, studies have shown that the elite is more important for political survival than the people (Gandhi, 2008; Geddes, 1999; Geddes et al., 2018; Svolik, 2012), which leads to the conclusion that dictators become less constrained over time (if they sit long enough to consolidate power). In addition to popular and elite constraints, economic and international constraints, e.g., directives from the IMF or the World Bank or conditionality from donors, may affect the priorities of the dictator. Due to the variations in threats and constraints, we should not expect the logic of political survival and, thus, the political institutions to be the only central determinants of policymaking and societal outcomes in autocracies. The autocrats’ motivation should be important.

In sum, I argue that dictators are constrained to varying degrees because all dictators want to stay in power. To realize one’s ideology or exploit power (in the cases where the autocrat is largely self-interested), and to avoid probably severe consequences of leaving power, staying in power is simply needed. This implies that we should also see ideologically motivated dictators try to consolidate power. I expect that dictators’ priorities change with variations in threats against their power, interpreted as the level of constraints they face. An ideologically motivated dictator is equally ideologically motivated in times of high and low constraints (and threat), but when the threat against his power is high, he directs focus and resources to staying in power and less to fulfilling his ideological agenda. A similar logic follows for a self-interested dictator. He will exploit power relatively more when constraints are low compared to high. In times of few and weak constraints, the dictator’s basic motivation (utility function), no matter where on the ideology-self-interest scale he is placed, is expressed in behavior and policies. In times of high constraints, all dictators, no matter their motivation, have to spend their resources on navigating within the constraints to secure themselves and their political power.

14 Dictators who are self-interested power maximizers, i.e., interested in power for its intrinsic value, will always try to maximize power no matter what, and constraints do not affect their priorities.
Correlates of Motivation: When Are Dictators Likely to Be Ideologically Motivated?

Road to Power

A dictator’s motivation is unlikely to be random. There may be systematic patterns in the dictators’ motivation: who are predominantly ideologically motivated and who are predominantly self-interested? Dictators’ motivation and the way they gain power may be connected via a selection effect and a socialization effect. The mechanism behind the selection effect is a cost-benefit analysis in which risk and gain are weighted, whereas the mechanism behind the socialization effect is that experiences on the road to power affect the future dictator’s preferences and, in turn, the degree of ideological motivation.

The selection effect denotes that if the road to power is challenging, only highly ideologically motivated people will follow it, whereas highly self-interested people may choose other—less challenging—ways to satisfy their interest. Contrarily, when the road to power is less costly, people at both ends of the spectrum may be inclined to seek political power. Hence, when self-interested and ideologically motivated dictators face identical constraints (a tough or easy road to power), different preferences make them choose differently.

In some cases, power can be very challenging and costly to achieve. The climb to power can be expensive in money and time, people may risk their lives in the process, and they may even fail to reach their goal. This is often the case for guerilla fighters, who live a high-risk life without immediate benefit. Although politics often involves economic and political privileges, a rational cost-benefit calculation for a self-interested person would strongly advise against taking this path. From this perspective, it seems implausible that people choose to go through this process to gain power or money without a strong belief driving them. Wealth may be achieved elsewhere, for instance in business (Alexander, 2014; Dolan, 2020; Flannery, 2019; Tripp, 2010, pp. 24, 129–130), and with fewer sacrifices for oneself and other people. Similarly, entering politics as competing for power in the opposition may be costly. Hence, mainly ideologically motivated people may be inclined to seek power through that path.

In comparison, inherited power may be the easiest way to power. Achieving power coming from within the incumbent elite, and maybe even being

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Many studies have shown that certain people tend to adhere to specific ideological beliefs (ideological content, in particular regarding the placement on the classic left-right dimension) (Haidt, 2012; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009), although the extent to which they are ideologically motivated in the first place is rarely studied.
groomed and handpicked as successor, is also a less costly road to power, and there may be a pay-off in terms of money and power before reaching the top. Election campaigns may be costly, but the security risk is low. Achieving power through a coup d’état is risky, but the probability of a successful coup d’état can be high for people from the army because they possess strategic skills and have access to weapons (Powell, 2012). Thus, this road to power is neither very easy nor very challenging.

This means that dictators who are former guerilla fighters or from the opposition are likely to be the most ideologically motivated, followed by military dictators and dictators from the incumbent elite; and finally, monarchs are the least likely to be ideologically motivated.

The socialization effect strengthens this pattern. Socialization is the process through which people internalize values and norms through experiences and from their surroundings and, in turn, this process affects people’s preferences. Socialization is a life-long process; first as primary socialization and, later, as secondary socialization (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 157; Grusec & Hastings, 2015, pp. 110, 125). In the present context, the socialization effect occurs when the road to power affects the values and identity, and thereby the preferences (motives), of the dictator. Socialization in the military is likely to be strong because it creates a strong identity, which in turn affects preferences (Akerlof & Kranton, 2010). As mentioned, a few autocracy scholars have suggested that military dictators are different from other dictators because of this socialization process. They may have corporate interests (Geddes, 1999; Nordlinger, 1977) as well as nationalist interests (Nordlinger, 1977) instead of narrow self-interest. Overall, socialization in the military is likely to make people more ideologically motivated.

Dictators who inherit power may also be subject to a socialization effect. Prejudice about other people and groups in society is natural. Reducing prejudice and creating a breeding ground for sympathy towards these groups are facilitated by contact (in a situation with equal status) and by people having similar experiences, such as oppression (Allport, 1954). This is relevant regarding monarchs’ socialization. Members of the royal family may not really be aware of life outside their palace, which implies that they have neither personal contact nor similar experiences as the people. They are only socialized into elite groups. Therefore, the monarch is unlikely to be able to identify with the injustices the population faces. He is not prone to build up grief and anger in response to injustices in society and may therefore not be very ideologically motivated. Examples are Kim Jong-Il and Kim Jong-Un in North Korea.

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16 In the period 1950-2010, around half of all coup attempts were successful (Powell, 2012).
counter-argument is that some royal families socialize their members to take pride in running the country and thereby honor their lineage. Alternatively, some monarchs may be socialized into a worldview in which the king is supposed to rule and dominate his people. In sum, the socialization effect renders it probable that dictators who inherit power are likely to be less ideologically motivated than other dictators.

Dictators who have been in government for a long time before taking power may also be subject to the lack-of-grievance mechanism. These dictators have experienced struggling in the political game while perhaps enjoying spoils. In this process, they may have internalized different values while becoming alienated from the people whose cause they were originally fighting, and, thus, losing their ideological drive (if they had any in the first place). This can be illustrated empirically by comparing the five dictators who have been to power in Tanzania. Of the five, Julius Nyerere and John Magufuli appear to be the most ideologically motivated, and in contrast to the other three (Ali Hassan Mwinyi, Benjamin Mkapa, and Jakaya Kikwete), they had not been in politics for a very long time before they became ultimate rulers (Tanzania Expert 2, 2017; Tanzania Expert 4, 2017; Tanzania Expert 5, 2017).

Guerilla fighters continuously face what they perceive as injustices, which adds to their grievances. This is likely to make them even more ideologically motivated. A similar argument is valid for dictators coming from the political opposition as they may constantly be run over and attacked by the incumbent regime. Thus, also in this end of the road-to-power scale does the socialization effect strengthen the pattern of the selection effect.

Taking both the selection and socialization effect into account leads to the expectation that former guerilla fighters are the dictators most likely to be ideologically motivated and, second, dictators coming from the opposition. These groups include several political leaders who have been perceived as freedom fighters against injustices, such as Hugo Chávez and Vladimir Lenin, but also independence fighters in former colonies, such as Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe), Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), and Seretse Khama (Botswana). In the middle of the spectrum are military dictators. The least likely to be ideologically motivated are people coming from within the incumbent elite and monarchs. Notice that this relationship is not causal, because the mechanisms work in opposite directions: The selection effect is an effect of motivation on the road to power, and the socialization effect is a consequence of the road to power for motivation.
Personal Characteristics: Education, Socioeconomic Background, and Age

There may be other patterns in ideological motivation than the road to power. It is likely that leader characteristics, such as education and socioeconomic background, affect the extent to which a dictator is ideologically motivated. There are several mechanisms at play. First, a cost-benefit analysis entails at least two mechanisms, substantiated by an opportunity-cost argument and a resource argument, respectively. Regarding the former, there are high opportunity costs for both well-educated and wealthy people to enter politics, which implies that their alternatives to entering politics are good. This leads to the expectation that dictators with a higher education or a strong socioeconomic background are the most ideologically motivated. Had they been selfish, it may not have been beneficial to enter the risky road towards the political top. Conversely, the resource argument leads to the opposite conclusion. Achieving power may be relatively easier for well-educated and wealthy people, which means that the risk of not succeeding is lower. Hence, this latter argument leads to the conclusion that less educated and previously poor dictators are the most likely to be ideologically motivated. However, since the road to power is often risky even for well-educated and wealthy people, the opportunity-cost argument may be the strongest. Thus, the cost-benefit analysis leads to the tentative conclusion that the most educated and wealthy (prior to entering power) dictators are most likely to be ideologically motivated.

Regarding both educational and socioeconomic background, there may also be a socialization effect. Although socialization is a life-long process, socialization in the formative years is crucial (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Grusec & Hastings, 2015). Education is likely to reduce self-interest because education makes people aware of how other people live. It has often been argued that education fosters sociotropic values, such as tolerance (Pinker, 2018). The opposite is the case regarding socioeconomic background, where the lack-of-grievance mechanism is at play just as for monarchs. In contrast to the wealthy, who are unlikely to have experienced strong injustices to trigger grievance, the poor are likely to have experienced injustices and, therefore, cultivated a strong desire to change society. The socialization effect combined with the conclusions from the cost-benefit analysis lead to the expectation that education is positively correlated with ideological motivation, but the correlation between motivation and socioeconomic background is more ambiguous.

Finally, the age of the dictator may be correlated with the degree of ideological motivation. The youth is often perceived as more open to new ideas, and perhaps, also more extreme ideas compared to elderly. The personality trait of openness to experiences captures this. Psychologists have shown that
the youth have higher degrees of openness compared to elderly (Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006). This could be an argument for younger dictators being more ideologically motivated compared to older dictators. However, most likely, this only concerns the extremity of the ideological content, and not the degree of ideological motivation (as opposed to self-interest). In contrast, sociological and psychological studies have shown that elderly are more collectivistic, and the youth is more individualistic (Bengtson, 1975). This may apply to the political scene, which should lead us to expect that dictators are more other-regarding the older they are. This expectation is supported by studies showing that personality traits like agreeableness and conscientiousness on average increase with age. These findings are even robust across cultures (McCrae et al., 1999; Roberts et al., 2006). This leads to the overall expectation the degree of ideologically motivation is higher the older a dictators is.

Corrupted by Power over Time?

A final note on the correlates of motivation is that time in power may also affect dictators’ motivation. Dictators may lose some of their ideological motivation over time (if they had any to begin with) because they become insulated by the political process and detached from the life and struggles of the people. Thus, it is likely that some dictators become more self-interested during their incumbency. As this regards a change in basic motivation (utility function), it is different from change in priorities due to increased threat, as previously discussed.

The Consequences of the Dictator’s Motivation

In the previous sections, I have discussed the extent to which and when dictators are likely to be ideologically motivated. I will now turn to the potential impact of dictators’ motivation. I first discuss the impact on different types of socio-economic development, and second the effect on repression and civil war.

Development

A country’s development is often understood as its economic development, as it is a means to improving the well-being of the people. However, the phenomenon of development also contains “the removal of poverty and undernutrition: it is an increase in life expectancy; it is access to sanitation, clean drinking water, and health services; it is the reduction of infant mortality; it is increased access to knowledge and schooling, and literacy in particular” (Ray,
Consequently, economic development is an important aspect of development because it enables the core aspects of development, namely people’s well-being; but because development is particularly sensitive to the well-being of the poor in society, it also has a redistributional aspect. Interchangeably with the term development, I use the common term socio-economic development to highlight both social and economic aspects.

The road from the motivation of the ruling autocrat to development outcomes is long and conditioned by constraints both in the policymaking process and in the implementation process. In the following, I will discuss how a dictator’s motivation affects his willingness to enhance human well-being through the creation of development-enhancing policies which in turn affects development outcomes. As I discussed the constraints (conditions) previously, I will not take up the discussion here. This implies that I will not differentiate between the effect of motivation on willingness, policies, and outcomes in the following sections. The three terms will therefore be used interchangeably.

Ideologically motivated dictators have a clear idea about the good world or society that they strive to create. The group of strongly ideologically motivated dictators includes dictators as diverse as right-wing military dictators, Brazilian Castello Branco and Argentinian Pedro Eugenio Aramburu; the East German communist leaders, Walter Ulbricht and Erich Honecker; and the white rulers of South Africa during apartheid, Hans Strijdom and Hendrik Verwoerd. Surely, these dictators did not have the same view and prioritization of socio-economic development. It is clear that in combination with the degree of ideological motivation, the content of the ideology matters. I argue that the classic economic, i.e., left-right, dimension of the ideology does not substantially affect the motivation to enhance socio-economic development in general but instead affects the means to development. In contrast, the degree of exclusion prescribed by the ideology should matter for development, at least under highly exclusionary dictators. I will treat the two dimensions as orthogonal.

The Content of the Ideology: The Economic Dimension
Starting with the economic dimension, there are two ideal-typical ways of securing the people’s well-being. One is to focus on economic growth to increase the general wealth in society, which corresponds to fairness understood as utilitarianism. The other is to target the poor and focus on redistribution, which corresponds somewhat to the equality conception of fairness. The welfare state literature (focused on Western democracies) indicates that left-wing regimes reduce poverty more than right-wing regimes do (Brady, 2009; Huber
& Stephens, 2010; Korpi & Palme, 1998). Yet, in developing and middle-income countries, this difference may not be so pronounced, for two reasons.

First, as ideologically motivated dictators care about their people’s well-being, and a large part of the people in developing or middle-income countries live under terrible conditions, not even ideologically motivated right-wing dictators can seriously care about the development of the country and the general well-being by completely disregarding the poorest. For this reason, we should expect both the economic left and right to, at least to some degree, care about the well-being of the poor.

Second, for developing and middle-income countries, it is evident that a broader economic transformation is needed to enhance socio-economic development (Whitfield, Therkildsen, Buur, & Kjær, 2015). Some policies, like industrialization and land reform, are simply necessary if dictators seriously want to improve the life of their people, which we should expect of all ideologically motivated dictators across the economic spectrum. Many communist dictators during the Cold War prioritized redistribution, but they were still very aware of the importance of general economic development of their country through industrialization. In contrast, right-wing dictators like Park and many Latin American right-wing rulers were aware that development, in addition to focusing on industrialization and business development needed a redistributional aspect, which made them introduce land reforms. As these big steps towards development may matter more for development than specific means that may diverge across the politico-economic spectrum, the effect of economic adherence may not matter as much as in highly developed countries.

Although the specific means may differ, all ideologically motivated dictators (in developing and middle-income countries) with largely inclusionary ideologies have an interest in increasing the overall development in their country, no matter whether they belong to the economic left or right; and they will try to enhance development by attempting to create the necessary economic transformation. Consequently, if a dictator is ideologically motivated, we should expect an effect of the economic dimension of the ideology only on development measures particularly connected to redistribution, such as inequality measures, and to measures particularly connected to the industry and business community. We should not expect an effect of the economic ideology on more economically neutral development measures like GDP per capita, infant mortality, education, and in part the development of the welfare state.
The Content of the Ideology: The Exclusion Dimension

The exclusion dimension of the ideology denotes the extent to which the ideology prescribes exclusion of some people. Sometimes, groups of people in society are excluded from the idea about the “good society” and (the reciprocal) altruism. This phenomenon is called parochial altruism and is limited to members of the in-group, i.e., the people with whom dictators identify (Bernhard, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2006; Choi & Bowles, 2007; Haidt, 2012). In this way, this concerns the scope of the fairness concerns.

These in-group/out-group structures often coincide with strong social markers such that we automatically favor the people who are closest to us, or those we perceive resemble us (Crisp & Turner, 2007; Greene, 2013; Haidt, 2012; Pinker, 2011). Sometimes, different norms and habits make it difficult for groups to understand and identify with each other. In the worst cases, people may not even see each other as human beings, a phenomenon called dehumanization (Pinker, 2011, pp. 766–767). However, awareness of these in-group/out-group structures can break down the divisions between them (Greene, 2013; Pinker, 2011)—especially if they are created arbitrarily—e.g., by contact (Allport, 1954). Ideologies and beliefs differ in the perception of in-group/out-group structures (Haidt, 2012).

This psychological in-group/out-group theory mainly concerns how we perceive each other, how we act, and to some extent how we break down these divisions. The theory is generally silent about how these divisions emerge, and why they look like they do. Divisions in ideologies do not have to be deep, and they do not necessarily need to mirror existing divisions in society. The sociological boundary-drawing literature addresses the emergence and suggests that social divisions, known as boundaries, are often shaped by power relations, both among political leaders and in interaction with society. Boundaries in beliefs can be created as a response to injustices in society, but also in response to networks and power relations among elites. Both the strength and the location of the boundaries are affected by these factors (Wimmer, 2013, pp. 32–34). Haidt (2012) illustrates differences in location of the boundaries by comparing liberals and conservatives in the United States. He argues that liberals have a less constrained scope of altruism. To liberals, all Americans are a part of “Us”, whereas conservatives have a narrower scope, limited to civil society or the family.

I argue that a dictator’s willingness to increase the well-being of ordinary citizens depends on how strong the boundary is and the location of the boundary, i.e., whether it is close to include everyone in the country, or whether it divides the population. If the boundary is strong (i.e., when there are deep social divisions in ideology), and if the excluded groups in the country are large (i.e., narrow boundaries and a small in-group), the willingness to secure
human well-being in the general society is low. The simple reason is that the out-group members are not a part of the “good” and the important group in the ideology. They may not even be regarded as human beings. Thus, only a small group and not the national living standard and socio-economic development will be prioritized, even though the dictator is highly ideologically motivated.

An example is Adolf Hitler and his beliefs. He may have tried to create the best possible world for his in-group (Aryan Germans). This may have been his reason for invading several territories, which he claimed belonged to Germany, and why disabled people were killed (to increase the “strength” of the race). His argument for killing out-groups (including Jews) was that they were a threat to racial purity and blossoming (Hitler, 1925). Thus, some ideologically motivated dictators can do horrible things and may harm the well-being of the population even more than predatory, non-ideologically motivated dictators may. Accordingly, if the out-group is large, and the boundary is strong, the ideologically motivated dictator may enhance development of society even less than non-ideologically motivated dictators such as Mobutu. On the other hand, if the dictator’s ideology contains no, weak, or broad boundaries, he will be more willing to enhance human well-being and prioritize development than other dictators—either by focusing on increasing prosperity or by redistributing resources to the poor.

In the cases in between the two extremes of highly inclusionary and highly exclusionary dictators, what should we expect regarding development? Even if the out-group is large, but social division is not particularly pronounced, strong alienation will not occur. The excluded group may not experience as much development as the included group, but the included group may experience a relatively higher rise in development. This will lead to unequal development. However, as overall development is only somewhat sensitive to inequality, the overall expected increase in development may only be a little lower when the dictator is highly inclusionary, ceteris paribus. In the reverse case where the boundary is strong but the out-group is relatively small, a similar conclusion can be drawn. Overall socio-economic development may only be slightly lower than in countries led by inclusionary dictators because the out-group is very small and does not significantly affect the overall level of development. In this sense, the impact of the exclusion dimension on socio-economic development more generally is not expected to be linear, except when considering inequality sensitive dimensions of development such as inequality and to some extent human development, which is particularly sensitive to the living standards of the worst off.

A country will only develop less under an ideologically motivated dictator than under a self-interested dictator in the extreme cases where ideologically
motivated dictators are highly exclusionary, i.e., their ideology contains both narrow and strong boundaries (excluding a large group of people in the population and prescribing strong social division). These extremely exclusionary dictators are likely to comprise only a very small group of the ideologically motivated dictators. This leads to the expectation that ideologically motivated dictators generally have a positive impact on development compared to self-interested dictators, who have no intrinsic motivation to enhance development.

Repression

A country’s level of repression, like its level of development, seriously affects the life and well-being of the population. I now turn to the potential impact of the dictators’ motivation on violent repression, defined as government strategies that violate the physical integrity of individuals, such as state-sponsored beatings, torture, and killings.

As discussed in Chapter 2, repression—especially violent repression—is an important tool in autocracies that is not really an option in democracies. The level of violent repression varies across autocracies, as we learned that single-parties stand out as the least repressive (Davenport, 2007).

The motivation of the autocrat may also affect the degree of violent repression. There is no reason, a priori, to expect that the economic content of the ideology should matter. There are highly repressive left-wing dictators like Stalin and Pol Pot, and highly repressive right-wing dictators like Hitler, other fascists and some Latin American military rulers. However, the reason for the violent repression was not the economic content of the ideology, but rather that they were highly exclusionary or highly self-interested dictators.

Ethnically exclusive regimes are known to be very likely to engage in more violent repression (Rorbæk, 2019). Although this observation does not differentiate between self-interested and ideologically motivated dictators, it indicates that exclusion is central for the use of violent repression. The ideologically motivated exclusionary dictator is likely to be the most repressive dictator, because repression is important to implement his ideological aims. He desires to create or sustain the boundary by assimilating the out-group, by controlling it and keeping it down, or in extreme cases by deportation or distinction. These aims are likely to involve force and violent repression.

The self-interested dictator is also likely to engage in violent repression, but only to the extent it is needed for him to stay in power, that is, if the anticipated benefits exceed the costs, and if it is less expensive than alternative strategies. However, the highly self-interested dictator has no concern for the people. In this regard, human sacrifices do not count separately when a highly
self-interested dictator considers how much he will repress; it only counts insofar as it is important to the winning coalition, potentially including parts of the international community. Thus, self-interested dictators are likely to be the most violently repressive except for very exclusionary ideologically motivated dictators. In contrast to these, the more ideologically motivated and inclusionary a dictator is, the more general human well-being matters to him, and the more will he refrain from using violent repression. Violent repression does not have to be absent, but it will be significantly more “expensive” (in lost utility) than to exclusionary and self-interested dictators. In sum, violent repression is likely to be most widespread in autocracies ruled by strongly exclusionary or highly self-interested dictators, and least likely in autocracies ruled by highly ideologically motivated dictators with inclusionary ideologies.

Civil War

I now turn to the potential impact of the dictators’ motivation on the likelihood of onset and duration of a civil war, a phenomenon that like development and repression has an enormous impact on the well-being of the people in a country.

Civil wars are extremely costly for all parts, also for self-interested autocrats. A full-blown civil war is therefore always a last option. They start when rebels or the opposition estimate that they cannot get through with their strongly held beliefs through other means than violence (the regime may be violent first), and the regime cannot suppress the opposition violence. Two factors—strong grievances and perceived regime illegitimacy—are important for the likelihood of rebels will engage in violence against the regime (L.-E. Cederman, Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013; Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch, 2001). When a regime generally lacks legitimacy and has low capacity, the likelihood of civil war increases. Hybrid regimes appear to be more likely to experience civil war because they are often perceived as more illegitimate and are less capable compared to other regimes (Hegre, 2014; Hegre et al., 2001). Also, military dictatorships are at higher risk of entering civil war than other autocracies (except hybrid regimes) (Fjelde, 2010). In contrast, single-party regimes are least prone to experience civil war among autocracies due to their strong institutionalization, which affects both legitimacy and capacity (Fjelde, 2010; Hegre, 2014; Hegre et al., 2001).

Based on these insights, we should expect dictators with highly exclusionary ideologies to be more likely to experience civil war during their incumbency compared to inclusionary dictators. Exclusion generates grievances among the excluded, and the excluded are likely to view the leadership as illegitimate. There may also be an effect of the degree of ideological motivation,
because motivation may affect legitimacy. A highly self-interested autocrat is likely to be viewed as less legitimate than an ideologically motivated dictator if the people know his true motives, since egotropic preferences are generally viewed as less agreeable than sociotropic preferences. Strongly self-interested dictators who do not manage to conceal their power abuse, such as embezzling the state or a lavish lifestyle, are likely to be viewed as more illegitimate than other dictators. The discovery that the country’s resources are not spent on the people but on the dictator and his cronies is very likely to generate strong grievances among the people. However, strongly ideologically motivated inclusionary dictators may also generate grievances insofar as their ideology contains radical views. I expect exclusionary ideologically motivated dictators to be most likely to experience civil war. Only in cases where self-interested dictators are unable to hide their self-interest may they be more likely to experience civil war than ideologically motivated dictators with inclusionary ideologies. In the opposite case, the relationship may be reversed. The risk of civil war tends mainly to be affected by societal factors. The motives and thus the behavior of the dictator may not be strongly related to the risk of civil war. This part of the empirical analysis will therefore be highly explorative.

Theoretical Expectations

The Prevalence of Ideologically Motivated Dictators

I have argued that the dictators’ motivation varies on a spectrum from very self-interested to very ideologically motivated, and that we should expect that a large share of the world’s dictators to be at the ideological end of the spectrum. All dictators need to stay in power to realize their motives. In times of high threats to their power or person by the elite, the people, the international community, or heavy economic constraints, all dictators will focus on their personal and political survival. In times of low constraints, their basic motivation (utility function) will translate into behavior and have an effect on different outcomes, as I return to below.

Correlates of Motivation

Before turning to the consequences of dictators’ motivation, I summarize the expected correlates of motivation. The dictators’ road to power and several background characteristics should be correlated with the degree of ideological motivation. Socialization arguments and cost-benefit analyses constitute the mechanisms behind these expectations. The mechanisms are not causal arguments, as only the socialization effects have an effect on motivation. The cost-benefit calculations are based on pre-existing differences in motivation.
Regarding the road to power, dictators who are former guerilla fighters are most likely to be ideologically motivated followed by dictators coming from the opposition. In the middle of the spectrum, we find military dictators. The least likely to be ideologically motivated are dictators coming from within the incumbent elite and monarchs.

The dictators’ educational level, socioeconomic background, and age upon entry may also be correlated with motivation. We should expect high education, strong socioeconomic background, and age to be positively correlated with ideological motivation. However, the expectation to the correlation with socioeconomic background is ambiguous, as several arguments are pulling the correlation in the opposite direction (dictators with a weak socioeconomic background are likely to be the most ideologically motivated).

The Consequences of Motivation

In times of low constraints, dictators’ motivation will affect their behavior and, in turn, the national development. Motivation is also likely to affect the extent to which dictators engage in violent repression of the people and the likelihood of experiencing civil war during their incumbency. Not only does the degree of ideological motivation matter, so does the content (for dictators with at least some ideological motivation). Table 3.1 displays the expected impact of three dimensions of the dictators’ motivation on development, repression, and civil war.

**Table 3.1. Expectations about the Impact of Dictators’ Motivation on Development, Repression, and Civil War**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Development</th>
<th>Repression</th>
<th>Civil war</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree of ideological motivation</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological content: Economic dimension</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological content: Exclusion dimension</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Some of the effects have been discussed as interaction effects. The direct effects presented in this table are based on the assumption that extremely exclusionary ideologically motivated dictators are rare. The two categories containing ideological content are only relevant for dictators with some degree of ideological motivation.

The more ideologically motivated a dictator is, the more he is likely to prioritize the people’s general well-being and to enhance development. This is regardless of the economic content of the ideology, which is not expected to matter for general socio-economic development (in developing and middle-income countries, categories to which most autocracies belong). The general relationship hides the expectation that extremely exclusionary ideologically mo-
tivated dictators are likely to improve development even less than selfish dictators. However, as extremely exclusionary ideologically motivated dictators are probably rare, I expect the overall relationship between degree of ideological motivation and development to hold. Among ideologically motivated dictators, the degree of exclusion is expected to have a negative impact on development.

Turning to repression, the most ideologically motivated dictators are likely to repress the least because the well-being of the people matters to them, whereas it matters less the more self-interested a dictator is. Again, the only exception is the highly exclusionary ideologically motivated dictator who may get intrinsic satisfaction from repressing parts of the people. In line with this, I expect exclusionary dictators to be more repressive than inclusionary dictators.

Dictator motivation may also affect the risk of civil war, although mainly indirectly. I expect self-interested dictators to be slightly more likely to experience civil war than ideologically motivated dictators, but this expectation is not strong. Instead, the more exclusionary a dictator is, the more likely he is to experience civil war because exclusion can create or strengthen pre-existing grievances and delegitimize the regime in the eyes of the excluded. Both are crucial elements for a civil war to arise and endure.

The next chapter addresses the issue of measuring dictators’ motivation and lays out observable implications used for assessing dictators’ motivation in the case studies contained in the two first empirical parts of the book, namely, the small-N and medium-N studies presented in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively.
Chapter 4.
How to Measure Dictators’ Motivation: Observable Implications

Ferdinand Marcos was democratically elected in the Philippines in 1965. He managed to win the elections because he could afford an extremely expensive campaign and because he told the people that he had been a guerilla in the Filipino resistance movement against the Japanese during World War II. It was revealed later that he had not. After a couple of years as incumbent, he centralized power and turned the Philippines into a full-blown dictatorship. It was not particularly repressive compared to other autocracies, but Marcos took the liberty to plunder the state treasure. When he was forced from power fifteen years after his entry, he managed to flee and ended up living a wealthy life in exile in Hawaii (Pletcher, 1998). Not many people would doubt that Marcos’ primary motivation during his rule was self-serving wealth maximization.

Another clear example of a self-interested autocrat is Saparmirad Niyazov, who ruled Turkmenistan from 1991 to 2006 when he died in power. Briefly after being installed in power by the Soviet leadership (right before independence), he started building a cult of personality while reducing the living standard of the Turkmen people. He closed many hospitals and schools and ordered monuments of him built and erected around the country. Over time, he renamed days of the week, a crater on the Moon, a breed of horse, and a wide range of places after himself and members of his family (Brown, 2009). In contrast to Marcos, although also self-interested, Niyazov was clearly driven by the motive of maximizing his own power for its intrinsic value.

There are also clear examples of ideologically motivated dictators like Fidel Castro, who ruled Cuba for almost a half century. He was a socialist and revolutionary before coming to power. He fought the incumbent dictator, Fulgencio Batista for six years, risked his life several times, and went to prison on the way to power. This was a deliberate choice. Batista’s rule was extremely brutal, so Castro knew the risk he was facing. When he came to power, he became an even more radical socialist; he introduced radical socialist and anti-American policies, including expropriation of American business and agricultural estates (Goldberg, Wallenfeldt, Tikkanen, Quintana, & Cunningham, 2016). This is ridiculous from a power perspective, since he would have been safer in power by not offending the United States. He was successful in securing support from the Soviet Union (Goldberg et al., 2016), but this was not the safe option considering the geographic placement of Cuba and the fact that the
United States protected a brutal and nondemocratic dictator like Batista for so long. Castro might very likely have flown under the American radar while centralizing power and amassing wealth had he not claimed adherence to socialism.

Except for these clear-cut examples—and some may argue that the latter is not clear enough—how is it possible to measure dictators’ motivation in a systematic and transparent way? This is what I address in this chapter.

**Measuring Motivation in a Bayesian Framework**

Motivation cannot be observed directly and is therefore, like many other phenomena in the social sciences, difficult to investigate. Instead, I will use behavior as an indicator. Many implications of self-interest and ideological motivation are overlapping (the middle part of Figure 4.1) because highly self-interested autocrats may try to hide their self-interest behind ideology (Gerschewski, 2013; Linz, 2000; Moghaddam, 2013; Svolik, 2012; Wintrobe, 1998, pp. 78, 222–223). Nevertheless, it is possible to look for implications that are unique for ideological motivation; that is, they are consistent with ideological motivation but inconsistent with self-interest (the green part of Figure 4.1).

**Figure 4.1. Observable Implications of Motivation**

Essentially, I investigate the dictators’ motivation by evaluating their behavior against the expected behavior of different motives, including counterfactuals. I use Bayesian updating as a tool to structure the analysis and assess the impact of observing (and not observing) the empirical implications. Prior to the analysis, I evaluate the observable implications on scales of certainty and uniqueness to determine how to weight evidence of observing and not observing the specific implications in the final assessment (Beach & Pedersen, 2016; Bennett & Checkel, 2015).
The degree of certainty is the probability of observing the implication if the proposition is true. For instance, a certain implication of ideological motivation is an implication that is highly likely to be observed among ideologically motivated dictators (note that the degree of certainty is unrelated to the likelihood of observing it among non-ideologically motivated dictators). In turn, the degree of uniqueness is the reverse probability of the implication being observed if the proposition is false. In this way, a unique implication of ideological motivation is an implication that is highly unlikely to be observed among non-ideologically motivated dictators (hence, the degree of uniqueness is unrelated to the likelihood of observing it among ideologically motivated dictators). It is difficult to set up implications that are both highly certain and highly unique for ideological motivation, so here is a choice to make. Because the confirming evidence of unique implications is stronger than of certain implications (Beach & Pedersen, 2016; Bennett & Checkel, 2015), I mainly investigate unique implications, i.e., empirical implications that are unlikely to stem from self-interest but rather from ideological motivation (which again corresponds to the green part of Figure 4.1).

The idea is to look for implications consistent with ideological motivation but highly inconsistent with self-interest. The logic is that highly self-interested dictators will spend resources on staying in power (either for the intrinsic value of power maximization or its instrumental value leading to wealth maximization) and not on anything that would not help this cause, unless it benefits them economically. This is in line with the dominant way of thinking in existing research. Behavior that goes against this indicates ideological motivation if the actions are consistent with the proclaimed ideology (a necessary second-order condition). Observing the implications below goes against the classic theories on constituencies and theories regarding the importance of the ruling coalition’s interests (see, e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Olson (1993), and Svolik (2012)).

Six Implications\(^\text{17}\)

Six implications are highly unique for ideological motivation (as opposed to self-interest), but they are not necessarily observed for ideologically motivated dictators. The implications are not fitted to a specific ideology or belief, so they

\(^\text{17}\) The validity of the implications rests on the dictators being rational or approximately rational. Although humans are not rational in decision-making, it is realistic that they do not make arbitrary important choices or significantly miscalculate in the situations discussed below, and thus, the dictators can be treated as rational.
are formulated in a general way. Because the implications are very unique but not certain, it is important that they are evaluated together.

I assign specific values to the degree of certainty and uniqueness of the implications to be able to calculate and, thereby, indicate the impact of my findings by using Bayesian updating. To keep focus on the substance of the analyses, I convert these to ordinal assessments to make the exact numbers less important. Moreover, I examine the robustness of the results in the first part of the analysis, i.e., the three case studies, by calculating posterior confidence given conservative assessments of the degrees of uniqueness and certainty. To complement the rigid calculated posterior confidence, I assess each dictator with a judgement-based evaluation as well.

The six implications of ideological motivation are:
1. Harming groups within the winning coalition
2. Pleasing groups outside the winning coalition
3. Having a non-minimal winning coalition
4. Stepping down voluntarily
5. Having a low or moderate personal income

Implications (1)-(3) concern the dictators’ winning coalition, which is defined as the group of people his power depends on, often the military, the government, the ruling elite, as well as certain groups in society. A winning coalition is not always constant. It changes when power structures change. Sometimes, it may look as if a dictator is harming his winning coalition, but he is actually trying to change the power structures instead. In the analyses of the cases, I have been particularly aware of this to avoid conflating evidence of power centralization with evidence of putting the power at risk.

As elaborated below, my evaluation of the implications is conservative because it is difficult to assess (both for dictator and researcher) who exactly the winning coalition consists of. Note that introducing (somewhat competitive) elections increases the size of the winning coalition. Implications (1)-(3) and (6) require the fulfillment of the second-order condition that the evaluated actions are consistent with the proclaimed ideology for the specific implication to be observed. The certainty and uniqueness of the implications will be discussed in ordinal terms. For the exact values assigned, see Table I.1 in Appendix I.

*Harming groups clearly inside the winning coalition* (i.e., groups the dictator’s power depends on) is an observable implication of ideological motivation because for a self-interested dictator, it simply does not make sense since it weakens his power foundations. However, the implication contains a
“clearly” because the dictator (and the researcher) may not know who exactly is in the winning coalition. In this way, the possibility of misinformation or lack of information is taken into account, and we need to observe harming of people on whom the dictator’s power certainly depends. This implication applies to groups and not individuals, because harming a few individuals (who are not hugely important for the dictator’s political survival) may make sense if it pleases a large part of the winning coalition. Especially in countries holding elections, it may sometimes make sense to punish scapegoats to please the, here, larger winning coalition. For this reason, harming a few people in the winning coalition can be consistent with self-interest, although this action may have negative externalities for the rest of the winning coalition, making them fear for their positions and consider defection.

Yet, punishing larger (or more important) groups within the dictator’s winning coalition is irrational if the dictator is self-interested. This would seriously weaken the dictator’s power foundations, and the likelihood of observing this implication if the dictator is self-interested is very low, which implies that the observation is highly unique. The degree of certainty of observing the implication among ideologically motivated dictators is difficult to assess. It may be moderate because the dictator is likely to make sacrifices for the sake of ideology, also from inside his winning coalition. However, it is not high, because the dictator cannot risk losing power either, as his possibilities of realizing his ideological aims depend heavily on staying in power. Moreover, it may not always be necessary to sacrifice groups within his winning coalition.

A second implication of ideological motivation is pleasing groups clearly outside the winning coalition. This does not make sense for a self-interested dictator because he wastes resources on people who are not critical to his political survival. However, this is also qualified by a “clearly” because the dictator may not want to take chances by pleasing too few people when he is uncertain about who exactly he needs to stay in power. Instead, he may please more people than he needs. Thus, people clearly outside his winning coalition are people on whom his power is very unlikely to depend, that is, small and negligible groups in the population. Therefore, the likelihood of observing this implication for self-interested dictators is very low, meaning that the uniqueness of the implication is very high. Behavior not only serving the dictator’s winning coalition may derive from ideological motives. Ideology prescribes who is included in the “good society” and who is not. Dictators driven by inclusionary ideologies are not constrained only to serve the group who keeps them in power. However, their winning coalition is likely to mirror their ideology (e.g.,

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18 The dictators’ family and friends do not count as being outside the winning coalition. Theoretically, they are treated as a part of the leader himself.
socialists redistribute to the poor, who are often a part of their winning coalition. Dictators with highly exclusionary ideologies (i.e., ideologies that prescribe strong social division along ethnic, racial, or social lines) sometimes only serve a small group in society (which is strong enough to keep the dictator in power), which could also coincide with their winning coalitions. Based on these arguments, the certainty of this implication is moderate. An example of evidence of this implication is Hugo Chávez’ fight for rights and goods for the Indians. Indians only made up 2% of the population, and were not a strong societal group in Venezuela (Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2017) and therefore not in Chávez’ winning coalition, so this behavior is an example of pleasing groups outside the winning coalition.

A third implication of ideological motivation is having a winning coalition that is not (close to) minimal. In theory, there are different potential winning coalitions for all dictators; that is, different constellations of people could potentially comprise their political foundation. However, maximizing a dictator’s chances of staying in power requires that he picks the minimal winning coalition (cf. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003); but also in line with Olson (1993) and wealth maximization because there will be fewer people to please). For example, this implies that to the extent the dictator has a choice, it does not make sense to build his winning coalition on poor farmers, who are difficult to mobilize. One caveat is that sometimes, only the weakest part of the population is not already served by the existing government and, thus, the only available group to form the potential power base of a new dictator. In these cases, perceivably socialist dictators may be self-interested. Thus, “minimal” should be understood as within the boundaries of what is realistic. The implication here is qualified by a “close to” because of the difficulties estimating the size and because the dictator may fear defections. Hence, marginally oversized coalitions are safer than undersized coalitions. For similar reasons as for the previously discussed implication, the uniqueness of this implication is high. As discussed above, ideologically motivated dictators may have a winning coalition that mirrors their ideology. However, dictators rarely gain power in a clear power vacuum. Sometimes, only one winning coalition constellation is realistic, and then this implication will be considered unobserved. Accordingly, the certainty of this implication is low.

A fourth implication of ideological motivation is voluntarily stepping down without receiving large sums of money afterwards. This is directly against the expected behavior of autocrats motivated by holding power. A step-down is only voluntary if it is by no means forced, and the dictator could have stayed in power for longer without a high risk to his life and well-being. Hence, voluntary means stepping down given a relatively low threat to the dictator’s person in the near future. If we add the condition that the dictator
neither receives a large sum of money for stepping down nor stays in charge of large businesses, this implication is also opposed to wealth-driven dictators’ expected behavior. It follows that this implication is highly unique for ideological motivation; however, it is far from certain. It is likely to be rare among ideologically motivated dictators as well because of the severe personal consequences of stepping down. Moreover, stepping down reduces their power to realize their ideas. Yet, after some time in power, some of the ideologically motivated dictators may believe that stepping down is in the interest of the people. Based on this, I assess the certainty to be relatively low.

A fifth implication is that the dictator has a relatively low or moderate personal income. If this is the case, he is unlikely to have enriched himself (through formal or informal channels), and therefore, he is highly unlikely to be self-interested. Although this implication mainly concerns wealth-driven self-interest, it is likely that a dictator driven by power would allow himself a high income as well (money is also power). The presence of this implication requires two specific implications to be present. One is low or moderate formal income,—that is, a low or moderate salary. The other is low informal income, that is, the dictator is not personally corrupt—and does not distribute public resources to himself and his family. This is distinguished from political corruption, such as allowing corruption in the political system and in the bureaucracy, since this could be necessary to implement certain (also ideologically motivated) policies. Because it is not at all consistent with being self-interested, a low or moderate personal income is a highly unique implication of ideological motivation. The certainty of this implication is moderate because ideologically motivated dictators may have a good salary but they are very unlikely to be personally corrupt.

A sixth implication is clearly excessive (with respect to staying in power) violent repression, but this is only relevant for dictators proclaiming to hold highly exclusionary ideologies. Repressing the population more than needed to stay in power does not make sense if the dictator is self-interested. It would be a waste of resources because repression is expensive, and excessive violent repression may backfire. The type of repression and the use of violent repression are often a matter of capacity. Violent repression may be more prevalent in low-capacity regimes because subtle and controlled repression is more difficult to manage. However, even for low capacity regimes, repression can be excessive for staying in power because high levels of repression increase the risk of backfiring. This implication is also qualified by a “clearly” because of the information scarcity discussed above. Dictators do not know exactly what the optimal amount of repression for staying in power is. Repressing a bit too

\[\text{For more on this distinction, see Weyland (1998).}\]
much may be safer than repressing a bit too little. Hence, because dictators risk losing power when they use excessive repression, I perceive the likelihood of observing the implication if the dictator is self-interested to be low. Also, it is unlikely to occur among dictators motivated by inclusionary ideologies.

Based on these arguments, I find this observation highly unique for ideologically motivated dictators with exclusionary ideologies. Repression is very likely to occur if the dictator is driven by a very exclusionary ideology because the rationale of the repression is not to control the people to stay in power but rather to punish or eradicate groups of people. Many highly exclusionary ideologically motivated dictators will punish the out-group by violent repression, but there is also the option of using low-intensity repression (and then extend the time in power) or simply exclusion from society. Because of this, I perceive the certainty of observing the implication for an ideologically motivated dictator with an exclusionary ideology to be only moderate.

**Potential Posterior Confidence**

Assigning degrees of certainty and uniqueness to the different observable implications systematizes and increases the transparency of the evaluation of the relevance and strength of the evidence. Yet, the logic of Bayesian updating suggests that our posterior confidence in a theory should also depend on the level of prior confidence in order to truly build cumulative knowledge (Bennett & Checkel, 2015).

Naturally, the posterior confidence, \( p(P|k) \) (or \( p(P|\neg k) \)), in a theory (or proposition, \( P \)) depends on whether the theorized observable implication \( k \) is found or not. Yet, posterior confidence also depends on the level of prior confidence, \( p(P) \), and the character of the observable implications (Bennett & Checkel, 2015), i.e., the certainty and uniqueness of the observable implications. Recall that the degree of certainty, \( p(k|P) \), is the probability of observing the implication if the proposition is true; and the degree of uniqueness, \( 1 - p(k|\neg P) \), is the reverse probability of observing \( k \) if the proposition is false. Formula 4.1 below describes the posterior confidence in a proposition if \( k \) is observed, whereas Formula 4.2 describes the posterior confidence if \( k \) is not observed (Bennett & Checkel, 2015).
Formula 4.1. Posterior confidence if \( k \) is observed.

\[
p(P|k) = \frac{p(P)p(k|P)}{p(P)p(k|P) + p(\neg P)p(k|\neg P)}
\]

Formula 4.2. Posterior confidence if \( k \) is not observed.

\[
p(P|\neg k) = \frac{p(P)p(-k|P)}{p(P)p(-k|P) + p(\neg P)p(-k|\neg P)}
\]

A special feature of Bayesian updating is that the impact of a study depends on the prior confidence in a theory. The same (quality of) evidence does not lead to the same posterior confidence in two cases with different prior confidence. Instead, there is an intended bias towards the prior confidence, which is a proxy for prior knowledge.

I draw on this theoretical logic when assessing the empirical evidence. Table 4.1 summarizes the assigned degrees of certainty and uniqueness and shows the potential posterior confidence in a dictator being strongly ideologically motivated given the implications are observed or not. The prior confidence is set to 30\% for the three first case studies. It is pulled downwards by the predominant assumptions and arguments about dictators being highly self-interested in the literature on autocracies, and it is pulled upwards by the fact that I have chosen most-likely cases in the case studies in Chapter 5.

Table 4.1. Overview of the Posterior Confidence in a Dictator Being Ideologically Motivated Given a Prior Confidence of 30\% and 20\%, and Whether a Specific Implication is Observed or Not

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implication, ( k )</th>
<th>Certainty</th>
<th>Uniqueness</th>
<th>Posterior if ( k ) is observed( ^a )</th>
<th>Posterior if ( k ) is not observed( ^b )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harm groups in WC</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Please groups outside WC</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-minimal WC</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low personal income</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excessive repression</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Very high ≥ 95\%. High ≥ 67\% and < 95\%. Moderate ≥ 33\% and < 67\%. Low > 5\% and < 33\%. Very low ≤ 5\%. The degree of uniqueness is 1 minus the rate of false positives.

\( ^a \) Calculated from Formula 4.1. \( ^b \) Calculated from Formula 4.2.

The dictators studied in the medium-N study in Chapter 6 are chosen randomly, and for this reason, I lower my prior confidence to 20\% in this part of the analysis. However, the impact of a ten percentage points change in the
prior confidence does not have a large substantial impact as the four last columns in Table 4.1 indicate (see Table I.1 in Appendix I for the numerical differences behind the ordinal scores).

Further Considerations

When evaluating several independent implications, the calculations of the posterior confidence become a “chain calculation” where the posterior confidence becomes the prior confidence in the evaluation of the next implication. If the implications are not independent, the degree of dependence must be taken into account in the calculations such that dependent implications do not affect the confidence in the theory as much as independent implications do, ceteris paribus (Bennett & Checkel, 2015).

It is important to consider the accuracy of the observations when evaluating the observable implications. Accuracy is the degree of alignment between the existence and our observation of an implication. If these are not aligned, our finding or non-finding of an implication is not as strong evidence as if there had been an alignment. Thus, the impact on the confidence in the theory is lower (Beach & Pedersen, 2016). In the analyses, I take this into account by reducing the impact on the conclusion of a particular implication if the evidence is unclear.

Sources

One thing is how to make use of evidence; another is what kind of evidence to rely on. To assess the presence of the different observable implications, I mainly employ biographical readings and country-specific accounts covering the period of interest. I use different independent sources to examine each observable implication. Biographies contain detailed information about the specific dictator, but the biographers are likely to hold strong views of the dictators they assess. As these views may affect the framing and focus in the biography, I supplement the biographical readings with literature with a broader focus to counter the unavoidable subjectivity of the evidence accessed through biographical readings. For instance, I use country biographies like Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide (Lemarchand, 1996), The History of Cuba (Staten, 2003), and The Yemen Arab Republic: Development and Change in an Ancient Land (Wenner, 1991) to study the motivations of Pierre Buyoya, Fulgencio Batista, and Abdul Rahman Al-Iryani, respectively (cases from the medium-N study). I also use broader regional accounts like Rivalry and Alliance Politics in Cold War Latin America (Darnton, 2014) in the assessment of Argentinian Alejandro Lanusse. I complement these sources
with encyclopedia articles from *Britannica*[^20] and obituaries from large newspapers like *The New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *The Independent*, and *The Guardian*. I also use data from my interviews conducted in Tanzania and Uganda as supplementary material, in particular in the assessment of Tanzanian Julius Nyerere in Chapter 5.[^21] I have mainly relied on source material in English, but also sources in French and Danish.

For each case under investigation, I start out broadly to discover as much potentially relevant material as possible. Second step is to evaluate the credibility of the material by looking up authors and publishers. I prioritize large recognized university presses but I also use literature from local university presses. Regarding authors, I prioritize academic scholars from large internationally recognized universities and local universities and research institutions, journalists specialized in the country or region in question, ambassadors and to some extent civil servants. However, I avoid using civil servants and journalists with a clear political affiliation. To the extent possible, I use the different sources in a complementary manner to avoid the trade-off between objectivity (international scholars) and in-depth knowledge (local scholars, journalists, and civil servants). I am cautious to use politicians, as they are likely to be the most subjective sources. However, if they appear to hold important evidence, I include them in the analyses as complementary sources and explicitly discuss the potential impact on the conclusions in the case study.

For some cases, like Tito and Mobutu, there is plenty of material. Even in these cases, to be sure to discover potential discrepancies and nuances in the sources with regard to the study of dictator motivation, I try to avoid discarding any relevant material. In the cases where relevant material is sparse, I assess fewer sources, and often the more objective and less detailed sources, like encyclopedia articles and obituaries. These are often complemented by a few local accounts. I handle these sources with extra care as they often hold a good deal of subjectivity and explicitly discuss the potential consequences of this in the case studies.

Historical accounts are never objective, not even if they are written by international scholars. I therefore triangulate the sources, weigh them according to criterions of quality as described above, and pay attention to the issue of independence between sources. This approach guides all case studies, i.e., the

[^20]: In some cases, I have included political encyclopedias like *Profiles of People in Power: The World’s Government Leaders* (East & Thomas, 2003), *Famous Assassinations in World History: An Encyclopedia* (Newton, 2014), and *Heads of Government* (Lentz, 2014).

[^21]: See Bibliography for information about the country experts from my interviews.
three contained in Chapter 5 (where I add analyses of the impact on policies and outcomes) and the twenty case studies behind the analyses in Chapter 6.

**Expert Assessments**

Another way of studying motivation than evaluating the six implications is to use direct judgements about a dictator’s motives by people who have known him personally or have in-depth knowledge (e.g., biographers and country experts). The value of this kind of assessment depends on the source’s relation to the dictator. If the source assesses the dictator as ideologically motivated, the evidence is stronger the less affiliated the dictator and the source are (e.g., the more the source seems to dislike the dictator). Vice versa, assessments in the self-interested end of the motivation spectrum are more reliable the more affiliated the source is with the dictator (e.g., the more the source seems to like the dictator). The reason is that being self-interested, especially as a political leader, is widely perceived to be an undesirable and inappropriate trait. One will therefore be more likely to perceive and expound one’s friends as other-regarding and one’s enemies as the opposite. To illustrate, during fieldwork in Uganda, I asked my interviewees (journalists, academics, former civil servants, and a former minister in Uganda) to assess Idi Amin. They all had a strong dislike of Amin and his regime, but they all saw him as sincerely patriotic, although either too patriotic (in a wrong way) or just incapable of running the country (Uganda Expert 1, 2017; Uganda Expert 2, 2017; Uganda Expert 3, 2017; Uganda Expert 4, 2017; Uganda Expert 5, 2017). The dislike of Amin combined with the perception of him as ideologically motivated makes this assessment strong evidence.

I only use these direct assessments as secondary evidence of motivation (my primary evidence is the evaluation of the six implications) because it is difficult to know what has given the source the impression that the dictator is/was ideologically motivated or self-interested. For instance, the assessment is likely to be influenced by the policy outcomes delivered during the dictator’s incumbency, which is highly problematic for the further use of the data to study effects of motivation. Hence, this type of evidence will only be used as a validation check (especially when assessment and achievements converge—in contrast to the case of Idi Amin).

So far, I have discussed to what extent and when we should expect dictators to be ideologically motivated and which consequences it may have; and I have discussed how to investigate these theoretical expectations. Now, it is time for the empirical investigation.
Chapter 5:
Do Ideologically Motivated Dictators Even Exist? Three Case Studies

Autocracy scholars agree that the dynamics and consequences of dictatorship vary with the institutional setup (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Gandhi, 2008; Geddes et al., 2018; Olson, 1993; Svolik, 2012). Less attention has been paid to differences between the rulers of dictatorships, namely, the dictators. Like other human beings, they may hold different motives and concerns. Repression is inherent in autocracies, but the kind and degree of repression vary, and most dictators do other things than repress. Some amass enormous wealth while in power, some build a cult of personality, and some spend available resources on attempting to develop their country – or part of it, e.g., in favor of a particular group – through for example industrial investment and/or investment in education or health care. These variations in behavior cannot necessarily be ascribed to differences in the institutional setup – it is very possible that the dictators’ motives can explain some of these differences. All dictators repress, but this does exclude the possibility that some of them hold other-regarding beliefs instead of being exclusively or mainly self-interested. This chapter takes the first step in the empirical investigation of dictators’ motives and their consequences for policymaking and societal outcomes.

Because of the predominance of the assumption about self-interested dictators, and because ideology has not played a major role in autocracy studies for decades, the first empirical step is to investigate whether ideologically motivated dictators exist at all. To probe the existence of ideologically motivated dictators and the impact of their motivation, dictators and their motives must be studied in detail. It does not make sense to pick a random sample from the population of all dictators, because we are likely to include self-interested dictators as well, which does not serve the present purpose. These arguments justify studying dictators we should expect to be ideologically motivated, if any.

In practice, I choose cases based on three criteria. First, to be sure that I study dictators, I only choose political leaders from countries that are clearly classified as autocracies (at the time the dictator was in power). Second, I select dictators who seem to have been relatively unconstrained regarding decision-making (e.g., relatively high degree of personalization) as well as economic conditions, at least in parts of their rule (Barber, 1978; Chandler, 1992; Fouéré, 2015; Hinton, 2005, p. 32; Lofchie, 2014, p. 80; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, pp. 90, 128; Plate, 2010, p. 24; Tanzania Expert 2, 2017). This criterion secures
that we should be able to detect a potential effect of motivation. The third criterion is that the selected dictators do not appear to be clear-cut examples of power and wealth maximizers. Rather, autocracy scholars (and/or the public) admit that these dictators may have been driven by other motives than self-interest during their incumbencies (Backes & Kailitz, 2016, p. 283; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, pp. 22–23; Esrow & Frantz, 2011, pp. 72, 92).

To be able to capture differences in the ideological content as well, I study three dictators who seem to have adhered to very different ideologies. The sample ends up containing two dictators with inclusionary ideologies but who differ on the classic economic dimension: Tanzanian Julius Nyerere, a social- ism, and Singaporean Lee Kuan Yew, an economic liberal. The third dictator is Pol Pot, who ruled Cambodia in the 1970s. He had a very exclusionary ideology that preached a variant of radical socialism. A potential fourth case study of a dictator with an exclusionary liberal ideology is not necessary, because the difference between economic left and right is likely to be most outspoken in an inclusionary ideology. In contrast to inclusionary dictators to whom the economic dimension is often important, exclusionary dictators are likely to prioritize the exclusionary dimension over the economic dimension; compare for instance the cases of Hitler and the apartheid rulers in South Africa to inclusionary rulers like Josip Tito in Yugoslavia and previously mentioned rulers like Park and Chávez.

The chapter is structured as follows. I conduct the three case studies of Nyerere, Lee, and Pol Pot in turn. Each contains thorough analyses of the dictators’ motives leading to qualitative assessments based on the guidelines provided in Chapter 4, thus, I systematically study the existence of five or six observable implications for each dictator. Each case study also contains an analysis of the consequences of the motives. After the three case studies, I discuss the assessment of the dictators’ motives through Bayesian updating calculations and the implications of this. The final section discusses the findings more broadly and concludes.

**Nyerere (Tanzania): The Socialist**

Julius Nyerere was the leader of Tanzania from independence in 1961 until 1985. He studied philosophy at the University of Edinburgh where he developed his concept of socialism, self-reliance, and *ujamaa* (Swahili for “familyhood”), which later influenced his rule. He returned to Tanganyika, today Tanzania, in 1952 and became president of the Tanganyika African Association (later TANU and CCM) in 1953. TANU’s main purpose was national sovereignty and independence (Fouéré, 2015, Chapter 1; Melady & Melady, 2011). Upon his return, he started a job as a teacher, a job he had to quit when he
entered government seven years later (Bjerk, 2017, p. 9; Melady & Melady, 2011). Today, Nyerere is viewed as the father of the country and by the nickname, Mwalimu (Swahili for “teacher”), symbolizing his background as well as him being a great national leader and pioneer in uniting the nation (Bjerk, 2017, p. 9; Fouéré, 2015, p. 6; Lofchie, 2014, pp. 6–8). Nyerere is also known for having economically devastated the country with his extreme socialist policies.

Ideology (proclaimed)

Nyerere’s ideas were socialist but also nationalist. He argued that the country could not prosper and develop if it was not self-reliant. Moreover, the collective was important. Nyerere’s socialism was not directed towards the working class as with communism but mainly towards the rural population, especially the peasants (Bjerk, 2017, pp. 75–77; Fouéré, 2015, pp. 33–37; Nyerere, 1962). Although Nyerere was against “the exploiters” (the capitalists) (Nyerere, 1962), his proclaimed ideology was largely inclusionary. For this reason, I only evaluate the presence of five of the six observable implications.

Winning Coalition

The winning coalition in a dictatorship most often includes the military and the political elite. For most of the time, Nyerere was in control of the political elite and in this sense relatively unconstrained (Bjerk, 2017, pp. 73–74; Tanzania Expert 2, 2017), but it was important to keep it that way, as they could potentially be a threat to his power. Thus, the people in his government were definitely in his winning coalition. The armed forces did not seem to have been a major threat to his power, but had they been dissatisfied, they may have had the resources to remove Nyerere from power. Consequently, they were a part of his winning coalition. Since Nyerere did not face much domestic resistance during his rule, it is particularly difficult to assess whom his power critically depended on. In addition to the army, the farmers were most likely in his winning coalition. At least, it is unlikely that he could have stayed in power (especially in the first years) without some popular support, and his powerbase was built around the farmers.

Nyerere came to power in a political power vacuum in the sense that fighting for independence, nationalism, and Pan-Africanism would have been a sufficiently strong political platform to achieve power. He did not have to fight a wealthy black elite to gain power. Therefore, appealing to the most resourceful black Tanzanians at the time would have been the rational decision had he been driven by self-interest. However, by adhering to a socialist ideol-
ogy, he built a non-minimal winning coalition. Had Nyerere been self-interested and wanted to gain and stay in power for selfish reasons, it was imprudent to choose socialism, follow a rural-socialist agenda, and build a power-base around the poor farmers, given that they were spread out over the large countryside, and the infrastructure was bad. As an indicator of the information and communication infrastructures, only 4,000 TVs existed in Tanzania in 1960 in a population of 10 million people of whom 95% lived in the countryside. The transportation infrastructure was equally bad. An indicator is that the country, with a land area of almost 900,000 square kilometers, only had 3,000 kilometers of railroad. Tanzania is almost twice the size of Germany, but in 1960, the latter had more than 30,000 kilometers of railroad (Comin & Hobijn, 2009; World Bank Group, 2020). In a large country with undeveloped infrastructure, it was unlikely that the rural population would have been able to mobilize and become a threat against Nyerere’s regime had he not empowered them. This group was also difficult and resource demanding for Nyerere to mobilize (in favor of himself) in the first place.

Harming Groups Clearly Inside the Winning Coalition

Power Consolidation

Nyerere started consolidating power briefly after taking power. He created a one-party system with reference to ujamaa, arguing that allowing for more parties would split rather than unite and strengthen the country (Bjerk, 2017, pp. 73–74; Hatch, 1976, p. 185). Regardless, power consolidation is not inconsistent with ideological motivation since power is a prerequisite for implementation of any political vision. The power consolidation did indeed make the introduction of policies much easier. Nyerere’s policies went through in their original radical form without much discussion (Bjerk, 2017, pp. 14, 73–74). As I will discuss below, not much indicates that Nyerere used his power to serve himself personally (by increasing his own wealth or maximizing power), but rather that he used it to implement his sociotropic ideas (which turned out to be disastrous).

Fighting Corruption

During the 1960s, many of the people in Nyerere’s government tried to build up their own wealth. Consistent with his ideology (as a fight against exploiters (Nyerere, 1962)), Nyerere responded by introducing a code of conduct (The Leadership Code) as a part of his party manifesto, The Arusha Declaration, in 1967. The code of conduct contained several anti-corruption rules, including a ban on receiving salary from more than one employer (Bjerk, 2017, p. 81; TANU, 1967). According to one of Nyerere’s ministers, many people in the
government thought that they should earn more because they had obtained special qualifications and served the community by being politicians. They felt very threatened when Nyerere announced that leading the country was a duty and a privilege and did not merit extra pay (Hatch, 1976, pp. 194–195). Although he faced resistance from people in the government, he also had several supporters, which made it possible for him to realize the Arusha Declaration (Hatch, 1976, p. 195; Tanzania Expert 1, 2017). The Leadership Code was abandoned in 2001, but today many people would like to have it reinstated (Fouéré, 2015, p. 49; Tanzania Expert 1, 2017; Tanzania Expert 4, 2017). The introduction of The Leadership Code indicates that Nyerere did not put his winning coalition before his ideology. However, the rural poor were also part of his winning coalition, and they supported this. Nevertheless, going against all these important people in his government must have jeopardized his power rather than secured it. After all, despite being a large group, the rural poor were weak.

Socialist Initiatives

Among the more classic socialist initiatives, Nyerere nationalized the economy, including companies and production. He had the idea that agriculture should grow faster than industry, which implied that industrial production was slowed down because agriculture could not keep the pace (Hatch, 1976, p. 197). Clearly, this initiative was devastating for growth as it harmed the strong segments of society and obstructed the urban population that may have been the strongest group. It may still be rational from a power perspective, since this group was outside his winning coalition. In addition to his government, the rural poor were an important part of his winning coalition, and in that sense, slowing down the industry was pleasing his winning coalition. However, he also obstructed his winning coalition by collectivizing the farms. Most farmers did not like the idea, and collectivization was the policy that turned the most people against him (Fouéré, 2015, pp. 15–16). However, Nyerere used force to implement the collectivization (Lofchie, 2014, pp. 96–99). These initiatives were strongly in line with his proclaimed socialist ideas (Nyerere, 1962), although they seriously harmed his winning coalition. Hence, there is strong evidence that Nyerere harmed large groups inside his winning coalition. Not even the radical argument that the urban population or the economic elite were in his winning coalition can make Nyerere’s actions appear to derive from self-interest and effort to stay in power, since he created policies that were very unpopular among the two largest groups in society.
Pleasing Groups Clearly Outside the Winning Coalition

Evidence for pleasing groups outside Nyerere’s winning coalition would imply pleasing the economic elite and the industry. There is no clear evidence of this behaviour.

Voluntary Step-Down

Despite decreasing popularity since the mid-1970s (Fouéré, 2015, pp. 12, 17, 38), Nyerere was still quite popular in Tanzania in 1985 even though the economy was devastated, and the West, which had opposed his ideology throughout his incumbency, was increasingly dissatisfied (Melady & Melady, 2011; Tanzania Expert 2, 2017). Despite his popularity, Nyerere admitted that his policies had failed, and someone else should take over. Country experts agree that he could have stayed in power for many more years if he had wanted (Tanzania Expert 1, 2017; Tanzania Expert 2, 2017; Tanzania Expert 4, 2017). Still, he chose to step down in the interest of the nation (Bjerk, 2017, p. 15; Lofchie, 2014, pp. 5–7), which is inconsistent with self-interest. The risk of severe repercussions after stepping down was low as he was popular, and he was able to select his successor; however, he did not select his successor to protect himself. He selected a Muslim from Zanzibar who was a former civil servant and had briefly been president of Zanzibar. He was a known advocate of reform, which made him a good choice in terms of putting the country right and leading a liberalization process (Bjerk, 2017, p. 124; Fouéré, 2015, p. 238; Tanzania Expert 3, 2017). Thus, Nyerere’s choice of successor was not a choice to protect himself but to keep the promise of co-leadership between Zanzibar and the Tanzanian mainland (Tanzania Expert 2, 2017) and in favor of the country’s restoration and development in the face of his own failed political project. Stepping down was a viable option for Nyerere, but it was also a voluntary decision that did not secure himself but the interest of the country. The implication of voluntary step-down is observed.

Personal Income

A self-interested dictator is likely to be corrupt or have a very high salary. However, neither was the case for Nyerere. He even cut his salary (to £3,000 a year; the lowest in the world among leaders at that time) to state an example as he wanted others to cut theirs when the economy was in crisis (Hatch, 1976, p. 191). Moreover, he does not appear to have been personally corrupt, and the Tanzanian people believed – and still believe – that he was not (Fouéré, 2015, p. 12; Lofchie, 2014, pp. 7–8; Tanzania Expert 1, 2017). Today, both the dom-
inant party, CCM and the opposition parties use him as a symbol of anti-corruption. For instance, during the corruption scandals that brought down former Prime Minister Lowasa in 2007, the opposition used Nyerere as a contrast and a role model who had a strong moral and fought corruption (Fouéré, 2015, p. 47). This strongly indicates that Nyerere was not corrupt, which accordingly supports the hypothesis that he was not self-interested.

**Expert Assessments**

The detection of four out of the five observable implications clearly indicates that Nyerere was in fact strongly driven by ideology and sociotropic beliefs. The expert assessments support this conclusion. Country experts and people who have met Nyerere express a very similar view of him. Although they agree that Nyerere’s economic policies were devastating for the country, they also agree that he was strongly ideologically motivated. He sincerely believed in ujamaa, and he cared very much for the country (Bjerk, 2017, pp. 9–10, 13; Tanzania Expert 1, 2017; Tanzania Expert 2, 2017; Tanzania Expert 3, 2017; Tanzania Expert 4, 2017; Tanzania Expert 5, 2017). This is also the dominant belief across all social classes in Tanzania today (Fouéré, 2015, pp. 12–13), and it is the widespread impression among academics (Lofchie, 2014, pp. 4–9). Reviews of biographies and other assessments of Nyerere show that a vast majority assess Nyerere as a strongly ideological and well-intentioned leader (Fouéré, 2015, Chapter 1). Moreover, at least since 2005, both CCM and the opposition have frequently used Nyerere as a positive point of reference in election campaigns (Fouéré, 2015, pp. 45–46). The presidential candidate from the opposition party in 2010 claimed that he wanted to “follow in Nyerere’s footsteps of a meaningful leadership so as to bring the country to a better place” (Fouéré, 2015, p. 47).

**Constraints and Impact on Policymaking and Societal Outcomes**

**Classic Socialist Policies: Economic and Cultural Initiatives**

The analysis above strongly indicates that Nyerere was very ideologically motivated. This section evaluates the impact of his ideas on policymaking and outcomes. As mentioned, Nyerere introduced several classic socialist initiatives that cannot be explained by self-interest because he created policies that were unpopular among both large groups in society: the urban elite (e.g., slowing down production) and the farmers (e.g., collectivization) (Hatch, 1976, pp. 196–198; Lofchie, 2014, pp. 64–65). He also introduced other socialist policies, such as universal free education and prohibition of non-public religious schools to remove religious (and ethnic) divisions and convey equality (Bjerk,
even though he was a Catholic and kept practicing after his step-down (Bjerk, 2017, p. 127).

One could suspect that these socialist initiatives were driven by strong links to the Soviet Union instead of ideology. However, officially, Tanzania enforced a non-alignment policy (Melady & Melady, 2011, p. 47). The Soviet Union may have supported Tanzania unofficially, but this does not appear to have been the case. According to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, the major official bilateral aid-inflows came from Western countries, especially from the United Kingdom, the Nordic countries, and the US, although East Germany’s close relationship to Zanzibar also resulted in aid (Edwards, 2014, Chapter 4). Therefore, it is implausible that Nyerere implemented socialist policies in response to external pressure. Instead, his ideology is likely to have affected the introduction of these policies.

**Anti-Corruption**

Nyerere’s anti-corruption measures are another major initiative that is consistent with his ideological motivation and difficult to explain from a self-interest perspective. They were not just a play to the gallery since they actually had an effect (Hatch, 1976, p. 197). On corruption indicators, Tanzania scores between 3.5 and 4 throughout Nyerere’s incumbency on a scale from 0 to 4 (higher values indicate less corruption), although the corruption levels slightly increased throughout the period. However, before Nyerere, Tanzania scored only 1.5 (Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), 2016).^{22}

**Ideological Impact in Comparative Perspective**

To put the consequences of Nyerere’s ideological rule into perspective, it is valuable to compare to the development in other countries. Comparing to DR Congo in the same period, under the rule of the extremely corrupt Mobutu, may give the impression that dictators’ motivation does not matter, as both Nyerere and Mobutu managed to devastate their countries economically. However, this conclusion is not set in stone. The economic consequences were only somewhat similar. Taking the economic potential of the two countries into account, it is safe to say that DR Congo with it natural resources had better prospects of development when Mobutu entered compared to Tanzania upon independence (Haskin, 2005, p. 51; Renton et al., 2007; Van Reybrouck, 2009).

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^{22} I use four indicators to create an additive index from 0 to 4. The four indicators are “executive bribery and corrupt exchanges,” “executive embezzlement and theft,” “public sector corrupt exchanges,” and “public sector theft.”
2014, pp. 369–371, 378–379, 389–390). However, the fact remains that Nyerere’s policies devastated the country, although this clearly is an effect of the ideological content, and not because motivation does not matter (as will become clear in the analysis of Lee Kuan Yew below).

In terms of national unity, the most important area for Nyerere, his ideological vision clearly had an impact, even in the long run. Despite a variety of ethnicities, ethnic tensions are almost non-existent in Tanzania today (although there is still some religious dispute, mainly between Zanzibar and the mainland) (Bjerk, 2017, pp. 143, 147; Tanzania Expert 1, 2017). This is in stark contrast to DR Congo where Mobutu did nothing to calm ethnic tensions but rather enhanced them. He claimed to fight for national unity, but in the end he only fought for himself (Haskin, 2005, p. 50; Renton et al., 2007, p. 117; Van Reybrouck, 2014, pp. 349, 351). The DR Congo remains highly ethnically divided today. This contrast is even clearer when we compare Tanzania to other East African countries like Rwanda, Kenya, and Uganda where ethnic tensions are highly salient and divisive today. There is little doubt that Tanzania’s success with removing ethnic tensions is a long-term effect of Nyerere’s motives (and his dictatorial enforcement of these) (Bjerk, 2017, pp. 143, 147; Tanzania Expert 1, 2017).

**Constraints**

An explanation of the large effects of Nyerere’s policies is that he faced relatively weak constraints. Although Nyerere’s policies turned out to be catastrophic for the country, international, especially Scandinavian, donors kept supporting Tanzania until the beginning of the 1980s (Tanzania Expert 2, 2017). For this reason, Nyerere was not very constrained economically, although his policies ruined the country’s economy. Moreover, he was very popular among the people during most of his incumbency (Fouéré, 2015; Lofchie, 2014, p. 80). The people may not have understood the implications of socialism, but Nyerere was very charismatic and convincing. The people liked his idealism and ideas about unity and equality. He was in control of the government for the same reasons (and because of the power consolidation) (Bjerk, 2017, pp. 73–74). Most of his colleagues believed in him and his ideas without realizing the implications (Tanzania Expert 2, 2017).

To put this into perspective, Nyerere’s successor, Mwinyi was subject to massive economic constraints because Nyerere’s policies had devastated the economy. This meant that international donors, especially the World Bank and IMF, decided almost everything. Therefore, Mwinyi’s personal motivation for staying in power, whether it was self-interest or ideological motivation, did

To sum up, the analysis clearly indicates that Nyerere was strongly ideologically motivated by socialism, and this had a large impact on the policies he made and implemented.

Lee (Singapore): The Developmentalist

Lee Kuan Yew became prime minister of Singapore in 1959 and continued to rule after independence from the British in 1963 (from Malaysia in 1965) until 1990. His party, the People’s Action Party (PAP) won 53% of the votes (fourteen parties took part) in the 1959 election (Barber, 1978, pp. 174–175; Bowring, 2015; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, pp. 16–17). Lee had an education from Cambridge and had a law firm with his wife, before he decided to enter politics and fight for independence. He formed PAP in 1954 and developed nationalist beliefs while studying abroad. PAP formed the biggest opposition party by uniting with the leftist faction in Singaporean politics (because PAP realized that they would never win without uniting). The party was tied together by anti-colonialism and worked for independence for a unified Malaya and Singapore, but in 1961 the Communist faction broke out (Barber, 1978, p. 171; Barr, 2000, pp. 23–24; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, pp. 38–40). Lee’s regime is known for its top-down-steered economic development and less for its repression, although the latter was also present (Mauzy & Milne, 2002, pp. 192–193). Lee is also known for ridding Singapore of corruption (Mydans, 2015).

Ideology (proclaimed)

Lee adhered to a very nationalist and developmentalist, rationalist and goal-oriented ideology (Barr, 2000, pp. 243–245; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, pp. 54, 64). About his ideological basis, Lee said in 2009, “You may call me a ‘utilitarian’ or whatever. I am interested in what works” (Plate, 2010, p. 46). Included in this was an anti-corruption view and a wish for a clean city state (Barber, 1978, pp. 177, 198–199; Barr, 2000; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, pp. 4, 7, 17; Mydans, 2015). Lee was an elitist, and he even believed in eugenics, i.e., that some races have better genes than others. This does not mean that he adhered to an exclusionary ideology. He claimed that he wanted society to equalize differences between people with good and people with bad genes.

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23 The proclaimed ideology is analyzed based on expressions and statements prior to and in the beginning of the autocrat’s incumbency. However, this quote from 2009 is included as it captures Lee’s proclaimed ideology in the beginning of his incumbency as well (as the core of his proclaimed beliefs is very consistent over time).
He claimed to be driven by a utilitarian belief about distributing resources in a way that maximized utility, although he did not discard equality concerns. With his elitist beliefs, Lee was against democracy in a Western edition, claiming that too many people are incapable of ruling and that heightens the risk of mob rule (Barber, 1978, pp. 195–196; Han et al., 2015, p. 215; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, pp. 6–7, 129). Already when he was studying in London, he told his fellow peers that they, the educated, had to go back and lead the country towards being the new Switzerland instead of letting the uneducated take over and turn Singapore into another Palestine (Bowring, 2015).

**Winning Coalition**

The government, i.e., PAP, must have been in Lee’s winning coalition. The elite – especially the educated elite – was important for Lee. Although Singaporean elections were not free and fair, they were not completely nominal, at least in the beginning of his incumbency. This implies that Lee was somewhat dependent on the people as well. The upper class (and perhaps the middle class) was a part of his winning coalition. Briefly after entering power, he managed to centralize power and create a hierarchy of elites in the top positions, and thereafter, his winning coalition mainly consisted of these top leaders and the government (Barr, 2000, p. 113). Thus, his winning coalition consisted of the strongest part of the population. Therefore, *Lee did not have a non-minimal winning coalition.*

**Harming Groups Clearly Inside the Winning Coalition**

*Power Consolidation and Crack-Downs*

Aligned with trying to stay in power, Lee was harsh on his opponents. He conducted an oppressive form of government, and he banned and punished many acts on the pretext of obstructing progress. For instance, he put many left-wing activists in jail without trial because they (according to him) tried to overthrow the government with force and obstructed progress (Barber, 1978, pp. 195–196; Bowring, 2015; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, p. 130; Mydans, 2015). However, Lee was also harsh on people in his ruling coalition if they broke the law, e.g., were corrupt. On several occasions, Lee raised corruption charges against central people in PAP, for instance the minister of national development in 1986 (Mauzy & Milne, 2002, pp. 7, 91). Lee encouraged the public to report misbehavior and rudeness to make civil servants more civil and avoid misbehavior, such as corruption and “yellow culture” (Barber, 1978, p. 117; Mauzy &
Milne, 2002, p. 17). Although the people may have been in favor of these initiatives, and Lee may have been somewhat dependent on the people, deliberately punishing members of government and the bureaucracy was risky and not a behavior to be expected had he only been concerned with staying in power.

Lee employed people in the party and civil servants based on merit instead of loyalty, and he paid them well (Barber, 1978; Barr, 2000, Chapter 4; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, Chapters 7, 54, 60; Mydans, 2015). This can be viewed as harming the winning coalition in the sense that some loyal members of the winning coalition might feel overlooked, but on the other hand, he created a competent and efficient winning coalition. Nevertheless, this might in some ways be more dangerous than safe, since they might be more autonomous than people hired based on loyalty. In any case, merit-based hiring is strongly in line with Lee’s educational developmental aims.

**Hunt for a Successor**

A clear instance of harming the winning coalition was Lee’s hunt for a successor. He wanted his successor to be second generation, i.e., not from the core of his ruling coalition (his argument was that he wanted the country to be run well many years ahead). Moreover, he expected the first generation, i.e., his winning coalition, to retire. This renewal started in the 1970s, and in 1988, Lee was the only one left from the old generation. According to Lee himself, many people in the first generation were not happy because they felt that they were not ready to go. In addition, PAP’s popularity among the people (election results in the 1980s) declined during the years of renewal (Mauzy & Milne, 2002, pp. 45–46).

**Other Policy Initiatives**

Other initiatives that harmed Lee’s winning coalition were cutting the salaries of the academics to increase equality, which is largely consistent with his ideology (Barber, 1978, p. 177), combatting pollution, preserving historical buildings, and introducing fines for littering to keep the country clean (Barber, 1978, pp. 198–199; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, pp. 130–131). Although this did not directly harm his winning coalition, providing these kinds of collective goods did not make sense if he wanted to please his winning coalition. It would have been much more cost-effective to direct his resources towards his winning coalition. These initiatives were largely inconsistent with self-interest but highly consistent with his ideological aims. Another example is his family-planning policies, which influenced marriage choices in order to enhance Singapore’s
genetic quality, e.g., by encouraging graduates to reproduce among themselves (Barr, 2000, pp. 120–125; Bowring, 2015). He introduced tax deductions for educated females who had children to breed a new generation that was as talented as possible. This initiative was very controversial (Barr, 2000, pp. 120–125; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, p. 60) and unpopular, but it was highly consistent with his belief in eugenics.

In conclusion, there is ample evidence that Lee pursued his proclaimed ideology at the expense of his winning coalition. Therefore, I conclude that this implication is observed.

Pleasing Groups Clearly Outside the Winning Coalition

In addition to harming his winning coalition, Lee pleased groups outside his winning coalition. He implemented free education for the people (Barber, 1978, pp. 196–197; Barr, 2000, pp. 120–121; Bowring, 2015), and already in the 1960s, expenditures on education increased, and the number of teachers doubled (Boon & Gopinathan, 2006). This is consistent with his elitist ideology in which education played a major role. It may also have been in line with the wishes of the educated elite. However, it is inconsistent with power maximization since it is expensive to educate the people, and education may empower people. Hence, educating people outside his winning coalition could well increase his risk of losing power. Therefore, this implication is deemed observed.

Voluntary Step-Down

Lee stepped down voluntarily. He was still popular among the people, and the economy and the country in general were faring well (Mauzy & Milne, 2002, p. 128). The risk involved in stepping down was low, as he had carefully chosen his successor in the party, and he still had an advisory role after he stepped down (Mauzy & Milne, 2002, pp. 8, 114, 120). However, he lost power by stepping down voluntarily, so this implication is observed.

Personal Income

Lee’s salary may not have been particularly low, and his government was paid well. PAP raised the salary of the politicians and civil servants, arguably because the most qualified people would join PAP and the bureaucracy, and strong meritocratic norms would be built. Afterwards, this strategy has been copied in other East Asian countries, such as China (Barber, 1978; Barr, 2000, Chapter 4; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, pp. 54, 60, 85–98). However, he was not corrupt (Barber, 1978, p. 193; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, p. 7; Mydans, 2015), and
he lived a very spartan life (Barber, 1978, p. 170). Consequently, I evaluate this implication as only partly observed.

**Expert Assessments**

Expert assessments support the picture of Lee as a strongly ideologically motivated leader. He is generally perceived, also by the people, as a good and well-intentioned leader who really made a difference (Barr, 2000, pp. 236–237, 250; Bowring, 2015; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, p. 5). Even his enemies perceive him as patriotic rather than self-interested. He did not enter politics with corrupt and greedy motives, and he did not affiliate with his opponents for strategic purposes (Barber, 1978, p. 170).

**Constraints and Impact on Policymaking and Societal Outcomes**

**Implications**

Lee’s ideological beliefs had a large impact on the policies that were introduced (Mauzy & Milne, 2002, pp. 5–8). First, he fought hard for Singaporean independence. After independence, there are many examples of policies that reflect the motives of promoting prosperity and “progress”. He established manufacturing factories, invested in infrastructure, and introduced initiatives to make Singapore an international trade center. In this, he succeeded (Barber, 1978, pp. 191–216; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, pp. 66–84). While being consistent with his proclaimed ideology, these policies are also somewhat consistent with self-interest in that they secure performance legitimacy. In contrast, (as discussed) two major set of policies, education and anti-corruption, were clearly an effect of his ideological beliefs. In line with the latter, Lee created many other policies to make people behave “properly”. He had a tough line on crime, and he introduced many initiatives to increase cleanliness in the city, mainly through anti-pollution policies and by introducing larges fines for “inappropriate” behavior (Barber, 1978, pp. 198–199; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, pp. 130–131). The eugenic-inspired initiatives like the tax deductions for educated females who had children (in order to breed a new and talented generation) were obviously consistent with his elitist views, but also very controversial (Mauzy & Milne, 2002, p. 60), and were definitely not introduced to increase his popular support.

Lee and the PAP succeeded in state building and creating effective governance\(^\text{24}\) through the introduction and enforcement of anti-corruption measures

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\(^{24}\) Note that this does not imply democracy, an institution that they certainly did not introduce.
and principles of meritocracy (Mauzy & Milne, 2002, pp. 192–193). The education policies also had an enormous impact on the Singaporean people and in the creation of a successful knowledge-based economy (Mauzy & Milne, 2002, p. 1). These are in many ways impressive achievements (as noted by many scholars who view Singapore as one of the four “East Asian Tigers”) that stand in stark contrast to many other countries in the region (and elsewhere) (Mauzy & Milne, 2002, pp. 192–193).

It is not easy to find a good counterfactual case to the small city state of Singapore, but it remains illustrative to compare Lee’s rule to that of his contemporaries, Marcos in the Philippines and Suharto in Indonesia. The two latter were highly corrupt, and despite proclaiming somewhat similar goals to Lee’s (some variant of developmentalism), they did not try to build meritocratic systems, did not manage to build a strong state, and to a lesser extent to provide prosperity to their people, at least in part because their egotropic interest surpassed sociotropic interest (Levy, 2008; Pletcher, 1998). Of course, there are other differences than motives of the rulers to explain this, e.g., geography. Creating a strong centralized state apparatus is easier in a small city state than in a large country with several islands (like the Philippines and Indonesia), although Singapore has no natural resources or space for agricultural production (Barber, 1978, p. 191). Yet, this may make the creation of a knowledge-based economy an appealing development strategy.

Despite many differences between Tanzania during Nyerere’s rule and Singapore during Lee’s rule, the comparison illustrates important effects of the content of ideology for ideologically motivated autocrats. Both dictators had development as a goal, however, the means and the success rates differed markedly as consequences of their different political beliefs.

**Constraints**

Lee was able to introduce (and implement) his policies, because he was very unconstrained and in control (Barber, 1978, p. 193). Shortly after independence, the country started to prosper, which lifted the economic constraints. Singapore did not only experience economic growth, but also increased human development. These developments had a positive effect on Lee’s popularity among his people, despite the lacking political rights and liberties (Barber, 1978; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, pp. 90, 128). Although Geddes, Wright, & Frantz (2012) coded Singapore during Lee’s incumbency as a party-based autocracy, Lee was clearly in control of his ruling coalition (Plate, 2010, p. 24). As illustrated above, he could risk charging his own people, and he succeeded in renewing his entire ruling coalition against their will, which indicates that he
was not heavily constrained by his ruling coalition. Moreover, he had no problem neutralizing his opponents.

In conclusion, the evidence strongly suggests that Lee was very ideologically motivated. It is also clear that his developmentalist ideology had a strong impact on his policies, especially regarding state building and creating sustainable growth through education of the people and anti-corruption. Lee faced very few constraints during his incumbency, which explains the strong link between ideology and policies.

**Pol Pot (Cambodia): The Extreme Exclusionary**

Pol Pot was Cambodia’s dictator from 1975 to 1979. He led the Khmer Rouge in a military coup against Lon Nol’s right-wing military dictatorship. During his incumbency, Pol Pot committed genocide against the urban population and against the non-Khmers including the Vietnamese minority. In addition to these deeds, he ruined the national economy (Chandler, 1992; Kiernan, 1996; Short, 2004).

Unfortunately, there is not much information about Pol Pot himself, especially during his incumbency. Pol Pot seemed to want to be out of the spotlight, before, during, and after (Chandler, 1992, pp. 139, 159; Kiernan, 1996, p. xi–xii, 331; Short, 2004, p. 5). However, as I will show in the subsequent sections, most (of the sparse) evidence points in the same direction, and the conclusions are still largely solid.

**Ideology (proclaimed)**

Before Pol Pot came to power, he adhered to communism, or rather to Maoism and Stalinism, and as leader of the Khmer Rouge, he spent much time teaching Maoism to his guerilla party (Kiernan, 1996, pp. 125–128). Already when he studied abroad, he joined the Cambodian French communists, which indicates early nationalist beliefs as well (Chandler, 1992, p. 6; Gorlinski, 2006b; Kiernan, 1996, p. 11; Short, 2004, pp. 47–84). After becoming the leader of Khmer Rouge in 1963, these boundaries grew stronger and became more exclusionary (Chandler, 1992). His version of communism implied that the deserving real workers in Cambodia were the peasants. In contrast, the urban population equated all the bad people in society, because they lived well on the peasants’ hard work (Chandler, 1992, pp. 120–122; Kiernan, 1996, p. 62; Short, 2004, p. 284). Moreover, only the pure Khmers (as was Pol Pot’s own ethnicity (Chandler, 1992, p. 7)) were a part of the in-group, the deserving Cambodians. In that way, Pol Pot’s ideas contained a strong element of racial
supremacy. In addition to the urban population, mainly foreigners and newcomers, such as the Vietnamese, were the enemies (Kiernan, 1996, pp. 184–187, 463–466).

Winning Coalition

Pol Pot’s winning coalition contained the rural Khmers, which was a large part of the population (only 15% of the population were non-Khmers). However, Pol Pot had a much smaller ruling coalition, the Angkar (Party Organization) (Hinton, 2005, pp. 20, 32; Kiernan, 1996, p. xi), which were also a part of his winning coalition. As the Vietnamese army ended up costing him his power, Vietnam should also be viewed as part of Pol Pot’s winning coalition.

Pol Pot’s choice of ideology and powerbase, assuming he was strategic and selfish, does not seem prudent. As with Nyerere’s socialism, fighting the interest of the poor unorganized rural population does not seem the most sensible choice if the only driver is self-interest. Cambodia is only a fourth the size of Tanzania, but it is still difficult to mobilize many people in the countryside when the infrastructure is bad, which was certainly the case. In 1970, the United Kingdom, which is only marginally larger, had 50 times more railroad (and probably of better quality). The Cambodian communication infrastructure was equally bad (Comin & Hobijn, 2009; World Bank Group, 2020). Even though the United Kingdom may seem an unfair comparison, these differences indicate that the infrastructure in Cambodia was seriously underdeveloped. The rural population was therefore difficult to mobilize. By implication, the rural Khmers were neither a strong partner nor a serious threat, and therefore they did not comprise a minimal winning coalition, given he had a choice, which he did. The urban population would have been easier to mobilize than the peasants, and nothing indicates that they were a part of Lon Nol’s winning coalition (Gorlinski, 2006a; Kiernan, 1985; Short, 2004, p. 284). Moreover, avoiding the rural aspect but holding a more classic communist powerbase including the workers would have been an option, and also a safer option given the international climate, and to avoid conflicts within the winning coalition (given the importance of neighboring Vietnam). In this sense, Pol Pot could have chosen differently and more prudently from a power perspective. All this implies that Pol Pot’s winning coalition was not minimal, and he did not choose his ideology strategically but because he believed in it.

Harming and Pleasing Inside and Outside the Winning Coalition

Due to the character of Pol Pot’s behavior, I will discuss the harming groups inside and pleasing groups outside the winning coalition concurrently. Right
after seizing power, the Khmer Rouge started implementing their ideology. The urban population were rid of their wealth and luxury belongings and forced from their houses into labor camps. People who did not obey or in other ways had expressed dissatisfaction with the ideological lines of Khmer Rouge were killed without mercy, even for the smallest faults (Kiernan, 1996; Short, 2004, pp. 9–10). Pol Pot and the Angkar held regular study sessions for the members of the party to discuss the ideology and to indoctrinate the members of the party who would “teach” lower party cadres and others (Kiernan, 1996, pp. 153, 333; Path & Kanavou, 2015; Short, 2004). These actions are strongly in line with the proclaimed ideological goals. Indoctrination is also consistent with power maximization, but taking away luxuries from people, sending the urban population into labor camps, and the massive killings were very risky. The hunting down and killing of the ethnic Vietnamese was extremely risky (Kiernan, 1996, p. 461), since this was straight against Vietnamese interests. Although Pol Pot was in control of the party and the country (Kiernan, 1996, pp. 33, 375), international opposition was still a threat.

During his incumbency, Pol Pot committed genocide against the urban population and against the non-Khmers including the Vietnamese minority. Moreover, he ruined the national economy (Chandler, 1992; Kiernan, 1996; Short, 2004). His regime killed many of the rural Khmers as well, if they did anything suspicious not strictly in line with the ideology. Anyone who acted suspiciously or not strictly as expected were considered enemies, traitors or “microbes” (Chandler, 1992, pp. 136–137; Hinton, 2005, p. 87; Kiernan, 1996, p. 336). Pol Pot also killed people within his ruling coalition on this basis (Chandler, 1992, pp. 134–135; Kiernan, 1996, p. 336) and thus harmed many important people in his winning coalition. In fact, he did not really seem to serve it at all. Nor did he seem to serve people outside it. This behavior could be an indication of paranoia, which is indicated by several people close to him (Chandler, 1992, Chapter 1). However, this explanation does not hold without a complementary ideological explanation. Apparently, he had become somewhat paranoid already in the 1960s (Chandler, 1992, pp. 69–71), and that did not make him leave the country or flee to France where he had relatives. Instead, he stayed in Cambodia and kept fighting for power, revolution, and his ideology, although he moved around between different residences in fear of assassination during his incumbency (Chandler, 1992, p. 139). Thus, he may have been somewhat paranoid, but this does not explain his actions. In contrast, ideology does.
Voluntary Step-Down
Pol Pot did not step down voluntarily. However, it is worthwhile to dwell a little longer on this. His chances of stepping down without being killed or going into exile were very low after he started the genocide. However, a purely self-interested leader may have chosen to flee to security when the Vietnamese declared war on Cambodia instead of fighting and risking to be killed, as there was no doubt that Cambodia would lose. Pol Pot did not flee to Thailand until the Vietnamese forced Khmer Rouge from power (Chandler, 1992; Kiernan, 1985, p. xxvi). Even in exile, he kept leading the Khmer Rouge and worked actively against the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia for more than a decade, until all his followers had left him, and he was finally captured (Chandler, 1992, pp. 181–185; Kiernan, 1985, pp. xxvii–xxxv; Mydans, 1998). However, this does not change the fact that he did not step down voluntarily and, thus, this implication is not observed.

Personal Income
Pol Pot’s salary is not known, but he does not appear to have been “living the sweet life” or to have been personally corrupt. When he left power, he did not go into exile to live a wealthy life (Gorlinski, 2006b; Short, 2004, pp. 402–443). First, he lived in the Thai jungle near the border to Cambodia. According to defectors, in 1990, he lived in a guarded compound in Thailand and spent his time teaching his ideas to students. He taught them how to fight the Vietnamese and how to form a successful revolution (Chandler, 1992, pp. 181–185; Short, 2004, pp. 422–423). These stories indicate that he was ideologically motivated. Although he only had four years of chaotic rule in a devastated country (in the end at least), he could have amassed some wealth or have appropriated the money and luxury goods he stole from the population. Thus, I deem this implication observed, but due to uncertainties and sparse information, this implication only receives half weight in the final assessment of Pol Pot’s motivation.

Excessive Violent Repression
Because Pol Pot had a very exclusionary ideology, we should expect him to have engaged in excessive violent repression. He did exactly that. According to Fariss’s (2014) violent repression measure scaled from -3.1 to 4.7 (global data from 1949 to 2013), Cambodia’s average score during Pol Pot’s incumbency was -2.4, which is worse than for instance Mao (-2.1). In general, less than a handful of countries were more repressive at any time in the period from 1949 to 2013. Pol Pot killed excessively many people (around 20 percent
of eight million Cambodians) (Gorlinski, 2006b; Kiernan, 1996, pp. 456–460; Short, 2004, pp. 10–11). It seems plausible that he attempted to realize his radical worldview: The Khmers and the peasants were the rightful owners of the country and wealth. He killed around 40% of the urban population (Chandler, 1992), and he killed Khmers and people from his own party if they veered from the ideological line, e.g., did not work, tried to steal, or protested (Chandler, 1992, pp. 136–137; Hinton, 2005, p. 87; Kiernan, 1996, p. 336). This is clear evidence of a very strong ideology, and as discussed above, paranoia alone (without strong ideology) cannot explain this behavior.

Expert Assessments

When Pol Pot returned from France, he told his brother that he had become interested in politics because he cared for the people, which indicates that he was ideologically motivated at the time (Chandler, 1992: 43). However, he and his brother may not be the most reliable sources, so this statement is relatively weak evidence. However, people who knew Pol Pot before he came to power, even people whose family were killed by the regime, denied that Pol Pot was evil and selfish (Chandler, 1992, pp. 4–5; Short, 2004, p. 11). Thus, even people who had strong personal reasons to loath Pol Pot perceived him as ideologically motivated. This is strong evidence. Moreover, country experts have assessed him as highly visionary and motivated by his ideology, although he may also have enjoyed being in power (Chandler, 1992, p. 187; Hinton, 2005; Kiernan, 1996, p. 465; Path & Kanavou, 2015; Short, 2004, pp. 52, 65, 288).

Constraints and Impact on Policymaking and Societal Outcomes

As implied above, Pol Pot’s ideology clearly had a strong impact on his policies and their implementation. His ideology was the main driver of the genocide (Kiernan, 1996). Although Pol Pot took power after a civil war, his power was less constrained in the very beginning of his rule than later when he completely devastated the economy. When he took power, he was highly popular, and 70-80% of the rural population supported the Khmer Rouge (Hinton, 2005: 32). However, although many were indoctrinated, his popularity quickly deteriorated. Moreover, Pol Pot did absolutely nothing to please international actors, such as neighboring Vietnam, who could threaten his power (Kiernan, 1996). That Pol Pot managed to implement his ideology for four years while being heavily constrained seems contradictory. Yet, it is not. Pol Pot did not seem to care about the normal constraints a dictator faces when trying to stay in power (in the long run). His failure to accommodate the constraints were one of the reasons he was ousted from power after only four
years. He still managed to affect his people and country, as (violent) repression is much easier to execute in a highly (economically) constrained environment than for instance development policies.

As a part of the explanation of his implementation of ideology, he was in control of his inner circle (ruling coalition) (Chandler, 1992; Short, 2004). His degree of control is indicated by the fact that his inner circle did not leave him after his fall (Chandler, 1992, Chapter 9; Kiernan, 1985, pp. xxvii–xxxv, 1996; Mydans, 1998; Short, 2004, p. 423). As the country’s economy was ruined, it seems implausible that he could give his ruling coalition spoils. Instead, many people in his ruling coalition were indoctrinated by him and his ideology, and he managed to rule by fear (Chandler, 1992; Hinton, 2005; Kiernan, 1996; Short, 2004, p. 419).

In conclusion, there is no doubt that Pol Pot was one of the most horrible dictators of all times; but regarding motivation, the story is different from the story of narrowly self-interested and predatory dictators. Pol Pot was too repressive to be self-interested. On the contrary, his behavior can well be explained by strong ideological beliefs. Although he did not step down voluntarily, the case for Pol Pot being ideologically motivated is as strong as the cases of Nyerere and Lee. The patterns of genocide and the extent of killing are evidence of a strong ideology and it simply cannot be explained by self-interest or paranoia (alone). The total lack of caring for support from international actors (or just attempting to fly under their radar) as well as the existence of ideological consistency in behavior before, during, and after holding the top political post are clear indications of a strong ideological belief. The case of Pol Pot indicates that ideological motivation can be much worse than narrow self-interest when it comes to the well-being of the people.

Bayesian Updating: Calculating Posterior Confidence

In addition to the qualitative judgement of the three dictators' motivation, I use Bayesian updating as a tool to even more transparently evaluate the motivation of the dictators based on the observance and non-observance of the investigated implications. Table 5.1 provides an overview of the presence of the implications of ideological motivation across the three cases.
Most of the implications were observed for all three autocrats. Recall that these implications are relatively unique, but not certain, for ideological motivation to exist. This implies that finding just one or a few of the implications strongly indicates ideological motivation (especially implications with the highest certainty). The qualitative conclusions that the three dictators were highly ideologically motivated hold when the posterior confidence in the propositions is calculated using Bayesian updating. However, because the results are very sensitive to the exact degrees of certainty and uniqueness assigned to the implications (and prior confidence), Table 5.1 shows the posterior confidence on an ordinal scale. In this way, the results become less sensitive to the exactness of the assigned values. The results show that we should have very high posterior confidence in the propositions even though I assumed the prior confidence to be as low as 30%. The results do not change substantially with a prior confidence of 10% (see Table I.2 in Appendix I for numerical assessments).

The final posterior confidence is calculated assuming independence of the implications, which is a strong assumption and clearly does not hold, especially in the case of Pol Pot where torture and genocide affect more than one of the implications. Not assuming this would lower confidence in the theory. Nevertheless, the final posterior confidence would still be high as noting for instance that solely observing the implication that the dictator harms groups within the winning coalition, pleases groups outside it, or engages in excessive repression increases the posterior confidence significantly (to high). I have

Table 5.1. Posterior Confidence in Nyerere, Lee, and Pol Pot Being Ideologically Motivated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implications</th>
<th>Nyerere</th>
<th>Lee</th>
<th>Pol Pot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$k$</td>
<td>Posterior</td>
<td>$k$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harm groups within the WC</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Please groups outside the WC</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-minimal WC</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low personal income</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>(O)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excessive repression</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Final posterior confidence**$^b$

|                                    | Very high | Very high | Very high |

**Final posterior confidence**$^{bc}$

|                                    | Very high | Very high | Very high |

Note: O = observed, N = not observed.
Very high ≥ 95%. High ≥ 67% and < 95%. Moderate ≥ 33% and < 67%. Low >5% and < 33%. Very low ≤ 5%.

$^a$The change in confidence is halved due to inaccuracy. $^b$Assuming no independence between implications. $^c$Assuming 10% prior confidence.
conducted robustness checks with lowering the degree of uniqueness of all six implications by ten percentage points. I do this because the uniqueness of the implications may be the most disputed assessments and have the largest impact when the implications are found. This does not substantially change the results (see Table I.3 in Appendix I). Increasing the certainty and thus weighting non-findings higher also does not change the results substantially (see Table I.4 in Appendix I).

Although the qualitative assessments in the three cases all clearly indicated strong ideological motivation, this more rigid use of Bayesian updating calculations is an important tool in cases where evidence is not as clear or points in different directions. In the randomly selected case studies on which the next chapter is based, the assessment will be evaluated with qualitative assessments and from Bayesian updating calculations.

Concluding Discussion

The Existence of Ideologically Motivated Dictators – and Motivation Matters

The point of departure for this chapter was that the predominant literature on autocracies assumes and expects dictators to be highly self-interested and focus on staying in power, which is not a picture supported by qualitative research. In this chapter, I have taken the first step in analyzing dictators’ motives and their potential impact in a systematic and transparent way. The previous chapter laid out the observable implications of ideological motivation on which this chapter’s case studies of Nyerere, Lee, and Pol Pot were based. I have provided evidence supporting that these three dictators were strongly ideologically motivated. Moreover, their ideologies substantially affected policymaking, although with very different outcomes due to the diversity of their ideologies.

But how does motivation matter? As the cases studied here show, there is a huge difference between the consequences of Nyerere’s fundamental socialism and Lee’s developmentalism. The primary legacy of Lee’s policies is Singapore’s state building and economic development (through education and meritocracy). In contrast, Tanzania was economically ruined after Nyerere because his socialism did not prioritize and promote industrialization and economic growth. This goes against my expectations developed in Chapter 3 that all inclusionary ideologically motivated dictators prioritize general socio-economic development. However, Nyerere did prioritize industrialization, but he wanted agriculture to catch up, so he slowed down industrialization. This indicates that there are radical cases, at least on the economic left where equality
trumps development to such a degree that it ends up harming it. Nyerere admitted that he was wrong in the sense that he expected development, but his policies had failed. In Chapter 9, I will explore this more broadly to see whether Nyerere is an exception in this regard, or whether the economic left tends to enhance development less than the economic right.

Nyerere’s policies of equality have another more positive legacy, namely that religion and ethnicity are surprisingly non-salient, which has led to less conflict in Tanzania today, especially compared to other East African countries with comparable ethnic compositions (Tanzania Expert 1, 2017). A trait that these two ideologies had in common is that they were inclusionary, and the entire population was included in the development and equality project, respectively. The more exclusionary ideologies, such as Pol Pot’s racial supremacy, are very different, and his ideology led to death and destruction. While this is dreadful in itself, it also implies that Pol Pot’s ideology had a very negative impact on most socioeconomic outcomes. This supports the expectation that ideologically motivated dictators with strong exclusionary ideologies tend to harm socioeconomic outcomes even more than selfish dictators tend to do. The consequences of rule by an ideologically motivated dictator with an inclusionary ideology may depend on the economic content of the ideology. In particular, the economic content of the ideology affects the means to development, but perhaps also development in itself as the comparison of Nyerere and Lee indicates. However, this will be studied further in Chapter 9.

The findings in this chapter indicate several positive consequences for national development and unity in the cases of the inclusionary dictators. These conclusions should not be interpreted as a recommendation of certain dictatorships (as long as the dictator is inclusionary). Nowhere have I compared to non-autocratic regimes. Moreover, I only analyze particular aspects and outcomes of a dictatorship. Repression and restrictions on personal and political liberties are inherent to (almost) all dictatorships, also in Lee’s Singapore (perhaps the case with the most positive legacy).

One caveat regarding the consequences of ideological motivation is that some of the behavior used to assess the motivation is also policies and outcomes evaluated as consequences. Although this is unavoidable, it is problematic for the conclusions regarding consequences. I have mainly used evidence narrowly regarding winning coalition, income, and step-down, but to fulfill the second-order condition about ideological alignment, the evidence evaluated is analytically close to the consequences. However, the most problematic aspect is the evaluation of the excessive repression in the case of Pol Pot. This is important evidence, which is relevant to reveal his motives, but it is also an important consequence of his regime. Nevertheless, other pieces of evidence
and broader consequences, which are less directly linked, still indicate strong ideological motivation, and important—and severe consequences—of his rule.

The Next Step

What is in common for all three cases is that extant theory on policymaking in autocracies, such as the constituency argument, selectorate theory, and Svolik’s classic arguments about authoritarian power-sharing and control cannot explain policies and their outcome in these cases. Now, the next question is how exceptional these cases are. Are they just exceptions from a general picture of self-interested and relatively constrained dictators? There are reasons to believe that this is not the case.

Many of the implications outlined above can be found for other dictators as well, meaning that they are likely to be substantially motivated by ideology as well, since all implications are highly unique for ideological motivation. I have already mentioned a dictator who clearly pleased groups outside his winning coalition, namely Chávez, as he prioritized the Indians although they only comprised 2% of the Venezuelan people (Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2017) and thus were not crucial for him staying in power. Park is a clear example of an unconstrained dictator who abstained completely from personal corruption (Lee, 2012, pp. 150–151), but a more famous dictator, Mao, is known to have led an extremely modest lifestyle (Gu, 2009, p. 14; Yu, 2014). Some of the most brutal and greedy dictators are known to be African (Kriekhaus, 2006), but even among these are dictators voluntarily stepping down without the prospect of wealth. An example is Joaquim Chissano, a former dictator in Mozambique (Tanzania Expert 1, 2017), and from another continent is the example of Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, a former dictator in Argentina (Associated Press, 1979; Huntington, 1968, p. 233).

Although these examples are anecdotal evidence, they indicate that ideological motivation is not only the exception among dictators. These examples demonstrate that their ideologies have an impact on policies (think for instance of Chavez’ socialism and Park’s long-term investments). Hence, Nyerere, Lee, and Pol Pot are unlikely to be the only exceptions to a general pattern of self-interested and relatively constrained dictators, which is the expectation based on other theories on policymaking in autocracies. The relatively unique implications for ideological motivation, on which the studies in this chapter are based, are likely to be found among other dictators as well. Moreover, dictators may not be as constrained as extant literature sometimes suggests. Especially in times of – and in regimes with – relatively low constraints, dictators’ motivation is likely to matter. The next chapter investigates whether
these dictators are exceptions to the norm by studying the prevalence of ideological motivation in a medium-N setting.
Idi Amin is known as one of the world’s most ruthless dictators, and in many instances, his rule appears to be alike to Mobutu’s. However, appearances can be deceiving. Evidence from interviews with Uganda experts indicates that Idi Amin was highly ideologically motivated. All my Ugandan interviewees had a strong dislike of Amin and his regime; however, none of them doubted that he was sincerely patriotic, although either too much or just incapable of running the country (Uganda experts 1-5, 2017). He may not have been as strongly motivated by ideology in the sense of patriotism and nationalism as Nyerere (whom he ended up fighting a war against), but nor was he as selfish as Mobutu. Amin’s narcissist actions like giving himself extravagant titles and possible self-enrichment are explained by self-interest. In contrast, other actions, like deportation of Asian-Ugandans and use of excessive violence, are difficult to explain with pure self-interest but can be explained with ideological motivation.

In the previous chapter, I systematically and transparently showed that Nyerere, Lee, and Pol Pot were highly ideologically motivated and that their ideologies affected their countries to a large degree. Now, the time has come to address whether these dictators are just exceptions to the norm, i.e., not just show that they exist but study how widespread ideological motivation is among dictators. This calls for more cases and a different case selection strategy. Case studies of randomly selected dictators in a medium-N setting are suitable to investigate the prevalence of ideological motivation. It allows for detailed investigation of each dictator, which is necessary to generate credible and useful insights on the dictators’ motivation. In addition, there are enough cases to have a representative sample of dictators, which is needed to study the prevalence of the different types of motivation. As these cases are not most-likely cases, the assessment may be more difficult, as we should expect a large overlap between behaviors stemming from self-interest and from ideological motivation. Thus, the assessment in some of the cases may be more uncertain. Yet, random selection is a necessary step to create generalizability.

In addition to studying the dictators’ motivation in a descriptive sense, I investigate systematic patterns in motivation. In Chapter 3, I argued that we should expect dictators with a difficult road to power, with high education, a strong socioeconomic background, and older dictators to be the most ideologically motivated.
Analytical Setup

I conduct twenty case studies of dictators’ motivation. The cases are randomly selected from Svolik’s global dataset containing dictators who were in power at some point from World War II until 2008 (Svolik 2012). Simple random sampling and stratified random sampling are two obvious choices of sampling techniques. The latter implies dividing the population into different strata determined by one or more variables and then sampling from these strata. This makes the sample representative with regard to the strata. I discard this strategy in favor of simple random sampling due to the lack of one or two obvious strata to divide the population into. Variables like region, time in power, type of dictatorship, and all potential correlates of motivation could be used, and using one variable may potentially make the sample less representative with regard to other variables. I sample on dictators and not on dictator years. This implies that all dictators are equally likely to appear in the sample (although countries with long-sitting dictators may be underrepresented) instead of long-sitting dictators being overrepresented in the sample.

It is no disadvantage that Svolik’s dataset is only updated until 2008, since it is easier to access credible information about a dictator when he is no longer in power. In my sample, only Fijian Bainimarama is still in power. I have excluded dictators who have been in power for less than six months because it is not sufficient time to assess motivation.

Based on the evaluation of the six implications and the expert assessments in Chapter 4, the twenty dictators are each scored on a motivation scale from 1 to 5, where higher scores indicate stronger ideological motivation. In addition, I evaluate the motivation using a Bayesian updating strategy. The format of the case studies is similar to the format in Chapter 5, except that I only assess the dictators’ motivation in a descriptive sense, and not its impact. The easiest cases to assess are dictators near the extremes of the motivation scale. The studies of those cases are similar to the case studies in Chapter 5. In the more difficult case studies, securing evidence is slightly more extensive. The length of the case studies varies roughly between 2,000 and 4,000 words (on average slightly more than 3,000 words), and each case study is on average based on more than ten different sources (additional source material has been investigated to be discarded – see the discussion on the quality of the sources in Chapter 5). The case studies are available in full length in Appendix II.

Along with the overall assessment of ideological motivation, I will also present the results for the two implications concerning income (scored 1-4) and voluntary step-down (scored 1-3) because these are the easiest to evaluate and, thus, most useful for further large-scale studies of motivation. The scores are
presented in Table 6.1 below. It has been possible to score all dictators, although the conclusions in three of the cases are uncertain (see Table 6.1). None of the dictators seems to have been suffering strongly from paranoia or any other mental illness. Only one of them, Pierre Buyoya (Burundi), appears to have experienced a significant change in motivation during his time in power.

I will be able to evaluate to what extent dictators are ideologically motivated simply by looking at the variation in motivation across the twenty dictators. Correlating motivation with measures of potential correlates as outlined in Chapter 3, namely, road to power and personal background, enables me to explore the patterns in motivation and, thereby, assess when dictators are likely to be ideologically motivated.

Measuring Correlates

Road to Power

I use Svolik’s variables “political affiliation 1-3” and “institutional affiliation” to create a five-point scale to capture the five roads to power that I theorized upon in Chapter 3 (Svolik, 2012). Some of the categories overlap. For instance, a dictator can be both a guerilla and in opposition. Inherited power and guerillas are coded as dominating other roads to power. In the coding, military affiliation dominates coming from inside politics. Hence, a dictator’s road to power will only be coded as coming from the opposition or from the incumbent regime (including being in government or in the ruling party) if the dictator is not royal, a former guerilla fighter, or affiliated with the military. According to the theoretical expectations, the different roads are coded from 1 to 5, where 5 is the toughest road to power and, thus, the dictators with this road to power are the most likely to be ideologically motivated (i.e., guerilla fighters).25 I also include dummies of each of the roads to power.

My expectation about a tough road to power is by far the strongest. I therefore include an alternative measure of this, namely, a dichotomous measure of whether the dictator has been to jail prior to assuming office (excluding short detentions for minor misdemeanors) from the Cursus Honorum dataset (Baturo, 2016). This is a relatively objective measure, although there is a risk that it captures more than politically motivated activism. However, this is not the case regarding my sample. All five dictators who are coded to have been in

25 Specifically, road to power is coded as follows: 1 = royal, inherited power; 2 = incumbent regime, government, or party; 3 = military affiliation; 4 = opposition; 5 = guerilla.
jail prior to entering power were in jail because of political activism (see Appendix II). Thus, this measure seems appropriate.26

Education

I measure education in several ways as well. Based on Baturo’s (2016) detailed description of educational background, it is possible to divide the educational level into three categories: no education (scored 1), military education (scored 2), and university education (scored 3). If a dictator is educated both in the army and in university, the case is coded as a military education to be sure military college is coded as military education and not university education, since this distinction is important for the theoretical arguments. I include this variable as well as the dummy variables for capturing each of the three categories in turn.27 I also investigate whether education abroad and education in the West are correlated with motivation (Baturo, 2016).

Socioeconomic Background

I include two measures of socioeconomic background. One is a measure scaled from 1 to 3 of the socioeconomic class the dictators’ family belonged to before

26 Alternative measures of a challenging road to power are involvement in a revolutionary movement or opposition in a prior non-democratic regime or in an anti-colonial struggle (Baturo, 2016) and prior engagement in rebel activity (Ellis et al., 2015). However, they are not suitable for the present purpose. Regarding the first measure, both Mobutu and Abdallah were involved in national independence. Mobutu only joined the independence fight towards the end, and he was not at the frontline. Abdallah was sitting in the French parliament, and people were not sure whether he wanted independence at all until he declared independence (see Appendix II). In contrast, Lee is missing from the statistics although he fought a long battle for independence. The measure may still be useful in a larger sample, but in this small sample, two or three cases coded “wrongly” have a large impact on the results. The rebel activity measure is also problematic for the present purpose. Almost two thirds of the dictators in the sample have been involved in rebel activity, which indicates that the conceptualization of rebel activity may be too broad.

27 An alternative measure is LEAD’s four-point measure of education level, but it is not suitable for this sample. When we inspect the measure more closely, it appears that both Mobutu and Batista are coded to have a university degree, but none of them did. Mobutu was in missionary school and entered the military before turning 20, and Batista had a couple of unskilled jobs before he joined the military to learn stenography (see Appendix II). In Cursus Honorum, they are coded to have no education and military education, respectively, which seems to be a better fit. Mobutu and Batista are both coded as highly self-interested, and when they are coded as having university degrees, it obviously affects the overall correlation a great deal.
he entered power (working, middle, or upper class) (Baturo, 2016). The other measure is a three-point scale of the family’s wealth before the dictator took power (Ellis, Horowitz, & Stam, 2015). There is some discrepancy across the two measures, mainly about where to place the boundaries between the classes. LEAD tends to place dictators slightly higher than Cursus Honorum. I include both measures in the analysis, as neither is preferable for the present purpose.

Age and Career
In addition to the discussed background characteristics, I include the dictator’s age when he entered power (Baturo, 2016) and two common career traits of the dictators in the sample, namely, whether a dictator has a military career, and whether he has been a teacher prior to entering the top political post (Ellis et al., 2015). I expect older dictators to be more ideologically motivated than younger dictators, but career traits are investigated in an exploratory manner.

Institutional Traits: Type of Autocracy
As my arguments about leader motivation stand in contrast to institutional factors, I will explore the correlation between motivation and one of the most discussed institutional factors, namely, type of autocracy. I explore whether dictator motivation is correlated with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz’ (2012) autocracy types, i.e., monarchy, personalist, military, and party-based regimes. I include dummies for each type, except monarchy (there is only one case in that category) in the sample.28

Results I: Descriptives
Table 6.1 gives an overview of the cases and the core variables. A quick look at the different regions and types of dictatorships represented in the sample indicates that the sample is representative of the population of autocrats in power after World War II, which is what to expect from the random sampling.

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28 Five of the cases are not coded by GWF, namely, Abdallah (Comoros), Bainimarama (Fiji), Wangchuck (Bhutan), Souvanna Phouma (Laos), and Touré (Mali). The three former are excluded from the dataset because the countries are too small; Souvanna Phouma’s regime is coded as a warlord regime due to the civil war; and Touré’s regime is coded as a provisional regime. I have coded the five cases into GWF’s four regime categories guided by their coding rules. However, the reported correlations below do not change substantially when I exclude the five cases.
## Table 6.1. Overview of Cases. Core Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Autocrat</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Start year</th>
<th>End year</th>
<th>Motivation</th>
<th>BU-score</th>
<th>In-come</th>
<th>Step-down</th>
<th>Road to power</th>
<th>Jail</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>SES (CH)</th>
<th>Entry age</th>
<th>GWF</th>
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<tr>
<td>Abacha, Sani</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>middle</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Military</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>Regime</td>
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<td>1974</td>
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<td>middle</td>
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<td>1993</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>1974</td>
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<td>1980</td>
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<td>SSA</td>
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<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Latin America</td>
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<td>1973</td>
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<td>0.97</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Singapore</td>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2005</td>
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<td>middle</td>
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<td>Mobutu Sese Seko</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1997</td>
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<td>1979</td>
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<td>Personalist</td>
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<td>Europe</td>
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<td>1980</td>
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<td>0.60</td>
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<td>Touré, Amadou</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>1998</td>
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<td>0.99</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>None</td>
<td>upper</td>
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<td>Europe</td>
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<td>1989</td>
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<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>working</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Mean          |            |          | 1972       | 1985     | 3.50       | 0.57     | 1.45    | 0.63       | 0.25           |      |           |          | 49        |         |
| Min           |            |          | 1945       | 1959     | 1          | 0.05     | 0       | 0         | 0             |      |           |          | 17        |         |
| Max           |            |          | 2007       | 2003     | 5          | 0.99     | 3       | 2         | 1             |      |           |          | 63        |         |

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a. The assessment of this dictator’s motivation is uncertain.
b. Buyoya was in power twice (1987-1993, 1996-2003), and the ideological assessment is based on both incumbencies.
When we look at the core variable of interest, motivation, it appears that dictators are not only self-interested. In fact, there appears to be great variation, and the mean is 3.50 (on a scale from 1 to 5), which indicates that dictators on average tend to be slightly more ideologically motivated than self-interested (see also Figure 6.1). The Bayesian updating scores indicate similar conclusions with a mean of 0.57. Although it is difficult empirically to find the middle of the scale, i.e., measure exactly how ideologically motivated vs. self-interested a dictator is, it is clear that ideological motivation is substantial and widespread among the dictators in the sample. This suggests that we should care about these differences. There is also great variation among the ideologically motivated in terms of ideology (not shown in the table). Both the economic left and right are represented, e.g., by the communists, Gierek, Tito, Zhivkov, and by Caetano, Lee, and Park, respectively. There are also examples of dictators who actually wanted to democratize, such as Lanusse, Figueriedo, and Touré (see Appendix II).

Figure 6.1. Frequency Distribution of Ideological Motivation

Military Democratizers
It is worth dwelling on Lanusse, Figueriedo, and Touré. As Table 6.1 shows, they all happened to be military dictators with regard to the type of autocracy they ruled and their personal background. Their presence in a sample of only
twenty dictators indicates that some military dictators do not enter power to become military strongmen or because they have a strong encompassing ideology about changing the country (or the world) for better or worse. Instead, they are driven by saving their country from chaos or corruption (or from communists) and then leaving power again. This is what most dictators, military dictators in particular, promise when they enter power. Apparently, some military dictators do actually hold this belief, and some of them step down voluntarily and hand over power to civilian rule. A further look at the three cases provides evidence that this is what is really going on.

Touré took power in a military coup d’état in 1991 and removed the military strongman, Moussa Traoré, who had been in power for more than 20 years (Baxter, 2002; Cold-Ravnkilde, 2013, p. 29; Reuters, 2016; USAID, 2014, p. 2; Wing, 2008, p. 8). Touré promised to pull the soldiers out of politics; he created a democratic constitution with multiparty elections and a limit of two terms; and he abstained from running in the election himself (Baxter, 2002; Cold-Ravnkilde, 2013, p. 29; DiPiazza, 2006, p. 35; Hagberg & Körling, 2012, p. 113; Reuters, 2016; USAID, 2014, p. 2; Wing, 2008, p. 8). In 1992, Touré stepped down to hand over power to a democratically elected civilian government.

Both Figueriedo and Lanusse ended the military regimes in their respective countries and introduced elections in which they did not run. While Figueriedo was economically constrained by an economic crisis, Lanusse had plenty of chances to take power before he did and to centralize power. However, he abstained (O’Donnell, 1988, p. 186; Potash, 1996, p. 307). None of the three seemed to benefit economically, in terms of a high salary or corruption, from their time in power. While Touré and Lanusse appear to have been strongly driven by the motive to set the country right, some people speculate that Figueriedo might not have wanted to hold the top political post, but as he happened to hold it, he chose to use it in a sociotropic rather than an egotropic way (see Appendix II for more details).

In light of the predominant research on autocracies, it is highly surprising that so many autocrats appear to be substantially motivated by ideological

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29 In Argentina, a new military regime took power a few years later, but Lanusse was not involved this time.

30 Note, this has no normative claim. It does not imply that the dictators were “good”. Ruling in a sociotropic way does not exclude the use of repression. It refers to rule in the way that the dictator finds best with regard to (parts of) the people and the country (as opposed to himself). In dictatorships, this often implies the use of repression, e.g., to protect the country from communists.
goals and not only by power and wealth. However, ideologically motivated dictators also need power to implement their ideological goals. Therefore, it is even more peculiar that some dictators are not really interested in power, or at least their aims are less extensive and radical in the sense that they wish to stabilize the country, though sometimes through massive use of force, which often makes them extremely unpopular. Sometimes, these dictators step down voluntarily.

Other Indications of Sociotropic Motivation
The more objective motivation indicators, low or moderate income (including no personal corruption) and voluntary step-down also exhibit substantial variation. The saying that all dictators are corrupt and embezzle state funds does not seem to be true (see the left panel in Figure 6.2). For instance, Mahathir, Park, and Figueriedo clearly were not corrupt. Especially Park had a great deal of power independent of the people in the last ten years of his rule but did not engage in personal corruption (see Appendix II). In contrast, Abacha, Batista, and Mobutu stole enormous sums from the national treasury. Perhaps even more surprising, in 20% of the cases, the dictator chose to step down voluntarily (see the right panel in Figure 6.2). Notice that these cases do not include health-related step-down. Wangchuck and Touré even stepped down relatively young—at 51 and 44—although Touré ran for president ten years later (through electoral means).

These findings clearly show that dictators’ motivation vary, and dictators are not exclusively self-interested as much of the comparative autocracy literature assumes. Far from all dictators maximize power and wealth.

Of course, it is difficult to estimate exactly where on the spectrum to place the dictators—especially as implications of self-interest and ideology will always overlap to some extent. On the one hand, self-interested dictators are likely to try to hide their motives behind a cover of ideology; on the other, also ideologically motivated dictators need power consolidation. Existing research on autocracies tends to see instances of overlap as evidence of self-interest, which leads to overestimation of this motive. For this reason, some people may look at the findings of this chapter with surprise—and maybe skepticism. Highlighting examples from a case with a large overlap of the observable implications leading to a conservative assessment (implying that ideological motivation is not overestimated) may help convince the skeptical readers that ideological motivation is widespread among dictators (at least in this sample).
The Case of Marcello Caetano

Portugal’s former dictator, Marcello Caetano, to whom António de Oliveira Salazar handed over power shortly before he died, is scored as predominantly ideologically motivated. Caetano’s behavior was consistent with his corporatist and authoritarian beliefs, and it was highly consistent over time (before, during, and after his incumbency). The main reason that he only scores 4 is that much of his behavior was also consistent with power maximization. However, there are several exceptions. Before he came to power, he continuously criticized Salazar when he deviated from his ideology and his implementation failed. Caetano’s criticism was mainly conveyed in private correspondences with Salazar and therefore cannot simply have been to show the people and supporters that he was a stronger ideologue than Salazar. Instead, Caetano’s criticism was extremely risky regarding his chances of inheriting power.

When Caetano came to power, he kept many of Salazar’s supporters in government and added some of his own along with technocrats. While this was consistent with his ideology, it was probably not the best way to secure power. An even clearer instance of not acting in a power-maximizing way was his behavior regarding the Portuguese colonies. Caetano was a strong supporter of colonialism. He kept defending Portugal’s right to keep her colonies,
although a substantial part of his winning coalition, including some of the
most conservative, had turned against him on this issue. Moreover, Caetano
received strong international criticism and pressure because of this. If he did
not sincerely care about the colonial issue, it would have been much easier and
less costly to abandon the project after it lost general support. Also, because
he was highly constrained internationally, not liberalizing and granting inde-
pendence to the colonies put Caetano under extreme international pressure
which might indirectly have led to his downfall (Gallagher, 1983, p. 165;

When Caetano was in exile in Brazil after being ousted from power and
had no prospects of returning to Portuguese politics, he kept interfering con-
sistently with his ideological beliefs. There is no evidence that Caetano had a
high income or was corrupt. The fact that he started working at a university
after he went into exile indicates that he had not achieved excessive economic
benefits from staying in power. This behavior supports the conclusion that he
was not very self-interested but predominantly ideologically motivated.

Although Caetano’s ideology is by no means commendable, his actions are
better explained by this than by self-interest. The experts’ assessment of Ca-
etano as strongly ideologically motivated is unequivocal. For instance, his bi-
grapher, a leftist (i.e., a political opponent) with a doctorate in history, writes
consistently that Caetano was highly ideologically motivated, and he kept
most of his values from his youth with him when in power (Martinho, 2018, p.
viii, 192). In terms of his anti-liberal, conservative, and traditionalist stance,
“Strictly speaking, he broke with none of these principles” (Martinho, 2018, p.
43).

Despite clear evidence, Caetano has not received the maximum (ideologi-
cal) score on the motivation scale, since much of his behavior was consistent
with both self-interest and ideology, and because all the coding is done con-
servatively to be certain to avoid biasing the results towards ideological moti-
vation.

Results II: Correlates of Motivation

In addition to investigating the prevalence of ideological motivation among
dictators, this chapter explores potential systematic patterns in ideological
motivation. One way to do this is to inspect Table 6.1 visually. However, with
twenty cases, I run correlations as well.

The two easiest implications of ideological motivation to observe, low or
moderate income (and no personal corruption) and voluntary step-down, cor-
relate at 0.82 and 0.52, respectively, with the judgement-based measure of
ideological motivation, and similarly with the Bayesian updating-measure
(see Table III.1 in Appendix III). This is as expected because I have used these implications to assess the dictators’ motivation. Moreover, it is not surprising that voluntary step-down has the lowest correlation of the two. It is far from a certain indicator of ideological motivation as ideologically motivated dictators also have strong incentives to stay in power.

Figure 6.3 illustrates the correlations between ideological motivation (both the judgement-based score and the Bayesian updating score), low or moderate income (and no personal corruption), and voluntary step-down, and a set of relevant variables to test my expectations about the correlates of motivation (see Table III.1 in Appendix III for the specific correlations).

Road to Power
There is no strong correlation between the five-point scaled measures of road to power and motivation. On the one hand, this is surprising based on my theoretical argument. On the other hand, my expectations regarding parts of the spectrum were less clear. Also, when we look at the military dictators in the sample in Table 6.1 (and the case studies in Appendix II), it is clear that they can be divided into at least two very different groups. Abacha, Batista, and Mobutu were highly self-interested, whereas Figueriedo, Lanusse, and Touré were relatively ideologically motivated. The latter three all took part (to different degrees) in a military coup to restore order and stability, and they all restored democracy as promised. Observing these very different motivations within the same road to power explains the weak correlation between a military road to power and motivation (−0.32 and −0.26 for the judgement-based and Bayesian updating measures, respectively).

At the guerilla end of the spectrum, where the expectations about motivation were strongest, I find an even weaker correlation (0.21 and 0.19) with ideological motivation. However, only two dictators are coded in the guerilla category (see Table 6.1), and with all the other ideologically motivated dictators in the sample, this null finding is not surprising. Yet, the case studies reveal that several dictators were engaged in risky political activism prior to entering power. As previously discussed, the jail measure seems to capture this neatly. Indeed, the jail measure and ideological motivation are positively correlated (0.41 and 0.32). However, these dictators are less likely to step down voluntarily compared to dictators who have not been in jail. The explanation may be that they have a very strong political-ideological motivation that does not allow them to leave politics.
Examples are Yemeni Abdul Rahman Al-Iryani (very ideologically motivated, scoring 5) and Yugoslavian Josip Tito (predominantly ideologically motivated, scoring 4). Both were jailed for political activism prior to entering power.

Before coming to power, Al-Iryani was a revolutionary fighting for republicanism and implementation of modern ideas and secular reforms with a
group of other liberal reformers (Burrowes, 1987; Peterson, 1982, pp. 77, 102; Rabi, 2015, p. 25; Wenner, 1991, p. 131). He served 15 years in prison for fighting the Islamic imam king and was minutes away from being executed before he was pardoned by the king (Lentz, 2014, p. 847; Peterson, 1982, p. 108; The Times, 1998; Whitaker, 1998).

After entering power in 1967, after the civil war, as the first civilian leader of North Yemen, he kept fighting for republicanism, secularization, and national unity. The strong power bases of Yemen were the conservatives and the shaykhs, and later in his incumbency, Saudi Arabia played a major role in support of the conservative agenda. Consequently, power maximization would have led him to support this faction and break with the modernists and leftists. However, he continuously made choices against the conservatives in support of the modernist. For instance, he forced out a conservative prime minister and replaced him with a radical modernist and leftist, Hassan Makki. Moreover, Al-Iryani instructed Makki to prioritize development by involving technocrats and without consulting the conservatives (Burrowes, 1987, pp. 54–56). The development initiatives, and especially the anti-corruption initiatives, were very harmful to the shaykhs, who mainly sustained their power and prestige through patronage and were highly focused on self-enrichment (Burrowes, 1987, pp. 32, 49–51; Peterson, 1982, pp. 105–106). Additional arguments for the riskiness of installing Makki as prime minister are that Saudi Arabia was deeply dissatisfied with this decision (Peterson, 1982, p. 113; Stookey, 1978, p. 271), and the shaykhs largely controlled the army (Burrowes, 1987, p. 51). Makki did not even come with a power base (Peterson, 1982, p. 113), so the choice of him as prime minister cannot even be explained by Al-Iryani switching between power bases. From a power perspective, this move was foolish (Peterson, 1982, p. 113), but it makes perfect sense from an ideological point of view with his personal and political background in mind. His revolutionary work and time spent in jail may not have been in vain, as he, when he finally reached power, kept fighting for the same things as before.

The history of Tito is in many ways similar. Prior to entering power, he lived a risky life as a guerilla and revolutionary travelling different countries to fight for socialism (Auty, 1974, p. 11; Carter, 1990, pp. 9–10, 32). He was imprisoned many times, one time for five years, but it did not stop him from fighting (Hanes, Hanes, & Baker, 2004, pp. 444–445; Maclean, 1980, pp. 118–119). During the Second World War, he fought underground against the Nazis for Yugoslavian independence (Anderson, 1980; Doder, 1980), and Hitler put a price on his head as an illegal communist organizer in Yugoslavia (Binder, 1980).
When he came to power, he kept fighting for socialism (but not radical communism) and national self-determination. The fight for the latter is easiest to separate from selfish motives, as the Soviet Union was an extremely important ally, had Tito wanted to securely consolidate and enjoy power, and the power of the Soviet Union was the primary obstacle to Yugoslavian self-determination and non-alignment. Tito chose to follow his ideological beliefs.

One of the clearest examples is that Tito fell out with Joseph Stalin as he refused to take orders from him (Anderson, 1980; Doder, 1980; Hanes et al., 2004, pp. 446–448; Maclean, 1980, pp. 90–95; Reuters, 1980). This was a deliberate choice by Tito in the name of non-alignment and national pride, that is, in line with his proclaimed ideological aims. Historians and biographers agree that this was a very risky move (Anderson, 1980; Binder, 1980; Carter, 1990, p. 27; Hanes et al., 2004, pp. 446–448). It had consequences in the form of economic blockade and a Soviet-sponsored assassination attempt on Tito (Carter, 1990, p. 27). This did not make Tito fall into line. He chose to discuss domestic problems with other Eastern European leaders without involving the Soviet Union, which further provoked Stalin (Maclean, 1980, p. 90). He never made up with Stalin, and although he was on better terms with Nikita Khrushchev, he deliberately supported Hungary in a strife with the Soviet leadership in 1956. In 1968, Tito supported the Czech Republic in modernizing communism, again directly against the will of the Soviet leadership and consistent with Tito’s proclaimed ideology (Anderson, 1980; Doder, 1980; Hanes et al., 2004, pp. 448–449; Maclean, 1980, pp. 107–108). This behavior is not consistent with self-interest but with his ideological motives that he also fought for prior to entering power. Like Al-Iryani, Tito continued his fight for ideological beliefs after he reached the top political post.

A political fight that may result in imprisonment is likely to be a symptom of strong ideological beliefs. In the cases where someone who holds these beliefs ends in the top political post, he is likely to carry these beliefs with him, as the cases of Al-Iryani and Tito show. Of course, there is a risk that dictators become corrupted by power over time. Some may argue that Tito did to some extent, as he spent lavish amounts on himself and cultivated a very extravagant lifestyle (one of the reasons he is only assessed to be in the second-highest category of other-regarding). However, he at no point lost his ideological views (Carter, 1990, p. 24; Djilas, 1981, pp. 5, 48–49; Maclean, 1980, pp. 88, 119; Ognjenovi & Jozelic, 2016, p. 3; Swain, 2011, pp. 1–3). This evidence indicates that strong ideological beliefs are likely to be carried on in a dictators’ incumbency.

Summarizing on the findings regarding road to power, previously jailed dictators are likely to be more ideologically motivated, arguably because they choose to risk and sacrifice a great deal to gain power, which indicates strong
ideological beliefs (prior to entering power). Moreover, there appears to be at least two types of dictators with a military background: one type who is highly self-interested, and one type who champions the classic military values: nationalism, order, and stability.

Education
Turning to the education measures, education is positively correlated with ideological motivation. The three-point scale measure consisting of university, military, and no education has a moderately strong (0.58 and 0.54) correlation with ideological motivation. When the variable is split into dummies, university education is positively correlated with ideological motivation, and both military education and no education are negatively correlated with ideological motivation, although military education only very weakly (-0.17 and -0.11). Thus, university educated dictators tend to be more ideologically motivated than less educated dictators and dictators with only military education. This result holds when we look at a subsample including only dictators from the middle class, which is the largest category (see Table III.2 in Appendix III). Therefore, the correlation with education is not created by a correlation with socioeconomic background.

The results in Figure 6.3 suggest that also dictators educated abroad seem to be slightly more ideologically motivated than dictators who are not (correlations on 0.35 and 0.32). When we look at the sample of university-educated dictators only, the moderate correlation with the motivation measures persists (see Table III.3 in Appendix III). However, this result may be partly driven by socioeconomic background, because when we look at the middle class, the result is only sustained regarding the correlation with voluntary step-down. There is no strong correlation between motivation and being educated in the West, but when we look at the sample of only university-educated dictators, again we find a strong correlation (0.64) with voluntary step-down. Yet, due to the low number of cases, the interpretation of the results in the subsamples should be cautious. In the subsamples of middle-class dictators and university-educated dictators, the number of observations varies between 10 and 13.
Socioeconomic Background

Socioeconomic background appears to be moderately correlated with motivation for both measures. This is sustained when we only look at university-educated dictators. However, the size of the correlation is smaller than for education. The reason may be the oppositely directed causal mechanism outlined in the theoretical framework, namely that the well-off face high-opportunity costs when they enter power, which makes them more likely to be ideologically motivated. The worst-off are likely to be motivated by grievances and therefore more likely to be ideologically motivated than those who are better off.

Age

I investigate the correlations between motivation and age. There is no apparent correlation between age and motivation. Yet, there is a negative correlation between age and voluntary step-down. However, it becomes weak (0.29) when Wangchuck is removed from the sample (not shown). His case is an outlier as he was only 17 when the entered power (and stepped down voluntarily).

The lacking effect of age is surprising, as the psychological literature is relatively clear about elderly being more other-regarding, although we might expect younger dictators to adhere to more radical ideologies provided they are ideologically motivated in the first place. This conclusion is not final, as I will investigate the correlates in a large-N setting in Chapter 8 to see if the results are replicated.

Career

The last part of the analysis is highly explorative. I look at two common career traits, namely, being a teacher (4 of the 19 dictators in the sample) and having a military career (10 of the 19 dictators in the sample). These careers appear to be only weakly correlated with motivation. The reason that there is no correlation with military career may again be found in the two very different types of dictators who come from the military: the highly egotropic who strive towards becoming military strongmen, and the more sociotropic who sincerely want to create stability and return the country to civilian rule.

Autocracy Types

Finally, Figure 6.3 shows the correlation between dictator motivation and GWF’s autocracy types. Generally, there does not seem to be a strong correlation between these institutional traits and motivation. However, personalist

\[ \text{32 There is no data on these two variables for Bainimarama.} \]
dictators are correlated at -0.30 and -0.29 with the two measures of ideologi-
cal motivation, respectively. This indicates that personalist dictators tend to
be relatively more self-interested than other dictators. This result is largely
robust to only including the fifteen cases GWF have coded (see footnote 27
above and Table III.4 in Appendix III); despite with fewer cases, strong corre-
lations are more vulnerable.

It is not surprising that personalist dictators tend to be the least ideologi-
cally motivated. Power is valued differently across the motivation spectrum,
and personalist dictators are per definition the least constrained dictators,
that is, the dictators with most personal power. Ideologically motivated dicta-
tors are likely to focus more on problem solving and policymaking whenever
their power is sufficiently consolidated, since power is mainly an instrument
to policymaking, whereas (most) self-interested dictators find high intrinsic
value in power and, thus, never start diverging their resources from consoli-
dating power (although wealth-maximizing dictators will also try to extract
wealth). This implies that self-interested dictators are more likely to become
personalist dictators. Hence, this explanation suggests that motivation affects
institutions (though I have tested neither the mechanism nor the causal direc-
tion of this potential effect).

The different motivations of dictators with a military background support
this interpretation. Apparently, at least two types of dictators come to power
with a military background. Some with highly egotropic motives, like Abacha,
Batista, and Mobutu; and others with sociotropic motives and perhaps a wish
for democratization, like Figueriedo, Lanusse, and Touré. Abacha, Batista, and
Mobutu all centralized power, and certainly the two latter succeeded in turn-
ing their respective regimes into a personalis-
t dictatorship. In contrast, as de-
mocratization (or at least stability) rather than power is the ruling purpose of
the second set of dictators, they sustain the military institution. This happened
in Brazil, Argentina, and Mali where the three other-regarding military dicta-
tors ruled. All three ended up returning their respective countries to democ-

cy. I will return to this discussion in Chapter 8 where I investigate the cor-
relates of motivation in a large-N setting.

Three Patterns: Summarizing the Correlates
I largely found the expected correlates of motivation. Not all correlations with
road to power were as expected. One reason is that the military category in-
cludes at least two very different types of dictators. Another is that the group
of former guerilla fighters only includes two of the twenty dictators, and rela-
tively many dictators in the sample were driven by ideological concerns. How-
ever, dictators who have previously been in jail and therefore had a challenging road to power are more likely to be ideologically motivated than dictators who have not.

My findings also suggest that the more educated a dictator is, the more likely he is to be ideologically motivated, and dictators educated abroad are more likely to step down voluntarily compared to dictators who are not educated abroad. A strong socioeconomic background also correlates positively with ideological motivation, although not as strongly as education.

These correlations are unlikely to be causal. As I argued in Chapter 3, at least two mechanisms lead to these effects: a cost-benefit calculation weighing direct costs, opportunity costs, and risk and benefit of success given the preferences, and a socialization mechanism. Only the causality of the socialization effect runs from the particular correlate, e.g., road to power, education, or socioeconomic background, to motivation, whereas the cost-benefit calculation runs the other way (the calculation is made based on the pre-existing motivation leading to a selection effect).

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to investigate the prevalence of ideological motivation among autocrats. Dominant theoretical and comparative accounts of political dynamics in autocracies essentially assume that all dictators are rationally self-interested power and wealth maximizers. We know from psychology and behavioral economics that human beings are not only self-interested but also often driven by other-regarding concerns. Many case study scholars indicate that in this sense, dictators are ordinary human beings: They also do have nuanced motives. By carefully studying twenty randomly selected dictators, I have found strong evidence that, indeed, dictators are not as self-interested as normally assumed. 60% of the dictators are found to be predominately ideologically motivated, whereas self-interest was the predominant motivation for 30% of the dictators. For the remaining two dictators in the sample, the motivation was mixed. In contrast to the general view of dictators, my study has revealed that several dictators appear not to have been corrupt at all. Another finding that challenges the dominant view of dictators is that 20% of the dictators in the sample stepped down voluntarily (without economic benefit), which we should never see according to existing theory. Moreover, the majority of the dictators in the sample do not appear to have been corrupt.

In addition to credibly showing that sincere ideological motivation is widespread among autocrats, I have investigated systematic patterns in dictators’ motivation. The analysis suggests that dictators who had a challenging road to
power, educated dictators, and dictators with a strong socioeconomic background are the most likely to be ideologically motivated. There are also some indications that personalist dictators tend to be relatively more self-interested than other types of dictators. As I will further investigate these patterns in a large-N setting in Chapter 8, I will postpone a longer discussion on this.

The study undertaken in this chapter has three different but interconnected implications. First, it affects our understanding of what actually drives dictators. Different dictators have different motivations for being in power and are not only driven by incentives created by the institutional settings they govern, such as different types of autocracy. This is particularly clear regarding the military dictatorship, as the study suggests that two very different types of dictators come to power with a military background. One group contains Abacha, Batista, and Mobutu, who were highly self-interested dictators trying to personalize power to steal enormous sums of money from the state coffers for personal use. The other group contains dictators such as Figueiredo, Lanusse, and Touré, who strongly held the classic military values, nationalism and stability, and succeeded in democratizing their respective countries. In other words, military dictators can be incredibly diverse regarding motivation and, hence, in how they affect policymaking and society.

Second, the study prompts a discussion about assuming that dictators are self-interested when we study political dynamics in autocracies, even in large-N global settings. It is a parsimonious assumption that would be justifiable if dictators were predominantly self-interested. However, since a majority of the dictators studied here is found to be predominantly ideologically motivated, there is a serious need to reconsider the dominant assumption. While theory on power consolidation and constraints is still important since most dictators want power at least for its instrumental value, we miss an important aspect of authoritarian politics by not including more nuanced motives for dictators. This is especially the case regarding the least constrained dictators, where motivation unquestionably matters for policymaking and outcomes. For instance, the case of South Korea’s economic growth during the Park Chung Hee era is extremely difficult to explain without taking motivation into account. Park centralized power but did not use it to embezzle the state or build palaces for himself. Instead, he kept investing in heavy chemical industrialization that led to immense long-term growth. He did this despite growing unpopularity, which may indirectly have led to his assassination.

The third implication is practical. Although it is difficult to incorporate more nuanced motives of the dictators in empirical studies, this study has shown that it is an important step to take in order to enhance our understanding and explanation of dictators’ behavior. One thing is to incorporate more
nuanced motivation in theory building; another is to incorporate it in quantitative global studies. Because motivation is so extremely difficult and resource demanding to investigate on a large scale, no measure of dictator motivation exists. This is a next step. In Chapter 7, I will introduce a large-N dataset on dictator motivation, the Obituary Registry of Dictators Dataset (ORDD), and in Chapter 8, I will use this dataset to try to replicate the results found in the current chapter in a large-N setting.
Chapter 7: Studying the Prevalence of Ideological Motivation with the Obituary Registry of Dictators Dataset (ORDD)

The picture of the self-interested power- and wealth-maximizing dictator has in particular been predominant in large-N studies, whereas case studies of specific countries or autocrats tend to paint a much more diverse picture. First, autocrats are often motivated by their beliefs about what is best for their people, or subsets of their people, as their beliefs can be highly exclusionary. The beliefs may rely either on classic ideology or more specific ideas and beliefs. Second, autocrats’ beliefs seem to matter quite a lot for policymaking and social, political, and economic outcomes. Consequently, dictator motivation is important. In the previous chapters, I have carefully and systematically studied dictators’ motivation and found that ideological motivation is indeed much more widespread than normally assumed, in quantitative research in particular. However, this conclusion has come about through detailed case studies. Now, time has come to take this to the next level.

In addition to the concern for parsimony and the belief in the realism of the self-interest assumption, one reason large-N studies have treated dictators as individuals with similar and relatively simple motives (or utility functions) is most likely the lack of relevant data. I try to alleviate this problem by using a new original dataset, “the Obituary Registry of Dictators Dataset” (ORDD), which I present in this chapter.

The ORDD is a unique dataset that is based on 695 Western obituaries of 297 deceased dictators who have held power at some point during the period 1945-2008. The focus of the dataset is motivation. It contains variables measuring the extent to which a dictator seems mainly preoccupied with self-interested goals such as power and wealth maximization in contrast to acting on more other-regarding motives, such as ideology or other beliefs. This group of variables contain judgement-based measures as well as measures of more observational character like the dictators’ level of personal corruption, lifestyle, and extent to which he stepped down voluntarily. In addition to the motivation-related measures, the dataset contains measures of the content of the ideology (economic content and degree of exclusion) as well as several other characteristics of the dictator not already coded in existing datasets on political leaders, including the popular perceived legacy of the dictator and whether he came from a rural or urban background.
The ORDD reveals, in a large-N global setting, the diversity in dictators’ motivation and allows researchers to investigate when and how different “types” of dictators emerge. For instance, it allows us to investigate the conditions under which predatory dictators such as Mobutu in DR Congo and Papa Doc in Haiti are likely to emerge, or when we should expect to see different more ideologically motivated dictators like Lee, Nyerere, and Pol Pot. This is important because motivation seems to have an impact on policies (an important conclusion from Chapter 5).

In this chapter, I present the dataset and conduct a descriptive analysis of the prevalence of different types of dictator motivation. In Chapter 8, I use the data to study the correlates of motivation on a large scale. Finally, in Chapter 9, I use the data to investigate the effects of motivation.

**Why Do We Need Data on Motivation? Comparison to Existing Data**

Existing data on autocracies focus primarily on institutions. There are several datasets measuring regime type (Cheibub, Gandhi, & Vreeland, 2010; Geddes, Wright, et al., 2014; Hadenius & Teorell, 2007) and the nature of elections (Coppedge et al., 2020; Hyde & Marinov, 2012).\(^{33}\) Even some of the leader-specific data, such as Archigos (Goemans, Gleditsch, & Chiozza, 2009), Svolik’s (2012) leadership data, and Geddes, Wright, and Frantz’ (2017) new data on personalism, focus mainly on institutional data, measuring characteristics such as how the leader came to power, his institutional affiliation, length of tenure, and how personalized the regime is. Lastly, a group of leader-specific measures from LEAD (Ellis et al., 2015) and Cursus Honorum (Baturo, 2016) focus on the leaders’ personal background, such as education, socioeconomic background, and previous occupation.

The ORDD goes further than the existing datasets by measuring characteristics that are not easily observable or purely observational data, since it attempts to capture the motivation of the dictators instead of the institutional settings they navigate within or their socioeconomic background. Even the more concrete measures of personal corruption, lifestyle, and degree of voluntary step-down contain information that is not directly observational and not easily accessible. It requires a certain kind of in-depth information to code these traits.

\(^{33}\) The Varieties of Democracy measures contain many variables in addition to variables closely related to elections and democracy (Coppedge et al., 2020). However, it does not capture data on dictators’ motivation.
We have no preexisting data on dictators’ motivation and motivation-related traits. Although this data is more difficult to retrieve and is more uncertain than most of the measures from existing datasets, it allows us to measure new dimensions of authoritarian leaders. Due to the preexisting very simple view of dictators’ motives, this dataset is extremely important in terms of improving our understanding through descriptive analyses as well as our ability to explain the political dynamics in autocracies as the previous chapters have shown on a smaller scale. In particular, the ORDD enables us investigate the emergence of dictators with different motives (Chapter 8) and their consequences for outcomes such as development, repression, and conflict (Chapter 9).

Methodology
As in Chapter 6, I use Svolik’s global dataset on dictators, covering the period 1945-2008, to define the population (Svolik, 2012). Since the ORDD relies on obituaries, it contains only deceased dictators. I have included dictators who have held power for at least six months. 23.2% of the dictators in the final sample are missing. However, most of these dictators held power for less than a year and many were from microstates. Therefore, only 6.1% leader years are missing from the sample, which consists of data on 297 leaders and 3,809 leader years.

Obituaries as Source
There are many challenges involved in assessing and coding motivation. It is very difficult to assess and impossible to observe directly. The closest we can get to a dictator’s motivation is “expert” assessments, i.e., from people with in-depth knowledge about the dictator. However, choosing the right experts whose assessments are relevant, precise, and comparable across countries and contexts is difficult and resource demanding (Skaaning, 2018, pp. 110–111). This is why I base my coding on obituaries, which are relatively brief (about 500 to 3000 words) pieces of information about dictators written by journalists, many of whom are correspondents from a specific region or have scholarly knowledge of a dictator’s country or region. For example, at The New York Times, Jeffrey Gettleman, who wrote Ethiopian Meles Zenawi’s obituary, was NYT’s East Africa bureau chief in Kenya for more than ten years. David Binder, who wrote Bulgarian Todor Zhivkov’s and Yugoslav Josip Tito’s obituaries, served as a correspondent in Europe and lectured on and wrote several academic articles about the Balkans (The New York Times, 2019; Wikipedia, 2018). The obituaries typically contain a brief summary of the dictators’ life,
incumbency, motives, and achievements.\textsuperscript{34} I have mainly relied on obituaries from\textit{The New York Times}, \textit{The Washington Post}, \textit{The Independent}, and \textit{The Guardian}, since these are major newspapers with broad spatial and temporal coverage and are widely recognized for independent, balanced, high-quality reporting. This makes the obituaries an easily accessible source of relatively condensed in-depth and relevant information about dictators.

\textbf{Source Validation}

There are potential disadvantages to using obituaries. An obituary may be biased towards judging dictators as more ideologically motivated than they were. We tend not to talk too critically about the dead, so obituary writers could be inclined to downplay self-interest. However, as ideology is not necessarily a good thing, and ideology (especially in extreme cases) may be viewed as a foul motive, it is not necessarily played up. To alleviate problems regarding potential bias in the obituaries, I have crosschecked fifteen randomly selected cases with in-depth case studies based on biographies and historical writings about specific countries (see Table IV.1 in Appendix IV).\textsuperscript{35} The check reveals a large overlap in assessments and no systematic tendency to evaluate dictators as more ideologically motivated than in in-depth case studies (see Table IV.2 in Appendix IV).

I have relied on up to four obituaries per dictator when available. Generally, \textit{The New York Times} has the broadest coverage, and in around 90\% of the cases, the coding is based partly or solely on obituaries from this newspaper. I have included variables indicating substantial disagreement between obituaries in the assessment of core variables. The sources disagree only in two of the almost three hundred cases, and only with respect to one variable, namely the dictator’s lifestyle. Thus, the only problem with the varying number of obituaries is that the coding is more certain for some dictators than for others. To alleviate this problem, I have included a binary variable indicating whether the coding of a specific dictator is particularly uncertain.

Since I have only relied on Western newspapers, there is a risk that the obituaries present a specific Western point of view. To investigate the size of this potential bias, I have compared Western with Russian and Brazilian obituaries for a handful of dictators across the motivation spectrum, and there does not seem to be large divergence (see Tables IV.3 and IV.4 in Appendix IV).

\textsuperscript{34} See a typical obituary here: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/carlos-julio-aro semenas-38132.html

\textsuperscript{35} The cases consist of the fifteen deceased dictators from the medium-N study. Bain-imarama, Buyoya, Mahathir, Touré, and Wangchuck are still alive.
IV). On average, both Russian and Brazilian obituaries seem to perceive the dictators as slightly more ideologically motivated than the Western obituaries.

I have coded the entire dataset myself to ensure consistency and internal validity, but there may still be a risk of bias (Skaaning, 2018). An intercoder reliability test on a random sample of 50 dictators (see Table IV.5 in Appendix IV) showed significant overlap in the coding. I reassessed the cases with divergence and recoded a couple of them.

To supplement the qualitative motivation measures, I included measures of a somewhat more observational character, capturing the extent to which the dictators appear to have been involved in embezzlement, had an extravagant lifestyle, and whether they stepped down voluntarily. However, these variables only capture specific dimensions of motivation and only provide a crude indication of the dictators’ degree of self-interest.

Core Variables

In this section, I present the four groups of core variables in the dataset and conduct descriptive analyses. First, I present two groups of measures of dictators’ motivation: judgement-based measures and measures of more observational character, respectively. Next, I present the measures of the ideological content, and finally a group of important background variables that are missing in existing leader-specific datasets.

Judgement-Based Motivation Measures

Two of the core variables in the dataset are judgement-based evaluated along a self-interest/other-regarding scale (Andreoni & Miller, 2002; Baumard et al., 2013). The first measure consists of direct statements in the obituaries about motivation. The first category captures direct statements of ideological motivation (in a broad sense). A statement of ideological motivation is coded as present if at least one of the following items is directly stated in the obit(s):

a. the dictator was ideologically motivated, visionary, or idealistic;

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36 My coding assistant is a trained graduate student who had recently completed an extensive seminar on dictatorships and coded the 50 cases on all variables based on the same obituaries as in the original dataset.

37 On the overall judgment variable, my assistant tended to score some dictators as slightly more self-interested than in the original coding. Most of these cases can be explained by ruthlessness being coded as self-interest per se. However, this need not be the case since a strong and exclusionary ideology (like in the case of Pol Pot in Cambodia) may also explain ruthless behavior.
b. the dictator cared about the people (or a significant subset of the people);  
c. the dictator had ideological or visionary aims/goals;  
d. the dictator was a Marxist, communist, liberal, etc.;

e. the dictator was trying to implement specific ideology.

In 43% of the cases, there is at least one direct statement of the dictator’s ideological motivation. One of the simplest examples is the following “Bordaberry [Uruguay] was an ultra rightwing Catholic”. A similar but slightly more expansive example is: “He [Gomulka, Poland] was, of course, a Communist, but in the public’s view – and the public was largely Roman Catholic and conservative – he was also a nationalist and a patriot.” One of the most elaborate examples is this: “Marshall Tito [Yugoslavia] appears to have developed a vision [...] It was a vision of a socialist Yugoslavia, and in the next five decades he never lost sight of it.”

Another category of the measure captures direct statements of self-interest, i.e., about the dictator being driven by power or wealth concerns, or opportunism. This was the case in 16% of the cases. A few statements directly note that the dictators were not self-interested. Hence, this measure is not a binary measure (0-1), but “negative” statements are coded -1. An example of a statement about self-interest is the following: “Siad Barre’s [Somalia] overwhelming desire was to have, and to hold on to, power at all costs.”

The high presence of ideological statements (43% of the cases) and relatively low presence of self-interest statements (16% of the cases) indicate that dictators are much more ideologically motivated and less concerned with power and wealth than is normally assumed. A caveat to this interpretation may be that these dictators seemed ideologically motivated because they were highly constrained. As I will discuss below, there are good reasons not to believe this; but in any case, this dataset allows us to test whether seemingly ideologically motivated dictators are the most constrained.

In addition to direct statements of motivation is a variable that contains an overall judgement of a dictator’s motives based on the obituaries; thus, the direct statements are also a part of the overall judgement. In cases where the dictator’s motives seemed to change over time, the coding of this measure is based on the predominant motivation during the incumbency. The degree of

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38 Option (d) is far from the dominant category, and even when statements in this category occur, it is often emphasized that the dictator really believed in his ideology; e.g., [Hoxha, Albania] “was a dedicated Marxist-Leninist”, Spyros Kyprianou was a “true conservative”, or “His [Keita, Mali] basic socialist sympathies hardened in his last years in power.”

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ideological motivation from clearly very self-interested to clearly very ideologically motivated is coded on a four-point scale. The two polar categories are cases where the dictator is clearly driven by either self-interest or ideology (and other sociotropic concerns). The two categories in the middle contain cases with some indications of both, or there is uncertainty in the assessment typically caused by a large overlap between ideologically motivated behavior and self-interested behavior. Thus, their behavior is often highly consistent with both types of motives, e.g., when the dictator is highly constrained (see more information about the coding in Appendix V).

Generally, the coding is restrictive regarding ideological motivation, which implies that very good evidence of ideological motivation is needed for a dictator to be put in the highest category. Frequently, dictators only achieve the second-highest score, meaning that they are assessed as relatively ideologically motivated despite the presence of direct statements about ideological motivation. Isa Ibn Al-Khalifah (Bahrain) is an example of a dictator assigned the second-highest score despite the statement that “Sheikh Isa was liked by the majority of Bahrainis, a man genuinely eager to preserve social stability and the welfare of his citizens.” The reason for assigning only the second-highest score to him is (partly) that Bahrain is a very rich country, which makes it almost impossible to find instances where behavior motivated by other-regarding beliefs and by self-interest diverges. Thus, his degree of ideological motivation is not clear (except for the direct statement).

Dictators about whom the information is sparse (short obituaries) are rarely put in the category of the most ideologically motivated dictators. An example of an uncertain case is the military dictator Manuel Odria (Peru), who is described as “concerned with augmenting economic development”. This could, but does not necessarily, indicate sociotropic motivation as the prioritization of economic development could also be a way to enhance performance legitimacy, although the framing of the sentence does not indicate this. Odria stepped down somewhat voluntarily in the sense that he introduced elections and did not run. Apparently, he did not try to rig the elections or to stay by force, but the step-down is not coded as completely voluntary as the military regime was highly unpopular and subject to public pressure. These are (weak) indications of ideological motivation, but due to the sparse information, Odria is only coded as relatively ideologically motivated.

Leonid Brezhnev (The Soviet Union) is another difficult case (although not due to short obituaries). The following quote indicates ideological motivation: “Brezhnev was a cautious gradualist whose success in establishing the Soviet Union as a superpower based on nuclear equality with the United States was obtained at the expense of a more rapid improvement in living standards, another of his principal goals.” Moreover, he cultivated a relatively modest
lifestyle (especially compared to some other communist leaders), and he tried to avoid the creation of a cult of personality (in contrast to Stalin and Khrushchev). However, there are (weak) indications that he liked power in the way his power centralization is described, but it may be that he just centralized power for ideological purposes. Due to this uncertainty and the possibility of mixed motives with an overweight of ideological motivation, Brezhnev only receives the second-highest score (relatively ideologically motivated).

Sometimes direct statements attest to both ideological motivation and self-interest. An example is the following statement about Norodom Sihanouk (Cambodia): “It is beyond question that Sihanouk deeply loved the Cambodian people,’ wrote Bruce Sharp, a longtime Cambodia observer and founder of a website about Indochina, in a review of Sihanouk’s memoirs. ‘But Sihanouk had one critical flaw: as much as he loved the Cambodian people, he loved himself just slightly more.’” Because the statement indicates that he was more self-interested than ideologically motivated, he is assigned the second-lowest score, i.e., relatively selfish. Table 7.1 shows examples of some well-known dictators in each category.

**Table 7.1. Examples of Dictators on the Motivation Spectrum**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very self-interested</th>
<th>Relatively self-interested</th>
<th>Relatively ideologically motivated</th>
<th>Very ideologically motivated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marcos (Philippines)</td>
<td>Suharto (Indonesia)</td>
<td>Pinochet (Chile)</td>
<td>Pol Pot (Cambodia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobutu (DR Congo)</td>
<td>Kim Il-Sung (North Korea)</td>
<td>Brezhnev (Soviet Union)</td>
<td>Nasser (Egypt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duvalier (Haiti)</td>
<td>Ceausescu (Romania)</td>
<td>Franco (Spain)</td>
<td>Lee (Singapore)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim Jong-Il (North Korea)</td>
<td>Amin (Uganda)</td>
<td>Tito (Yugoslavia)</td>
<td>Nyerere (Tanzania)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some dictators do not fit into any of the four categories. Two residual categories – apathetic and largely other-regarding/apathetic and largely selfish – capture the few dictators who do not seem to want to stay in power. Dictators in the first category do not seem to want political power in the first place but seem to care about their country rather than themselves. Examples are some of the (military) dictators who were only installed to end a military dictatorship and hand over power to civil democratic rule. The sample does not contain any dictators in the second category. Finally, a third residual category contains dictators who appear to have been suffering from paranoia or mental illness during most of their incumbency.
The left panel in Figure 7.1 shows the distribution of the dictators’ motivation. Most dictators score as relatively ideologically motivated (44%), and the second-most frequently used category is very ideologically motivated dictators (25%). This indicates that more than two thirds of the dictators seem to be substantially motivated by ideology or broader beliefs than their own (and their family’s) power and wealth. According to the coding rules, the two middle categories on the ideological-self-interested scale are somewhat uncertain and difficult to distinguish, but even a very conservative assessment regarding ideological motivation implies that 25% of the dictators in the sample are highly ideologically motivated and not predominantly motivated by self-interest.

Figure 7.1. Dictators’ Motivation. Judgement-Based Motivation (Left Panel) and Quote-Based Measure (Right Panel)

Note: n = 297 for the judgement-based measure; n = 297 for the quote-based measure.

These results are also consistent with the distribution of direct statements of self-interest and ideological motivation. The right panel in Figure 7.1 combines the two types of direct statements. Dictators score -1 if there are only direct statements in favor of the dictator being self-interested, 0 if there are
no direct statements of self-interest nor ideological motivation or if there are statements in both categories, and 1 if there are only statements of ideological motivation. This measure also indicates that dictators tend to be more ideologically motivated than self-interested, or the conservative interpretation that many dictators are definitely motivated by other-regarding or ideological concerns. Hence, even with a conservative interpretation, these measures indicate that dictators have very diverse motives, and many dictators are motivated by ideological concerns and care about their country.

Many datasets on political regimes and leaders span many decades, and analyses often assume homogenous relationships over long periods. Nevertheless, some may argue that the apparently high prevalence of ideology is hardly surprising since ideology was widespread during the Cold War, which is 70% of the period covered by this dataset. However, while ideology was more often used as legitimizer and as a means to maintaining power in the context of the bipolar world order (e.g., anti-Communism used by Duvalier in Haiti and Mobutu in DR Congo), it is not given that ideological motivation (other-regarding motivation), which is what this dataset attempts to capture, was more prevalent. When we look at the temporal development in the motivation measures, ideological motivation seems to be somewhat more widespread during the Cold War than before and after. However, this result seems to be driven by the decolonization period, as ideological motivation appears to be most widespread from the 1950s to the mid-1970s (see Figures VI.1 and VI.2 in the Appendix VI). Thus, ideological motivation seems not to be a general Cold War phenomenon, but dictators who fought for independence were probably some of the most ideologically motivated dictators.

A Note on Motivational Change over Time
Since dictators are only given one score on the motivation scale no matter how long they have been in power, some may inquire whether some of the ideologically motivated dictators are coded based on their starting point, despite perhaps becoming more self-interested during their incumbency. To accommodate inquiries like this, I have coded whether the obituary indicates a substantial change in motivation over time. It turns out that this is rarely the case. 89% of the dictators do not seem to substantially change motivation over time. 5% become substantially more self-interested, less than 1% become more ideologically motivated, 4% change ideology, e.g., extreme communists becoming more moderate; and a little more than 1% develop mental illness during their incumbency. Of course, this is a tentative conclusion since the change in motivation may be under-reported, especially in the shorter obituaries. Thus, these scores may be higher.
Other Motivation-Related Traits

A second group of variables in the dataset contains other motivation-related traits of dictators. One variable indicates the extent to which a dictator is personally corrupt, that is, has engaged in self-enrichment such as embezzlement. This is different from political corruption (Weyland, 1998), which is often related to the system rather than the dictator. Personal corruption occurs when a dictator makes a deliberate choice to misuse public funds to enrich himself, whereas, in some countries, engaging in political corruption may be the only way to implement policies in the short and medium term. This distinction is unique to this measure. Another characteristic of the measure is that, unlike other measures (Coppedge et al., 2020), it only concerns the dictator and not the entire government.39

The personal corruption measure is coded on a four-point scale from the dictator clearly being engaged in personal corruption (directly stated or clear indications of embezzlement or personal corruption) to clearly not being personally corrupt (directly stated or clear indications of the dictator being clean). The lower middle score indicates that the dictator is likely to have been personally corrupt, but that this is only weakly indicated. Indications could be broader accusations about corruption (i.e., not embezzlement/personal corruption) or withdrawn charges of embezzlement. The upper middle score indicates that the dictator is unlikely to have been corrupt, but it is coded as a residual category, meaning that nothing about corruption is stated in the obituary. Thus, this score may be controversial, but it relies on the assumption that excessiveness is reported. Especially if the dictator has been very corrupt, I assume it would be indicated in the obituary. A fifth category exists for cases where it is impossible to assess the degree of personal corruption because legitimate income and inappropriate self-enrichment are entangled. Examples are rich monarchs who inherited palaces and were born to an expensive lifestyle, but where there is no evidence of the dictator stealing public funds.

Unsurprisingly, the most frequent score assigned is “unlikely to be personally corrupt”, that is, the residual category (see the left panel Figure 7.2). In Figure 7.2, the cases with short obituaries or otherwise high uncertainty are excluded. Hence, this category indicates that there is no mention of the dictator being corrupt in one or more relatively long obituaries (nor do the obituaries explicitly state that he was clean). The variation on the measure is generally large. 7% of the dictators were clearly not corrupt at all. This includes

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39 Whereas the measure of executive embezzlement and theft (v2exembez) seems to capture personal rather than political corruption, it concerns the executive, i.e., head of state, head of government, and the cabinet ministers, and therefore does not only capture the dictator’s personal corruption.
several unconstrained dictators, e.g., Ahidjo (Cameroon), Lee (Singapore), and Chiang Kai-shek (Taiwan).

One caveat regarding the measure is that it may tend to underreport personal corruption, as hidden wealth stemming from corruption and embezzlement may not be revealed until after a dictator leaves power. As some dictators die in power, potential hidden wealth may not yet have been discovered when the obituaries are written. However, underreporting is likely to be rather small since less than a third of the dictators in the sample died in power. This group also includes people who left power due to poor health. Their potential hidden wealth may have been revealed before they died and the obituaries were published. Moreover, some of the personally corrupt dictators who died in power may not have succeeded in hiding or even tried to hide their embezzlement during their incumbency. Good examples are Papa Doc (Haiti), Anastacio Somoza Garcia (Nicaragua), and Saparmurat Niyazov (Turkmenistan).

A related measure is the dictator’s lifestyle, which is more difficult for the dictator to hide (had he wished to do that) and therefore not subject to the caveat discussed above. Lifestyle is scored on a three-point scale from extravagant to modest (see right panel in Figure 7.2). A dictator only scores on this measure if the obituary includes a statement about his lifestyle in office and/or during retirement, and only 119 cases are coded on this measure. This measure suggests a large variation in lifestyle. Slightly more dictators have an extravagant lifestyle than a modest lifestyle. Yet, it is surprising that more than 29% of the dictators have a modest lifestyle (based on common assumptions about dictators). An example: “As chief of state he [Abboud, Sudan] lived in a modest one-story brick house in Khartoum with his wife and five children.” An example of an extravagant lifestyle is Francois Duvalier (Haiti): “When he fled Haiti, American officials said he held $200 million to $500 million in foreign bank accounts and had a reputation for giving family members million-dollar vacations at luxury resorts, as millions of Haitians lived in squalor and scrounged for food.”

The temporal developments in the embezzlement and lifestyle measures show that personal corruption and an extravagant lifestyle have become somewhat more prevalent among dictators since the 1960s and 1970s (see Figures VI.3 and VI.4 in Appendix VI).

One may ask whether absence of personal corruption and cultivating a modest lifestyle are really symptoms of not being self-interested. An alternative explanation is that it is a proxy for constraints. However, a quick look at some of dictators who are coded as clearly not corrupt and with a modest lifestyle supports rejecting this hypothesis. Dictators such as Julius Nyerere (Tan-
zania), Park Chung-Hee (South Korea), and António de Oliveira Salazar (Portugal) fit in this category, and they were all highly unconstrained during most of their incumbencies.\footnote{Both Park and Salazar are above the upper quartile (only autocratic regimes are in the sample) on Geddes et al.’s (2017) personalism measure, and Nyerere is on the boundary to the upper quartile during the last seven years of his rule.}

Figure 7.2. Dictators’ Self-Enrichment (Left Panel) and Lifestyle (Right Panel)

Note: In the left panel, the cases with high uncertainty are excluded. $n = 209$ for the corruption measure; $n = 119$ for the lifestyle measure.

Another motivation-related trait is voluntary step-down, which is not expected among self-interested dictators, especially those who are motivated by power maximization. The same applies to ideologically motivated dictators, though it would be more likely to if they believed it to be best for the country. The measure of voluntary step-down evaluates the degree to which a dictator left power voluntarily and is coded on a three-point scale from completely forced to completely voluntarily. Most dictators do not step down voluntarily. However, 22\% step down somewhat voluntarily (e.g. after accepting a lost election where they might have been able to stay by force). The 7\% who step
down voluntarily are mainly strongly ideologically motivated dictators, such as Nyerere (Tanzania) and Lee (Singapore), but also former military dictators who deliberately chose to install elections and not run, for instance, Aramburu (Argentina) and Gizikis (Greece).

Summarizing the exploration of the motivation-related traits, there are many surprises in relation to the existing theory about highly power- and wealth-seeking dictators. Surprisingly, many did not engage in embezzlement and misuse of public funds for personal benefit, many cultivated a modest lifestyle, and some even stepped down voluntarily.

Table 7.2 below shows pairwise correlations between the five core motivation variables in the dataset. As expected, the motivation-related traits, except voluntary step-down (perhaps due to the limited variation on this measure), are highly correlated with the two judgement-based measures. On the other hand, it is evident that the motivation-related traits only capture specific dimensions of motivation and, thus, only provide a crude indication of degree of self-interest. However, the high correlations give some face validity to the judgement-based measures, as the most sociotropic dictators can be expected to be the least likely to engage in personal corruption and the most likely to have a modest lifestyle and, perhaps, step down voluntarily.

Table 7.2. Pairwise correlations between core variables (p-values in parenthesis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Judgement-based motivation</th>
<th>Quote-based motivation</th>
<th>Absence of personal corruption</th>
<th>Modest lifestyle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quote-based motivation</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of personal corruption</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modest lifestyle</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: n ≥ 250 in all pairwise correlations except for the ones involving “modest lifestyle” where n ≥ 101.

41 In addition to these five motivation-related measures, the ORDD contains measures that capture whether a dictator created a personality cult, and whether a dictator chose to stay in power despite a high risk rather than fleeing into exile. See codebook in Appendix V.
Contents of Ideology

After concluding that ideology is an important motive for many dictators, it becomes highly relevant to look at the content of the ideologies. The ORDD contains a set of variables related to this. Two string variables indicate the dictator’s primary and secondary proclaimed ideology. The reason for measuring *proclaimed* ideology and not ideology based on behavior is to enable the study of potential consequences of the (proclaimed) ideology, which requires that these are not included in the measure.

In addition to coding specific ideologies, proclaimed ideologies are scored on an economic dimension and on an exclusion dimension. The economic content of an ideology is coded on a five-point scale from 0 to 4 from extreme right to extreme left. The measure regards the dictator’s proclaimed view on redistribution.42

Examples of the score 0 are right-wing military dictators, e.g., in Argentina and Brazil, Chile’s Augusto Pinochet, or other right-wing aristocratic dictators like Marcello Caetano and António de Oliveira Salazar from Portugal. Examples of the score 4 are communist dictators like the well-known Mao Zedong, Kim Il-Sung, Ho Chi Minh, and Joseph Stalin, and the less well-known Mohammad Najibullah (Afghanistan), Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal (Mongolia), and Gustáv Husák (Czechoslovakia). The score 2 is given to dictators who are in the center, for instance, liberals with some redistributional priorities like some of the Asian developmentalists, e.g., Park Chung-Hee and Lee Kuan Yew. The scores 1 and 3 indicate moderate economic right and left. The moderate right includes many of the most liberal (in contrast to conservative) Latin American military dictators and some developmentalists in Asia, whereas the moderate left includes modern socialists or moderate former communists, e.g., some of the moderate socialists appearing at the end of the Cold War (in Eastern Europe and elsewhere).

A residual category is available for dictators who do not seem to have emphasized one economic goal or strategy over others. This is often the case for dictators with highly exclusionary proclaimed ideologies. The panel to the left in Figure 7.3 reveals huge variation in proclaimed economic ideology, and the distribution resembles the normal. Most dictators have a moderate rather than an extreme proclaimed economic ideology. The temporal development in this variable shows that dictators claimed to be more right wing during the Cold War than before and after (see Figure VI.5 in Appendix VI). This may seem surprising, since many communist regimes broke down by the end of the Cold War.

42 Redistribution refers to reallocation of resources to the poor (and the middle class). Reallocation of resources to the dictator and his co-rulers, friends and family is not perceived as redistribution in the present context.
war. However, this was also the case for many right-wing military dictatorships in Latin America. Many of them democratized and, thus, disappeared from the sample, whereas some of the post-communist countries from the Soviet Bloc remained autocracies and leftist, though more moderate. This may explain the temporal tendency.

The other dimension of proclaimed ideology is the exclusion dimension. It describes to what extent specific groups are excluded from the “good world” prescribed by the ideology. The measure is coded from 0 to 3, where 3 is the most exclusionary. 0 is given to dictators who clearly emphasize unity without implying exclusion of groups (unlike exclusionary nationalism), e.g., Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt. The score 1 is given when neither exclusion nor inclusion are proclaimed. This is based on the assumption that proclaimed exclusion is more likely to be reported than inclusion, since the former is more dramatic. A dictator receives the score 2 if he has a weakly exclusionary proclaimed ideology, and 3 indicates a strongly exclusionary proclaimed ideology. Ideologically motivated dictators like Ayatollah Khomeini and Pol Pot are in this category along with rather self-interested dictators like Slobodan Milošević and Kim Jong-II, as it measures proclaimed ideology. I have coded a string variable indicating which groups are excluded if the dictator scores 2 or 3 on the previously mentioned measure. The most typically excluded group in the sample is communists. Surprisingly, we do not find many ethnic or religious groups among the excluded. A reason may be that the measure captures proclaimed ideological content, and exclusion of certain ethnic and religious groups is viewed as more illegitimate than exclusion of groups like communists. Anti-communism was more legitimate, especially during the Cold War. Consequently, ethnic exclusion may be underreported, which implies that these cases are probably not coded as exclusionary, since it is only based on proclaimed ideology and not action such as policies or repression. In this case, coding the proclaimed ideology may be a drawback, but it is traded off against the important advantage that it allows us to test the consequences of proclaimed ideology (since the measure is not coded to capture behavior).

Since the score 1 is a somewhat residual category, it is no surprise that it encompasses most dictators (see the right panel in Figure 7.3). However, the cases with short obituaries or otherwise high uncertainty are excluded. Hence, the score 1 indicates that the dictator’s proclaimed ideology is coded based on sufficient information, and no exclusionary or highly inclusionary claims are mentioned. This may be a source of bias as the obituary writer may not have mentioned this dimension at all, but it is likely that a majority of dictators actually belong to this category because they prescribed neither exclusion nor inclusion but focused on, for instance, economic goals. These arguments justify the coding.
It is clear that there is a lot of variation across the exclusionary measure. The temporal development in this variable indicates that the dictators have become slightly more exclusionary since the end of the Cold War (see Figure VI.6 in Appendix VI).

**Figure 7.3. Proclaimed Ideology: Economic and Exclusion Dimensions**

![Graph showing economic and exclusion dimensions](image)

Note: In the right panel, the cases with high uncertainty are excluded. \( n = 239 \) for the economic dimension; \( n = 209 \) for the exclusion dimension.

Since a large number of dictators in the world seem to have been substantially ideologically motivated, the content of their ideology has become highly relevant. I find variation on both the economic and the exclusion dimension. This variation is likely to be able to explain policies and outcomes for substantially ideologically motivated dictators.

**Background Characteristics**

In this section, I present a couple of variables measuring aspects of the dictators’ background not previously coded. The ORDD contains information about the dictators’ legacies; specifically whether they are remembered as despised leaders (0), popular leaders (2), or the population in the specific country has diverse perceptions of the deceased leader (1). As it appears in the left panel...
in Figure 7.4, there is considerable variation. Surprisingly perhaps, more than one third of the dictators (35%) were generally popular upon their death.

The ORDD also contains a variable that covers costly rebel activity prior to coming power. The LEAD dataset (Ellis et al., 2015) already contains data on rebel activity, but the requirements for what qualifies as rebel activity are very minimalist, which implies that most dictators have been involved in rebel activity. Cursus Honorum (Batro, 2016) contains a similar variable that measures whether a leader has been revolutionary or involved in independence struggle. However, these two measures do not distinguish costly rebel activity from go-with-the-flow rebel activity, which is an important qualitative difference. For example, Mobutu is coded as independence fighter, although he did not really fight for long but simply exploited a power vacuum to gain power. The measure I include here attempts to mend these shortcomings. While the measure has merit in itself, it is particularly important for one of the purposes of this book, i.e., investigating patterns in motivation, as it can be used as an indicator of a tough road to power. Scoring 2 on the measure indicates costly rebel activity prior to entering power. The score 1 indicates that the dictator has been involved in a successful coup without installing himself prior to entering power. 0 indicates that neither 1 or 2 applies to the specific dictator. If both 1 and 2 apply, the dictator is given the score 2. According to the center panel in Figure 7.4, most dictators are not involved in costly political activity prior to entering power. However, 8% of the dictators in the sample have been involved in coups without installing themselves in power, and 28% have been involved in costly rebel activity.

Both the LEAD dataset (Ellis et al., 2015) and Cursus Honorum (Batro, 2016) contain data on educational and socioeconomic background. However, neither contains measures of rural or urban background. The ORDD contains such a measure, and I have added royal background as a third category. It is unlikely to matter, theoretically and empirically, whether an upbringing was rural or urban if it was also royal, so royal trumps the two other categories. According to the right panel in Figure 7.4, most dictators had a rural upbringing. This is no surprise, since the data contains dictators who have been in power as early as 1945 when most people lived in rural areas. In addition, autocracies tend to be developing or middle-income countries, and for most of the twentieth century, most countries in the sample had huge rural populations.
A Reflection on Potential Issues Regarding the Coding Process

All coding of motivation has aimed to avoid directly evaluating specific outcomes, and in particular the coding is unrelated to whether the specific dictator was successful in his attempts, and whether he did well for the people or not. Also for this reason, the content of the ideology is coded regarding proclaimed ideology. Obviously, the obituary writers may have been affected by the societal outcomes when they evaluated the dictators. Therefore, we may suspect the quote-based measure of motivation to be affected by outcomes. However, as most obituary writers can be viewed as experts of the region, they have better sources than just outcome to evaluate the dictators. Consequently, this reduces the potential bias.

How the people perceive a dictator upon his death, which is what the legacy variable captures, may also affect the assessment of his motives. This variable correlates at 0.63 and 0.44 with the judgement-based and quote-based motivation measures, respectively. Although these are fairly strong correlations, they do not necessarily imply that the motivation measures are biased.
by outcomes, as people may not evaluate their leaders solely based on the outcomes they produce, but also on perceived motives. As we saw in Chapter 5, Nyerere was extremely popular among all Tanzanians until his death (and after), although he devastated the economy. Moreover, the people generally perceive military dictators badly (implied by moderate negative correlations between legacy and different measures of military dictatorship and military background of the dictator); although some of them are found to be substantially ideologically motivated. I will return to this discussion in Chapter 8 when I investigate systematic patterns in motivation.

Conclusion: The Myth of the Self-Interested Dictator

This chapter has presented the ORRD, a dataset of 297 deceased dictators who ruled part of the period spanning 1945-2008, and is an attempt to measure dictators’ motivation. The dataset is based on obituaries, a source that is relatively brief and still contains in-depth information needed to assess a dictator’s motivation reasonably. The descriptive statistics reveal that dictators have very diverse motivations, both in terms of motivation more broadly and ideological content. Evidently, far from all dictators are narrowly self-interested. Even when motivation is evaluated restrictively with respect to other-regarding motivation, 25% of the dictators were strongly driven by ideological concerns. Moreover, direct statements in the obituaries suggest that 43% of the dictators were motivated substantially by other-regarding concerns. In addition to the judgement-based measures of motivation, the ORDD includes measures of more observational character. I have coded the extent to which each dictator has been involved in self-enrichment, i.e., through embezzlement, which I view as an indicator of self-interest. Relatedly, the dataset contains information about moderate or extravagant lifestyle. The dataset also contains data on voluntary step-down. Regarding all three issues, I find enormous variation across dictators; several dictators lived ascetic lives and did not embezzle the state coffers, and quite a few dictators stepped down voluntarily. These results are very surprising in light of the selfish motives we usually attribute to dictators. That all dictators are self-interested is indeed a myth.

Many autocracy scholars may be surprised by the results. Despite the potential problems and difficulties in studying motivation (through obituaries), there are strong reasons to believe that the findings in this chapter are solid. First, the findings are robust across all five measures of motivation, which include variables of judgement-based and observational character. Second, the
conclusions are drawn conservatively, implying that the evidence of the prevalence of ideological motivation is even stronger than the conclusions indicate. Finally, I have conducted several validity and reliability tests to ensure the quality of the data.

Whereas the prevalence of ideological motivation is surprising in light of existing research on autocracies, these results are extremely consistent with the findings in Chapter 5 and in Chapter 6, in particular. The results are taken to a new level. The study in this chapter, based on a new and original dataset, is the first global study to investigate dictators’ motivation seriously. Also in this setting, there is strong evidence that dictators have varying motivations, and surprisingly many dictators, the majority, is substantially motivated by ideological beliefs rather than pure power and wealth maximization.

Using the ORDD, I will now investigate systematic patterns in dictators’ motivation.
Chapter 8: Correlates of Motivation on a Large Scale

Ideological motivation among dictators is widespread. This is the main conclusion drawn from the previous chapters. This makes it increasingly interesting to know when we can expect to see dictators with a particular motivation. When will we see predatory dictators, like Mobutu, Marcos, and Papa Doc, whose behavior may be well explained by existing models, and when are we more likely to see dictators strongly motivated by ideology, like Nyerere, Caetano, and Pol Pot, whom we may need to analyze from a different perspective? Chapter 6 provided evidence from a medium-N setting, and Chapter 7 presented the ORDD, which enabled investigation on a large scale. This chapter explores the correlates of motivation on a large scale.

Chapter 3 presented expectations regarding patterns in motivation across dictators’ background and road to power. More specifically, I argued that a socialization effect and a selection effect (grounded in a rational cost-benefit calculation based on preexisting motivation) lead to the expectation that dictators with a challenging road to power, educated and older dictators, as well as dictators with a strong socioeconomic background are likely to be the most ideologically motivated. The evidence presented in Chapter 6 supports three of the four expectations. A dictator’s age upon entry and his motivation do not appear to be correlated.

The empirical studies in Chapters 6 and 7 indicate that a subgroup of dictators with a military background seem to fall in a particular motivational category. They take power with the sincerely held motive to stabilize the country and voluntarily return it to democratic, or at least civilian, rule. This is in stark contrast to the military strongmen who centralize power in their own hands and often appear to be driven by strongly selfish motives. Finally, Chapter 6 indicated that personalist dictators tend to be relatively more self-interested than other dictators.

In this chapter, I reinvestigate these relationships in a large-scale setting in a global sample using data from the ORDD as well as the measures of correlates presented in Chapter 6. In the last part of the chapter, I study the connection between motives and institutional settings and constraints on the autocrat.
Estimation Technique and Model Specification

One way to investigate the correlates of motivation is to run pairwise correlations as in Chapter 6. However, with a large sample, other techniques are more suitable. Using regression models allows inclusion of other variables and a further investigation of the nature of the relationships. As motivation and correlates comprise only one observation per dictator, dictator is the unit of analysis in the models. Most theoretical mechanisms behind the expectations about patterns in motivation are not only causal and in some instances entail reverse causal mechanisms (the socialization mechanisms run from the correlates to motivation, whereas the mechanisms derived from cost-benefit analyses regard the likelihood that dictators with a certain motivation pursue the top political post given the specific correlate). Despite this, regression analysis where I treat motivation as the dependent variable is a superior way of investigating the patterns in motivation in a large-N setting.

I run regressions with the judgement-based measure of motivation as the main measure of motivation. I use the quote-based measure for robustness checks. I also study the relationship between the potential correlates and the motivation-related traits of corruption, lifestyle, and voluntary step-down. All five motivational measures are discrete variables, but all measures are created to capture the degree of other-regarding motivation, and there are (approximately) equal theoretical distances between the categories. I expect a linear relationship, and in turn, I use OLS regression (Angrist & Pischke, 2009, pp. 94–99) with country-clustered standard errors as the estimation technique (Angrist & Pischke, 2009, pp. 308–315). I use the same measures of the correlates as in Chapter 6. Therefore, they will not be discussed in detail here.

Regressing dictators’ motivation on potential correlates like traits of the dictators’ background may not exactly capture the relationship between these phenomena but rather between the dictators’ motivation and characteristics of the prior regime or societal characteristics affecting the dictators’ background. For instance, finding a relationship between a dictator’s motivation and education may rather capture a potential relationship between the dictators’ motivation and societal development (that also affects the dictator’s education). Another example is that a military background may be more likely if the prior dictator had a military background, and that the history of military rule affects motivation, but not through the personal background of the specific dictator. A way to control for this is to include the dependent variable (motivation measure) for the previous dictator in some of the models, which resembles the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable (Keele & Kelly, 2006). It captures the effects of potential confounders that affect motivation through
the motivation of the previous dictator. However, some effects may not be captured by the previous dictators’ motivation but by the previous dictators’ background, i.e., education in the example. For this reason, I also include the independent variable (the specific correlate) for the previous dictator in some of the models.

A drawback is that dictators can only be included if there is data for the previous dictator, which implies that dictators whose predecessor was a democratic leader or just outside the sample will be excluded in these specifications. The “naked” models are important complements, as many observations are lost when “lagged” dependent and independent variables are included. It may induce bias as many countries will be excluded from the sample, namely, all the countries with only one dictator in the sample. These may happen to be dictators with a long tenure. Moreover, all first dictators in the sample will be excluded, which potentially creates a temporal bias.

As most potential confounding societal factors are likely to be captured by including the lagged variables, I will not include others in the models. However, other background characteristics of a specific dictator may confound the relationship. When investigating the relationship between a dictator’s motivation and educational background, I control for his socioeconomic background as this could potentially drive the relationship.

As the primary purpose of this study is not causality but correlational patterns (see discussion about the nature of the theoretical mechanisms), and part of the purpose is to find strong predictors (indicators) of motivation, the naked models are interesting in themselves. However, part of the theoretical mechanisms about the expected relationships are causal, and controlling for potential confounders further adds to our knowledge about the nature of the relationships under investigation.

First, I investigate the relationship between motivation and road to power as well as different background characteristics of the dictators. Afterwards, I study the relationship between motivation and institutional settings.
Correlates of Motivation: Road to Power and Background Characteristics

Road to Power

The first correlate under investigation is the dictators’ road to power.\textsuperscript{43} Table 8.1 indicates a relationship between road to power and motivation in the naked model (Model 1) and in the most restrictive model (Model 4). More specifically, the tougher the road to power, the more ideologically motivated the dictators tend to be. However, the models including only the lagged dependent (Model 2) or the lagged independent (Model 3) variables indicate no relationship. Notice that the number of observations is almost halved when the lagged variables are introduced. The relationship is not robust to using the cruder quote-based measure of motivation (see Table VII.1 in Appendix VII).

Table 8.1. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Road to Power. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road to power (five-point scale)</td>
<td>0.106* (0.0415)</td>
<td>0.102 (0.0691)</td>
<td>0.092 (0.0645)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.207* (0.0990)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.243* (0.0989)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road to power of the previous dictator (LIV)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.041 (0.0644)</td>
<td>-0.139* (0.0687)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.590*** (0.142)</td>
<td>1.196*** (0.255)</td>
<td>1.710*** (0.252)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * \( p < 0.1 \), * \( p < 0.05 \), ** \( p < 0.01 \), *** \( p < 0.001 \). Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

As the measure includes five different theoretically ordered roads to power, it may be worth it to look at the comparison of the different categories. Figure 8.1 shows this based on similar regressions to the ones in Models 1 and 4 in \textsuperscript{43} Recall that the road to power is coded as follows: 1 = royal, inherited power; 2 = incumbent regime, government, or party; 3 = military affiliation; 4 = opposition; 5 = guerilla.
Table 8.1, except the road-to-power measure is treated as a categorical variable (see Table VII.2 in Appendix VII). Four of the five categories lie as expected. Dictators coming to power from within the prior government tend to be more ideologically motivated than expected. This indicates that they are not encapsulated in the political game as quickly or easily as expected. Moreover, they do not seem to be in politics just for the money (and power). This is somewhat surprising. However, it may be that the people who become politicians for a living (to earn money) do not want to become the top ruler of the country. Only the very power-greedy and even more strongly ideologically motivated people attempt to take the final steps towards the top political post.

Although there is no overall correlation with the quote-based measure of motivation, the same tendencies between the categories appear, namely, that guerrilla fighters are the most ideologically motivated together with dictators coming from the opposition or the former regime (see Figure VII.1 in Appendix VII). Military leaders appear to be relatively less ideologically motivated when the quote-based measure is used.

**Figure 8.1. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Road to Power. Based on Naked (Left Panel) and Restrictive (Right Panel) Models**

Note: The left and right panels are based on Models 1 and 4 in Table VII.2 in Appendix VII, respectively.
To investigate the relationship between dictator motivation and a tough road to power further, I include a measure of whether a dictator has been imprisoned (not including imprisonment for misdemeanors) prior to entering power to approximate involvement in risky political activity, and thus, a tough road to power. Table 8.2 shows that dictators who have been imprisoned prior to gaining power are significantly more ideologically motivated than dictators who have not. The size of the relationship is substantial as previously imprisoned dictators tend to be 0.54 (see Model 1) more ideologically motivated on a scale from 0 to 3 compared to dictators who have not previously been imprisoned. Thus, this simple characteristic “predicts” a lot.

Table 8.2. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Imprisonment Prior to Gaining Power. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</td>
<td>0.544***</td>
<td>0.508***</td>
<td>0.410**</td>
<td>0.372*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
<td>(0.141)</td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
<td>(0.157)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previously jailed (CH) (dummy)</td>
<td>0.171*</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.197)</td>
<td>(0.216)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.197)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous dictator previously jailed (CH) (LIV)</td>
<td>1.744***</td>
<td>1.390***</td>
<td>1.650***</td>
<td>1.391***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0748)</td>
<td>(0.216)</td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
<td>(0.242)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

I have conducted robustness checks with my own measure (from the ORDD) of costly rebel activity prior to entering power as well as with Cursus Honorum’s measure of involvement in a revolutionary movement or opposition in a prior non-democratic regime or in an anti-colonial struggle (Baturo, 2016). The results are robust to these alternative measures and somewhat robust to

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44 Recall that the theoretical mechanisms, i.e., the selection and socialization effects behind the relationship suggest two-way causality.
45 I discarded the measure for the medium-N study in Chapter 6, because a couple of the cases in the sample were coded wrongly, which would affect the results significantly in a small sample. However, the results based on a larger sample are less sensitive to coding mistakes, so the measure is reasonable for a robustness check in the present study.
the quote-based motivation measure, especially in combination with the
ORDD measure (see Tables VII.3-VII.7 in Appendix VII).

The results are generally robust, but they are strongest when the ORDD
measure of costly rebel activity is used. One may suspect the significant rela-
tionship to be caused by a bias in the motivation coding, as I have coded the
rebel measure as well as the motivation measures myself. This may be a valid
point regarding the judgement-based measure, although I have used clear
coding rules (see Appendix V). However, the point is less valid regarding the
quote-based measure, since this is coded based on direct statements from the
obituary writer. Unless the obituary writer is affected by the record of costly
rebel activity in the judgement of the dictator (which of course is possible),
there should be no bias. Instead, the robust relationship is probably an in-
stance of high validity of the costly rebel activity measure, i.e., it actually cap-
tures dangerous political activism rather than other imprisonment or oppor-
tunist rebel activity (this does not imply that all rebels are in it for a strong
sociotropic cause).

This interpretation is supported by the fact that the more observational
motivation traits of corruption and lifestyle are also significantly and robustly
related to the road-to-power measures (both when the five-point measure and
the dichotomous measures of a tough road to power are employed) (see Tables
VII.8-VII.15 Appendix VII). The tougher the road to power, the less personally
corrupt dictators tend to be and the more modest their lifestyle.

In contrast, there appears to be no relationship between voluntary step-
down and road to power, or rather, former guerilla fighters (and dictators who
inherited power) are the least likely to step down voluntarily. Thus, there is no
relationship with road to power as measured on the five-point scale (see Fig-
ure VII.2). Yet, a tough road to power as approximated by the dichotomous
measures is significantly negatively related to voluntary step-down (see Tables
VII.16-VII.18 in Appendix VII). As discussed in Chapter 6, this may be because
guerilla fighters and other dictators with a very tough road to power are often
strongly ideologically motivated and thus unwilling to step down or to see po-
tential detrimental effects of their ideology that should make them step down.
Tanzanian Julius Nyerere and Zambian Kenneth Kaunda are examples of this.
Dictators with a military background appear to be more likely to step down voluntary (though not significantly different from former politicians). With-
out over-interpreting these weak results, they hint at the existence of a group
of military dictators who actually come to power to do what they promise; in
the cases of Figueriedo and Lanusse, stabilization and installing civilian rule.
Education

In Chapter 6, one of the strongest correlates of dictator motivation was found to be educational background. Table 8.3 shows that the dictators’ education on a three-point scale capturing no education, military education, and university education is somewhat related to motivation. Dictators tend to be more ideologically motivated the higher their education. This result is robust to control for socioeconomic background, which may affect education, but not to additional inclusion of lagged independent or dependent variables. This seems to be at least partly due to the reduction in sample size. When Models 1 and 2 are run with no lagged variables on the sample of the most restrictive model (Model 5), there is no significant relationship between dictators’ motivation and educational background (table not shown). The results are not robust to LEAD’s alternative education measure (see Table VII.19 in Appendix VII). However, the quality of this particular measure may be questioned based on the discussion in Chapter 6 (see footnote 26).

Since the measure of educational background can also be treated as a categorical variable due to the military category, the relationship between ideological motivation and each educational category is shown in Figure 8.2. Although it is justifiable to treat the measure as continuous, the panel to the left (where n = 231 because of the absence of lagged variables) indicates that university education is what drives the overall relationship. Turning the variable into a dummy variable of university education further supports this point, as there is a significant positive relationship between university education and ideological motivation, even after control for socioeconomic background, but not when a lagged dependent variable is included (see Table VII.21 in Appendix VII).

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46 Dictators educated in the military and scored as university educated are excluded from the university category in all models.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ideological[motivation (judgement-based)]</td>
<td>Ideological[motivation (judgement-based)]</td>
<td>Ideological[motivation (judgement-based)]</td>
<td>Ideological[motivation (judgement-based)]</td>
<td>Ideological[motivation (judgement-based)]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (none, military, university) (CH)</td>
<td>0.145*</td>
<td>0.143*</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.209*</td>
<td>0.128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0677)</td>
<td>(0.0674)</td>
<td>(0.0960)</td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES (lower, middle, upper class) (CH)</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0879)</td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td>(0.128)</td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.205*</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.260*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of the previous dictator (CH) (LIIV)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.093</td>
<td>-0.217*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0991)</td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.584***</td>
<td>1.546***</td>
<td>1.188***</td>
<td>1.470***</td>
<td>1.181***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.156)</td>
<td>(0.238)</td>
<td>(0.295)</td>
<td>(0.344)</td>
<td>(0.331)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
Figure 8.2. Ideological Motivation and Education. Based on Naked (Left Panel) and Restrictive (Right Panel) Models

Note: The left and right panels are based on Models 1 and 4 in Table VII.20 in Appendix VII, respectively. A control for socioeconomic background is included in both models.

Table 8.4 shows the relationship between dictators’ degree of ideological motivation and whether they are educated abroad. There appears to be a significant relationship, implying that if a dictator is educated abroad, he is more likely to be ideologically motivated compared to dictators who are not educated abroad. However, this relationship is driven by university-educated dictators, as it disappears after control for university education. There is no relationship between being educated in the West and motivation (see Table VII.22 in Appendix VII).
Table 8.4. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Education in a Foreign Country. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.279*</td>
<td>0.220</td>
<td>0.220</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
<td>(0.171)</td>
<td>(0.186)</td>
<td>(0.197)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>University education (dummy) (CH)</td>
<td>0.226*</td>
<td>0.223*</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.273</td>
<td>0.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.132)</td>
<td>(0.132)</td>
<td>(0.132)</td>
<td>(0.194)</td>
<td>(0.182)</td>
<td>(0.201)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>SES (lower, middle, upper class) (CH)</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.0707</td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0879)</td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
<td>(0.133)</td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.177*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.206*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Foreign education of the previous dictator (CH) (LIV)</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.171)</td>
<td>(0.177)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.805***</td>
<td>1.727***</td>
<td>1.678***</td>
<td>1.289***</td>
<td>1.496***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0791)</td>
<td>(0.0831)</td>
<td>(0.191)</td>
<td>(0.299)</td>
<td>(0.258)</td>
<td>(0.306)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
Considering the relationship between educational background and other motivation-related traits, two findings are worth highlighting. While there appears to be no relationship between the level of personal corruption and education level more generally, dictators educated abroad, and particularly in the West, tend to be less personally corrupt (see Tables VII.23 and VII.24 in Appendix VII). The second finding is that a strong educational background, both university and military, is positively related to a dictator’s likelihood of stepping down voluntarily. This is shown in Figure 8.3, which is created similarly to Figure 8.2 (see Tables VII.25 and VII.26 in Appendix VII). This latter finding is once again an indication of the existence of a group of military dictators who do not opt to become military strongmen but rather do what they promise, namely, bring about stability and return their country to civilian rule.

**Figure 8.3. Voluntary Step-Down and Education. Based on Naked (Left Panel) and Restrictive (Right Panel) Models**

Note: The left and right panels are based on Models 1 and 4 in Table VII.25 in Appendix VII, respectively. A control for socioeconomic background is included in both models.
Overall, there is a rather robust relationship between dictators’ motivation and their educational background. Dictators with a university degree tend to be more ideologically motivated than dictators without, and they tend to be more likely to step down voluntarily. Whereas dictators educated in the military do not tend to be particularly ideologically motivated, they do tend to step down more often than dictators with other educational backgrounds. This further supports the existence of sincerely nationalist military dictators. Lastly, dictators educated abroad and in the West are likely to be less personally corrupt than dictators not educated abroad.

Socioeconomic Background

In the previous section, the dictators’ socioeconomic background was investigated indirectly as a control. However, including education in a study of the relationship between socioeconomic background and motivation most likely induces post-treatment bias, since dictators’ education may be affected by their (family’s) socioeconomic background, but not vice versa, as their socioeconomic background is settled prior to educational background. This section measures the relationship between dictators’ socioeconomic background and their motivation.

Table 8.5 indicates no relationship between a dictator’s socioeconomic background, based on Cursus Honorum (Baturo, 2016), and his motivation. As my overall expectation of a weak positive relationship is based on mechanisms leading to opposite expectations, I take a closer look at the three socioeconomic classes. Treating socioeconomic background as a categorical variable reveals that dictators from the middle class tend to be more ideologically motivated than dictators from the lower class (see the right panel in Figure 8.4). This result is robust to (and even stronger) using the alternative measure of socioeconomic background as provided by LEAD (Ellis et al., 2015) (see Tables VII.27 and VII.28 in Appendix VII). However, the relationship is only statistically significant when at least one lagged variable is included. This may be caused by a suppressor effect; however, it may also be caused by a bias in the sample, due to the exclusion of dictators. The earliest ruling dictators are excluded which (also) implies that the number of countries is significantly reduced in the sample.
Table 8.5. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Socioeconomic Background. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ideological</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>motivation</td>
<td>motivation</td>
<td>motivation</td>
<td>motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(judgement-</td>
<td>(judgement-</td>
<td>(judgement-</td>
<td>(judgement-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>based)</td>
<td>based)</td>
<td>based)</td>
<td>based)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES (lower, middle,</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>upper class) (CH)</td>
<td>(0.0869)</td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
<td>(0.156)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.246</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>previous dictator</td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LDV)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES of the previous</td>
<td>-0.087</td>
<td>-0.096</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dictator (CH) (LIV)</td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td>(0.127)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.817***</td>
<td>1.290***</td>
<td>1.800***</td>
<td>1.187***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.186)</td>
<td>(0.313)</td>
<td>(0.290)</td>
<td>(0.334)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, **** $p < 0.001$. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

The curvilinear relationship between dictators’ motivation and socioeconomic background is not highly robust, and it is not exactly what I expected to find. However, I expected opposite mechanisms for the different socioeconomic groups, and in this light, the finding does make sense theoretically. Dictators with a strong socioeconomic background have high opportunity costs to entering power, which leads to the expectation that only very ideologically motivated dictators should take this path, as wealth (and power) can be found easier elsewhere (than climbing the costly and dangerous path towards the top political post with little chance of success). On the other hand, these dictators are less likely to hold strong ideological beliefs in the first place, since strong beliefs may be most likely to develop among people who experience injustices and build up strong grievances, i.e., the poor and marginalized segments of society. This aligns with the result that dictators from the middle class tend to be the most ideologically motivated. Since they face relatively high opportunity costs, mainly ideologically motivated dictators climb the difficult road to power. Moreover, they are likely to have experienced sufficient injustices to make them ideologically motivated in the first place.
There is also evidence that dictators from the middle class tend to be the least corrupt (see Tables VII.29 and VII.30 in Appendix VII). The strongest evidence of a relationship between motivation and socioeconomic background is when voluntary step-down is employed as motivation measure (see Tables VII.31 and VII.32 in Appendix VII). Dictators from the upper and middle classes tend to step down more often than dictators from the lower class. Voluntary step-down is an interesting motivational trait because it is least correlated to ideological motivation as such. Many ideologically motivated dictators are as disinclined to step down as many self-interested dictators are. As we have seen regarding the road to power, voluntary step-down is very rare among former guerilla fighters and political activists. A possible explanation why dictators from the lower class are the least likely to step down voluntarily is that they are also most likely to become guerilla fighters and extremely ideologically motivated, as in the case of Josip Tito. This actually happens to be the case. The jail measure, approximating prior involvement in political activism,
is strongly negatively related to socioeconomic background (table not shown). Thus, the fact that dictators from a weak socioeconomic background are not as willing to step down as other dictators are does not necessarily mean that they are less ideologically motivated. Instead, some of them may be particularly blinded by their ideological motivation. However, in light of the results regarding the primary measure of ideological motivation, dictators from the lower class still seem to be the least ideologically motivated, and dictators from the middle class seem to be the most ideologically motivated.

There is some evidence that dictators from the middle class tend to be the most ideologically motivated, which can be explained by the theoretically opposite grievance and selection mechanisms. Dictators from the middle class are likely to build up grievances leading to ideological motivation. Moreover, people from the middle class face sufficiently high opportunity costs to make wealth- (and power-) driven people in this group choose another path to fulfilling their desires than to opt for political top post (given the risky and costly road to power). However, these results are not very robust, so we cannot draw firm conclusions. There is stronger evidence that dictators with the weakest socioeconomic background are least likely to step down voluntarily. However, this is not necessarily explained by them being more self-interested; some of them may be extremely ideologically motivated like some guerilla fighters or other dictators formerly involved in dangerous political activism tend to be.

Age

The dictators’ age upon entering power appears to be positively related to their degree of ideological motivation as indicated by Table 8.6. The result is not robust to the quote-based measure of motivation. Older dictators (upon entry) are also likely to be less corrupt and more likely to cultivate a modest lifestyle, but there is only weak evidence that they are more likely to step down voluntarily (see Tables VII.33-VII.36 in Appendix VII). This is as expected, since many studies show that sociotropic personality traits are enhanced with age. This seems to be the case for dictators as well. Some readers may find this surprising, as intuition may point to young people holding more radical views. As discussed in Chapter 3, this may be true. Thus, younger dictators may adhere to more extreme ideologies, but this regards the ideological content. The extent to which dictators’ motives are sociotropic (degree of ideological motivation) is another matter.
Table 8.6. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Entry Age. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ideological</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>motivation</td>
<td>motivation</td>
<td>motivation</td>
<td>motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(judgement-based)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(judgement-based)</td>
<td>(judgement-based)</td>
<td>(judgement-based)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry age (CH)</td>
<td>0.016***</td>
<td>0.021**</td>
<td>0.023**</td>
<td>0.023**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00514)</td>
<td>(0.00648)</td>
<td>(0.00682)</td>
<td>(0.00680)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.192*</td>
<td>0.225*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the previous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dictator (LDV)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry age of the</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>previous dictator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CH) (LIV)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.074***</td>
<td>0.375</td>
<td>0.540</td>
<td>0.609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.275)</td>
<td>(0.440)</td>
<td>(0.611)</td>
<td>(0.600)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

Career

The last part of the analysis of the dictators’ background is highly explorative. I investigate the relationship between the most common careers for the dictators in the sample. The prevalence of the following six careers prior to entering power spans from 12 to 38% of the dictators in the sample: teacher (13%), military career (38%), lawyer (16%), politician (35%), (aristocratic) landowner (12%), and blue-collar worker (13%). Only a military career is significantly related to dictators’ motivation (see Tables VII.37-VII.41 in Appendix VII). The relationship is presented in Table 8.7 and shows that dictators with a military career are less likely to be ideologically motivated. This speaks against the presence of the group of military democratizers. However, recall from Chapter 7 that the motivation measure excludes the residual category of dictators who did not seem to be strongly interested in power as such (since they are not possible to place on the scale from self-interested to ideologically motivated), a category to which many dictators belong. Moreover, there appears to be no relationship between dictators with a military career and the likelihood of stepping down voluntarily (see Table VII.42 in Appendix VII).
Table 8.7. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Military Career. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideological</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>motivation</td>
<td>(judgement-based)</td>
<td>(judgement-based)</td>
<td>(judgement-based)</td>
<td>(judgement-based)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military career (dummy) (LEAD) (CH)</td>
<td>-0.282’ (0.120)</td>
<td>-0.317’ (0.148)</td>
<td>-0.439” (0.150)</td>
<td>-0.404” (0.161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.207’ (0.0895)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.213’ (0.0840)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military career (dummy) (LEAD) of the previous dictator (CH) (LIV)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.233’ (0.137)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.006*** (0.0840)</td>
<td>1.627*** (0.212)</td>
<td>1.972*** (0.118)</td>
<td>1.583*** (0.193)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ‘ p < 0.1, ’ p < 0.05, ” p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

I have now investigated patterns in background and found evidence that dictators tend to be more ideologically motivated the tougher their road to power, the older they are and if they hold a university degree. There is also some evidence that dictators from the middle class tend to be more ideologically motivated compared to dictators with another socioeconomic background. Moreover, there is evidence that (some) dictators with former military affiliation are the most likely to step down voluntarily, which strengthens the evidence of the existence of a group of military democratizers who are radical outliers to the existing view of dictators as power and wealth maximizers.

As the main claim of this book relates to the importance of studying dictators’ motives, whereas existing research on autocracies concerns institutional settings and constraints, it is essential to look at the relationship between motivation and institutions. This is the purpose of the next two sections.

Can Institutions Explain Motives?

When are dictators other-regarding, and does it matter if other-regarding dictators are also the most constrained? Since extant research is highly preoccupied with the constraints on political leaders, and how these shape incentives, it is highly relevant to investigate whether institutions can explain motives (or vice versa), or whether motivation is something very different. I start by studying the relationship between degree of authoritarianism and the dictators’
degree of ideological motivation. I use V-Dem’s (Coppedge et al., 2017) measure of polyarchy as degree of authoritarianism (lack of democracy). Table 8.8 reveals that there is no significant difference in authoritarianism (democracy score) across the motivation spectrum. This is regardless of the motivation measure, as the results do not change when the quote-based motivation measure is used instead of the judgement-based measure (see Table VII.43 in Appendix VII). Thus, these kinds of institutions do not seem to be able to explain differences in motivation.

Table 8.8. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Electoral Democracy. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</td>
<td>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</td>
<td>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</td>
<td>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Democracy (V-Dem)</td>
<td>0.627 (0.387)</td>
<td>-0.264 (0.331)</td>
<td>0.328 (0.479)</td>
<td>-0.367 (0.448)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.224* (0.0971)</td>
<td>0.221* (0.0989)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral democracy level for the previous dictator (LIV)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.225 (0.722)</td>
<td>0.248 (0.713)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.771*** (0.111)</td>
<td>1.510*** (0.217)</td>
<td>1.822*** (0.149)</td>
<td>1.488*** (0.214)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, **** $p < 0.001$. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

Although the degree of authoritarianism may not be related to dictators’ motivation, the type of autocracy may. I investigate the relationship between dictator motivation and authoritarian institutions more closely by investigating the relationship between motivation and Geddes et al.’s (2014) four autocracy types, namely monarchies, personalist regimes, military regimes, and party regimes. Indications of a relationship in Table 8.9 are very weak. Yet, how these results appear in a table depends on the choice of reference category. The relationship is illustrated graphically in Figure 8.5. Institutions do not seem to be a strong predictor of motives (or the other way around), as only dictators from party regimes and personalist dictatorships score significantly differently from the others. More specifically, personalist dictators tend to be
most self-interested, and dictators in party regimes tend to be most ideologically motivated. The results are similar but even weaker for the quote-based measure (see Table VII.44 and Figure VII.3 in Appendix VII).

**Table 8.9. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and GWF’s Autocracy Types. OLS Regression**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</td>
<td>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</td>
<td>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</td>
<td>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged independent variable included</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalist dictatorship</td>
<td>-0.165 (0.185)</td>
<td>-0.385 (0.310)</td>
<td>-0.707* (0.325)</td>
<td>-0.363 (0.511)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military dictatorship</td>
<td>0.169 (0.174)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.290)</td>
<td>-0.384 (0.365)</td>
<td>0.031 (0.510)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party dictatorship</td>
<td>0.591*** (0.161)</td>
<td>0.422 (0.302)</td>
<td>0.253 (0.369)</td>
<td>0.599 (0.493)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.098 (0.0970)</td>
<td>0.162 (0.113)</td>
<td>0.098 (0.0970)</td>
<td>0.162 (0.113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.619*** (0.129)</td>
<td>1.588*** (0.273)</td>
<td>1.727*** (0.176)</td>
<td>1.506*** (0.299)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01, * * * * p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
These preliminary results indicate that dictators’ motivation is different from incentives shaped by autocratic institutions. Moreover, where there seems to be a relationship with regard to dictators in party-based regimes and personalist dictators, it is more likely that motivation affects institutions than the other way around, especially for personalist dictators. Whereas it is possible to inherit a party regime, nobody is placed in a personalist dictatorship, which is created by and built around the specific ruler (Svolik, 2012, pp. 54–55). As discussed in Chapter 6, where I also found evidence that personalist dictators tend to be more self-interested than other dictators, this is no surprise. The utmost desire of a power- (and wealth-)maximizing autocrat is to become a personalist dictator, so he is as unconstrained as possible and has to share his power and wealth with as few people as possible. In contrast, dictators with broader motives will only consolidate power to the extent it is necessary to fulfill other desires like implementation of ideology. Thus, only in rare cases will these dictators become personalist dictators.
Are Ideologically Motivated Dictators the Most Constrained?

In the previous section, I have investigated the relationship between different authoritarian institutional settings and the motivation of the autocrat. I have discussed constraints on the dictators implicitly. A more explicit way to study the relationship between dictator motivation and constraints is to employ the latent measure of personalism created by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2017). It is an index measure that contains eight sub-measures related to power centralization spanning from controlling the important power centres like the armed forces and the central administration, hiring on the basis of loyalty, and ethnic and social favouritism (Geddes et al., 2017). Although the ethnic favouritism is closely related to ideologically motivated acts of exclusionary dictators, it is the best available measure of autocrats’ constraints.

Table 8.10 shows the relationship between the average level of personalism throughout a dictator’s incumbency (for some dictators, the level of personalism increases over time) and motivation. There is strong evidence that high levels of personalism are most widespread among the most self-interested dictators. Thus, these are the least constrained. This result is robust to using the end-year level of personalism instead of the average, and to employing the quote-based measure of motivation (see Tables VII.45-VII.47 in Appendix VII). Similar results appear between degree of personalism and the likelihood of stepping down voluntarily. The relationship to dictators’ degree of personal corruption is less robust, and there is no relationship between personalization and dictators’ lifestyle (see Tables VII.48-VII.53 in Appendix VII).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</td>
<td>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</td>
<td>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</td>
<td>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</td>
<td>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average level of personalism (GWF)</td>
<td>-1.174*** (0.239)</td>
<td>-1.190*** (0.280)</td>
<td>-1.003** (0.318)</td>
<td>-1.015** (0.344)</td>
<td>-0.948* (0.368)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency (days)</td>
<td>0.00000236 (0.0000174)</td>
<td>-0.0000194 (0.0000280)</td>
<td>-0.0000194 (0.0000237)</td>
<td>-0.0000262 (0.0000298)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.158 (0.107)</td>
<td>0.155 (0.113)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous dictator's level of personalism (LIV)</td>
<td>-0.129 (0.327)</td>
<td>-0.147 (0.340)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.303*** (0.102)</td>
<td>2.298*** (0.107)</td>
<td>1.975*** (0.232)</td>
<td>2.266*** (0.158)</td>
<td>2.014*** (0.259)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, † p < 0.05, ‡ p < 0.01, §§ p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
As discussed in the previous section, it is not surprising that ideologically motivated dictators are the most constrained in the sense that they rule the least personalized regimes. Now, the question is whether ideological motivation has an impact on policymaking, or whether ideologically motivated dictators are too constrained.

Following the argument about the rise of the personalist dictator, we should not expect ideologically motivated dictators to be too constrained. Strongly ideologically motivated dictators simply do not have an interest in becoming personalist dictators, as they prefer to create (or sustain), for instance, an institutionalized party regime in order to implement their ideology. It would be wrong to deny that institutions also affect motivation and that dictators are not subject to exogenous constraints, because they are, but so are self-interested dictators (who sometimes fail to personalize power). Most dictators have the chance to affect the institutional settings in which they navigate. Examples are found in the case studies on which Chapter 6 is based (see Appendix II). Several ideologically motivated dictators had the chance to centralize power significantly more than they did.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have investigated patterns in dictators’ motivation with regard to their background as well as characteristics of the institutions on, and within, which they rule. Chapter 6 contains a similar analysis conducted in a medium-N setting based on twenty detailed case studies, whereas the analysis in this chapter is based on a larger sample of almost 300 dictators coded in the ORDD.

**Background Characteristics**

The strongest patterns in motivation, according to the large-N part of the analysis, are found in the dictators’ road to power and age. The older a dictator is when he enters power, the more likely he is to be ideologically motivated; and the tougher a dictator’s road to power, the more ideologically motivated he tends to be. Especially dictators who have been involved in costly rebel activity or have been imprisoned prior to entering power are likely to be substantially ideologically motivated. These dictators are also the least likely to step down voluntarily, while dictators with a military background are the most likely.

I found that the background characteristics university education and middle class were positively related to ideological motivation. However, the results were not as robust as expected, as they were not robust when lagged variables were introduced as controls. This also drastically reduced the sample sizes, and there are indications that this, and not the inclusion of potential
confounders, erased the results. Even if this is not the case, it is still highly interesting and relevant that dictators’ education (and to some extent socioeconomic background) is correlated with dictators’ motivation. Thus, background is an indicator of motivation, although the relationship is not necessarily causal.

**Military Democratizers**

I have found several indications that dictators with a military background are more likely to step down than other groups of dictators; and in some models, military dictators also tend to be substantially ideologically motivated. This pattern is sustained in a comparison to the results in Chapter 6. This is further supported by the finding, in Chapter 7, of a residual category of dictators who do not necessarily want to be in power but seemingly have sociotropic ends while in power. This is evidence that some military dictators do not enter power to become military strongmen or because they have a strong encompassing ideology about changing the country (or the whole world) for the better or the worse. Instead, they are driven by saving the country from chaos or corruption (or from communists) and then leaving power again. Most dictators, military dictators in particular, make this promise but are not believed. Apparently, some (military) dictators do actually hold this belief, and some of them step down voluntarily and hand over power to civilian rule. Chapter 6 showed case evidence of this with the three former dictators, Malian Amadou Touré, Argentinian Alejandro Lanusse, and Brazilian João Figueriedo, and in this chapter, it is supported in a large-N setting.

In light of the predominant research on autocracies, finding that many dictators are substantially ideologically motivated is surprising. However, like self-interested dictators, they need to secure their political survival (and power enough to implement their ideas). The existence of military democratizers is even more astonishing, as they “play a very different game”. Their time horizon is often shorter, as their goals are often less extensive in the sense that they wish to stabilize the country, and they plan to return it to civilian rule.

**Institutions and Constraints**

The autocracy literature focuses overwhelmingly on the effect of institutions, because such structures create constraints and thus incentivize autocrats to act. However, an investigation of the relationship between my motivation measures and type of autocracy suggests that the two are not closely correlated, although personalist dictators tend to be more self-interested compared to other types of dictators. Looking at personalism as a degree supports this
conclusion. The degree of personalism equals the degree of lack of institutionalization, and in this way, it can be viewed as a measure of constraints (at least elite constraints). This implies that self-interested dictators tend to be the least constrained dictators. However, this does not imply that ideologically motivated dictators are unable to implement their ideological goals, such that their beliefs do not matter. Dictators inherit constraints, but the processes of power consolidation and personalization are not inherited. There may be limits to how much a dictator can consolidate power, but some dictators are also likely to choose to consolidate and personalize power to different degrees. Power maximizers get intrinsic value from personalization. In contrast, many ideologically motivated dictators do not; at least, they do also get intrinsic value from realizing their ideology. For them, power is also means to implementing ideology, so they will diverge some of their resources away from consolidating power towards realizing their ideology. Consequently, motivation and institutions are different, and where they overlap, the causality very likely runs from motivation to institutions. Although ideologically motivated dictators tend to be more constrained than self-interested dictators, to the extent they had a choice, they should still be sufficiently unconstrained to realize parts of their ideology. Motivation is therefore likely to have an independent effect on outcomes, such as development, repression, and conflict. Parts of this conclusion is based on theoretical arguments. In the next chapter, I investigate the consequences of dictators’ motivation empirically.
Nyerere created inclusive socialist policies in Tanzania; Lee Kuan Yew created a strong state and secured economic development in Singapore; Pol Pot used violent repression and killed almost a quarter of his people, which ended up costing him his power; and Mobutu heavily repressed his people, looted the DR Congo, and caused total economic devastation. As shown in previous chapters, these four autocrats were driven by very diverse motivations. Evidently, this had a crucial impact on policies and development in the four countries. Are these dictators exceptional with regard to the impact of their motives, or do they actually represent a tendency that dictators’ motivation matters?

Predominant theoretical accounts of autocracies predict that motivation matters for outcomes in times of low constraints. However, this expectation is deemphasized, since dictators are assumed to have similar egotropic motives (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Olson, 1993; Svolik, 2012). The previous chapters have made evident that this is a myth and that dictators’ motivation varies a lot. Consequently, we should expect motivation to matter, in particular in times of low constraints. Yet, findings in the previous chapter indicate that self-interested dictators tend to be less constrained than ideologically motivated dictators, which might lead to the expectation that ideological motivation does not matter much. However, this is likely to be an erroneous conclusion, since the reason for the different degrees of constraints may be explained by differences in motives (and not vice versa), such that more egotropic dictators choose to never stop consolidating power, whereas dictators with broader utility functions (including sociotropic concerns) choose to direct attention to implementing their beliefs after they have consolidated power sufficiently. Of course, there are also exogenous explanations of autocratic constraints, but it is not obvious that they should affect dictators systematically differently with regard to their motives.

We can only elucidate this inquiry by empirical investigation. This chapter investigates the effects of dictators’ motivation more broadly. Using the ORDD, presented in Chapter 7, I will study the impact of ideology on development (policies and outcomes), repression, and civil war. We should expect both the degree of ideological motivation and the content of ideology to matter. In the following, I will briefly review the theoretical expectations (see Ta-
ble 3.1 for an overview) and the nature of the relationships previewing the analytical setup, discuss the measurement and estimation techniques, and finally present and discuss the empirical evidence.

**Review of Theoretical Expectations and the Nature of the Relationships**

**Outcome 1: Development**

As outlined in Chapter 3, we should expect a positive effect of the degree of ideological motivation on socio-economic development, including human development, because these outcomes are likely to be prioritized more by largely other-regarding than by self-interested dictators, almost no matter the content of their ideology. Yet, there is one exception, namely dictators with highly exclusionary ideologies. If the excluded group is sufficiently large, these dictators may create as detrimental development outcomes as the self-interested dictators, or even worse.

Ideally, this relationship should be tested in an interaction model, but it requires sufficient statistical power and a substantial amount of observations in extreme values, which, although the gross number of observations is 297, the data cannot sustain. I will focus on exploring the direct effects, as these are the most crucial. Despite the exception of the highly exclusionary dictator, we should expect an overall positive effect of ideological motivation, since the ideologically motivated dictators who are extremely exclusionary and who exclude a sufficiently large group are rare. Consequently, they are unlikely to affect the overall relationship significantly.

We should also expect an independent negative effect of exclusion on development, although the degree of ideological motivation varies. Proclaimed exclusion should have no effect for the self-interested dictators. Thus, these dictators will only be noise to the overall relationship, leading to a reduced effect. In contrast, the economic content of the ideology is expected only to play a role with regard to certain development goals, namely those that focus specifically on the business environment and those closely connected to inequality. For developing countries, progress in development more broadly is unlikely to be affected by the dictators’ economic preferences as long as the dictator is ideologically motivated (and not extremely exclusionary).
Outcome 2: Repression

Briefly summing up the expectations regarding violent repression, we should expect ideologically motivated dictators with inclusionary ideologies to repress the least, and ideologically motivated dictators with highly exclusionary beliefs to repress the most. The self-interested dictator does not care much about the people, so he will not avoid repression to spare the people for their sake, nor will he repress certain groups just to punish them, unless it would strengthen his power; thus, self-interested dictators will repress more than inclusionary dictators, but less than the extremely exclusionary ideologically motivated dictator will. As with the argument for human development, highly exclusionary dictators are likely to be few, so I expect ideologically motivated dictators to generally repress less than self-interested dictators.

Outcome 3: Civil War

The expectations regarding civil war onset and duration are similar with regard to exclusion, but more ambiguous for degree of ideological motivation. A civil war is costly for all, and no dictator would like to enter a civil war. A civil war only arises when many factors are present at once. Therefore, the impact of leader motivation perhaps only indirectly and weakly affects civil war. Studying the effect of dictator motivation on civil war is a more explorative undertaking.

A Note on the Nature of the Relationship

The casual chain from the dictator’s motivation to societal outcomes, like development, is long and conditioned by several factors (such as the dictator’s autonomy and the state’s capacity to implement policies). However, ceteris paribus, we should expect an unconditioned effect of motivation on policies, and on outcomes, though it may be weaker. The reason is that where the optimal conditions are absent (e.g., for very constrained dictators, and where the state is very weak) the effect is merely reduced (or zero), but we should not expect it to be negative. Yet, it requires enough statistical power to investigate conditioned effects (through interaction models); as the gross number of observations is 297, and observations are dropped as variables are added to the model, the data cannot sustain such interaction models. For this reason, I will stick to investigating the unconditioned effects.

The causal chain from the autocrat’s motivation to policymaking is shorter than to societal outcomes. This is therefore ideal to investigate, as it avoids unfounded assumptions about potential mechanisms. Thus, I look at the effect on development policies first. However, as the variety of high-quality and
broad-coverage measures is not impressive, these analyses are limited to pol-
icies relating to the development of welfare states for which the best data is
found. To study development more broadly, I supplement with outcome
measures.

Data and Measurement

I use motivation and ideology variables from the ORDD, presented in Chapter
7, as independent variables. My primary measure is the judgement-based mo-
tivation measure, whereas the quote-based motivation measure will be used
to check the robustness of the results. To investigate the impact of the content
of ideology, I use the two measures of proclaimed economic ideology and pro-
claimed exclusionary ideology as the independent variables.

Although I have clear theoretical expectations regarding the impact of mo-
tivation on development, repression, and civil war, my approach to this is also
explorative. The dependent variables are measured in twelve different ways in
total. The measures are chosen based on two criteria: measurement validity,
which for obvious reasons is crucial, and broad coverage, which is particularly
important in terms of sustaining statistical power in the models, since there
are less than 300 dictators in the motivation dataset. Table 9.1 gives an over-
view of the twelve measures of the dependent variables.

Table 9.1 Twelve Measures of the Dependent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Range a</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development policies</td>
<td>Major welfare laws</td>
<td>0-6</td>
<td>SPaW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weekly work hours</td>
<td>40-72</td>
<td>SPaW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development outcomes</td>
<td>GDP/capita</td>
<td>265-42,917</td>
<td>The Maddison Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Value added manufacturing (% of GDP)</td>
<td>0-41</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000)</td>
<td>9-226</td>
<td>CLIO Infra;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
<td>31-79</td>
<td>Gapminder;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gapminder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>Latent repression</td>
<td>-3-3</td>
<td>Fariss (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Physical violence</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>V-Dem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>Civil war onset (25 battle deaths)</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>PRIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil war onset (1,000 battle deaths)</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>Correlates of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil war duration (25 battle deaths) b</td>
<td>0-27</td>
<td>PRIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil war duration (1,000 battle deaths) b</td>
<td>0-20</td>
<td>Correlates of War</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Some of the numbers are rounded off.
b. Duration is only estimated within incumbencies and not across.
Development Policies

A major challenge when measuring policies in autocracies is finding measures that capture policies that are intended to be implemented rather than pro forma policies. I employ two measures of policies related to development of the welfare state: a measure of major welfare laws and standard number of work hours (before being paid overtime) provided by the Social Policies around the World Database (SPaW) (Rasmussen, 2016b). An important advantage of the measure is its broad coverage, which implies that using the measure only marginally reduces the number of observations. Moreover, these are welfare policies closely related to socio-economic development. The measure of major welfare laws captures in how many of the following six areas a major welfare law exists: old age, maternity, sickness, unemployment, work accidents, and child rearing. The second measure is the official number of weekly work hours, i.e., the standard number of work hours before overtime kicks in. Historically, shorter and fewer workdays have been major demand from workers—even before demanding a welfare state more broadly.

The measure of the existence of major welfare laws is a crude measure, which is a disadvantage if the purpose is to study the nuances in the six areas. As this is not the case here, it is a suitable measure insofar as the existence of major welfare laws indicates that these laws are politically prioritized and planned to be implemented rather than pro forma policies. An important advantage of using the SPaW data is that the researcher collecting the data has investigated exactly this potential problem and found that the measure is unlikely to capture pro forma policies, as the introduction of a new welfare law is strongly correlated with increased social spending in the specific area (Rasmussen, 2016a, pp. 149–153). Similar tests show that the measure of the official number of work hours does capture policies that are being implemented and not just pro forma policies (Rasmussen, 2016a, pp. 147–149). Thus, both measures have high validity and broad coverage.

While both measures are general development initiatives, some welfare laws include equality concerns in addition to risk management, so it is possible that they are preferred slightly more by the economic left than by the economic right.

Development Outcomes

In addition to the impact on motivation on policies, I study outcomes. I study outcomes that are approximately politically-economically neutral in developing countries. Economic development broadly is captured by GDP per capita (Bolt, Inklaar, Jong, & Jan Luiten van Zanden, 2018), and in addition, I include a measure of value-added manufacturing as percent of GDP (World
Bank Group, 2020) to proxy industrialization (Butcher & Svensson, 2016; Gerring, Gjerløw, & Knutsen, n.d.).

I include two measures of human development from the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem): infant mortality, i.e., the number of infants who die before the age of one, per thousand born, and life expectancy, i.e., expected longevity at birth. These two measures capture two important aspects of human development. They are both affected by living standards, especially for the worst off in society, which is at the core of human development. In addition, both measures have broad coverage and are composed of several measures from different sources, mainly from Gapminder and Clio Infra (Clio Infra, 2017; Coppedge et al., 2017; Gapminder, 2017). The measure of infant mortality rate is log-transformed due to an expected strong floor effect.

In autocracies, which are largely developing countries in the Global South, these broad development measures are expected to be affected mainly by the degree of ideological motivation rather than the content of economic policy. However, the broader economic development measures might be favored slightly more by the economic right, and the human development indicators slightly more by the economic left.

Repression

Two of the most widely used measures of repression are the Political Terror Scale (PTS) and the Civil Integrity Right Index (CIRI). However, evidence shows underreporting of human rights abuses back in time compared to today, because the understanding of repression has changed over time (Schnakenberg & Fariss, 2014). Fariss’ (2014) measure of latent repression corrects this temporal bias. The measure is based on PTS and CIRI along with other measures of repression, and it has the additional advantage that it covers the entire period for which repression data is available (i.e., from 1949 onwards).

An alternative measure is V-Dem’s expert-based measure of violent repression. It captures the extent to which physical integrity, i.e., freedom from political killings and torture, is respected (Coppedge et al., 2020).

Civil War

Civil war is measured in two ways, as onset and duration. The Peace Research Institute Oslo’s (PRIO) definition and operationalization of civil war is the most widespread (Dixon, 2009). A civil war, in a given year, exists when fighting between a rebel organization and the government within a sovereign country results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one year (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand, 2002). The Correlates of War
project (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010) requires 1,000 battle-related deaths in one year. Both datasets include measures of onset and duration. In the following, I will refer to the two types of civil war as minor and major civil wars, respectively.

**Estimation Technique and Model Specification**

Several estimation techniques are used to investigate the impact of the dictators’ motivation on development, repression, and civil war. There is no standard way of modelling this, because the dictator is the most sensible unit for the independent variable (as motivation is only coded once for each dictator), and country years is the unit for the dependent variables. In addition, the dictators have not been in power equally long, and there may be dependency between the dictators, especially between those from the same country.

**Technique 1: Country-Year OLS**

One way to address these issues is to measure the yearly average effect of motivation on the dependent variables. Two techniques allow for that. One is to use all possible information on the dependent variables by conducting an OLS regression on the data where the unit is country years. I control for the entry level of the dependent variable, which refers to the level of the dependent variable the year the dictator enters power. To avoid inflating the results by using all years even though motivation is constant for each dictator, I double cluster the standard errors on country and dictator (Correia, 2017). Only dictators who have been in power for at least one year are included in the sample.

**Technique 2: Dictator as Unit, Yearly Average Change in DV**

A more straightforward way to measure the yearly average effect is to use dictator as unit and regress the yearly average change in the dependent variable (the difference between entry and exit level divided by years in power) on motivation while still controlling for entry level of the dependent variable. The unit of analysis does not contain years, so there is only one observation per dictator. To avoid measuring the deeds of the subsequent leadership, the exit level of the dependent variable (used to calculate the yearly average change) is the level of the dependent variable the year before the dictator leaves power. For this reason, and to avoid measuring the deeds of the previous dictator, only dictators who have been in power for at least two years are included in the sample to which this estimation technique is applied. I include country-clustered standard errors to account for the potential dependency between dictators from the same country (Angrist & Pischke, 2009, pp. 308–315).
Technique 3: Dictator as Unit, Total Change in DV

A final way of estimating the effect of motivation on policies, outcomes, repression, and civil war is to estimate the total change. The model is similar to the previous one, except the dependent variable is the exit-level outcome, but due to the inclusion of the entry-level outcome in the model, the interpretation is the total change (instead of a yearly average as in the former model). In this model, a control for length of incumbency is added.

Lagged Dependent Variable

Including the level of the dependent variable in the year the dictator takes power works as including a lagged dependent variable. It captures the variation generated by potential confounders of the dependent variable in the start year (Keele & Kelly, 2006). An example with development as the outcome of interest illustrates this. For a potential confounder to be a confounder it has to (directly) affect development and affect, or at least be correlated with (but not be affected by), the dictators’ motivation. The level of inequality in society potentially lives up to these criteria. Assuming a homogenous relationship over time (which is a sensible and standard assumption), societal inequality should also affect the level of development in the entry year. Thus, including the level of development in the entry year takes up the potentially confounding variation from inequality (and from other variables).

The only caveat is that the level of inequality upon entry may take time to affect development, such that the entire effect is not captured by the entry level of development. This is an argument for including potential confounders as controls, but it would be like using a sledgehammer to crack a nut. Most potential confounders, like inequality, are sluggish variables. They change slowly, implying that most likely only a very small change in inequality is not captured by the entry level of development. Including extra variables reduces the statistical power by reducing the number of observations and reduces efficiency by increasing the variance (Verbeek, 2008, p. 63; Wooldridge, 2013, pp. 97–99). Especially in this setting where the gross number of observations is less than three hundred, statistical power and efficiency are weighty concerns.

The only (other) potential confounders that are not taken into account are the dictators’ background characteristics. However, I will not control for these, since they will take up all the relevant variation we are actually interested in (as we saw in the previous chapters).47

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47E.g., controlling for education also captures the variation that runs through motivation, which is the variation we are interested in, regardless of where it comes from.
It does not make sense to include controls in the years after the dictator enters power, not even when using Technique 1 where all years are included as observations. The risk of post-treatment bias will be high, as a dictator’s motivation potentially has an effect on these variables as soon as he enters power.

Consequently, including a lagged dependent variable in this setting strengthens the potential for making causal claims based on the analysis. However, it is a hard test, since it suppresses the explanatory power of the other independent variables (Plümper, Troeger, & Manow, 2005; Wilkins, 2018).

Deciding on a Specific Technique

The three different estimation techniques are not equally good for measuring the effect of all four groups of dependent variables. Development policies and outcomes mainly change in one direction over time, and it takes time, especially regarding development outcomes, to observe an effect of motivation. Therefore, the third estimation technique, i.e., estimating the total change, is ideal here. However, the two other estimation techniques will be used for robustness checks.48

In contrast, repression is not a phenomenon that is accumulated over time. It can fluctuate a lot. While it takes time and capacity to build an apparatus of effective subtle repression, it does not take long to affect violent repression, which is the focus there. Thus, the only theoretically valid estimation technique of the three is the first because repression in all years are taken into account.

Civil war is a rare event. Therefore, I measure onset as the presence (or absence) of any onset during the entire incumbency (resembling the third technique, but using the information for all years instead of the difference between entry and exit). Because onset is a dichotomous variable, I use a logit model for estimation. Civil war duration is also measured in a cumulative manner, in a way that resembles the third estimation technique, namely, as how many years the country has been in civil war. I control for whether there is an ongoing war upon entry and for years in power.

To explore the time dimension of the relationships, I include alternative models (to all base models) that consist of three subsamples comprising only

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48 It is unlikely that a dictator’s background should significantly affect the outcome without substantially affecting his motivation (and that this other variation is not captured by societal factors included in the lagged dependent variable).
dictators who have been in power for at least three, five, and ten years, respectively. Especially for the two human development measures, it may take a long time from a policy is introduced for an effect to substantiate.

In a robustness check, I include degree of ideological motivation and content in the same models, but as expected, the dimensions are close to orthogonal, since including them all together does not change the results substantially (see Tables VIII.1 and VIII.21 in Appendix VIII). 49

Results I: Dictator Motivation and Development

Based on the described analytical setup, I now proceed to the analyses. I will start by addressing the effects of motivation on development.

Ideological Motivation

Models 1 and 2 in Table 9.2 indicate that ideological motivation has a statistically positive effect on the introduction of major welfare laws, but no effect on the standard number of weekly work hours. These two results are very robust to using the quote-based measure instead of the judgement-based, to smaller subsamples, and to other estimation techniques (see Tables VIII.2-VIII.8 in Appendix VIII). The clear effect of ideological motivation on major welfare laws is exactly as expected, whereas it is surprising that weekly work hours seem to have no effect. Self-interested dictators should not be as inclined as ideologically motivated dictators to reduce work hours (the well-being of the people only has an instrumental and not an intrinsic value for self-interested dictators). However, a possible explanation is that the measure only contains little variation, since work hours are often only changed a couple of times in each country during the entire period under investigation.

49 Although I have an implicit control for potential confounders, I still run robustness checks including a control for autocracy type. I use Geddes, Wright, and Frantz’s (2012) measure as a categorical variable differentiating between one-party regimes, military dictatorships, personalist autocracies, and monarchies. The variable is included in a robustness check because it is the most important potential confounder, as it is the core institutional factor discussed in existing research on autocracies.
Table 9.2. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Development. OLS regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare laws</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work hours</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/cap</td>
<td>396.9**</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>-0.0374+</td>
<td>0.358</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrialization</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.572***</td>
<td>0.811***</td>
<td>1.093***</td>
<td>0.867***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality</td>
<td><strong>0.129</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.146</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.152</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.129</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.146</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
<td><strong>0.129</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.146</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.152</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.129</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.146</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum years in power</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency</td>
<td>0.0252**</td>
<td>-0.116**</td>
<td>21.31</td>
<td>-0.0104</td>
<td>-0.0313***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.630**</td>
<td>20.55***</td>
<td>684.3</td>
<td>2.544*</td>
<td>-0.283+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
Turning to Models 3-6 with outcome measures of development, there appears to be a positive effect of ideological motivation on GDP per capita, a negative effect on infant mortality, but no effect on industrialization and life expectancy. The effect of GDP per capita is very robust to different subsamples and estimation techniques. It is also robust in most models with the quote-based measure of ideological motivation. Although there appears to be no effect on industrialization, there is a significant positive effect in the subsample with only dictators who have been in power for at least ten years. Moreover, there is a positive effect in almost all models when the quote-based measure of motivation is used (across different subsamples and estimation techniques, see Tables VIII.2-VIII.8 in Appendix VIII). Thus, there is an effect on both general development outcome measures, although the effect on industrialization is only robust to using the quote-based measure.

The finding that ideological motivation reduces the infant mortality rate is robust to different subsamples, control for autocracy type, and somewhat robust to the second estimation technique (estimating the effect on yearly averages). However, it is not robust to the quote-based measure of motivation. A positive effect of life expectancy appears for the judgement-based measures in ten-year subsamples using the second and third estimation method (the ones that use changes from entry to exit). An explanation is that it takes a long time to change life expectancy (especially to the better), so only autocrats who have been in power for a very long time can significantly increase life expectancy.\footnote{When a control for autocracy type is included, all models in the two-year subsamples become statistically significant, but because of the risk of post-treatment bias, we should not conclude too much from this specific result.}

The detected effects sizes are substantial. To illustrate: On the basis of Model 3 in Table 9.2, I find that on average countries with highly ideologically motivated dictators (score = 3) experience an increase in GDP per capita of 1,191 US dollars more during the dictators’ tenure compared to countries with highly self-interested dictators (score = 0). The average tenure of a dictator in my sample is 12 years.

Overall, there are more or less robust effects of all development measures, and the direction of the effects are as expected: more ideologically motivated dictators appear to increase development, measured as welfare policies, general development, and to some extent, at least in the longer run, human development. In the next two sections, the content of the (proclaimed) ideologies will be inspected.
Economic Ideology

Models 1 and 2 in Table 9.3 show that the more economically left-wing a dictator is, the more likely he is to introduce major welfare laws, but there appears to be no effect of reducing work hours. Both results are very robust across different subsamples and estimation techniques (see Tables VIII.9-VIII.14 in Appendix VIII).

Regarding the outcome variables, shown in Models 3-6, there appears to be an effect of proclaimed economic ideology on only industrialization. The effect is negative, which implies that the more economically right-wing a dictator claims to be, the more he enhances industrialization. This result is robust to all subsamples using the second or third estimation techniques (those estimating the effect on yearly averages). The lacking effects of proclaimed economic ideology on GDP per capita, infant mortality rate, and life expectancy are replicated across all subsamples using the first and third estimation techniques (see Tables VIII.9-VIII.14 in Appendix VIII). However, in some subsamples, there are effects when the second estimation technique, i.e., yearly average effect, is used. The effect on GDP per capita is negative, implying that the more economically right-wing dictators claim to be, the more they enhance GDP per capita. In contrast, the effects on infant mortality rate and life expectancy are in the favor of the autocrats who claim to be leftwing. Hence, the more left-wing, the lower the infant mortality rate and the higher life expectancy.

Lastly, I check whether the lacking effects are produced by the inclusion of the group of self-interested dictators generating too much noise; I exclude the most self-interested dictators (i.e., those who score 0 on the four-point scaled judgement-based motivation measure) from the sample. This does not reveal a hidden impact. Consequently, the effects of proclaimed economic ideology on development policies and outcomes are largely non-existing. Only regarding introduction of major welfare laws is there a robust significant effect. This makes sense because all measures are supposed to capture broad development tendencies, such that both the economic left and right wing will prioritize progress in these areas if they are ideologically motivated (the last part of this expectation was supported by the first part of the analysis).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Welfare laws</td>
<td>Work hours</td>
<td>GDP/cap</td>
<td>Industrialization</td>
<td>Infant mortality</td>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum years in power</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic ideology</td>
<td>0.116⁺</td>
<td>-0.0942</td>
<td>-172.1</td>
<td>-1.381⁺</td>
<td>-0.0141</td>
<td>0.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0644)</td>
<td>(0.354)</td>
<td>(140.5)</td>
<td>(0.589)</td>
<td>(0.0186)</td>
<td>(0.226)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable (entry year)</td>
<td>0.743***</td>
<td>0.549***</td>
<td>0.486⁺</td>
<td>0.743***</td>
<td>1.098***</td>
<td>0.851***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0529)</td>
<td>(0.0742)</td>
<td>(0.220)</td>
<td>(0.0702)</td>
<td>(0.0345)</td>
<td>(0.0332)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency</td>
<td>0.0271⁺⁺</td>
<td>-0.102⁺</td>
<td>17.67</td>
<td>-0.0440</td>
<td>-0.0304⁺⁺</td>
<td>0.480⁺⁺</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00938)</td>
<td>(0.0448)</td>
<td>(22.11)</td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
<td>(0.00381)</td>
<td>(0.0469)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.770⁺⁺</td>
<td>22.06***</td>
<td>1978.0⁺</td>
<td>6.438⁺⁺</td>
<td>-0.367⁺</td>
<td>7.169⁺⁺</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.238)</td>
<td>(3.651)</td>
<td>(864.8)</td>
<td>(1.880)</td>
<td>(0.149)</td>
<td>(2.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ⁺ p < 0.1, ⁺⁺ p < 0.05, ⁺⁺⁺ p < 0.01, ⁺⁺⁺⁺ p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
Exclusionary Ideology

Models 1-6 in Table 9.4 indicate that proclaimed exclusionary ideology has no effect on development policies or outcomes, except on GDP per capita where the effect is positive, implying that the most exclusionary dictators are the ones who increase GDP per capita the most. These results are very robust and replicated across all subsamples using alternative estimation techniques (see Tables VIII.15-VIII.20 in Appendix VIII). This is surprising, as I expected to find a negative impact of exclusionary ideology on development, because exclusionary dictators (if they are ideologically motivated) should focus on discrimination against the out-group(s). Yet, there may be different explanations for not finding this. I will discuss these in turn.

The explanation may be a question of modelling. The theoretical expectation regarding the effect of exclusion on development is in fact an interaction effect. The expectation that exclusionary dictators repress more than inclusionary dictators is stronger the more ideologically motivated a dictator is. We should see no effect for extremely self-interested dictators. Since it has only been possible to investigate the direct effect and not the interaction effect, self-interested dictators in the sample may blur the results to such a degree that it is not possible to find significant results. However, estimating similar models in a sample without the most self-interested dictators (i.e., those who score 0 on the judgement-based motivation measure) does not substantially change the results. The explanation has to be found elsewhere. Four other potential explanations exist.

First, the measure of proclaimed exclusionary ideology is not ideal, since the value 1 (“somewhat inclusionary”) on the measure coded on a scale from 0 to 3 is also used as a residual category. The theoretical reasons are discussed in Chapter 7. However, when we look at the distribution of observations across the measure, 55% of the observations fall in this category. It is possible that these dictators in fact adhered to a somewhat inclusionary ideology, but it is also likely that the obituaries in many cases did not mention that the dictator had a very inclusionary (score 0) or a largely exclusionary ideology (score 2). This is despite the fact that dictators with very short obits are coded missing on this variable.
Table 9.4. Exclusionary Ideology and Development. OLS regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Welfare laws</td>
<td>Work hours</td>
<td>GDP/cap</td>
<td>Industrialization</td>
<td>Infant mortality</td>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum years in power</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary ideology</td>
<td>0.0250 (0.0687)</td>
<td>0.628 (0.554)</td>
<td>397.7** (148.4)</td>
<td>0.729 (0.586)</td>
<td>-0.0354 (0.0242)</td>
<td>0.425 (0.380)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable (entry year)</td>
<td>0.753*** (0.0471)</td>
<td>0.568*** (0.0689)</td>
<td>0.501* (0.221)</td>
<td>0.796*** (0.0618)</td>
<td>1.092*** (0.0318)</td>
<td>0.867*** (0.0314)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency</td>
<td>0.0260** (0.00843)</td>
<td>-0.133** (0.0434)</td>
<td>19.02 (17.06)</td>
<td>-0.0135 (0.0691)</td>
<td>-0.0313*** (0.00321)</td>
<td>0.484** (0.0390)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.938*** (0.232)</td>
<td>20.55*** (3.271)</td>
<td>998.8* (555.3)</td>
<td>2.407* (1.241)</td>
<td>-0.309* (0.141)</td>
<td>5.940** (1.824)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
Second, the exclusion variable contains *proclaimed* exclusion (mainly in the beginning of the incumbency or before inauguration). Exclusionary beliefs may not always be popular or agreeable, and some dictators may want to pretend to be inclusionary rather than exclusionary. If this is the case, it will surely affect the results.

Third, the primary aim of ideologically motivated dictators with exclusionary ideologies may not always be to reduce living standards for the excluded group, but rather focusing on improving it for the rest of the people. Thus, nobody is faring worse (perhaps except for the consequences of increased repression), but the included are faring significantly better than the excluded. In that sense, a dictator motivated by exclusionary ideology may not necessarily be obstructive for development in general but only for inequality.\(^{51}\)

A final, related, argument is that the theoretical argument that an exclusionary dictator is no good for development requires the excluded group to be sufficiently large. However, in most cases, communists and non-communists were the excluded groups. There are some examples of ethnic exclusion of the majority, like the white South African dictators who excluded the black population; but ethnic exclusion is not the predominant type of exclusion in the sample. Thus, the size of the excluded group is important, but it is not included in the measure. In cases like Pol Pot, this argument appears empirically valid. However, it seems that only the most radical exclusionary dictators deliberately reduce the living standard of the excluded. The rest positively favor the rest of the people, so it is (probably) only detrimental to equality but not to general socio-economic development, at least in the short run. However, we should still expect exclusionary dictators to repress more than the inclusionary, as there is a part of the people they at best do not really care about.

**Results II: Dictator Motivation, Repression, and Civil War**

**Ideological Motivation**

Models 1 and 2 in Table 9.5 indicate that ideological motivation has a statistically positive effect on both measures of (absence of) violent repression. These

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\(^{51}\) I do not study the effect of inequality here due to the importance of the two criteria of concept validity and broad coverage. Generally, it is difficult to obtain inequality data of high quality from autocracies. Moreover, many small autocracies are included in the sample, and these are rarely covered by data on inequality. Because I need the entry levels to be coded for an observation to be included in the sample, the quality of the analysis is particularly sensitive to broad coverage.
two results are very robust in subsamples, but they are not robust to using the quote-based instead of the judgement-based measure (only for the latent repression measure in the subsample of dictators who have been in power for at least five years) (see Tables VIII.22-VIII.26 in Appendix VIII). Thus, ideologically motivated dictators are less likely to engage in violent repression than selfish dictators are, although the results are not very robust to using the quote-based motivation measure. This could be because the functional form of the relationship is quadratic rather than linear, i.e., the most ideologically motivated dictators repress as much as self-interested dictators because they are ready to use any means to realize their ideology. In other words, even inclusionary dictators, who get intrinsic value from the people’s well-being, might want to sacrifice this for the “greater good”. However, this is not the case as the quadratic term of ideological motivation is far from reaching statistical significance when included in the model (table not shown). Instead, the less robust results may be explained by the expected difference between inclusionary and exclusionary ideologically motivated dictators, as I will return to below.

Regarding the civil war measures, Models 3-6 indicate that ideological motivation only has an impact on major civil war onset—a result that is robust across all subsamples. However, when the quote-based measure is used, ideological motivation is significantly negatively related to all four civil war measures, and these results hold across all subsamples. In sum, the most robust result is that ideologically motivated dictators are less likely than selfish dictators to start a major civil war (or experience an onset). The result is less robust for starting a minor civil war and experiencing longer wars, both minor and major, but the tendency is the same (see Tables VIII.22-VIII.26 in Appendix VIII).

As expected, there is no evidence of an impact of economic ideology affecting repression or civil war. Therefore, the effects are not displayed here (see Table VIII.27 in Appendix VIII).
### Table 9.5. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Repression and Civil War. OLS regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Absence of) latent repression&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.116*&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.0244+</td>
<td>-0.166</td>
<td>-0.387*</td>
<td>-0.479</td>
<td>-0.383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Absence of) physical violence&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>(0.0470)</td>
<td>(0.0138)</td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
<td>(0.177)</td>
<td>(0.337)</td>
<td>(0.254)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor civil war onset&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.838***</td>
<td>0.827**</td>
<td>0.0177</td>
<td>0.0209</td>
<td>0.0788*</td>
<td>0.0350*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(entry year)</td>
<td>(0.0457)</td>
<td>(0.0661)</td>
<td>(0.0155)</td>
<td>(0.0150)</td>
<td>(0.0308)</td>
<td>(0.0179)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major civil war onset&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-0.324**</td>
<td>0.0190</td>
<td>-1.133*</td>
<td>-0.796*</td>
<td>1.073*</td>
<td>1.062*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Major civil war duration)</td>
<td>(0.0984)</td>
<td>(0.0203)</td>
<td>(0.501)</td>
<td>(0.471)</td>
<td>(0.601)</td>
<td>(0.523)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor civil war duration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major civil war duration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency</td>
<td>5.637***</td>
<td>3.508***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(entry year)</td>
<td>(1.041)</td>
<td>(0.733)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-1.133*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.501)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum years in power</td>
<td>2481</td>
<td>2928</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

- b. Logit model.
Exclusionary Ideology

Models 1 and 2 in Table 9.6 show that there is a negative effect of exclusionary ideology on latent repression, implying that dictators with a proclaimed exclusionary ideology repress more than dictators with a proclaimed inclusionary ideology. In contrast, there seems to be no effect when the physical violence measure is used. Both results are replicated across different subsamples (see Tables VIII.28-VIII.31 in Appendix VIII). Thus, violent repression is more likely among exclusionary than among inclusionary dictators, but the results are only robust to the latent repression measure.

Models 3-6 show a positive statistically significant impact of exclusionary ideology on minor civil war onset and duration, but no effect on major civil war. Across the subsamples, the results are largely replicated (see Tables VIII.28-VIII.31 in Appendix VIII). These results are interesting. Some may not view a minor civil war as a civil war at all because it only requires 25 battle-related deaths in a year. Instead, it can be viewed as a measure of repression. In that sense, there seems to be no effect of exclusionary ideology on civil war, but a clearer effect on repression.

Like the effect on development, the effects of exclusionary ideology on repression and civil war are not as clear as expected. The explanations regarding measurement discussed in relation to the results for development may also apply here. The potential bias in the coding of the measure regarding the residual category and the fact that the measure concerns proclaimed exclusion may very well explain the lack of robustness of the results.

However, another explanation also exists. Failure to find significant results for V-Dem’s physical violence measure may be caused by underreporting of physical violence back in time, as I find robust significant results with the latent repression measure that corrects for underreporting. Viewing the measures of minor civil war as instances of repression further strengthens support for the conclusion that a dictator’s proclaimed degree of exclusion affects the degree to which he violently represses his people.

Overall, the effects of ideological motivation on repression and civil war are as expected, i.e., the more ideologically motivated a dictator is, the less he represses, the less likely he is to start a civil war, and the shorter the potential war. The effects of exclusionary ideology are also largely as expected. The more exclusionary a dictator claims to be, the more likely he is to repress, the more likely he is to start a minor civil war, and the longer the civil war is likely to last. However, there is no effect on major (what some would call “real”) civil war, and the results regarding repression only hold for one of the two measures.
Table 9.6. Exclusionary Ideology and Repression and Civil War. OLS regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>(Absence of) latent repression&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>(Absence of) physical violence&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Minor civil war onset&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Major civil war onset&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Minor civil war duration</th>
<th>Major civil war duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent variable</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum years in power</td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary ideology</td>
<td>-0.156**&lt;sup&gt;**&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-0.0213</td>
<td>0.335&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>0.741&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0505)</td>
<td>(0.0140)</td>
<td>(0.172)</td>
<td>(0.192)</td>
<td>(0.370)</td>
<td>(0.256)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>0.775***</td>
<td>0.823***</td>
<td>5.108***</td>
<td>3.287***</td>
<td>(1.143)</td>
<td>(0.734)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0460)</td>
<td>(0.0709)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(entry year)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency</td>
<td>0.0187</td>
<td>0.0223</td>
<td>0.0846&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.0392&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>(0.0153)</td>
<td>(0.0336)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0154)</td>
<td>(0.0202)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.0307&lt;sup&gt;+&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.0874&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-1.818***</td>
<td>-1.822***</td>
<td>-0.816</td>
<td>-0.0631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0603)</td>
<td>(0.0372)</td>
<td>(0.371)</td>
<td>(0.407)</td>
<td>(0.580)</td>
<td>(0.353)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2422</td>
<td>2848</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; <sup>+</sup> \( p < 0.1 \), <sup>*</sup> \( p < 0.05 \), <sup>**</sup> \( p < 0.01 \), <sup>***</sup> \( p < 0.001 \). Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

<sup>a</sup> Double-clustered standard errors.
<sup>b</sup> Logit model.
Despite the lacking robustness, these results are interesting and perhaps even surprisingly clear in light of the hard test they have been exposed to. In addition to the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable, there has been noise in the models, and the statistical power has been relatively low, which implies that it is increasingly difficult to find statistically significant results.

Conclusion

In Chapter 3, I presented my expectations regarding the potential consequences of dictators’ motivation for development, repression and civil war. In Chapter 5, these expectations were probed in three case studies. Surprisingly, development appears to be affected differently by ideologically motivated dictators with diverging economic ideologies. Right-wing Lee Kuan Yew managed to spur enormous development in Singapore, whereas socialist Julius Nyerere led Tanzania towards economic devastation. This chapter describes the first large-scale global study of the consequences of dictators’ motivation. My theoretical expectations about the consequences of the dictators’ motivation were tested more systematically in a large-N setting based on the dataset created and presented in Chapter 7. Table 9.7 provides an overview of the main results compared to the theoretical expectations.

Table 9.7. Expectations and Findings: The Impact of Dictators’ Motivation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Development</th>
<th>Repression</th>
<th>Civil war</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree of ideological</td>
<td>Expected</td>
<td>Result</td>
<td>Expected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>motivation</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological content:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological content:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Some of the effects have been discussed as interaction effects. The direct effects presented in this table are based on the assumption that extremely exclusionary ideologically motivated dictators are rare. The two categories containing ideological content are only relevant for dictators with some degree of ideological motivation.

Providers of Development

The general finding is that the more ideologically motivated a dictator is, the more he is likely to enhance development. Another important finding is that the economic content of the ideology does not matter for socio-economic development approximated by GDP per capita, infant mortality rate, and life expectancy. In this sense, the case of Nyerere is an outlier. This is consistent with
the theoretical expectations, as dictators often rule developing or middle-income countries where large economic transformations are known to be necessary to enhance development significantly, and ideologically motivated dictators will attempt to do this no matter their economic stance. More economically “biased” aspects of development are affected by the economic content of the ideology, but ideologically motivated dictators (compared to self-interested dictators) still generally prioritize all aspects. For instance, the welfare state becomes more developed under left-wing dictators, whereas right-wing dictators are more likely to focus on the industry, production, and business.

It appears that ideologically motivated dictators with exclusionary ideologies are not particularly harmful to the general socio-economic development in their country. This is surprising since exclusion of certain groups should harm the focus on development, and the comparison, in Chapter 5, of the inclusionary Lee and Nyerere on one side and the exclusionary Pol Pot on the other indicates that degree of exclusion should matter for development (although Nyerere also happened to destroy the national economy). Yet, like Nyerere, Pol Pot may be an outlier. Exclusion may only harm general socio-economic development insofar as it is exclusion of large groups and strong exclusion, which is very rarely the case. Instead, moderate exclusion may only affect inequality but not overall development.

Repressive and War-Prone Dictators

Ideologically motivated dictators are generally less likely than self-interested dictators to repress their people violently, which may be explained by other-regarding concerns among ideologically motivated dictators. Repression has an intrinsic cost by inflicting harm on the people, and the more self-interested a dictator is, the less he cares. However, the more exclusionary a dictator is, the more repressive he should be. This expectation is supported empirically.

Ideologically motivated dictators are generally also less likely to experience civil war during their incumbency, especially inclusionary dictators as there is a positive relationship between dictators who claim exclusion and the risk of (minor) civil war.

Even though the results are not as robust as expected, the support found for the theoretical expectations is rather interesting. The expectations have been exposed to hard test conditions in three ways in particular. First, due to the analytical setup, given the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. Including a lagged dependent variable is widely regarded as a hard test, because so much of the variation is taken up by this variable. Second, the inclusion of noise (self-interested dictators) means that the effects of the ideological content are most likely underestimated. Third, the low number of observations in
itself means that it is more difficult for a relationship to reach statistical significance. Even under these conditions, most of the expected relationships are empirically supported.

Wider Impact

Dictators’ motivation matters. Ideologically motivated dictators tend to develop their country more, they tend to repress less, and they are less likely to experience civil war during their incumbency. However, the group of ideologically motivated dictators is heterogeneous. Exclusionary dictators are more repressive and war-prone than their inclusionary counterparts, although they are not as detrimental to their countries as expected. The finding that some dictators are better for their country than others (with regard to the outcomes investigated here) has no normative claim. Yet, this finding is important for understanding and explaining the political dynamics and societal outcomes in autocracies. The analyses in this chapter have accounted for the institutional settings that most research on autocracies study; thus, the impact of motivation adds to this.

That dictators’ motives matter has largely been neglected in most theoretical and comparative research on authoritarian regimes. There has been an overwhelming focus on constraints and institutions. Therefore, this study is particularly important. To keep assuming that all dictators are self-interested blocks the possibility to take a great leap forward in our understanding of and ability to explain the behavior of dictators. Only a minority of dictators are really motivated exclusively by self-interest. The robust finding that dictators’ motivation actually matters for several important outcomes affecting the people living in autocracies demonstrates that also the one-eyed focus on constraints has become a barrier to enhancing our explanations of the political dynamics in autocracies. To drive forward the research in the field, we must attempt to include the dictators’ different motives. Chapter 7 has provided the data, and this chapter has taken a first step in showing how this can be done in a global quantitative setting.

52 Note, moreover, that I have not compared to democracies, so the results imply nothing about which regime type is preferable with regard to the outcomes investigated here. Of course, we know that repression is inherent in autocracies, whereas violent repression, in particular, is absent in democracies, per definition.

53 Although I have included a control for the institutional setting in all models (via the lagged dependent variable), I have conducted robustness checks with explicit inclusion of GWF’s autocracy types. This inclusion had no (substantial) effect on the results (see Tables VIII.8, VIII.14, VIII.20, VIII.26, and VIII.31 in Appendix VIII).
Chapter 10: Discussions and Conclusions

The growing unrest in Belarus these days, and Lukashenko, who has been the ruler for 26 years, locking up and torturing protesters while clinging to power make us awkwardly aware that dictatorships still exist, and the rights, freedoms, and chances of choosing the political leader are absent, or at best, restrictive. 40% of the world population currently live under autocratic rule, and uncovering systematic patterns in the behavior of autocrats and their regimes is an ever-important task. This book adds to the current knowledge of autocracies by providing the first coherent and systematic study of dictators’ motives.

It makes three substantial contributions: First, in contrast to the dominant view, this book provides strong evidence that a vast majority of dictators are substantially driven by sincerely held ideological beliefs. Second, certain traits of dictators’ personal and political background correlate with their motivation. Finally, the book provides evidence that dictator motivation has consequences for development, repression, and civil war. Methodologically, the book shows that motivation can be empirically investigated, and how. Relatedly, it introduces a global dataset on dictators’ motivation which helps advance future research by enabling the incorporation of dictators’ nuanced motives, which is essential to enhance our understanding and explanation of dictators’ behavior and the political dynamics in autocracies.

After highlighting the contributions in turn, I will discuss the implications for the broader literature.

Ideological Motivation among Dictators: Prevalence, Patterns, and Consequences

In stark contrast to the self-interest assumption that is predominant in theoretical and comparative research on autocracies (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Olson, 1993; Svolik, 2012; Wintrobe, 1998), this book presents evidence that dictators hold very diverse and different motives, for instance concern for the poor, concern for a particular ethnicity (a national majority or minority), anti-communism, national concerns including independence, stability, and

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54 Based on population sizes from World Development Indicators (World Bank Group, 2020) and democracy measure from Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (Skaaning, Gerring, & Bartusevicius, 2015).
economic development, as well as concerns for their own power and wealth. Most of these concerns are sincere, (conditional) sociotropic concerns in contrast to pure egotropic concerns of power and wealth maximization. Most dictators are substantially motivated by ideology, some are ideologically motivated and at the same time interested in power and wealth, whereas only around 10-20% of the modern time dictators appear to be exclusively power and wealth maximizing.

After having established that dictators have widely different motives, and a majority are substantially ideologically motivated, it is interesting to know when we can expect to see a Mobutu, a Lee Kuan Yew, and a Pol Pot. The second contribution of this book is to detect such patterns in motivation. Several traits in the dictators’ personal and political background are correlated with motivation, likely due to a selection effect as well as socialization. Reaching the top political post in an autocracy is most often extremely difficult and risky. When the road to power is particularly risky, and when a dictator has other options to become wealthy and powerful, e.g., through business and education, many self-interested dictators are likely to select out, leaving the most ideologically motivated dictators to climb the difficult road to political power. This, along with socialization effects, may explain why dictators with a tough road to power, i.e., guerilla fighters and former political prisoners, and dictators with a strong educational background, as well as elderly dictators tend to be the most ideologically motivated.

Lastly, the book provides evidence of the consequences of dictators’ motivation for development, repression, and civil war. Requirements for a dictator’s motive to affect national development are autonomy to introduce policies and capacity to implement them, which can be obstructed by constraints. Dictators are generally much less constrained (i.e., subject to elite, popular, international, and economic constraints) than democratic leaders, in particular due to fewer popular and elite constraints (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Meltzer & Richard, 1981; Niskanen, 2003; Olson, 1993). Moreover, most theoretical models on autocracies do indeed predict that the autocrats’ motives play an important role, although this is strongly deemphasized, as motives are generally perceived to be similar for all dictators, i.e., constant power and wealth maximization (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Meltzer & Richard, 1981; Niskanen, 2003; Olson, 1993). However, dictators are not equally constrained. Although this study has shown that autocratic institutions, and constraints, are not closely related to motivation, dictators in personalist regimes tend to be more self-interested than other types of dictators (dictators who rule party regimes in particular). This may lead to the erroneous conclusion that ideologically motivated dictators do not have a substantial
impact on outcomes like development, repression, and civil war. However, whereas this does imply that selfish dictators tend to be the least constrained, it does not mean that we should see a smaller impact of dictators’ motives when they are other-regarding than when they are selfish. Dictators in personalized regimes are the most selfish dictators probably because they are selfish. They gain intrinsic value from power, and thus, they will never stop power consolidation. In contrast, ideologically motivated dictators rarely have an interest in becoming personalized dictators but rather to direct resources towards implementation of their ideological aims as soon as power is sufficiently consolidated (to secure political survival and power to implement their beliefs).

The evidence confirms this explanation, since dictators’ motivation has a clear impact on development, as well as on repression and civil war, even after control for institutional setting, i.e., constraints. The more ideologically motivated a dictator is, the more he is likely to introduce development policies and enhance socio-economic development, and the less likely he is to engage in violent repression and start and continue a civil war. Dictators with exclusionary ideologies are not less likely to enhance national development, but they are more likely to use violent repression and experience civil war compared to their inclusionary counterparts. The classic economic left-right dimension of ideology has no clear effect on these phenomena.

In light of dominant research on how power-greedy dictators seek to navigate within a set of constraints to obtain maximum power and exploit it for personal (economic) gain, the findings of this book are surprising. Given the complex and controversial character of the subject of study, I have strived to explore dictators’ motivation in particularly systematic and transparent ways. Accordingly, four concerns have been in focus: avoid measuring motivation on the basis of outcomes; distinguish motivation from institutions; avoid over-reporting ideological motivation; and concept consistency. On the basis of these concerns, the three inquiries on dictators’ motivation (i.e., prevalence, correlates, and consequences) have been studied in two ways: through detailed case studies covering more than twenty dictators, and on a broader scale in a quantitative setting. For the latter, I created the Obituaries Registry of Dictators Dataset covering almost 300 dictators ruling in the period 1945-2008. Using obituary writers as experts by carefully evaluating their assessments with the regard to the concept of motivation resulted in a dataset covering several aspects of the dictators’ motivation (as well as other variables of relevance to autocracy scholars). Thus, in addition to enabling this study of dictators’ motivation, the empirical strategy has provided guidelines as well as a dataset to advance future research on dictators’ motivation.
Implications: Where to Go From Here?

The most central and ground-breaking contribution of this study is the provision of descriptive evidence that dictators’ motives often include other-regarding ideological beliefs and are broader and often more complex than simply personal wealth and power. This has several broad implications. Two important questions to ask—and answer—concern whether and how to incorporate more nuanced motives in our theoretical and empirical models. I will address them in turn.

Accuracy vs. Parsimony

Although I have found that many dictators are ideologically motivated, and that it matters, should we, and how should we, incorporate this in future research? While some scholars surely believe that dictators are mainly self-interested, others employ this assumption due to lack of alternatives (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, pp. 22–23; Gandhi, 2008, pp. 141–142; Olson, 1993; Svolik, 2012; Wintrobe, 1998, p. 95). Milton Friedman (1953, p. 14) famously stated, “Truly important and significant hypotheses will be found to have ‘assumptions’ that are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of reality.” The reason is the belief in (radical) parsimony, i.e., explaining much with little, hence, assumptions need to be as simple as possible, which will imply only very crude approximations to reality (Friedman, 1953, pp. 7–15). The self-interest assumption is simple and enables parsimonious models. These are reasons for keeping it. This study has shown that the empirical support of the self-interested dictator is lacking, so the argument about the accuracy of the assumption does not hold. Instead, the answer to the question about whether to implement ideological motivation into the models of dictatorships hinges on a trade-off between accuracy and parsimony. Given the solid evidence of substantial ideological motivation among a large majority of modern autocrats, it is difficult to defend the principle of parsimony on this basis, unless we, like Friedman, do not assign any value to accuracy, which is a radical and much criticized view (Green & Shapiro, 1994). Simply, too few dictators act in accordance with pure self-interest, and we miss too much of the picture by holding on to this assumption in general studies of modern dictators.

All dictators need to survive in power to translate their aims into reality, which seems to imply the predominant focus on political survival to be justified. It is—research on political survival is indeed very important. However, it is not justified that we do not try to optimize our models when we know better. Not only are the current assumptions quite far from reality, which affects our understanding of what is happening. Moreover, as motivation appears to have an effect on important phenomena such as national development, repression
levels, and the risk of civil war, it is crucial for explaining (and predicting) the dynamics of authoritarian regimes.

Specifically, studies investigating the effect of political regimes on different aspects of development are somewhat inconclusive, although most recent studies find democracies to be superior with regard to development (Gerring et al., 2012; Gizelis, 2009; Justesen, 2012; Knutsen, 2012; Miller, 2015). A reason for the unclear findings might be that the effects are conditional on the motives of the dictators (and perhaps the democratic leaders, although they tend to be more constrained). Most of these studies are based on the theoretical argument that autocrats are less constrained than their democratic counterparts, which implies that, due to their selfish motives, autocrats will exploit power for their personal economic benefit. In contrast, democratic leaders will provide welfare and development for the people, because they are forced to do so by the people on whom their power depends (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003; Meltzer & Richard, 1981; Niskanen, 2003; Olson, 1993). However, this argument hinges very much on the assumption that rulers are self-interested. Dictators who hold ideologies favoring national development are likely to enhance development much more than self-interested autocrats (and perhaps even compared to the more constrained democratic leaders). Given the evidence provided in this book and the importance of motives in the theoretical models (although deemphasized), many studies on the consequences of political regime type for development-related outcomes may reveal different results when the dictators’ varying motives are accounted for.

Under certain circumstances, however, we may hold on to the self-interest assumption. As evidence from Chapters 6 and 8 indicates, some dictators are more likely to be self-interested than others. For instance, in the study of highly personalized regimes, self-interest may be an appropriate assumption. Also, monarchies, where power is inherited (implying that selfish dictators do not select out due to a tough road to power), and where the ruler has the least contact with the people, tend to be ruled by rather self-interested dictators. Of course, there are exceptions. Self-interest in a particular variant, namely power maximization, may be appropriate to hold on to in cases where the dictators are heavily constrained, but only in a study of the consequences where the particular constraints expectedly put the basic motivation out of play.

Arguing that self-interest may be a justified assumption in the study of highly personalized autocracies, i.e., the least constrained, as well as studying regimes under heavy constraints may lead to the erroneous conclusion that

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55 The “Lee thesis” that dictators’ autonomy and “goodwill” could lead to enhanced development has been represented in older research, although the importance of motives was not highlighted (Knutsen, 2012; Przeworski & Limongi, 1993).
most dictators can be assumed self-interested. Only few dictators, like Julius Nyerere’s successor Ali Hassan Mwinyi, are extremely constrained throughout their rule; and assuming self-interest here is still trading off parsimony against accuracy, as many of these dictators are in fact ideologically motivated. At the opposite end of the constraint spectrum, only the most personalized leaders tend to lean strongly toward the selfish end of the motivation spectrum. Two thirds of the dictators ruling the 10% most personalized dictatorships are at the self-interested end of the spectrum (scoring either of the two lowest scores on a four-point scale), but already among the 10-20% most personalized dictatorships, a majority of the rulers are at the other-regarding end of the spectrum (receiving either of the two highest scores).  

This discussion concerns when, if ever, it is most justified to assume self-interest by weighting parsimony over accuracy. Recall that one of the main conclusions in this book is that 60-70% of the dictators are substantially ideologically motivated, and only between 10-20% of dictators are (almost) purely self-interested. Thus, we should strive to include nuanced motives in our models, but the assumption about self-interest may be justified under certain circumstances where the concern for parsimony may exceed the concern for accuracy.

Introducing Nuanced Motives in Practice

As should be clear by now, introducing nuanced motives of dictators in our theoretical and empirical models is crucial. If we really want to enhance our knowledge about authoritarian regimes, we need to break with the predominant assumption about dictators being interested in only power and wealth. No doubt, this will be difficult, especially in quantitative research, and the models will become more complex, but this step is unavoidable. This is not a general critique of modern rational choice theory or of formal modelling. It is a critique of the narrow way it has often been implemented in the field of autocratic research, where the content of the utility function is narrow egotropic concerns. In other words, this is a call to expand the content of dictators’ utility function by introducing more nuanced, including sociotropic, motives. But how should we do this in practice?

I will deal with issues of introducing nuanced motives into our theoretical models, by discussing, first, which aspects of motivation are needed, and, second, the different roles motives could play in the models. Lastly, I turn to the possibilities of including motives in our empirical models.

It is neither advisable nor possible to introduce similar and parsimonious models substituting sociotropism for self-interest: not advisable because it

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56 The calculations are based on Geddes et al.’s (2017) personalization measure, and the judgement-based measure of motivation is from the ORDD.
would be highly inaccurate since most dictators are placed somewhere between the two poles of the motivation spectrum; not possible because power and wealth maximization are only two concerns, whereas ideological motivation covers a variety of beliefs (types of ideology).

The first steps to incorporating more nuanced motives into our theoretical and empirical models are taken in this book. In addition to studying the prevalence of ideological motivation among dictators, I have studied the patterns in as well as the consequences of dictator motivation. In the study of patterns in motivation, the theory builds on the overall motivation spectrum from egotopic to sociotropic, while disregarding the content of ideology. In contrast, the study of the consequences of motivation also includes the ideological content, although the clearest expectations were about the overall degree of ideological motivation. Empirically, the overall degree of ideological motivation were also found to be the most important motivational aspect, in particular because what would disturb this picture is highly exclusionary ideologically motivated dictators, like Pol Pot and Hitler, but these extreme examples are few. This finding suggests that we can learn a lot by introducing one measure of motivation, i.e., the degree of ideological (or sociotropic) motivation, into our models. Hence, it may be possible to sustain some degree of parsimony. Of course, it depends on the aim of the study. Exploring the consequences of motivation on for instance inequality may demand inclusion of at least the exclusionary dimension of the ideology, whereas in the study of the consequences for socio-economic development more broadly, it may be defensible to only include the overall degree of ideological motivation (and not the ideological content).

The dictators’ motives can play different roles in the models of authoritarian research. I have studied their correlates and used them as explanatory factors in the study of their consequences. However, as illustrated in the previous section, we may want to build conditional arguments where the dictators’ motives appear as scope conditions, such that a theoretical expectation is only expected if the dictators hold certain motives. This implementation is relevant both in the revision of existing theories of how autocracies work and when building new models. The models on political survival or power consolidation, like the many models building on selectorate theory, most likely fit self-interested dictators better than highly ideologically motivated dictators. This conditional role of motivation can be thought of analogously to the common use of autocracy types: Just as many arguments and studies only concern a particular type of autocratic setting, they may only be relevant given certain types of motives of the autocrat.

How to investigate dictators’ motivation empirically is a tough, but not impossible, question to answer. Although nobody is a perfect mind reader, we
can study motivation in meaningful ways. I addition to showing this, I provide
guidelines on how to conduct qualitative investigations of motivation and a
global dataset of dictators’ motivation, namely the ORDD, to be used in a
quantitative setting. Despite the temporal invariance over a dictators’ incum-
bency, in the sense that each dictator’s motives equals one observation, the
data is very useful for several purposes. As shown in Chapters 8 and 9, it is
possible to study patterns in and consequences of motivation. Another use
with a large potential is the test of conditional arguments, i.e., it is relevant to
use dictator motivation as an interaction term (also in TSCS analyses where
the analytical unit is country years), or as a tool to specify a population on the
basis of motivation. The data on dictator motivation is similar to measures of
autocracy type, with regard to the invariance within a dictator spell, and can
be implemented empirically in similar ways.

The Scope of the Argument

The empirical scope of this book is dictatorships after World War II. However,
since many of the theoretical mechanisms are expected to be universal, there
is reason to believe that the results travel both temporally and spatially. This
does not imply that many dictators were also motivated by ideological con-
cerns rather than pure self-interest, for instance back in the Middle Ages. On
the one hand, the explanation about human nature has not changed. On the
other hand, different views of fairness (on which motives are based) have
changed significantly over time. For example, the Enlightenment introduced
new ideas with a strong focus on rights, equality, and freedom. Generally, the
people became more visible to the rulers, partly due to their demands for
rights and equality, and partly due to the technological development, e.g., with
regard to access to information (Norberg, 2016; Pinker, 2018). Interaction
with people combined with new thoughts about all human beings as equals increase the likelihood of caring about them (Allport, 1954; Greene, 2013;
Pinker, 2011). Therefore, we may expect people in general, and most likely also
rulers, to have been more sociotropic after than before the Enlightenment.
Another argument is that monarchies were much more widespread centuries
ago than today, and monarchs are found to be more self-interested than some
of the other dictators.

A related question is whether this picture is sustained in the future. As the
world develops, and more people become informed and educated, sociotropic

57 My studies indicate that dictators’ motivation rarely changes much during their
incumbency and, thus, a single score per dictator is approximately empirically accu-
rate.
perspectives might become even more prevalent (although there are always reversals), among ordinary citizens as well as dictators. Moreover, although many autocracies today have ruling parties from where the successor is often picked, many regimes are highly personalized, which often makes the battle for the top political post dangerous and tough, in particular for someone who would like to topple the incumbent rather than wait for him to step down or die in power. In addition, alternative options for power and wealth maximizers may become more viable as countries become richer. Thus, many self-interested people are still likely “select out” and not pursue the top political post.

However, there are tendencies that pull in the opposite direction. In some countries, in particular party dictatorships, politics is increasingly viewed as a job and not mainly as a place to change the country, and there is money to earn on the road to the top political post, also if it is never reached (Tanzania Expert 2, 2017; Tanzania Expert 4, 2017; Uganda Expert 2, 2017; Uganda Expert 4, 2017). Thus, also people with rather selfish motives may be inclined to pursue a political career in these settings. Another important argument is that other-regarding concerns can transcend not only concerns for standard of living or economic development, but also concerns for rights and freedoms, implying that an increasing number of sociotropic dictators may attempt to democratize, as we have already seen in some cases. If this happens (which is far from certain), the remaining dictators may be relatively more selfish on average. Thus, future dictators are also likely to hold many different motives, but whether they will tend to be more egotropic or sociotropic than today is difficult to predict.

A final reflection on the scope of the argument concerns whether it also applies in democracies. The impact of democratic leaders’ motives is most likely smaller due to the decentralization of power, especially in parliamentary systems. However, there is reason to believe that democratic leaders hold as many different motives as dictators, and that they can be “predicted” by similar background factors. The road to power is less risky in democracies than in autocracies. It may be expensive in terms of money and time, but the challengers rarely risk their life in the process (except perhaps the few democratic leaders who fought the democratization battle). Thus, people with many different motives may strive towards the top political post. On the other hand, the development argument also applies here (although this is not inherent to democracy, but an effect of development, which is generally high in the Western world where most established democracies are placed): The more developed a country is, the better options for reaching wealth and power elsewhere (in particular if inequality is low), which makes self-interested dictators select out of politics. In addition, many democracies have a more educated population,
which generally implies more other-regarding concerns. A final concern related to the core of democracy is that the people have the option not to elect the most obvious egotropic leaders. However, the empirical impact of this depends on how easily the people work out the motives of their potential leaders.

In conclusion, today and in the future, dictators (and democratic leaders) will have diverging motives. Machiavelli may have been able to help many rulers in the sixteenth century where he offered tips and tricks to help the self-interested dictator to political survival. However, his guidance is no longer sufficient. All dictators still need power regardless of their motives (even the ones who just want to “put the country right” and leave), but most dictators have substantial other-regarding concerns in addition to (or instead of) self-interest, which changes important aspects of the political game.

Reflections

In this book, I have argued and shown that dictators are not purely self-interested but have diverse motives, including sociotropic ones. This does not imply that this book is about the “good” dictator. Ideologically motivated, other-regarding, or sociotropic dictators are not necessarily “good”. Certain effects of specific motives may be perceived as good. Although strongly ideologically motivated (in particular inclusionary) dictators tend to be better for the well-being of their people regarding important aspects of life than their selfish counterparts, this does not mean that these dictators are commendable for at least two reasons:

First, although dictators with certain ideological beliefs have a positive impact on some outcomes, it will not be on everything or for everyone. Take the example of Nyerere in Tanzania, one of the most ideologically motivated and inclusionary dictators in this study. He managed to install national unity, but he also led the country into economic devastation, and he did not abstain from repression. Moreover, his concerns for equality were as radical as they suffered from the “levelling down objection”, i.e., some people become worse off in an absolute sense in the name of equality. He did not only prioritize agriculture; he deliberately slowed down and harmed the industry in order to reduce the development gap to the agricultural sector. At the other end of the political-economic spectrum, we find the highly ideologically motivated utilitarian, like Park Chung-Hee, who prioritized only the “best” people and businesses where overall utility would be highest, largely disregarding the parts of the population that would be difficult to help. In addition to these examples of ideologically motivated dictators are the likes of Pol Pot, who was also ideologically motivated but one of the most dreadful dictators in modern times.
Second, and even more important, certain traits inherent in autocracies are unavoidable. Even if dictatorships ruled by dictators with certain motives fare better in certain regards compared to democracies, the lack of political and personal rights and liberties, as well as the risk of misrule by the dependency on one man’s good will, is a high price to pay. Even inclusionary dictators may make their people suffer under ideology, and dictators are often blinded by their ideology. Only rarely will they stop and reflect. Nyerere seemed to do it when he decided to step down, but it was already too late. The following quote expresses the essence of this:

Debates about Nyerere’s personal legacy and the impact of his strategies will continue, but there is little doubt that he implemented radical new politics in pursuit of a peaceful, prosperous, and inclusive society. Tanzania’s congenial peace today is a testament to his successes. But the price of his stubborn idealism was authoritarian rule that blinded him to the economic dysfunction, secrecy, and cynicism that his policies caused (Bjerk, 2017: 147).

Thus, there are many aspects to what a “good” ruler and political regime are. In essence, this is not what this book is about. Instead, it is about acquiring knowledge about autocracies. Without knowledge, the lives of the people cannot be improved. Important knowledge is provided in this book. The study of dictators’ motives is essential, as dictators have nuanced motives, and these motives have consequences. We should try actively to incorporate dictators’ different motives in our theoretical and empirical models, as this will significantly enhance our understanding and explanations of how dictatorships work.


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English Summary

The predominant theoretical frameworks and comparative empirical accounts of political dynamics in authoritarian regimes view dictators as rationally self-interested power and wealth maximizers. In contrast, qualitative research often incorporates more nuanced motives of dictators. This discrepancy may not only be a question of different beliefs but also of feasibility. It is much easier to build both theoretical and (quantitative) empirical models when it is assumed that actors are rationally self-interested than when more nuanced motives are introduced. This approach may also be justified if most dictators are in fact predominantly self-interested. But are they? This question is central to this book as I set out to investigate to what extent and when dictators are ideologically motivated and to what extent dictators' motivation affects policymaking and outcomes in autocracies.

All dictators need power to be able to rule, no matter which intrinsic motives they may have. But after the most critical power consolidation, more generally, in times of low constraints, do dictators keep amassing personal power and wealth, or do they have a more sociotropic vision they choose to follow? I argue that most dictators do have broader visions that guide their rule, as they are likely to be motivated by certain fairness concerns, as ordinary people are. Fairness can be many things, for instance, it can be based in equality, in utility maximization, and it can be rather exclusionary. On the political scene, these core concerns translate into political ideologies or specific beliefs, like variants of socialism, developmentalism, conservatism, nationalism, racism etc. Given that the road to the top political post in an autocracy is often extremely risky and costly, and the chances of success in reaching the top political post are low, people mainly concerned with power and wealth will find other ways to satisfy their interests, e.g., in business. In contrast, ideologically motivated people will seek political influence. This leads to the expectation that many dictators are substantially ideologically motivated, and only few purely self-interested. Because of this mechanism, we should expect dictators with a particularly tough road to power to be the most ideologically motivated along with dictators who face high opportunity costs when choosing to enter the struggle for top political post.

Although existing research on autocracies pictures dictators as highly constrained individuals who try to navigate within these constraints to secure political survival (and economic gain), dictators are constrained to different degrees (e.g., by the elite, the people, the economy, and the international community), and we should expect motivation to matter, in particular in settings
and times of low constraints. Generally, we should expect more positive consequences for the people’s well-being the more ideologically motivated the dictator is, simply because the well-being of the people has intrinsic value to the ideologically motivated dictator, albeit to different degrees, depending on the ideological content (e.g., whether a dictator belongs to the economic right or left, and in particular whether he is exclusionary or inclusionary). In contrast, the well-being of the people has no intrinsic value to the purely self-interested dictator.

These claims, regarding the prevalence of, the patterns in, and the consequences of dictators’ ideological motivation, are empirically investigated in two ways: qualitatively in case studies, and quantitatively in a larger global sample. In the case studies, I investigate the dictators’ motives, guided by a battery of pre-listed indicators of motivation, by employing biographical readings and country-specific accounts covering the period of interest. Although the case studies cover twenty randomly selected dictators representative of the dictators ruling after World War II, I increase the number of observations in the second part of the empirical analysis in order to further enable generalization. I create the Obituary Registry of Dictators Dataset containing almost three hundred dictators. The empirical results of the two types of analysis are largely similar, which implies that the conclusions drawn are well founded.

This book provides evidence that most dictators are not predominantly self-interested, that is, driven by power and wealth maximization; rather they are motivated substantially by ideological beliefs spanning socialism or communism, e.g., Fidel Castro (Cuba) and Léopold Senghor (Senegal); developmentalism, e.g., Park Chung-Hee (South Korea) and Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore); conservatism, e.g., António Salazar (Portugal) and Pedro Araburu (Argentina); nationalism, e.g., Gamal Nasser (Egypt), and Josip Tito (Yugoslavia); exclusion, e.g., the apartheid rule (South Africa), Ayatollah Khomenei (Iran) and Pol Pot (Cambodia). In addition, the empirical studies indicate that a subgroup of dictators with a military background seem to fall in a particular motivational category. They take power with the sincerely held motive to stabilize the country and voluntarily return it to democratic, or at least civilian, rule. This is in stark contrast to the military strongmen who centralize power in their own hands and often appear to be driven by strongly selfish motives.

In line with the theoretical expectations, the empirical studies indicate that dictators with a tough road to power, and educated as well as older dictators tend to be the most ideologically motivated. Moreover, institutions and motivation are not closely related, although personalist dictators tend to be the least ideologically motivated. This is not surprising as most self-interested dictators find large intrinsic value in power and never stop power maximizing
in contrast to ideologically motivated dictators, who direct attention to realizing their ideas. Thus, in this case, motivation probably affects institutions, and the fact that self-interested dictators appear to be the least constrained (by their ruling coalition) does not mean that ideological motivation does not matter, as ideologically motivated dictators consolidate power sufficiently to enable implementation of ideology. However, dictators may be subject to constraints that they do not control, which can be illustrated by comparing the two Tanzanian dictators, Julius Nyerere and Ali Hassan Mwinyi. Nyerere was largely unconstrained as he received much unconditional aid from international donors. In contrast, Mwinyi inherited a country that was economically devastated, and he had no option but accept the conditional economic aid from the international community. Thus, whereas Nyerere was largely unconstrained, Mwinyi had very little leeway from the constraints. This implies that Nyerere’s socialist beliefs had an enormous impact on the policies and the country, whereas Mwinyi’s motives had little or no impact. Thus, dictators are constrained to varying degrees, and we should see that motivation matters when the dictators are not severely constrained.

Indeed, the empirical studies show clear effects of dictator motivation. The more ideologically motivated a dictator is (as opposed to self-interested), the more he tends to develop his country, the less he tends to repress, and the lower is the risk of civil war. Dictators with exclusionary beliefs tend to repress more than dictators with inclusionary beliefs.

These conclusions do not imply that (some) dictators are “good”, but rather that they are much more diverse than existing research tends to assume. A majority of all dictators are substantially motivated by ideological beliefs, and their motives matter. This book strongly recommends that future research incorporate more nuanced motives in theoretical and empirical models, as this will significantly enhance our understanding and ability to explain the political dynamics in dictatorships.
Dansk resumé

Diktatorer er snævert egennyttemaksimerende og forsøger kun at maksimere deres egen magt og velstand. Det er antagelsen i langt det meste teoretiske og komparative forskning i autokratier. Kvalitative studier har ofte mere nuancerede antagelser om diktatorernes motiver. Denne diskrepanse er bemærkelsesværdig. Den skyldes ikke nødvendigvis, at forskerne med de to tilgange ikke tror det samme om diktatorernes motiver, men i mindst lige så høj grad at det er svært at modellere nuancerede motiver, både teoretisk og (kvantitativt) empirisk. En forsimpling ved fastholdelsen af antagelsen om den snævert egennyttemaksimerende diktator kan dog også retfærdiggøres, såfremt diktater overvejende er snævert egennyttemaksimerende. Men er de nu også det? Dette er et centralt spørgsmål i denne bog, hvor jeg undersøger, i hvilket omfang og hvornår diktatorer er ideologisk motiverede, og i hvilket omfang det påvirker de politiske dynamikker og outcomes som udvikling, undertrykelse og borgerkrig i autokratier.

Alle diktatorer har brug for en vis grad af politisk magt for at kunne regere. Men spørgsmålet er, hvad diktatorer gør, når (hvis) de har konsolideret magten tilstrækkeligt? Fortsætter de med at centralisere magten omkring dem selv og/eller udnytte den til egen fordel, f.eks. ved at stjæle fra statskassen, eller forsøger de i stedet at implementere deres (mere eller mindre) sociotropiske ideer? Min forventning er, at diktatorer i høj grad har bredere overbevisninger, som er baseret på deres idé om, hvad der er retfærdigt eller fair, hvilket også motiverer almindelige mennesker. Retfærdighed kan være mange ting, herunder lighedsbaseret, utilitaristisk og/eller ekskluderende. På den politiske scene kan dette udmøntes i ideologiske overbevisninger som f.eks. socialism, ”developmentalism”, konservativisme, nationalism, racisme m.m. Vejen til den øverste politiske post i et autokrati er oftest utrolig usikker og omkostningsfuld. I øvrigt er sandsynligheden for faktisk at nå toppen meget lav. Selvom det også er svært at blive en magtfuld og rig forretningsmand, er det mindre svært og afgjort mindre livsfarligt. Derfor vil snævert egennyttemaksimerende mennesker oftere forsøge dette fremfor at søge den ypperste politiske magt. Derimod har stærkt ideologisk motiverede mennesker ikke samme mulighed for at realisere deres overbevisning andre steder end ved at blive landets leder. Derfor bør vi forvente, at diktatorer oftest er ganske ideologisk motiverede og kun sjældent udelukkende er snævert egennyttemaksimerende. Denne tendens bør være særligt tydelig hos diktatorer, der har haft en særlig svær og farlig vej til magten, samt hos diktatorer, der har haft høje alternativomkostninger, da de besluttede at gå efter den øverste politiske post.
Selvom eksisterende forskning ofte tegner et billede af diktatorers magt som værende meget begrænset af deres ruling coalition, og delvist af befolkningen, og at de bruger al deres tid på at navigere mellem disse begrænsninger for at beholde magten, er diktatorer begrænset i meget forskelligt omfang. Kun meget få er bundet på hænder og fødder. Derfor skal vi forvente, at diktatorers motivation har væsentlig betydning for politik og outcomes i autokratier, i særlighed når diktaturen sidder relativt sikkert på magten. Vi bør forvente, at ideologisk motiverede diktatorer har en positiv effekt på landets udvikling, undertrykker deres befolkning mindre og udgør en mindre trussel for at starte og fortsætte en borgerkrig, alt sammen fordi deres befolknings velbefindende i større eller mindre grad har intrinsisk værdi for diktaturen med modsætning til den snævert egennyttemaksimerende diktator, som kun tænker på sig selv og sine nærmeste. Dog betyder indholdet af en eventuel ideologi selvfølgelig noget. Særligt diktatorer med ekskluderende ideologier bekymrer sig kun om en del af befolkningen, hvilket selvfølgelig må være afgørende for effekten på de ovenfor nævnte outcomes.

Disse forventninger vedrørende udbredelsen af, mønstrene i og konsekvenserne af diktatorers motiver er empirisk undersøgt på to måder: kvalitativt i casestudier og kvantitativt i et globalt udtræk på næsten trehundrede diktatorer. I casestudierne undersøges diktatorernes motiver ved at undersøge tilstedeværelsen af en række motivationsindikatorer ved brug af biografiske og landespecifikke historiske værker som kilder. Diktatorerne i casestudierne er tilfældigt udvalgt og dermed repræsentative for diktatorer, der har regeret på et tidspunkt i perioden fra anden verdenskrig til i dag. Derudover udføres en analyse af et endnu bredere udsnit af diktatorer for yderligere at øge generaliseringspotentialet. Til dette formål udformer jeg ”The Obituary Registry of Dictators Dataset”. De empiriske resultater baseret på de to typer analyser er næsten ens, hvilket betyder, at konklusionerne baseret på dette studie er velfunderede.

militærdiktatorer, der ikke sidder på magten, fordi de har en stor plan for dem selv eller befolkningen, men som faktisk ikke har et stort ønske om at have magten som sådan. De kommer til magten for at stabilisere landet og træder hurtigt tilbage for at installere demokrati, eller i hvert fald for at indsætte et civilt styre. Disse diktatorer står i stor kontrast til de egennyttemaksimerende militærdiktatorer, som kommer til magten i håbet om at centralisere den og opbygge et personalistisk diktatur.

I overensstemmelse med de teoretiske forventninger indikerer de empiriske analyser, at diktatorer med en omkostnings- og risikofyldt vej til magten, med høj uddannelse samt ældre diktatorer er de mest ideologisk motiverede. Derudover tyder resultaterne ikke på en stærk sammenhæng mellem de autokratiske institutioner og diktatorens motiver. Dog tenderer personalistiske diktatorer til at være de mest snævert egennyttemaksimerende. Dette kan forklares med, at de finder høj intrinsisk værdi i magten, dvs. at de aldrig stopper med at centralisere magten, hvorimod ideologisk motiverede diktatorer bruger ressourcer på at realisere deres ideologiske mål, når magten er tilstrækkeligt konsolideret. Dette tilstrækkelighedsargument medfører også, at selvom personalistiske diktatorer har den største personlige magt, burde motiverne også blandt de ideologisk motiverede diktatorer have store konsekvenser for diverse outcomes.


Disse konklusioner betyder ikke, at ideologisk motiverede diktatorer er ”gode”. Men det betyder, at diktatorers motiver ikke er ens. I modsætning til antagelsen i meget eksisterende autokratiforskning har diktatorer mange forskellige motiver, og det har stor betydning for deres land og befolkning. Denne bogs primære budskab er dermed, at fremtidige studier af autokratier bør forøge at inkorporere mere nuancerede motiver for diktatorer for virkelig at øge vores forståelse af og evne til at forklare de politiske dynamikker i autokratier.
Appendix I: Bayesian Updating Calculations

Table I.1. Overview of the Posterior Confidence in the Theory Given a Prior Confidence of 30% and 20%, Given Degrees of Certainty and Uniqueness of the Implications, and the Implications being Observed or Not

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implication, $k$</th>
<th>Certainty</th>
<th>$1 - \text{uniqueness}$</th>
<th>Posterior if $k$ is observed$^b$</th>
<th>Posterior if $k$ is not observed$^b$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prior confidence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harm groups in WC</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Please groups outside WC</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-minimal WC</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low personal income</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excessive repression</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Calculated from Formula 4.1.
b. Calculated from Formula 4.2.

d. The change in confidence is halved due to inaccuracy.

b. Assuming no independence between implications.
c. Assuming 10% prior confidence.

Table I.2. Posterior Confidence in Nyerere, Lee, and Pol Pot Being Ideologically Motivated. Prior Confidence = 30%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implications</th>
<th>Nyerere</th>
<th>Lee</th>
<th>Pol Pot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$k$</td>
<td>Posterior</td>
<td>$k$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harm groups within the WC</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Please groups outside the WC</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-minimal WC</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low personal income</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>(O)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excessive repression</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Final posterior confidence$^b$</strong></td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Final posterior confidence$^{bc}$</strong></td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: O = observed, N = not observed.
a. The change in confidence is halved due to inaccuracy.
b. Assuming no independence between implications.
c. Assuming 10% prior confidence.
Table I.3. Posterior Confidence in Nyerere, Lee, and Pol Pot Being Ideologically Motivated. Prior Confidence = 30%, and Conservative Degrees of Uniqueness (+10 Percentage Points)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implications</th>
<th>Nyerere</th>
<th>Lee</th>
<th>Pol Pot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>k</td>
<td>Posterior</td>
<td>k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harm groups within the WC</td>
<td>O 0.53</td>
<td>O 0.53</td>
<td>O 0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Please groups outside the WC</td>
<td>N 0.23</td>
<td>O 0.53</td>
<td>N 0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-minimal WC</td>
<td>O 0.36</td>
<td>N 0.29</td>
<td>O 0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td>O 0.36</td>
<td>O 0.36</td>
<td>N 0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low personal income</td>
<td>O 0.39</td>
<td>(O) 0.35*</td>
<td>(O) 0.35*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excessive repression</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>O 0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Final posterior confidence</strong></td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Final posterior confidence</strong></td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: O = observed, N = not observed.
a. The change in confidence is halved due to inaccuracy.
b. Assuming no independence between implications.
c. Assuming 10% prior confidence.

Table I.4. Posterior Confidence in Nyerere, Lee, and Pol Pot Being Ideologically Motivated. Prior Confidence = 30%, and Conservative Degrees of Uniqueness (+10 Percentage Points) and Increased Certainty (by +10 Percentage Points)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implications</th>
<th>Nyerere</th>
<th>Lee</th>
<th>Pol Pot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>k</td>
<td>Posterior</td>
<td>k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harm groups within the WC</td>
<td>O 0.59</td>
<td>O 0.59</td>
<td>O 0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Please groups outside the WC</td>
<td>N 0.20</td>
<td>O 0.59</td>
<td>N 0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-minimal WC</td>
<td>O 0.46</td>
<td>N 0.26</td>
<td>O 0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td>O 0.46</td>
<td>O 0.46</td>
<td>N 0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low personal income</td>
<td>O 0.46</td>
<td>(O) 0.38*</td>
<td>(O) 0.38*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excessive repression</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>O 0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Final posterior confidence</strong></td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Final posterior confidence</strong></td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: O = observed, N = not observed.
a. The change in confidence is halved due to inaccuracy.
b. Assuming no independence between implications.
c. Assuming 10% prior confidence.
Appendix II: Case Studies

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Guide to Reading the Appendix

Approach and Concepts

This appendix contains case studies of the motivation of twenty dictators randomly selected from Svolik’s (2012) dataset on dictators who have been in power at any point in the period 1945 to 2008.

The dictators’ motivation is analyzed with the purpose of assessing where they should be placed on a scale from self-interested to ideologically motivated (other-regarding to some extent). Since there is a huge overlap between behavior motivated by ideology and behavior motivated by self-interest, my approach is to look at behavior that appears to stem from ideology and carefully investigate whether it could stem from self-interest too; and if not, it is strong evidence of ideological motivation. It is worth noticing that power and some degree of power-consolidation are necessary for all—also for ideologically motivated dictators. This implies that we are likely to see power-consolidating initiatives in all cases.

All dictators receive two assessments based on the analysis. First, their motivation is evaluated as an overall judgement on a five-point-scale, where 1 indicates highly self-interested, and 5 indicates highly ideologically motivated. In addition to the overall judgement score, all dictators get a score based on a more rigid Bayesian updating approach. The Bayesian updating approach indicates how sure we should be that a certain dictator is ideologically motivated (as opposed to self-interested). In theory, the scale spans from 0 to 1 (probability of ideological motivation), but given the number and properties of my observable implications (listed below), it spans from 0.05 to 1, where 0.05 implies that the dictator is self-interested (only 5% posterior confidence in him being ideologically motivated), and 1 implies that the dictator is ideologically motivated (100% posterior confidence in him being ideologically motivated).

I evaluate the presence of the following six observable implications:

1. Non-minimal winning coalition (evaluated as the winning coalition is presented)
2. Harming groups clearly inside the winning coalition
3. Pleasing groups clearly outside the winning coalition
4. Voluntary step-down
5. Low personal income
6. Excessive repression

Implications (1)-(3) concern the dictators’ winning coalition, which is defined as the group of people the autocrat’s power depends on; often the military, the government, the ruling elite as well as certain groups in society. A winning
coalition is not always constant. It changes when power structures change. Sometimes, it may look like a dictator is harming his winning coalition, but he is actually trying to change the power structures. In the analyses of the cases, I have been particularly aware of this to avoid conflating evidence of power centralization with evidence of putting the power at risk. Note that introducing (somewhat competitive) elections normally increases the size of the winning coalition.

My evaluation of the implications is conservative because it is difficult to assess (both for dictator and researcher) who exactly makes up the winning coalition. Implications (1)-(3) and (6) require the fulfillment of the second-order condition that the evaluated actions are consistent with the proclaimed ideology for the specific implication to be observed. Implication (6) is only evaluated if the dictator holds a proclaimed exclusionary ideology.

In addition to the six implications, I use expert assessments to further inform the analysis, although they do not enter in the calculation of the Bayesian updating score.

Sources

For assessing the presence of the different observable implications, I mainly rely on biographical readings and historical accounts covering the country and period of the regime under investigation. I use different independent sources to assess each observable implication to strengthen the validity of finding or not finding these. Biographies contain detailed information about the specific dictator, but the biographers are likely to hold strong views of the dictators they assess. As these views may affect the framing and focus in the biography, I supplement the biographical readings with literature with a broader focus to counter the unavoidable subjectivity of evidence accessed through biographical readings.

I discuss the sources continuously, as needed, in a section at the end of case studies where the sources give rise to extra discussion, for instance, when they disagree substantially, and when there is insufficient source material on a dictator to make a proper assessment of his motivation.

Generally, when sources disagree, I weigh the information and the sources based on quality and quantity to the extent possible. However, it will often be a difficult trade-off between more general and objective sources and sources close to the dictator that may possess the most detailed information but also have most personal involvement in the issues and therefore are most likely to deliver (consciously or unconsciously) biased evidence.
Structure of the Appendix

The dictators are analyzed in alphabetical order in turn. Each analysis has the following structure:
- Background information
- Proclaimed ideology (to use as fixing point when evaluating the observable implications)
- Winning coalition (analyzing who is included in the winning coalition and evaluating whether it is non-minimal, i.e., Implication 1).
- Harming groups clearly inside the winning coalition (Implication 2)
- Pleasing groups clearly outside the winning coalition (Implication 3)
- Voluntary step-down (Implication 4)
- Low personal income (Implication 5)
- Excessive repression (Implication 6)
- Expert assessments
- Summary (including the overall judgement and the Bayesian updating scores)
- Sources
Abacha, Sani (Nigeria, 1993-1998)

Sani Abacha ruled Nigeria from 1993 to 1998. He entered power through a coup d'état, and he stayed in power until he died in 1998 (Iloegbunam, 1998; Kaufman, 1998; Kirk-Greene, 1998; Rupert, 1998a, 1998b). His death appeared natural, but there is still speculation about whether it in fact was (Babatope, 2000, p. 166; Mark, 2012; Rupert, 1998b). Abacha was educated in the military and was commander-in-chief of the army when he took power (Iloegbunam, 1998; Kaufman, 1998; Kirk-Greene, 1998; Rupert, 1998b). He had participated in two earlier military coups (Iloegbunam, 1998; Kirk-Greene, 1998; Rupert, 1998a, 1998b). In addition to military affiliation, he held political positions prior to becoming president; for instance, minister of defense (Kaufman, 1998; Kirk-Greene, 1998). Abacha was not a very public person, although his face was everywhere in the country (Kaufman, 1998; Rupert, 1998a).

Abacha’s regime was highly repressive and brutal. He got rid of all opponents with brutality (Amuwo, Bach, & Lebeau, 2001, pp. 14–18; Babatope, 2000, pp. 90–91; Kaufman, 1998; Kirk-Greene, 1998; Olukotun, 2004, pp. 60–95). In addition, his regime was highly corrupt. After he died, it was revealed that he had stolen enormous sums from the state, especially oil money (Amuwo et al., 2001, pp. 3–5; Babatope, 2000, pp. 179, 181–182; Iloegbunam, 1998; Kaufman, 1998; Kirk-Greene, 1998; Mark, 2012; Rupert, 1998b, 1998a). This is despite him trying hard to fight corruption in the beginning of his incumbency (Babatope, 2000, pp. 169–181; Osaghae, 1998, pp. 278–281). When he took power, the economy was deteriorating. During the first six months of his incumbency, his tight economic policies improved the economy slightly, but throughout his incumbency the living standard decreased due to poor policies and corruption (Amuwo et al., 2001, p. 5; Osaghae, 1998, pp. 273, 280–286, 314; Rupert, 1998a).

Abacha promised to step down from power in 1998, but he made his allies form parties and in this way planned to make them reinstall him in power. However, he died before the election (Amuwo et al., 2001, pp. 16–17; Iloegbunam, 1998; Kaufman, 1998; Olukotun, 2004, p. 91).

Ideology (proclaimed)

When Abacha took power, he promised, like many other military dictators, to quickly return the country to civilian democratic rule (Iloegbunam, 1998; Osaghae, 1998, p. 286). He stated two reasons for the coup: economic mismanagement and corruption. These were also his reasons for the coup in which he participated in 1983 (Osaghae, 1998, p. 169). He promised fiscal discipline and to fight corruption (Amuwo et al., 2001, p. v, 6-7). His proclaimed
ideology was order and stability and return to democratization, i.e., the common (proclaimed) military ideology. Nigeria was deeply divided (between the rich North and poor South, but also tribal), but Abacha’s proclaimed ideological aims did not contain tribal, or other social, divisions (Kirk-Greene, 1998). His ideology was not exclusionary, and, therefore, I will not analyze the excessive repression implication.

Winning Coalition

Abacha’s winning coalition obviously consisted of the armed forces, but he seems also to have been dependent on civilian support, namely from the elite. There were basically two elite groups he could choose between. The economic (and political) elite from the North was interested in avoiding democracy, because it would empower the South (Babatope, 2000, pp. 11–12, 63, 81–82, 87, 181–182). The other group was the part of the political elite that favored democratization. Abacha’s first cabinet was largely made up of this group. They joined NADECO (National Democratic Coalition) early in Abacha’s incumbency (Babatope, 2000, p. 8).

Apparently, the people were not a part of Abacha’s winning coalition as long as Nigeria was not a democracy. Abacha was highly unpopular among the people during most of his incumbency (Babatope, 2000, pp. 69, 83; Osaghae, 1998, pp. 280–286), but he was not about to lose power when he died (Amuwo et al., 2001, pp. 1, 25, 28–29). The following quote summarizes his winning coalition: “Finally, without a pliant and malleable political class, a demented political military class and a host of other opportunists, Abacha could neither have held on to power for that long, nor, for that matter, entertained the idea of becoming Nigeria’s elected president” (Amuwo et al., 2001, p. 30). No matter which elite group Abacha chose to include in his winning coalition, it cannot be said to be a non-minimal winning coalition.

Harming Groups Clearly Inside the Winning Coalition

There are indications that Abacha planned for long to become the ruler of Nigeria. After his participation in the first coup in 1983, he was, in narrow circles, called khalifa, meaning “king in waiting” (Osaghae, 1998, p. 190). In 1993, shortly before coming to power, Abacha was Minister of Defense as well as de facto commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Already then, he started removing President Babangida’s supporters from important military positions (Osaghae, 1998, pp. 261–262). This evidence of both long- and short-term preparation to take power indicates strong motivation and determination. However, it is highly consistent both with taking power for intrinsic reasons
and, thereby, aligned with self-interest, but also with taking power as an instrument to implement other-regarding beliefs, namely, his ideological motives. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude much on this type of behavior.

**Economic Policies**

Aligned with his proclaimed ideological aims, Abacha conducted tight economic policies during the first six months of his rule. However, this was also aligned with pleasing his winning coalition because his cabinet strongly advised him to do this. A former member of the cabinet reports that Abacha was very interested in advice regarding economic policies during the first six months of his incumbency (Olukotun, 2004, pp. 16–17, 44). This resulted in a return to a state-controlled economy pushed through by his (well-intentioned (Osaghae, 1998, p. 284)) nationalist advisors (Osaghae, 1998, p. 282). Yet, it was against the interest of Western creditors and therefore increased external constraints. Inefficiently implemented policies led to further economic decline and crisis (Amuwo et al., 2001, p. 5; Osaghae, 1998, pp. 273, 283), which resulted in the reintroduction of liberalization measures in 1995 (Osaghae, 1998, p. 283). It is not easy to conclude much about Abacha’s motivation based on the introduction of the economic policies, because it was in the interest of the cabinet, which was his winning coalition, but also consistent with the ideological aim of stabilizing the economy. Abacha did not personally seem to favor either left- or right-wing economic policies. In any case, the reintroduction of liberalization was not a real choice but almost forced due to the tight external constraints.

**Anti-Corruption Policies**

Abacha also entered power on a promise to fight corruption; and he actually did that, especially in the first half year of his incumbency. He fought corruption by cleaning out in the former regime and several state departments. No one was spared, not even powerful and wealthy elites that were formerly considered untouchable (Babatope, 2000, pp. 169–181; Osaghae, 1998, pp. 278–281). In this light, the anti-corruption initiatives can be viewed as evidence of ideological motivation. However, the powerful Northerners were not exactly a part of his winning coalition in the beginning of his incumbency. The democratizers in his cabinet were enough to keep him in power. Although he did not seem to have been highly dependent on the people, the regime had to find sources of legitimization, also among the supporters of and people within the first cabinet. Abacha’s anti-corruption measures generally increased his pop-

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58 Recall that Abacha had only received military education.
ularity (Babatope, 2000, pp. 169–181; Osaghae, 1998, pp. 278–281). However, there were popular doubts about whether the anti-corruption was genuine or just a way to consolidate power, as he could take out political opponents and other threats to his rule on the pretext of fighting corruption (Osaghae, 1998, pp. 280–281). Over time, he exhibited contradictory behavior as he engaged in neopatrimonialism (Amuwo et al., 2001, pp. 25–26) and started building a network of socio-economic patronage for oil money (Amuwo et al., 2001, p. 9). He bought off military generals, politicians as well as selected West African leaders with oil money to secure political support (Amuwo et al., 2001, pp. 26–27). After he died, it became apparent that he had stolen enormous sums from the state (Amuwo et al., 2001, pp. 3–5; Babatope, 2000, pp. 179, 181–182; Iloegbunam, 1998; Kaufman, 1998; Kirk-Greene, 1998; Mark, 2012; Rupert, 1998b, 1998a). Thus, these anti-corruption measures were a way to consolidate power more than an ideologically motivated attempt to actually reduce corruption. Another option is that Abacha’s motivation changed after about a year in power from relatively ideological to largely self-interested.

**Democratic Transition and Repression**

Although Abacha called his government “provisional” and promised to hand over power to civilian rule quickly, he generally appeared hesitant and reluctant to democratize (Osaghae, 1998, pp. 286–294). He abolished the existing transition program, and he dissolved parties as well as elected executive and legislative bodies (Olukotun, 2004, p. 69; Osaghae, 1998, pp. 273–275). As a reaction to this, a large part of his government created the pro-democracy coalition, NADECO and tried to make Abacha resign (Babatope, 2000, pp. 36, 181–182). But as the powerful elite from the North was not interested in democracy (Babatope, 2000, pp. 80–81, 87), Abacha turned to them instead and dissolved the cabinet filled with NADECO members (Babatope, 2000, p. 49). He took absolute power and was backed by the military and the Northerners (Babatope, 2000, p. 17). This swift switch in affiliation also indicates a switch in motivation, namely an increased wish for power. However, his early affiliation with the pro-democracy elite can also be viewed as a way to legitimate his rule and, in this way, consolidate power, as society, in general, was hostile to military rule (Osaghae, 1998, pp. 273, 275). The timing of his turn to the powerful North can be explained by the increased threat from his cabinet towards the military and their increased pressure to return the country to civilian democratic rule and make Abacha resign (Babatope, 2000, p. 49).

Already in 1994, Abacha’s regime was highly repressive, especially towards journalists, political opponents, and pro-democracy people (Amuwo et al., 2001, pp. 1, 25; Kaufman, 1998; Rupert, 1998a). After dissolving his first cabinet, Abacha’s fight against democratizers really started (Babatope, 2000, p.
He also repressed the people he came to power with and who might pose a threat to his power from within the elite (Amuwo et al., 2001, p. 13).


The most repressive incident was the killings of the Ogoni people in 1995 (Amuwo et al., 2001, pp. 19–20; Babatope, 2000, pp. 71–77; Osaghae, 1998, pp. 304–306). The Ogonies were a relatively small ethnicity from the poor Nigerian South who wanted democracy and a fair share of the oil profit (Amuwo et al., 2001, pp. 15, 23). Although the repression of the Ogonies may have looked excessive to stay in power, it should rather be perceived as a desperate last try to thwart the pro-democracy opposition (Osaghae, 1998, p. 306).

Abacha promised to step down in 1998, but it was clear that he did not plan to. He made his cronies form parties and, in this way, planned to make them install him in power after the election (Amuwo et al., 2001, pp. 16–17; Iloegbunam, 1998; Kaufman, 1998; Olukotun, 2004, p. 91). Abacha’s carrot-stick strategy (to buy support for oil money and repress political opponents and journalists) worked well. Had he not died, he was highly likely to have been able to rig the 1998 elections and become elected (Amuwo et al., 2001, pp. 1, 25, 28–29).

Based on this, there is not much that suggests that Abacha was ideologically motivated. He did not directly harm people inside his winning coalition. Instead, his change in affiliation during 1994-95 should be viewed as a switch in winning coalition as a link in his power consolidation process. If he was ideologically motivated at all, it seems to only have been during the first year, or less, of his incumbency.

**Pleasing Groups Clearly Outside the Winning Coalition**

As mentioned above, the change in affiliation with groups should not be viewed as harming people inside his winning coalition or pleasing groups outside the winning coalition, but rather as a switch in winning coalition.
Voluntary Step-Down

Abacha did not step down voluntarily, since he died in power. Moreover, he was just about to get elected in a nominal election later in 1998.

Low Personal Income

During Abacha’s incumbency, there was no evidence of him stealing money from the state because, apparently, he was good at hiding the money (Mark, 2012; Rupert, 1998a). Yet, Abacha and his family were known to own numerous businesses and properties (Rupert, 1998a) and have spectacular residences (Mark, 2012; Rupert, 1998a). When he stepped down, it was revealed that he had been massively corrupt. He had stolen enormous sums from the state for himself and his family (Amuwo et al., 2001, pp. 3–5; Babatope, 2000, pp. 179, 181–182; Iloegbunam, 1998; Kaufman, 1998; Kirk-Greene, 1998; Mark, 2012; Rupert, 1998b, 1998a). After his death, his wife was caught trying to leave the country with almost forty suitcases filled with cash (Mark, 2012). Hence, Abacha did not have a low personal income.

Expert Assessments

The general perception among experts is that Abacha was greedy and valued power intrinsically (Amuwo et al., 2001, pp. 2, 10; Mark, 2012; Osaghae, 1998, p. 315). A group of Nigerian scholars write that the rule of Abacha and his cronies almost “made nonsense” of “politics as a contestation of ideas, values and principles in the public realm” in the sense that they were not guided by values and ideas at all (Amuwo et al., 2001, p. 2) Also, they compare Abacha to the previous dictator, Babangida (who was not perceived well either) whom they called almost benevolent compared to Abacha (Amuwo et al., 2001, p. 2). Another scholar indicated, in 1998, that Abacha was not ideologically motivated, by suggesting that a visionary and nationally-oriented leadership was needed to take over (Osaghae, 1998, p. 315). He also argued that many of the military dictators in Nigeria had been driven by self-serving interests (Osaghae, 1998, p. 315). The people were also not convinced of Abacha’s other-regarding intentions, not even in the beginning of his incumbency when they suspected that the anti-corruption measures were only means to consolidate power (Osaghae, 1998, pp. 280–281).

In addition to this uniform view of Abacha’s intentions, some experts believe that Abacha was well-intentioned in the beginning of his incumbency but became corrupted after a years or less. A former minister in his first cabinet argues that the anti-corruption initiatives as well as the tight economic policies in the beginning were implemented to serve the country and not Abacha himself, and that he actually planned to step down quickly but suddenly and
unexpectedly changed his mind (Babatope, 2000, pp. 15–16). A former colonel from the army also believes that Abacha was well-intentioned in the beginning but changed after facing too much pressure from the democratizers, including an ultimatum to resign (Babatope, 2000, p. 36). The former minister argues that on top of the pressure to resign, the powerful Northeners pressured Abacha to stay and promoted his self-interest (Babatope, 2000, pp. 80–81, 87, 181–182). This assessment is not particularly good evidence, since the minister has incentives to argue that Abacha was well-intentioned when he worked for him, but turned bad when the minister was fired. The minister does not have responsibility for the atrocities or the corruption of Abacha’s regime, only the good policies. Therefore, I conclude that the expert assessments generally indicate that Abacha was highly self-interested, but that he might have been more visionary and ideologically motivated in the beginning of his incumbency.

Summary
Most evidence indicates that Abacha was a highly self-interested and greedy military dictator. In the beginning of his incumbency, it is difficult to disentangle self-interest and ideological behavior, and it is possible that he was ideologically motivated, driven by a wish to stabilize Nigeria and return the country to civilian rule. After the first year in power, almost no evidence points towards ideological interest, but mostly towards self-interest. Right before he died, he planned to rig the elections and reinstall himself in power. He was also found to have stolen enormous sums from the state, although one of his proclaimed key aims was to fight corruption. Had he been ideologically motivated, he could have invested the oil money in the country’s development and the people.

Harm: N (perhaps semi-observed in the first year of his incumbency)
Please: N (perhaps semi-observed in the first year of his incumbency)
Non-minimal: N
Voluntary step-down: N
Income: N
Expert: Definitely self-interested, but perhaps he had other-regarding intentions during the first year (or less).

Overall qualitative judgement: 1
Bayesian updating score: 0.05

Ahmed Abdallah Abderemane was the first Comoro President after independence from the French in 1975, he declared Comoros independent but was removed shortly thereafter (AP, 1989; Rajab, 1989; Sellström, 2015, pp. 161–162). At the time of independence, Abdallah had already been in politics for a couple of decades (AP, 1989; Newitt, 1984, p. 56; Newton, 2014, pp. 1–2; Weinberg, 1994, p. 87). Before 1975, many people suspected him of being on the French side and being against independence (Rajab, 1989). Abdallah returned to power in 1978, where he stayed until his assassination in 1989 (AP, 1989; Rajab, 1989). His rule was despotic, and his power was protected by mercenaries who were used to remove his opponents (AP, 1989; International Business Publications USA, 2013, pp. 37, 44–45; Mattoir, 2004, p. 131; Newitt, 1984, pp. 59, 69; Sellström, 2015, pp. 170–171; Weinberg, 1994, pp. 88–89).

Abdallah was born on the island Anjouan (today a part of Comoros), son of a merchant. He quickly became one of the richest businessmen on the island (Newitt, 1984, p. 56; Rajab, 1989; Sellström, 2015, p. 159). Also in politics, he was a merchant (Sellström, 2015, p. 159). As incumbent, he directed his policies towards nursing his own businesses. Abdallah was assassinated in a coup in 1989, probably by the mercenary Bob Denard, the person who deposed him in 1975 and reinstalled him in 1978 (Mattoir, 2004, p. 137; Sellström, 2015, p. 172).

Throughout Abdallah’s incumbency, Comoros remained very poor with low administrative capacity (AP, 1989; Newitt, 1984, p. 67; Sellström, 2015, p. 166). The country was deeply dependent on foreign aid from France, South Africa, the European Community, and the conservative Arab states (International Business Publications USA, 2013, p. 46; Newitt, 1984, p. 67). The people loved Abdallah when he entered power in 1978 because he took over from Ali Soilih, a very radical and socialist leader in a conservative country (Rajab, 1989; Sellström, 2015, p. 165). However, his popularity soon decreased and remained low for the rest of his incumbency (International Business Publications USA, 2013, p. 37). The people hated him for his despotic and money-grabbing style (Rajab, 1989).

Ideology (proclaimed)

Abdallah was generally perceived as Francophile before independence. Also after 1978, he argued in favor of French involvement in Comorian affairs (Deschamps, 2005, p. 57; Sellström, 2015, pp. 40, 161). Yet, around independence, he argued in favor of independence. This does not appear to have been
a sincere shift in ideological motivation but was more likely a strategic move to keep the ruling elite, including himself, in power.

Another proclaimed ideological aim seems to have been conservative Islamism (in contrast to Soolih’s modernist socialist regime from 1975 to 1978) (International Business Publications USA, 2013, pp. 40, 114). Regarding economic policies, he was anti-socialist and in some sense a liberal (Sellström, 2015, p. 159). However, when he took power in 1978, he is reported to have said something like “We have put our money into freeing you, now you have to pay us back”, i.e., legitimizing his import and export monopolies (Weinberg, 1994, p. 99). This indicates that he cared much about his own businesses and perhaps less about the nation and the people. To be able to analyze the discrepancy between behavior motivated by self-interest and ideologically motivated behavior, I will analyze his potential ideological aims, as I have laid them out here.

**Winning Coalition**

Abdallah was protected by a presidential guard partly consisting of mercenaries, including Bob Denard, the chief of the presidential guard (Sellström, 2015, p. 167), and they were crucial for Abdallah staying in power (International Business Publications USA, 2013, p. 37; Mattoir, 2004, p. 131; Newitt, 1984, p. 69; Weinberg, 1994, pp. 88–89). Denard was especially important because he was involved in Abdallah’s disposal in 1975 and in 1989 (Mattoir, 2004, p. 137; Sellström, 2015, pp. 166, 172). Also, Abdallah hired Denard and other mercenaries in 1978 to install him in power (International Business Publications USA, 2013, p. 117; Newitt, 1984, p. 64; Newton, 2014, p. 1). The fact that Denard and the mercenaries could be hired made Abdallah vulnerable to other businessmen and “notables” who had money. Support from France also seemed crucial. The country was rumored to have been involved in all three coups (in 1975, 1978, and 1989) (Sellström, 2015, p. 166) and was a major provider of foreign aid.

Hence, Abdallah’s winning coalition consisted of the presidential guard (not the entire national army), the wealthiest faction of society, and France. This seems to be the smallest possible winning coalition, and therefore, *the winning coalition was minimal, which implies that the implication of a non-minimal winning coalition is not observed.*

**Harming Groups Clearly Inside the Winning Coalition**

Relations to France

For most of his political career, Abdallah favored French involvement in Comoro affairs, which is to be expected based on his ideological motivation and
him being self-interested since the French were a part of his winning coalition. His brief deviation from this behavior, in the mid-1970s when he compromised his support of the French rule and opted for Comorian independence, indicates that he was more self-interested than ideologically motivated. According to historians, there are strong indications that the French were not prepared or able to protect the interest of the ruling elite in Comoros, which made Abdallah and a couple of other businessmen opt for independence. Shortly before, Zanzibar had introduced socialism, and its ruling elite had lost power and privilege (International Business Publications USA, 2013, p. 40; Newitt, 1984, p. 57). Another explanation of his change in behavior could be that Abdallah experienced a sincere and major shift in ideology. However, this seems unlikely since it would be two rather than one shift in five years, i.e., from very Francofile to favoring Comorian independence back to favoring more power to the French. For instance, when Abdallah returned to power in 1978, the French navy was allowed full access to Comoros, and the French received several other military and economic benefits (Newitt, 1984, pp. 66–67, 119; Sellström, 2015, p. 167). In conclusion, this analysis suggests that Abdallah may have been Francophile, but he weighed his business interests and power higher than this concern.

Conservativism and Islam

When Abdallah came to power in 1978, he restored the powers of the Muslim clergy as well as the notables. Abdallah also made Comoros an Islamic republic and introduced legislation that favored conservatism and Islam (Mattoir, 2004, pp. 114–119; Newitt, 1984, p. 119; Sellström, 2015, pp. 166–167). This behavior is highly consistent with ideological motivation, and it did not cost him much. In a sense, it actually increased his grip on power. The people and the notables favored conservatism and believed that the development under Soilih had been too fast and too radical. Many people wanted a return to conservatism. Therefore, Abdallah’s return to conservative Islam is no strong indication of ideological motivation, since it is neither an instance of harming the winning coalition nor of pleasing people clearly outside it (at a cost).

Favoring Businessmen and the Presidential Guard

Especially favoring the notables after coming to power is consistent with power-maximizing self-interest. After coming to power in 1978, Abdallah started distributing spoils among the notables, i.e., mainly businessmen (Mattoir, 2004, p. 119; Sellström, 2015, pp. 166–168). The political system became very corrupt and primitive under Abdallah (International Business Publications USA, 2013, p. 44; Mattoir, 2004, pp. 130, 145; Sellström, 2015, p. 168). He pleased the presidential guard and the mercenaries he had hired
for the coup by paying them well, and he invited Denard to join his firm (Sellström, 2015, p. 171). This is another instance of pleasing his winning coalition.

Consolidating Power and Expanding Trade Empire

When Abdallah came to power in 1978, he put a lot of effort into consolidating his power and expanding his businesses. He came to power along with another businessman but soon ruled alone. For instance, he used presidential decrees (International Business Publications USA, 2013, p. 42; Mattoir, 2004, pp. 126, 129–130; Newitt, 1984, pp. 66–67; Sellström, 2015, p. 168); he banned parties and created a one-party-rule (Mattoir, 2004, pp. 126–129; Newton, 2014, p. 2); he frequently removed potential contenders from “the temptation” to take power by reshuffling the cabinet (International Business Publications USA, 2013, p. 44); he used co-optation to consolidate power; and he had an oversized civil service partly financed by foreign aid (International Business Publications USA, 2013, p. 46). These civil servants were not strictly inside his winning coalition, but nor were they strictly outside. Even if they were, this co-optation strategy does not seem to be in line with his ideology. It is likely that it was just a way to protect himself and his power. All this is highly consistent with self-interest, but it is also consistent with ideological motivation, since it takes power to realize an ideology.

Abdallah’s behavior in the economic arena is not consistent with ideological motivation. He simply disregarded the needs of the people (even the Muslims) to nurse and expand his trade empire (Sellström, 2015, p. 167). He re-monopolized the import of rice (Rajab, 1989) and monopolized the sale of vanilla to a handful of people, including himself (Newitt, 1984, p. 109). The three business families who had financed the coup, including Abdallah’s family, owned the monopolies and possessed the economic power in Comoros (Mattoir, 2004, pp. 121–122; Newitt, 1984, p. 67). Moreover, he declined international pressure to divert the agricultural production to provide for the people (at the expense of his own vanilla business and rice import – on which he basically had monopoly) (International Business Publications USA, 2013, p. 46; Sellström, 2015, p. 168; Weinberg, 1994, pp. 100–101). Meanwhile, he imported rice and other staple products and sold them to the people at monopoly prices (Sellström, 2015, p. 168). According to a businessman who formerly worked with Abdallah and generally had a very negative view of him, Abdallah sold rice donated by foreign agencies as aid (Weinberg, 1994, pp. 100–101). Even without the last piece of evidence, it is clear that, as a scholar writes, “President Abdallah generally put his personal interest ahead of national interest in making economic policy” (International Business Publications USA, 2013, p. 46).
There is really no indication of Abdallah harming his winning coalition. He was repressive and had the presidential guard remove members of the opposition, but these people were outside his winning coalition (AP, 1989; International Business Publications USA, 2013, pp. 44–45; Newitt, 1984, p. 59; Sellström, 2015, pp. 170–171). Abdallah repressed parts of the people because he was not popular (International Business Publications USA, 2013, p. 117). The people, in general, were also outside his winning coalition. As long as these parts of the population were repressed, they would not be important to his staying in power.

In sum, it is clear that Abdallah did not harm his winning coalition, nor did he deliberately please people outside it. Instead, he was highly concerned with protecting his own businesses and power, and he did not give up any wealth or power to help the Comoro people (not even the Muslims, which would have been in line with his ideology).

**Pleasing Groups Clearly Outside the Winning Coalition**

As previously discussed, there is no indication that Abdallah deliberately pleased groups outside his winning coalition. Hence, this implication is not observed.

**Voluntary Step-Down**

Abdallah did not step down voluntarily since he died in power (AP, 1989; International Business Publications USA, 2013, p. 47; Rajab, 1989). Nothing indicates that he was about to step down, quite to the contrary. Briefly before he was killed, he managed to change the constitution to allow him to stay in power for life (there had been a term limit of two terms before that) (International Business Publications USA, 2013, p. 47; Mattoir, 2004, p. 136).

**Low Personal Income**

Abdallah did not have a low or moderate personal income. Even when we take into account that Abdallah was very rich when he entered power, there is overwhelming evidence that he used his power to significantly increase his wealth, mainly by creating and protecting own monopolies. In that sense, he engaged in “self-enrichment at the expense of the country” (International Business Publications USA, 2013, p. 43). There is also some, although less certain, evidence that he more directly took money from the state (Rajab, 1989; Weinberg, 1994, p. 99). Even without this evidence, it is safe to conclude that

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59 The source from Weinberg (1994) was a former business partner of Abdallah who generally presents a very negative view of Abdallah. The other source is a newspaper article.
Abdallah used his political power for self-enrichment by strengthening his businesses to the detriment of the people. As mentioned, he rejected to diversify the economy for the sake of the people since it would harm his own businesses.

**Expert Assessments**

Since the five implications have not been observed, there is strong evidence that Abdallah was highly self-interested. Experts generally agree with this conclusion. Most experts emphasize that his primary – or even sole – motivation for seeking and sustaining political power was to advance his business interests (International Business Publications USA, 2013, p. 46; Newitt, 1984, p. 58; Rajab, 1989; Sellström, 2015, p. 168; Weinberg, 1994, pp. 99–101). A former French ambassador, who did not have too harsh feelings towards Abdallah, writes that Abdallah was a strategist but not an ideologue, nor a visionary (Deschamps, 2005, p. 73). An opposition member claims that Abdallah was more interested in power than money. Only his sons claim that he was a patriarch (Weinberg, 1994, p. 106). In conclusion, there is overwhelming evidence that Abdallah’s primary motivation for staying in power was his own economic benefit. It is worth noting that several experts emphasize that ideology was not strong in Comorian politics in general, and especially during Abdallah’s rule, personal ambition drove many politicians (International Business Publications USA, 2013, p. 44; Mattoir, 2004, pp. 130, 145; Newitt, 1984, p. 58). However, this does not change the conclusion about Abdallah’s motivation.

**Summary**

None of the observable implications of ideological motivation were found. There is strong evidence that Abdallah went into politics to protect his business empire and clearly used it to expand it at the expense of the people. In contrast, there is no evidence of him sacrificing just a little to follow ideological aims, even if we perceive them as concern for only the Muslim part of the population. When entering power in 1978, he should even have said publicly that he and his business partners had spent a lot of money on freeing the people from the former dictatorship, and therefore they deserved economic benefit for being in power.

Harm: N
Please: N
Non-Minimal: N
Voluntary step-down: N
Income: N
Expert: Highly self-interested, the primary political motivation seems to have been to protect and expand his business empire.

Overall qualitative judgement: 1
Bayesian updating score: 0.05
Al-Iryani, Abdul Rahman (Yemen, 1967-1974)

Abdul Rahman Al-Iryani came to power in The Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) in a coup in 1967 and left power the same way seven years later in 1974 (Burrowes, 1987, p. 57; El Mallakh, 1986, pp. 9–10; Lentz, 2014, p. 847; Peterson, 1982, p. 99; Rabi, 2015, pp. 67, 72; The Associated Press, 1998; The Times, 1998). He fled into exile in Damascus, where he died in 1998 (Clark, 2010, p. 104; Peterson, 1982, p. 113; The Associated Press, 1998; The Times, 1998; Whitaker, 1998). Al-Iryani was the first and only civilian president of North Yemen (Clark, 2010, p. 104; Whitaker, 1998). He is known for his powerful personality (Burrowes, 1987, p. 33) and his attempt to reconcile the Islamic royalist right wing and the modernist left in order to foster a stable government and nation (Burrowes, 1987, p. 52; Peterson, 1982, p. 114; The Times, 1998; Whitaker, 1998). Despite a weak state apparatus and tight political and economic constraints (Burrowes, 1987, pp. 34–38; Peterson, 1982, p. 107), Al-Iryani is perceived to have had a significant and positive impact on modern Yemen (Rabi, 2015, p. 72; The Times, 1998; Wenner, 1991, p. 148; Whitaker, 1998). He created stability after the civil war (Burrowes, 1987, pp. 38–49); in 1970, he drafted a constitution that lasted almost twenty years (Clark, 2010, p. 102; Whitaker, 1998); and, at the end of his incumbency, he succeeded in implementing several development initiatives (Burrowes, 1987, pp. 54–56; El Mallakh, 1986, pp. 9–10). Although Al-Iryani was perceived as inadequate and incapable by the time of his ouster, he generally remained popular and respected in Yemen (despite living in Syria after his ouster) (Rabi, 2015, p. 108; The Associated Press, 1998; The Times, 1998).

Al-Iryani was born into a family of the landed elite. In accordance with family tradition, he became an Islamic Shia judge (Lentz, 2014, p. 847; Peterson, 1982, p. 108; Rabi, 2015, p. 25; Stookey, 1978, p. 267; The Times, 1998). Before he came to power, Al-Iryani was a revolutionary fighting for republicanism and the implementation of modern ideas and secular reforms with a group of other liberal reformers (Burrowes, 1987, p. 21; Peterson, 1982, pp. 77, 102; Rabi, 2015, p. 25; Stookey, 1978, p. 216; The Associated Press, 1998; Wenner, 1991, p. 131; Whitaker, 1998). He served 15 years in prison for fighting the Islamic Imam king (Lentz, 2014, p. 847; Peterson, 1982, p. 108; The Associated Press, 1998; The Times, 1998; Whitaker, 1998). He was minutes away from being executed, before he was pardoned by the king (The Associated Press, 1998; The Times, 1998; Whitaker, 1998). From 1962 to 1970, a civil war between republicans (supported by Egypt) and royalists (supported by Saudi Arabia) was going on in Yemen. Al-Iryani was deeply involved politically on the republican side but against external influence (Burrowes, 1987, p. 26; Lentz, 2014, p. 847; Rabi, 2015, pp. 47–48; The Times, 1998; Wenner,

**Ideology (proclaimed)**

There is only sparse information available from Al-Iryani’s inauguration, but judging by his demands during the civil war, Al-Iryani was in favor of republicanism and against the king and the royalists (Burrowes, 1987, pp. 21, 26). He claimed that he was not a leftist although he wanted modernization (Rabi, 2015, pp. 47–48; Whitaker, 1998). He criticized the former government for being corrupt, incompetent, and inefficient (Rabi, 2015, pp. 54–55). The general view was that his most important goal was to create stability and national unity (Burrowes, 1987, p. 52; Peterson, 1982, p. 114; Stookey, 1978, p. 267; The Times, 1998; Whitaker, 1998).

**Winning Coalition**

North Yemen was a highly tribal country, and the tribes – in essence, the tribal leaders, called the shaykhs – were powerful (Burrowes, 1987, pp. 32–33, 49–51, 132; Clark, 2010, pp. 101–102; El Mallakh, 1986, pp. 9–10; Peterson, 1982, pp. 20–22, 105–106; Whitaker, 1998). The conservatives (conservative republicans) were also very powerful (Burrowes, 1987, p. 132; Peterson, 1982, p. 107; Stookey, 1978, p. 267). The power of these groups was strengthened later when they received external support from Saudi Arabia (Burrowes, 1987, p. 50). In contrast, leftists, modernizers, and technocrats were not strong, but the republicans needed the technocrats’ expertise for state building (Burrowes, 1987, p. 31). The fact that Al-Iryani was the only civilian leader of North Yemen implies that the military was often involved in politics. Support from the army was crucial to stay in power, and Al-Iryani’s winning coalition consisted of the army, the conservative republicans, and the shaykhs. There was no viable alternative, and, therefore, *Al-Iryani did not have a non-minimal winning coalition*.

**Harming Groups Clearly Inside the Winning Coalition**

One of the first things Al-Iryani did after entering power was to create a government that included a mix of factions: conservatives, leftists, modernizers, and technocrats (Burrowes, 1987, pp. 28–31; Clark, 2010, p. 102; Peterson, 1982, pp. 107–108). He invited people from different striding tribes and ethnicities to take core positions in government (Clark, 2010, p. 102), and he gave special space to the shaykhs in government (Burrowes, 1987, p. 32; Peterson, 1982, pp. 107–108). This uniting of various different factions of society is
highly consistent with his aim of creating unity and stability. It cannot be explained by narrow self-interest, although the shaykhs were invited into the government. It would have been a power-maximizing strategy to create a more conservative government (including the shaykhs), but he also invited people from less significant tribes as well as the leftists and modernizers who did not have much influence. This is an instance of harming his winning coalition (taking away power from the conservatives by giving influence to other groups), but even more an instance of pleasing groups clearly outside his winning coalition.

A couple of years later, the conservatives kicked the radical leftists out of the government. The moderate modernizers and technocrats stayed because they were needed for the state building (Burrowes, 1987, p. 31), but as a whole, the government became even more conservative (Burrowes, 1987, pp. 28–31). That Al-Iryani allowed this is an instance of pleasing his winning coalition, but it does not conflict with his ideological goals in the sense that he was subject to strong constraints from the generally very powerful conservatives and shaykhs.

After the civil war ended in 1970, stability was created, and state building and development projects started with the modernists, including Al-Iryani’s educated nephew, in the front seat (Burrowes, 1987, pp. 38–49). But soon, the conservatives, and the shaykhs in particular, grew hostile towards the development projects, since they feared that their own prosperity and position were threatened (Burrowes, 1987, p. 49). This led to increasing polarization between the different factions in government (Peterson, 1982, pp. 109–111). As the conservatives and the shaykhs were increasingly powerful (now also backed by Saudi Arabia (Stookey, 1978, pp. 260, 267)), a power-maximizing strategy from Al-Iryani would (still) have been to support the conservatives and the shaykhs. However, he seemed to do all he could to keep the factions united to secure stability and unity (Stookey, 1978, p. 267). Thus, he seemed to act on ideological motivation. A specific example was his choice of a leftist prime minister (a position with a lot of executive power) after a coup attempt in 1971, despite the very strong conservative faction (Stookey, 1978, p. 267).

Towards the end of his incumbency, in 1974, Al-Iryani had become increasingly unpopular among both the conservatives (who found he served the leftists too much) and among the modernizers (who saw him as too conservative) (Burrowes, 1987, p. 54; Peterson, 1982, pp. 112–113). As the conservative faction was by far the strongest, power-maximization would have led him to support this faction and break with the modernists and leftists. However, he did the exact opposite by forcing out a conservative prime minister and replacing him with a radical modernist and leftist, Hassan Makki. Moreover, Al-Iryani instructed Makki to prioritize development by involving technocrats and
without consulting the conservatives (Burrowes, 1987, pp. 54–56). Many development projects were quickly implemented, and more were planned (Burrowes, 1987, pp. 54–56; El Mallakh, 1986, pp. 9–10). In addition, anti-corruption measures were initiated (Burrowes, 1987, pp. 54–56; Whitaker, 1998), which is highly consistent with balancing power between different factions to secure unity and with his own modernization agenda. This was a clear instance of both pleasing groups outside the winning coalition and harming groups inside his winning coalition. The development initiatives, and especially the anti-corruption initiatives, were very harmful to the shaykhs, who mainly sustained their power and prestige through patronage and were known for being highly focused on self-enrichment (Burrowes, 1987, pp. 32, 49–51; Peterson, 1982, pp. 105–106). Additional arguments for the riskiness of installing Makki as prime minister are that Saudi Arabia was deeply dissatisfied with this decision (Peterson, 1982, p. 113; Stookey, 1978, p. 271) and the shaykhs largely controlled the army (Burrowes, 1987, p. 51). Finally, the new prime minister, Makki, did not come with a power base (Peterson, 1982, p. 113), so the choice of him as prime minister cannot even be explained by Al-Iryani switching between power bases. Hence, from a power perspective, this move was foolish (Peterson, 1982, p. 113).

In the case of Al-Iryani, the overlap between serving his ideological aims and his winning coalition is relatively small. This makes the two first implications easier to evaluate. There is solid evidence for the first implication, namely, that Al-Iryani harmed his winning coalition by trying to balance power between the different factions and by implementing development and anti-corruption policies despite strong pressure from the shaykhs and the conservatives. However, these observations, and especially the balancing of power by inclusion of less powerful factions such as the leftists, are also clear instances of pleasing groups outside his winning coalition. The strongest example was the installation of Makki as prime minister. Based on this, I evaluate both implications as being observed.

**Pleasing Groups Clearly Outside the Winning Coalition**

Based on the discussion in the previous section, this implication is observed.

**Voluntary Step-Down**

As mentioned, Al-Iryani was ousted in a coup d’état and thus did not leave power voluntarily.

**Low Personal Income**

In the covered material, there is no direct statement about Al-Iryani’s income or lifestyle, or whether he was personally corrupt or not. It is mentioned a few
times that the shaykhs were engaging in self-enrichment (Burrowes, 1987, pp. 32, 49–51; Peterson, 1982, pp. 105–106). This would be odd to highlight if this was also the case for Al-Iryani and others. The absence of evidence of self-enrichment and an extravagant lifestyle indicates that Al-Iryani had a low or moderate income, but since there is no clear evidence, I conclude that this implication is only partly observed.

**Expert Assessments**

So far, the analysis indicates that Al-Iryani was ideologically motivated and really wanted national stability, unity and development. The expert assessments generally support this conclusion (Burrowes, 1987, pp. 33, 52, 54–55; Peterson, 1982, p. 114; Rabi, 2015, p. 72; Stookey, 1978, pp. 227, 267; The Times, 1998; Whitaker, 1998). It is not directly stated that he was an ideologue but rather that he was a reformer (Stookey, 1978, p. 227) and a modernist (Rabi, 2015, p. 72); that political balance and unity was his goal (Stookey, 1978, p. 267) and dream (Whitaker, 1998); that his ambition was to end one-man rule and democratize (Burrowes, 1987, p. 33; The Times, 1998); and that he was worried about the conservatives’ obstruction of progress and development (Burrowes, 1987, pp. 54–55). None of the experts in the covered material seem to assume or argue that Al-Iryani was power or wealth maximizing.

**Summary**

The analysis strongly indicates that Al-Iryani was ideologically motivated. Despite tight constraints, he frequently took initiatives that put his own power at risk to follow his goals of national unity and development. His behavior is highly consistent with ideology over time, also before coming to power. There is no indication of him engaging in self-enrichment, and experts deem him ideologically motivated. Generally, he seems to have put himself at high risk to serve politics and his country without a lot of personal gain. Thus, I conclude that he was ideologically motivated.

Harm: O
Please: O
Non-Minimal: N
Voluntary step-down: N
Income: (O)
Expert: Ideologically motivated

Overall qualitative judgement: 5
Bayesian updating score: 0.95
Frank Bainimarama came to power in Fiji in 2006 in his second coup d’état, as commander of Fiji’s military forces (Firth, 2017, p. 218; Hayward-Jones, 2014; Herr & Bergin, 2014; Marks, 2014; Siegel, 2012; Tuimalealiifano, 2020). In 2000, he also installed himself in power, but handed over power to Laisenia Qarase two months later. He staged a coup against the same Qarase in 2006 (Firth, 2017, p. 217; Herr & Bergin, 2014; Marks, 2014; Tuimalealiifano, 2020). Bainimarama’s proclaimed reason for the coup was that Qarase’s government was corrupt and increasingly driven by ethno-nationalism (Firth, 2017, p. 220; Fraenkel & Firth, 2007, p. xxii; Herr & Bergin, 2014; Marks, 2014; Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, pp. 50, 249; Siegel, 2012; Tuimalealiifano, 2020). After the 2006 coup, Bainimarama was criticized internationally, and Australia and New Zealand imposed sanctions (Lal, 2007, p. 148; Marks, 2014; Siegel, 2012). Democratic elections were planned, but instead martial law was introduced in 2009 (Alley, 2010, p. 145; Firth, 2017, p. 218; Lal, 2012, p. 85; Marks, 2014; Siegel, 2012). This led to further international punishment (Herr & Bergin, 2014; Lal, 2012, pp. 85–88). In 2013, Bainimarama introduced a new constitution that prepared elections, but it also favored Bainimarama’s party, “FijiFirst” (Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, pp. 52–53, 70, 186). In 2014, Bainimarama stepped down from leading the military to run in the election (Herr & Bergin, 2014; Marks, 2014; Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, p. 200; Tuimalealiifano, 2020). The election was characterized as democratic, although in a minimalist sense, since the electoral process was clean, but the media was controlled by the regime, and opposition parties faced many obstacles (Hayward-Jones, 2014; Lal, 2012, p. 85, 2014, p. 458; Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, p. 55; Siegel, 2012). Bainimarama won a landslide victory (Herr & Bergin, 2014; Lal, 2014, p. 458; Marks, 2014; Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, pp. 9, 55; Tuimalealiifano, 2020), and many people and scholars believe that Bainimarama would not have stepped down if he had lost power in 2014 (Fraenkel, 2019, p. 506; Lal, 2014, p. 468; Marks, 2014; Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, p. 273). Bainimarama won the election, mainly because he was very popular among the Indo-Fijian and more generally among the poor and the rural population (Fraenkel, Firth, & Lal, 2009, p. 25; Marks, 2014; Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, p. 65).

Bainimarama has managed to secure stability in the sense that so far there has been no coup since he took power in 2006 (Firth, 2017, p. 221; Herr & Bergin, 2014; Marks, 2014), whereas before, Fiji experienced four coups in less than twenty years (Fraenkel et al., 2009, p. 4; Marks, 2014; Siegel, 2012).
Bainimarama has worked for and succeeded in reducing the saliency of ethnicity in Fiji (mainly the gap between indigenous Fijian and Indo-Fijian) (Fraenkel, 2019, p. 492; Lal, 2012, p. 85, 2014, p. 468). Moreover, he has created economic development and made life easier for especially the poor and the middle class (largely targeting the Indo-Fijians) (Fraenkel, 2019, p. 483; Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, pp. 51, 271). However, Bainimarama’s regime is largely in control of the media and is harsh on regime opponents. This was also the case before Fiji became quasi-democratic in 2014 (Marks, 2014; Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, pp. 59, 208; Siegel, 2012).

Ideology


Winning Coalition

Bainimarama’s regime is crucially dependent on military backing (Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, p. 178). As the country experienced four military coups within two decades before Bainimarama took power, the risk of unseating by the military seems prevalent. Hence, the military is clearly a part of Bainimarama’s winning coalition. Scholars agree with this conclusion (Fraenkel et al., 2009, p. 4; Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, pp. 4, 7, 273).

Bainimarama is also dependent on the international community with regard to economic aid and trade (Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, p. 183). They imposed sanctions after the coup in 2006, and after he cancelled his election plans in 2009. Already in 2006, the Western international community demanded elections (Fraenkel et al., 2009, p. 14; Lal, 2007, p. 148; Marks, 2014; Siegel, 2012). Bainimarama might have known that he could not rule by decree forever and had to install elections at some point (Fraenkel et al., 2009, pp. 15–16). Even though minimalist democracy appears sufficient to satisfy the international community, he needs some support from the people to win the elections. I conclude that already in 2006 when he took power, he had a broad winning coalition (to be able to stay in power in the long run) because he probably knew he had to introduce elections at some point in the future.
Bainimarama’s winning coalition mainly consists of Indo-Fijians, but he also needs indigenous Fijian support since the indigenous Fijian comprises about 60% of the country’s population (Fraenkel, 2019, p. 505; Lal, 2007, pp. 149–150; Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, pp. 2–3). However, considering the military’s importance for Bainimarama’s winning coalition and the fact that the military mainly comprises indigenous Fijians (Fraenkel & Firth, 2007, p. 417; Lal, 2007, p. 150, 2014, p. 459; Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, pp. 8, 179), it would have been easier to choose a winning coalition consisting of only indigenous Fijians, had it been possible. There are indications that it would have. At least, Bainimarama’s main pretext for seizing power was a clean-up campaign, and he legitimized his coup with the anti-corruption cause more than with multiracialism. Anti-corruption also seems to be a central source of his popularity (Fraenkel et al., 2009, pp. 25, 425; Lal, 2007, p. 148, 2012, p. 85, 2014, p. 459).

On the political scene in Fiji, there has been both an ethno-nationalist platform and a multiracial platform for a long time, and in the 2014 election, the political parties occupying the two platforms were weak (Lal, 2014, p. 467).

Despite the option of choosing the ethno-nationalist platform, Bainimarama chose to follow his proclaimed ideology about a multiracial society, which meant he had to struggle with convincing the military leaders of this idea, although it would have been easier to occupy the ethno-nationalist political platform. Thus, he could have chosen a “smaller”, i.e., less resource-demanding, winning coalition. In that sense, Bainimarama has chosen a non-minimal winning coalition (by including Indo-Fijians instead of indigenous Fijians, who comprised the military).

**Harming Groups Clearly Inside the Winning Coalition**

Consolidating Power

Bainimarama took many power-consolidating measures throughout his incumbency. First, he secured himself military backing. After taking power, he expanded the military budget (Firth, 2017, p. 221), promoted specific military officers, increased their salaries (Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, p. 179), and sacked officers who did not agree with his vision (Fraenkel & Firth, 2007, p. 417). Throughout his incumbency, he prioritized staying in power of the military. In 2014, he had to step down as commander in chief to run in the elections, but he remained in control of the army (Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, pp. 66, 179, 200; Tuimalealiifano, 2020). Seven former officers were cabinet members, which can be viewed as a sign of satisfying military interest (Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, pp. 183–184).
In addition to securing support from the military, Bainimarama consolidated power by taking control of the media. Even after turning Fiji into a quasi-democracy, he still retains control over the media (Hayward-Jones, 2014; Lal, 2012, p. 85, 2014, pp. 458, 461; Siegel, 2012). Journalists are sacked or fined even for the mildest criticisms of the regime (Hayward-Jones, 2014; Lal, 2014, p. 461). Bainimarama’s daughter and Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum’s, his right-hand man, brother hold central positions in Fiji TV and the company behind (Fraenkel, 2019, p. 488). The regime also uses repression against political opponents (Marks, 2014; Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, p. 59; Siegel, 2012). Thus, Bainimarama’s power-consolidating strategies are very sophisticated, and often not outright brutal. In this way, Bainimarama stays in complete control and remains relatively popular among the people (also due to economic development and introduction of social services) (Lal, 2014, p. 461; Marks, 2014). These power-consolidating initiatives have been stability enhancing, which is consistent with one of Bainimarama’s ideological aims.

The 2014 and 2018 Elections

The 2014 election should be viewed as a power-consolidating strategy rather than a power-sharing initiative. As mentioned, Bainimarama was pressured by the international community to install elections, which he clearly expected to win (Marks, 2014). In 2013, he introduced a new constitution to determine the rules of election and who was eligible. He made sure to favor his own party, FijiFirst (Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, p. 70) and introduced strict eligibility laws (Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, pp. 52–53, 186). He weakened the opposition significantly by having his two main opponents, Qarase and Mahendra Chaudhry, convicted for corruption (Fraenkel, 2019, pp. 487–488; Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, pp. 52–53; Siegel, 2012). Moreover, he made sure that the constitution would be extremely difficult to change (it requires support of 75% of registered voters in a referendum) (Fraenkel, 2019, p. 485), and he used patronage to gain electoral support (Fraenkel, 2019, p. 485; Lal, 2014, p. 461; Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, p. 186). As he was still in control of the media, he could easily promote his image as a benevolent leader who wanted to modernize and de-racialize Fiji (Lal, 2014, p. 461; Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, p. 66).

Bainimarama won a landslide victory, and after the election, the international community became much more positive and cooperative (Lal, 2014, p. 458; Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, pp. 170, 231). Bainimarama’s legitimacy in Fiji also increased (Firth, 2017, p. 221; Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, p. 231). Thus,

61 In this section, I point to specific instances that happened after 2014 and therefore are outside the scope of the analyses. Yet, sources point to these examples to illustrate how Bainimarama behaved also before the 2014 election.
Bainimarama lost nothing and only strengthened his position through the elections. With the power he had obtained, this was foreseeable, and he knew that he did not risk much by installing elections eight years after entering power.

To make sure he would stay in control, Bainimarama ensured that members of parliament and the civil service would not get enough power to challenge him by denying pay raises to tenured positions and giving them to people with short-term contracts (Fraenkel, 2019, p. 485). However, he dared giving considerable power to Sayed-Khaiyum. Before the election, the two shared 20 portfolios, and after the election, they still hold most of the de facto power (Fraenkel, 2019, p. 483; Hayward-Jones, 2014; Lal, 2014, p. 458; Siegel, 2012).

Although the 2018 is not within the scope of the analysis, it is commenting on it. It is a similar story in terms of controlling the election and thwarting the opposition’s chances of winning (Australian Associated Press, 2018; Fraenkel, 2019, pp. 485, 488), only Bainimarama did not win with a large margin this time. While all the polls showed that he would get 60-80% of the votes, he only got slightly above 50% (Fraenkel, 2019, pp. 483, 500). It will be interesting to see what will happen if he loses an election. Most scholars believe he will not accept the result, as he probably would not have had he lost in 2014 or 2018 (Fraenkel, 2019, p. 506; Lal, 2014, p. 468; Marks, 2014; Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, p. 273). However, this is speculation.

There is not much evidence of Bainimarama harming groups inside his winning coalition in the name of his ideology. Indeed, he has taken power from the rural traditional chiefs (indigenous Fijian) (Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, p. 52), but they can be viewed as being outside his winning coalition, since he only needs some indigenous Fijian votes in addition to the Indo-Fijian votes to get sufficient support. It makes better sense to try to win support from indigenous Fijian who are positively affected by the initiatives targeted at Indo-Fijians, especially rural poor indigenous Fijians who also prefer social services to an ethnically unequal society (Marks, 2014). Many of them are also happy about the reduced power of the chiefs, since Bainimarama has secured the poor rural Fijian right to own their own land (Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, p. 65).

However, these initiatives – as well as the previously mentioned power-consolidating initiatives – are aligned with Bainimarama’s proclaimed ideology. They create stability and ethnic equality. Bainimarama has taken important initiatives to enhance the position of the Indo-Fijian minority. He has introduced many progressive social and economic reforms that benefit the poor and the middle class, which target the largely marginalized Indo-Fijians but also many, especially rural, indigenous Fijians (Lal, 2012, p. 85, 2014, p. 458).
Examples are abolishing school fees, building roads and bridges, introducing longer agricultural leases, and opening up more land to agriculture (Fraenkel, 2019, p. 500; Lal, 2014, p. 464; Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, pp. 51–52, 65, 271). In the 2013 constitution, he directly targeted the Indo-Fijians by changing the official names of the groups in society. Now, all Fijians should be called Fijian, which was previously reserved for indigenous Fijians (Fraenkel, 2019, p. 492; Lal, 2012, p. 85). Thus, there are many instances of Bainimarama consolidating power by pleasing his winning coalition, but they are in line with his proclaimed ideology.

Summing up, Bainimarama’s behavior was and is highly consistent with his aims of stability and multiracialism, and with pleasing his winning coalition. There is no evidence of Bainimarama harming people clearly inside his winning coalition.

**Pleasing Groups Clearly Outside the Winning Coalition**

An instance of pleasing groups outside the winning coalition is installing elections and initiatives to secure general development and social services. As discussed, the former was mainly a power-consolidating (and stability-securing) measure, and the latter also affected his broad winning coalition. Therefore, Bainimarama cannot be shown to deliberately serve groups clearly outside his winning coalition.

**Voluntary Step-Down**

Bainimarama is still in power, so this implication will not be evaluated.

**Low Personal Income**

There is no reporting of Bainimarama embezzling the state for personal gain or having a lavish lifestyle. However, his income may be viewed as excessive as hinted by the scholar, Lal, who makes a point about the paralyzed media in Fiji: “No one, for example, dared to ask whether his [Bainimarama’s] and his attorney general’s salaries were in excess of a million dollars each and paid through a private accounting firm run by the attorney general’s aunt” (Lal, 2014, p. 46). In addition, there are reports of the regime misusing public funds, but it is unclear whether it was for personal or political gain (Lal, 2014, p. 468; Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, p. 183). It might be the latter, since it is combined with a criticism of the regime disregarding fundamental financial procedures (Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, p. 183). However, none of these descriptions are direct statements about of Bainimarama’s personal income, and there is no other mention of this. As Bainimarama’s pretext for taking power in 2006 was to end corruption and bad governance, it should expectedly be reported if he was highly corrupt. However, the media in Fiji is under his strict control,
and he is still in power. Consequently, knowledge about corruption or a lucrative salary may be hidden from the public. But since there is some, albeit uncertain, evidence of a high income, I conclude that Bainimarama did probably not have a low or moderate income. Thus, this implication is evaluated as absent, but due to the uncertainty of the evaluation, the implication only weighs half in the final assessment.

**Expert Assessments**

Assessments of Bainimarama’s motives vary quite a lot. Most scholars agree that he did like power (Fraenkel & Firth, 2007, p. xxii; Lal, 2007, p. 148; Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, pp. 72, 193), that he would not have democratized without pressure (Hayward-Jones, 2014), and that he suffered from megalomania and viewed himself as a national savoir (Fraenkel & Firth, 2007, pp. 175, 180). However, both journalists and scholars see him as other-regarding and holding a sincere multiracial vision (Herr & Bergin, 2014; Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, p. 51) and a vision of a Fiji rid of corruption and bad governance (Fraenkel et al., 2009, p. 22; Lal, 2007, p. 148; Tuimalealiifano, 2020). These assessments indicate that Bainimarama enjoyed power but also had a broader sincerely held vision for Fiji. One scholar writes that Bainimarama and his supporting coalition for the coup were brought together by the desire to be in power, but their visions for Fiji’s future differed (Fraenkel et al., 2009, p. 16). Another view is that he was afraid of stepping down because he feared legal proceedings after his two coups and for mismanagement of military funds prior to seizing power, and he is afraid of assassination after the assassination attempt in 2000 (Fraenkel et al., 2009, p. 24; Lal, 2007, p. 138; Tuimalealiifano, 2020).

Many ordinary people in Fiji viewed and still view Bainimarama as an honest man who wants the best for Fiji (Fraenkel et al., 2009, p. 25); in contrast, they are not keen on his right-hand man, Sayed-Khaiyum, whom they view as a power-lover (Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, p. 73). But as Bainimarama is still in power, and the media is largely controlled by the regime, the public opinion is not a valid “expert assessment”.

To sum up, the experts seem not to doubt that Bainimarama likes to stay in power for its own sake, but he is probably also other-regarding in the sense that he wanted the best for Fiji, that is, a multiracial society without a corrupt government. Moreover, Bainimarama might be afraid of leaving power for fear of repercussions.

**Summary**

It is difficult to distinguish Bainimarama’s pleasing of his winning coalition and realizing his ideological aims, because there is a large empirical overlap.
One thing that may speak in favor of Bainimarama being ideologically motivated is that his multi-racial agenda would not have been as easy to follow as an ethno-national agenda would have been, given the composition of the military (almost only indigenous Fijian); thus, it is concluded that his winning coalition was non-minimal. But except for this, none of the other implications are observed. The experts also disagree on his motives. It is possible that he liked power but also held a multiracial vision—a view that some experts also support. Bainimarama is still in power today, so more details about his rule may appear after he leaves power.

Harm: N  
Please: N  
Non-Minimal: O  
Voluntary step-down: Still in power  
Income: (N)  
Expert: Mixed, Bainimarama definitely likes power

Overall qualitative judgement: 3  
Bayesian updating score: 0.26
Batista, Fulgencio (Cuba, 1933-1944 and 1952-1959)

Fulgencio Batista dominated Cuban politics from 1933-1959. As head of the army, he was de facto in power from 1933 after a coup. In 1940, he installed elections (although not entirely free and fair) and was elected. He stepped down after losing the elections in 1944. After a couple of years in Florida, he was elected to the senate in Cuba in 1948. He planned to run in the presidential elections again in 1952, but as his winning chances were low, he staged a coup d’état and took power before the elections (Argote-Freyre, 2006, pp. ix–x; Domínguez, 1998, pp. 113–114, 118; Mallín, 1974, p. 15). In 1959, he fled into exile realizing that Castro would oust him from power (Argote-Freyre, 2006, pp. 1–2; Mallín, 1974, pp. 25–26).

Batista came from a poor, mixed-race rural family (Argote-Freyre, 2006, pp. 2, 4; Chomsky, 2015, p. 27; Domínguez, 1998, p. 114; Gellman, 1973, p. 184; Guerra, 2012, p. 52). After working in different drift jobs, such as sugar cane cutter and railroad worker (Argote-Freyre, 2006, pp. 6–22; Staten, 2003, p. 69), he joined the military to get an education and stayed for many years as a stenographer (Argote-Freyre, 2006, pp. 25-27; 32-33; Mallín, 1974, pp. 3–4).

Batista’s regime was highly repressive, and torture was widely used against the opposition and journalists already in the 1930s (Argote-Freyre, 2006, pp. 156–157; Guerra, 2012, p. 127). Throughout his de facto rule from the 1930s to the 1950s, dead bodies of opposition members or journalists frequently turned up in streets and alleys. Although this cannot be linked directly to Batista, there has been a pattern of this happening every time Batista’s regime was extremely threatened (Argote-Freyre, 2006, pp. 174, 231; Fontova, 2005, p. 80). It is not certain how many people his regime killed, but it was between hundreds and 20,000 (Guerra, 2012, p. 43).

Ideology (proclaimed)

Several scholars point out that Batista did not adhere to an ideology (Argote-Freyre, 2006, pp. 88–89; Domínguez, 1998, p. 128). According to himself, at the end of the 1930s, he was an evolutionist trying to make progress for the people (Argote-Freyre, 2006, p. 215; Domínguez, 1998, p. 128). In the 1930s, his concern focuses on rural poor (the group to which he used to belong), who had been forgotten by earlier regimes (Argote-Freyre, 2006, p. 215). Batista has also been perceived as a conservative favoring the bourgeoisie (Argote-Freyre, 2006, p. 269). Batista’s motivation to join the coup in 1933 was apparently dissatisfaction with military procedures, it was corrupt, especially at the top, and promotion was in no sense based on merit (Argote-Freyre, 2006, pp. 40, 55–56, 60; Staten, 2003, p. 60).
**Winning Coalition**

As Batista was in power for a very long time, the winning coalition should be studied as varying over time. Throughout his incumbency, the army was a part of his winning coalition, even in the beginning of the 1940s when he was elected and had some democratic legitimacy.

Cuban politics has generally experienced much fluctuation and instability in coalitions. There have been few ideologically based coalitions in Cuba (before Castro). Instead, politics has been characterized by corruption and tactical clientelism (Dominguez, 1998, pp. 116–117). This makes it unusually difficult to assess which groups in the elite and among the people belong to the winning coalition. It was important for Batista’s power to have some elite support as well as some support in the people, but as long as Batista had the support of the United States, which was a strong actor in Cuban politics, he was relatively secure in power (Staten, 2003, pp. 84–85). Thus, the United States can be viewed as an important part of the winning coalition. One reason the US was so dominant in Cuba was that it offered loans during the Cuban economic crisis in the 1930s (Staten, 2003, pp. 84–85). The US supported Batista because it saw him as the best option to stabilize the country. Already in 1934, the US ambassador, Jefferson Caffery stated in an internal letter that the US had to ignore (at least partly) the power abuse to secure American interests (Argote-Freyre, 2006, p. 160). Over time, and especially in the 1950s, the fight against communism and protection of American businesses were strong reasons for supporting Batista (Argote-Freyre, 2006, p. x, 208; Chomsky, 2015, pp. 26, 33; Dominguez, 1998, p. 115; Gellman, 1973, pp. 193–194; Mallin, 1974; Shetterly, 2007, pp. 28, 99; Staten, 2003, pp. 46, 62, 71). Hence, Batista had relatively strong backing from the US both in the 1930s and in the 1950s, as long as he fought communism. Regarding the evaluation of the composition of Batista’s winning coalition, *nothing indicates that he had a non-minimal winning coalition*.

Because parts of the winning coalition are somewhat difficult to distinguish, the second-order condition regarding ideological consistency in the implications becomes even more important. Hence, it is important to examine to what extent Batista’s actions were consistent with his proclaimed ideology and over time.

**Harming Groups Clearly Inside the Winning Coalition**

As I will discuss below, almost none of Batista’s behavior can be classified as harm to groups clearly inside his winning coalition. Most of Batista’s behavior is highly consistent with pleasing his winning coalition. I discuss Batista’s behavior towards different groups in turn.
Favoring the Army

Throughout his periods in power, Batista strongly favored the army, which is consistent with staying in power. Especially in the 1950s, he favored loyalists in the army. When he came to power in 1952, he improved conditions for the military significantly, and he filled the military ranks with his own military friends (Staten, 2003, p. 72). Exactly this was what he had claimed to fight against when he took power in 1933, so it is inconsistent with his ideology. The only time he acted against the interest of the army was immediately after his election in 1940, when he made them return to the barracks shortly after he had made them the main provider of rural social services (Gellman, 1973, pp. 186–187). This was also right after he stepped down as leader of the army (Argote-Freyre, 2006, p. 265). In general, the army did not support him so much in this period, not even before he made them return to the barracks (Gellman, 1973, pp. 186–187). Thus, this move can be viewed as a way to contain the threat from the army. This behavior is highly inconsistent with ideology motivation, since he argued for the importance of the military as social service provider, and as soon as he became president he withdrew them. Although an explanation could be that he simply had changed his mind about the best way to provide social services, it is very conspicuous that he changed policy this drastically. It is more likely that it happened because he was now less dependent on the military due to the new source of legitimacy and because he was no longer in command of the army.

Favoring the United States

Most of Batista’s behavior was strongly in line with American interests and often at odds with his proclaimed ideology. The US interest is especially good at explaining Batista’s form of political power in Cuba (i.e., democrat, autocrat, or de facto ruler). Letters from the 1930s exchanged between the US ambassador and other high-ranking Americans show that they warned Batista against taking power (in a coup), even though they supported his de facto power (Argote-Freyre, 2006, pp. 207–208). Especially Roosevelt pressured for democratization at the end of the 1930s (Argote-Freyre, 2006, p. 232). These events explain why Batista was only the de facto ruler in the 1930s, installed elections in 1940 which he won, and stepped down in 1944. It is unlikely that he would have sustained US support in 1944 if he had staged a coup d’état or in other ways forced his way to power. Yet, during the Cold War, American interests had changed such that anti-communism and, generally, protection of American business and trade were more important than democracy. This made it a viable option for Batista to take power in a coup in 1952 after realizing that he would lose the election. Until the end of the 1950s, Batista was strongly supported by the US, which may have been the only reason
he was able to stay in power until 1959, despite the atrocities and violence (Argote-Freyre, 2006, p. 174; Chomsky, 2015, p. 28) he committed against the opposition and other people in his way (Argote-Freyre, 2006, p. x, 208; Chomsky, 2015, pp. 26, 33; Dominguez, 1998, p. 115; Mallin, 1974; Shetterly, 2007, p. 99; Staten, 2003, pp. 46, 62, 71).

Only rarely did Batista’s regime go against American interests, and these instances are not even arguments against Batista being self-interested, since he was relatively constrained by his ruling coalition. The first time a Cuban government challenged US domination of Cuba was in 1933. The two leaders Batista shared power with, Ramón Grau and Antonio Guiteras, were nationalists and against American dominance as was the foreign policy (Argote-Freyre, 2006, pp. 92–94). Batista clearly did not agree with this line. The government needed US backing to survive, and Batista started to work against the Grau government and ultimately made Grau step down (Argote-Freyre, 2006, pp. 88, 96, 126; Staten, 2003, p. 62). Hence, although Batista’s regime worked against American interests for a short while, Batista was the one who stopped it. The second time Batista’s behavior was inconsistent with American interests was when he formed a coalition with the communists in 1940, but as discussed below, this also appears to be for power-maximizing reasons.

The Communists

Batista was anti-communist through most of the 1930s (Argote-Freyre, 2006, pp. 94–96), but he claimed to fight for the rural poor, which might seem somewhat contradictory. Moreover, Batista joined the government with the communists in the 1940s and told the US that it was to expose the failures of the communists (Argote-Freyre, 2006, pp. 254–256). This could indicate that he was mainly interested in the communists to secure that he won the election (Argote-Freyre, 2006, p. 269). Consistent with this interpretation, he did not pick any communists to his cabinet but he picked ministers from four of the other parties in the coalition (Gellman, 1973, p. 185). Furthermore, Batista banned the communist party and imprisoned (and killed) many communists in the 1950s (Chomsky, 2015, p. 27). As previously discussed, this was clearly consistent with US preferences. Especially in the 1950s, US support was most likely the only thing that enabled Batista to stay in power (Argote-Freyre, 2006, p. 174; Chomsky, 2015, p. 28). Again the conclusion is that he was highly inconsistent regarding ideology; these shifts in behavior appear to have served the purpose of keeping himself in power.

Generally Favoring Supporters in the 1950s

In the 1950s, when Batista’s political power was least constrained, he openly favored his supporters by handing them money (Dominguez, 1998, p. 123). He
substituted the Congress with an eight-man advisory council consisting of the economic elite, e.g., presidents of the sugar mill owners’ association and the sugar growers’ association (Domínguez, 1998, pp. 120–121). Furthermore, he collaborated with the American mafia, led by his old friend, Meyer Lansky (Staten, 2003, p. 66). The mafia owned many hotels as well as the gambling and sex industry in Havana and engaged in corruption with politicians (Shetterly, 2007, p. 28; Staten, 2003, p. 82).

In addition to the rich business and mafia, Batista still relied on the support of the army. Consistent with self-interest, but inconsistent with his former outrage against unfairness in the military, he promoted the people in the military loyal to him (Domínguez, 1998, pp. 120–121), and increased their salaries (Mallin, 1974, p. 17).

In sum, there are very strong indications that Batista’s behavior was inconsistent with ideology and consistent with self-interest, namely, serving his winning coalition. This is also evident when we look at pleasing groups clearly outside his winning coalition (see below).

**Pleasing Groups Clearly Outside the Winning Coalition**

An argument for Batista pleasing groups outside his winning coalition was his social service programs in 1937 targeted at the rural poor (Argote-Freyre, 2006, pp. 208–209; Mallin, 1974, p. 10; Staten, 2003, p. 64). This included land reform that improved the conditions for small sugar farmers and harmed the land-owning elite. However, the land reform was very minor, and he withdrew the rest of his great rural development plan already in 1938 (it was presented in 1937) (Argote-Freyre, 2006, pp. 249–250). It looks like Batista used these actions to brand himself as benefactor before the elections in 1940. Although the elections were not completely free and fair, he needed some popular support, which implies that this was the time when his winning coalition was largest. Thus, the rural poor were not clearly outside his winning coalition, and the landed elite was not clearly inside his winning coalition. Moreover, these social service programs increased his popularity to the highest level throughout his period in power (Argote-Freyre, 2006, p. 214). Batista made the army implement the program (Argote-Freyre, 2006, pp. 200–201; Mallin, 1974, p. 10; Staten, 2003, p. 64), which can be interpreted as an effort to improve their reputation in the population and Batista’s as the leader of the army. Inconsistent with this behavior to be driven by ideological concerns, in the 1950s, the rural poor were yet again left behind (inequality in the country was enormous) (Staten, 2003, pp. 81–82).

Another potential argument for Batista pleasing groups outside his winning coalition was that he improved conditions for the workers and united with the labor union when he first was in power in the 1930s (Argote-Freyre,
2006, p. 14). Later in the 1930s, he banned strikes and oppressed the labor union (Argote-Freyre, 2006, pp. 162–163; Staten, 2003, p. 63). Hence, although it is difficult to assess when the labor union was inside his winning coalition, there is clearly a lack of ideological consistency in this behavior.

In sum, whether Batista harmed groups inside or pleased groups outside his winning coalition is difficult to judge because the winning coalition is not easy to identify. So by the “clearly” requirement, none of the two can be observed. But, as discussed, there is almost no behavior close to harming groups inside his winning coalition or pleasing groups outside it. The second-order condition of ideology-consistent behavior is not satisfied either. There was little consistency in behavior and ideology over time. Furthermore, several shifts can be observed. This strongly indicates that Batista was driven by self-interest.

**Voluntary Step-Down**

In the late 1950s, Batista (and his wife) survived several assassination attempts (Argote-Freyre, 2006, p. 1). He stepped down and went into exile when it was clear that Castro would overthrow him (Argote-Freyre, 2006, pp. 1–2; Mallin, 1974, pp. 25–26). Hence, this step-down was not voluntary. He also stepped down in 1944 after losing the democratic election (Chomsky, 2015, p. 27). But as discussed, clinging to power in 1944 might not have been a viable option for Batista because he was likely to lose his crucial support from the US. Therefore, I conclude that he did not step down voluntarily at any point.

**Low Personal Income**

There is ample evidence that Batista did not have a low or even moderate personal income. In 1940, nine days after the election, the American ambassador noted that corruption pervaded the administration to an incredible extent (Gellman, 1973, p. 185). When Batista left office in 1944, he was already extremely wealthy (Staten, 2003, p. 66), and he had recently acquired a new large home and a ranch in the countryside (Argote-Freyre, 2006, p. 242). Especially in the 1950s, the elite, including Batista, had access to, and embezzled, public funds, and the regime was very corrupt (Domínguez, 1998, p. 120; Guerra, 2012, pp. 46, 52, 202). In the 1950s, Batista did not even deny that he was corrupt; he just referred to corruption being everywhere (Domínguez, 1998, pp. 122–123). He never took money directly from the state, but he engaged widely in subtle corruption. One method was supporting businesses with public funds and privately investing and receiving a good share of the return (Domínguez, 1998, p. 125). Another was giving bonuses to politicians, including himself, when new laws were introduced (Argote-Freyre, 2006, p. 242).
One may defend this behavior by arguing that political and personal corruption and embezzlement were the norm. Although this was the case (Chomsky, 2015, pp. 23–24, 27), it does not imply that every single politician should embezzle the state. An example was the non-corrupt President Mendieta, who shared power with Batista in 1933. When he had trouble paying the mortgage on his farm, he was encouraged to finance it with public funds (as most other politicians at the time would have done), but he chose to cut his living expenses instead (Argote-Freyre, 2006, p. 138).

**Expert Assessments**

Experts agree that Batista was not ideologically motivated and his main motive was power and wealth maximization, especially in the 1950s (Argote-Freyre, 2006, pp. 88–89, 248; Dominguez, 1998, p. 122; Fontova, 2005, pp. 79–80). Yet, as indicated, he did not invent non-ideological and clientelistic politics, as they were already in place when he came to power, but he chose to embrace them (Dominguez, 1998, p. 115). Generally, he lacked ideology and guiding ideas (Argote-Freyre, 2006, pp. 88–89; Dominguez, 1998, p. 128). He might actually have wanted to improve the living standard of the poor in the 1930s since he could have chosen other groups to mobilize. Yet, this was still a link in his power project (Argote-Freyre, 2006, pp. 217–218, 221).

**Summary**

None of the observable implications of ideological motivation were found, and ideological consistency was generally lacking. Had Batista had an ideology or a belief about improving the well-being of just some part of the people, e.g., the rural population, it was traded for his own power and wealth. In no way did he sacrifice his own wealth and power for his proclaimed ideology. The large fluctuations in his political behavior can be assigned to variations in constraints and varying sizes of the winning coalition.

Harm: N
Please: N
Non-Minimal: N
Voluntary step-down: N
Income: N

Overall qualitative judgement: 1
Bayesian updating score: 0.05


Buyoya was a soldier (Červenka & Legum, 1994, p. 13; East & Thomas, 2003, p. 79; Reuters, 2003; Samii, 2014, p. 214), trained at a Burundian military academy. He studied in several European countries (East & Thomas, 2003, p. 79; Palmer, 2005, p. 221), but he returned to Burundi as an officer and became a part of politics, as the army already ruled the country by then (East & Thomas, 2003, p. 79). In 1982, he became a member of the central committee of the ruling party, UPRONA; however, he was quite unknown to the people until the coup in 1987 (East & Thomas, 2003, p. 79).

Buyoya is a Tutsi from the Bururi province as was both his predecessors, Bagaza and Michel Micombero (Červenka & Legum, 1994, p. 13; Lemarchand, 1996, pp. 116–117; Palmer, 2005, p. 221; Reuters, 2003; Samii, 2014, p. 214; Watt, 2008, p. 41). The Tutsis have traditionally been in power, both politically and economically, in Burundi, despite being the minority (around 15% compared to 85% Hutus) (Červenka & Legum, 1994, p. 13; Lindholt, 2000, p.
Buyoya was generally disliked by both Tutsi and Hutu extremists. He is widely viewed as a more moderate leader than Bagaza (Krueger & Krueger, 2007, p. 30; Lindholt, 2000, pp. 14–16, 22; Watt, 2008, p. 42), but also as a ruthless Tutsi military dictator (Lemarchand, 1996, p. 152; Watt, 2008, p. 76), and his regime was responsible for many human rights abuses (Krueger & Krueger, 2007, pp. 288–289; Lemarchand, 1996, p. 168; Lindholt, 2000, p. 14). Some view Buyoya as a democratizer, since he handed over the leadership to a democratically elected leader in 1993 (Lemarchand, 1996, p. xxix; Lindholt, 2000, p. 14) and again in 2003 (East & Thomas, 2003, pp. 79–80; Reuters, 2003). Others say he was pressured to do so, at least in 2003 (Krueger & Krueger, 2007, p. 31; Watt, 2008, pp. 70, 78). In general, the sources used for this case study strongly disagree on the extent to which Buyoya actually did create reforms or whether it was window-dressing. Consequently, the sources disagree on Buyoya’s motives, and as I will discuss in detail at the end of the case study, the best and most valid sources also disagree. Thus, the conclusions will be more uncertain than for most of the other case studies.

**Ideology (proclaimed)**

Upon entering power in 1987 and again in 1996, Buyoya claimed that he wanted reconciliation between Hutus and Tutsis. In 1987, this should be viewed in light of Bagaza’s extreme exclusion of the Hutus; in 1996, it was against the backdrop of the civil war (East & Thomas, 2003, p. 79; Palmer, 2005, p. 221). Buyoya directly claimed that he was non-extremist and non-exclusionary (Červenka & Legum, 1994, p. 9), so I will not evaluate the implication on excessive repression. Buyoya also claimed that national unity was a precondition for democracy (Lemarchand, 1996, p. 160). Although his party, the independence party UPRONA, was initially viewed as leftist (East & Thomas, 2003, p. 79), the economic dimension of politics was not salient and not included in his political promises.

**Winning Coalition**

Since Buyoya was a military dictator, and since the army has traditionally been involved in politics in Burundi, the military leadership and a large part of the military were in his winning coalition. However, at least indirectly, and maybe also directly, the Tutsi elite was also a part of Buyoya’s winning coalition. The powerful positions in the military were held by Tutsis (Červenka & Legum, 1994, p. 13; Lindholt, 2000, p. 63), and there were strong ethnic ties in the Burundian society. Therefore, Buyoya would probably have lost military support if he was not liked by the Tutsis in general. Buyoya had a strong power-base in the Bururi province where he grew up (East & Thomas, 2003, p. 79;
Lemarchand, 1996, p. 165). This overlaps with the Tutsi elite and the Tutsi army.

The Tutsi military elite was not just one united entity. There were extremist hardliners like Bagaza, and then the more moderate to whom Buyoya by most scholars is deemed to belong (Lindholt, 2000, pp. 15–16; Watt, 2008, p. 42). Both factions were strong, and Buyoya’s power seemed to depend on them both (Lindholt, 2000, pp. 15–16).

Buyoya’s power also depended, at least indirectly, on the international community in the form of economic aid. Although his power did not depend on the people at large, donor aid in the war-torn country was important to be able to pay salaries (Krueger & Krueger, 2007, pp. 277–278; Lindholt, 2000, pp. 33–36; Watt, 2008, p. 70).

Consequently, during most of Buyoya’s time as leader of Burundi, his winning coalition consisted of the army, the Tutsi elite, and international donors. However, before the election in 1993, he needed broader support to stay in power since he had to win on democratic terms, and his winning coalition expanded to necessarily include some Hutus (as they made up 85% of the population).

Based on this discussion, I conclude that Buyoya had a very narrow winning coalition during most of his rule and that it was minimal, meaning that the implication of a non-minimal winning coalition is not observed. In the period where his winning coalition had to be larger, it was still minimal.

**Harming Groups Clearly Inside the Winning Coalition**

As many other autocrats, Buyoya took power-consolidating initiatives upon taking power (both in 1987 and 1996). First, he kept close the military troops that had helped him seize power. These were the same he relied on when he seized power again in 1996 (Krueger & Krueger, 2007, pp. 269–270). Moreover, he retained the Tutsi dominance in military (Červenka & Legum, 1994, p. 13; Krueger & Krueger, 2007, pp. 3, 268; Lemarchand, 1996, p. 168; Lindholt, 2000, pp. 63–64). In 1989, only 6 of 71 of the enrolled in the military academy were Hutu (Lemarchand, 1996, p. 168). Also, he made sure the Tutsi dominance in the judicial areas continued. Tutsi dominance in both areas was sustained throughout both of Buyoya’s incumbencies (Krueger & Krueger, 2007, pp. 3, 268; Lindholt, 2000, pp. 63–64). In 1998, Buyoya also strengthened himself in the political arena by expanding the number of seats in parliament and placing people highly loyal to him in these (Krueger & Krueger, 2007, p. 277).

The regime also used repression to consolidate power. It cracked hard down on Hutu “dissidents” and other (especially Hutu) potential challenges to
the regime (Lemarchand, 1996, pp. 152, 168). In 1988, rebel Hutus killed fourteen Tutsis in a northern province of the country, the army replied brutally and ended up killing between 5,000 and 20,000 Hutus, thus, committing genocide. Buyoya promised to investigate the genocide, but he never did (Červenka & Legum, 1994, p. 10; Krueger & Krueger, 2007, p. 31; Watt, 2008, p. 41).

During his second incumbency, Buyoya had concentration camps (according to Nelson Mandela) for the Hutus (Krueger & Krueger, 2007, p. 274). Buyoya refused to let international doctors into the camps to treat sick patients (Krueger & Krueger, 2007, p. 275). This harsh repression is a classic example of attempts to consolidate power (although the genocide was excessive and was punished by the international community (Krueger & Krueger, 2007, p. 33), but it is unclear what degree of violence Buyoya had given orders to).

During Buyoya’s first incumbency, Ndadaye was sent to prison but was released after international pressure. Ndadaye was imprisoned after he had held a speech suggesting reconciliation and a ten-year transition period to democracy (Krueger & Krueger, 2007, pp. 2, 33, 268–269). This is another clear example of consolidating power, especially because Ndadaye actually suggested a solution close to what Buyoya himself claimed to work for.

After Ndadaye was elected in 1993, he experienced a failed coup attempt (Krueger & Krueger, 2007, pp. 268–269; Watt, 2008, pp. 43–44). It is still a mystery whether Buyoya ordered the coup attempt and the assassination of Ndadaye (Krueger & Krueger, 2007, pp. 268–269; Reuters, 2003; Samii, 2014, p. 214; Watt, 2008, p. 56). The most widespread belief seems to be that it was Bagaza’s associates who conducted the assassination (Samii, 2014, p. 214), although a UN report named Buyoya and other officers as instigators of the assassination (East & Thomas, 2003, p. 80). Because of the uncertainty, I will refrain from concluding anything regarding Buyoya’s motives based on these incidents.

Yet, in conclusion, there is still a lot of evidence that Buyoya consolidated power, and especially the imprisonment of Ndadaye was inconsistent with acting on ideological motivation. It is worth mentioning that some of the previously discussed initiatives, as well as trying to contain the extremist Tutsi groups and locking Bagaza up (Lindholt, 2000, p. 17), can be viewed as conflict containment (also controlling the Tutsi extremists) in a reconciliation process. On the other hand, it may also just be to consolidate power further by taking control or satisfying other parts of the winning coalition (e.g., the international community). Based on these discussions, I conclude that Buyoya took many power-consolidating initiatives, and there are no clear incidences of deliberately harming his winning coalition.
Pleasing Groups Clearly Outside the Winning Coalition

Buyoya introduced several reforms during both incumbencies. In his first incumbency, he released hundreds of political prisoners and appointed Hutus to ministerial posts (Červenka & Legum, 1994, p. 5; East & Thomas, 2003, pp. 79–80; Lemarchand, 1996, pp. 119, 160–161). He initiated political and economic liberalization processes (Červenka & Legum, 1994, p. 5; Lemarchand, 1996, p. 119), and he spent time and resources on making sure that the military would not obstruct the process (Červenka & Legum, 1994, p. 13; Lemarchand, 1996, p. 185). These initiatives seem to be instances of pleasing groups outside his winning coalition. However, a couple of sources argue that this was mainly window-dressing, and in reality, he kept power in his own hands (Krueger & Krueger, 2007, pp. 31, 33, 190; Watt, 2008, p. 42). As mentioned, he did keep control over the military and the judiciary. Although it might only be a small step, and the Hutu ministers did not have much real influence (Lemarchand, 1996, p. 166), releasing political prisoners is not window-dressing. Also the Tutsi hardliners were deeply dissatisfied with Buyoya’s liberalization initiatives (Červenka & Legum, 1994, p. 13; Lemarchand, 1996, p. 119; Watt, 2008, pp. 42–43, 77), which indicates that they were not just window-dressing.

The liberalization initiatives could also be viewed as instances of pleasing his winning coalition if he planned to install and run in the election already in the beginning of his incumbency, since his winning coalition would then be broader. When the election approached, he used his power to win support. He sought to mobilize the masses through UPRONA. He spent patronage resources and brought Hutu into the party to attract Hutu supporters as well (Lemarchand, 1996, p. 169). The next question is then, “why did Buyoya install elections in the first place?” The international community did not focus much on the domestic politics in Burundi before the start of the civil war, and Buyoya looked moderate compared to Bagaza (International Crisis Group, 2001, p. 17; Krueger & Krueger, 2007, pp. 277–278), thus, the international pressure was not strong yet. Moreover, as the country was ethnically polarized, and the Hutus were the overwhelming majority, it does not seem to make sense to democratize, unless Buyoya really wanted reconciliation (and democracy). In conclusion, Buyoya seemed deliberately to please groups outside his winning coalition by installing elections in 1993, although he ran himself. As I will come back to, most of the sources for the case study support this conclusion (East & Thomas, 2003, pp. 79–80; Lemarchand, 1996, p. xxix; Lindholt, 2000, p. 14; Watt, 2008, p. 42).

During Buyoya’s second incumbency, he also initiated reconciliation reforms. In 1996, he suspended the parliament and banned political parties, but months later, he created a civilian parliament (East & Thomas, 2003, p. 80). He thus abstained from bringing the army into the parliament. In 1998–1999,
many government-led steps were taken towards transition and reconciliation, e.g., preparing a transitional constitution and election five years after his entry (Lindholt, 2000, p. 18). However, progress faltered, and the sources disagree on why. One argument is that the obstacles to further progress in 1999 were mainly internal splits, and Buyoya wanted to continue the process (Lindholt, 2000, p. 22). Another is that it was the international sanctions and the deteriorating economy that forced Buyoya to create reforms (Lindholt, 2000, pp. 33–36, 43–44; Watt, 2008, pp. 62–65, 70). It took long and intensive international negotiations in 2001 with Julius Nyerere (former president of Tanzania) and Nelson Mandela as mediators, before Buyoya agreed to introduce elections. The former argument is difficult to validate, but there was a long negotiation process going on, and also Burundi faced severe sanctions from 1996, because the international community was not satisfied with Buyoya’s peace-making and democratizing efforts (Lindholt, 2000, pp. 33–36, 43–44; Watt, 2008, pp. 62–65, 70). Thus, there were strong international incentives for Buyoya to democratize, and his actions seem to be driven by this pressure. Consequently, regarding his second incumbency, there is no clear evidence that he was deliberately pleasing groups outside his winning coalition.

In conclusion, Buyoya pleased the Hutus with some of his initiatives during his time in power, but only in the first incumbency did it seem to be a deliberate choice without pressure. Hence, there is evidence that Buyoya deliberately pleased groups outside his winning coalition during his first incumbency, whereas there is no clear evidence that he did in his second incumbency, as he faced strong international pressure.

Voluntary Step-Down

In continuation of the discussion above, Buyoya appears to have been forced from power by the international community in 2003. There was strong international pressure, and he had troubles paying salaries to the army due to the international sanctions (Watt, 2008, p. 70). Moreover, his domestic popularity, also in the army, was at a low point (International Crisis Group, 2001, p. 15). Thus, he might have lost power in a harder way had he not stepped down. In 1993, the international pressure was much weaker, and Buyoya was still in good standing internationally, although one source argues that there was international pressure then too (Krueger & Krueger, 2007, p. 31). He did indeed run in the elections in 1993 and lost, although he thought he would win (Krueger & Krueger, 2007, p. 35; Lemarchand, 1996, p. 178; Watt, 2008, p. 43). He decided to let go of power, although he is suspected of being behind the failed coup against Ndadaye afterwards. Others speculate that he would have been strong enough to seize power in 1993 if he wanted to; at least many people in the population thought he would have stayed ( Reuters, 2003).
light of this, he stepped down somewhat voluntarily. At least he deliberately took a risk of losing power by installing elections in the first place. Based on this discussion, I conclude that the implication, voluntary step-down was partly present in Buyoya’s first but not in his second incumbency.

**Low Personal Income**

There is no direct information on Buyoya’s income or potential embezzlement. We should expect to find such information if Buyoya had a high personal income or just a lavish lifestyle. Even the most skeptical sources who mention many misdeeds by Buyoya do not accuse him of embezzlement, misappropriation of office, or a lavish lifestyle. However, there is evidence of misappropriation of funds in the political-military system of the Bururi province, but it is unclear whether Buyoya took part personally (International Crisis Group, 2001, p. 16). Based on this, I conclude that this implication is partly observed, that is, Buyoya did probably have a low or moderate income.

**Expert Assessments**

As mentioned, sources disagree widely on the assessment of Buyoya’s motives. Most sources agree that Buyoya sincerely wanted reconciliation, national unity, and democracy during his first incumbency, and he deserves credit for the 1993 democratization (Červenka & Legum, 1994, p. 13; East & Thomas, 2003, pp. 79–80; Lemarchand, 1996, p. xxix, 132, 184; Lindholt, 2000, p. iii, 14, 22, 67-68; Watt, 2008, pp. 43, 77). Especially Dr. Lone Lindholt’s report is interesting in this regard because one of her research questions concerns Buyoya’s motives directly (Lindholt, 2000, pp. 3–4). She argues that some of Buyoya’s actions may have appeared to be based on selfish motives, but in the contemporary context, they seemed not to be (Lindholt, 2000, p. 14). However, Robert Krueger, U.S. ambassador in Burundi in 1994-1995, disagrees. He cites an anonymous European diplomat: “When I came to Burundi I thought of Pierre Buyoya as a kind of George Washington figure: a father to his country who personally sought to bring Hutu and Tutsi together; one

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62 “I loathe the actions sponsored by men such as Pierre Buyoya and Jean Bikomagu: the death of Melchior Ndadaye; the slaughter of 20,000 Hutus in 1998; the concentration camps with their torture and humiliation; the overturning of democracy; the abolishment of Parliament; the daily slaughter of innocents; the mock trials regarding Ndadaye’s assassination; the closing of schools; the rape of young girls and old women; the disemboweling of pregnant mothers; the cruelty and callousness in which children are reared and in which the entire society lives.” (Krueger & Krueger, 2007, pp. 288–289)
who gracefully accepted defeat in an election and a role as an elder statesman. The longer I stayed in Burundi, the less the picture fit” (Krueger & Krueger, 2007, pp. 266–267). Krueger holds the same view of Buyoya (Krueger & Krueger, 2007, pp. 266–267) and argues that Buyoya only worked for the welfare of the Hutus to the extent it was necessary to stay in power (Krueger & Krueger, 2007, pp. 31, 33, 190).

Buyoya’s motives in his second incumbency are evaluated differently. Most sources dated during or after his second incumbency use examples from his first incumbency when arguing that he sincerely wanted reconciliation, national unity and democracy. In that sense, they do not focus on his second incumbency. However, two sources have a more general, positive view of Buyoya. They are not in-depth studies, but an article from Reuters (Reuters, 2003) and a two-page biography (East & Thomas, 2003, pp. 79–80). In contrast, the International Crisis Group writes in 2001 that Buyoya’s government’s only concern is to protect its privileges, and that Buyoya protects the interest of the political-military Bururi oligarchy (International Crisis Group, 2001, pp. 16–17). Nigel Watt, former Director of the Africa Centre in London, has lived in Burundi and suggests that Buyoya’s intentions changed between his two incumbencies. He was disappointed that he was not elected 1993 after having sacrificed himself for the people; therefore he turned bitter. Watt adds that some Burundians believe that Buyoya came back to get revenge or at least to protect himself from accusations about his role in Ndadaye’s assassination – but with little interest in the people (Watt, 2008, pp. 77–78). Yet, Watt still argues that Buyoya is an enigma, and it is very difficult to evaluate his motives (Watt, 2008, p. 77).

Summing up, most experts believe that Buyoya sincerely wanted national unity and was other-regarding and ideologically motivated in his first incumbency. Former US ambassador in Burundi, Krueger, disagrees. In Buyoya’s second incumbency, his motives might have changed. At least, there are specific arguments that he was selfish.

Summary
Buyoya ruled Burundi twice, and the two incumbencies were similar in many ways. He installed himself in a coup and left after having installed elections. During his first incumbency, he seemed relatively unconstrained compared to his second incumbency where he was under heavy pressure, especially from the international community. This makes the assessment of some of the implications difficult as they differ across the two incumbencies. Almost none of the implications are observed for the second period (although he probably had a low or moderate income throughout both incumbencies), whereas in the first period he pleased groups outside his winning coalition and stepped down
somewhat voluntarily (installed elections voluntarily and left when he lost the election). The experts disagree on Buyoya’s motives, but most assessments point towards Buyoya being rather ideologically motivated during his first incumbency and rather selfish during his second incumbency. Thus, he appears to have changed motives over time. However, the conclusions in the case study of Buyoya are generally uncertain.

Harm: N
Please: (O) - O/N
Non-Minimal: N
Voluntary step-down: (N) - (O)/N
Income: (O)
Expert: Probably ideologically motivated in his first term and selfish in the second – but in general disagreement.

Overall qualitative judgement: 3
Bayesian updating score: 0.42

Note: In the analysis, I use the average assessment across the two incumbencies where they differ across the incumbencies, namely with regard to the second and fourth implication.

Sources
In the case study of Buyoya, the sources disagree noticeably. Especially Robert Krueger, former US ambassador in Burundi, is very skeptical of Buyoya. Nigel Watt, who lived in Burundi for years, is also rather skeptical. In contrast, academic scholars (with specialization in Africa or Burundi) and broader historical notes hold a more positive view of Buyoya and his reforms as more than window-dressing. One explanation may be that academic scholars are trained to distance their personal feelings and impressions from their work. In that sense, they may be the more reliable sources. On the other hand, living in Burundi – especially as ambassador – one may obtain more detailed and in-depth information about Buyoya and his motives. It is difficult to weigh the sources with regard to reliability, and I have used them all in tandem to get the most accurate assessment of Buyoya.
Caetano, Marcello (Portugal, 1968-1974)

Marcello Caetano was installed as Portuguese prime minister after António de Oliveira Salazar’s death in 1968 and was ousted by General Spinola in a coup in 1974 (de Meneses, 2009, p. 602; Gallagher, 1983, pp. 165–188; Graham & Makler, 1979, pp. 110–111; Martinho, 2018, pp. 208–210; Pinto, 2003, p. 82; Reuters, 1980b). Caetano continued Salazar’s authoritarian rule, although he very slowly started reforming and liberalizing (Lopes, 2014, p. 83; Reuters, 1980b). Caetano was a law professor, and he had been in politics for many years as Salazar’s closest associate. He was one of the architects behind the Portuguese constitution (which was based on Italian Fascism) (Gallagher, 1983, p. 132; Martinho, 2018, pp. 46, 62; Raby, 1988, pp. 137, 237; Reuters, 1980b; Soares, 1975, p. 226). In 1958, he was removed as de facto deputy premier and retreated to work at the University of Lisbon where he became rector (Gallagher, 1983, p. 161; Martinho, 2018, p. 160; Reuters, 1980b). He was still frequently in touch with Salazar, and they were on good terms (Martinho, 2018, p. 160). In 1968, Caetano was appointed head of state when Salazar became seriously ill (de Meneses, 2009, p. 602; Gallagher, 1983, p. 161; Martinho, 2018, p. 181; Raby, 1988, p. 237; Soares, 1975, pp. 225–226). Caetano was very popular in the beginning; he was viewed as more moderate and reformist than Salazar and had support from liberals and some leftists (Martinho, 2018, pp. 175–176, 207; Raby, 1988, p. 237; Soares, 1975, p. 228). Nonetheless, his downfall was caused by pressure from both the extreme right and the left, who realized that he was not going to democratize (Martinho, 2018, pp. 207–210). He fled into exile in Brazil where he worked at Rio University and lived until his death in 2018 (Martinho, 2018, p. 225; Reuters, 1980b).

Caetano was born in Lisbon into a lower middle-class family. He was well educated and literate, unlike many other Portuguese at the time (Martinho, 2018, pp. 5–8, 42–43; Reuters, 1980b). As a Catholic, he became increasingly conservative and anti-liberal, believing in salvation, the return to Christian civilization, and he was opposed to enlightenment (Martinho, 2018, pp. 10–11). He became a leading activist and strong supporter of a counter-revolutionary, anti-liberal, and anti-republic movement in favor of decentralization, traditionalism, nationalism, and a strong reaction to modernity (Gallagher, 1983, p. 132; Martinho, 2018, p. 25). Later, Caetano became leader of Salazar’s party’s youth organization (Gallagher, 1983, p. 166; Martinho, 2018, pp. 70, 82). He was a political activist as well as an intellectual (Gallagher, 1983, p. 165; Martinho, 2018, p. 43; O’Donnell, Schmitter, & Whitehead, 1986, pp. 112–113; Soares, 1975, p. 226). Caetano was one of the only people who dared criticize Salazar, even though he was a close associate (de Meneses, 2009, p.
604; Martinho, 2018, p. viii, 77, 82, 149, 222). For instance, letters show that he reported to Salazar that there was no corporatist spirit (team spirit) in the youth organization, and Caetano criticized Salazar for doing nothing about it (de Meneses, 2009, pp. 316–319, 384; Martinho, 2018, p. 82). In 1944, Caetano was appointed Minister of the Colonies (Gallagher, 1983, p. 166; Martinho, 2018, p. 109; Soares, 1975, p. 226); in 1947, he became President of the Executive Commission of Salazar’s party, União Nacional, after a reshuffling of the cabinet (Gallagher, 1983, p. 166; Martinho, 2018, pp. 111–113; Soares, 1975, p. 226); and in 1955, Salazar appointed Caetano as Minister of the Presidency, i.e., de facto deputy premier (Gallagher, 1983, p. 166; Martinho, 2018, pp. 149–150; Reuters, 1980b; Soares, 1975, p. 227). He was removed in 1958 and returned to University of Lisbon as rector. In protest against Salazar intervening in university business, he stepped down as rector a couple of years later and went back to teaching (Gallagher, 1983, pp. 161, 166; Martinho, 2018, pp. 160, 169, 173; Raby, 1988, pp. 137, 237; Reuters, 1980b; Soares, 1975, pp. 227–228).

**Ideology (proclaimed)**

Judging by his activism and alliances before coming to power, Caetano was a conservative authoritarian and a defender of corporatism (and decentralization). However, he was more moderate and reformist than Salazar. Already in the 1960s, an elite group of supporters of Caetano, “Marcelistas”, existed. They adhered to “Marcelismo”, connoting reformism and even some degree of liberalism (at least compared to Salazar and the right-wing of the regime) as well as economic modernization, corporatism, and federalism of the colonial system (de Meneses, 2009, p. 416; Gallagher, 1983, p. 161; Lopes, 2014, pp. 7, 203; Martinho, 2018, pp. 146–147, 160). Caetano’s slogan was “evolution within continuity” (Chilcote, Hadjiyannis, Fred III, Nataf, & Sammis, 1990, p. 84; Gallagher, 1983, p. 166; Graham & Makler, 1979, p. 47; Lopes, 2014, pp. 7, 245; Raby, 1988, p. 237; Soares, 1975, p. 263). With this, he promised reformism, although it did not necessarily mean democracy. Nonetheless, in the beginning of his incumbency, he was a reputed liberalist after his progressive actions in the Salazar regime and because he stepped down as rector in reaction to Salazar’s illiberal meddling with university affairs (Raby, 1988, p. 237; Soares, 1975, p. 228).

Caetano clearly supported Portuguese colonialism. His reasons were that the colonies belonged rightfully to Portugal through exploration, discovery, and the Portuguese conquerors offering Christianity to the natives. Moreover, the colonies had not matured sufficiently to sustain themselves and were therefore better off under Portuguese rule (Martinho, 2018, p. 201).
Winning Coalition

Generally, Caetano’s (as well as Salazar’s) rule was based on a narrow group of supporters (Graham & Makler, 1979, p. 3). Caetano’s winning coalition consisted of a large group within the party as well as the military. Salazar had been somewhat independent of the people, but he had control over the party and the military (Whitman, 1970). Caetano’s downfall was partly caused by the emergence of an extreme right within the party, partly by the mobilization of the left (Martinho, 2018, pp. 209–210), and partly by the church. Support from one of the groups plus the church might have been enough to stay in power (Martinho, 2018, pp. 209–210; Soares, 1975, pp. 229, 232). In conclusion, the military, broad support in the party, including either extreme right or moderates, and support from the church must have been sufficient to keep him in power, as it was to keep Salazar in power (Whitman, 1970). An alternative winning coalition may have included the moderate right and the liberal democratizers. Based on the previous discussion, Caetano did not have a non-minimal winning coalition.

Harming Groups Clearly Inside the Winning Coalition

Prior to Becoming Premier

Generally, Caetano acted very consistently with his ideology, also before entering power. By then he was also acting in ways that harmed his chances of getting power in the future. One example is his criticism of Salazar, which over time became mainly privately (documented by letter correspondences) (de Meneses, 2009, pp. 316–319; Martinho, 2018, p. viii, 77, 82, 149, 222), and therefore cannot simply have been to show the people that he was a stronger ideologue than Salazar. Instead, he risked ending on bad terms with Salazar. However, this implication is solely evaluated based on actions taken when Caetano was in power, since autocrats’ motives when in power may have changed from before entering power. The previous discussion is only to back up the evidence of ideological consistency presented below.

General Political Direction

When entering power, Caetano kept most of Salazar’s ministers, who were right wing, but there were some reformists, Marcelistas, among them (Martinho, 2018, p. 184). He also brought in a small number of technocrats to develop reformist and industrialization policies – and to implement the corporatism that the Salazar regime had never actually implemented. They also implemented a progressive development plan, including a more balanced redistribution of income (Chilcote et al., 1990, pp. 84–85; Gallagher, 1983, pp. 172–173; Graham & Makler, 1979, p. 108; Lopes, 2014, pp. 7, 104; Pinto, 2003,
Two years later, Caetano formed a new government with more liberals and technocrats, i.e., people who were in favor of his reformist and progressive policies (Gallagher, 1983, p. 168; Pinto, 2003, p. 43; Raby, 1988, p. 239). He could not give them free hands to operate due to a strong Salazarist group in the cabinet who needed some policy concessions (Gallagher, 1983, p. 169). Caetano maintained the fraud elections (only 1.8 of 5 million potential voters were allowed to vote) as well as political repression, which had only eased slightly (Gallagher, 1983, pp. 167–168; Lopes, 2014, p. 7; Martinho, 2018, p. 190; Raby, 1988, p. 239; Soares, 1975, pp. 240–241). All these actions were highly consistent with his ideology but they also pleased his winning coalition, although one may speculate that keeping a more right-wing Salazarist policy agenda might have been safer if his predominant objective was to maintain power.

Another initiative that Caetano took right after entering power was to invite back some of his political opponents from the left who were in exile (Gallagher, 1983, p. 166; Lopes, 2014, p. 213; Martinho, 2018, p. 207; Raby, 1988, pp. 237–238). This is consistent with his slightly reformist ideology, and it increased his popularity and the support from the moderates and liberals (Martinho, 2018, p. 207). Thus, he did not harm his winning coalition, but nor can it be considered a clear and deliberate attempt to please groups outside his winning coalition. However, the right wing was harmed by his liberal initiative and they conspired against him (Graham & Makler, 1979, pp. 110–111; Martinho, 2018, p. 207). In that sense, he did harm part of his winning coalition while pleasing another.

In 1971, Caetano had lost substantial support from liberals because they stopped believing in democratic institutional changes from within – both because the right wing had so much power and because Caetano seemed unwilling to go through with democratization (Gallagher, 1983, p. 171; O'Donnell et al., 1986, p. 113; Raby, 1988, p. 239; Soares, 1975, pp. 277–278). The people became increasingly dissatisfied as the industrial investments did not increase living standards broadly – only for the first couple of years. Among the reasons were rising oil prices and also uneven distribution of development regionally and socially. This led to social unrest (Gallagher, 1983, p. 173; Graham & Makler, 1979, p. 110; O'Donnell et al., 1986, p. 114).

In general, many of Caetano’s political initiatives were more reformist than Salazar’s but still authoritarian. Thus, he ended up harming the right as well as the moderate left. His group of supporters became too narrow, which eventually led to his downfall (Graham & Makler, 1979, pp. 110–111; Martinho, 2018, pp. 208–210). While his political course was perfectly consistent with his proclaimed ideological aims, it is unclear whether he could have foreseen
the fatal consequences for his regime. The fragility of the regime was not obvious to many, nor necessarily to Caetano (O’Donnell et al., 1986, pp. 113–114). Thus, his general political course is (weak) evidence (due to a possible information constraint) of harming his winning coalition since he could have chosen to direct his policies more towards the right or towards the left to get support from either group.

Colonialism

Consistent with his ideological belief in authoritarianism and Portugal’s right to its colonies, Caetano was against Portugal joining the EEC, and the country only joined strictly economic agreements (Martinho, 2018, pp. 204–207). As with many other of his actions, this was largely consistent with the wants of his winning coalition, especially the right. In contrast, his staunch defense of Portugal’s right to keep her colonies was only pleasing the extreme right (Gallagher, 1983, pp. 184–185; Lopes, 2014, p. 8; Raby, 1988, p. 223), but highly consistent with ideological motivation. Many of Caetano’s supporters, also among the conservatives, had distanced themselves from his position on the issue (Martinho, 2018, p. 206; Pinto, 2003, pp. 44, 161; Raby, 1988, p. 223). He only opened independence negotiations with Guinea due to strong external pressure (Martinho, 2018, p. 203), and he did not bow to other pressure (regarding the other colonies) (Martinho, 2018, p. 203). In general, he did not strive for international recognition (Lopes, 2014, p. 243). He changed his arguments for why Portugal should keep the colonies (from deserved in conquest and development to paternalistic protection arguments) (Lopes, 2014, p. 8; Soares, 1975, p. 269). If he did not sincerely care about this, it would have been easier and less costly just to abandon the project after it lost general support. Also, because he was highly internationally constrained, not liberalizing and granting independence to the colonies put Caetano under extreme international pressure which might indirectly have led to his downfall (Gallagher, 1983, p. 165; Lopes, 2014, p. 246). Moreover, even among soldiers, the belief that Portugal should fight in the colonies was eroded (Gallagher, 1983, p. 186). In contrast to his general political direction discussed above, he was likely to have known that his strong stance on colonialism would do no good in terms of staying in power (Lopes, 2014, p. 246). This is evidence of Caetano harming his winning coalition in favor of defending his ideological goals.

Based on this discussion, it is clear that there was a huge overlap between pleasing his winning coalition and attempting to fulfil his ideological beliefs. Yet, when there was room for discrepancy, his behavior was highly consistent with his proclaimed ideological aims and less with the wants of his winning
coalition. Therefore, I conclude that there is evidence of observing this implication.

*Pleasing Groups Clearly Outside the Winning Coalition*

There is no evidence of Caetano pleasing groups clearly outside his winning coalition. As discussed, not necessarily because he was not ideologically motivated, but perhaps due to the large overlap between pleasing the winning coalition and pursuing his proclaimed ideology.

Yet, when he was in exile and had no prospects of returning to Portuguese politics, he kept interfering in Portuguese politics. For instance, he wrote a letter to the Brazilian minister of justice in 1975, expressing his concern about what was going on in the Portuguese colonies where life for whites presumably had become tough or almost impossible (Martinho, 2018, pp. 231–232). In line with his ideology, he fought for the Portuguese in the colonies, but they would never be a part of his winning coalition. However, this was not very costly since he was out of power. Generally, he spent a lot of time trying to “defend” himself and his regime (Martinho, 2018, pp. 230–235), perhaps to protect his name. In any case, since these actions happened after he left power, they do not count as evidence of observing this implication; hence, it remains unobserved.

*Voluntary Step-Down*

Caetano did not step down voluntarily since he was ousted in a coup d’état (Gallagher, 1983, pp. 165–188; Graham & Makler, 1979, pp. 110–111; Martinho, 2018, pp. 208–210; Pinto, 2003, p. 82; Reuters, 1980b). Despite his slow moves towards reform and liberalization, there is no evidence that he had a concrete plan for democratization.

*Low Personal Income*

There is no reporting of Caetano embezzling the state or in other ways engaging in self-enrichment. It is unclear how large his salary and pension were, and the latter was cancelled when he was ousted from power. He kept complaining in letters to friends and other associates that he had not gotten his pension with him when he went into exile (Martinho, 2018, p. 227). Nothing indicates that he had a very high income or lived extravagantly, but there is no explicit indication of the opposite either. As nothing is stated in the material covered, including his private letters, it is probably more likely that he had a moderate than a high income, and it is unlikely that he stole from the state. In any case, he did not have money shipped off to tax havens or international banks since he started working at the university when in exile in Brazil. Based on this, I conclude that this implication is partly observed.
Expert Assessments

So far, there is some (although weak) evidence that Caetano was ideologically motivated. He acted strongly in line with his proclaimed ideology; however, most of the time, this was consistent with staying in power. Nothing indicates that he was wealth-seeking, and there are instances where he must have known that he risked his power for his ideology. Most experts agree that he was strongly ideologically motivated (Gallagher, 1983, p. 133; Graham & Makler, 1979, pp. 47–48, 106–107; Martinho, 2018, p. viii, 34, 43, 192; Raby, 1988, p. 239; Reuters, 1980b). They view him as conservative, corporatist, anti-liberal, and traditionalist. He did not believe in democracy and too much liberty because he was afraid that the left wing would misuse it (Gallagher, 1983, p. 133; Graham & Makler, 1979, pp. 106–107; Martinho, 2018, p. viii, 34, 43, 192; Raby, 1988, p. 239; Reuters, 1980b). Despite his distrust in democracy, he was a reformist and a modernist compared to Salazar (Martinho, 2018, p. 223).

His biographer, a leftist with a doctorate in history, writes consistently that Caetano was highly ideologically motivated, and he kept most of his values from his youth with him when in power (Martinho, 2018, p. viii, 192). In terms of his anti-liberal, conservative, and traditionalist stance, “Strictly speaking, he broke with none of these principles” (Martinho, 2018, p. 43).

Diogo Freitas do Amaral, a right-wing/center-right (later left-wing) law scholar, said about Caetano, in 2011: “To the contrary of many who changed when they reached power, Marcello Caetano did not change: his administration was entirely coherent with his ideas” (Martinho, 2018, pp. 223–224). Although Amaral may have been on good terms with Caetano, he was only in politics after the revolution in 1974, and he turned leftist (Martinho, 2018, pp. 223–224). Thus, his statement is fairly credible. His biographer, who is a professional historian and leftist, is even more credible.

Before he died, Salazar hinted that Caetano was ideologically motivated and certainly not power greedy: “he was a courageous and intelligent man, who dared to criticize me, but who did not understand that in order to make a difference he had to be in the cabinet” (de Meneses, 2009, p. 604). This quote is (weaker) evidence that Caetano was ideologically motivated, since Salazar and Caetano were close for many years.

A Portuguese historian with a doctorate in international history from London School of Economics who works at the Department of Contemporary History at the Universidade Nova de Lisboa argues that it is unclear why Caetano did not fully democratize, and that three reasons are likely: personal political conviction, concerns about social disorder, or unwillingness to break with the powerful extreme right (Lopes, 2014, p. 7). All three, perhaps except the third,
point to some kind of ideological motive encouraging his behavior, and none of them point to power- or wealth-driven motives.

It is possible to find people who saw Caetano’s objective as conquering power, among them journalists (Martinho, 2018, p. 182) and a German counsellor who did not approve of Caetano’s anti-European policies (Lopes, 2014, p. 190). Mario Soares, a left-wing politician and Salazar’s and Caetano’s main opponent, seems to have perceived many of Caetano’s actions before coming to power as strategic, for instance withdrawing from politics in 1958 and when resigning as rector (Soares, 1975, pp. 112, 203–204). He also explained some of Caetano’s actions when in power as sincere, e.g., ideological changes or navigating within tight constraints to fulfill his ideological goals (e.g., his position on colonialism) (Soares, 1975, p. 229). Due to Soares’ political position, this is rather strong evidence that Caetano was ideologically motivated.

Thus, the experts generally evaluate Caetano as ideologically motivated. As discussed, most sources are credible in this regard, and this judgement is unlikely to be based on positive evaluation of the outcome of Caetano’s incumbency since he grew increasingly unpopular and neither intended nor managed to democratize. Furthermore, private letters between Caetano in exile and his friends back in Portugal document that he discussed the lost Portugal and nostalgia for how it should have been (Martinho, 2018, pp. 226–228, 236). This indicates that Caetano was really ideologically motivated, and it worried him that the democratic and left-wing policies in Portugal did not push Portugal in the direction that he wanted.

**Summary**

Caetano appears to have been ideologically motivated, although many of the relative objective or observational implications are absent or only weakly present. This is caused by a large overlap between ideologically motivated behavior and behavior that pleases the winning coalition. Yet, Caetano was even more consistent in pursuing his ideology than in pleasing his winning coalition. For instance, he kept defending Portuguese colonialism even though it no longer pleased his winning coalition. Although it does not weigh much in the conclusion, it is worth mentioning that his actions were also highly ideologically consistent before he came to power (as well as after). Moreover, experts largely agree that he was highly ideologically motivated.

Harm: O
Please: N
Non-Minimal: N
Voluntary step-down: N
Income: (O)
Expert: Ideologically motivated

Overall qualitative judgement: 4
Bayesian updating score: 0.60
Figueiredo, Joao (Brazil, 1979-1985)

General João Figueiredo became the fifth and final president in the Brazilian military dictatorship that lasted from 1964 to 1985. Ernesto Geisel appointed Figueiredo to be his successor, and the latter was inaugurated in 1979 (Sanders & Gall, 1981, p. 163; Skidmore, 1988, p. 200). He was considered a castelista and moderate as Castelo Branco (the first president in the Brazilian military regime) and Geisel had been, and in contrast to the hardliners Artur de Costa e Silva and Emílio Médici (the second and third president in the military regime). Figueiredo had held a position in Médici’s government, and during Geisel’s tenure, he had been promoted to head the SNI, the national intelligence agency, where he had been working before he entered government (Skidmore, 1988, pp. 160–162). Figueiredo was one of the conspirators behind the 1964 revolution (Skidmore, 1988, p. 210). His father was an almost legendary fighter in favor of democracy and against Vargas’ regime a half century before João Figueiredo’s inauguration (Sanders & Gall, 1981, pp. 167–168; Skidmore, 1988, p. 210; Snider, 2013), and this might also have added a reason for Geisel to choose Figueiredo as his successor in the democratization process (Roett, 1999, pp. 129–130). Figueiredo inherited a country with major economic problems. The country was in economic crisis throughout his incumbency, partly due to the huge national debt built up during the military dictatorship (traded off for economic growth). This was an important constraining factor during his incumbency (Roett, 1999, pp. 131, 134; Skidmore, 1988, pp. 230–233, 236–237).

Ideology (proclaimed)

As mentioned, Figueiredo was considered a military moderate. He did not support preemptive repression but wanted to complete the re-democratization process that Geisel had started (Roett, 1999, p. 131; Skidmore, 1988, p. 212). He wanted it to be slow, secure, and gradual (Sanders & Gall, 1981, pp. 169, 181) so the country could remain stable. Figueiredo promised further liberalization and that Brazil would be a democracy when his term ended (Roett, 1999, p. 152; Sanders & Gall, 1981, pp. 168–169; Skidmore, 1988, p. 212). In addition to wanting to return the country to democracy, he prioritized order and stability, and he was an economic liberal (Roett, 1999, p. 131; Skidmore, 1988, p. 212). Instability (the risk of civil war), economic crisis, and risk of communism had been the reasons for the coup and installation of the military dictatorship in the first place (Skidmore, 1988, pp. 4, 14–15, 17–18). Upon inauguration, Figueiredo claimed that he would continue the economic liberalization, and he supported free initiative and the private sector. Moreover, he
spoke about the importance of supporting agriculture, the crucial sector in terms of stabilizing the balance of trade (Sanders & Gall, 1981, p. 169).

Winning Coalition

When discussing Figueiredo’s winning coalition, it is important to consider the time frame, because the military had institutionalized term limits of five years, which none of the previous military dictators had exceeded. In this light, staying in power for the five years did not require a large ruling coalition, only modest support from the military junta. Yet, military dictators sometimes succeed in changing the constitution or implement a state of emergency to stay longer. For this project, Figueiredo was dependent on a larger part of the military ruling coalition, especially the hardliners, who supported the authoritarian regime.

The military regime held elections for the two houses in the Congress. The elections were not free and fair (Skidmore, 1988, p. 227), but the government was somewhat dependent on popular support. This was especially the case in 1982 when the election was freer than during the entire military dictatorship (Skidmore, 1988, p. 233). In addition, Geisel had implemented liberalizations that implied reduced presidential powers in Geisel’s and Figueiredo’s incum- bencies (Roett, 1999, pp. 13, 130–131; Sanders & Gall, 1981, pp. 146–162, 166; Skidmore, 1988, p. 167). The presidential elections were indirect, but they were only nominal as presidents were appointed by military consensus. Although elections were not free and fair, support from some parts of the population, at least the people in Congress, would also be necessary to be able to stay in power for longer than one term. Figueiredo had chosen to have very few military people in his cabinet compared to the former presidents, so instead he also depended on many technocrats and civilians (Skidmore, 1988, pp. 211–212).

The military dictatorship has traditionally had support from the large businesses and the upper class (Skidmore, 1988, p. 233), which has kept the military in power. These groups can be said to have been a part of Figueiredo’s winning coalition, whereas the poor, the middle class, and the left wing in general have been clearly outside.

In sum, although the military had liberalized, Brazil was no democracy. Figueiredo’s winning coalition comprised mainly the military junta and the business elite and was almost as minimal as it could get. Figueiredo did not have a non-minimal winning coalition.

Harming Groups Clearly Inside the Winning Coalition

One of Figueiredo’s first steps after entering power was dissolving the two-party system although it consisted of two largely military-friendly parties. This
opened up for more parties to compete for the seats in Congress, including more leftist parties. However, this was done in the hope of weakening rather than strengthening the opposition. By allowing the opposition to compete in different parties, they might no longer be able to form a united opposition. Even if the military party would not maintain its majority, there was a chance that the military party would be able to join a coalition government with the conservative faction of the opposition. Hence, changing the party system was an attempt to maintain military influence in Congress despite the liberalization and re-democratization policies introduced by Geisel and later Figueiredo (Alves, 1985, pp. 212–215; Sanders & Gall, 1981, pp. 199–204; Skidmore, 1988, p. 219; Snider, 2013). This move was an instance of serving the winning coalition and consistent with wanting to stay in power. However, it is also consistent with Figueiredo pursuing his ideology by keeping the right wing forces in power while still liberalizing.

There were also instances where Figueiredo harmed his winning coalition, most importantly the continuation of the liberalization and re-democratization process and the clear attempt to avoid repression (Skidmore, 1988, p. 214), which both went strongly against the hardliners’ interest. Figueiredo had “inherited” Geisel’s main advisor, General Golbery, who was a strong advocate of democratization. Figueiredo also had a several hardliners on central posts (Skidmore, 1988, pp. 211–212) and had to balance the interests of both groups. Already here, leaning toward liberalization and democratization was inconsistent with being self-interested, as the hardliners were strong and expressed strong dissatisfaction with the democratization process (too quick or too far). This dissatisfaction resulted in right-wing terrorist attacks (from within the military) against left-wing union leaders and politicians who anticipated obtaining more political influence with the political opening. In response, Figueiredo completed a desultory investigation and then closed the case as a way to maintain support from the strong hardline to continue the liberalization. Golbery resigned in 1981, in the aftermath of the attacks (Roett, 1999, p. 133; Skidmore, 1988, pp. 227–229). This implied that the hardliners stood increasingly strong. In fact, many people connected to Médici’s government (the most authoritarian of the five military governments) had strong positions in Figueiredo’s regime (Skidmore, 1988, p. 229). Had Figueiredo been self-interested and wanted to stay in power, there would have been plenty of support in the ruling coalition to turn towards more authoritarian policies again. Nevertheless, he continued the democratization process despite the

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63 This mix of moderates and hardliners had been prevalent during the entire military regime as a way to maintain a united military.
hardliners’ dissatisfaction. Figueiredo had support in the population for democratization (Skidmore, 1988, p. 229), but as mentioned, his power mainly depended on the military.

During his incumbency, Figueiredo also made attempts to increase redistribution, which highly dissatisfied the middle and upper classes, since their position in society was impaired. The conditions improved for the lower class, although they did not really appreciate it, as it was not major improvements (Skidmore, 1988, pp. 226–227). Hence, this initiative harmed his own winning coalition. Alone, this is not strong evidence of harming the winning coalition because these initiatives may also be viewed as a response to the increasing social unrest among the workers.

Generally, the continuation of the democratization process is not consistent with staying in power. It can be argued that as long as Golbery was in government (and with the popular pressure), democratization may have been the only viable option for Figueiredo, although the hardline was already relatively strong. However, after Golbery resigned, many people were worried that the process would stop because the hardline was strong. The fact that this did not happen is a strong indication that Figueiredo deliberately harmed people within his winning coalition (the hardliners) in order to complete his ideological project of democratization. Consequently, this implication is observed.

**Pleasing Groups Clearly Outside the Winning Coalition**

The most important specific policy during Figueiredo’s incumbency is giving amnesty to all former political prisoners or exiled since 1961 (except for a few, e.g., prisoners convicted for terrorism). This was strongly against the hardliners’ position (Alves, 1985, pp. 211–212; Roett, 1999, pp. 12–13, 49; Sanders & Gall, 1981, pp. 192–195; Skidmore, 1988, pp. 218–219; Snider, 2013). While it increased Figueiredo’s popularity in the population and was a major step in the liberalization process, it was also risky because many of the people he allowed to come back were communists from the pre-1964 regime. However, also torturers (in action mainly during Silva’s and Médici’s time) got amnesty, which was likely a necessary step to avoid that the hardliners (with dirty hands) would obstruct the liberalization and democratization processes (Alves, 1985, pp. 211–212; Roett, 1999, pp. 12–13, 49; Sanders & Gall, 1981, pp. 192–195). Yet, the formulation was vague, so opening cases against torturers later might still be an option (Skidmore, 1988, pp. 218–219). In conclusion, this part of the liberalization process was an instance of pleasing the leftists who were clearly outside Figueiredo’s winning coalition and harming the hardliners within it. It is consistent with his proclaimed ideological aim of political liberalization and democratization, but because this initiative included
amnesty to the torturers of the former regime, and it is a small initiative, I only give the observation of this implication half weight in the final assessment.

Voluntary Step-Down
Figueiredo stepped down due to a term limit, i.e., not really voluntarily. He could have tried to stay longer, but it can still not be treated as voluntary step down due to a strong popular pressure for change, and the term limit had not been exceeded by any of the other presidents in the military regime, not even the most authoritarian ones.

Low Personal Income
Despite a corrupt system, Figueiredo does not appear to have been corrupt or had a high salary when in power. After stepping down, he led an austere life, and when he died, he appeared to have been short of money (Cardoso & Winter, 2006, p. 171; Harding, 1999). Therefore, I conclude that this implication is observed.

Expert Assessments
Since most of the sources used for this case study are broad historical accounts of the military dictatorship in Brazil or even broader accounts, there is not much assessment on Figueiredo as a person. Yet, according to some expert assessments, Figueiredo did not want to become president in the first place, although he strongly wanted the country to prosper and democratize, despite the strong hardline he was depending on (Roett, 1999, pp. 12–13; Snider, 2013). This indicates that he was in the ideological end of the spectrum but not among the most ideologically motivated dictators.

Summary
Generally, Figueiredo was relatively constrained during his incumbency, especially economically but also by his ruling coalition. He appears to have been ideologically motivated by an economic right-wing ideology but especially determined to finish Geisel’s democratization project. The latter clashes with him being self-interested. Although presidents were only allowed to stay in power for one term, a step towards more power would be to stop the democratization process after his pro-democracy advisor resigned and left him surrounded by hardliners. Figueiredo did not pursue a wealth-maximizing strategy either since there are strong indications that he was not corrupt and left power without having acquired much wealth. In conclusion, Figueiredo appears not to have been in power for wealth and power, and he was somewhat ideologically motivated. Perhaps he did not really want to be in power, but as he was, he prioritized the nation’s best over his own narrow self-interest.
Harm: O
Please: (O)
Non-Minimal: N
Voluntary step-down: N
Income: O
Expert: Ideologically motivated (but maybe a reluctant leader).

Overall qualitative judgement: 4
Bayesian updating score: 0.90
Gierek, Edward (Poland, 1970-1980)

Background
Edward Gierek came to power in Poland after being selected to the position by the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) in 1970 (Kunicki, 2012, p. 164; Leslie, 1980, p. 405; McFadden, 2001; The Independent, 2001; The Telegraph, 2001; The Times, 2001). He had been member of the party for many years, but he had mainly worked in, and later controlled, the industrial branch as he had a background in engineering and mining (Lepak, 1988, pp. 47–50; Leslie, 1980, p. 413; McFadden, 2001; Prazmowska, 2013, pp. 198–199; The Independent, 2001; The Telegraph, 2001; The Times, 2001; Traynor, 2001). In his youth, he was actively involved in underground work, for instance, against the Nazis in Belgium where he grew up (Lepak, 1988, pp. 47–50; Leslie, 1980, p. 413; McFadden, 2001; Prazmowska, 2013, pp. 198–199; The Independent, 2001; The Telegraph, 2001; The Times, 2001; Traynor, 2001). Gierek led Poland for ten years and was ousted in a coup in 1980 (McFadden, 2001; The Independent, 2001; The Telegraph, 2001; The Times, 2001; Traynor, 2001).

As incumbent, Gierek followed a rather unorthodox political line; he allowed for import of Western products and generally tried to open up to the West and liberalize—more than a decade earlier than the rest of the Communist bloc (McFadden, 2001; Prazmowska, 2013, pp. 200–201; Simon & Kanet, 1981, p. xi; The Independent, 2001; The Times, 2001). One of his main priorities was investment in economic development. This went well in the first half of his incumbency where the country experienced significant improvements in living standards and economic growth (Bromke & Strong, 1973, pp. 41, 49; Leslie, 1980, pp. 418–421; Poznanski, 1996, p. 3; Simon & Kanet, 1981, p. 406). This made him very popular (Bromke & Strong, 1973, p. 41; Lepak, 1988, p. 74; Leslie, 1980, pp. 409, 441; Poznanski, 1996, p. 64; Simon & Kanet, 1981, p. 6; The Independent, 2001; The Times, 2001), and when he died, he was nostalgically remembered (McFadden, 2001; The Times, 2001; Traynor, 2001). However, his economic policies failed him. He invested heavily in industry but much less in the underdeveloped agriculture (Lepak, 1988, p. xv, 132-134; Simon & Kanet, 1981, p. 407; The Independent, 2001). In addition, politics were corrupt and huge sums money were wasted (Bromke & Strong, 1973, p. 50; Kunicki, 2012, p. 162; The Telegraph, 2001; Traynor, 2001). At the end of the 1970s, the country had a huge foreign debt (McFadden, 2001; Prazmowska, 2013, pp. 202–203, 208; Simon & Kanet, 1981, p. 407; The Times, 2001; Traynor, 2001), living standards did not rise as quickly as planned, and food prices rose (Lepak, 1988, pp. 74–75; The Times, 2001).
Throughout Gierek’s incumbency, there was surprisingly little repression (Kunicki, 2012, p. 171; Poznanski, 1996, pp. 65–66; The Independent, 2001; The Times, 2001; Traynor, 2001), and he stood up against the hardliners who wanted him to crack down on the people (Poznanski, 1996, pp. 65–66). The last years before his ouster, protests and riots were going on, but they were repressed (Gierek’s involvement in this is uncertain) (Lepak, 1988, p. 180). In 1980, he was hospitalized abroad, and when he returned, he realized that he had been unseated by the party (The Independent, 2001; The Times, 2001; Traynor, 2001). He became the scapegoat of the new Communist leaders (The Independent, 2001; The Telegraph, 2001; The Times, 2001; Traynor, 2001) and lived in silence during his retirement (McFadden, 2001; The Independent, 2001; The Times, 2001).

**Ideology (proclaimed)**

Upon inauguration, Gierek promised to work for a “socialist democracy” (Lepak, 1988, pp. 45, 64–65; Simon & Kanet, 1981, p. 413), to create national unity (Bromke & Strong, 1973, p. 51; Lepak, 1988, p. xv, 45, 52), and to improve standards of living (Bromke & Strong, 1973, p. 41; Leslie, 1980, pp. 415–416; Prazmowska, 2013, p. 198). He did not emphasize Communism as much as the earlier leaders had but seemed to have a more pragmatic approach to development (Lepak, 1988, p. 52).

**Winning Coalition**

First and foremost, the leadership of the party was a part of Gierek’s winning coalition. It was ultimately the party that forced his predecessor Władysław Gomułka to go, selected Gierek as successor (Kunicki, 2012, p. 164; Leslie, 1980, p. 405), and removed him ten years later (Lepak, 1988, p. 179; The Independent, 2001; The Times, 2001; Traynor, 2001). However, the people were dissatisfied with both Gomułka and Gierek when they were ousted (Kunicki, 2012, p. 164; Lepak, 1988, p. 179; Leslie, 1980, pp. 405–406; Prazmowska, 2013, pp. 196–198; The Independent, 2001; The Telegraph, 2001; Traynor, 2001). Biographers and historians in the case material make it very clear that the Polish people’s support of regime and leader was crucial for political survival (Bromke & Strong, 1973, p. 50; Simon & Kanet, 1981, pp. 17–21, 411), especially the support from the workers (Lepak, 1988, p. 180; Leslie, 1980, p. 442; Simon & Kanet, 1981, p. 409). Compared to other autocracies, it seems that a larger part of the people, and definitely the workers, were in Gierek’s winning coalition. Like the rest of the Soviet bloc, Poland was heavily dependent on support from Kremlin, and although the Soviet leadership is an external factor, it can be viewed as a part of the winning coalition. The armed forced did not seem to play a crucial role in high politics in Poland, but their
support is necessary for any autocrat to survive. Overall, it seems that Gierek had a relatively large winning coalition.

In order to evaluate whether Gierek had a minimal winning coalition, I need to assess whether he could have chosen another, smaller winning coalition. Gomulka, before him, was more hardline and relied more on repression and hardline support from within the party, and less on the people (Kunicki, 2012, p. 164; Leslie, 1980, pp. 405–406; McFadden, 2001). So did Gierek’s successor, Stanislaw Kania (The Times, 2001). Gomulka was ousted under pressure from the people, although the decision was taken by the party leadership (Kunicki, 2012, p. 164; Leslie, 1980, pp. 405–406; Prazmowska, 2013, pp. 196–198). When Gierek came to power, it may not have been viable to choose a hardline and repressive approach and to rely more on hardliner and military support than on popular support. As this conclusion is far from certain, I conclude that Gierek probably did not have a non-minimal winning coalition (implying that the absence of this implication is only given half weight in the final assessment).

**Harming Groups Clearly Inside the Winning Coalition**

**Consolidating Power**

When Gierek came to power, he replaced rivals as well as Gomulka’s old hardliner guard from important positions with his own men (Lepak, 1988, pp. 55–65; McFadden, 2001; Poznanski, 1996, pp. 60–61; Simon & Kanet, 1981, p. 15). Many were younger people and technocrats (Lepak, 1988, pp. 55–65; Leslie, 1980, p. 413). However, his inner circle also included moderates and hardliners in the party leadership. Gierek managed to reduce the split in the top of the party and forge much more unity than under Gomulka’s leadership (Bromke & Strong, 1973, p. 39; Simon & Kanet, 1981, pp. 15–16). This behavior is a clear instance of pleasing (or even creating) his winning coalition.

Gierek tried hard to please Kremlin, especially verbally (Lepak, 1988, pp. 102–103; Leslie, 1980, p. 411), but when they refused to finance a development project, he shut down electricity delivery to the Soviet Union (Lepak, 1988, p. 89). Whereas his general pattern of pleasing the Soviet Union is an instance of pleasing his winning coalition, the electricity sanction was a quite a risky move. However, many Poles wanted to associate with the West rather than the East, and Gierek’s move against the Soviet Union can also be interpreted as an attempt to please the people, who were also a part of the winning coalition. Therefore, this instance is not clear evidence of deliberately harming the winning coalition.
Development

Already in 1970, Gierek started to implement his development initiatives. He improved and modernized the Polish industry by taking loans in Western countries (Poznanski, 1996, p. xxii, 115; The Independent, 2001). He allowed for decentralization and privatization of the industry (The Times, 2001), and he allowed for import of Western products (McFadden, 2001; Prazmowska, 2013, pp. 200–201; The Independent, 2001; The Times, 2001). He introduced higher salaries and cut food prices, which improved living standards (Bromke & Strong, 1973, p. 41), and he raised workers’ sick benefit from 70 to 100 percent, although they were reduced again after problems with absenteeism (Lepak, 1988, p. 69).

Until the oil crisis in 1973, his economic strategies for modernizing industry and agriculture went well, and economic growth and living standards improved (Bromke & Strong, 1973, pp. 41, 49; Leslie, 1980, pp. 418–421; Poznanski, 1996, p. 3; Simon & Kanet, 1981, p. 406). However, in 1976, the economy really started to suffer; partly due to external factors, partly due to inefficient management (Bromke & Strong, 1973, p. 50; McFadden, 2001; Simon & Kanet, 1981, p. 406; The Independent, 2001; The Telegraph, 2001; Traynor, 2001). For years, bureaucrats had been hired based on loyalty instead of merit (Bromke & Strong, 1973, p. 50). Gierek had taken initiatives to change this (Lepak, 1988, p. xv); for instance, by basing salaries on merit instead of loyalty (Prazmowska, 2013, p. 202). This can be viewed as a way of harming his winning coalition (the loyal technocrats in the party); however, many inefficient bureaucrats were actually allowed to stay (Bromke & Strong, 1973, p. 50). The shift in hiring procedures is best viewed as a way to increase effectiveness and thus economic development, which in turn can be viewed as a way to please his winning coalition, the people, and especially the workers. His popularity grew in the face of the economic development; and it positively affected party unity (Lepak, 1988, pp. 209–210; Leslie, 1980, pp. 422–428; Simon & Kanet, 1981, p. 19). On the other hand, it was consistent with his proclaimed ideology. Generally, his economic policies can be viewed as being based on both motives. Several scholars assume that the economic development policies were actually motivated by both. Gierek wanted Poland to prosper because he cared for the country and the people. However, he did not really have a choice (had he wanted something else) because he needed to please the people to stay in power (Bromke & Strong, 1973, pp. 41–42, 48–49, 51; Lepak, 1988, p. 214; Poznanski, 1996, p. 7; Simon & Kanet, 1981, pp. 19, 413–414).

In 1976 and in 1980, Gierek increased the prices on basic food products, which led to huge demonstrations (Lepak, 1988, pp. 74–75; The Times, 2001).
The regime started to increasingly use repression, which further reduced his popularity among the people (Lepak, 1988, p. 180). Yet, this behavior cannot be viewed as evidence of harming his winning coalition, since he was constrained to act in this way: economically (increasing food prices) and by the hardliners in the party (regarding repression) (Lepak, 1988, p. 180).

In conclusion, there is no clear evidence of Gierek harming his winning coalition, so this implication is not observed. However, this implication has a relatively low degree of certainty, and in the case of Gierek, there is a large overlap between pleasing his winning coalition and realizing his proclaimed ideology.

**Pleasing Groups Clearly Outside the Winning Coalition**

Especially when Gierek entered power, but generally throughout his incumbency, he travelled around the country to listen to the people’s wishes and complaints, and he set up committees for people to be heard (Lepak, 1988, pp. 69, 159–161; Simon & Kanet, 1981, p. 6). This may seem like an instance of pleasing his winning coalition, but since it increased his popularity among the people, including the workers, his winning coalition, this is not conclusive evidence of pleasing groups outside his winning coalition.

Another issue to assess with regards to this implication is Gierek’s development agenda. Because a large part of the people, at least the workers, were a part of Gierek’s winning coalition, and they were pleased by this initiative, the general development agenda cannot be viewed as pleasing groups outside his winning coalition.

Gierek did not only try to develop the industry. He took bold initiatives to modernize the agricultural sector (Lepak, 1988, p. xv, 105; Poznanski, 1996, pp. 4, 13), but due to bad weather (Lepak, 1988, p. 180) and inefficiencies (Lepak, 1988, p. xv), the initiatives in this sector were never as successful as the initiatives in the industrial sector. In this sense, Gierek spent resources on a sector outside his winning coalition. It is even argued that he did not seem to view the farmers as a threat (Lepak, 1988, pp. 132–134). Thus, the attempts to improve agriculture can be viewed as pleasing groups outside his winning coalition while being consistent with his proclaimed development goals. However, he still prioritized industry over agriculture (Lepak, 1988, p. xv, 132-134; Simon & Kanet, 1981, p. 407; The Independent, 2001). On this basis, I conclude that this implication is only partly observed.

**Voluntary Step-Down**

Since Gierek was unseated in a coup, he did not leave power voluntarily.
Low Personal Income

There was definitely both political and personal corruption in the political system during Gierek’s incumbency (Kunicki, 2012, p. 162; The Telegraph, 2001; Traynor, 2001), but it is unclear whether Gierek was directly involved. He was imprisoned briefly after his ouster as allegations of corruption were investigated, but he was cleared and released after a year (The Independent, 2001; The Telegraph, 2001). Since he was made a scapegoat after his ouster, these allegations may not have originated in reality, and it is unclear whether the allegations concerned political or personal corruption. One scholar argued that Gierek was honest and not totally corrupt (like some other politicians) (Lepak, 1988, p. 207), which indicates that he was not personally corrupt. Even Priest Wyszyński found him an honest man (Lepak, 1988, p. 207), despite their heavy disputes and disagreements (Prazmowska, 2013, pp. 205–207). Gierek himself complained about his low pensions, and that he could only afford to live because of the money he earned before he came to power (The Telegraph, 2001). However, his own claims cannot be evaluated as strong evidence. In conclusion, the evidence points towards Gierek not being personally corrupt and generally having a low or moderate personal income, but the evidence is uncertain. Therefore, I evaluate this implication as only partly observed.

Expert Assessments

So far, the evidence of Gierek’s motivation does not point towards one end of the scale. Although much of his behavior can potentially have been caused by both self-interest and ideology, most evidence points towards ideological motivation. Expert assessments support this conclusion. Most scholars and journalist (national and international) in the covered material deem Gierek ideologically motivated and strategic (Bromke & Strong, 1973, pp. 48, 51; Lepak, 1988, p. 88; Simon & Kanet, 1981, p. 19) (which does not collide with ideological motivation (Lepak, 1988, p. 214; Poznanski, 1996, p. 7)). Scholars specifically mention him as an honest leader (Lepak, 1988, p. xvii, 207) with great determination (Lepak, 1988, p. xv; Prazmowska, 2013, pp. 199–200), good intentions (Lepak, 1988, p. 206; The Times, 2001), willingness to fix problems (Simon & Kanet, 1981, pp. 413–414), who hoped and planned to improve living standards (Bromke & Strong, 1973, pp. 41–42, 49; Traynor, 2001) and conducted benign misrule (Traynor, 2001). He is also perceived as a leader with a dream or a vision (Kunicki, 2012, p. 168; Lepak, 1988, pp. 44, 52, 134; Prazmowska, 2013, p. 200), and he is contrasted to dogmatic ideologues in the sense that he was pragmatic (Lepak, 1988, p. 52; Poznanski, 1996, pp. 60–61; The Independent, 2001). This is also how he said he perceived himself (Kunicki, 2012, p. 168).
Summary

In the case of Gierek, there is a large overlap between behavior consistent with pleasing his winning coalition and realizing his ideology. This makes Gierek a difficult case to evaluate. However, some evidence points towards him being somewhat ideologically motivated, namely his investment in agriculture combined with his strong consistency in ideological behavior. Moreover, he was probably not personally corrupt, although his surroundings were. Expert assessments are clearer about his motives. They agree that he was ideologically motivated in the sense that he cared much about his country, but he was pragmatic in his approach to improving the living conditions of the people. These assessments ignore the fact that he did not produce the expected outcome for the people due to both misfortune and inefficient implementation. A tentative conclusion is that Gierek was driven by ideological motivation and actually tried to increase the living standard of the people for their sake.

Harm: N
Please: (O)
Non-Minimal: (N)
Voluntary step-down: N
Income: (O)
Expert: Ideologically motivated

Overall qualitative judgement: 4
Bayesian updating score: 0.42


Kolingba was born into a poor family of the Yakoma tribe to whom less than 5% of the CAR population belong (Baxter, 2011, p. 32; Bradshaw & Fandos-Rius, 2016, p. 371; Carayannis & Lombard, 2015, p. 30; Ghura & Mercereau, 2004, p. 13; Mehler, 2004, p. 61; The Times, 2010). He was in primary and secondary school before joining the armed forces as a way out of poverty. He quickly rose through the ranks during Jean-Bédel Bokassa’s rule. He managed to become both military and political advisor to Bokassa (Bradshaw & Fandos-Rius, 2016, p. 372; The Times, 2010). When David Dacko ousted Bokassa, Kolingba was allowed to stay and became chief-of-staff of the armed forces (Bradshaw & Fandos-Rius, 2016, p. 372; International Business Publications, 2016, p. 39; The Times, 2010). Within four months, in a period of political unrest and economic decline, Kolingba overthrew Dacko’s regime. Dacko was ill, and accounts of his departure vary. Some claim that he left power somewhat voluntarily to hand it over to the armed forces: others that Kolingba forced him out of power (Baxter, 2011, p. 30; Carayannis & Lombard, 2015, pp. 29, 302; Lumumba-Kasongo, 2005, p. 180; The Times, 2010; Titley, 1997, p. 160).

left power, 70% of the army were Yakomas (Baxter, 2011, pp. 33, 42; Carayannis & Lombard, 2015, pp. 30–31; Ghura & Mercereau, 2004, p. 12; Mehler, 2014). Kolingba's rule was not particularly repressive, and he was known for reprieving prisoners with death sentence (Mehler, 2014; Titley, 1997, pp. 202–203). In the beginning of his incumbency, he installed a program for tight economic recovery (Banks, 1993, p. 142; Carayannis & Lombard, 2015, p. 307; O'Toole, 1986, pp. 68–69), but after few years, he seemed to focus less on economic development than on personalizing power (O'Toole, 1986, pp. 71, 110; Titley, 1997, p. 161).

**Ideology (proclaimed)**

When Kolingba came to power, he set up the Military Committee for National Recovery to rule the country; it included himself as the leader (Baxter, 2011, p. 30; Carayannis & Lombard, 2015, p. 29; Lumumba-Kasongo, 2005, p. 180; O'Toole, 1986, p. 68; The Times, 2010). The name of the committee implies that the proclaimed aim of the dictatorship was to deliver economic and political recovery. He explicitly promised that he would return the country to civilian rule after the recovery (Banks, 1993, p. 143; O'Toole, 1986, p. 114). Moreover, he promised to reduce corruption, the oversized civil service, and the armed forces (O'Toole, 1986, p. 68).

**Winning Coalition**

Since Kolingba's regime started out as a military dictatorship, the military leadership and a large part of the military were in his winning coalition. When he turned the regime into a one-party autocracy, we should expect that the party, and especially the party leadership, would become more important. However, at that point, Kolingba had already personalized power, so the party was not particularly strong. He kept many military people in the party and only replaced a few with civilians (Banks, 1993, p. 143; Titley, 1997, p. 184), so de facto his winning coalition did not change much. Because the regime was so heavily dependent on the military, and it was highly personalized, it did not depend much on the people, at least not directly.

Another important powerbase was external actors, namely, international donors, in particular France, the former colonial master of the CAR. The support of France was crucial (Baxter, 2011, pp. 32, 34; O'Toole, 1986, p. 145; The Times, 2010; Titley, 1997, p. 205). During the Cold War, French support was relatively easy to achieve due to the polarized world order. However, after 1989, France and other donors started demanding democratization in return for foreign aid (Banks, 1993, p. 143; Baxter, 2011, p. 32; Bradshaw & Fandos-Rius, 2016, p. 373; Carayannis & Lombard, 2015, p. 31; International Business Publications, 2016, p. 39; Lumumba-Kasongo, 2005, p. 182; The Times,
The CAR was generally very poor, especially due to the legacy of Bo-
kassa’s rule, and the economy deteriorated even more during Kolingba’s rule (Ghura & Mercereau, 2004, p. 7; International Business Publications, 2016, p. 42; Lumumba-Kasongo, 2005, p. 193). Therefore, any incumbent regime would have been heavily reliant on support from international donors (Ghura & Mercereau, 2004, p. 10; O’Toole, 1986, pp. 68, 71–72; The Times, 2010; Titley, 1997, p. 205). Without that, it would be impossible to please the (rest of) winning coalition. Based on this discussion, I conclude that **Kolingba had a very narrow winning coalition, and that it was minimal, meaning that the implication of a non-minimal winning coalition is not observed.**

**Harming Groups Clearly Inside the Winning Coalition**

**Consolidating Power**

When Kolingba came to power, he distributed many government jobs to his own tribe, namely the Yakomas, built up the military with Yakomas (Baxter, 2011, p. 32; Carayannis & Lombard, 2015, pp. 30, 300, 307–308; Ghura & Mercereau, 2004, p. 12; Lumumba-Kasongo, 2005, p. 191; Titley, 1997, p. 163). This group cannot be viewed as a part of his winning coalition as such since they comprise less than 5% of the population, and it is not a particularly wealthy and influential group (Baxter, 2011, p. 32; Bradshaw & Fandos-Rius, 2016, p. 371; Carayannis & Lombard, 2015, p. 30; Ghura & Mercereau, 2004, p. 13; Mehler, 2004, p. 61; The Times, 2010). However, employing mainly Yakomas can still be viewed as a power-maximizing strategy. It can be viewed as a divide-and-rule strategy. By making ethnicity salient (or increasingly salient), it is unlikely that people from different ethnicities will unite and rebel against the leader. Moreover, after increasing saliency, and since tribal relations were already somewhat salient, making the military consist of mainly Yakomas also secured power, since they would be the people in society least likely to rebel against Kolingba (due to the saliency of ethnic affinity).

Another interpretation of the ethnic favoritism is that Kolingba tried to please a group outside his winning coalition, which would be consistent with an exclusionary tribal ideology. This was not his proclaimed ideology, but he may just have chosen not to admit that it was since it is highly exclusionary. Another argument weakens the ideological interpretation: Some people contend that he mainly distributed spoils to the elite of the group, and he did not act as a patron for the group in general (Carayannis & Lombard, 2015, p. 300). Only one source reports this, and thus, the conclusion remains uncertain.

Another argument against the ideological interpretation is that Kolingba started out by also inviting people from other tribes into the military, and the ethnic favoritism clearly increased after a coup attempt in 1982 (Carayannis &
Lombard, 2015, pp. 307–308; Titley, 1997, p. 161). The coup attempt may have convinced him that he needed to consolidate power, and he introduced a harder line against political opponents after the coup attempt (O’Toole, 1986, p. 70).

From Military Dictatorship to One-Party Regime

In 1986, Kolingba created a one-party state and held highly rigged elections when his self-imposed term limit of six years was about to expire. He kept many military people in the party but invited some civilians to join (Banks, 1993, p. 143; Titley, 1997, p. 184). On the surface, this can be viewed as fulfilling his promise of restoring civilian rule, but this was clearly not the case since he had personalized power around himself, and there was no real competition. Kolingba argued that a multiparty regime would lead to ethnic dispute (Banks, 1993, p. 143; Titley, 1997, p. 184). Not until the end of the Cold War was he forced to implement multiparty elections by France and other donors. He even managed to hold a new election after he lost in 1992. When he lost again in 1993, he had to go (Bradshaw & Fandos-Rius, 2016, p. 373; Carayannis & Lombard, 2015, p. 31; Ghura & Mercereau, 2004, pp. 10–11; International Business Publications, 2016, p. 39; The Times, 2010; Titley, 1997, pp. 205–206).

Kolingba’s transformation of the regime into a one-party regime is not consistent with his promise to return to civilian rule. It looks like a claim to legitimacy, which may have had a positive impact on the people, and not least the international aid donors, who were a part of his winning coalition.

Kolingba’s ethnic favoritism can be viewed as a power-maximizing strategy to gain loyalty from the military. It is also largely consistent with an exclusionary tribal ideology and is thus an instance of pleasing people outside his winning coalition. However, the evidence is stronger for the power-maximizing perspective. There is no evidence of harming groups inside his winning coalition.

Pleasing Groups Clearly Outside the Winning Coalition

One the one hand, Kolingba’s ethnic favoritism may be interpreted as an instance of pleasing groups clearly outside the winning coalition; on the other hand, when the Yakomas first joined the army or entered the party leadership, they became part of his winning coalition and were no longer outside. Still, distributing spoils to the group in general can be viewed as an instance of pleasing his winning coalition, but as mentioned, there is some dispute over the extent to which this was actually the case. Thus, the ethnic favoritism can at best be viewed as weak evidence of pleasing groups outside his winning coalition.
Economic Policies

Another strand of behavior that should be evaluated is Kolingba’s economic policies. In the beginning of his incumbency, he implemented tight economic policies aimed at economic recovery (Banks, 1993, p. 143; Carayannis & Lombard, 2015, p. 307; O’Toole, 1986, pp. 69, 71, 110). He took development initiatives, such as trade promotion, privatization of state-run companies, civil-service reductions, and efforts to combat widespread tax and customs fraud. However, implementation was slow and ineffective (Banks, 1993, p. 142).

There may be many motives for these initiatives. The IMF and the World Bank had already put pressure on Dacko to implement this type of policies and were crucial to obtain loans in the already stricken economy. With these policies, Kolingba may have tried to please his winning coalition. Another interpretation is that he tried to create long-term economic development, which would increase his popularity among the people, who were largely outside his winning coalition. On the other hand, he also needed money to distribute spoils to his winning coalition, and long-term economic development would be a way to solve this problem as well. Based on these diverse arguments, Kolingba’s economic recovery program cannot be viewed as an instance of pleasing groups clearly outside his winning coalition.

It seems that Kolingba was only committed to sustaining these economic initiatives in the very beginning of his incumbency. He soon diverged his focus to other things, for instance personalizing power and ethnic favoritism (O’Toole, 1986, pp. 71, 110). This may be because his motivation actually changed, or because he tried to make a good impression to donors in the beginning of his incumbency.

In conclusion, only Kolingba’s ethnic favoritism can be viewed as evidence of him pleasing groups outside his winning coalition, but there are serious caveats. There is some dispute about whether he actually pleased the entire group or just his friends and family, and employed loyal supporters in the army (to make them part of his winning coalition). Therefore, I conclude that he did probably not please groups outside his winning coalition (implying that the absence of this implication is only given half weight in the final assessment).

Voluntary Step-Down

As mentioned, Kolingba was forced out of power when he lost the multiparty elections in 1993 that he had been forced to implement. Thus, he did not step down voluntarily. However, there are some indications that he could have stayed by force, since he was still supported by the army that consisted of 70%
Yakomas. Moreover, there are rumors that influential people in the army urged Kolingba to take power by force in 1993, but that he turned them down (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2005, p. 191). It is difficult to say what would have happened if he had tried to stay in power by force. But since he needed French support, which would have been likely to disappear entirely, he may not have lasted long. Based on this, I conclude that Kolingba did not step down voluntarily, but the conclusion is slightly uncertain. Therefore, the implication is only given half weight in the final assessment.

**Low Personal Income**

There is broad evidence that Kolingba did not have a low or even moderate income. First, it is reported that he had a lavish lifestyle (International Business Publications, 2016, p. 42). Second, his regime in general was clearly corrupt (Carayannis & Lombard, 2015, p. 308; O'Toole, 1986, p. 71), and the politicians engaged in looting and embezzlement (CL15: 308). One author writes that Kolingba did not gain much himself (Carayannis & Lombard, 2015, pp. 301–302), but others claim that he did, and that he was personally corrupt (Baxter, 2011, p. 32; Titley, 1997, p. 161). One author indicates that Kolingba stole from the state, though not to the same extreme degree as Bokassa (Baxter, 2011, p. 32). Lastly, in 2003, yet again seeking to gain popularity, Kolingba asked the people for forgiveness for the excesses during his rule (The Times, 2010), which is likely to have referred to excesses in personal spending. Hence, most evidence indicates that Kolingba had a high personal income.

**Expert Assessments**

Since none of the sources for this analysis are biographies, it mainly relies on general historical accounts of events and of the CAR in general. Therefore, there are not many direct and clear evaluations of Kolingba as a person and leader. However, the few there are may be credible since they are likely to be less subjective than biographers’ evaluations.

Two authors hint that Kolingba and his regime were mainly interested in power and generally serving itself like most regimes in the CAR (O’Toole, 1986, p. 145; Titley, 1997, pp. 160–161), but they also claim that Kolingba sincerely wanted national unity (O’Toole, 1986, p. 68; Titley, 1997, p. 160). Others write that he was interested in placing his own tribe in important positions (Baxter, 2011, p. 32; Carayannis & Lombard, 2015, p. 30). It is unclear whether this was for instrumental (power) reasons or for ideological reasons. The only way these views can be interpreted in the same direction is that Kolingba had an interest in national unity, but he was predominantly motivated by consolidating power, which made him favor his own tribe. Another conclusion is that he sincerely wanted to protect his tribe, and then the accounts of him wishing
national unity in an inclusionary sense are simply flawed. The former interpretation may be more likely to be correct since it accommodates all expert views. Going with this interpretation (which also aligns with the other evidence in the analysis), I conclude that Kolingba was mainly interested in power, but he might have had a secondary interest in the nation’s well-being.

**Summary**

None of the implications of ideological motivation are observed in the case of Kolingba. However, there was some overlap in expected behavior from different motives, which makes it difficult to detect ideologically motivated behavior. Yet, the overlap is not that large, so in conclusion, Kolingba is likely to have been predominantly self-interested. He may have had a secondary interest in the nation’s best, as the experts point to. An alternative, but less likely, interpretation is that he was ideologically motivated the first one or two years of his incumbency but then became increasingly self-interested.

Harm: N  
Please: (N)  
Non-Minimal: N  
Voluntary step-down: (N)  
Income: (N)  
Expert: Mainly in it for the power and wealth

Overall qualitative judgement: 2  
Bayesian updating score: 0.08

**Sources**

Some of the books report and agree on very specific details, which indicates that some sources build on each other or common sources. Thus, the sources may not be independent, which means that the conclusions are more uncertain.
Lanusse, Alejandro (Argentina, 1971-1973)

Alejandro Lanusse took power in a military coup in 1971 as head of the army and installed himself as President of Argentina. He stepped down in 1973 when he introduced free elections and did not run. Lanusse came from a wealthy landowning family. He graduated from the National Military College at the age of twenty in 1938 and served the military from then (Caistor, 1996; Lentz, 1994, p. 40). The first time Lanusse was involved in a coup attempt was the unsuccessful attempt against President Perón in 1951. Lanusse was jailed and was not released until after the ouster of Perón in 1955 (Novitski, 1972b). Later that year, Lanusse was involved in the ouster of President Lonardi, who had appointed him commander of the presidential guard shortly before. Lanusse actively took part in another coup against President Illia in 1966 and was appointed chief of the army by the next president, Juan Carlos Onganía. However, as leader of the military junta, he forced Onganía to resign in 1970. Roberto Levingston was installed as president only to be ousted in 1971 when Lanusse installed himself as president as head of the military junta (Lentz, 1994, p. 40), although he chose to share his power with the navy and the air force (Potash, 1996, p. 361).

Lanusse had been a military hardliner until President Frondizi’s accession at the end of the 1950s. Lanusse became a softliner and committed to the legalist cause. Throughout his life, including his retirement, Lanusse voiced strong anti-Peronist opinions (Potash, 1996, pp. 6–7).

During Lanusse’s incumbency, Argentina saw widespread guerilla violence from both left and right, and violent responses from the regime (Darnton, 2014, p. 82; Lentz, 1994, p. 40; Potash, 1996, pp. 389–390, 410–411). The country experienced economic hardship, especially high inflation rates, which led to several strikes (Lentz, 1994, p. 40; Onis, 1971b). The greatest achievement of the regime was returning Argentina to democracy, although it only lasted three years until the military coup in 1976 and the beginning of the Dirty War.

**Ideology (proclaimed)**

Lanusse seized power on the promise of restoring political order in light of the terrorism and protests the country was experiencing (Darnton, 2014, p. 82). He promised to return Argentina to democracy by holding elections in March 1973 (two years after he seized power) (Collier, 1972; Onis, 1971a). Already before he came to power, Lanusse was a strong advocate for democratic restoration (Potash, 1996, p. 263). This advocacy continued throughout and after his incumbency (Lewis, 2002, pp. 214–215; Novitski, 1972b; Sparks, 1996).
Especially before Lanusse came to power, he claimed to be strongly anti-Peronist, in particular anti-Juan Perón (O’Donnell, 1988, p. 168; Potash, 1996, pp. 6–7). However, since 1966, he increasingly valued democracy higher than anti-Perónism, although he still despised Perón (Onis, 1971a). Economic concerns were always secondary to the fulfillment of the political goals (Potash, 1996, pp. 363–364).

**Winning Coalition**

When discussing Lanusse’s winning coalition, it is necessary to distinguish between his two viable options for staying in power: staying in power as a dictator (military strongman) and democratizing the country and winning the election. The first path would be the power-maximizing one. To succeed, Lanusse was dependent on a large part of the military, especially the hardliners who supported the authoritarian regime. He was also somewhat dependent on the navy and the air force with whom he ruled. In addition to the armed forces, his power is likely to have depended on support from the economic and political elite.

Winning an election required more support in numbers: support from a much larger part of the population as well as some degree of military support to avoid a military coup. The military junta was strongly anti-Perónist (Potash, 1996, pp. 368–370), but it was divided between hardliners favoring stability and authoritarianism and soft liners who wanted to return the country to democracy and civilian rule, yet, without leaving it to the Perónists (Perón was the reason the military interfered with politics twenty years earlier) (Potash, 1996, p. 365). Based on this, the Perónists were outside Lanusse’s winning coalition, and most workers were Perónists (Potash, 1996, p. 368). Lanusse’s winning coalition in a democratic setting would therefore be the middle and the upper classes.

Given that I have defined the Peronists to be outside Lanusse’s winning coalition, his winning coalition (for a democratic leadership) cannot be said to be clearly non-minimal. Instead, I count pleasing the Peronists as evidence of Lanusse pleasing groups clearly outside his winning coalition.

**Harming Groups Clearly Inside the Winning Coalition**

Lanusse had significant de facto political power during the military dictatorship from 1966, when Onganía was president, until he left power in 1973 (Potash, 1996, pp. 243, 260, 266, 271–275). For this reason, it is relevant to analyze his behavior from 1966 and onwards.
Economic Policies

When Lanusse took power in 1971, he changed the economic policies in a way that is consistent with pleasing his winning coalition in a democratic setting, since he softened the economic policies by for instance removing the cap on wage increases and increasing pensions and family allowances, things that were strongly demanded by the middle class (and by the poor). The government invested in public work construction to increase employment (O'Donnell, 1988, pp. 265–266; Potash, 1996, pp. 387,!417), but when the economy kept deteriorating, they reversed and implemented tighter economic policies again. For instance, in response to marked decreases in foreign reserves, they introduced a ban on all imports (Potash, 1996, p. 388). This retrenchment cannot be viewed as deliberately punishing the winning coalition but rather as actions imposed by the strong economic constraints the government was facing.

Democratization

The democratization process can be viewed in different ways: as punishing groups within the winning coalition, namely the military hardliners, or as being consistent with demands from the softliners and the middle class (Potash, 1996, pp. 275–276). The democratization process becomes even more difficult to evaluate because a political centralization process would reduce the need for popular support and enhance the power of the military, and thereby of Lanusse. As discussed, democratizing seems not to have been a power-maximizing choice. Yet, it is difficult to conclude with certainty as the military regime was highly unpopular (Potash, 1996, p. 396; Sparks, 1996), and being a military strongman would require some support from the people. Yet, Lanusse enjoyed much support from the army (O'Donnell, 1988, pp. 198, 229; Potash, 1996, pp. 307–309, 345, 472), and both Onganía and Levingston might have stayed considerably longer if Lanusse had not decided to oust them. Yet again, part of Lanusse’s popularity in the army might have been endogenous to his democracy agenda. However, the hardliners were also strong (Potash, 1996, pp. 381–385), and he would have won their support had he not pushed for democratization. Therefore, I conclude that the democratization process could have been avoided, and thus, it was inconsistent with Lanusse being narrowly self-interested.

Another move against his winning coalition was allowing exiled Peronists back by lifting the Peronist ban. He thereby also allowed Perón to come back (although not to run in the election) (Lentz, 1994, p. 40; Novitski, 1972b). This was clearly against his winning coalition because the army was very anti-
ronist (and the Peronists were not a part of Lanusse’s winning coalition). Never-
theless, it was consistent with his ideology about unconstrained elections
and democracy.

Lanusse did other things that are clear evidence of harming his winning
coalition. For instance, the first thing he did after coming to power was lifting
the state of emergency (Onis, 1971a), which ceteris paribus reduced the power
of the president. Yet, it was an important step towards democracy. Generally,
Lanusse’s behavior is highly consistent with his ideological beliefs, as his push
for democratization was underlying in his behavior since the ouster of Illia in
1966 (Potash, 1996, p. 263), which speaks in favor of the second-order condi-
tion being met. Also the consistency over time is important to notice. He even

Out of Power

Although it is difficult to talk about a winning coalition after Lanusse stepped
down, it is important to point to the consistency in his behavior and incon-
sistency in motives of self-interest. During the Dirty War and after, Lanusse
remained politically active and criticized the hardliner regime, the use of vio-
ence, and the lack of democracy (Sparks, 1996), and he did it at a considerable
cost. The hardliners were after him, he was in jail in 1977 and in house arrest
in 1994, although only briefly both times. An even higher cost were the disap-
pearances, and eventually killings, of his former close staff (Lewis, 2002, pp.
214–215). However, it is not completely certain that all this happened as direct
consequences of Lanusse’s public writings. Some of it may have happened be-
cause the hardliners had not forgiven him for introducing democracy (and
eventually letting Perón back) (DeYoung, 1977). Based on these pieces of evi-
dence, I conclude that Lanusse harmed his winning coalition to promote his
ideological beliefs.

Pleasing Groups Clearly Outside the Winning Coalition

Pleasing Perónist

Pleasing the Perónists by letting them back into the country and positively
spending time and resources on them participating in politics were also clear
examples of pleasing groups outside the winning coalition. Moreover, when
Lanusse became president, he dropped charges against Perón (Novitski,
1972a). According to a political commentator, inviting Perón back was needed
to restore democracy (Novitski, 1972a) and can be viewed as a link in promot-
ing democracy, although it was against Lanusse’s personal belief about Perón.
Lanusse also ran a clear risk by doing this, and he negotiated the return in
secret without the military’s knowledge (Novitski, 1972a). Generally, Lanusse
seemed to work on incorporating all groups in society (O'Donnell, 1988, p. 240) and consequently people outside his winning coalition.

Pleasing Onganía and Levingston

Both Onganía and Levingston were important people outside Lanusse's winning coalition when they were in power since they were the ultimate reason that Lanusse was not. Therefore, only trying to get rid of them and placing himself in power would be consistent with self-interest, especially if Lanusse feared losing his de facto power. Consistent with this, the day before he was ousted from power, Levingston fired Lanusse as head of the army. Lanusse’s coup d'état the following day may be viewed as a reaction to this, but a closer look at the events reveals that causality runs the other way. Levingston fired several other people in the army, as well as Lanusse, in order to prevent a coup d’état (Maidenburg, 1971a; Onis, 1971a; Potash, 1996, pp. 339–340, 357–358). Levingston was increasingly unpopular in both the army and in the population, as he did not work toward democratic restoration (Potash, 1996, p. 335). He openly declared that elections would not happen within four years, as economic stability was a precondition (Onis, 1971a; Potash, 1996, p. 358). Although Lanusse had backing—especially within the army (O'Donnell, 1988, p. 198; Potash, 1996, p. 345)—and reason to oust Levingston relatively early, he tried to work with Levingston to make him implement a policy program that led towards elections, instead of ousting him right away (Potash, 1996, pp. 340, 342). Levingston did not want to be directed (Potash, 1996, p. 356), and the coup d’état was perfectly consistent with Lanusse’s ideological orientation. It was also in line with installing himself in power, but had he mainly been interested in power, he could have done it before. A letter to the chief-of-staff (in the army) shows that he considered a coup but deliberately tried to make Levingston change political course instead (Potash, 1996, p. 355).

In 1969, Onganía also fired Lanusse but reinstalled him later the same day because Onganía’s potential successor refused to take the position (Potash, 1996, pp. 258–260). This happened a year before Lanusse forced Onganía from power, and fear of losing his position does not seem to be the reason for the ouster in this case either. In fact, long before Lanusse ousted Onganía from power, he had the chance and military backing to take power (O'Donnell, 1988, p. 186; Potash, 1996, p. 307). Onganía's tight economic policies constrained consumption and neglected the social unrest and demand for democracy, which made him very unpopular among the people (Potash, 1996, pp. 242, 280; Sparks, 1996). Despite this, and the fact that Lanusse was the leader of the army, Lanusse did not take power. Instead, he spent at least one and a half years actively trying to persuade Onganía to change course economically and especially with regard to democratic restoration (O'Donnell, 1988, pp.
Onganía believed that economic restoration should precede democratic restoration and did not plan to hold elections any time soon. According to General Cornicelli’s notes, Lanusse’s mood was very affected by the outcome of political negations with Onganía. Lanusse was extremely happy when Onganía seemed to listen and showed signs of willingness to incorporate his ideas, and he was equally angry when Onganía ignored Lanusse’s policy suggestions and stuck to his tight economic policies with no plans to democratize (Potash, 1996, pp. 283–285). This is strong evidence that Lanusse was not pretending to care about democracy in the quest for power. The fact that Lanusse put this much effort into making Onganía change political course instead of taking power himself strongly indicates that Lanusse prioritized his ideological beliefs over being in power. Additional evidence is that Lanusse did not even install himself in power after the ouster of Onganía, which created a power vacuum in which Lanusse had the backing to install himself as president. Yet, he chose to look far for another president (O’Donnell, 1988, pp. 198, 200; Potash, 1996, p. 309). According to Lanusse’s memoirs, he did not take power because he did not want to be accused of removing Onganía because of self-interest (Potash, 1996, p. 309).

In conclusion, there is strong evidence that Lanusse deliberately pleased groups outside his winning coalition, including the Perónists, and especially worked hard to make the former presidents change course towards democratization instead of installing himself in power (which he clearly had support to do).

**Voluntary Step-Down**

Lanusse did not run in the elections in 1973 although he could (Lentz, 1994, p. 40; O’Donnell, 1988, p. 257; Potash, 1996, pp. 393–396). In that sense, he voluntarily stepped down. However, some scholars argue that in 1971, he believed that he would not have been able to win the election, so it was not a voluntary step-down (Norden, 1996, pp. 43–44; O’Donnell, 1988, pp. 254–255). On the other hand, he finally announced that he would not run a year before the elections (Potash, 1996, pp. 423–424), and he had said several times earlier that he did not intend to run unless he was called upon (Potash, 1996, p. 399). Another reason he did not announce with certainty that he would not run earlier could be that he wanted to avoid become a “lame duck” and losing negotiation power (Potash, 1996, p. 393). He might have been able to stay longer, rig the elections or abandon them, but he did not even try. At least, when he came to power, he was very strong. He was deemed the strongest and most unconstrained president since Perón (Collier, 1972). Another interpretation is that he sacrificed his candidacy in order to secure the transition against a coup by (further) delegitimizing it, since his self-exclusion came with
a law implying that no one from the current (in summer 1972) government could run, and nor could non-residents at that point in time. The former excluded Lanusse and many other people in the military government, and the latter excluded Perón (O’Donnell, 1988, p. 257). This again indicates that Lanusse prioritized democracy over his own power. Moreover, it would clearly be against the military’s self-interest to hand over the country to civilian rule, as their salaries would drop and pensions decrease (Maidenburg, 1971b). Based on these arguments, I conclude that Lanusse stepped down largely voluntarily, but to be conservative, I will only assign this observation half weight when assessing the impact on the final conclusion.

Low Personal Income

In 1977, Lanusse was arrested on charges of financial corruption, involving illicit building of an aluminum power plant with public funds during his incumbency, but he was found innocent by the appeal court and released after a month (Lentz, 1994, p. 40; Lewis, 2002, p. 167). Evidence that indicate that he was corrupt in this instance has never been found (Lewis, 2002, p. 176). This is the first reason we cannot deduce from this case that Lanusse was personally corrupt. Second, the corruption charge was not about stealing or personal embezzlement, i.e., not about personal corruption (Lewis, 2002, pp. 167, 170). Third, Lanusse’s imprisonment appears to be the culmination of a raid against him by the military hardliners, who had never forgiven him for democratizing and inviting the Peronists back (and because Lanusse kept criticizing the hardliner regime) (DeYoung, 1977; Sparks, 1996). In fact, the opposite can be inferred from this case. Had Lanusse been corrupt or embezzled the state, he would probably have been charged with this as it would have been a stronger case now that the hardliners were after him. This strongly indicates that he did not embezzle the state.

The literature on politics in Argentina indicates that Perón was highly corrupt (Novitski, 1972a), and there was plenty of corruption in the military during the Dirty War after Lanusse left power (Norden, 1996, pp. 62–65). Again, this is indirect evidence that Lanusse (and the rest of the military dictatorship) was not corrupt. Although both pieces of evidence are only indirect, I conclude that Lanusse probably did not embezzle the state.

Yet, Lanusse’s family controlled large enterprises (O’Donnell, 1988, p. 228), so Lanusse was relatively wealthy. Nevertheless, the important point remains that he did not use state resources to increase his wealth, and this does not seem to have been his motivation for entering power. Since there is no direct evidence of Lanusse having a low or moderate personal income, I conclude this implication to be only partly observed.
**Expert Assessments**

No one disagreed that Lanusse favored a democratic transition (Potash, 1996, p. 270), although his political opponents claimed that it was because he wanted to run in the elections himself (Potash, 1996, pp. 270, 306–307, 385). Yet, many scholars indicate—directly or indirectly—that Lanusse was ideologically motivated, driven by national rather than personal goals (Darnton, 2014, p. 84; Norden, 1996, p. 39; O’Donnell, 1988, pp. 56–57, 152, 242–243, 252; Potash, 1996, pp. 263, 274, 360, 488). He wanted to see Argentina return to democracy, but a democracy the military could accept (Potash, 1996, p. 361), i.e., without Perón taking power (Lewis, 2002, p. 74). A journalist concluded that many Argentines viewed Lanusse as an honest man with good intentions, whereas others viewed him as a soldier who kept meddling in politics without a clear vision (Caistor, 1996).

Before concluding, there is a final piece of evidence that strongly indicates that Lanusse cared about Argentina returning to democracy and less about political power. Colonel Cornicelli recalls that when Levingston was being most uncooperative (and authoritarian) as president, Lanusse told his secretary that he considered retiring because he would not want to be accused of an overthrow of three presidents. This implies that he wanted to overthrow Levingston if he did not democratize—and he did not prioritize becoming president (Potash, 1996, p. 354). Although this is not as good as a diary statement, it should still be assessed as strong evidence.

**Summary**

Lanusse was in power from 1971 to 1973, but he had substantial political power already from 1966. Based on analysis of (mainly) the period from 1966 to 1973, Lanusse appears to have been highly ideologically motivated. Unlike many other presidents, he had little interest in the economic directions but cared much about the stability of the country and, most of all, returning it to democracy.

Harm: O
Please: O
Non-Minimal: N
Voluntary step-down: (O)
Income: (O)
Expert: Ideologically motivated

Overall qualitative judgement: 5
Bayesian updating score: 0.97
Sources

Information about Lanusse is not as extensive and there are fewer sources than for many other leaders in this appendix. I have relied extensively on Potash’s history book on the army and politics in the period 1962 to 1973 (the third volume in a three-volume account and analysis of the Argentine political-military history). Potash relies on many primary-source accounts, including interviews with Lanusse. His meeting with Lanusse is likely to have made him more positive and understanding in his evaluation of him. However, Potash seems very aware of this potential bias since he discusses controversial acts with help from many different sources. There is no biography (in English at least) about Lanusse, so I have relied on smaller sections in history books as well as newspaper articles from the New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Independent as they are large, relatively neutral newspapers with an international focus. History books are normally also more neutral than biographies regarding specific persons.
Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore, 1959-1990)

Lee Kuan Yew became prime minister of Singapore in 1959 and continued after independence from the British in 1963 (from Malaysia in 1965) until 1990. In 1959, Lee’s party, the People’s Action Party (PAP) won 53% of the votes (fourteen parties took part) (N. Barber, 1978, pp. 147–148; Bowring, 2015; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, pp. 16–17). Lee had an education from Cambridge and had a law firm with his wife, before he decided to enter politics and fight for independence. He formed PAP in 1954 and developed nationalist beliefs while studying abroad. PAP became the biggest opposition party. They united with the leftist, because PAP would not stand a chance without it. The united party was tied together by anti-colonialism and worked for independence for a unified Malaya and Singapore, but in 1961 the Communist faction broke out (N. Barber, 1978, p. 171; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, pp. 38–40). Lee’s regime is known for its top-down-steered economic development and less for its repression, although the latter was also present. Lee is also known for ridding Singapore of corruption (Mydans, 2015).

Ideology (proclaimed)

Lee adhered to a very nationalist, developmentalist, rationalist, and goal-oriented ideology (Barr, 2000, pp. 243–245; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, pp. 54, 64). About his ideological basis, Lee said in 2009, “You may call me a ‘utilitarian’ or whatever. I am interested in what works.” (Plate, 2010, p. 46). Included in this was an anti-corruption view and a wish for a clean city state (N. Barber, 1978, pp. 177, 198–199; Barr, 2000; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, pp. 4, 7, 17; Mydans, 2015). Lee was also an elitist, and he even believed in eugenics (that some races have better genes than others). However, he did not adhere to an exclusionary ideology. He wanted society to equalize differences between people with good and people with bad genes (Bowring, 2015; Han, Fernandez, & Tan, 2015, p. 155; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, p. 55; Plate, 2010, p. 53). He was driven by a utilitarian belief about distributing resources in a way that maximized utility, although he did not discard equality concerns. With his elitist beliefs, Lee was against democracy in a Western edition, claiming that too many people are incapable of ruling and that heightens the risk of mob rule (N. Barber, 1978, pp. 195–196; Han et al., 2015, p. 215; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, pp. 6–7, 129). Already when he was studying in London, he told his fellow peers that they, the educated, had to go back and lead the country towards being the new Switzerland instead of letting the uneducated take over and turn Singapore into another Palestine (Bowring, 2015).
Winning Coalition

First, the government, namely PAP, must have been in Lee’s winning coalition. The elite – especially the educated elite – was important for Lee. Although Singaporean elections were not free and fair, they were not completely nominal, at least in the beginning of his incumbency. This implies that Lee was somewhat dependent on the people as well. The upper class (and perhaps the middle class) was a part of his winning coalition. Thus, his winning coalition consisted of the strongest part of the population. Therefore, *Lee did not have a non-minimal winning coalition.*

Harming Groups Clearly Inside the Winning Coalition

Power Consolidation and Crack-Downs

Consistent with motives of power-maximization, Lee was harsh on his opponents. He conducted an oppressive form of government, and he banned and punished many acts on the pretext of them obstructing progress. For instance, he put many left-wing activist in jail without trial because they (according to him) tried to overthrow the government with force (and obstructed progress) (N. Barber, 1978, pp. 195–196; Bowring, 2015; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, p. 130; Mydans, 2015). However, Lee was also harsh on people in his ruling coalition if they broke the law, e.g., were corrupt. On several occasions, Lee raised corruption charges against central people in PAP, for instance the minister of national development in 1986 (Mauzy & Milne, 2002, pp. 7, 91). Lee also encouraged the public to report misbehavior and rudeness to make the civil servants more civil and avoid misbehavior, such as corruption and “yellow culture” (N. Barber, 1978, p. 117; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, p. 17). Although the people may have been in favor of these initiatives, and Lee may have been somewhat dependent on the people, deliberatively punishing members of government and the bureaucracy was risky and not a behavior to be expected had he only been concerned with staying in power.

Lee employed people in the party and civil servants based on merit instead of loyalty, and he paid them well (N. Barber, 1978; Barr, 2000, Chapter 4; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, Chapters 7, 54, 60; Mydans, 2015). This can be viewed as harming the winning coalition in the sense that some loyal members of the winning coalition might feel overlooked, but on the other hand, he created a competent and efficient winning coalition. Nevertheless, this might in some ways be more dangerous than safe, since people employed on the basis of merit might be more autonomous than people hired based on loyalty. In any case, merit-based hiring is strongly in line with Lee’s educational developmental aims.
Hunt for a Successor

A clear instance of harming the winning coalition was Lee’s hunt for a successor. He wanted his successor to be second generation, i.e., not from the core of his ruling coalition (his argument was that he wanted the country to be run well many years ahead). Moreover, he expected the first generation, i.e., his winning coalition, to retire. This renewal started in the 1970s, and in 1988, Lee was the only one left from the old generation. According to Lee himself, many people in the first generation were not happy because they felt that they were not ready to go. In addition, PAP’s popularity among the people (election results in the 1980s) declined during the years of renewal (Mauzy & Milne, 2002, pp. 45–46).

Other Policy Initiatives

Other initiatives that harmed Lee’s winning coalition was cutting the salaries of the academics to increase equality, which is largely consistent with his ideology (N. Barber, 1978, p. 177), combatting pollution, preserving historical buildings, and introducing fines for littering to keep the country clean (N. Barber, 1978, pp. 198–199; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, pp. 130–131). Although this did not directly harm his winning coalition, providing these kinds of collective goods did not make sense if he wanted to please his winning coalition. It would have been much more cost-effective to direct his resources towards his winning coalition. These initiatives were largely inconsistent with self-interest but highly consistent with his ideological aims. Another example is his family-planning policies, which influenced marriage choices in order to enhance Singapore’s genetic quality, e.g., by encouraging graduates to reproduce among themselves (Bowring, 2015). He introduced tax deductions for educated females who had children to breed a new generation that was as talented as possible. This initiative was very controversial (Mauzy & Milne, 2002, p. 60) and unpopular, but it was highly consistent with his belief in eugenics.

In conclusion, there is ample evidence that Lee pursued his proclaimed ideology at the expense of his winning coalition. Therefore, I conclude that this implication is observed.

Pleasing Groups Clearly Outside the Winning Coalition

In addition to harming his winning coalition, Lee pleased groups outside his winning coalition. He implemented free education for the people (N. Barber, 1978, pp. 196–197; Bowring, 2015), and already in the 1960s, expenditures on education increased, and the number of teachers doubled during the decade (Boon & Gopinathan, 2006). This is consistent with his elitist ideology in which education played a major role. It may also have been in line with the
wishes of the educated elite. However, it is inconsistent with power maximization since it is expensive to educate the people, and education may empower the people. Hence, educating people outside his winning coalition could well increase his risk of losing power. Therefore, this implication is deemed observed.

**Voluntary Step-Down**

Lee stepped down voluntarily. He was still popular among the population, and the economy and the country in general were faring well (Mauzy & Milne, 2002, p. 128). The risk involved in stepping down was low as he had carefully chosen his successor from within the party. Moreover, he still had an advisory role after he stepped down (Mauzy & Milne, 2002, pp. 8, 114, 120). However, he lost power by stepping down, which implies that this observation does not align with being self-interested, as it was completely voluntary.

**Low Personal Income**

Lee’s salary may not have been particularly low, and his government was paid well. PAP raised the salary of the politicians and civil servants, arguably because the most qualified people would join PAP and the bureaucracy and strong meritocratic norms would be built. Afterwards, this strategy has been copied in other East Asian countries, such as China (N. Barber, 1978; Barr, 2000, Chapter 4; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, Chapters 7, 54, 60). However, he was not corrupt (N. Barber, 1978, p. 170; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, p. 7; Mydans, 2015), and he lived a very spartan life (N. Barber, 1978, p. 170). Consequently, I evaluate this implication as partly observed.

**Expert Assessments**

Expert assessments support the picture of Lee as a strongly ideologically motivated leader. He is generally perceived, also by the people, as a good and well-intentioned leader who really made a difference (Barr, 2000, p. 250; Bowring, 2015; Mauzy & Milne, 2002, p. 5). Even his enemies perceived him as patriotic rather than self-interested. He did not enter politics with corrupt and greedy motives, and he did not affiliate with his opponents for strategic purposes (N. Barber, 1978, p. 170).

**Summary**

All implications of ideological motivation are either fully or partly observed, except one: having a non-minimal winning coalition. Lee acted very consistently towards implementing his development policies throughout his incumbency, and he stepped down voluntarily. This is strong evidence that Lee was
very ideologically motivated, and experts agree that he was. Thus, this is the final assessment.

Harm: O
Please: O
Non-Minimal: N
Voluntary step-down: O
Income: (O)
Expert: Strongly ideologically motivated.

Overall qualitative judgement: 5
Bayesian updating score: 0.99

Mahathir Mohamad ruled Malaysia from 1981 to 2003. He had a very outspoken and provocative style, and he was known for uttering very strong anti-West and anti-Semitic statements in order to secure national unity (Marks, 2003; Mauzy & Milne, 1999, p. ix–x, 183; Perlez, 2003; Rajendran, 1993, p. 1; Sipress, 2003; Wain, 2009, p. 306). He was disliked in many Western countries (Bonner, 2002), but he was a popular autocrat at home (Marks, 2003). His opponents criticized his repressive style (Marks, 2003), but both supporters and opposition agree that he secured economic development and made Malaysia avoid the resource curse by globalizing the economy and not only relying on natural resources (Khoo, 2003, p. 1; Marks, 2003; Moten, 2008, p. 44; Perlez, 2003). Although he favored the Malays, the majority and poorest part of the population, he created harmony among the different ethnic groups in the highly divided country (Marks, 2003; Sipress, 2003). In addition, he created stability (Bonner, 2002). Although the political system was definitely corrupt during his incumbency, and shady financial deals with big businesses were going on (Khoo, 2012, pp. 53, 236; Marks, 2003; Mauzy & Milne, 1999, pp. 68–72, 185; Sipress, 2003), there are no indications that Mahathir stole from the state and enriched himself (Marks, 2003). In 2002, he surprisingly announced that he would step down, which he did in 2003, apparently voluntarily (Bonner, 2002; Khoo, 2003, pp. 167–169; Sipress, 2003).

Mahathir had a background in medicine (Khoo, 1995, p. 2; Sipress, 2003), but he was active in politics before becoming prime minister. He entered parliament in 1964 but lost his seat in 1969. People expected him to return to politics some day, as he had already become an important figure in the UNMO party (Mauzy & Milne, 1999, p. 21). He came to power after criticizing the alternative leader of UNMO, a brave and risky move (Mauzy & Milne, 1999, pp. 24–25). Moreover, other contenders had died, so Mahathir was the obvious choice as successor after the former prime minister left office (Mauzy & Milne, 1999, p. 28). Mahathir was relatively unconstrained during his two decades as incumbent (Bonner, 2002; Mauzy & Milne, 1999, p. 1). He faced weak checks and balances, and the ones he faced, he eliminated (Khoo, 2003, pp. 18, 29, 173; Mauzy & Milne, 1999, pp. 2–3, 29–49, 186; Moten, 2008, p. 96). His power became increasingly personalized, which enabled him to implement most of the policies he preferred. Mahathir is not known as a particularly brutal autocrat (Bonner, 2002; Khoo, 2003, p. 173, 2012, p. 236; Marks, 2003).
Ideology (proclaimed)

Mahathir claimed to fight for several goals but had two primary goals. The overarching goal, which he presented in 1981, was development, i.e., modernization, industrialization, and deregulation (Khoo, 1995, p. ix). He also claimed to fight for a united Malaysia across ethnicities (Khoo, 1995, pp. 328, 334; Mauzy & Milne, 1999, pp. 75, 96, 160). In 1991, he introduced “Vision 2020”, which focused especially on Malaysia as a developed and multicultural country with unity across ethnicities (Khoo, 1995, p. ix, 327, 2003, pp. 20–26, 2012, pp. 5, 7; Mauzy & Milne, 1999, p. xvii, 75). He also had other goals. He wanted the poor Malays to keep up with the Chinese and Indians and to prosper (Mauzy & Milne, 1999, p. 166), and he advocated for a kind of affirmative action. Furthermore, Mahathir was an outspoken champion of Muslim causes, but he was also a critic of radical Islam (Marks, 2003; Mauzy & Milne, 1999, p. 84).

Winning Coalition

As in most autocracies, the armed forces were a part of Mahathir’s winning coalition. But due to family ties to the ruling elite, which has created a tradition of not intervening in politics, it has not been necessary for political leaders to spend many resources to buy off the military to secure its support (Mauzy & Milne, 1999, pp. 2–3; Moten, 2008, p. 252).

Another part of Mahathir’s winning coalition was his party, the UNMO. In fact, the real competition for power was within the party (Khoo, 1995, Chapter 7). It was also from within the party, Mahathir experienced his greatest challenges, especially in the period 1987-1990 (Khoo, 2003, p. 18). Traditionally, the important political and military posts were held by Malays (60% of the population) (Mauzy & Milne, 1999, p. 95), although they were on average the poorest part of the population, mainly working in agriculture. The Chinese (30%) and Indians (10%) tended to be in manufacturing and the commercial sectors (Khoo, 1995, p. 199; Mauzy & Milne, 1999, p. 52). Since the important people in the party were mainly Malays, and ethnicity was highly salient, a large part of the Malay population can indirectly be said to have been in Mahathir’s winning coalition. However, directly, he did not need the people to stay in power (Mauzy & Milne, 1999, p. 182). It does not seem to have been possible to have another winning coalition, e.g., consisting only of Chinese and Indians, and based on this, I conclude that Mahathir did not have a non-minimal winning coalition.
Harming Groups Clearly Inside the Winning Coalition

Consolidating Power

Shortly after gaining power, Mahathir started to consolidate power by eliminating checks on his power and removing potential opposition, also within the party (from the so-called “Team B” in UNMO) (Khoo, 2003, p. 18; Mauzy & Milne, 1999, pp. 29–49, 186; Moten, 2008, p. 96; Sipress, 2003; Wain, 2009, pp. 310–311). In 1987-1988, he abolished the independence of the judiciary (Mauzy & Milne, 1999, pp. 46–49). These initiatives are perfectly consistent with self-interest. Alternatively, they could be steps towards being able to effectively implement his ideology. While Mahathir eroded the function of the party, he enhanced the function of the bureaucracy by introducing “new public management” (Khoo, 2012, p. 241; Wain, 2009, pp. 310–311). This can also be viewed as a step towards easier introduction and implementation of his policies. Mahathir was heavily criticized for the imprisonment of his long term collaborate, Anwar Ibrahim, in 1998-99, who was in his own winning coalition (Khoo, 2003, pp. 108–131, 173; Perlez, 2003; Plate, 2011, p. 9) and openly criticized some of Mahathir’s policies. However, Anwar did not explain his imprisonment as being part of a power rivalry, but rather by political differences (Moten, 2008, p. 96). This indicates that Mahathir actually did care about policy, and this was not just power-maximizing behavior. Anwar’s imprisonment can be viewed as an instance of harming the winning coalition, although several observers viewed it as an attempt to secure power.

Economic Development

Mahathir’s development regime can be divided into two periods: the first period from 1981 until the Asian economic crisis in 1997; and the second period, after the economic crisis, until the end of his incumbency, in 2003. In the first period, Mahathir led aggressive development with focus on poverty reduction through privatization and moderate government expenditure, except for the investment in heavy industry (HI). In the second period, Mahathir was concerned with crisis management, and he took several nationalization measures (Khoo, 2012, p. 29), which hampered some of the social plans (Khoo, 2003, pp. 5–14, 2012, pp. 5, 49–51, 116–171, 229). Mahathir started implementing development policies from the very beginning of his incumbency (he started in 1980 as Minister of Trade and Industry by setting up the state-owned Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM) (Khoo, 2012, pp. 7, 37)). In 1981, he introduced his “Look East” policy (Mauzy & Milne, 1999, p. xvii, 55-56). He created Malaysia Incorporated, which was supposed to resemble the South Korean chaebols (Khoo, 2003, p. 180, 2012, pp. 15, 29), to encourage business owners and workers in the public and private sectors to collaborate (Khoo,
In 1983, Mahathir introduced privatization policies (Khoo, 2003, p. 8, 2012, p. 5; Mauzy & Milne, 1999, pp. 56–59), and he initiated both state-led investments and market-led development projects to create growth (Khoo, 2012, pp. 7, 15, 29).

Generally his visions created popular support (Khoo, 2003, p. 13). So did his policies—at least after they started creating growth at the end of the 1980s (Khoo, 2012, p. 7). Inequality actually decreased as an effect of the policies (Mauzy & Milne, 1999, p. 74). Although the crisis in 1997-1998 led to some discontent, some praised him for not following IMF’s demands but leading Malaysia out of the crisis in his own way (Khoo, 2012, p. 49; Perlez, 2003). The mix between state- and market-led development favored both the Malays and the Chinese (Khoo, 2012, p. 41). Based on these considerations, Mahathir’s development policies were both highly consistent with his proclaimed ideology and with staying in power because they created performance legitimacy.

Ethnicity, Religion, and Culture

Mahathir introduced several affirmative-action policies advantaging ethnic Malays (Marks, 2003; Sipress, 2003). For instance, he guaranteed Malays places at universities and shareholdings in corporations (Marks, 2003), implemented Muslim values in the state administration and made Malaysia an Islamic state (Moten, 2008, p. 19). This also favored the Malays, who were mainly Muslim (Mauzy & Milne, 1999, p. 1). These actions were consistent with implementing his ideology but also with pleasing his winning coalition. However, he continuously fought and criticized Islamic fundamentalism (Perlez, 2003), which harmed parts of his winning coalition, and he introduced English in schools against the wish of the Malays (he had already introduced it in Chinese and Indian schools). This aligned with his development agenda (Khoo, 2003, pp. 192–193), but it harmed a substantial part of his winning coalition. Also, he harmed the Malays verbally by scolding them and calling them lazy in order to make them step up (Sipress, 2003).

Concluding, Mahathir’s behavior was generally consistent with both self-interest and ideology. However, there were several specific instances where he harmed groups inside his winning coalition without gaining support from other parts. The evidence is not strong, which leads me to conclude that this implication is only partly observed.

Pleasing Groups Clearly Outside the Winning Coalition

Both the market-oriented growth policies and the introduction of English in Chinese and Indian schools were instances of pleasing the Chinese and Indians. In addition, Mahathir opened up some important positions, formerly only
filled by Malays, to these groups (Mauzy & Milne, 1999, pp. 95–96). This looks like instances of pleasing groups outside his winning coalition, since Mahathir was not dependent on these parts of the population. However, observers have argued that the latter initiative might have been a way to win back Chinese support lost in the 1990 election (Mauzy & Milne, 1999, p. 96). The other two instances are more difficult to explain from a self-interested perspective, as they happened before 1990. All three instances are consistent with Mahathir’s proclaimed core ideological aims of development and multiculturalism (de-ethnizing). Consequently, there is some, but not overwhelming, evidence of Mahathir pleasing groups outside his winning coalition, so this implication is only partly observed.

Voluntary Step-Down

In 2002, Mahathir surprisingly announced that he would step down (Bonner, 2002; Khoo, 2003, pp. 167–169). Most people thought that he would hold on to power as long as possible, since he had firmly repressed and gotten rid of any potential contenders (Khoo, 2003, p. 18; Mauzy & Milne, 1999, pp. 29–49, 186; Moten, 2008, p. 96; Sipress, 2003). However, it appears that his step-down was completely voluntary (Bonner, 2002; Sipress, 2003). His popularity was at a high point nationally and internationally (Bonner, 2002; Wain, 2009, pp. 304–305), and the economy was faring increasingly well (after the 1997-98 crisis) (Khoo, 2003, p. 168). His decision to step down was unlikely to have been caused by health issues as he is still alive today. In fact, he joined forces with his former enemies and was democratically elected prime minister in 2018 to oust the corrupt incumbent (Ellis-Petersen, 2018). Based on this, I conclude that this implication is observed.

Low Personal Income

The political system became increasingly corrupt during Mahathir’s incumbency, and shady financial deals with big businesses took place (Khoo, 2012, pp. 53, 236; Marks, 2003; Mauzy & Milne, 1999, pp. 68–72; Sipress, 2003). However, the authors of the case material do not mention Mahathir being involved and engaging in self-enrichment (Mauzy & Milne, 1999, pp. 68–72), only that he did not do enough to stop it (Mauzy & Milne, 1999, pp. 170–172). The rising corruption levels are explained as unintended consequences of the development policies (Khoo, 2012, p. 236). A British journalist explicitly writes about Mahathir that “Unlike some of his Asian contemporaries, such as the former Indonesian president, Suharto, he has never sought to enrich himself” (Marks, 2003). This indicates that Mahathir did not have an excessive (legal) income. The only argument against him being clean is that Mahathir’s
sons own large assets (Mauzy & Milne, 1999, p. 184), but this may have come about through legal means. In conclusion, this implication is observed.

**Expert Assessments**

So far, the general picture is that Mahathir seems to have been highly ideologically motivated since he has not departed from his ideological aims. Expert assessments clearly support this conclusion. Scholars, journalists, and politicians from Malaysia and abroad seem to agree that Mahathir was extremely ideologically motivated and patriotic (Khoo, 1995, pp. 2–3, 6–8, 328, 333, 2003, pp. 1–5, 169; Mauzy & Milne, 1999, pp. 6–7, 67; Moten, 2008, pp. 44, 94; Plate, 2011, pp. 4–9; Rajendran, 1993, p. 2; Sipress, 2003; Wain, 2009, pp. 79, 135, 305). However, he also seemed to believe that only he was capable of implementing his ideas (Mauzy & Milne, 1999, pp. 159, 184). Moreover, he was very hardworking (Mauzy & Milne, 1999, p. 184) and sincerely wanted to turn Malaysia into a developed country (Khoo, 1995, pp. 2–3, 333; Wain, 2009, pp. 79, 135). I my case material, I have found no experts (mainly academics and journalists) who assesses him as selfish and not driven by ideology and what he found to be the nation’s best. Mahathir has frequently been heavily criticized for his authoritarian style (Khoo, 1995, pp. 6–7, 199; Marks, 2003; Plate, 2011, pp. 4–9), this is not an argument against him being ideologically motivated.

**Summary**

In the case of Mahathir, there has been a large overlap between behavior motivated by ideology and by power-greed, and the implications regarding his ruling coalition are therefore only partly observed. The unique implications of voluntary step-down and low income are observed. Mahathir’s behavior was highly consistent with his proclaimed ideology of development and national unity. These observations comprise strong evidence that Mahathir was strongly ideologically motivated, and expert assessments support this conclusion.

Harm: (O)
Please: (O)
Non-Minimal: N
Voluntary step-down: O
Income: O
Expert: Strongly ideologically motivated

Overall qualitative judgement: 5
Bayesian updating score: 0.95
Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire, 1965-1997)

Mobutu was the ruler of the former Zaire (today DR Congo) from 1965 to 1997 (FitzGerald, 1997; French, 1997; Ikambana, 2007, p. 1; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p. 141; Smith, 1997). He took power in a coup d’état and was ousted the same way after rebellion and civil war (FitzGerald, 1997; French, 1997; Ikambana, 2007, p. 1; Smith, 1997). He was in exile in Morocco for less than a half year before he died (FitzGerald, 1997; French, 1997; Petersen & Skov, 2004, p. 166; Smith, 1997). His regime is known for its extreme brutality and extreme looting of the resource-rich country.

Mobutu was born into a poor family. He went to missionary school, but quit to join the colonial army. After rising to the highest rank for a Congolese, he quit the army and became a journalist (FitzGerald, 1997; French, 1997; Petersen & Skov, 2004, p. 159; Renton, Seddon, & Zeilig, 2007, pp. 112–114). He was in Belgium prior to independence but returned to be appointed chief-of-staff in the army under Lumumba’s leftist independence government (Duke, 2003, p. 78; FitzGerald, 1997; French, 1997; Gerard & Kucklick, 2015, pp. 29, 86; Petersen & Skov, 2004, pp. 160–161; Renton et al., 2007, pp. 112–114; Smith, 1997). After independence in 1960, Congo was characterized by chaos, several secession attempts, and internal conflict. Lumumba was murdered, and although Mobutu was not officially in the political leadership, he had (most) control of the country (Duke, 2003, pp. 78–79; FitzGerald, 1997; French, 1997; Petersen & Skov, 2004, pp. 160–161; Renton et al., 2007, pp. 101–109, 113–114; Smith, 1997). In 1965, he was encouraged by the United States to take power, which he did (Renton et al., 2007, p. 91). Though he was generally popular, there were several regional rebellions and attempts to ouster him; however, the West, in particular the US, helped him restore stability, put down rebellions, and consolidate power (Duke, 2003, pp. 5, 79–81, 127; French, 1997; Gerard & Kucklick, 2015, p. 3; Renton et al., 2007, pp. 114–115; Smith, 1997).

After entering office in 1965, Mobutu quickly consolidated power by building a personality cult around him in the name of “authenticity” and Africanism (FitzGerald, 1997; French, 1997; Haskin, 2005, pp. 44–46; Kalu & Falola, 2019, p. 168; Ofosu-Appiah, 1979, p. 188; Petersen & Skov, 2004, p. 159; Renton et al., 2007, pp. 5, 117, 126; Schatzberg, 1991, p. 34; Smith, 1997; Van Reybrouck, 2014, pp. 351–355). Superstition has been a central part of the religion in Zaire. Rumors about Mobutu having magical powers helped him control the population (Duke, 2003, pp. 76–77; Petersen & Skov, 2004, pp. 162–163; Smith, 1997). There is no dispute that Mobutu looted the state. He stole between $5 and $10 billion during his incumbency, and he lived extravagantly (Duke, 2003, pp. 10, 71, 80–81; FitzGerald, 1997; French, 1997; Gerard &

**Ideology (proclaimed)**

When Mobutu came to power, he promised stability and prosperity within five years (Renton et al., 2007, p. 117; Van Reybrouck, 2014, p. 334), and he was
clear about being anti-communist (French, 1997; Smith, 1997). A couple of years later, he introduced an authenticity ideology, later known as Mobutuism. The idea was to embrace values that were supposedly unique to Africans (French, 1997; Haskin, 2005, pp. 44–45; Renton et al., 2007, pp. 5, 117). This was arguably a way to rise from the oppression of colonial rule and to create national unity across the many ethnicities existing in the huge country (French, 1997; Renton et al., 2007, p. 117).

**Winning Coalition**

Mobutu relied on the army when he came to power, and for the first five years, this was his major domestic power base (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, pp. 153–154; Van Reybrouck, 2014, pp. 339, 351). Later, he mainly relied on paramilitary troops, including his special security division. The general army was weak and ill-equipped (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, pp. 153–154; Petersen & Skov, 2004, pp. 164–165; Smith, 1997; Van Reybrouck, 2014, pp. 370–373), and the special security forces (the well-equipped part of the army) were definitely in Mobutu’s winning coalition.

Western external actors, in particular the United States, France, and Belgium as well as Morocco, comprised a crucial powerbase for Mobutu, (FitzGerald, 1997; French, 1997; Ikambana, 2007, p. 1; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p. 160; Renton et al., 2007, p. 5; Schatzberg, 1991, p. 58; Van Reybrouck, 2014, pp. 372–373). In fact, their backing seems to have been necessary for him to stay in power. After Mobuto took power, they helped crush rebellions that he had little chance to crush himself (Duke, 2003, pp. 5, 127; FitzGerald, 1997; French, 1997; Smith, 1997). Throughout the 1990s, he was unpopular among the people, and there were several rebellions and protests (French, 1997; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p. 165; Renton et al., 2007, pp. 5, 123; Smith, 1997; Van Reybrouck, 2014, pp. 395–432), but it was not until he lost external support and the US started supporting his successor, Laurent Kabila, that he was ousted (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, pp. 141–142; Renton et al., 2007, pp. 178, 181–184).

Had his special security forces turned their back on him, he may have fallen before. They and the Western external actors were definitely a part of his winning coalition. In contrast, his power does not seem to have depended much on the Zairian people, although a couple of authors argue that some support from the people was still important (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, pp. 165–168; Van Reybrouck, 2014, p. 351), and he was at least dependent on support from his own small ethnic group (Haskin, 2005, p. 50).

The conclusion is still that his winning coalition was extremely narrow, mainly consisting of the special security forces, the US, France, and Belgium.
Therefore, I conclude that his winning coalition was minimal, and the implication of a non-minimal winning coalition is not observed.

**Harming Groups Clearly Inside the Winning Coalition**

**Consolidating Power**


Another aspect of the power consolidation process was the cultivation of a strong personality cult, which implied that Mobutu was the leader and owned the country and all its assets (Duke, 2003, p. 77; French, 1997; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p. 166; Schatzberg, 1991, p. 34). He also introduced the ideology of authenticity, which was a cultivation of “African values” and rejection of Western, in particular colonial, symbols and values. As a part of this, the name of the country was changed from Congo to Zaire, and the names of citizens and cities were changed from colonial to traditional African names. It was forbidden to wear a tie and other Western types of clothes (FitzGerald, 1997; French, 1997; Haskin, 2005, pp. 44–46; Kalu & Falola, 2019, p. 168; Ofosu-Appiah, 1979, p. 188; Petersen & Skov, 2004, p. 159; Renton et al., 2007, pp. 5, 117, 126; Schatzberg, 1991, p. 34; Smith, 1997; Van Reybrouck, 2014, pp. 351–355). The introduction of this ideology may be viewed as a sincere attempt to create national unity and break colonial ties (Kalu & Falola, 2019, p. 168); however, it may as well be viewed as a way to legitimize his rule (French, 1997; Haskin, 2005, p. 46; Renton et al., 2007, pp. 5, 117). The personality cult, and Mobutu as the ultimate leader of the country, were also built into the authenticity ideology, and several traits (about clothing style) were copied from Asian dictators, such as Mao and Kim Il-Sung, who were not African (Van Reybrouck, 2014, pp. 355–356).

Another link in Mobutu’s power consolidation was hard repression of opposition and dissidents, including torture and public executions. His regime was very brutal, especially in the beginning and towards the end (Duke, 2003,
Several authors claim that he ruled by fear (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p. 141; Renton et al., 2007, p. 117; Schatzberg, 1991, p. 58; Van Reybrouck, 2014, pp. 339–340, 344), and he effectively eliminated potential challengers. This cannot be viewed as harming but rather as containing his winning coalition. A milder form of this was his frequent reshuffling of cabinet, which implied that no one had time and resources to build a powerbase to challenge him (French, 1997; Haskin, 2005, p. 53; Schatzberg, 1991, p. 34). Mobutu weakened the army to make it ill-equipped to unseat him. Thus, he weakened this part of his winning coalition (such that they were no longer a part of it) and instead strengthened and paid his special security forces well (Duke, 2003, p. 74; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, pp. 153–154, 157–160; Petersen & Skov, 2004, pp. 164–165; Smith, 1997; Van Reybrouck, 2014, pp. 370–373). Although there is some dispute about whether he favored his own ethnicity (Haskin, 2005, p. 50; Van Reybrouck, 2014, pp. 349, 351), he employed many of them in his special security forces (Haskin, 2005, p. 50).

Foreign Aid and Natural Resources

Finally, money was an important part of Mobutu’s rule. The country was devastated by war when he took power, but it was full of natural resources, so the potential was large. Mobutu managed to realize the potential during his first decade in power (see below). Moreover, Zaire received large amounts of foreign aid from the West, because of Mobutu’s anti-communism (French, 1997). This created wide access to money. Mobutu spent a lot on buying off important people, including the special security forces (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, pp. 157–160), and critics by giving them gifts and graft (Van Reybrouck, 2014, pp. 356, 384). Thus, Mobutu used a combination of cooptation and repression. In particular at the beginning and end of his rule, he mainly relied on repression (Schatzberg, 1991, pp. 43–48, 58; Van Reybrouck, 2014, pp. 385–387, 396, 406). A reason may be the economic situation, i.e., his access to state money. The economy boomed in the period 1968–1974 but then declined until the very end of his rule (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p. 148; Renton et al., 2007, pp. 121–122).

So far, there is no indication of Mobutu harming his winning coalition. Instead, his behavior was highly consistent with power consolidation and pleasing his narrow winning coalition (and keeping it narrow). It may be argued that he tried, and succeeded in, keeping his promise about stability by using hard repression, and he followed his authenticity ideology. Nevertheless, these initiatives were highly consistent with consolidating power as well, and the creation of a personality cult is probably more consistent with this than with
other-regarding motives. Based on this, I conclude that Mobutu did not deliberately harm his winning coalition.

Pleasing Groups Clearly Outside the Winning Coalition

As mentioned, Mobutu’s implementation of the authenticity ideology may look like an instance of pleasing the people who were largely outside his winning coalition, but it can also be viewed as a power consolidation measure. Because parts of the ideology were imported from other closed and personalized dictatorships (e.g., China and North Korea) and there was a strong personalization element in the authenticity arguments, it looks more like a power consolidation attempt than an ideologically motivated initiative.

Economic Policies

Another initiative worth analyzing is Mobutu’s development policy. Shortly after coming to power, Mobutu implemented economic reforms, which were initially successful (Ofosu-Appiah, 1979, p. 188; Petersen & Skov, 2004, p. 159). The economic reforms included nationalization of foreign companies (French, 1997; Haskin, 2005, pp. 47–48; Petersen & Skov, 2004, pp. 159, 163; Van Reybrouck, 2014, pp. 345, 357). The initial success increased Mobutu’s popularity among the people (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, pp. 145, 165; Van Reybrouck, 2014, pp. 332–335, 346), and the reforms can be viewed as an instance of pleasing the people, who were generally outside his winning coalition. However, it was also the start of Mobutu’s personal fortune building. Although parts of the economic improvements benefitted the people, a large part went into Mobutu’s, his friends’ and family’s pockets (French, 1997; Haskin, 2005, pp. 47–48; Renton et al., 2007, p. 119). This also enabled him to coopt the armed forced.

From the mid-1970s, the economy started to decline drastically, partly due to decreasing copper prices, but mainly due to corruption and mismanagement (Haskin, 2005, pp. 47–48; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, pp. 150–151; Petersen & Skov, 2004, pp. 159, 163–166; Renton et al., 2007, pp. 120, 124–129, 132; Schatzberg, 1991, p. 36; Van Reybrouck, 2014, pp. 358–359, 374, 376). The people became extremely impoverished (Duke, 2003, p. 71; FitzGerald, 1997; Haskin, 2005, p. 51; Petersen & Skov, 2004, pp. 165–166; Renton et al., 2007, p. 5; Smith, 1997; Van Reybrouck, 2014, pp. 369–371, 378–379, 389–390). Mobutu did not do much to stop this decline but continued to spend public funds for private purposes and to coopt important people. Hence, the economic reforms did not seem to be a serious attempt to please the people, but rather an attempt to consolidate power and generate money for himself. Another interpretation is that he tried to please the people in the
first five or ten years of his incumbency but then changed motivation and became largely selfish.

Democratization

Mobutu’s democratization attempts in the 1990s were only pro forma (Duke, 2003, p. 81; Van Reybrouck, 2014, pp. 396–397). The US (and the domestic opposition) put pressure on him to implement multiparty elections and democratize. He allowed multiparty elections but made sure that they did not become a serious threat to his power (FitzGerald, 1997; French, 1997; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p. 151; Renton et al., 2007, p. 5; Smith, 1997). Also, he tried to buy off his opponents (Van Reybrouck, 2014, p. 398). Therefore, this is not an instance of pleasing people outside his winning coalition. It is exactly the opposite, namely an attempt to please his winning coalition while not giving up too much power.

Based on these discussions, there is no clear evidence of Mobutu pleasing groups outside his winning coalition. At best, he did it in the beginning of his rule but then changed motivation.

Voluntary Step-Down

Mobutu stayed for long under high pressure, including seven months of civil war. Most accounts claim that he was ousted by Kabila (French, 1997; Ikambana, 2007, p. 1; Smith, 1997), but one account said that he “fled” during the rebellion (FitzGerald, 1997). Even this account does not change the conclusion that he did not step down voluntarily.

Low Personal Income

It is clear that Mobutu largely used the national treasury as his personal bank account (FitzGerald, 1997) and was involved in extreme and systematic embezzlement, also after the national economy declined drastically, and his people lived in poverty (Duke, 2003, pp. 10, 71, 80–81; FitzGerald, 1997; French, 1997; Gerard & Kucklick, 2015, p. 220; Haskin, 2005, pp. 45, 52–53; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p. 141; Petersen & Skov, 2004, pp. 159, 163, 165–166; Renton et al., 2007, pp. 5, 123, 128; Schatzberg, 1991, p. 38; Smith, 1997; Van Reybrouck, 2014, p. 359). He even gave birth to the term “kleptocracy” (Duke, 2003, p. 71; French, 1997; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p. 160; Smith, 1997; Van Reybrouck, 2014, p. 381). He lived extravagantly, had a large palace in his province of birth, mansions in many different countries, and spent much time travelling (Duke, 2003, pp. 80–81; FitzGerald, 1997; French, 1997). Hence, he did not have a low personal income.
**Expert Assessments**

All sources agree that Mobutu was highly self-interested and was motivated by power for its intrinsic value as well as wealth (Duke, 2003, pp. 156–157; FitzGerald, 1997; French, 1997; Gerard & Kucklick, 2015, p. 110; Haskin, 2005, p. 50; Kalu & Falola, 2019, p. 17; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, pp. 141, 151; Petersen & Skov, 2004, pp. 162–163; Renton et al., 2007, p. 111; Schatzberg, 1991, p. 38; Van Reybrouck, 2014, pp. 335–356, 375, 380–381). He is said to have been greedy (FitzGerald, 1997; Schatzberg, 1991, p. 38; Van Reybrouck, 2014, p. 375), egocentric (FitzGerald, 1997), a narcissist (Van Reybrouck, 2014, p. 381), a tyrant (Renton et al., 2007, p. 111); he used ideology as an instrument to power (Petersen & Skov, 2004, pp. 162–163) and prioritized himself and his wealth at the expense of the well-being of the people (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p. 151; Schatzberg, 1991, p. 38). However, a few authors suggest that he had other-regarding intentions when he first came to power, and that he actually wanted to create stability and improved living conditions for his people, but his motivation changed after a decade or a half in power (Gerard & Kucklick, 2015, pp. 108–109; Kalu & Falola, 2019, pp. 17, 168; Van Reybrouck, 2014, pp. 331–356). The expert assessments support the conclusions based on the rest of the analysis, namely that Mobutu was strongly driven by self-interest, power and wealth.

**Summary**

Mobutu is one of the clearest examples of a highly self-interested dictator. He quickly consolidated power by building a personality cult around himself in the name of “authenticity” and Africanism. Shortly after consolidating power, he started looting the state. He stole between $5 and $10 billion during his incumbency, and he lived extravagantly. He managed to stay in power for so long mainly due to external support. An alternative evaluation of his motives is that he was partly driven by other-regarding concerns in the very beginning of his incumbency and became extremely selfish after five or ten years. However, he engaged in personal corruption relatively early, which favors the interpretation that he was highly self-interested throughout his incumbency.

Harm: N
Please: N
Non-Minimal: N
Voluntary step-down: N
Income: N
Expert: Highly self-interested (maybe less in the very beginning of his incumbency).
Overall qualitative judgement: 1
Bayesian updating score: 0.05
Park Chung Hee (South Korea, 1961-1979)

South Korean President Park Chung Hee served the military for about twenty years before he took power in a coup d’état in 1961. After taking power, he claimed that he planned to restore the country by fighting poverty and creating well-being for the people and the country as well as building a strong national defense (H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, pp. 5, 12–13, 89; Lee, 2012, p. 20). However, he claimed that the military junta was important to restore the economy, security, and an administrative democracy (H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, p. 5). He promised to return the country to civilian rule after two years. Park decided to run in the election, and he won, although the elections were not considered free and fair at any time. After ten years in power, Park centralized power even more. During his incumbency, Park introduced land reforms and industrialized the country through investment in heavy and chemical industry (HCI), which was an important source of development (C. N. Kim, 2007, pp. 108–119; H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, pp. 95–106, 150–154). An important road to this outcome was that he created a strong state in which the bureaucracy was a meritocracy and many positions were filled by technocrats. This was also the case for the central political and economic advisors (C. N. Kim, 2007, pp. 105–109, 147–148; H.-A. Kim, 2004, pp. 76–78). Park was assassinated in 1979.

Park grew up in a poor rural family. He was very intelligent and hard working. Despite his poor background, he did well in school and became a teacher before he joined the military and became a major general (Lee, 2012, pp. 26–28, 38–39, 70, 171, 267–272; H. S. Stokes, 1979). Park is mainly known for his hard-handed centralization and for the rapid and resilient economic development of South Korea (H. S. Stokes, 1979).

**Ideology (proclaimed)**

Park was first of all a proclaimed nationalist. A strong national identity was at the core of his ideology. He was very clear that rapid economic development was the means to pulling the people out of poverty and to building a strong and independent national defense against North Korea and other external threats, including communism (C. N. Kim, 2007, pp. 101, 112, 133; H.-A. Kim, 2004, pp. 1, 70, 188; H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, pp. 12–13, 45, 95–106; Lee, 2012, pp. 216, 272–275; H. S. Stokes, 1979). Park often emphasized that the major enemies of the Korean society were poverty, communism, and corruption (H.-A. Kim, 2004, p. 73; H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, p. 102). His official priority of his goals was economic development, securing basic welfare, strengthening national power, sustaining national security, promoting democracy, and reunification (H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, pp. 95–106).
Winning Coalition

Parks’s winning coalition has to be assessed in two parts: the first part of his incumbency, 1961-72, when elections were held (although not free and fair); and the second part of his incumbency, 1972-79, the Yusin (reconstruction) period without elections and under martial law (P.-K. Kim & Vogel, 2011, pp. 5–8). In the first part of his incumbency, his winning coalition consisted of the rural population, who constituted his popular support (C. N. Kim, 2007, p. 107; H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, pp. 145–165; P.-K. Kim & Vogel, 2011, pp. 345–346), and of his ruling coalition, i.e., his government and the chaebols (the big businesses) whom Park relied on in his development project. Outside of the winning coalition was the urban population, especially the workers, whom he largely viewed as producers and instrumental to the development process (rather than people whose well-being should be prioritized) (H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, p. 13). Among Park’s political opponents were people who prioritized democracy, liberals, intellectuals, and students (H.-A. Kim, 2004, p. xiii; H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, pp. 99, 110). In the second part of his incumbency, during the Yusin period, Park centralized power, eliminated checks on the executive, and banned elections (C. N. Kim, 2007, pp. 131–134). These institutional changes narrowed his winning coalition. For instance, the need for support of the rural population is likely to have been reduced or completely eliminated. This was a large part of the population (56.5% in 1961 (H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, p. 146)), but it was not very strong and mobilized, as the transportational and communicational infrastructures were undeveloped (H. S. Stokes, 1979). With the centralization of power, his inner circle and the army were more important.

When Park came to power, South Korea was extremely poor, dependent on aid and on military defense against North Korea, and American support was extremely important (H. S. Stokes, 1979). The US was an external actor but can be viewed a part of Park’s winning coalition.

Park’s winning coalition was close to minimal as he aligned himself with the strongest part of society, the big business, and was forced to rely on the US for help, in particular in the beginning of his incumbency when South Korea was extremely aid dependent. In the first part of Park’s incumbency, he needed a broader support base, and the rural poor were a part of his winning coalition. Consequently, Park did not have a non-minimal winning coalition before or during the Yusin period.
Harming Groups Clearly Inside the Winning Coalition

Workers

In general, the policies implemented favored Park’s winning coalition, namely the chaebols and partly the rural population, and it harmed the urban workers. Park tried to secure a favorable investment climate for FDI by keeping wages and friction down, but this led to human suffering, dissatisfaction and resentment among the urban workers (H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, pp. 6, 122–144). This was also the case during the two economic crises under Park’s incumbency. The country recovered quickly from both, but the recovery was paid by the working class (H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, p. 4). Since the workers had very little power when Park took office, these moves made sense from a selfish perspective, but they were also consistent with his development ideology. Park was more liberal towards the workers before the Yusin period and allowed strikes and labor activism, but right before and during the Yusin period, he introduced major restrictions on workers’ political rights (H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, pp. 111, 122–144).

Park tried to increase the workers’ production and unity by mobilizing them ideologically through the narratives of nationalism and developmentalism, which is consistent with Park’s proclaimed desire and ideology (H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, p. 128). However, it can also be viewed as indoctrination as a means to demobilize the workers politically. Generally, the treatment of the workers was consistent with Park wanting to stay in power (as well as with his ideology), so this cannot be viewed as instances of harming his winning coalition.

Economic Policy

Economic development can create performance legitimacy, but investment was needed to provide economic development in South Korea, and this did not increase development in the short run. In a poor population, investment can be a very risky strategy, because surviving politically to enjoy the political benefits of the investment is not certain. In this light, the overall project of huge investments in big companies was a risky project because South Korea was almost bankrupt when Park took power. He was taking large loans to invest in POSCO (a large iron and steel company), and the people were very poor (H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, p. 48). Hence, in the first decade of his incumbency, when he held elections, his winning coalition was relatively large, so long-term investments were likely to spur dissatisfaction, especially among the poor, e.g., the rural population who was within his winning coalition (and of course the urban population). In fact, he won the three elections in his incumbency...
by only small margins (P.-K. Kim & Vogel, 2011, p. 141). However, his investment policies were perfectly consistent with his developmentalist ideology. Especially by the end of the 1960s, he had become very unpopular because he favored the big companies, focused too much on the industries, and took to large foreign loans instead of redistributing to the people (C. N. Kim, 2007, p. 111; H.-A. Kim, 2004, pp. 95, 117, 120–121). His economic policies definitely harmed the rural population, which was a large part of his winning coalition, and this is evidence of harming his winning coalition.

Rural Population

The heavy investment policies were risky and could make the major part of Park’s winning coalition, namely, the rural population (as well as the urban workers) dissatisfied, but the way he treated the rural population, specifically, is also difficult to explain assuming Park’s overall goal was to stay in power. He tried to modernize the rural sector and raise the spirit of the rural people several times, which is consistent with trying to stay in power. But the way he did it and the timing indicate that he was not (only) trying to gain political support. First, his strongest effort was during the Yusin period, when the rural population was least important to his power—probably completely outside his winning coalition. Moreover, the way he spoke about the rural population did not indicate he was trying to gain votes. He talked about wanting to pull them out of poverty, but he also talked about how the “traditional peasant consciousness” was an impediment to development (H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, p. 158). Therefore, parts of the “help” to the rural population was mental and focused on self-help. The material help such as straightening fields and improved irrigation was distributed top-down based on effort. The people who showed self-reliance, hard-work, and independence were prioritized (C. N. Kim, 2007, pp. 135–137; H.-A. Kim, 2004, pp. 133–139; H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, p. 152). The same principles were followed to choose recipients of support among companies (see below). Although these initiatives did not directly harm the rural population, resources could have been distributed more effectively among the rural population had the goal been political support and not economic development (ideology). This is (weak) evidence of Park harming his winning coalition.

Anti-Corruption

Park’s anti-corruption measures safeguarded the public funds from potentially greedy chaebols and the rest of his ruling coalition, and in this sense, these initiatives were inconsistent with power maximization. Anti-corruption initiatives could be viewed as pleasing the wider population, including the rural population, before the Yusin period (C. N. Kim, 2007, p. 70). But when his
winning coalition narrowed after he introduced the Yusin period, he did not become corrupt, although this was the optimal time for him and the elite to loot public funds had they been self-interested. Instead, implementation of the good-for-nothing (regarding staying in power) heavy and chemical industry (HCI) policies was top priority.

Another issue worth evaluating was Park’s treatment of the business. As with the support to the rural people, it was top-down and depending on performance. Only the firms that performed well and collaborated with the military junta (and later Park’s more or less civilian government) were supported. Park intervened heavily in the businesses and punished business leaders to increase their performance (H.-A. Kim, 2004, pp. 81-82; 115-116) or if they tried to enter politics (P.-K. Kim & Vogel, 2011, p. 11). Although he helped some businesses, he steered them with an iron first, and the ones that did not perform were not supported. That he only paid the companies that collaborated with the military junta can be viewed as an attempt to consolidate power; however, the performance criterion for support seems to be driven by ideology.

The Yusin Period: the Ruling Coalition

The introduction of the Yusin period was a move to narrow his winning coalition. He tightened control of the army, the police, the chaebol (big businesses), unions, workers, etc. (H.-A. Kim, 2004, pp. 139, 165–187, 207; H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, p. 36) and increased political oppression (H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, p. 36). The introduction of the Yusin period was consistent with staying in power since Park only marginally won the previous election, public support in the cities was declining, and social unrest was increasing, especially among urban workers (C. N. Kim, 2007, pp. 130–131; H.-A. Kim, 2004, pp. 124–126; H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, p. 110; H. S. Stokes, 1979).

However, it is also very consistent with his ideological aims of development. Instead of using his increased control to please the narrower winning coalition, the elite, to consolidate power, he used it to speed up industrialization and specifically implement the unpopular HCI policies (C. N. Kim, 2007, pp. 126–127; H.-A. Kim, 2004, p. xiii, 150-151; H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, pp. 6, 31). Park chose two technocrats to lead with him, the engineer O Wónch’öl and the economy professor Kim Chóngnyóm (H.-A. Kim, 2004, p. xiii, 118). He chose O Wónch’öl to run his economic development program rather than the free-market economists of his own Economic Planning Board (EPB). In this way, he secured the HCI policy was carried out effectively instead of a US-inspired economic agenda (H.-A. Kim, 2004, p. xiii). National security through HCI was officially declared the top priority (H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, p. 20). By issuing different decrees and laws, Park shielded
this set of policies from political interference, interference from big business and from his own party and elite (H.-A. Kim, 2004, p. xiii; H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, pp. 49–53). Documents, working agendas, etc. show how much the HCI policies were prioritized (H.-A. Kim, 2004, pp. 165–187). Moreover, the regime became increasingly repressive in the name of development (H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, p. 37). Park introduced mandatory teaching programs for all leaders in society, including business leaders, so they could teach the people the spirit of self-reliance, hard-work, and execution of the Yusin, so he basically tried to indoctrinate the people to support the Yusin project (H.-A. Kim, 2004, pp. 144–145, 165–187). This was risky, as he put his winning coalition on the sideline, and it was risky to give so much power and autonomy to his two co-leaders, the HCI bureaucracy and technocrats (H.-A. Kim, 2004, p. xiii; H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, pp. 27–28).

As several scholars mention, a strategic leader as Park had definitely known that introducing the Yusin period and focusing on the HCI program would reduce his chances of staying in power for long, because the HCI was generally very unpopular (C. N. Kim, 2007, p. 150; H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, pp. 31, 49–53; P.-K. Kim & Vogel, 2011, p. 31). He indicated that he was aware of this in a speech entitled “Spit on my grave”. In other words, he did not care about their opinion about the HCI project, and he would complete it for the sake of the nation (P.-K. Kim & Vogel, 2011, p. 31). As mentioned, the Yusin period radically increased anti-state protests (H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, pp. 27–28), and scholars agree that the HCI policy triggered the protests that led to the uprising and his assassination in 1979 (H.-A. Kim, 2004, pp. 147–149, 162; H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, pp. 7, 37).

The Relation to the United States

Although the United States cannot be considered a part of Park’s winning coalition in a traditional sense (since is it external), it can be treated analogously, as it was South Korea’s main protector and allied. However, Park’s relations the American leadership deteriorated during his incumbency. He did not follow the its economic advice, and introducing the Yusin period was a large step away from democracy. Moreover, Park invested in nuclear weapons (H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, p. 30). If Park had followed the Americans’ advice, Korea would not have experienced rapid industrialization (H.-A. Kim, 2004, pp. 5–6). This is not a strong observation against Park being mainly concerned with power, but it adds to the evidence because had Park not prioritized his ideological national project about building HCI, it might have been wiser to follow the American to a larger degree than he did.

Even if we disregard top-down modernization of the rural sector as an immediate harm to the rural population, there is still plenty of evidence that Park
on several occasions deliberately harmed his winning coalition as a trade-off for his ideological project, especially his behavior during the Yusin period. Thus, this implication is observed.

**Pleasing Groups Clearly Outside the Winning Coalition**

All Park’s policies were very consistent with his proclaimed beliefs: placing national goals over individual needs and prioritizing economic growth over redistribution. Park made an effort to increase the living standard of the people, especially the rural population (H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, p. 138), although it was very difficult because of a very bad infrastructure (H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, p. 162). This behavior is consistent with self-interest when it happened before the Yusin period when the rural population was a part of his winning coalition. During the Yusin period, the rural population should largely be considered outside Park’s winning coalition. His first attempt to modernize the rural sector and raising the standard of living was in 1963, and his second attempt was in 1968. However, there were no strong effects, and in 1970 he tried again by introducing the Saemaul Movement (New Village Movement), which was an even stronger effort to improve rural living conditions. However, it was based on a “swim-or-drown” logic (C. N. Kim, 2007, pp. 135–137; H.-A. Kim, 2004, pp. 133–139; H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, p. 152). Had he actually tried to please the rural population for popular support, it does not make sense that he kept spending resources on modernizing the rural sector and raising the standard of living after he introduced the Yusin period, since his need for this part of the population declined. In addition to straightening fields and improving irrigation, in this period, he increased rural electrification and road building (C. N. Kim, 2007, p. 136; H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, p. 158; H. S. Stokes, 1979). The New Village Movement also had large effects (C. N. Kim, 2007, pp. 135–137). Between 1970 and 1980, the income of the poorest farmers increased by 69%, and for the wealthiest by more than 100% (H.-A. Kim, 2004, p. 136). This is evidence of pleasing people largely outside the winning coalition. At least, we should expect that he would direct fewer resources towards rural population.

Although Park did largely treat the urban workers as production input and tried to reduce their political power during the Yusin period, he took some measures to improve their living conditions. He forced employers to implement company welfare programs, such as dormitories for workers, company savings, loan associations, scholarship programs. Park seemed to underestimate the size of the problems (bad working conditions). His and the government’s efforts to alleviate the problems were sporadic and inadequate (H.-A.
Kim & Sorensen, 2011, pp. 133–134). This could be a way to dampen the protests, but it is odd that these initiatives were mainly taken in the Yusin period when Park was most in control (although he was unpopular).

In sum, Park took measures to increase the living standards of the two large groups in society, also (especially for the workers) during the Yusin period, when he needed their support least. Improvement of rural and urban workers’ living conditions is aligned with increasing development. Therefore, I evaluate this implication observed.

**Voluntary Step-Down**

Park did not step down voluntarily because he died in power.

**Low Personal Income**

There is strong evidence that Park was not personally corrupt. He did not leave much to his daughter and other relatives, and in private, he and his wife did not wear expensive clothes. They lived very modestly (Lee, 2012, pp. 150–151). His regime and presidents succeeding him have been investigated several times, and almost surprisingly, nothing was found on Park and his two central advisors, O Wónch’ól and Kim Chóngnyóm, but widespread corruption and embezzlement among Park’s successors was found. In fact, the Park regime was found to have showed marked financial transparency during the Yusin period as well. Not only were they not corrupt; their personal wealth was low despite their important positions (H.-A. Kim, 2004, pp. 191–192). This is strong evidence against self-interest, since Park was subject to very few constraints during the last half of his incumbency, namely the Yusin period.

**Expert Assessments**

The Korean people is divided with regard to Park’s motives, especially a couple of decades ago (H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, pp. 85–87; Lee, 2012, pp. 1–2). On average, the perception of Park has changed dramatically over time. He was loathed by many when he was president and the following years because he prioritized economic development over the immediate well-being of the people (also due to his repressive methods). Today, there is a large degree of authoritarian nostalgia about him, called “The Park Syndrome”, because his economic achievements are in focus (H.-A. Kim, 2004, pp. 7–9; H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, p. 8).

Scholars are also divided on whether he was good or bad for the country, depending on their relative weight of economic development and human rights (H.-A. Kim & Sorensen, 2011, pp. 85–87; Lee, 2012, p. 4). However, most scholars agree that he strongly believed in his development project, and he was very nationalist and ideologically motivated (C. N. Kim, 2007, pp. 133,

Summary
In the case of Park, most implications are observed, except that he did not have a non-minimal winning coalition, and he died in power. There is strong evidence that he was ideologically motivated. He consistently followed his development ideology. The evidence is particularly strong because he kept making unpopular long-term investments even during the Yusin period when he was highly unconstrained. Moreover, he was not personally corrupt, nor did he have a particularly high income, even though he was highly unconstrained during the last half of his incumbency. The overall evaluation of Park is that he was strongly ideologically motivated. The expert assessments support this conclusion.

Harm: O
Please: O
Non-Minimal: N
Voluntary step-down: N
Income: O
Expert: Ideologically motivated

Overall qualitative judgement: 5
Bayesian updating score: 0.97
Souvanna Phouma (Laos, 1945-1975 with brief interruptions)

Souvanna Phouma, educated in architecture and electoral engineering in France and nephew of the Lao king (but not in line of succession (Sharkey, 1984)), was prime minister in Laos several times during the Cold War. After World War II, he and his half-brother Souphanouvong joined the Lao Issara (Free Laos) movement, and Souvanna became prime minister in the provisional Vientiane government. When the French reoccupied Laos (after Japanese rule), Souvanna fled to exile in Bangkok. He returned to Laos in 1949 to work for the government as France began conceding autonomy to Laos. In 1951, he became leader of the National Progressive Party and was elected prime minister. He was in office until 1954 when he was replaced but continued to work for the government as deputy prime and defense minister. In 1956, he was back as prime minister and formed at broad coalition government including both the Communist Pathet Lao (headed by Souvanna’s half-brother) and the right-wing military-royalists (headed by Souvanna’s cousin, Boun Oum). In 1958, he left office again, unable to form a government. He was ambassador in Europe for two years until he was reinstalled as prime minister after Captain Kong Le’s coup in 1960. Four months later, he was removed in a rightist countercoup and went into exile again, this time in Phonm Pehn, Cambodia. Souvanna negotiated peace between the Pathet Lao and the right wing and came back as prime minister in 1962. The peace collapsed in 1963, the leftists resorted to military violence, and another decade of civil war between the left and the right wing had begun. Souvanna tried to negotiate peace several times, and in 1974, he formed a new coalition government. However, the Pathet Lao had grown very strong, and as the Communists won power in Vietnam and Cambodia in 1975, the Pathet Lao made Souvanna resign and took power. Officially, he stayed as advisor for the government until his death in 1984 (Brown & Zasloff, 1986, p. 121; Lentz, 1994, pp. 499–500; Pace, 1984; Savada, 1994, p. xxxi; Sharkey, 1984; Young, 2016).

Souvanna is best known for his fight for Laotian neutrality in the ideological struggles in East Asia and his neutralist fight to unite left and right in the country (Pace, 1984; Young, 2016).

Ideology (proclaimed)

Souvanna’s main proclaimed ideological beliefs were to sustain Laotian independence by being neutralist as neighboring Cambodia and Burma and support neither the Communists (North Vietnam and China) nor the anti-Communists (South Vietnam and Thailand). Domestically, Souvanna’s main goal was national unity, which implied reconciliation between left and right
(Rantala, 1994, p. 33; Ratnam, 1980, pp. 122–124). However, he claimed to be more pro-West than pro-Communism (Dommen, 1971, p. 182).

**Winning Coalition**

Due to both internal and external factors, it is difficult to say who Souvanna’s winning coalition consisted of. The country was more or less constantly in civil war from 1953 to 1975 (Great Britain. Central Office of Information. Reference Division., 1970, pp. 53–57). This was also a proxy war between the United States and the Soviet Union, and between Lao Communists and the anti-Communist neighbors (Brown & Zasloff, 1986, p. 96; Ratnam, 1980, pp. 131–132; Savada, 1994, pp. 62–63; Young, 2016). External factors were not only important because of security issues; Laos was also heavily dependent on aid (Great Britain. Central Office of Information. Reference Division., 1970, pp. 53–57; Ratnam, 1980, p. v, 131-135).

In the 1950s, the right wing is likely to have been the strongest, as it defended the royalist status quo and enjoyed the support of the army. None of this changed over time. Crucially, however, the people were not strongly against the right wing at this time, at least they were not mobilized. Increasingly over time, especially during the 1960s, the masses started supporting the left more than the right (Ratnam, 1980, p. 151). An indication is that in 1965, the middle class was elected into the National Assembly, removing some of the old elite. These new members were not specifically left or right wing but simply dissatisfied with the power of the old elite (Ratnam, 1980, pp. 127–129). While the right wing lost support, the left wing ran Communist campaigns that worked, and they grew stronger (Brown & Zasloff, 1986, pp. 59–60, 96), although the king stayed popular, especially among the peasants (Brown & Zasloff, 1986, p. 153). In this sense, Souvanna’s winning coalition can said to have shifted from right to left over time, as the left grew stronger. Another factor in this shift was that the United States strongly supported the right wing until 1960 (Brown & Zasloff, 1986, p. 64; Dommen, 1971, pp. 110–111, 182; Ratnam, 1980, p. 25) when the right wing staged a coup against Souvanna, civil war started, and John F. Kennedy was elected president. After 1960, the US supported Souvanna and the neutralists instead (Dommen, 1971, pp. 200–228), and in the beginning of the 1970s, the US was on its way out of Indochina (Savada, 1994, p. 72).

Until 1960, the rightist royal army was also a part of Souvanna’s winning coalition. But after 1960, Kong Le’s neutralist army became an important factor, and the leftist military groups (supported by the North Vietnamese) grew increasingly stronger. Hence, there was no longer only one army or important military group (Brown & Zasloff, 1986, pp. 70–101).
Until 1960, Souvanna’s winning coalition was the right-wing army, the old elite, and the royalists (and the neutralists), whereas the balance started shifting around 1960, and at the end of the 1960s, the winning coalition contained the left wing and the neutralists. As there was no power vacuum when Souvanna came to power and, thus, no alternative to these constellations, he cannot be said to have chosen a non-minimal winning coalition.

**Harming Groups Clearly Inside the Winning Coalition**

Souvanna’s continuous attempts to include both the left wing and the right wing in his government at the same time is mainly evidence of pleasing groups outside his winning coalition, as will be discussed in the next section. Yet, the attempts to include the left wing before 1961 are also evidence of harming groups inside his winning coalition. The reason is that it strongly provoked the United States and the right wing and ultimately caused his own government to break down.

Both in 1956 (Brown & Zasloff, 1986, p. 61; Savada, 1994, p. 37) and in 1958 (Dommen, 1971, pp. 110–111), Souvanna tried to include the Pathet Lao in the government (that already consisted of neutralist and right wing), and the United States did not approve. Especially in 1958, this resulted in strong pressure. The price of trying to include the left was that Souvanna’s government broke down because other factions took advantage of the crisis (Dommen, 1971, pp. 110–111).

Also in 1960, he tried to form a broad government including Pathet Lao, although he could have had a sustainable government comprising the right wing and neutralists. After the neutralist coup in 1960, Souvanna insisted on settling with ousted cabinet members and getting approval by the king (Le Kong was not keen on this at first). Moreover, he wanted both the left and the right wing to come together to end the civil war. He tried to negotiate with both parts in turn, but neither was very cooperative. The right wing radicalized in the process (Brown & Zasloff, 1986, pp. 74–75; Dommen, 1971, pp. 148–153, 156–165; Savada, 1994, p. 47). The cooperation with the left wing went strongly against American interests, and they suspended their aid as punishment and made the anti-Communist Thai put up a food and fuel blockade. When the US denied making the Thai lift their blockade, Souvanna turned to the Soviet Union for help. He did not change course although he received more economic threats from the US (realizing this, the US resumed their aid) (Brown & Zasloff, 1986, pp. 76–77; Ratnam, 1980, pp. 25, 29). In 1961, Souvanna officially said that he was a non-Communist, but that being pro-West does not mean pro-American. He claimed that the American did not understand Laos (Dommen, 1971, p. 182). As the US was a part of Souvanna’s winning coalition, this anti-American and anti-right wing behavior can be viewed
as evidence of harming groups inside his winning coalition. Souvanna’s choice about inclusion is highly consistent with his ideological belief about national reconciliation and neutrality, but had he wanted to stay in power, it had been more prudent not to try to include the left (at this point in time).

Another example of Souvanna harming his winning coalition was when he reduced the size of the armed forces in 1960, as a part of a military reform (Ratnam, 1980, p. 79). This only affected the government army (although it was right wing). This behavior is very difficult to explain, assuming that Souvanna was motivated by staying in power. Sometimes, leaders may reduce the military because they are afraid of a coup d’état (although the opposite has also been argued for). This explanation is not valid in this case because several other paramilitary groups had the capacity to stage a coup. Instead, his behavior is consistent with a neutralist aim to cut down on the army.

Based on these pieces of evidence, I conclude that there are instances of Souvanna clearly harming his winning coalition consistent with his proclaimed neutralist ideology.

**Pleasing Groups Clearly Outside the Winning Coalition**

The core of Souvanna’s behavior, namely, continuously opting for a broad coalition is also strong evidence of pleasing groups clearly outside his winning coalition. As mentioned, Souvanna tried to include both the left and the right wing during until 1960, although he could have sustained a coalition without the left wing. Yet, also after 1960, when the balance started shifting, he kept working to create and sustain a government coalition that included neutralists, the Communist Pathet Lao as well as the right wing (Dommen, 1971, p. 253; Savada, 1994, p. 60). Hence, Souvanna attempted to create broad coalitions even though his power was likely to be much better secured by choosing side.

Another example of Souvanna being consistent with his neutralist ideology is when he simultaneously sent identical requests to the US and the Soviet Union for aid in the mid-1960s (Dommen, 1971, p. 234). However, this cannot be interpreted as pleasing groups outside or harming groups inside his winning coalition; especially not at this point in time, when the balance between left and right was relatively even. Despite this, the consistent attempts to create and sustain broad coalition governments is strong evidence that Souvanna pleased groups clearly outside his winning coalition. Thus, this implication is observed.

**Voluntary Step-Down**

Souvanna promised to retire in 1976 and, thus, not run in the elections (Ratnam, 1980, p. 141). This may be explained by the fact that he suffered a
serious heart attack in 1974 (Brown & Zasloff, 1986, p. 111), and hence, it cannot be evaluated as a voluntary step down (although he lived for a decade after). Moreover, he was already ousted in a coup in 1975, for which reason we cannot be sure that he would actually had stepped down in 1976.

Because Souvanna left power several times, it is necessary to assess his earlier step-downs as well. On April 17, 1964, Souvanna resigned—or at least said he would (Brown & Zasloff, 1986, p. 91; Savada, 1994, p. 59)—because the tripartite negotiations had once again fallen apart. The Pathet Lao had left the government, and the civil war was raging (Brown & Zasloff, 1986, p. 91; Dommen, 1971, p. 261; Savada, 1994, p. 59). He resigned saying that he has failed to secure national unity, and he was arrested upon resignation (Brown & Zasloff, 1986, p. 91; Dommen, 1971, p. 260; Savada, 1994, p. 59). The right wing staged a coup attempt in the power vacuum (Dommen, 1971, pp. 260–261) (the coup had been planned for some time (Dommen, 1971, pp. 266–267)). However, it was only a coup attempt, and the US pressured Souvanna to return. After negotiations, they reinstalled him (Dommen, 1971, p. 267), and he survived politically (Brown & Zasloff, 1986, pp. 91–92). Only a month later, Souvanna threatened the Americans that he would resign again because he wanted them to stop bombing the Pathet Lao (who had left the government) (Dommen, 1971, pp. 273–274). Yet, this may not have been a credible threat and cannot be counted as evidence. But the first resignation can. The fact that he was arrested speaks indicates that this was not just a play to the gallery. Based on this, I conclude that voluntary step-down is partly observed.

Low Personal Income

History books and obituaries do not discuss whether Souvanna was corrupt, but several times they describe the old (right wing) elite as well as former politicians as corrupt and the political system as permeated by a feudal culture (Ratnam, 1980, p. 127; Savada, 1994, p. 72). Also it is underscored that, when right-wing General Phoumi Nosavan came to power in 1959, corruption rose to alarming levels, which eroded his and his government’s legitimacy (Gacek, 1994, p. 160). The fact that politicians and leaders other than Souvanna were corrupt, while there is no mentioning of Souvanna being implicated, indicates that he was not outright corrupt.

Kong Le’s coup was conducted in the name of anti-corruption, ending the civil war, and securing neutrality (Brown & Zasloff, 1986, p. 74). However, this piece of evidence is weak as anti-corruption arguments would be a likely road to legitimacy in the light of Phoumi Nosavan’s corrupt regime (although corruption had historically pervaded politics).
Another weak piece of evidence of Souvanna not being corrupt was that, in 1964, the Radio Pathet Lao called Souvanna a traitor, a tool for the Americans, and capitulationist to discredit him (Brown & Zasloff, 1986, p. 94; Savada, 1994, p. 60). They could have called him corrupt if he had been, but they did not. However, they had not finally given up working with him, so perhaps charging him with corruption would have been an imprudent attack.

In addition to not appearing corrupt, Souvanna does not appear to have been rich either, although he was royal. First, there was a sharp divide between the royal family and the vice-royal branch, and Souvanna was in the latter (Dommen, 1971, pp. 174, 332). Second, as mentioned, he worked in the public works after returning from education in France. When he was in exile in Bangkok in 1946, he lived modestly. He worked for a Thai electric company, and his wife started a silk business to provide for their kids (Brown & Zasloff, 1986, p. 42; Dommen, 1971, pp. 27–28). During his retirement, he lived in a “comfortable villa” with a small personal staff in Laos, and he played bridge every weekend (Brown & Zasloff, 1986, pp. 152–155). This appears to be a decent but not extravagant lifestyle.

Nothing suggests that Souvanna had a high income or extracted a lot of money for himself and his family, but there is not much positive direct evidence of him not doing it either. For this reason, I evaluate the implication as being only partly observed and only assign half weight to this implication.

**Expert Assessments**

Many scholars and commentators suggest that Souvanna was a patriot who cared for and had a vision for the country’s political future (Brown & Zasloff, 1986, p. 55; Pace, 1984; Rantala, 1994, pp. 62–63; Ratnam, 1980, pp. 77–78; Sharkey, 1984), and he was an important person in Laotian history (Sharkey, 1984). One even claims directly that Souvanna sought no personal glory in return for working hard to keep his country neutral and stable (Ratnam, 1980, pp. 62–63). Other scholars argue that he truly wanted to end the civil war and obtain reconciliation between the left and the right, but leave the end goal implicit and vague (Brown & Zasloff, 1986, pp. 103, 131; Ratnam, 1980, pp. 100–101; Savada, 1994, p. 47). Since they do not explicitly discuss the end goal it could in principle be staying in power in a stable country. Therefore, this type of evidence is weaker.

Not many people accused Souvanna of being self-interested. Some of the exiled right-wing leaders later accused him of being self-serving (Brown & Zasloff, 1986, p. 133), but most of them accused him of giving in to his brother

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[^64]: Consistent with being ideologically motivated, Souvanna also wrote political and economic ideas for the future Laos at that point in time (Dommen, 1971, p. 28).
and the left wing in the end (Brown & Zasloff, 1986, pp. 133, 154) indicating that he believed in neutralism, but only gave up the fight at the very end (which can be explained by his heart attack).

Summarizing, most experts and even some of Souvanna’s enemies indicate—more or less strongly—that he cared about the country, and he believed in neutralism and unity because he believed it to be best for Laos.

Summary
In the case of Souvanna, most implications of ideological motivation are observed. He consistently tried to create national unity, despite the ongoing civil war, by fighting for a broad-based government including both the left and the right. It would have been much safer to choose sides. Moreover, he voluntarily stepped down but was persuaded to return to power. Expert assessments support the conclusion that he was strongly ideologically motivated.

Harm: O
Please: O
Non-Minimal: N
Voluntary step-down: (O)
Income: (O)
Expert: Ideologically motivated (nothing indicates that he was not; only one author directly and explicitly claims that he cared about the nation and not himself).

Overall qualitative judgement: 5
Bayesian updating score: 0.97
Josip Broz Tito ruled Yugoslavia for 35 years from 1945 until 1980 and died in power (Carter, 1990, p. 1; Ognjenovi & Jozelic, 2016, pp. x–xi; Reuters, 1980a). He was president for life from 1974 (Anderson, 1980; Reuters, 1980a). Tito was originally a communist but called it socialism to distinguish the ideology from Soviet communism (Anderson, 1980; Carter, 1990, p. 1; Reuters, 1980a). Internationally, he stood hard on non-alignment together with Nehru (India) and Nasser (Egypt) (Anderson, 1980; Carter, 1990, pp. 1, 31; Nissen, 1976, p. 61; Reuters, 1980a). Tito was a proponent of nationalism but in an inclusionary form; he wanted to unite the country across ethnic differences (Binder, 1980; Carter, 1990, p. vii; Reuters, 1980a). Although his regime was highly repressive towards political opponents (Anderson, 1980; Carter, 1990, p. 34; Ognjenovi & Jozelic, 2016, p. ix), it is known for its relative openness towards the West compared to other Eastern European communist regimes (Doder, 1980; Ognjenovi & Jozelic, 2016, pp. 67–68).

Tito was part Croat and part Slovene and born into a relatively poor rural family. He left school early, switched between drift jobs, and worked as a metal worker for a long time (Anderson, 1980; Bender, 1980; Carter, 1990, pp. 3–10; Doder, 1980; Hanes, Hanes, & Baker, 2004, pp. 444–445). He joined the Yugoslav Communist Party more than twenty years before he came to power (Carter, 1990, p. 7; Doder, 1980). In 1937, he became leader of the highly factionalized Yugoslav Communist Party (Binder, 1980; Carter, 1990, pp. 14–17; Ognjenovi & Jozelic, 2016, p. 78). During the 1920s and 1930s, he lived a risky life as a guerilla and revolutionary travelling different countries to fight for socialism (Auty, 1974, p. 11; Carter, 1990, pp. 9–10, 32). He was imprisoned many times, one time five years in a row, but it did not stop him from fighting (Anderson, 1980; Binder, 1980; Carter, 1990, pp. 3–10; Doder, 1980; Hanes et al., 2004, pp. 444–445; Maclean, 1980, pp. 118–119). During the Second World War, he fought underground against the Nazis for Yugoslavian independence (Anderson, 1980; Doder, 1980; Reuters, 1980a), and Hitler even put a price on his head as an illegal communist organizer in Yugoslavia (Binder, 1980).

Tito was generally popular during his incumbency and has as a largely positive legacy in Yugoslavia (Auty, 1974, p. 338; Nissen, 1976, p. 62; Ognjenovi & Jozelic, 2016, p. xi). He was liked for his non-alignment policies; his relatively liberal socialism that, at least for a while, led to improved living standards; and not at least his attempt to unite Yugoslavia across strong ethnic and national cleavages (Doder, 1980; Reuters, 1980a).


**Ideology (proclaimed)**

The overall proclaimed ideological purpose of Tito’s regime was to create Yugoslav “brotherhood and unity”, which was also what he claimed to be fighting for before coming to power (Binder, 1980; Ognjenovic & Jozelic, 2016, p. viii, 7). However, he also claimed to fight for socialism and improved standards of living through national self-management and non-alignment (Hanes et al., 2004, p. 444; Ognjenovic & Jozelic, 2016, p. viii, 3).

After Tito’s fallout with Stalin three years after he entered power, the claims about socialism contained decentralization and more free market forces than upon Tito’s inauguration, and the distinction from Soviet communism became clear (Anderson, 1980; Carter, 1990, p. 28; Doder, 1980). How much of this was changes in actual beliefs and how much was adaptation to circumstances is unclear.

**Winning Coalition**

Tito’s regime was a one-party regime, and his power was built around support from the party. Therefore, a large part of the party, at minimum the leadership, can be viewed as being a part of his winning coalition. It also seems that he, at least indirectly, depended on the support of the people (Maclean, 1980, p. 120), especially the workers’ because the party depended on it. Generally, Tito had strong support from the party leadership throughout his rule (Djilas, 1981, p. 8), and, as mentioned, he was generally popular among the people as well.

The military must also have been a part of his winning coalition, as in all other autocracies. However, due to the legacy of his underground efforts during the Second World War, he did not need to buy them off as frequently as might be necessary in other regimes (Djilas, 1981, p. 57).

External actors were also important for Tito’s power. Given the geographic size and location of Yugoslavia and the Soviet impact on independence at the end the Second World War, Soviet support was crucial. It may even be that Tito needed support from fewer people from the population and less backing in the army if he had solid Soviet support. Not having Soviet support would create a huge threat to the regime. In this sense, the Soviet leadership was a part of Tito’s winning coalition.

Generally, Tito’s winning coalition was broad. It resembles Gierek’s a lot, and like Gierek’s, Tito’s winning coalition may have been non-minimal: with substantial reliance on Soviet support, the people, the national army, and perhaps even the party may have been less important. This is clearer in the case of Tito, but since this assessment is far from certain, I conclude that Tito did probably have a non-minimal winning coalition, so this implication is partly observed.
Harming Groups Clearly Inside the Winning Coalition

Consolidating Power

Tito was hard on political opponents and dissidents, and his regime used targeted repression from the very beginning (Anderson, 1980; Carter, 1990, p. 34; Ognjenovi & Jozelic, 2016, p. ix). Especially in the early years, he ruled by fear and force (Doder, 1980), but he and the regime still managed to build a personality cult around him (Djilas, 1981, p. 123; Ognjenovi & Jozelic, 2016, p. ix, 2). As will be discussed below, he implemented many popular policy initiatives, which consolidated his power, helped him build a winning coalition and remove contenders. Over time, he removed two of his three most central supporters because they disagreed with his political line. One wanted democratization, and the other was against decentralization (Doder, 1980). Tito’s removal of these people can be viewed as instances of harming his winning coalition while acting according to his ideological beliefs. Djilas, who wanted democratization, said that he and Tito parted due to ideological discrepancies (Djilas, 1981, p. 5), not because Tito saw him as a contender for power. Getting rid of his old friends and inner circle seems to be an instance of harming his winning coalition to protect his ideological goals, but it could also be a way to further centralize power. Yet, the third of his very close associates, whom he did not remove, might have been a potential successor although he was old. He died from natural causes a year before Tito (Doder, 1980; Maclean, 1980, p. 106).

Risky Non-Alignment Moves

The clearest example of Tito harming his winning coalition was when he fell out with Joseph Stalin. Tito refused to take orders from him (Anderson, 1980; Doder, 1980; Hanes et al., 2004, pp. 446–448; Maclean, 1980, pp. 90–95; Reuters, 1980a). This was a deliberately choice by Tito in the name of non-alignment and national pride, that is, in line with his proclaimed ideological aims. Historians and biographers agree that this was a very risky move (Anderson, 1980; Binder, 1980; Carter, 1990, p. 27; Hanes et al., 2004, pp. 446–448). It had consequences in the form of economic blockade and a Soviet-sponsored assassination attempt on Tito (Carter, 1990, p. 27). This did not make Tito “fall into line”. He chose to discuss domestic problems with other Eastern European leaders without involving the Soviet Union, which further provoked Stalin (Maclean, 1980, p. 90). He never made up with Stalin, and although he was on better terms with Nikita Khrushchev, he deliberately supported Hungary in a strife with the Soviet leadership in 1956. In 1968, Tito supported the Czech Republic in modernizing communism, again directly against the will of the Soviet leadership, but consistent with Tito’s proclaimed

Tito turned gradually to the West after his fallout with Stalin (Anderson, 1980; Doder, 1980; Maclean, 1980, pp. 95–96) and managed to achieve a considerable amount of foreign aid (Anderson, 1980; Doder, 1980; Hanes et al., 2004, p. 448). However, Tito was not popular in the West after coming to power although he was a war hero. He was leaning too much towards the Soviet Union and communism (Maclean, 1980, pp. 89–90). On the other hand, his investment in heavy industry did not please the Soviet leadership, since it made Yugoslavia more economically independent (Maclean, 1980, pp. 89–90). Thus, Tito did not do much to please either the East or the West. His non-alignment course was very risky, especially compared to aligning entirely with the Soviet Union. Over time, Tito became increasingly popular in the West, as Yugoslavia opened up despite its adherence to socialism.

Tito’s non-alignment course generally seems to be a clear example of harming the external, and perhaps strongest, part of his winning coalition, namely the Soviet Union. One caveat is that Tito’s popularity at home strongly increased as his policy succeeded (Doder, 1980). But as mentioned, it was a huge risk to take, both politically and personally, and support from the Soviet Union seems to have been more important than support from the people.

**Domestic Policies**

Right after Tito came to power, he acted upon his promise about increasing living standards. Already in 1946, he presented an ambitious five-year plan to industrialize Yugoslavia. He invested in heavy industry to increase living standards and self-sufficiency. His strategy was nationalization of both industry and agriculture (Carter, 1990, p. 26; Maclean, 1980, p. 89). He met quite a lot of resistance regarding the latter because collectivization was highly unpopular, but he negotiated a deal with the peasants (Maclean, 1980, p. 89).

A few years later, Tito departed from the strong focus on nationalization and started building a mixed economy that included space for free market forces and decentralization (Anderson, 1980; Doder, 1980; Hanes et al., 2004, p. 448; Maclean, 1980, pp. 99–105). At the end of his rule, there were no state-owned enterprises in Yugoslavia (Maclean, 1980, p. 121). He also opened the borders and allowed Yugoslavs to travel freely, even to the West (Doder, 1980; Ognjenovi & Jozelic, 2016, pp. 67–68).

Generally, Tito’s economic policies were highly consistent with his proclaimed ideology (Ognjenovi & Jozelic, 2016, p. 3). He succeeded in raising living standards (Anderson, 1980; Doder, 1980; Ognjenovi & Jozelic, 2016, pp. 28–31), mainly through socialist means. However, it is unclear whether the switch from fundamental socialism to “market socialism” (Doder, 1980)
was an effect of sincere change in beliefs or adaptation to circumstances. The hardcore nationalization and Marxist initiatives alienated many people, including the middle class (Anderson, 1980), and the fallout with Stalin made it easier to depart from fundamental socialism, which would also please the West.

Although the economic policies increased living standards and economic growth, at least until the 1970s, Tito faced a political problem: reconciling authoritarianism and economic liberalization and decentralization (Maclean, 1980, pp. 98–99). This may have been one of the reasons for the break with his close associate, Djilas. In addition to economic policies, Tito took measures to enhance national unity, which strongly increased his popularity (Anderson, 1980).

Generally, the domestic policies increased Tito’s popularity among the people and remained largely consistent with his proclaimed ideological aims. Therefore, it is difficult to evaluate his core motivation based on these. Still, I conclude that there is substantial evidence of him harming groups clearly inside his winning coalition due to his very risky defiance of the Soviet leadership almost throughout his incumbency.

**Pleasing Groups Clearly Outside the Winning Coalition**

As mentioned, Tito’s winning coalition was very broad, so not many people (in Yugoslavia) were clearly outside the winning coalition. Tito pleased the people by increasing living standards and by succeeding in his non-alignment strategy. But since a large part of the people were in his winning coalition, this is no clear instance of pleasing groups outside his winning coalition. Therefore, this implication is not observed.

**Voluntary Step-Down**

Since Tito died in power, he did not step down voluntarily.

**Low Personal Income**

Tito did not appear to have a low or even moderate personal income. He lived a luxurious life and owned several houses, cars, yachts, airplanes and a private island (Anderson, 1980; Auty, 1974, p. 338; Doder, 1980; Nissen, 1976, p. 61). Nevertheless, there is some disagreement here, as some authors point out that he lived in a suburban villa most of his incumbency (Djilas, 1981, p. 123; Maclean, 1980, p. 115). Another argues that Tito liked to live well but did not live in excess compared to other heads of state (Auty, 1974, p. 338). However, the opposite has been argued as well (Doder, 1980). Either way, it is not possible to conclude that Tito had a low or moderate income. Therefore, this implication is not observed. Still, Tito was atypical as he was very hard-working.
(Auty, 1974, p. 339; Djilas, 1981, pp. 126–127), he does not seem to have been involved in embezzlement (there is no mention of this in the case material), and he did not leave wealth or positions for his family (Auty, 1974, p. 340; Zimonjic, 2010).

**Expert Assessments**

So far, the evidence of Tito’s motives is very diverse. He clearly ran high risks throughout his life, also during his incumbency. It appears that he jeopardized his power for ideological goals, but he clearly liked the benefits of power. These conclusions are supported by expert assessments, which seem to agree that he was strongly ideologically motivated and ready to die for his visions and ideas for the Yugoslavian people (Anderson, 1980; Auty, 1974, pp. 337–338, 342–344; Binder, 1980; Carter, 1990, p. 24; Djilas, 1981, pp. 5, 48–49; Doder, 1980; Maclean, 1980, pp. 88, 119; Nissen, 1976, p. 60; Ognjenović & Jozelic, 2016, p. 3; Swain, 2011, pp. 1–3), but several point out that he also liked power a lot (Auty, 1974, p. 338; Carter, 1990, p. 34; Djilas, 1981, pp. 48–49, 135–136, 179; Zimonjic, 2010).

**Summary**

Tito was definitely highly ideologically motivated, since he risked his life and power several times for his ideological goals, but he also clearly enjoyed power and living well. Already before he came to power, he risked his life for his beliefs, and even when he was safe in power, he still played a very risky game. The non-alignment course was generally high risk. The evidence in favor of Tito being largely self-interested is that he lived a luxurious life, although he was hard-working. His actions were highly aligned with his ideological aims, also sometimes at increased risk of losing power. Moreover, there is no evidence of Tito engaging in self-enrichment except for his expensive living, nor did his family inherit anything. The conclusion is to place Tito between the middle and the ideologically motivated end of the motivation scale. Thus, he is assessed as predominantly ideologically motivated and as a dictator who really enjoyed power and luxury.

Harm: O
Please: N
Non-Minimal: (O)
Voluntary step-down: N
Income: N
Expert: Definitely ideologically motivated, but also definitely enjoyed power.

Overall qualitative judgement: 4
Bayesian updating score: 0.60

Sources
Unlike many of the other case studies, the case study of Tito is predominantly based on biographies (thus, not many general history books).
Touré, Amadou (Mali, 1991-1992)

General Amadou Toumani Touré ruled Mali for slightly more than a year from 1991 to 1992 (Baxter, 2002; Cold-Ravnkilde, 2013, p. 29; East & Thomas, 2003, p. 337; Hagberg & Körling, 2012, p. 113; Reuters, 2016; USAID, 2014, p. 2; Wing, 2008, p. 8). He took power in a military coup d’état and removed the military strongman Moussa Traoré, who had been in power for more than 20 years (Baxter, 2002; Cold-Ravnkilde, 2013, p. 29; Reuters, 2016; USAID, 2014, p. 2; Wing, 2008, p. 8). Touré created a democratic constitution with multiparty elections and a limit of two terms. He abstained from running (Baxter, 2002; Cold-Ravnkilde, 2013, p. 29; DiPiazza, 2006, p. 35; Hagberg & Körling, 2012, p. 113; Reuters, 2016; USAID, 2014, p. 2; Wing, 2008, p. 8) and stepped down in 1992 to hand over power to a democratically elected civilian government.

Touré was educated in the armed forces and had been employed there for many years before he took power in 1991 (Baxter, 2002; East & Thomas, 2003, pp. 337–338). He had received elite military training in the Soviet Union and France (Baxter, 2002). After he handed over power in 1992, he continued in the armed forced and headed several peace-keeping missions for the United Nations in Africa (Baxter, 2002; East & Thomas, 2003, p. 338). Moreover, he ran a children’s charity (Baxter, 2002; East & Thomas, 2003, p. 338). In 2002, he returned to politics; he was democratically elected and stayed for almost two terms before he was ousted in a coup d’état a month before his tenure ended (Cold-Ravnkilde, 2013, p. 18; DiPiazza, 2006, p. 36; East & Thomas, 2003, p. 338; Hagberg & Körling, 2012, pp. 113–114; USAID, 2014, pp. 2, 21–22). By 2012, he had become highly unpopular because of lost control over rebels in the north of the country, and due to the government and state bureaucracy being corrupt and mismanaging state affairs (Cold-Ravnkilde, 2013, pp. 13–14, 18; USAID, 2014, pp. 21–22). Since 1992, and until some point during his second incumbency, Touré has been viewed as a national democratic hero. He is still known as the person who democratized Mali (which had only experienced power transfers in coup d’états) (Baxter, 2002; Cold-Ravnkilde, 2013, p. 17; DiPiazza, 2006, p. 35; Hagberg & Körling, 2012, pp. 113–114; Wing, 2008, p. 8).

Since Mali is considered democratic in the 2002-2012 period, this part of Touré’s incumbency is outside the scope of the study. Unfortunately, most source material concerns this period since it was the longest, and the first period was very brief. It is mainly the democratization process in 1991 and 1992 that is described regarding Touré’s first incumbency. This was probably also one of the only political initiatives taken in the period, since his first incum-
bency was brief. Therefore, this case study relies on relatively little information compared to the other case studies, and the conclusions are more uncertain than for most of the other case studies.

**Ideology (proclaimed)**

When Touré took power in 1991, his sole proclaimed aim (or ideology) was to pull the army out of politics and to install democracy (DiPiazza, 2006, pp. 34–35; The Associated Press, 1991; USAID, 2014, p. 2).

**Winning Coalition**

The red berets, a military group, were clearly a part of Touré’s winning coalition. They were his supporters in taking power (Cold-Ravnkilde, 2013, p. 14; Hagberg & Körling, 2012, p. 120). Broader support from the army was necessary since the former regime was also a military dictatorship. Thus, the military was used to playing an important role in politics. It is unclear whether the military was enough to comprise the winning coalition, or whether he needed civilian support as well. Although Traoré’s regime was very unpopular, it had not been overthrown before, which indicates that the military needed to be involved in the overthrow and was if not the only, then at least the main part of the winning coalition. Moreover, it does not seem to have been possible to construct an alternative winning coalition, and it can be concluded that Touré did have a minimal winning coalition, implying that the observable implication of the presence of a non-minimal winning coalition is not observed.

**Harming Groups Clearly Inside the Winning Coalition**

Throughout his incumbency, Touré worked for changing the constitution and implementing democratic elections (Baxter, 2002; Hagberg & Körling, 2012, p. 113; USAID, 2014, p. 2; Wing, 2008, p. 75). There is no evidence that he secured the interests of the military in any way in the process. He basically gave up power, which definitely harmed his winning coalition (given that they wanted to stay in power).

As indicated in the discussion of his winning coalition, it appears that he was not under severe pressure to democratize. Mali had only experienced military coups since independence, so democracy was completely new (Baxter, 2002; DiPiazza, 2006, p. 35; Hagberg & Körling, 2012, p. 113; Reuters, 2016; USAID, 2014, pp. 1–2; Wing, 2008, p. 8). There was pro-democracy pressure in the population and among parts of the civilian elite (The Associated Press, 1991; USAID, 2014, p. 2), but it may not have been strong enough to unseat Touré since it was not strong enough to unseat Traoré. Therefore, I conclude that Touré deliberately harmed his winning coalition in order to democratize consistent with his proclaimed aim.
Pleasing Groups Clearly Outside the Winning Coalition

During his incumbency, Touré tried to implement democratic norms in the assembly, despite unfamiliarity with these among the Malians. For instance, he put an effort into making people discuss with each other instead of speaking to him as the authority (Wing, 2008, p. 75). He invited ordinary citizens to participate in the discussions, also regarding the drafting of the new constitution (USAID, 2014, p. 2; Wing, 2008, p. 75). This is highly consistent with his proclaimed democratic purpose; and since the Malian people did not expect this involvement, and they were not a part of his winning coalition, this initiative appears to be an instance of pleasing groups outside his winning coalition. However, it is only one minor instance, so I only evaluate this implication to be partly observed.

Voluntary Step-Down

Touré created a democratic constitution with multiparty elections and did not run in the election himself. As discussed, he probably had the chance to stay by force since he was relatively shielded from public pressure as long as he was backed by the military. Therefore, I conclude that he stepped down voluntarily to hand over power to a democratically elected civilian government.

Low Personal Income

There is no evidence that Touré had a high personal income during his first incumbency, nor is there strong evidence of the opposite. After stepping down, he kept working hard (in the armed forces and with children’s charity) (Baxter, 2002; East & Thomas, 2003, p. 338). This indicates that he needed to work for money, so he had not taken large amounts with him when he left office. On the other hand, in an interview in 2002, a Malian citizen explains that she does not understand why he wants to re-enter politics since he is a national hero, he is doing good humanitarian work, and he has money (Baxter, 2002). The money she refers to does not need to stem from his time as incumbent since he seems to have had well-paid jobs afterwards. Moreover, she may not refer to large amounts of money, just more money than ordinary, very poor Malians had (and who might enter politics for money). Had Touré been involved in embezzlement or cultivated a lavish lifestyle indicating a high income during his incumbency, this is likely to have been reported, and he might not have been deemed a national hero. Since none of this has been the case, and since he returned to non-political hard work afterwards, he probably did have a low or moderate personal income during his incumbency. But due to the uncertainty of the evaluation of this implication, I deem it only partly observed.
**Expert Assessments**

So far, the evidence strongly suggests that Touré was ideologically motivated in the sense that he really wanted to democratize. The experts largely agree on this interpretation. The leader of the civilian pro-democracy activists said in 1991 that he was convinced that Touré and the other coup plotters intended to implement civilian and democratic rule and did not want stay in power (The Associated Press, 1991). The same assessment is given by academic scholars (Hagberg & Körling, 2012, p. 113). In 2002, a Malian journalist indicated that Touré is not like the former president in the sense that he means what he says (implicitly that he sticks to his beliefs), and he is not cynical and vicious (Baxter, 2002). However, in 2002, when he reentered politics, some citizens suspected him of wanting power, although they had not done so before (Baxter, 2002). Despite this last point, most assessments indicate that he really wanted to end military rule and install democracy. Whether his motivation changed when he reentered politics a decade later is outside the scope of this analysis.

**Summary**

The analysis indicates that Touré was clearly not self-interested since he gave up power voluntarily in 1992. He actually did what he (and many other military dictators often) promised, namely secure order to install democratic elections and hand power over to a civilian government. Moreover, he did not seem to be interested in money as there is no evidence that he used his political power to enrich himself, and he kept working in the army afterwards. This analysis is only based on his first incumbency when Mali was still characterized as an autocracy. Because he stayed in power for only a year, this analysis is based on less elaborate material than the other case studies.

Harm: O
Please: (O)
Non-Minimal: N
Voluntary step-down: O
Income: (O)
Expert: Ideologically motivated – wanted to install democracy and leave power.

Overall qualitative judgement: 5
Bayesian updating score: 0.95
Wangchuck, Jigme Singye (Buthan, 1972-2006)

King Jigme Singye Wangchuck was the fourth king\(^{65}\) of Bhutan from 1972 to 2006. He inherited power when he was only 16 years old because his father died. In 1998, he gave up absolute power and ruled the last eight years of his incumbency together with his government, assembly, and advisors (BBC, 2006). In 2005, he started planning democratic elections for 2008 when he planned to step down (although the constitution for a two-party democracy had been in the making already since 2001) (Mathou, 2008, p. 24; The New York Times, 2005; Wangchuck, 2006, p. 21). He ended up passing on power to his son already in 2006 (BBC, 2006), and the election was held as planned in 2008 (Page, 2008; Sengupta, 2008). However, both the fifth and the fourth king still have a lot of de facto power (Mathou, 2008, pp. 35–36; Rizal, 2015, pp. 260–261, 287; Schmidt, 2017, pp. 102–104, 244–245), and it is contested to what extent Bhutan is a democracy (Boix, Miller, & Rosato, 2013; Mathou, 2008, p. 1; Page, 2008; Rizal, 2015, p. 299; Skaaning, Gerring, & Bartusevicius, 2015).

Bhutan has been a very poor country for a long time, and it still is. However, during the fourth king’s incumbency, the country’s prosperity has improved dramatically (Mathou, 2008; Page, 2008; Rosenberg, 2008; Wax, 2008). This gradual but steady development has been guided by the principle of “Gross National Happiness”, which entails sustainable development in harmony with Bhutanese culture and nature (Mathou, 2008; Wax, 2008). The fourth king is also known for his voluntary step-down and democratization of the country (Mathou, 2008, p. 1; Page, 2008).

**Ideology (proclaimed)**


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\(^{65}\) Because most of the kings in the Bhutanese dynasty share parts of their names, I refer to Jigme Singye Wangchuck as the fourth king.
adhered to securing free universal primary health care and primary education, and hundred percent child immunization (Crossette, 1995, p. 34). Based on this, his ideology is definitely more left- than right-wing on the economic scale. Although development was a goal, the ideology was very traditionalist. Moreover, the fourth king’s ideology emphasizes national and cultural unity. Even though this nationalist element of the ideology became relatively stronger over time (Schmidt, 2017, pp. 2, 120), it does not seem to be strongly exclusionary, and therefore I do not evaluate the implication about excessive repression.

**Winning Coalition**

The fourth king’s winning coalition must have been the royal family, which comprised a large part of the elite in the country, the Drukpa lineage (Schmidt, 2017, p. 53); in the long run, other potential elites; and the royal army as in most other autocracies. In contrast, he cannot have been very dependent on the people as most were very poor, which makes it difficult to mobilize against the regime. Bhutan is a mountain country in Himalaya, and its infrastructure was very weak, especially when he entered power (Crossette, 1995, pp. 4–5). Internet and TV were not allowed until 1999 (Mathou, 2008, p. 13; Rosenberg, 2008). Due to these factors, the people were unlikely to mobilize and threaten the fourth king’s power and were therefore generally not a part of his winning coalition. Bhutan was closed until the 1960 when it very slowly started opening up to the outside world. The country has generally not been subject to strong international pressure (Mathou, 2008, p. 16; Rosenberg, 2008) even though the economy is highly dependent on foreign aid (Schmidt, 2017, p. 59). Concluding, the fourth king’s winning coalition consisted mainly of the royal family and the army. This implies that there is no indication that he had a non-minimal winning coalition.

Because the fourth king planned to introduce elections (and they were introduced a couple of years after he stepped down), his winning coalition must have increased just before he left power. The main argument for pleasing groups outside his winning coalition concerns policies prioritized already from early in his incumbency. Therefore, the increase in winning coalition size is not crucial in the present analysis.

**Harming Groups Clearly Inside the Winning Coalition**

The fourth king introduced and implemented three large groups of policies during his incumbency. First, he decentralized some of the decision-making power and gave up substantial power in a long democratization process. Second, he introduced policies aimed at strengthening national culture and unity (Mathou, 2008, p. 17; Schmidt, 2017, p. 2). I will address these two agendas
below. In the section on pleasing groups outside the winning coalition, I will address the third issue of creating universal healthcare and education.

Decentralization and Democratization

Already early in the 1970s, he started decentralizing decision-making to the local communities. This increased the voice of the people regarding socio-economic decisions, although it was still the local elite who had the power in the local districts (Mathou, 2008, pp. 18–19; Wangchuck, 2006, p. 20). Even though it was only a small step in giving up power, it is evidence of harming the winning coalition including the fourth king himself, since he was deliberately giving up power. It is in sharp contrast to the moves of the first two kings who centralized power. The third king reorganized power, but the fourth king was the first to give back some of the power to the local authorities (Mathou, 2008, p. 18). This move is not directly to be expected from his proclaimed ideology, but it is still consistent with it as decentralization might improve the local development.

Although the king did not give up all his powers, the democratization process is definitely an instance of harming his winning coalition (and himself). In the democratization process, the country also liberalized by, for instance, allowing TV and internet in 1999 (Mathou, 2008, p. 13; Rosenburg, 2008). The fifth king still enjoys a good amount of power (Mathou, 2008, pp. 35–36; Schmidt, 2017, pp. 102–104, 244–245), and the fourth king probably still has strong influence (Rizal, 2015, pp. 260–261, 287). However, he did not face immediate pressure from within his winning coalition for democratization. Moreover, the people were directly against it (Page, 2008; Rosenburg, 2008), especially the rural population (Schmidt, 2017, p. 22), because it was not viewed as a success in the neighboring countries (e.g., Nepal, Bangladesh, and India), where democracy arguably had meant chaos and corruption (Page, 2008; Rosenburg, 2008; Sengupta, 2008; Wax, 2008). Based on these arguments, democratizing cannot be an argument for gaining public support (and the people were not a significant part of his winning coalition). Generally, the group of potential anti-monarchists was not large (Sengupta, 2008). The only considerable group that demanded democracy was Bhutanese of Nepalese origin living in the South. Ethnic tensions have existed for more than a half century, and the Nepalese minority has been oppressed under an assimilation paradigm (Crossette, 1995, p. 35; Rizal, 2015, p. 109). Many were expelled in 1990 and thus could not vote (Sengupta, 2008), and in the 2008 election, ethnicity-based parties were not allowed (Mathou, 2008, p. 39; Rizal, 2015, p. 32). Therefore, democratization cannot be viewed as means to satisfy this group of the population either (as I will discuss below, there are both power-consolidating and ideological reasons for banning ethnicity-based parties).
In an international climate of democracy, a monarchy stands out, and it may be argued that democratizing could be a prudent choice for being able to hold on to power for a long time (Rizal, 2015, pp. 29–31, 148). However, this argument is not very strong since Bhutan has not been under particularly strong external pressure, and many other countries have remained authoritarian despite stronger international pressure. Although the kings still have broad influence, the process has entailed giving away power (without consolidating it in other ways). Consequently, there is strong evidence that the fourth king deliberately gave up power, which is inconsistent with power-maximizing self-interest.

Culture and Unity

In pursuit of sustaining Bhutanese culture and unity, the fourth king has implemented restrictions in several areas. For instance, he banned tobacco sales (Page, 2008) and introduced environmental initiatives, such as forest protection measures and mountain climbing bans (Crossette, 1995, p. 6; Schmidt, 2017, pp. 191–192; The New York Times, 2005; Wangchuck, 2006, pp. 18–19). A national dress code requires people to wear the national clothes, which has been increasingly enforced over time (Schmidt, 2017, pp. 120–122). The dress code suited some poor and elderly, but especially young educated people were not happy about this (Crossette, 1995, pp. 28–29). Banning tobacco might not have been popular either. Environmental sustainability measures may be harmful mostly to the elite as potential investors in the industry. In fact, parts of the royal family owned parts of the (sparse) industry in the country (Crossette, 1995, p. 32). Therefore, these policies do not seem to please the winning coalition but rather create dissatisfaction, if anything. The tobacco ban, forest protection policies, and the dress code were justified with reference to national unity and the principle of gross national happiness (Crossette, 1995, p. 29; Page, 2008; Schmidt, 2017, pp. 191–192; Wangchuck, 2006, pp. 18–19). Therefore, these policies seem consistent with the fourth king’s ideology but somewhat harmful to his winning coalition. Moreover, they were more likely to slow down than speed up economic development.

An important policy consistent with the nationalistic aim of creating national unity was oppression of minorities, especially the Nepalese minority in the South. The conflict has lasted at least since Indian independence (Crossette, 1995, p. 35; Rizal, 2015, p. 109) and escalated in 1990 following the introduction of the 1989-policy, “One Nation, One People”, which promoted assimilation. The Nepalese language was partly banned, and everyone had to wear the Bhutanese national clothes (Schmidt, 2017, pp. 38, 120). If they did not comply, they were forced. It is still disputed how many people died in the clash between the Bhutanese police and the Nepalese dissidents, between one...
person (Crossette, 1995, pp. 29–30, 166) and hundreds (Rizal, 2015, p. 166). In the early 1990s, around 100,000 Nepalese, i.e., one seventh of the Bhutan population, left the country voluntarily or by force (Page, 2008; Rizal, 2015, p. 166; Schmidt, 2017, pp. 3, 70). Some people have called this expel ethnic cleansing (Rizal, 2015, p. 166); others disagree as many Nepalese still live in the country (Schmidt, 2017, p. 25). In any case, it is important to distinguish this from large-scale ethnic cleansing such as in the former Yugoslavia. Also, it has been claimed that some of the expelled people in South Bhutan were illegal immigrants, and their numbers have been on the rise due to the increased living standard in Bhutan (Crossette, 1995, p. 36). There are two very likely explanations for this highly national set of policies. One is that the Nepalese in the South were the largest group of anti-monarchists (Rizal, 2015, p. 109), and expelling them increased the power of the monarch. However, the Nepalese deportation was the only real threat to the fourth king’s regime throughout his incumbency because it created negative international awareness. For a small and poor country, negative international attention can be detrimental (Mathou, 2008, p. 33). In this light, it was very risky to make this move. The other potential reason for the assimilation policies is ideological, i.e., the fourth king sincerely wanted a culturally homogenous Bhutan. Perhaps both explanations are true (Mathou, 2008, pp. 8–11). In any case, the other evidence discussed above indicates that the fourth king took several measures consistent with his ideological aims, but they were harmful to his winning coalition and to his own power. This is especially the case regarding giving up power through decentralization and the democratization process.

**Pleasing Groups Clearly Outside the Winning Coalition**

Another important agenda for the fourth king was to increase the wealth of the poor. Since the 1960s, and continuing when the fourth king came to power, universal welfare has been prioritized (Schmidt, 2017, pp. 8–9). Throughout his incumbency, he worked for implementing universal education, first primary schooling and, later, for improving secondary and tertiary schooling (Mathou, 2008, p. 12). The fourth king achieved a relatively effective universal welfare system, especially regarding health and education (Schmidt, 2017, p. 2), which lifted many, especially the rural poor, out of poverty (Wax, 2008). Earlier, education (and decent health) was a privilege for the elite and the clerics (Schmidt, 2017, pp. 40–41), but with the new constitution that was finally implemented in 2008, the government provides nine years of free universal education, and healthcare is universal and free as well (Schmidt, 2017, pp. 235–236). Despite universal welfare, there are still systematic regional and ethnic biases in the prioritization. The southern and eastern parts of the country, where the Nepalese minority lives, are the least prioritized regions
The pattern of prioritizing of the poor and excluding the Nepalese (who were in exile) also applied to land policies (Schmidt, 2017, pp. 59–60).

Enhancing the living standard of the poor Bhutanese is highly consistent with the fourth king’s ideology of Gross National Happiness. It also explains the ethnic bias (the emphasis on unity and homogenous culture). In contrast, pleasing his winning coalition is not an explanation because the poor were outside his winning coalition. Therefore, introducing universal welfare (and other pro-poor policies) is strong evidence of the fourth king pleasing groups clearly outside his winning coalition. Hence, I deem this implication observed.

**Voluntary Step-Down**

The fourth king gave up absolutist power in 1998 (BBC, 2006) and stepped down early to hand power over to his son in 2006 (BBC, 2006). In 2008, Bhutan started holding somewhat competitive elections, which the fourth king had been planning since 2001 (Mathou, 2008, p. 24; The New York Times, 2005; Wangchuck, 2006, p. 21). As mentioned, the fourth king was very much in control and very popular at that point (Crossette, 1995, p. 32; Page, 2008; Rosenberg, 2008; Wax, 2008). Most authors agree that he was not under pressure in anyway and that he gave up power voluntarily (Mathou, 2008, p. 16; Page, 2008; Schmidt, 2017, p. 22). His early step-down, announced in 2005, was highly unexpected (The New York Times, 2005), which also indicates that there was no threat that forced him to go.

Only one author disputes that the step-down was voluntary. He claims that the monarchy was in danger, but he does not refer to any source or further explanation (Rizal, 2015, pp. 29–31, 148). The fourth king has stated in an interview that it is hard to defend monarchy at this point in history (Crossette, 1995, p. 18). But as mentioned, people did not want democracy, the anti-monarchists were not a dominant group, and many Nepalese dissidents were in exile. Except for negative international publicity following the Nepalese refugees in 1990, nothing indicates urgent external pressure.

Another issue that the skeptical author raises is that the king still has significant power today (Rizal, 2015, pp. 261, 287), and that Bhutan is not really a democracy today (Rizal, 2015, p. 299). This is not controversial (Mathou, 2008, pp. 35–36; Schmidt, 2017, pp. 102–104, 244–245), and minimalist democracy indices do not agree on whether Bhutan should be counted as a democracy (Skaaning et al., 2015) or not (Boix et al., 2013). However, the fact remains that the fourth king stepped down and gave up a lot of power, both to his son and to the people. In the winning coalition language, he widened his winning coalition without any immediate pressure. Based on this, I judge the implication about voluntary step-down to be present.
Low Personal Income

The fourth king was born into the royal family who had several palaces and, generally, a wealthy living (Schmidt, 2017, p. 228). In his office, he has a snow leopard skin, but when confronted with this, he claimed that it was there before him (Crossette, 1995, pp. 21–22). Obviously, the fourth king saying this himself is not strong evidence, as he would be expected to claim this whether it was true or not. Nevertheless, there are stronger indications that his lifestyle was relatively modest (in light of the fact that he had inherited palaces at his disposal). According to several correspondents, the king enjoyed a simple lifestyle working in a small cabin, while his wives enjoyed the palace (BBC, 2006; Crossette, 1995, p. 32). When he travelled around the country, he stayed in low-key houses such as wooden bungalows (Crossette, 1995, p. 260). Because he was royal, and he had access to considerable wealth, it cannot be concluded that he had a low or moderate income as such, but on the other hand, he cannot be expected to have had a lower income given his royal background (and inheritance of wealth). There are no indications that he embezzled money or spent absurd amounts on himself and his family. Therefore, I evaluate this implication as partly observed and only assign it half weight in the final assessment.

Expert Assessments

Most sources strongly agree that the fourth king had a vision to increase gross national happiness among the people, and (as his father) he cared for them (Crossette, 1995, p. 32; Mathou, 2008, pp. 17, 44; Rosenberg, 2008; Schmidt, 2017, pp. 218, 235; Wax, 2008). But the source who did not believe that he stepped down for altruist reasons also discusses his moves as means to staying power (Rizal, 2015, pp. 29–31, 148). He is a scholar, which should give him credibility as a source, but he is also Bhutanese, and his perspective might be subjective (he may also have valuable insider knowledge). Another Bhutanese source, a scholar and diplomat, holds the complete opposite views (Mathou, 2008, pp. 17, 44). I have also used journalists as sources, but their evaluations often rely on scholarly or popular sources, so they are weaker sources regarding the difficult matter of leader motives. However, several foreign scholars assess the fourth king as ideologically motivated (Schmidt, 2017, pp. 218, 235), and I conclude that the experts generally deem the fourth king to be ideologically motivated.

Summary

The fourth king of Bhutan, Jigme Singye Wangchuck was a highly popular king among his people, and most experts view him as strongly ideologically motivated. Most implications are observed, including the rare voluntary step-
down. Moreover, the fourth king developed the country and prioritized the poor, who was the group least likely to mobilize and the group his power depended the least on. Therefore, the conclusion is that the fourth king was strongly ideologically motivated.

Harm: O
Please: O
Non-Minimal: N
Voluntary step-down: O
Income: (O)
Expert: Ideologically motivated (one disagrees)

Overall qualitative judgement: 5
Bayesian updating score: 0.99
Zhivkov, Todor (Bulgaria, 1954-1989)


Zhivkov came from a poor rural family. He took part in organizing the national resistance movement against the Nazis during World War II. Afterwards, he got a job affiliated with the communist party and the Soviet government in Bulgaria and started rising in the ranks. In 1954, he was installed as the first secretary of the Central Committee in Bulgaria, which was, de facto, the leader of Bulgaria. Throughout his incumbency, Zhivkov stuck closely to the Soviet line, domestically and internationally (Binder, 1998; Crampton, 1998; The Washington Post, 1998; Thinley Kalsang Bhutia, 2017; Traynor, 1998).

Ideology (proclaimed)

If Zhivkov adhered to an ideology, it was clearly communism, although he also had a nationalist discourse. He viewed people living in Bulgaria as Bulgarians and expected non-ethnic Bulgarians to assimilate (G. Stokes, 1993, p. 130). This nationalist aim can be viewed as an exclusionary ideology. Therefore, I assess the excessive repression implication in the case of Zhivkov.

Winning Coalition

The Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) was in Zhivkov’s winning coalition, and he needed their backing. The party was relatively strong, and during the Cold War, not much information from the West was publically available. Hence, it appears that Zhivkov’s power did not depend much on the population. Yet, the educated part of the population was the group of people who knew most about other countries, they could mobilize the people and therefore had to be pleased or controlled (Crampton, 2008, p. 214; G. Stokes, 1993, p. 133). This setting was only stable as long as the Soviet Union supported Zhivkov. The Soviet Union was crucial in keeping Zhivkov in power (Crampton, 1998; G. Stokes, 1993, pp. 49–52; The Washington Post, 1998). Josip Tito’s strategy to be internationally neutralist in the region was perceived as risky. Aligning with the Soviet Union was likely to be the safest strategy for staying in power; especially in Zhivkov’s first years in power when the Soviet Union had a strong influence on the BCP in Bulgaria. In this sense, the Soviet Union can be viewed as a part of Zhivkov’s winning coalition (although it was an external actor). He had no real option to choose a different and smaller winning coalition, especially because of the strong Soviet influence when he entered...
power and generally during most of his incumbency. Based on this, Zhivkov’s winning coalition cannot be said to have been non-minimal.

Harming Groups Clearly Inside the Winning Coalition

Because Zhivkov’s power strongly depended on the BCP and the Soviet Union, and his proclaimed ideology was communism, it is extremely difficult to distinguish between him serving his winning coalition and following his ideological motivation. Following his ideology, whether he believed it or not, was means to pleasing the Soviet Union and the BCP; in turn, they were means to keeping Zhivkov in power. Because of this, I will focus on the nationalist part of Zhivkov’s ideology, but first, I discuss his behavior regarding a traditional communist ideology.

Consolidating Power

Zhivkov was first installed in power because he had good relations with Nikita Krushchev. Upon entering power, he started removing his contenders in the party (Crampton, 1998, 2008, pp. 347–351; Daskalov, 2011, pp. 281–282; The Washington Post, 1998). Generally, he was very strategic in keeping power (G. Stokes, 1993, p. 51). This is highly consistent with being motivated by power greed, but he did not compromise his ideological aims. Power is needed to implement ideological goals too, so this behavior was also consistent with ideological motivation. Zhivkov’s power was well consolidated already in the mid-1960s (Crampton, 1997, pp. 197, 200, 2008, pp. 347–351). Economic development and increasing living standards in the 1960s and 1970s helped keep the opposition small and calm (Crampton, 1997, pp. 200–202).

In another move to tame his winning coalition, Zhivkov allowed his inner circle to live a luxurious life, buy big houses, cars and other things with public funds (T. Barber, 1992). This constitutes pleasing rather than harming his winning coalition.

Communist Policies

Zhivkov generally obeyed Moscow (Crampton, 2008, p. 363). He introduced and implemented many communist policies very similar to the Soviet Union’s. This included (brutal) collectivization of farmlands (Binder, 1998; G. Stokes, 1993, pp. 49–52), and he opened large steel factories in Sofia (Binder, 1998), which led to a huge foreign debt when he left power (Binder, 1998; Goldman, 1997, p. 98; G. Stokes, 1993, p. 130). As discussed, these initiatives were strongly consistent with pleasing his winning coalition, the party and the Soviet Union, and with pursuing his proclaimed ideological goals.

Zhivkov managed to change the social stratification of education, which was offered based on class and peasants soon became educated. They thanked
the party for the education, and unlike the former educated elite, they had no strong connection to the West (G. Stokes, 1993, p. 51). Zhivkov spent time and resources on flattering the old educated elite, famous writers and other artists but still avoided paying them a high salary (G. Stokes, 1993, p. 51). Again, this is strongly consistent with Zhivkov’s ideology and a means to consolidate his power by winning the support of this important group.

**Nationalism**

Another important strand was Zhivkov’s nationalist behavior. He already took a couple of anti-minority initiatives when entering power by making sure that only Bulgaria was studied at the history department at the University of Sofia (G. Stokes, 1993, p. 130). During the 1960s, the regime forced Bulgarian-speaking Muslims to change their names to more Slavic-sounding names (Crampton, 1997, pp. 202–203; G. Stokes, 1993, p. 130), but it was not until the 1970s and 1980s that the serious systematic harassment of the non-ethnic Bulgarians (mainly Bulgarian Turks) started (The Washington Post, 1998; Traynor, 1998). In the mid-1980s, Zhivkov introduced harsh assimilation policies directed at Bulgarian Turks, including forced name change and restrictions on use of Turkish language (Crampton, 1998; G. Stokes, 1993, pp. 130–131). When people resisted, the army stepped in. In 1989, Zhivkov started deporting the Turks (G. Stokes, 1993, p. 131).

The nationalist assimilation policies can be explained with Zhivkov’s ideology. In addition, it did not harm his winning coalition. Such policies were common in neighboring states, especially under Ceaușescu in Romania (Crampton, 1997, pp. 202–203; G. Stokes, 1993, p. 130). Generally, a nationalist agenda can be used to glue society together and win support (Crampton, 1997, pp. 202–203), and no one in his winning coalition was strongly against this (except the educated perhaps). Why Zhivkov started brutally assimilating the Bulgarian Turks in the mid-1980s is not clear (G. Stokes, 1993, p. 130). An interpretation consistent with ideological motivation is that it is a predictable continuation of the nationalist agenda throughout his incumbency, and it ended up being at odds with staying in power because it created international criticism and criticism among the educated part of the population—especially after he started expelling the Turks in 1989 (G. Stokes, 1993, pp. 132–133). This made Zhivkov crack down on the educated elite, who turned against him, which made him fragile as they knew about the openings in the Soviet Union (Crampton, 1997, p. 214; G. Stokes, 1993, pp. 132–133). Another interpretation, which is consistent with a self-interested motivation, is that the radicalization of the assimilation policies was a desperate attempt to stay in power, despite the economic difficulties, and a year later, despite the political open-
ings in the Soviet Union (Crampton, 1998). The economic situation had deteriorated in the 1970s and up through the 1980s (Crampton, 1997, pp. 206–208), so the radical nationalist policy can be seen as a hope to gain new support (Crampton, 1997, p. 210). With Gorbachev entering power in 1985, Zhivkov lost the Soviet support (Crampton, 1997, pp. 210–214, 1998), and it did not appear that Zhivkov could gain Gorbachev’s support in any way (Crampton, 1997, pp. 210–213). Therefore, trying to please other parts of his winning coalition, or seeking to create a new one, i.e., one consisting of the people, seemed to be a last resort to be able to stay in power. This interpretation is highly consistent with self-interest. However, this strategy did not work. The people were increasingly dissatisfied with the economic stagnation (Crampton, 1997, pp. 206–208) and especially with the severe pollution from the factories (Crampton, 2008, pp. 381–382; G. Stokes, 1993, p. 132). It is difficult to determine which of the two interpretations of the radical assimilation policies is correct. Both might have been at play at once. This radical assimilation agenda cannot be said to be an instance of harming his winning coalition either (the Turks cannot be said to be a part of the winning coalition), although it was aligned with his proclaimed ideology.

Summing up, Zhivkov’s behavior was highly consistent with his proclaimed communist and nationalist ideology but also with pleasing his winning coalition. For this reason, there is no evidence of Zhivkov harming people clearly inside his winning coalition.

**Pleasing Groups Clearly Outside the Winning Coalition**

Based on the previous analysis, there is no evidence of Zhivkov serving groups (e.g., the people or the former elite) clearly outside his winning coalition without serving his winning coalition too.

**Voluntary Step-Down**

Zhivkov resigned in November 1989 (Crampton, 1998), but he did not step down voluntarily (Goldman, 1997, p. 90). In the fall 1989, Zhivkov faced the largest public demonstrations during his incumbency (Crampton, 1998) and was finally forced to resign in a bloodless coup d’état planned by people in his inner circle and backed by the army (Crampton, 2008, p. 388; Goldman, 1997, p. 90; G. Stokes, 1993, pp. 129, 134).

**Low Personal Income**

Officially, Zhivkov never owned a car and did not own any of the many villas he used during his incumbency because they were built for the leader of the party and not him personally (Crampton, 2008, p. 353). Nevertheless, he did have a very luxurious lifestyle, and in 1990, he was charged and put in house
arrest (not jail due to faltering health) for seven years for embezzling public funds to buy villas, apartments, and expensive cars for himself, his family, and his political cronies (T. Barber, 1992; Binder, 1998; Crampton, 1998). After 1997, when his sentence was reversed, he managed to live in comfort at his granddaughter's villa in a wealthy suburb of Sofia (The Washington Post, 1998). He gave a lot of influence and wealth to his children. His daughter was bright and well-liked by the people, so there might be valid reasons for allowing her influence. However, his son was incompetent, and promoting him was clearly nepotism (Goldman, 1997, p. 90). Although Zhivkov has been deemed less personally corrupt than Brezhnev and Ceaușescu (Crampton, 2008, p. 353), he clearly did not have a low income, and he was definitely personally corrupt.

**Excessive Violent Repression**

Since a part of Zhivkov's ideology was exclusionary towards non-ethnic Bulgarians, Zhivkov should be expected to be excessively repressive towards this group. There are different views of how repressive his regime was. In general, it does not seem to have been highly brutal (Crampton, 2008, p. 353; G. Stokes, 1993, p. 51), although he frequently assassinated political opponents (Binder, 1998; Crampton, 1997, p. 202). As far as his behavior at the end of the 1980s, he was highly repressive of the Bulgarian Turks (Binder, 1998; The Washington Post, 1998; Thinley Kalsang Bhutia, 2017; Traynor, 1998). He even used labor camps for dissidents (T. Barber, 1992; Binder, 1998). As discussed above, the repression of the Bulgarian Turks was definitely excessive for power maximization, thus, not optimal given he was purely interested in power. On the other hand, it might actually have been in an attempt to stay in power insofar Zhivkov had not realized that it was excessive. Supporting this interpretations are indications that he had become paranoid at the end of 1987 when he sacked long-term advisors based on absurd accusations of plotting against him (Crampton, 2008, p. 384). For this reason, I only assign half weight to the evidence of Zhivkov being excessively repressive.

**Expert Assessments**

There are different assessments of Zhivkov's motivation. Although his motives are not directly assessed, the way his power consolidation is described indicate that most authors seem to believe that Zhivkov was at least partly motivated by power (Crampton, 1997, pp. 198, 210, 1998, 2008, pp. 347–351; Daskalov, 2011, pp. 281–282; The Washington Post, 1998), and that he clung to power as long as he could (G. Stokes, 1993, p. 129). In contrast, several Western authors found him well-meaning but incapable (Goldman, 1997, pp. 83, 86; G. Stokes, 1993, p. 51). This is somewhat in line with the evaluation by a political
opponent, Georgi Markov (later assassinated by Zhivkov), who wrote that Zhivkov served the Soviet Union more ardently than the Soviet leaders did themselves (The Washington Post, 1998), which may be interpreted as that he strongly believed in communism. An alternative interpretation is that he just thought the Soviet leadership model was prudent for keeping power. The view that Zhivkov was motivated by power is supported by his own statements and bragging about his popularity among the people (Binder, 1998; The Washington Post, 1998). These different assessments paint a mixed picture, which could indicate that Zhivkov did like being in power but probably also truly believed in communism.

Summary
It is very difficult to distinguish Zhivkov’s pleasing of his winning coalition and realizing his ideological aims, because following the ideology, whether he believed it or not, was a means to pleasing the Soviet Union and keeping himself in power. His policy-making was very consistent with communism. He focused a lot on consolidating power in the beginning of his incumbency, and he clung to it in the end. Yet, this did not happen at the expense of communist policies and therefore was not inconsistent with his proclaimed ideology. Moreover, following the exclusionary part of his ideology was not inconsistent with pleasing his winning coalition, but perhaps it was not strictly necessary. This indicates that he truly believed in this. However, he was highly personally corrupt, which indicates self-interest. The expert assessments disagree about the extent to which Zhivkov was self-interested and ideologically motivated. Most authors agree that he liked power, but there are indications that he truly believed in communism and nationalism. Hence, my final assessment is to place him in the middle of the self-interested half of the motivation spectrum, but the assessment is uncertain.

Harm: N
Please: N
Non-Minimal: N
Voluntary step-down: N
Income: N
Excessive repression (O)
Expert: Mixed

Overall qualitative judgement: 2
Bayesian updating score: 0.18


Cold-Ravnkilde, S. M. (2013). War and Peace in Mali: Background and Perspectives.


Hayward-Jones, J. (2014, September 3). FIJI ON ROAD TO DEMOCRACY. The Australian.


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Marks, K. (2014, September 16). Campaigning in Coup-Coup Land; Fiji is accustomed to the violent transfer of power. But the latest military dictator has decided to test his popularity in an election. The Independent.


Studies.
Novitski, J. (1972a, August 20). Peron, the Ex-Dictator, Is the Key as Argentina Again Attempts Democracy. The New York Times.


USAID. (2014). *DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT OF MALI*.


## Appendix III: Correlates of Motivation

### Table III.1. Correlates of Motivation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Motivation (judgement-based)</th>
<th>Motivation (BU-score)</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Step-down</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideological motivation (Bayesian updating score)</td>
<td><strong>0.96</strong></td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low/moderate income</td>
<td><strong>0.82</strong></td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td><strong>0.52</strong></td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road to power 5-point scale (based on Svolik)</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road to power, incumbent regime (dummy)</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road to power, military (dummy)</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road to power, guerilla (dummy)</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previously jailed (dummy) (CH)</td>
<td><strong>0.41</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.32</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.19</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.32</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University, military, no edu (CH)</td>
<td><strong>0.58</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.54</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.67</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.11</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University degree (dummy) (CH)</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military education (dummy) (CH)</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No education (dummy) (CH)</td>
<td><strong>-0.42</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.41</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.58</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.11</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educated abroad (dummy) (CH)</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td><strong>0.42</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educated in the West (dummy) (CH)</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td><strong>0.42</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic background (CH)</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td><strong>0.34</strong></td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td><strong>0.48</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family wealth (LEAD)</td>
<td><strong>0.40</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.49</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.41</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.23</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age when entering power (CH)</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td><strong>-0.47</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher (dummy)</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military career (dummy)</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWF, personalist</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td><strong>-0.31</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.39</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWF, military</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWF, party</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Correlations in bold, p-values below. Correlations less than 0.3 are greyed.
### Table III.2. Correlates of Motivation. Only Middle-Class Dictators are Included

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Motivation (judgement-based)</th>
<th>Motivation (BU-score)</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Step-down</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University, military, no edu (CH)</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University degree (dummy) (CH)</td>
<td><strong>0.46</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.57</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.36</strong></td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military education (dummy) (CH)</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No education (dummy) (CH)</td>
<td><strong>-0.46</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.57</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.36</strong></td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educated abroad (dummy) (CH)</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td><strong>0.60</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educated in the West (dummy) (CH)</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td><strong>0.60</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Correlations in bold, p-values below. Correlations less than 0.3 are greyed. N=10.

### Table III.3. Correlates of Motivation. Only University-Educated Dictators are Included (Excl. Military Academies)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Motivation (judgement-based)</th>
<th>Motivation (BU-score)</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Step-down</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Educated abroad (dummy) (CH)</td>
<td><strong>0.55</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.58</strong></td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educated in the West (dummy) (CH)</td>
<td><strong>0.40</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.43</strong></td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td><strong>0.56</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic background (CH)</td>
<td><strong>0.35</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.44</strong></td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td><strong>0.44</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family wealth (LEAD)</td>
<td><strong>0.42</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.47</strong></td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Correlations in bold, p-values below. Correlations less than 0.3 are greyed. N = 7.

### Table III.4. Correlates of Motivation. Only GWF’s Originally Coded Cases are Included

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Motivation (judgement-based)</th>
<th>Motivation (BU-score)</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Step-down</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GWF, personalist</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td><strong>-0.39</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWF, military</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWF, party</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td><strong>0.33</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Correlations in bold, p-values below. Correlations less than 0.3 are greyed.
Appendix IV: Validity and Reliability Tests

Table IV.1. Overview of Dictators and Scores in Dataset and Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dictator</th>
<th>Overall assessment</th>
<th>Absence of personal corruption</th>
<th>Voluntary step-down</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dataset</td>
<td>Case studies</td>
<td>Dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abacha</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdallah, Ahmed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Iryani, Abdul Rahman</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batista</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caetano</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figueriedo, Joao</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gierek</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolingba, André</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanusse, Alejandro</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee Kuan Yew</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobutu</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Park Chung-He</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Souvanna Phouma</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tito, Josip</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhivkov</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table IV.2. Degree of Overlap in Scores from Dataset and Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overlap in Scores</th>
<th>Overall assessment</th>
<th>Absence of personal corruption</th>
<th>Voluntary step-down</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dataset scores 2 points higher than case study</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dataset scores 1 point higher than case study</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dataset score equal to case study score</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dataset scores 1 point lower than case study</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dataset scores 2 points lower than case study</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Sources from the Case Studies

Abacha, Sani (Nigeria, 93-98)


Abderemane, Ahmed Abdallah (Comoros, 78-89)

- Newton, Michael (2014) Famous Assassinations in World History: An Encyclopedia. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO LLC.
Al-Iryani, Abdul Rahman (Yemen, 67-74)

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**Figueiredo, Joao (Brazil, 79-85)**

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Kolingba, André (Central African Republic, 81-93)

- Lumumba-Kasonko, Tukumbi (2005), Liberal Democracy and Its Critics in Africa: Political Dysfunction and The Struggle for Social Progress, Dakar: CODESRIA.
Lanusse, Alejandro (Argentina, 1971-73)
- Novitski, Joseph (1972) Peron, the Ex-Dictator, Is the Key as Argentina Again Attempts Democracy. The New York Times, August 20.

Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore, 1959-90)
- Plate, Tom Giants of Asia: Conversations with Lee Kuan Yew. Marshall Cavendish Editions.
Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire, 65-97)


Park Chung-Hee (South Korea, 61-79)

Souvanna Phouma (Laos, 62-75)


Tito, Josip (Yugoslavia, 45-80)


Zhivkov (Bulgaria, 54-89)

- Britannica, [https://www.britannica.com/biography/Todor-Zhivkov](https://www.britannica.com/biography/Todor-Zhivkov)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table IV.3. Overview of Russian Obituaries and Newspapers</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Obit title</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;На смерть Бокассы... Может, съел кого-нибудь...&quot; Газета &quot;Коммерсантъ&quot; №190 от 06.11.1996, стр. 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konstantin Dvoretskiy (2018) &quot;Любитель плоти - Людоед Бокасса скармливал врагов крокодилам и тонул в бриллиантах&quot; <a href="https://lenta.ru/articles/2018/03/04/nyam_nyam/">https://lenta.ru/articles/2018/03/04/nyam_nyam/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vadim Truhanchev (2019) &quot;Густан Гуся. Драмы вождя Чехословакии&quot; <a href="https://nasledie.pravda.ru/1141226-gusak/">https://nasledie.pravda.ru/1141226-gusak/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Капитал Маркоса - Как филиппинский диктатор стал владельцем всей страны&quot; <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3087802">https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3087802</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vadim Truhanchev &quot;Тито: укротитель СССР, Югославии и Запада Читайте больше на&quot; <a href="https://www.pravda.ru/world/europe/balkans/07-05-2012/1113919-tito-o/#">https://www.pravda.ru/world/europe/balkans/07-05-2012/1113919-tito-o/#</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dictator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee Kuan Yew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim Il-Sung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trujillo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salazar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senghor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obit title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(&quot;To the 110 years anniversary of Sedar Senghor's birth&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obit title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAS AGÊNCIAS INTERNACIONAIS, “Pais está de luto pela morte do presidente”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(“Country mourns president’s death”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Serão inumados hoje em Manágua os despojos de Anastasio Somoza”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(“The remains of Anastasio Somoza will be buried today in Managua”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“A Câmara uruguaia homenageia unaniemete a memória do matador do presidente Somoza”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(“The Uruguayan Chamber unanimously honors the memory of the assassin of President Somoza”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Morre Tito, após longa agonia”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(“Tito dies after long agony”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“A Iugoslávia decreta luto por sete dias”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(“Yugoslavia decrees mourning for seven days”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAS AGÊNCIAS DE NOTICIAS, “Morre Lee Kuan Yew, fundador e primeiro premiê de Cingapura”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(“Lee Kuan Yew, founder and first Premier of Singapore, dies”)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table IV.5. Degree of Overlap in Scores from Original Dataset and Intercoder Reliability Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Possible range)</th>
<th>Directly stated motivation</th>
<th>Overall assessment</th>
<th>Absence of personal corruption</th>
<th>Modest lifestyle</th>
<th>Voluntary step-down</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Selfish</td>
<td>(0-1)</td>
<td>(0-1)</td>
<td>(0-3&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>(0-3&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>(0-2&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divergence due to the use of a residual category</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of original scores</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Original is 2 points higher than test score
- Original is 1 point higher than test score
- Original and test score the same
- Original is 1 point lower than test score
- Original is 2 points lower than test score
- # of original scores

*Residual categories are also possible.*
Appendix V: The Obituaries Registry of Dictators Dataset Codebook

Introduction
The overall purpose of the Obituary Registry of Dictators Dataset is to enable scholars to actually measure rather than just assume dictators’ motivation. Except for variables related to motivation, it contains a couple of background variables not already coded in existing datasets on political leaders.

The dataset is based on Svolik’s dataset on dictators (Svolik, 2012), which is based on the Archigos dataset (which contains both democracies and autocracies) (Goemans et al., 2009). Svolik’s dataset is a global dataset of dictators who have been in power in part of the period 1945-2008. The dataset is based on obituaries, which implies that it contains only deceased dictators. I have included dictators who have been in power for at least six months. 23.2% of the dictators in the final sample are missing. However, these are mainly dictators who have been in power for less than a year, and they are often from microstates. Only 6.1% leader years are missing from the sample, and the final dataset contains data on 297 leaders (on the core motivation variable).

I have mainly relied on obituaries from The New York Times, The Independent, The Washington Post, and The Guardian. If obituaries from all four newspapers were available, I used them. When they were not, I relied on obituaries from other newspapers, mainly Canadian and Australian newspapers, or just relied on fewer than four obituaries. In around 90% of the cases, the coding is based partly or solely on obituaries from The New York Times. In cases of little or uncertain information about a dictator, I have used information from other obituaries of deceased dictators from the same country, since some obituaries also comment or compare to former (or later) rulers. I have variables indicating whether this has been the case and what information is taken from other obituaries. Lastly, notes are available for most dictators. These are concerns about difficult coding decisions in the specific cases as well as specific traits and extra information about the dictators.

66 I have created a unique Leader ID due to misalignment between state leader and names. However, I have kept the IDs from both Svolik’s dataset and the Archigos dataset to make the data easy to combine with other data.
Obit sources selected (maximum four) from main newspaper articles

Primary sources
- The New York Times (NYT)
- The Independent (I)
- The Washington Post (WP)
- The Guardian (G)

Secondary sources
- The Times (Times)
- BBC (BBC)
- The Telegraph (Tel)
- The Daily Times (DT)
- The Economist (Eco)
- The Observer (Obs)
- Daily Mail (DM)
- Latin American Times (LAT)
- Globe & Mail (G&M)
- The Australian (Aus)
- Daily Nation (DN)

Secondary sources only include articles of at least 500 words.
For older obits, in case of lack of material, I have used the following to search for obits (only rarely):
- Californian online collection: https://cdnc.ucr.edu/cgi-bin/cdnc?a=p&p=home&e=-------en--20--1--txt-txIN-------1

Source disagreement
In addition to the substantial variables, a couple of technical variables are coded:

a. A variable indicating that the coding of a specific dictator is uncertain due to lack of information, typically when it is only based on very short obits or only from secondary sources.

b. A binary variable connected to each core variable to indicate strong disagreement between the sources. However, there is no strong disagreement between the obituaries except regarding the dictator’s lifestyle; and even here, the sources disagreed in only two of the almost three hundred cases.
Excluded cases and changes from Svolik’s sample of dictators

Cases are excluded from the sample if:
- the dictator is still alive
- the dictator has only been in power for less than a half year (in total).
- an obit does not exist (or it contains almost no relevant information). A list of excluded cases is available upon request.

If a dictator has been in power more than once (with other leaders ruling in between), the data only appears in the dataset for the last period. Former incumbencies/regimes are included in the dataset but left empty to avoid that a dictator counts twice in an analysis. However, the user can easily fill it out with existing data.

The dataset includes interim presidents, but when merged with Svolik’s, it is easy to exclude these cases if needed.

For a couple of cases, the search for obituaries of specific dictators has indicated that Svolik’s dataset does not contain the de facto leader in the specific case. In these instances, I have cross-checked with Cursus Honorum as well as with Wikipedia and Britannica. The following leaders have been changed (excluded leaders in parentheses):
- Algeria:
  - Kafi (Nezzar)
- Saudi Arabia
  - Ibn Saud (Aziz)
- Tajikistan
  - Emomali Rahmon (Rakhmonov)
- Yugoslavia
  - Kolisevski (Mojsov)
  - Mijatovic (Dragosavac)
  - Kraigher (Ribicic)
  - Stambolic (Markovic)
  - Spiljac (Sukrija)
  - Djuranovic (Zarkovic)
  - Vlajkovic (Renovica)
  - Hasani (Krunic)
- Mojsov (Suvar)
- Dizarevic (Pancevski)
- Drnovsek (none)
- Jovic (none)

Finally, Jordan’s Ibrahim pasa Hashem is excluded from the data because Wikipedia, Cursus Honorum, and the obituaries suggest that King Hussein overtook the throne directly from King Talal.

**Coders**
I have coded all data myself to ensure internal consistency. To enhance internal consistency and validity, I have coded all dictators from a country in one day. The coding has spanned less than six months (July-November 2018).

**Inter-coder reliability tests**
50 randomly selected cases have been coded by another coder based on the same obituaries as the original coding. I have gone through the cases with divergence again. More information on this is available in the data-presentation paper.

**Inter-source reliability test**
- Russian and Brazilian obituaries
  - See data-presentation paper
- In-depth case studies
  - See data-presentation paper

**Documentation: How to find the data?**
The dataset contains information on the following so it is possible to uniquely identify each obituary:
- Online newspaper
- Title
- (Note if the source is not an ordinary obit)

**Codebook Structure**
The dataset consists of 38 original variables on top of Svolik’s variables that are also in the dataset. In addition to the 38 variables, several extra variables
are constructed based on the original variables (for instance are the core variables accessible in versions where residual categories are excluded). See footnotes in the presentation of each of the original variables below.

The variables cover the following themes:
- **Motivation**
  - This is an attempt to assess the sincere motivation of the dictator. It is mainly structured around a spectrum from selfish to other-regarding (also called degree of ideological motivation, although ideology should be understood in a broad sense also including more specific sincerely held beliefs). Residual categories exist to incorporate alternative motives.
- **Content of proclaimed ideology**
  - This group of variables includes two dimensions of the dictator’s proclaimed ideology, namely an economic and an inclusionary-exclusionary dimension. Also very self-interested dictators are scored on this variable, since it is based on the dictators’ proclaimed ideologies. Therefore, measures in this category are coded independently of the scores in the previous category of variables.
- **Change in motivation over time**
- **Personal corruption and lifestyle**
- **Voluntary step-down**
- **Stay despite threats**
- **Rural/urban/royal background**
- **Former rebel or revolutionary activity**
- **Legacy**
- **Sources and uncertainty**
Index

Note: Variable names in parentheses.

Motivation

1. Is it stated that the dictator was visionary or ideologically motivated?\(^{67}\) (ideostated)
   - Clarification: This item is coded “yes” if at least one of the following is directly stated:
     - The dictator was ideologically motivated, visionary, or idealistic
     - The dictator cared about the people (or a significant part of the people), including the nation
     - The dictator had ideological or visionary aims/goals
     - The dictator was a Marxist, communist, liberal, nationalist etc.
     - The dictator was trying to implement a specific ideology
   - Coding:
     - 0 = no
     - 1 = yes

2. Quotes from the obit about ideological motivation (ideo_quote)
   - “String” if direct statement (if Item 1 is coded 1 = yes)

3. Is it stated that the dictator was self-interested?\(^{68}\) (selfstat)
   - Clarification: The item is coded “yes” if it is directly stated that the dictator was motivated by power or wealth, or if it is stated that he was opportunistic.
   - 0 = no
   - 1 = yes

4. Quotes from the obit about self-interest (self_quote)
   - “String” if direct statement (if Item 3 is coded 1 = yes)

5. What is the overall judgement of the dictator’s motivation on a self-interested vs. other-regarding (ideologically motivated) spectrum based on reading the obits (residual categories exist)?\(^{69}\) (overalljudgementide)
   - Clarification: This item is the overall judgement of a dictator’s motives based on reading the obit(s). In the cases where the dictator’s motives seemed to change over time, the coding of this item is based on the predominant motivation during the incumbency.

---

\(^{67}\) A variable that combines the data from Items 1 and 3 on motive quotes exists. It is coded -1 (selfish), 0 (both), and 1 (ideological) (objmotive).

\(^{68}\) A variable that combines the data from Items 1 and 3 on motive quotes exists. It is coded -1 (selfish), 0 (both), and 1 (ideological) (objmotive).

\(^{69}\) This variable exists in a “clean” version where the three residual categories, 5-7, are coded as missing (motive_clean).
- 0 = very selfish (clearly concerned with power and/or wealth without clearly adhering to any other-regarding set of ideas or ideology)
- 1 = relatively selfish (a dictator who seems to be driven largely by power or wealth concerns, but it is not certain, e.g., a large overlap between ideologically motivated behavior and self-interested behavior, but for instance not having a low income, and without behaving consistently with ideological aims, or just without ideological aims)
- 2 = relatively ideologically motivated (a dictator who seems to be driven by ideological beliefs, but it is not certain, e.g., a large overlap between ideologically motivated behavior and self-interested behavior)
- 3 = very ideologically motivated (often when it is clearly stated that the dictator was ideologically motivated, and he took risky steps to try to implement his ideas)
- 5 = apathetic and largely other-regarding (if the dictator does not seem to want political power in the first place but has have “good” intentions, e.g., some of the (military) dictators who are only installed to end a military dictatorship and hand over power to civil democratic rule)
- 6 = apathetic and largely selfish (if the dictator does not seem to want political power in the first place but seems to enjoy it and its benefits, e.g., an installed leader who does not seem to care nor risk much for the country and the people)
- 7 = paranoid or mentally ill (if the dictator seems to have been paranoid or in other ways mentally ill during most of his incumbency)

Note: If a dictator’s motivation seemed to have changed during his incumbency, the most predominant (or average) motivation is given.

Content of proclaimed ideology

All ideology items only concern proclaimed ideological aims. Hence, if an obituary’s argument for an ideological direction is based explicitly on a dictator’s policies, I do not use the data. This is necessary to avoid an overlap between the coding of motives and the policies and outcomes, which is necessary if we want to empirically investigate the effects of motivation on policies and outcomes.

6. What was the dictator’s primary (proclaimed) ideology? (mainideo)
- Clarification: e.g., communism, socialism, developmentalism (wish for national economic development, often center-center-right), conservative, democratization, liberalization, national unity, stability, anti-communist, independence, Arab unity, African unity, liberalism
  - “String”

7. What was the dictator’s secondary (proclaimed) ideology? (secideo)
   - “String”

8. Where is the dictator’s ideology to be placed on an economic dimension? (ecoideo)
   - This question regards the dictator’s view on redistribution (to the poor).
   - 0 = right (economically conservatives, e.g., many leaders of Latin American military dictatorships)
   - 1 = center-right (conservativism opening up, or right-wing liberal, e.g., the most liberal military dictators in the Latin American military dictatorships or some developmentalists in Asia)
   - 2 = center (liberal or center between socialist and conservative/right-wing liberal, e.g., some of the developmentalists in Asia)
   - 3 = center-left (modern socialists or moderate former communists, e.g., some of the moderate socialists appearing at the end of the Cold War in Eastern Europe and other places)
   - 4 = left (communists and radical socialists, e.g., many of the dictators in Eastern Europe during the Cold War as well as dictators leading radical socialist movements in Latin America and Africa).
   - 6 = no economic position (e.g., many strongly exclusionary ideologies do not have an economic dimension; the same has sometimes been the case for independence fighter, but also for dictators who were mainly self-interested). This value is only given if there is no indication of an economic position, and there is enough information in the obituaries.

9. Is there disagreement between sources regarding the placement of the dictator’s ideology on the economic dimension (Item 8)? (ec_dis)

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70 This variable exists in a “clean” version where the residual category, 6, is coded as missing (ecoideo_orig).
Clarification: It is only coded “yes” if there is clear disagreement. If only one or not all obits hint about the economic dimension of the ideology, the item is coded “no”. If only disagreement about degree, I also code the item, “no”.
- 0 = no
- 1 = yes

10. Disagreement between sources notes (economic dimension) (ec_disnote)
- “String”

11. Where is the dictator’s ideology to be placed on an inclusionary-exclusionary dimension? (exclideo)
- Clarification: This item only regards the dictator’s view on groups in society, thus, it is not based on action such as policies or repression. It describes to what extent specific groups are excluded from the “good world” prescribed by the ideology.
  - 0 = highly inclusionary (i.e., emphasizing inclusion but not national unity with an underlying exclusion of groups, e.g., exclusionary nationalism)
  - 1 = somewhat inclusionary (i.e., inclusionary, often no mention of either inclusion or exclusion, nor clearly excluding any group from the “good” world as prescribed by the ideology)
  - 2 = somewhat exclusionary (i.e., exclusionary but not directing negative attention to the excluded groups, likely to emphasize national or another kind of unity, but underlying this is excluding certain groups)
  - 3 = highly exclusionary (explicit exclusion of certain groups, often by derogative speech)

Note: Category 1 is often the default, assuming that having exclusionary ideas, as well as highly inclusionary ideas, will be mentioned in the obit.

12. Who are the excluded group(s)? (if scoring 2 or 3 on Item 11) (group)
- Clarification: E.g., communists, or specific ethnic or religious groups
- “String”

13. To what extent were they to be excluded? (if scoring 2 or 3 on Item 11) (extent)
- 0 = low
- 1 = high
14. Is there disagreement between sources regarding the degree to which the dictator's ideology is exclusionary (Item 11)? \((\text{ex\_dis})\)
   
   - Clarification: It is only coded “yes” if there is clear disagreement. If only one or not all obits hint about the ideology being exclusionary or inclusionary, the item is coded “no”. If only disagreement about degree, I also code the item, “no”.
   
   \[0 = \text{no}\]
   \[1 = \text{yes}\]

15. Disagreement between sources notes (exclusionary dimension) \((\text{ex\_dis\_note})\)
   
   - “String”

16. Did the dictator create a personality cult? \((p\_cult)\)
   
   \[0 = \text{no}\]
   \[1 = \text{yes} \text{ (if directly stated or clearly hinted at, e.g., pictures of the president everywhere and buildings named after him, and this is implemented by the dictator’s own wish)}\]

**Change in motivation over time**

17. Did the dictator's motivation substantially change along the self-interest-ideological-motivation spectrum during his incumbency? \((\text{change})\)
   
   - Clarification: Only strong indications on significant changes are coded as change (1, 2, or 3). The coding is based on an overall judgement of the reading of the obits.
   
   \[0 = \text{constant motivation}\]
   \[1 = \text{change from predominantly ideologically motivated to predominantly self-interested}\]
   \[2 = \text{change from predominantly self-interested to predominantly ideologically motivated}\]
   \[3 = \text{change in ideology (i.e., change in ideological orientation (on economic or exclusionary dimension), but not significantly in the degree of ideological motivation)}\]
   
   - A note is written about the change if this item is coded 3.
**Personal corruption and lifestyle**

18. Was the dictator clean (not personally corrupt or engaging in self-enrichment)\(^71\) (persclean)
   - Clarification: This question regards personal corruption and theft defined as using public funds for private gains. Private gains refer to material gains for the dictator, his close family, and close friends. Hence, favoring certain businesses or paying with “gray money” to get broader policies through is not necessarily in this category.
   - 0 = clear embezzlement/personal corruption (directly stated or clear indications of embezzlement or personal corruption)
   - 1 = likely personally corrupt (weakly indicated, e.g., by broader accusations about corruption (i.e., not embezzlement/personal corruption) or withdrawn charges of embezzlement))
   - 2 = unlikely to have been personally corrupt (often nothing stated)
   - 3 = not personally corrupt (directly stated or clear indications of the dictator being clean)
   - 5 = not assessable because legitimate income and inappropriate self-enrichment are entangled (e.g., monarchs who inherited palaces, are born to an expensive lifestyle and live expensively, but where there is no evidence of stealing)

*Note: Category 2 is often the default, assuming that personal corruption as well as certain absence of it will be mentioned in the obit.*

19. Is there disagreement between sources regarding the dictator’s degree of personal corruption (Item 18)? (pc_dis)
   - Clarification: It is only coded “yes” if there is clear disagreement. If only one or not all obits hint about the dictator being personally corrupt or clean, the item is coded “no”. If only disagreement about degree, I also code the item, “no”.
   - 0 = no
   - 1 = yes

20. Disagreement between sources notes (personal corruption) (pc_disnote)
   - “String”

\(^71\) This variable exists in a “clean” version where the residual category, 5, is coded as missing (persclean_clean).
21. Did the dictator have a modest lifestyle when in power?\textsuperscript{72} (amodlifestyle)
   - Clarification: Mentioning or examples of the dictator's lifestyle, e.g., how he lives.
   - 0 = no (cultivating a highly luxurious lifestyle)
   - 1 = partly (cultivating a lifestyle clearly above average but not excessive)
   - 2 = yes (stated modest or ascetic living or examples of this)

22. Did the dictator have a modest lifestyle during his retirement?\textsuperscript{73} (modlifestyle)
   - Clarification: Mentioning or examples of the dictator's lifestyle, e.g., how he lives.
   - 0 = no (cultivating a highly luxurious lifestyle)
   - 1 = partly (cultivating a lifestyle clearly above average, but not excessive; also if the dictator goes back to (light or prestigious) work in an ordinary job after leaving power)
   - 2 = yes (stated modest or ascetic living or examples of this; also often if the dictator goes back to (hard) work in an ordinary job after leaving power)

23. Examples regarding lifestyle (Item 21) (lf_examples)
   - “String”

24. Is there disagreement between sources regarding the dictator's lifestyle (Item 21)? (lf_dis)
   - Clarification: It is only coded “yes” if there is clear disagreement. If only one or not all obits hint about the dictator's lifestyle, the item is coded “no”. If only disagreement about degree, I also code the item, “no”.
   - 0 = no
   - 1 = yes

25. Disagreement between sources notes (lifestyle) (lf_disnote)
   - “String”

\textsuperscript{72} A variable that combines Items 21 and 22 exists (modls). The value for Item 21 dominates Item 22 if they both have scores (non-missing), but the scores are different.

\textsuperscript{73} A variable that combines Items 21 and 22 exists (modls). The value for Item 21 dominates Item 22 if they both have scores (non-missing), but the scores are different.
Voluntary step-down
26. Did the dictator step down voluntarily? (stepdown)
- Clarification: This item evaluates the way the dictator left power with regard to how voluntarily he left power.
  - 0 = no (e.g., dying in power, being forced out of power in a coup d’état or a revolt, or leaving due to illness, or old age)
  - 1 = somewhat (e.g., losing elections (or finishing a military term) but having had some chance of a forced stay, succumb to strong political or popular pressure to leave power)
  - 2 = yes (e.g., leaving with no strong pressure, namely, if neither 0 or 1 is a suitable characterization of the leaving power)

Stay despite high threats
27. Did the dictator stay in power despite high future risk/threat? (staydespite)
- Clarification: Whether a dictator stays in power despite high risk, such as assassination and coup attempts or high risk of revolt.
  - 0 = no (residual, or if it is directly stated that the president was safe in power throughout his incumbency)
  - 1 = somewhat (indications of coup attempts or the president being highly unpopular)
  - 2 = yes (e.g., assassination attempts or several coup attempts)

NB: If the dictator was in power for more than 10 years, 0 is almost never assigned.

Rural/urban/royal background
28. Did the dictator grow up in a rural or urban area? (ruralurbanroyal)
- Clarification: 2 = royal trumps the two others.
  - 0 = rural
  - 1 = urban
  - 2 = royal
**Former rebel or revolutionary activity**

29. Did the dictator engage in rebel or revolutionary activity prior to entering power? (*rebelrev*)
   - Clarification: This measure captures risky activity related to politics prior to coming to power. Thus, it is a measure of sacrifice for political goals.
     - 0 = no
     - 1 = involved in successful coups prior to entering power (i.e., if entering power in a coup, that coup does not count)
     - 2 = yes (the dictator was engaged in rebel or revolutionary activity and costly political activism prior to entering power; note that if this is the case as well as the dictator engaging in a coup, this item is coded 2)

**Legacy**

30. How does the people remember the dictator? (*legacy*)
   - Clarification: This item is evaluated based on direct statements about the dictator’s popularity at the time of his death. If this is not accessible, it is evaluated based on his popularity when in power.
     - 0 = despised (most people despised him, e.g., often the case for highly brutal and corrupt, or just lazy, dictators)
     - 1 = mixed (mixed opinions, e.g., often brutal dictators, but some who also did well for the country or at least were perceived to have good intentions)
     - 2 = popular (most people liked him, e.g., often less repressive dictators who did well for the country or at least were perceived to have good intentions)

31. Is there disagreement between sources regarding the dictator’s legacy (Item 28)? (*leg_dis*)
   - Clarification: It is only coded “yes” if there is clear disagreement. If only one or not all obits hint about the legacy, the item is coded “no”. If only disagreement about degree, I also code the item, “no”.
     - 0 = no
     - 1 = yes

32. Disagreement between sources notes (legacy) (*leg_disnote*)
   - “String”
Sources and uncertainty

33. Is the coding based on other sources than obits? (notobits)
   - Clarification: In this version of the dataset, obits are the only used score, so this variable is irrelevant.
     - 0 = no, only obits
     - 1 = yes – the dictator is not dead, so step-down articles are used instead
     - 2 = no – there were no obits to find, so step-down articles are used instead

34. Notes on other sources than obits? (no_notes)
   - Clarification: Notes
     - “String”

35. Is the coding of this dictator generally based on uncertain information? (littleinfo)
   - Clarification: Typically, little information, because the available obits are few and short.
     - 0 = no
     - 1 = yes

36. Do parts of the coding rely on information from obituaries from other dictators from the same country? (laterobits)
   - Clarification: Information from other obits from the same country is only used about dictators if (a) the secondary obits were written after the dictator stepped down, and (b) there is sparse information on the item(s) of relevance for the dictator in point.
     - 0 = no
     - 1 = yes

37. Whose obits are used to code which items? (lobit_notes)
   - Clarification: Only coded if 36 is coded 1 = yes.
     - “String”

38. Notes (notes)
   - Clarification: Any important or interesting notes about the dictator, or about difficult coding decisions. Quotes may be included.
     - “String”
Appendix VI: Temporal Developments (Chapter 7)

Figure VI.1. Temporal Development in Dictators’ Motivation (Judgment-Based Measure)

Figure VI.2. Temporal Development in Dictators’ Motivation (Quote-Based Measure)
Figure VI.3. Temporal Development in Personal Corruption among Dictators

Note: The cases with high uncertainty are excluded.

Figure VI.4. Temporal Development in Dictators’ Lifestyle
Figure VI.5. Temporal Development in Dictators’ Proclaimed Economic Ideology

Figure VI.6. Temporal Development in Dictators’ Proclaimed Exclusionary Ideology

Note: The cases with high uncertainty are excluded.
### Table VII.1. Ideological Motivation (Quote-Based) and Road to Power. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Road to power (five-point scale)</strong></td>
<td>0.0320 (0.0319)</td>
<td>0.0357 (0.0493)</td>
<td>0.00115 (0.0507)</td>
<td>0.0255 (0.0505)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</strong></td>
<td>0.0424 (0.0728)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0315 (0.0757)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Road to power of the previous dictator (LIV)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0202 (0.0502)</td>
<td>0.00826 (0.0531)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>1.191*** (0.0995)</td>
<td>1.112*** (0.175)</td>
<td>1.191*** (0.203)</td>
<td>1.131*** (0.214)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
<td>291</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, † p < 0.05, ‡ p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Model 4</th>
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<tr>
<td>(judgement-based)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged independent variable</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>included</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent regime</td>
<td>0.533**</td>
<td>0.620*</td>
<td>0.493</td>
<td>0.577**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.170)</td>
<td>(0.273)</td>
<td>(0.297)</td>
<td>(0.307)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military affiliation</td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td>0.287</td>
<td>-0.0311</td>
<td>0.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.162)</td>
<td>(0.258)</td>
<td>(0.260)</td>
<td>(0.278)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>0.500**</td>
<td>0.490</td>
<td>0.473*</td>
<td>0.460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.162)</td>
<td>(0.311)</td>
<td>(0.280)</td>
<td>(0.370)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerilla</td>
<td>0.767***</td>
<td>1.105***</td>
<td>0.862**</td>
<td>1.036***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.199)</td>
<td>(0.322)</td>
<td>(0.291)</td>
<td>(0.299)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherited power</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>previous dictator</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>0.169*</td>
<td>0.169*</td>
<td>0.169*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LDV)</td>
<td>(0.0917)</td>
<td>(0.0877)</td>
<td>(0.0877)</td>
<td>(0.0877)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.500***</td>
<td>1.128***</td>
<td>1.377***</td>
<td>1.195***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.138)</td>
<td>(0.297)</td>
<td>(0.229)</td>
<td>(0.330)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * \( p < 0.1 \), *\( p < 0.05 \), **\( p < 0.01 \), ***\( p < 0.001 \). Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
Table VII.3. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Previously Revolutionary, Opposition etc. OLS Regression

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<th>Model 4</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Ideological</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>motivation</td>
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<td>motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(judgement-</td>
<td>(judgement-</td>
<td>(judgement-</td>
<td>(judgement-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>based)</td>
<td>based)</td>
<td>based)</td>
<td>based)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previously</td>
<td>0.557***</td>
<td>0.562***</td>
<td>0.693**</td>
<td>0.650**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>revolutionary,</td>
<td>(0.136)</td>
<td>(0.162)</td>
<td>(0.211)</td>
<td>(0.210)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opposition etc. (CH)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(dummy)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the</td>
<td>0.171*</td>
<td>0.260*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>previous dictator</td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LDV)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous dictator</td>
<td>-0.257</td>
<td>-0.458*</td>
<td>-0.125</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>revolutionary etc. (CH)</td>
<td>(0.204)</td>
<td>(0.210)</td>
<td>(0.0757)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LIV)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.711***</td>
<td>1.346***</td>
<td>1.695***</td>
<td>1.329***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0822)</td>
<td>(0.215)</td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
<td>(0.234)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

Table VII.4. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Costly Rebel Activity Prior to Entering Power. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
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<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
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<td>Ideological</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>motivation</td>
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<td>motivation</td>
<td>motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(judgement-</td>
<td>(judgement-</td>
<td>(judgement-</td>
<td>(judgement-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>based)</td>
<td>based)</td>
<td>based)</td>
<td>based)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous costly</td>
<td>0.321***</td>
<td>0.326***</td>
<td>0.390***</td>
<td>0.362***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rebel activity (ORDD)</td>
<td>(0.0536)</td>
<td>(0.0750)</td>
<td>(0.0728)</td>
<td>(0.0783)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(three-point scale)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>0.169*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>previous dictator</td>
<td>(0.0992)</td>
<td>(0.0964)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LDV)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous dictator</td>
<td>-0.0787</td>
<td>-0.125</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>costly rebel activity (ORDD)</td>
<td>(0.0769)</td>
<td>(0.0757)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LIV)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.697***</td>
<td>1.392***</td>
<td>1.711***</td>
<td>1.450***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0705)</td>
<td>(0.180)</td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
<td>(0.193)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
Table VII.5. Ideological Motivation (Quote-Based) and Imprisonment Prior to Gaining Power. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Model 1</th>
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<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Ideological</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>motivation (quote-</td>
<td>motivation (quote-</td>
<td>motivation (quote-</td>
<td>motivation (quote-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>based)</td>
<td>based)</td>
<td>based)</td>
<td>based)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previously jail (CH) (dummy)</td>
<td>0.240*</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>0.0990</td>
<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td>(0.132)</td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td>(0.144)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.0270</td>
<td>0.0243</td>
<td>0.0820</td>
<td>0.0841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0820)</td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td>(0.130)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous dictator previously jailed (CH) (LIV)</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.235***</td>
<td>1.170***</td>
<td>1.141***</td>
<td>1.158***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0493)</td>
<td>(0.114)</td>
<td>(0.0616)</td>
<td>(0.119)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

Table VII.6. Ideological Motivation (Quote-Based) and Previously Revolutionary, Opposition etc. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
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<td>Ideological</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>motivation (quote-</td>
<td>motivation (quote-</td>
<td>motivation (quote-</td>
<td>motivation (quote-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>based)</td>
<td>based)</td>
<td>based)</td>
<td>based)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previously revolutionary, opposition etc. (CH) (dummy)</td>
<td>0.261**</td>
<td>0.268*</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>0.158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0996)</td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td>(0.188)</td>
<td>(0.193)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.0162</td>
<td>0.0225</td>
<td>0.0802</td>
<td>0.0858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0820)</td>
<td>(0.175)</td>
<td>(0.174)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous dictator revolutionary etc. (CH) (LIV)</td>
<td>0.0323</td>
<td>0.0426</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.175)</td>
<td>(0.174)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.218***</td>
<td>1.156***</td>
<td>1.151***</td>
<td>1.165***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0504)</td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
<td>(0.0626)</td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
Table VII.7. Ideological Motivation (Quote-Based) and Costly Rebel Activity Prior to Entering Power. OLS Regression

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideological motivation (quote-based)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous costly rebel activity (ORDD) (three-point scale)</td>
<td>0.137*** (0.0380)</td>
<td>0.169*** (0.0471)</td>
<td>0.178*** (0.0472)</td>
<td>0.177*** (0.0475)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.00743 (0.0688)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0257 (0.0647)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous dictator costly rebel activity (ORDD) (LIV)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0303 (0.0521)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0328 (0.0513)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.212*** (0.0437)</td>
<td>1.165*** (0.0991)</td>
<td>1.204*** (0.0571)</td>
<td>1.172*** (0.0973)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

Table VII.8. Absence of Corruption and Road to Power. OLS Regression

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road to power (five-point scale)</td>
<td>0.166*** (0.0446)</td>
<td>0.121 (0.0779)</td>
<td>0.147* (0.0617)</td>
<td>0.152* (0.0737)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.127 (0.119)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.165 (0.120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road to power of the previous dictator (LIV)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0344 (0.0545)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.101 (0.0604)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.188*** (0.153)</td>
<td>1.106** (0.372)</td>
<td>1.324*** (0.240)</td>
<td>1.252** (0.368)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
### Table VII.9. Absence of Corruption and Imprisonment Prior to Gaining Power. OLS Regression

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previously jailed (CH) (dummy)</td>
<td>0.363**</td>
<td>0.301*</td>
<td>0.438**</td>
<td>0.324*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
<td>(0.159)</td>
<td>(0.184)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.266</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>0.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
<td>(0.172)</td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
<td>(0.182)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous dictator previously jailed (CH) (LIV)</td>
<td>-0.266</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>-0.399*</td>
<td>-0.399*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.172)</td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
<td>(0.182)</td>
<td>(0.182)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.551***</td>
<td>1.365***</td>
<td>1.578***</td>
<td>1.468***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0760)</td>
<td>(0.233)</td>
<td>(0.0945)</td>
<td>(0.214)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Observations**: 216, 129, 122, 108

**Note**: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

### Table VII.10. Absence of Corruption and Previously Revolutionary, Opposition etc. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previously revolutionary, opposition etc. (CH) (dummy)</td>
<td>0.261*</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>0.374*</td>
<td>0.295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.127)</td>
<td>(0.155)</td>
<td>(0.183)</td>
<td>(0.199)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous dictator revolutionary etc. (CH) (LIV)</td>
<td>-0.233</td>
<td>-0.283</td>
<td>-0.213</td>
<td>-0.213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.201)</td>
<td>(0.213)</td>
<td>(0.213)</td>
<td>(0.213)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.565***</td>
<td>1.343***</td>
<td>1.576***</td>
<td>1.438***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0843)</td>
<td>(0.243)</td>
<td>(0.0979)</td>
<td>(0.223)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Observations**: 216, 129, 121, 108

**Note**: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
Table VII.11. Absence of Corruption and Costly Rebel Activity Prior to Entering Power. OLS Regression

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
<td>0.186***</td>
<td>0.152*</td>
<td>0.173**</td>
<td>0.186**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0484)</td>
<td>(0.0589)</td>
<td>(0.0607)</td>
<td>(0.0627)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous costly rebel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>activity (ORDD) (three-point scale)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.0979</td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous dictator costly rebel activity (ORDD) (LIV)</td>
<td>-0.0731</td>
<td>(0.0673)</td>
<td>-0.0970</td>
<td>(0.0635)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.552***</td>
<td>1.401***</td>
<td>1.606***</td>
<td>1.408***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0764)</td>
<td>(0.219)</td>
<td>(0.0986)</td>
<td>(0.221)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

Table VII.12. Modest Lifestyle and Road to Power. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modest lifestyle</td>
<td>0.101*</td>
<td>0.279*</td>
<td>0.152*</td>
<td>0.326*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0589)</td>
<td>(0.136)</td>
<td>(0.0768)</td>
<td>(0.141)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.454*</td>
<td>(0.238)</td>
<td>0.464*</td>
<td>(0.207)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road to power of the previous dictator (LIV)</td>
<td>-0.100</td>
<td>(0.0818)</td>
<td>-0.149</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.635***</td>
<td>-0.122</td>
<td>0.751**</td>
<td>0.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.174)</td>
<td>(0.472)</td>
<td>(0.276)</td>
<td>(0.438)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
### Table VII.13. Modest Lifestyle and Imprisonment Prior to Gaining Power. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Modest lifestyle</td>
<td>Modest lifestyle</td>
<td>Modest lifestyle</td>
<td>Modest lifestyle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previously jailed (CH)</td>
<td>0.337 (0.214)</td>
<td>0.619 (0.443)</td>
<td>0.912 (0.277)</td>
<td>0.292 (0.866)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.280 (0.269)</td>
<td>-0.129 (0.232)</td>
<td>0.281 (0.389)</td>
<td>0.292 (0.866)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous dictator previously jailed (CH) (LIV)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.129 (0.232)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0223 (0.398)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.890*** (0.0979)</td>
<td>0.712* (0.272)</td>
<td>0.809*** (0.141)</td>
<td>0.790+ (0.406)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

### Table VII.14. Modest Lifestyle and Previously Revolutionary, Opposition etc. OLS Regression

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Modest lifestyle</td>
<td>Modest lifestyle</td>
<td>Modest lifestyle</td>
<td>Modest lifestyle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previously revolutionary, opposition etc. (CH) (dummy)</td>
<td>0.0533 (0.193)</td>
<td>-0.0582 (0.343)</td>
<td>0.115 (0.271)</td>
<td>-0.459 (0.457)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.356 (0.254)</td>
<td>0.314 (0.288)</td>
<td>0.07562 (0.303)</td>
<td>0.0570 (0.570)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous dictator revolutionary etc. (CH) (LIV)</td>
<td>0.947*** (0.107)</td>
<td>0.761* (0.319)</td>
<td>0.879*** (0.160)</td>
<td>0.899* (0.389)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.947*** (0.107)</td>
<td>0.761* (0.319)</td>
<td>0.879*** (0.160)</td>
<td>0.899* (0.389)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
Table VII.15. Modest Lifestyle and Costly Rebel Activity Prior to Entering Power. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Modest lifestyle</td>
<td>Modest lifestyle</td>
<td>Modest lifestyle</td>
<td>Modest lifestyle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous costly rebel activity (ORDD) (three-point scale)</td>
<td>0.242** (0.0857)</td>
<td>0.234 (0.229)</td>
<td>0.288* (0.118)</td>
<td>0.227 (0.242)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.430+ (0.242)</td>
<td>0.429 (0.274)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous dictator costly rebel activity (ORDD) (LIV)</td>
<td>-0.0325 (0.122)</td>
<td>-0.0797 (0.181)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.795*** (0.0995)</td>
<td>0.475 (0.275)</td>
<td>0.805*** (0.170)</td>
<td>0.552 (0.338)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

Table VII.16. Voluntary Step-Down and Imprisonment Prior to Gaining Power. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previously jailed (CH) (dummy)</td>
<td>-0.177* (0.0777)</td>
<td>-0.178* (0.100)</td>
<td>-0.182* (0.0934)</td>
<td>-0.175* (0.100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.178* (0.0963)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.262* (0.134)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous dictator previously jailed (CH) (LIV)</td>
<td>-0.151 (0.103)</td>
<td>-0.0938 (0.102)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.367*** (0.0506)</td>
<td>0.354*** (0.0649)</td>
<td>0.467*** (0.0745)</td>
<td>0.385*** (0.0772)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
Table VII.17. Voluntary Step-Down and Previously Revolutionary, Opposition etc. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previously revolutionary, opposition etc. (CH) (dummy)</td>
<td>-0.238** (0.0739)</td>
<td>-0.204* (0.0921)</td>
<td>-0.105 (0.0967)</td>
<td>-0.116 (0.0916)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.163* (0.0976)</td>
<td>0.237* (0.137)</td>
<td>0.105 (0.0967)</td>
<td>0.116 (0.0916)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous dictator revolutionary etc. (CH) (LIV)</td>
<td>-0.244* (0.103)</td>
<td>-0.153 (0.102)</td>
<td>-0.153 (0.102)</td>
<td>-0.153 (0.102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.395*** (0.0551)</td>
<td>0.376*** (0.0723)</td>
<td>0.494*** (0.0821)</td>
<td>0.499*** (0.0889)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations 237 144 133 120

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

Table VII.18. Voluntary Step-Down and Costly Rebel Activity Prior to Entering Power. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous costly rebel activity (ORDD) (three-point scale)</td>
<td>-0.0838* (0.0378)</td>
<td>-0.0787 (0.0485)</td>
<td>-0.0955* (0.0496)</td>
<td>-0.0827* (0.0489)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.135 (0.0969)</td>
<td>0.140 (0.102)</td>
<td>0.140 (0.102)</td>
<td>0.140 (0.102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous dictator costly rebel activity (ORDD) (LIV)</td>
<td>-0.0214 (0.0541)</td>
<td>-0.00678 (0.0494)</td>
<td>-0.00678 (0.0494)</td>
<td>-0.00678 (0.0494)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.419*** (0.0562)</td>
<td>0.420*** (0.0756)</td>
<td>0.503*** (0.0893)</td>
<td>0.439*** (0.0861)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations 279 160 158 154

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
### Table VII.19. Ideological Motivation (Quote-Based) and Education. OLS Regression

<table>
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<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(none, military,</td>
<td>0.0368 (0.0520)</td>
<td>-0.0311 (0.0588)</td>
<td>-0.00228 (0.0786)</td>
<td>0.0321 (0.0770)</td>
<td>0.0363 (0.0757)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>university) (CH)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES (lower,</td>
<td>0.0422 (0.0658)</td>
<td>-0.0271 (0.0864)</td>
<td>-0.0220 (0.0854)</td>
<td>-0.0511 (0.0844)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>middle, upper</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>class) (CH)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the previous</td>
<td>0.0323 (0.0885)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dictator (LDV)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the previous</td>
<td>-0.00266 (0.0678)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0149 (0.0652)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dictator (CH) (LIV)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.217*** (0.120)</td>
<td>1.276*** (0.169)</td>
<td>1.269*** (0.233)</td>
<td>1.240*** (0.227)</td>
<td>1.196*** (0.252)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations: 242 234 148 157 144

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, **** $p < 0.001$. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

### Table VII.20. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Education. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Model 2</th>
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<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>variable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>included</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>0.282* (0.135)</td>
<td>0.149 (0.191)</td>
<td>0.406* (0.214)</td>
<td>0.242 (0.213)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education (CH)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>0.0266 (0.156)</td>
<td>0.0247 (0.177)</td>
<td>0.126 (0.234)</td>
<td>-0.0344 (0.235)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education (CH)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No education</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CH)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES (lower,</td>
<td>0.0211 (0.0878)</td>
<td>0.0476 (0.117)</td>
<td>0.0262 (0.130)</td>
<td>0.166 (0.137)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>middle, upper</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>class) (CH)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of</td>
<td>0.206* (0.115)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.263* (0.108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the previous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dictator (LDV)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.717*** (0.213)</td>
<td>1.277*** (0.311)</td>
<td>1.586*** (0.285)</td>
<td>1.096*** (0.306)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations: 231 134 129 114

436
Table VII.21. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and University Education. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideological motivation</td>
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<tr>
<td>(judgement-based)</td>
<td>0.274*</td>
<td>0.272*</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.340*</td>
<td>0.249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(dummy) (CH)</td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td>(0.167)</td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
<td>(0.171)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES (lower, middle, upper</td>
<td>0.0216</td>
<td>0.0490</td>
<td>0.0374</td>
<td>0.172</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>class) (CH)</td>
<td>(0.0881)</td>
<td>(0.117)</td>
<td>(0.127)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous</td>
<td>0.208*</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.263*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of the previous</td>
<td>-0.217</td>
<td>-0.443*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dictator (LIV)</td>
<td>(0.178)</td>
<td>(0.183)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.767***</td>
<td>1.726***</td>
<td>1.283***</td>
<td>1.669***</td>
<td>1.100***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0809)</td>
<td>(0.191)</td>
<td>(0.306)</td>
<td>(0.250)</td>
<td>(0.299)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
Table VII.22. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Education in a Western Country. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education from a Western country (dummy) (CH)</td>
<td>0.134 (0.154)</td>
<td>0.0710 (0.156)</td>
<td>0.0674 (0.157)</td>
<td>0.203 (0.202)</td>
<td>-0.0343 (0.206)</td>
<td>0.0948 (0.235)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University education (dummy) (CH)</td>
<td>0.271* (0.122)</td>
<td>0.269* (0.122)</td>
<td>0.116 (0.177)</td>
<td>0.285* (0.163)</td>
<td>0.158 (0.178)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES (lower, middle, upper class) (CH)</td>
<td>0.0279 (0.0892)</td>
<td>0.0397 (0.117)</td>
<td>0.0418 (0.136)</td>
<td>0.145 (0.145)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.214* (0.113)</td>
<td>0.236* (0.118)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western education of the previous dictator (LIV)</td>
<td>0.170 (0.172)</td>
<td>0.117 (0.182)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.847*** (0.0793)</td>
<td>1.746*** (0.0856)</td>
<td>1.694*** (0.192)</td>
<td>1.261*** (0.310)</td>
<td>1.567*** (0.254)</td>
<td>1.016** (0.332)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

Table VII.23. Absence of Corruption and Education in a Foreign Country. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education from a foreign country (dummy) (CH)</td>
<td>0.312** (0.112)</td>
<td>0.303* (0.116)</td>
<td>0.307* (0.118)</td>
<td>0.169 (0.133)</td>
<td>0.156 (0.162)</td>
<td>0.157 (0.162)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University education (dummy) (CH)</td>
<td>0.0387 (0.110)</td>
<td>0.0449 (0.113)</td>
<td>-0.0939 (0.147)</td>
<td>-0.0165 (0.152)</td>
<td>0.0494 (0.152)</td>
<td>-0.0880 (0.155)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES (lower, middle, upper class) (CH)</td>
<td>-0.0371 (0.0900)</td>
<td>-0.0165 (0.122)</td>
<td>-0.0307 (0.126)</td>
<td>0.0796 (0.130)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.144 (0.130)</td>
<td>0.107 (0.128)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign education of the previous dictator (CH) (LIV)</td>
<td>0.0407 (0.166)</td>
<td>-0.0148 (0.183)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.545*** (0.0803)</td>
<td>1.531*** (0.0920)</td>
<td>1.597*** (0.160)</td>
<td>1.412*** (0.288)</td>
<td>1.561*** (0.215)</td>
<td>1.319*** (0.304)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
Table VII.24. Absence of Corruption and Education in a Western Country. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
<td>0.219*</td>
<td>0.205*</td>
<td>0.212*</td>
<td>0.197*</td>
<td>0.157*</td>
<td>0.188*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University education</td>
<td>0.0684</td>
<td>0.0728</td>
<td>-0.0847</td>
<td>0.0526</td>
<td>-0.0822</td>
<td>0.0672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military education</td>
<td>-0.0311</td>
<td>-0.0203</td>
<td>-0.0585</td>
<td>0.0672</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.593***</td>
<td>1.566***</td>
<td>1.621***</td>
<td>1.406***</td>
<td>1.642***</td>
<td>1.318***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations 215 215 215 129 122 108

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

Table VII.25. Voluntary Step-Down and Socioeconomic Background. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lagged independent variable included</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University education (CH)</td>
<td>0.176*</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>0.104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military education (CH)</td>
<td>0.303*</td>
<td>0.263*</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>0.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No education (CH)</td>
<td>*Reference</td>
<td>*Reference</td>
<td>*Reference</td>
<td>*Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES (lower, middle, upper class) (CH)</td>
<td>0.0862*</td>
<td>0.161*</td>
<td>0.151*</td>
<td>0.130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.00878</td>
<td>-0.0902</td>
<td>-0.207</td>
<td>-0.136</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations 238 145 134 121

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
### Table VII.26. Voluntary Step-Down and Education. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (LEAD) (four-point scale)</td>
<td>0.169***</td>
<td>0.130*</td>
<td>0.145***</td>
<td>0.137*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0388)</td>
<td>(0.0533)</td>
<td>(0.0542)</td>
<td>(0.0543)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES (lower, middle, upper class) (CH)</td>
<td>0.0826+</td>
<td>0.149+</td>
<td>0.162+</td>
<td>0.132+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0462)</td>
<td>(0.0771)</td>
<td>(0.0678)</td>
<td>(0.0774)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0988)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of the previous dictator (LIV)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0855</td>
<td>0.0620</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0542)</td>
<td>(0.0511)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.158</td>
<td>-0.195</td>
<td>-0.358**</td>
<td>-0.283*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0978)</td>
<td>(0.136)</td>
<td>(0.119)</td>
<td>(0.127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

### Table VII.27. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Socioeconomic Background. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</td>
<td>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</td>
<td>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</td>
<td>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged independent variable included</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper class (CH)</td>
<td>0.0499</td>
<td>0.0145</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.173)</td>
<td>(0.225)</td>
<td>(0.292)</td>
<td>(0.317)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle class (CH)</td>
<td>0.216</td>
<td>0.335*</td>
<td>0.283</td>
<td>0.464*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.157)</td>
<td>(0.172)</td>
<td>(0.189)</td>
<td>(0.190)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower class (CH)</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.209+</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.235*</td>
<td>0.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.775***</td>
<td>1.271***</td>
<td>1.713***</td>
<td>1.259***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
<td>(0.246)</td>
<td>(0.199)</td>
<td>(0.270)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
### Table VII.28. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Socioeconomic Background. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lagged independent variable included</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High family wealth (LEAD)</td>
<td>-0.00107</td>
<td>0.247</td>
<td>0.0751</td>
<td>0.210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.160)</td>
<td>(0.227)</td>
<td>(0.229)</td>
<td>(0.242)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium family wealth (LEAD)</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>0.411*</td>
<td>0.365*</td>
<td>0.494*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.155)</td>
<td>(0.187)</td>
<td>(0.192)</td>
<td>(0.196)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low family wealth (LEAD)</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.248*</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0979)</td>
<td>(0.248)</td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
<td>(0.281)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.827***</td>
<td>1.216***</td>
<td>1.837***</td>
<td>1.357***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
<td>(0.244)</td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
<td>(0.281)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

### Table VII.29. Absence of Corruption and Socioeconomic Background. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lagged independent variable included</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper class (CH)</td>
<td>-0.0630</td>
<td>-0.182</td>
<td>-0.179</td>
<td>0.000600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
<td>(0.277)</td>
<td>(0.248)</td>
<td>(0.271)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle class (CH)</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>0.187</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.279+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
<td>(0.138)</td>
<td>(0.162)</td>
<td>(0.162)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower class (CH)</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.586***</td>
<td>1.326***</td>
<td>1.592***</td>
<td>1.395***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0923)</td>
<td>(0.233)</td>
<td>(0.162)</td>
<td>(0.266)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
### Table VII.30. Absence of Corruption and Socioeconomic Background. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged independent variable included</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High family wealth (CH)</td>
<td>-0.164 $(0.174)$</td>
<td>0.0961 $(0.253)$</td>
<td>-0.0800 $(0.246)$</td>
<td>0.0281 $(0.285)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium family wealth (CH)</td>
<td>0.200 $(0.122)$</td>
<td>0.485** $(0.147)$</td>
<td>0.362* $(0.145)$</td>
<td>0.478** $(0.158)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low family wealth (CH)</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.161 $(0.128)$</td>
<td>0.142 $(0.134)$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.598*** $(0.0935)$</td>
<td>1.143*** $(0.267)$</td>
<td>1.558*** $(0.143)$</td>
<td>1.286*** $(0.310)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, **** $p < 0.001$. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

### Table VII.31. Voluntary Step-Down and Socioeconomic Background. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged independent variable included</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper class (CH)</td>
<td>0.176* $(0.0914)$</td>
<td>0.272* $(0.160)$</td>
<td>0.474* $(0.180)$</td>
<td>0.422** $(0.196)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle class (CH)</td>
<td>0.308*** $(0.0830)$</td>
<td>0.360*** $(0.0853)$</td>
<td>0.353*** $(0.0928)$</td>
<td>0.316** $(0.0956)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower class (CH)</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.160* $(0.0883)$</td>
<td>0.245* $(0.124)$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.141** $(0.0441)$</td>
<td>0.105* $(0.0502)$</td>
<td>0.159 $(0.0967)$</td>
<td>0.193* $(0.0977)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, **** $p < 0.001$. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
Table VII.32. Voluntary Step-Down and Socioeconomic Background. OLS Regression

<table>
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<th>Model 4</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Lagged independent</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>variable included</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High family wealth</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>0.211*</td>
<td>0.0999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CH)</td>
<td>(0.0951)</td>
<td>(0.171)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td>(0.150)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium family wealth</td>
<td>0.217**</td>
<td>0.0555</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.0891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CH)</td>
<td>(0.0822)</td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low family wealth</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CH)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>previous dictator</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.228*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LDV)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.207**</td>
<td>0.241***</td>
<td>0.245*</td>
<td>0.222*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0628)</td>
<td>(0.0835)</td>
<td>(0.0956)</td>
<td>(0.0839)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

Table VII.33. Ideological Motivation (Quote-Based) and Entry Age. OLS Regression

<table>
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<th>Model 2</th>
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<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Ideological</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>motivation</td>
<td>motivation</td>
<td>motivation</td>
<td>motivation</td>
<td>motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(quote-based)</td>
<td>(quote-based)</td>
<td>(quote-based)</td>
<td>(quote-based)</td>
<td>(quote-based)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry age (CH)</td>
<td>0.00465</td>
<td>0.00645</td>
<td>0.00656</td>
<td>0.00706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00383)</td>
<td>(0.00468)</td>
<td>(0.00507)</td>
<td>(0.00531)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0217</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>previous dictator</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0883)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0920)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LDV)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry age of the</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00739</td>
<td>0.00293</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>previous dictator</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00644)</td>
<td>(0.00628)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CH) (LIV)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.058****</td>
<td>0.882***</td>
<td>0.487</td>
<td>0.685*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.202)</td>
<td>(0.253)</td>
<td>(0.364)</td>
<td>(0.369)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
### Table VII.34. Absence of Corruption and Entry Age. OLS Regression

<table>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Absence of</td>
<td>Absence of</td>
<td>Absence of</td>
<td>Absence of</td>
<td>Absence of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>corruption</td>
<td>corruption</td>
<td>corruption</td>
<td>corruption</td>
<td>corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry age (CH)</td>
<td>0.00924*</td>
<td>0.0145*</td>
<td>0.0144*</td>
<td>0.0199**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00513)</td>
<td>(0.00679)</td>
<td>(0.00773)</td>
<td>(0.00742)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>0.0845</td>
<td>0.0845</td>
<td>0.0845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>previous</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dictator (LDV)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry age of the</td>
<td>0.00309</td>
<td>-0.0102</td>
<td>-0.0102</td>
<td>-0.0102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>previous dictator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CH) (LIV)</td>
<td>(0.00798)</td>
<td>(0.00718)</td>
<td>(0.00718)</td>
<td>(0.00718)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.178***</td>
<td>0.671</td>
<td>0.693</td>
<td>0.983*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.279)</td>
<td>(0.406)</td>
<td>(0.500)</td>
<td>(0.505)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, † p < 0.05, ‡ p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

### Table VII.35. Modest Lifestyle and Entry Age. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
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<td>Modest lifestyle</td>
<td>Modest lifestyle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry age (CH)</td>
<td>0.0166**</td>
<td>0.00252</td>
<td>0.0200*</td>
<td>0.00911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00616)</td>
<td>(0.0139)</td>
<td>(0.00830)</td>
<td>(0.0132)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the</td>
<td>0.351</td>
<td>0.327</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>previous dictator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LDV)</td>
<td>(0.262)</td>
<td>(0.292)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry age of the</td>
<td>0.00510</td>
<td>0.0161</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>previous dictator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CH) (LIV)</td>
<td>(0.0125)</td>
<td>(0.0238)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.623</td>
<td>-0.357</td>
<td>-0.532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.328)</td>
<td>(0.726)</td>
<td>(0.720)</td>
<td>(1.504)</td>
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<td>Observations</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, † p < 0.05, ‡ p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
## Table VII.36. Voluntary Step-Down and Entry Age. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
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<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>step-down</td>
<td>step-down</td>
<td>step-down</td>
<td>step-down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry age (CH)</td>
<td>0.00657*</td>
<td>0.00344</td>
<td>0.00187</td>
<td>-0.000195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00339)</td>
<td>(0.00432)</td>
<td>(0.00470)</td>
<td>(0.00491)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the</td>
<td>0.192*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.270*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>previous dictator</td>
<td>(0.0974)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LDV)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry age of the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00990*</td>
<td>0.00601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>previous dictator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00584)</td>
<td>(0.00566)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CH) (LIV)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>0.136</td>
<td>-0.206</td>
<td>0.0276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.166)</td>
<td>(0.225)</td>
<td>(0.370)</td>
<td>(0.354)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

## Table VII.37. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Teaching Career. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
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<td>Ideological</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>motivation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(judgement-</td>
<td>(judgement-</td>
<td>(judgement-</td>
<td>(judgement-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>based)</td>
<td>based)</td>
<td>based)</td>
<td>based)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching career</td>
<td>0.0824</td>
<td>0.0978</td>
<td>0.0780</td>
<td>0.0880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(dummy) (LEAD)</td>
<td>(0.179)</td>
<td>(0.201)</td>
<td>(0.194)</td>
<td>(0.212)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the</td>
<td>0.225*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.241*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>previous dictator</td>
<td>(0.0965)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0966)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LDV)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching career of</td>
<td>-0.187</td>
<td>-0.0247</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the previous dictator</td>
<td>(0.212)</td>
<td>(0.195)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LEAD) (LIV)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.890***</td>
<td>1.446***</td>
<td>1.876***</td>
<td>1.423***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0726)</td>
<td>(0.201)</td>
<td>(0.0968)</td>
<td>(0.204)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
Table VII.38. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Law Career. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law career (dummy) (LEAD)</td>
<td>0.146 (0.152)</td>
<td>0.126 (0.173)</td>
<td>0.210 (0.153)</td>
<td>0.0980 (0.176)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.218* (0.0951)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.235* (0.0945)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer career of the previous dictator (LEAD) (LIV)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.147 (0.175)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0954 (0.178)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.879*** (0.0739)</td>
<td>1.454*** (0.194)</td>
<td>1.799*** (0.0972)</td>
<td>1.411*** (0.202)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

Table VII.39. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Political Career. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political career (dummy) (LEAD)</td>
<td>0.0902 (0.132)</td>
<td>-0.0939 (0.194)</td>
<td>0.130 (0.193)</td>
<td>0.0284 (0.210)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.230* (0.0956)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.242* (0.0938)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political career of the previous dictator (LEAD) (LIV)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.234 (0.176)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.226 (0.175)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.869*** (0.0700)</td>
<td>1.475*** (0.196)</td>
<td>1.897*** (0.0889)</td>
<td>1.495*** (0.210)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
### Table VII.40. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Landowner (Career). OLS Regression

<table>
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<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Ideological motivation</td>
<td>Ideological motivation</td>
<td>Ideological motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(judgement-based)</td>
<td>(judgement-based)</td>
<td>(judgement-based)</td>
<td>(judgement-based)</td>
<td>(judgement-based)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristocratic landowner (dummy) (LEAD)</td>
<td>-0.0486 (0.181)</td>
<td>0.0835 (0.282)</td>
<td>0.298 (0.423)</td>
<td>-0.00420 (0.556)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.225* (0.0979)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.242* (0.0977)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristocratic landowner of the previous dictator (LEAD) (LIV)</td>
<td>-0.240 (0.322)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0974 (0.421)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.906*** (0.0729)</td>
<td>1.453*** (0.203)</td>
<td>1.865*** (0.0932)</td>
<td>1.419*** (0.203)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

### Table VII.41. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Blue-collar Worker (Career). OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ideological motivation</td>
<td>Ideological motivation</td>
<td>Ideological motivation</td>
<td>Ideological motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(judgement-based)</td>
<td>(judgement-based)</td>
<td>(judgement-based)</td>
<td>(judgement-based)</td>
<td>(judgement-based)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue-collar worker (dummy) (LEAD)</td>
<td>0.244 (0.177)</td>
<td>0.236 (0.240)</td>
<td>0.119 (0.255)</td>
<td>0.157 (0.258)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.206* (0.0973)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.202* (0.0964)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue-collar worker of the previous dictator (LEAD) (LIV)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.222 (0.211)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.171 (0.208)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.864*** (0.0681)</td>
<td>1.467*** (0.197)</td>
<td>1.819*** (0.0830)</td>
<td>1.468*** (0.201)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
### Table VII.42. Voluntary Step-Down and Military Career. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>step-down</td>
<td>step-down</td>
<td>step-down</td>
<td>step-down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military career (dummy) (LEAD)</td>
<td>0.0763</td>
<td>0.00690</td>
<td>-0.0836</td>
<td>-0.0527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0780)</td>
<td>(0.0999)</td>
<td>(0.0860)</td>
<td>(0.0937)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.171*</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.189*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0972)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military career of the previous dictator (LEAD) (LIV)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0932)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.325***</td>
<td>0.340***</td>
<td>0.390***</td>
<td>0.311***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0507)</td>
<td>(0.0746)</td>
<td>(0.0809)</td>
<td>(0.0790)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

### Table VII.43. Ideological Motivation (Quote-Based) and Electoral Democracy. OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ideological</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>motivation</td>
<td>motivation</td>
<td>motivation</td>
<td>motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(quote-based)</td>
<td>(quote-based)</td>
<td>(quote-based)</td>
<td>(quote-based)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Democracy</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>0.310</td>
<td>0.268</td>
<td>0.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(V-Dem)</td>
<td>(0.269)</td>
<td>(0.313)</td>
<td>(0.321)</td>
<td>(0.335)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.0598</td>
<td>-0.0970</td>
<td>0.421</td>
<td>(0.0738)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0738)</td>
<td>(0.404)</td>
<td>(0.394)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral democracy level for the previous dictator (LIV)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.239***</td>
<td>1.124***</td>
<td>1.212***</td>
<td>1.061***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0708)</td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td>(0.0998)</td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
Table VII.44. Ideological Motivation (Quote-Based) and GWF’s Autocracy Types. OLS Regression.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ideological motivation (quote-based)</td>
<td>Ideological motivation (quote-based)</td>
<td>Ideological motivation (quote-based)</td>
<td>Ideological motivation (quote-based)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged independent variable included</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalist dictatorship</td>
<td>-0.262 (0.172)</td>
<td>-0.0251 (0.244)</td>
<td>-0.468 (0.435)</td>
<td>-0.137 (0.469)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military dictatorship</td>
<td>-0.0133 (0.162)</td>
<td>0.121 (0.228)</td>
<td>-0.222 (0.428)</td>
<td>0.0449 (0.468)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party dictatorship</td>
<td>0.133 (0.169)</td>
<td>0.306 (0.238)</td>
<td>-0.0528 (0.410)</td>
<td>0.178 (0.439)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.00998 (0.0766)</td>
<td>-0.0144 (0.0789)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.280*** (0.151)</td>
<td>1.079*** (0.237)</td>
<td>1.231*** (0.246)</td>
<td>1.108*** (0.243)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
Table VII.45. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Degree of Personalism (Exit Level). OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree of personalism upon exit (GWF)</td>
<td>-1.028*** (0.213)</td>
<td>-1.023*** (0.245)</td>
<td>-0.989*** (0.282)</td>
<td>-1.079*** (0.280)</td>
<td>-0.884** (0.321)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency (days)</td>
<td>-0.0000000792 (0.0000169)</td>
<td>-0.00000179 (0.0000280)</td>
<td>-0.000000836 (0.0000223)</td>
<td>-0.00000194 (0.0000291)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.167 (0.110)</td>
<td>0.162 (0.109)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous dictator’s level of personalism (LIV)</td>
<td>-0.105 (0.281)</td>
<td>-0.175 (0.298)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.297*** (0.0990)</td>
<td>2.299*** (0.104)</td>
<td>1.987*** (0.244)</td>
<td>2.282*** (0.145)</td>
<td>2.015*** (0.260)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
### Table VII.46. Ideological Motivation (Quote-Based) and Degree of Personalism (Average). OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Average level of personalism (GWF)</th>
<th>Length of incumbency (days)</th>
<th>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</th>
<th>Previous dictator’s level of personalism (LIV)</th>
<th>Constant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>-0.555*** (0.163)</td>
<td>0.00000178 (0.0000125)</td>
<td>0.0169 (0.0841)</td>
<td>1.460*** (0.0647)</td>
<td>1.460*** (0.0647)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>-0.680*** (0.180)</td>
<td>0.00000259 (0.0000175)</td>
<td>0.0169 (0.0841)</td>
<td>1.424*** (0.0675)</td>
<td>1.424*** (0.0675)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 3</td>
<td>-0.422* (0.244)</td>
<td>0.00000237 (0.0000175)</td>
<td>0.179 (0.195)</td>
<td>1.362*** (0.144)</td>
<td>1.362*** (0.144)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 4</td>
<td>-0.620* (0.256)</td>
<td>-0.00000290 (0.0000186)</td>
<td>0.252 (0.208)</td>
<td>1.384*** (0.0879)</td>
<td>1.384*** (0.0879)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 5</td>
<td>-0.537* (0.275)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.315*** (0.151)</td>
<td>1.315*** (0.151)</td>
<td>1.315*** (0.151)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

### Table VII.47. Ideological Motivation (Quote-Based) and Degree of Personalism (Exit Level). OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Degree of personalism upon exit (GWF)</th>
<th>Length of incumbency (days)</th>
<th>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</th>
<th>Previous dictator’s level of personalism (LIV)</th>
<th>Constant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>-0.563*** (0.143)</td>
<td>0.00000151 (0.0000119)</td>
<td>-0.0110 (0.0789)</td>
<td>0.00338 (0.160)</td>
<td>1.486*** (0.0597)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>-0.649*** (0.150)</td>
<td>0.00000562 (0.0000163)</td>
<td>-0.0292 (0.0829)</td>
<td>0.00862 (0.183)</td>
<td>1.453*** (0.0639)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 3</td>
<td>-0.482* (0.214)</td>
<td>0.00000521 (0.0000159)</td>
<td>-0.0292 (0.0829)</td>
<td>0.00862 (0.183)</td>
<td>1.453*** (0.141)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 4</td>
<td>-0.607** (0.207)</td>
<td>-0.00000735 (0.0000165)</td>
<td>0.00862 (0.183)</td>
<td>1.462*** (0.0841)</td>
<td>1.486*** (0.0639)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 5</td>
<td>-0.498* (0.231)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.479*** (0.154)</td>
<td>1.479*** (0.154)</td>
<td>1.479*** (0.154)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
Table VII.48. Voluntary Step-Down and Degree of Personalism (Average). OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average level of personalism (GWF)</td>
<td>-0.706*** (0.154)</td>
<td>-0.611*** (0.169)</td>
<td>-0.478* (0.208)</td>
<td>-0.684** (0.204)</td>
<td>-0.606** (0.223)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency (days)</td>
<td>-0.0000134 (0.00000958)</td>
<td>-0.0000210 (0.0000121)</td>
<td>-0.0000132 (0.00000970)</td>
<td>-0.0000134 (0.0000113)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.171 (0.110)</td>
<td>0.136 (0.110)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous dictator’s level of personalism (LIV)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.134 (0.175)</td>
<td>-0.0665 (0.201)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.586*** (0.0865)</td>
<td>0.617*** (0.0886)</td>
<td>0.569*** (0.118)</td>
<td>0.677*** (0.111)</td>
<td>0.600*** (0.147)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

Table VII.49. Voluntary Step-Down and Degree of Personalism (Exit Level). OLS Regression.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
<td>Voluntary step-down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of personalism upon exit (GWF)</td>
<td>-0.676*** (0.143)</td>
<td>-0.596*** (0.155)</td>
<td>-0.472* (0.186)</td>
<td>-0.506** (0.172)</td>
<td>-0.461† (0.187)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency (days)</td>
<td>-0.0000141 (0.00000962)</td>
<td>-0.0000262 (0.0000128)</td>
<td>-0.0000199 (0.00000980)</td>
<td>-0.0000223 (0.0000124)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.117 (0.112)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous dictator’s level of personalism (LIV)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.194 (0.173)</td>
<td>-0.152 (0.204)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.592*** (0.0836)</td>
<td>0.623*** (0.0859)</td>
<td>0.599*** (0.122)</td>
<td>0.663*** (0.0940)</td>
<td>0.696*** (0.137)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, † p < 0.05, ‡ p < 0.01. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
### Table VII.50. Absence of Corruption and Degree of Personalism (Average). OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average level of personalism (GWF)</td>
<td>-1.035*** (0.206)</td>
<td>-0.926*** (0.249)</td>
<td>-0.621* (0.296)</td>
<td>-0.601* (0.297)</td>
<td>-0.562* (0.310)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency (days)</td>
<td>-0.0000153 (0.0000188)</td>
<td>-0.0000553* (0.0000302)</td>
<td>-0.00000471* (0.0000264)</td>
<td>-0.0000653* (0.0000324)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.0865 (0.126)</td>
<td>0.135 (0.130)</td>
<td>-0.0959 (0.322)</td>
<td>0.0415 (0.300)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous dictator’s level of personalism (LIV)</td>
<td>1.996*** (0.0598)</td>
<td>2.026*** (0.0745)</td>
<td>1.880*** (0.219)</td>
<td>1.994*** (0.105)</td>
<td>1.801*** (0.215)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.996*** (0.0598)</td>
<td>2.026*** (0.0745)</td>
<td>1.880*** (0.219)</td>
<td>1.994*** (0.105)</td>
<td>1.801*** (0.215)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

### Table VII.51. Absence of Corruption and Degree of Personalism (Exit Level). OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of personalism upon exit (GWF)</td>
<td>-0.802*** (0.188)</td>
<td>-0.636*** (0.227)</td>
<td>-0.444* (0.247)</td>
<td>-0.449 (0.283)</td>
<td>-0.325 (0.274)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency (days)</td>
<td>-0.0000292 (0.0000180)</td>
<td>-0.0000645* (0.0000305)</td>
<td>-0.0000626* (0.0000238)</td>
<td>-0.0000689* (0.0000315)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.137 (0.134)</td>
<td>0.160 (0.135)</td>
<td>-0.192 (0.313)</td>
<td>-0.0617 (0.308)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous dictator’s level of personalism (LIV)</td>
<td>1.948**** (0.0597)</td>
<td>2.010*** (0.0704)</td>
<td>1.779*** (0.230)</td>
<td>2.029*** (0.0884)</td>
<td>1.743*** (0.231)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.948**** (0.0597)</td>
<td>2.010*** (0.0704)</td>
<td>1.779*** (0.230)</td>
<td>2.029*** (0.0884)</td>
<td>1.743*** (0.231)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
### Table VII.52. Modest Lifestyle and Degree of Personalism (Average). OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modest lifestyle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average level of personalism (GWF)</td>
<td>-0.323 (0.357)</td>
<td>-0.272 (0.400)</td>
<td>0.793 (0.754)</td>
<td>0.0961 (0.471)</td>
<td>1.034 (1.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency (days)</td>
<td>-0.000000717 (0.0000234)</td>
<td>0.00000503 (0.0000392)</td>
<td>-0.0000105 (0.0000283)</td>
<td>0.0000411 (0.0000501)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.046 (0.269)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.493* (0.252)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous dictator’s level of personalism (LIV)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.187 (0.511)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.051*** (0.174)</td>
<td>1.070*** (0.186)</td>
<td>-0.0493 (0.362)</td>
<td>0.934*** (0.260)</td>
<td>0.0862 (0.448)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Observations**: 105  105  23  60  23

**Note**: Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

### Table VII.53. Modest Lifestyle and Degree of Personalism (Exit Level). OLS Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modest lifestyle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of personalism upon exit (GWF)</td>
<td>-0.170 (0.335)</td>
<td>-0.0773 (0.368)</td>
<td>0.719 (0.724)</td>
<td>0.0585 (0.499)</td>
<td>0.603 (1.066)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency (days)</td>
<td>-0.00000192 (0.0000235)</td>
<td>0.0000556 (0.0000512)</td>
<td>-0.0000214 (0.0000307)</td>
<td>0.0000598 (0.0000553)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of the previous dictator (LDV)</td>
<td>0.467 (0.266)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.461 (0.265)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous dictator’s level of personalism (LIV)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.146 (0.496)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.984*** (0.176)</td>
<td>1.050*** (0.187)</td>
<td>-0.139 (0.346)</td>
<td>0.993*** (0.256)</td>
<td>-0.196 (0.434)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Observations**: 98  98  20  55  20

**Note**: Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
Figure VII.1. Ideological Motivation (Quote-Based) and Road to Power. Based on Naked (Left Panel) and Restrictive (Right Panel) Models.
Figure VII.2. Voluntary Step-Down and Road to Power. Based on Naked (Left Panel) and Restrictive (Right Panel) Models
Figure VII.3. Ideological Motivation (Quote-Based) and GWF’s Autocracy Types. Based on Naked (Left Panel) and Restrictive (Right Panel) Models

Note: The left and right panels are based on Models 1 and 4 in Table VII.44 in Appendix VII, respectively.
Appendix VIII: Selected Robustness Checks (Chapter 9)

**Development: All IDVs Included**

Table VIII.1. Ideological Motivation, Content of Ideology, and Development. OLS regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minimum years in power</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare laws</td>
<td>0.185*</td>
<td>0.441</td>
<td>470.4**</td>
<td>-0.329</td>
<td>-0.0521*</td>
<td>0.450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work hours</td>
<td>(0.0784)</td>
<td>(0.680)</td>
<td>(174.5)</td>
<td>(0.546)</td>
<td>(0.0310)</td>
<td>(0.394)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic ideology</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>-0.0794</td>
<td>-157.0</td>
<td>-1.100</td>
<td>-0.0106</td>
<td>0.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0675)</td>
<td>(0.421)</td>
<td>(125.6)</td>
<td>(0.672)</td>
<td>(0.0206)</td>
<td>(0.239)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary ideology</td>
<td>0.0566</td>
<td>1.018</td>
<td>595.3**</td>
<td>1.232*</td>
<td>-0.0735*</td>
<td>0.749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0840)</td>
<td>(0.737)</td>
<td>(196.1)</td>
<td>(0.684)</td>
<td>(0.0292)</td>
<td>(0.519)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable (entry year)</td>
<td>0.716***</td>
<td>0.533***</td>
<td>0.452*</td>
<td>0.671***</td>
<td>1.086***</td>
<td>0.839***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0572)</td>
<td>(0.0772)</td>
<td>(0.212)</td>
<td>(0.0725)</td>
<td>(0.0368)</td>
<td>(0.0400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency</td>
<td>0.0271**</td>
<td>-0.0937*</td>
<td>28.05</td>
<td>-0.0815</td>
<td>-0.0312***</td>
<td>0.488***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00957)</td>
<td>(0.0445)</td>
<td>(19.33)</td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
<td>(0.00376)</td>
<td>(0.0505)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.455</td>
<td>20.67***</td>
<td>301.3</td>
<td>6.662**</td>
<td>-0.118</td>
<td>5.981*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.285)</td>
<td>(4.153)</td>
<td>(648.5)</td>
<td>(2.320)</td>
<td>(0.194)</td>
<td>(2.639)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
### Table VIII.2. Ideological Motivation (Quote-Based) and Development. OLS regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare laws</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work hours</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/cap</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrialization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum years in power</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological motivation (quote-based)</td>
<td>0.196* (0.0770)</td>
<td>0.0623 (0.677)</td>
<td>337.1* (198.7)</td>
<td>0.676 (0.705)</td>
<td>-0.0449 (0.0323)</td>
<td>0.454 (0.431)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable (entry year)</td>
<td>0.768*** (0.0445)</td>
<td>0.589*** (0.0660)</td>
<td>0.510* (0.216)</td>
<td>0.830*** (0.0540)</td>
<td>1.096*** (0.0302)</td>
<td>0.874*** (0.0275)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency</td>
<td>0.0255** (0.00798)</td>
<td>-0.125* (0.0419)</td>
<td>16.60 (17.62)</td>
<td>-0.0102 (0.0672)</td>
<td>-0.0308*** (0.00311)</td>
<td>0.480*** (0.0389)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.660** (0.221)</td>
<td>20.10*** (3.090)</td>
<td>1351.2 (640.4)</td>
<td>2.526* (1.194)</td>
<td>-0.363** (0.132)</td>
<td>6.011*** (1.685)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>246</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>236</td>
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Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

### Table VIII.3. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Development. OLS regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare laws</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work hours</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP/cap</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrialization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum years in power</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</td>
<td>0.194** (0.0648)</td>
<td>0.112 (0.619)</td>
<td>375.5** (129.6)</td>
<td>0.186 (0.512)</td>
<td>-0.0420* (0.0236)</td>
<td>0.377 (0.316)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable (entry year)</td>
<td>0.737*** (0.0460)</td>
<td>0.557*** (0.0713)</td>
<td>0.470* (0.210)</td>
<td>0.780*** (0.0567)</td>
<td>1.097*** (0.0336)</td>
<td>0.861*** (0.0302)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency</td>
<td>0.0254** (0.00842)</td>
<td>-0.118* (0.0438)</td>
<td>19.96 (16.43)</td>
<td>0.00360 (0.0658)</td>
<td>-0.0316*** (0.00327)</td>
<td>0.488*** (0.0432)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.658*** (0.224)</td>
<td>21.45*** (3.461)</td>
<td>787.4 (615.2)</td>
<td>2.554 (1.537)</td>
<td>-0.291* (0.166)</td>
<td>5.935** (2.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
Table VIII.4. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Development. OLS regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare laws</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work hours</td>
<td>0.235**</td>
<td>-0.0717</td>
<td>409.0**</td>
<td>0.139</td>
<td>-0.0452*</td>
<td>0.483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0715)</td>
<td>(0.657)</td>
<td>(151.7)</td>
<td>(0.576)</td>
<td>(0.0270)</td>
<td>(0.358)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum years in power</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</td>
<td>0.693***</td>
<td>0.503***</td>
<td>0.446*</td>
<td>0.750***</td>
<td>1.111***</td>
<td>0.834***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0494)</td>
<td>(0.0718)</td>
<td>(0.207)</td>
<td>(0.0848)</td>
<td>(0.0403)</td>
<td>(0.0307)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>0.0205*</td>
<td>-0.104</td>
<td>15.39</td>
<td>0.0256</td>
<td>-0.0321***</td>
<td>0.490***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(entry year)</td>
<td>(0.00972)</td>
<td>(0.0493)</td>
<td>(18.01)</td>
<td>(0.0859)</td>
<td>(0.00376)</td>
<td>(0.0495)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency</td>
<td>0.820**</td>
<td>24.38***</td>
<td>898.5</td>
<td>2.531</td>
<td>-0.334*</td>
<td>7.051**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.261)</td>
<td>(3.496)</td>
<td>(655.3)</td>
<td>(2.173)</td>
<td>(1.97)</td>
<td>(2.085)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0205*</td>
<td>-0.104</td>
<td>15.39</td>
<td>0.0256</td>
<td>-0.0321***</td>
<td>0.490***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00972)</td>
<td>(0.0493)</td>
<td>(18.01)</td>
<td>(0.0859)</td>
<td>(0.00376)</td>
<td>(0.0495)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

Table VIII.5. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Development. OLS regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare laws</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work hours</td>
<td>0.267**</td>
<td>0.268</td>
<td>596.7***</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>-0.0602*</td>
<td>0.831*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0840)</td>
<td>(0.854)</td>
<td>(173.2)</td>
<td>(0.852)</td>
<td>(0.0356)</td>
<td>(0.401)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum years in power</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</td>
<td>0.665***</td>
<td>0.467***</td>
<td>0.380*</td>
<td>0.688***</td>
<td>1.124***</td>
<td>0.787***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0597)</td>
<td>(0.0745)</td>
<td>(0.193)</td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
<td>(0.0566)</td>
<td>(0.0426)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>0.0194</td>
<td>-0.0828</td>
<td>21.71</td>
<td>-0.0175</td>
<td>-0.0303***</td>
<td>0.465***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(entry year)</td>
<td>(0.0135)</td>
<td>(0.0661)</td>
<td>(25.07)</td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
<td>(0.00480)</td>
<td>(0.0602)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency</td>
<td>0.863*</td>
<td>25.16***</td>
<td>584.0</td>
<td>4.148</td>
<td>-0.417</td>
<td>9.410**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.345)</td>
<td>(3.875)</td>
<td>(633.4)</td>
<td>(3.597)</td>
<td>(2.858)</td>
<td>(2.845)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0194</td>
<td>-0.0828</td>
<td>21.71</td>
<td>-0.0175</td>
<td>-0.0303***</td>
<td>0.465***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0135)</td>
<td>(0.0661)</td>
<td>(25.07)</td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
<td>(0.00480)</td>
<td>(0.0602)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>116</td>
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Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
Table VIII.6. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Development. OLS regression. “Technique 1”

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
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<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare laws</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work hours</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/cap</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrialization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Minimum years in power 2 2 2 2 2 2

Ideological motivation (judgement-based) 0.271** 0.185 (0.0910) 305.9** 0.781 (112.8) -0.0109 (0.479) 0.307 (0.0273) (0.527)

Dependent variable (entry year) 0.762*** 0.600*** 0.578*** 0.816*** 1.022*** 0.820*** (0.0629) (0.0656) (0.116) (0.0629) (0.0385) (0.0495)

Constant 0.719*** 17.67*** 748.9* 1.026 -0.392* 14.64*** (0.178) (3.107) (311.6) (0.850) (0.181) (2.385)

Observations 2450 3134 2339 743 2508 2880

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with double-clustered standard errors.

Table VIII.7. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Development. OLS regression. “Technique 2”

<table>
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<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare laws</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work hours</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/cap</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrialization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Minimum years in power 2 2 2 2 2 2

Ideological motivation (judgement-based) 0.0140* -0.00671 24.93** 0.00289 -0.000443 -0.00567 (0.00561) (0.0382) (8.536) (0.0703) (0.00140) (0.0321)

Dependent variable (entry year) -0.0190*** -0.0264*** -0.0226* -0.0243*** 0.00757*** -0.00989*** (0.00453) (0.00468) (0.00884) (0.00804) (0.00226) (0.00266)

Constant 0.0761*** 1.222*** 46.15* 0.314* -0.0555*** 0.919*** (0.0170) (0.241) (20.53) (0.151) (0.0113) (0.170)

Observations 198 237 195 71 205 227

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
Table VIII.8. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Development. OLS regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>Policy Welfare</td>
<td>Policy Work hours</td>
<td>Outcome GDP/cap</td>
<td>Outcome Industrialization</td>
<td>Outcome Infant mortality</td>
<td>Outcome Life expectancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum years in power</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</td>
<td>0.184&quot; (0.0618)</td>
<td>-0.325 (0.716)</td>
<td>324.2* (126.3)</td>
<td>0.0000551 (0.484)</td>
<td>-0.0470* (0.0246)</td>
<td>0.576&quot; (0.311)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWF, personalista</td>
<td>0.280 (0.282)</td>
<td>0.221 (2.517)</td>
<td>-797.5 (671.8)</td>
<td>-3.350** (1.242)</td>
<td>0.0711 (0.0744)</td>
<td>-1.967&quot; (1.081)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWF, militarya</td>
<td>0.269 (0.323)</td>
<td>2.369 (2.343)</td>
<td>-345.2 (596.1)</td>
<td>0.747 (1.421)</td>
<td>0.0205 (0.0789)</td>
<td>-0.857 (1.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWF, one-partya</td>
<td>0.389 (0.314)</td>
<td>2.297 (2.422)</td>
<td>-664.9 (646.7)</td>
<td>-0.898 (1.174)</td>
<td>0.0397 (0.0703)</td>
<td>-1.478 (0.999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable (entry year)</td>
<td>0.722*** (0.0528)</td>
<td>0.536*** (0.0831)</td>
<td>0.876*** (0.0841)</td>
<td>0.723*** (0.0641)</td>
<td>1.081*** (0.0348)</td>
<td>0.866*** (0.0332)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency</td>
<td>0.0258** (0.00875)</td>
<td>-0.109* (0.0453)</td>
<td>45.03** (13.69)</td>
<td>-0.0145 (0.0669)</td>
<td>-0.0316*** (0.00344)</td>
<td>0.488*** (0.0459)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.419 (0.323)</td>
<td>21.37*** (5.789)</td>
<td>234.6 (754.7)</td>
<td>5.105&quot; (1.761)</td>
<td>-0.253 (0.178)</td>
<td>6.897** (2.338)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

a. Monarchy is the reference category.
### Development: Economic Ideology

#### Table VIII.9. Economic Ideology and Development. OLS regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum years in power</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic ideology</td>
<td>0.128*</td>
<td>-0.119</td>
<td>-181.2</td>
<td>-1.440*</td>
<td>-0.0173</td>
<td>0.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0669)</td>
<td>(0.375)</td>
<td>(142.2)</td>
<td>(0.590)</td>
<td>(0.0203)</td>
<td>(0.241)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>0.723***</td>
<td>0.518***</td>
<td>0.466*</td>
<td>0.718***</td>
<td>1.101***</td>
<td>0.846***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(entry year)</td>
<td>(0.0537)</td>
<td>(0.0812)</td>
<td>(0.219)</td>
<td>(0.0769)</td>
<td>(0.0364)</td>
<td>(0.0350)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency</td>
<td>0.0265**</td>
<td>-0.0890*</td>
<td>15.78</td>
<td>-0.0183</td>
<td>-0.0302***</td>
<td>0.482***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00990)</td>
<td>(0.0458)</td>
<td>(22.28)</td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
<td>(0.00406)</td>
<td>(0.0515)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.813***</td>
<td>23.47***</td>
<td>2094.2`</td>
<td>6.491***</td>
<td>-0.376*</td>
<td>7.379`</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.252)</td>
<td>(3.962)</td>
<td>(860.6)</td>
<td>(1.912)</td>
<td>(0.157)</td>
<td>(2.192)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

#### Table VIII.10. Economic Ideology and Development. OLS regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum years in power</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic ideology</td>
<td>0.191*</td>
<td>-0.109</td>
<td>-173.7</td>
<td>-1.849*</td>
<td>-0.0135</td>
<td>0.343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0765)</td>
<td>(0.435)</td>
<td>(173.0)</td>
<td>(0.728)</td>
<td>(0.0264)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>0.679***</td>
<td>0.481***</td>
<td>0.446`</td>
<td>0.674***</td>
<td>1.111***</td>
<td>0.820***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(entry year)</td>
<td>(0.0569)</td>
<td>(0.0806)</td>
<td>(0.216)</td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
<td>(0.0404)</td>
<td>(0.0350)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency</td>
<td>0.0225`</td>
<td>-0.0786</td>
<td>6.388</td>
<td>0.00877</td>
<td>-0.0305***</td>
<td>0.474***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0116)</td>
<td>(0.0544)</td>
<td>(27.08)</td>
<td>(0.166)</td>
<td>(0.00481)</td>
<td>(0.0598)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.884***</td>
<td>25.23***</td>
<td>2336.9`</td>
<td>7.434`</td>
<td>-0.426*</td>
<td>8.417***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.301)</td>
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<td>(939.0)</td>
<td>(3.204)</td>
<td>(0.179)</td>
<td>(2.247)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Observations</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>147</td>
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</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
### Table VIII.11. Economic Ideology and Development. OLS regression

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare laws</td>
<td>0.352***</td>
<td>-0.461</td>
<td>158.5</td>
<td>-1.813*</td>
<td>-0.00516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work hours</td>
<td>(0.0996)</td>
<td>(0.605)</td>
<td>(202.6)</td>
<td>(0.857)</td>
<td>(0.0382)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/cap</td>
<td>0.616***</td>
<td>0.474***</td>
<td>0.365*</td>
<td>0.615**</td>
<td>1.136***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrialization</td>
<td>(0.0639)</td>
<td>(0.0849)</td>
<td>(0.198)</td>
<td>(0.173)</td>
<td>(0.0531)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality</td>
<td>158.5</td>
<td>(202.6)</td>
<td>(0.857)</td>
<td>(0.0382)</td>
<td>(0.451)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
<td>-1.813*</td>
<td>-0.00516</td>
<td>0.560</td>
<td>(0.451)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum years in power</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic ideology</td>
<td>0.352***</td>
<td>-0.461</td>
<td>158.5</td>
<td>-1.813*</td>
<td>-0.00516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>(0.0996)</td>
<td>(0.605)</td>
<td>(202.6)</td>
<td>(0.857)</td>
<td>(0.0382)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(entry year)</td>
<td>0.616***</td>
<td>0.474***</td>
<td>0.365*</td>
<td>0.615**</td>
<td>1.136***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency</td>
<td>(0.0639)</td>
<td>(0.0849)</td>
<td>(0.198)</td>
<td>(0.173)</td>
<td>(0.0531)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.464***</td>
<td>26.19***</td>
<td>1552.1*</td>
<td>8.799*</td>
<td>-0.616*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.397)</td>
<td>(4.805)</td>
<td>(929.3)</td>
<td>(4.668)</td>
<td>(0.251)</td>
<td>(2.900)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

### Table VIII.12. Economic Ideology and Development. OLS regression. “Estimation Technique 1”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare laws</td>
<td>0.241*</td>
<td>-0.285</td>
<td>2.582</td>
<td>-0.819</td>
<td>-0.0377*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work hours</td>
<td>(0.0937)</td>
<td>(0.456)</td>
<td>(106.3)</td>
<td>(0.509)</td>
<td>(0.0219)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/cap</td>
<td>0.719***</td>
<td>0.611***</td>
<td>0.572***</td>
<td>0.810***</td>
<td>1.037***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrialization</td>
<td>(0.0741)</td>
<td>(0.0702)</td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
<td>(0.0670)</td>
<td>(0.0330)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality</td>
<td>1552.1*</td>
<td>8.799*</td>
<td>-0.616*</td>
<td>11.02***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
<td>2.582</td>
<td>-0.819</td>
<td>-0.0377*</td>
<td>0.686</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum years in power</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic ideology</td>
<td>0.241*</td>
<td>-0.285</td>
<td>2.582</td>
<td>-0.819</td>
<td>-0.0377*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.0937)</td>
<td>(0.456)</td>
<td>(106.3)</td>
<td>(0.509)</td>
<td>(0.0219)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(entry year)</td>
<td>0.719***</td>
<td>0.611***</td>
<td>0.572***</td>
<td>0.810***</td>
<td>1.037***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency</td>
<td>(0.0741)</td>
<td>(0.0702)</td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
<td>(0.0670)</td>
<td>(0.0330)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>18.18***</td>
<td>1344.4***</td>
<td>4.032*</td>
<td>-0.386*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(337.6)</td>
<td>(1.51)</td>
<td>(0.151)</td>
<td>(2.598)</td>
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<td>1951</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>2089</td>
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</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
**Table VIII.13. Economic Ideology and Development. OLS regression. “Estimation Technique 2”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare laws</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work hours</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GDP/cap</td>
<td>Industrialization</td>
<td>Infant mortality</td>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum years in power</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic ideology</td>
<td>0.00189</td>
<td>-0.00950</td>
<td>-15.57*</td>
<td>-0.197*</td>
<td>-0.00177</td>
<td>0.0342*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.00609)</td>
<td>(0.0271)</td>
<td>(8.978)</td>
<td>(0.0803)</td>
<td>(0.00137)</td>
<td>(0.0163)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>-0.0191*</td>
<td>-0.0283*</td>
<td>-0.0219*</td>
<td>-0.0348*</td>
<td>0.00799*</td>
<td>-0.00997*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(entry year)</td>
<td>(0.00512)</td>
<td>(0.00542)</td>
<td>(0.00980)</td>
<td>(0.0126)</td>
<td>(0.00252)</td>
<td>(0.00320)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.0993*</td>
<td>1.325*</td>
<td>135.0*</td>
<td>0.832*</td>
<td>-0.0552*</td>
<td>0.852*</td>
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<td>(0.0212)</td>
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<td>(0.270)</td>
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<td>(0.177)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>163</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\*\* p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with double-clustered standard errors.

**Table VIII.14. Economic Ideology and Development. OLS regression**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare laws</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work hours</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GDP/cap</td>
<td>Industrialization</td>
<td>Infant mortality</td>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum years in power</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic ideology</td>
<td>0.119*</td>
<td>-0.424</td>
<td>-80.08</td>
<td>-1.041</td>
<td>-0.0188</td>
<td>0.293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0655)</td>
<td>(0.407)</td>
<td>(96.15)</td>
<td>(0.669)</td>
<td>(0.0234)</td>
<td>(0.266)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWF, personalista</td>
<td>0.592*</td>
<td>2.006</td>
<td>-1169.2</td>
<td>-1.604</td>
<td>0.0847</td>
<td>-2.485*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.286)</td>
<td>(2.020)</td>
<td>(835.3)</td>
<td>(1.310)</td>
<td>(0.0887)</td>
<td>(1.395)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWF, militarya</td>
<td>0.762*</td>
<td>3.468*</td>
<td>-469.8</td>
<td>0.716</td>
<td>-0.00459</td>
<td>-0.743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.364)</td>
<td>(1.963)</td>
<td>(728.2)</td>
<td>(1.885)</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
<td>(1.349)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWF, one-partya</td>
<td>0.708*</td>
<td>4.976*</td>
<td>-669.9</td>
<td>-0.953</td>
<td>0.0268</td>
<td>-1.778</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.298)</td>
<td>(1.998)</td>
<td>(750.7)</td>
<td>(1.318)</td>
<td>(0.0857)</td>
<td>(1.269)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>0.702*</td>
<td>0.533*</td>
<td>0.886*</td>
<td>0.692*</td>
<td>1.079*</td>
<td>0.850*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(entry year)</td>
<td>(0.0638)</td>
<td>(0.0822)</td>
<td>(0.0986)</td>
<td>(0.0819)</td>
<td>(0.0367)</td>
<td>(0.0366)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency</td>
<td>0.0292*</td>
<td>-0.110*</td>
<td>52.58*</td>
<td>-0.0710</td>
<td>-0.0307*</td>
<td>0.485*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.00981)</td>
<td>(0.0507)</td>
<td>(16.74)</td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td>(0.00422)</td>
<td>(0.0507)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.220</td>
<td>19.85*</td>
<td>1125.3</td>
<td>7.475*</td>
<td>-0.303*</td>
<td>8.678*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(5.403)</td>
<td>(1056.9)</td>
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<td>(0.164)</td>
<td>(2.631)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\*\* p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

a. Monarchy is the reference category.
### Development: Exclusionary Ideology

#### Table VIII.15. Exclusionary Ideology and Development. OLS regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare laws</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum years in power</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary ideology</td>
<td>0.0138 (0.0768)</td>
<td>0.617 (0.591)</td>
<td>391.5*** (148.1)</td>
<td>0.770 (0.621)</td>
<td>-0.0404 (0.0259)</td>
<td>0.467 (0.407)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable (entry year)</td>
<td>0.738*** (0.0480)</td>
<td>0.544*** (0.0742)</td>
<td>0.482* (0.220)</td>
<td>0.771*** (0.0714)</td>
<td>1.096*** (0.0339)</td>
<td>0.860*** (0.0332)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency</td>
<td>0.0255** (0.00908)</td>
<td>-0.128** (0.0463)</td>
<td>18.48 (16.71)</td>
<td>-0.00100 (0.0707)</td>
<td>-0.0316*** (0.00338)</td>
<td>0.489*** (0.0426)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.005*** (0.255)</td>
<td>21.75*** (3.499)</td>
<td>1066.7 (563.9)</td>
<td>2.431* (1.357)</td>
<td>-0.312* (0.152)</td>
<td>6.104** (1.981)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

#### Table VIII.16. Exclusionary Ideology and Development. OLS regression

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare laws</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum years in power</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary ideology</td>
<td>0.0311 (0.0839)</td>
<td>0.889 (0.688)</td>
<td>428.5*** (149.5)</td>
<td>0.822 (0.647)</td>
<td>-0.0479 (0.0303)</td>
<td>0.664 (0.447)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable (entry year)</td>
<td>0.695*** (0.0511)</td>
<td>0.487*** (0.0741)</td>
<td>0.462* (0.219)</td>
<td>0.753*** (0.102)</td>
<td>1.112*** (0.0397)</td>
<td>0.831*** (0.0336)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency</td>
<td>0.0219* (0.0108)</td>
<td>-0.115* (0.0504)</td>
<td>13.42 (19.41)</td>
<td>0.0275 (0.0892)</td>
<td>-0.0324*** (0.00389)</td>
<td>0.490*** (0.0493)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.189*** (0.296)</td>
<td>24.20*** (3.633)</td>
<td>1197.0* (637.9)</td>
<td>2.039 (1.908)</td>
<td>-0.363* (0.174)</td>
<td>7.293*** (2.137)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table VIII.17. Exclusionary Ideology and Development. OLS regression</th>
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<td>Dependent variable</td>
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<tr>
<td>Welfare laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/cap</td>
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<tr>
<td>Industrialization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum years in power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(entry year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(entry year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(entry year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

<table>
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<th>Table VIII.18. Exclusionary Ideology and Development. OLS regression.</th>
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<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
</tr>
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<td>Welfare laws</td>
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<tr>
<td>Work hours</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP/cap</td>
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<tr>
<td>Industrialization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum years in power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(entry year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency</td>
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<tr>
<td>(entry year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(entry year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with double-clustered standard errors.
Table VIII.19. Exclusionary Ideology and Development. OLS regression. “Estimation Technique 2”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
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<td>Welfare laws</td>
<td>0.00184</td>
<td>0.0470</td>
<td>16.94*</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>-0.001000</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Work hours</td>
<td>(0.00770)</td>
<td>(0.0333)</td>
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<td>(0.00198)</td>
<td>(0.0528)</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrialization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum years in power</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary ideology</td>
<td>-0.0187***</td>
<td>-0.0266***</td>
<td>-0.0215*</td>
<td>-0.0270*</td>
<td>0.00786**</td>
<td>-0.00990**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(entry year)</td>
<td>(0.00476)</td>
<td>(0.00474)</td>
<td>(0.00870)</td>
<td>(0.0106)</td>
<td>(0.00245)</td>
<td>(0.0034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.0993***</td>
<td>1.167***</td>
<td>73.17***</td>
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<td>-0.0561***</td>
<td>0.863***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0216)</td>
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<td>(20.13)</td>
<td>(0.156)</td>
<td>(0.0126)</td>
<td>(0.138)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>229</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>219</td>
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</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, ****p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

Table VIII.20. Exclusionary Ideology and Development. OLS regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare laws</td>
<td>0.0561</td>
<td>0.488</td>
<td>250.1*</td>
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<td>0.195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work hours</td>
<td>(0.0764)</td>
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<td>(119.2)</td>
<td>(0.634)</td>
<td>(0.0269)</td>
<td>(0.342)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Industrialization</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum years in power</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary ideology</td>
<td>0.327</td>
<td>0.466</td>
<td>-841.3</td>
<td>-2.394*</td>
<td>0.128*</td>
<td>-2.074*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(GWF, personalist&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>(0.275)</td>
<td>(2.018)</td>
<td>(639.3)</td>
<td>(1.262)</td>
<td>(0.0720)</td>
<td>(1.113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWF, military&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td>2.455</td>
<td>462.5</td>
<td>1.739</td>
<td>0.0628</td>
<td>-0.856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.313)</td>
<td>(1.931)</td>
<td>(574.5)</td>
<td>(1.343)</td>
<td>(0.0754)</td>
<td>(1.068)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWF, one-party&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.598†</td>
<td>2.488</td>
<td>-558.3</td>
<td>-0.128</td>
<td>0.0610</td>
<td>-1.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.302)</td>
<td>(2.002)</td>
<td>(587.1)</td>
<td>(1.179)</td>
<td>(0.0686)</td>
<td>(1.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>0.719***</td>
<td>0.534***</td>
<td>0.905***</td>
<td>0.722***</td>
<td>1.074***</td>
<td>0.871***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(entry year)</td>
<td>(0.0557)</td>
<td>(0.0800)</td>
<td>(0.0871)</td>
<td>(0.0701)</td>
<td>(0.0354)</td>
<td>(0.0346)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency</td>
<td>0.0286**</td>
<td>-0.125†</td>
<td>45.02***</td>
<td>-0.00131</td>
<td>-0.0313***</td>
<td>0.485***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.00881)</td>
<td>(0.0478)</td>
<td>(12.97)</td>
<td>(0.0730)</td>
<td>(0.00350)</td>
<td>(0.0426)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.559†</td>
<td>20.32***</td>
<td>488.4</td>
<td>3.800†</td>
<td>-0.292†</td>
<td>7.364***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.321)</td>
<td>(5.076)</td>
<td>(736.0)</td>
<td>(1.568)</td>
<td>(0.158)</td>
<td>(2.139)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, ****p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

<sup>a</sup> Monarchy is the reference category.
### Repression and Civil War: Both IDVs Included

#### Table VIII.21. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Repression and Civil War. OLS regression.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Absence of) latent repression&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Absence of) physical violence&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.0837&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt; (0.0419)</td>
<td>0.0263&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt; (0.0145)</td>
<td>-0.111 (0.196)</td>
<td>-0.350&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt; (0.194)</td>
<td>-0.284 (0.343)</td>
<td>-0.305 (0.281)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min. years in power</td>
<td>0.147** (0.0485)</td>
<td>-0.0220 (0.0134)</td>
<td>0.362&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt; (0.177)</td>
<td>0.229 (0.198)</td>
<td>0.746&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt; (0.384)</td>
<td>0.242 (0.265)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor civil war onset&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.790*** (0.0477)</td>
<td>0.799*** (0.0736)</td>
<td>5.083*** (1.120)</td>
<td>3.354*** (0.714)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority civil war onset&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.0206 (0.0156)</td>
<td>0.0177 (0.0158)</td>
<td>0.0807&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt; (0.0318)</td>
<td>0.0344&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt; (0.0182)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority civil war duration</td>
<td>-0.124 (0.0965)</td>
<td>0.0479 (0.0368)</td>
<td>-1.702** (0.623)</td>
<td>-1.124&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt; (0.577)</td>
<td>-0.212 (0.794)</td>
<td>0.612 (0.659)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2382</td>
<td>2792</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

a. Double-clustered standard errors.
b. Logit model.
## Table VIII.22. Ideological Motivation (Quote-Based) and Repression and Civil War. OLS regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Minimum years in power</th>
<th>Ideological motivation (quote-based)</th>
<th>Dependent variable (entry year)</th>
<th>Length of incumbency</th>
<th>Constant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Absence of) latent repression&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1, 2, 2, 2</td>
<td>0.108 (0.067)</td>
<td>0.825** (0.043)</td>
<td>0.015 (0.015)</td>
<td>-0.263** (0.089)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>(Absence of) physical violence&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1, 2, 2, 2</td>
<td>0.0268 (0.019)</td>
<td>0.844*** (0.061)</td>
<td>0.0237 (0.015)</td>
<td>0.0237 (0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Minor civil war onset&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2, 2, 2, 2</td>
<td>-0.725** (0.251)</td>
<td>5.39** (1.016)</td>
<td>0.0827** (0.030)</td>
<td>-1.005** (0.497)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 3</td>
<td>Major civil war onset&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1, 2, 2, 2</td>
<td>-0.717** (0.237)</td>
<td>3.485*** (0.741)</td>
<td>0.0378 (0.018)</td>
<td>-0.665 (0.565)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 4</td>
<td>Minor civil war duration</td>
<td>2, 2, 2</td>
<td>-1.176* (0.497)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.281 (0.656)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 5</td>
<td>Major civil war duration</td>
<td>2, 2, 2</td>
<td>-0.814* (0.381)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.270 (0.578)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

<sup>a</sup> Double-clustered standard errors.

<sup>b</sup> Logit model.

## Table VIII.23. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Repression and Civil War. OLS regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Minimum years in power</th>
<th>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</th>
<th>Dependent variable (entry year)</th>
<th>Length of incumbency</th>
<th>Constant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Absence of) latent repression&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3, 3, 3, 3</td>
<td>0.134&lt;sup&gt;'&lt;/sup&gt; (0.053)</td>
<td>0.801*** (0.054)</td>
<td>0.0131 (0.016)</td>
<td>-0.374** (0.113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>(Absence of) physical violence&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3, 3, 3, 3</td>
<td>0.0278&lt;sup&gt;+&lt;/sup&gt; (0.015)</td>
<td>0.810*** (0.077)</td>
<td>0.0166 (0.015)</td>
<td>0.0191 (0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Minor civil war onset&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3, 3, 3</td>
<td>-0.174 (0.182)</td>
<td>6.100*** (1.185)</td>
<td>0.0703&lt;sup&gt;'&lt;/sup&gt; (0.031)</td>
<td>-1.005&lt;sup&gt;+&lt;/sup&gt; (0.497)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 3</td>
<td>Major civil war onset&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3, 3, 3</td>
<td>-0.404&lt;sup&gt;+&lt;/sup&gt; (0.178)</td>
<td>3.848*** (0.785)</td>
<td>0.0286 (0.018)</td>
<td>-0.665 (0.565)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 4</td>
<td>Minor civil war duration</td>
<td>3, 3, 3</td>
<td>-0.514 (0.352)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.281&lt;sup&gt;+&lt;/sup&gt; (0.656)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 5</td>
<td>Major civil war duration</td>
<td>3, 3, 3</td>
<td>-0.438 (0.271)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.270&lt;sup&gt;+&lt;/sup&gt; (0.578)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

<sup>a</sup> Double-clustered standard errors.

<sup>b</sup> Logit model.
### Table VIII.24. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Repression and Civil War. OLS regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Absence of) latent repression^a</td>
<td>(0.151*) (0.0599)</td>
<td>0.0306^* (0.0182)</td>
<td>-0.252 (0.203)</td>
<td>-0.461* (0.203)</td>
<td>-0.502 (0.392)</td>
<td>-0.459 (0.300)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Absence of) physical violence^a</td>
<td>0.769*** (0.0646)</td>
<td>0.804*** (0.0872)</td>
<td>6.902*** (1.662)</td>
<td>4.198*** (0.907)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor civil war onset^b</td>
<td>0.769*** (0.0646)</td>
<td>0.804*** (0.0872)</td>
<td>6.902*** (1.662)</td>
<td>4.198*** (0.907)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major civil war onset^b</td>
<td>0.769*** (0.0646)</td>
<td>0.804*** (0.0872)</td>
<td>6.902*** (1.662)</td>
<td>4.198*** (0.907)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor civil war duration</td>
<td>0.769*** (0.0646)</td>
<td>0.804*** (0.0872)</td>
<td>6.902*** (1.662)</td>
<td>4.198*** (0.907)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major civil war duration</td>
<td>0.769*** (0.0646)</td>
<td>0.804*** (0.0872)</td>
<td>6.902*** (1.662)</td>
<td>4.198*** (0.907)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Minimum years in power

| 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |

Ideological motivation (judgement-based)

| 0.151* (0.0599) | 0.0306* (0.0182) | -0.252 (0.203) | -0.461* (0.203) | -0.502 (0.392) | -0.459 (0.300) |

Dependent variable (entry year)

| 0.769*** (0.0646) | 0.804*** (0.0872) | 6.902*** (1.662) | 4.198*** (0.907) |

Length of incumbency

| 0.0346* (0.0188) | 0.0164 (0.0166) | 0.0621* (0.0343) | 0.0180 (0.0205) |

Constant

| -0.421** (0.127) | 0.0186 (0.0244) | -1.441* (0.609) | 1.380* (0.737) | 1.526* (0.645) |

Observations

| 1683 | 2032 | 165 | 180 | 169 | 173 |

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

a. Double-clustered standard errors.
b. Logit model.

### Table VIII.25. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Repression and Civil War. OLS regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Absence of) latent repression^a</td>
<td>(0.180*) (0.0741)</td>
<td>0.0332 (0.0247)</td>
<td>-0.218 (0.225)</td>
<td>-0.336* (0.200)</td>
<td>-0.486 (0.488)</td>
<td>-0.438 (0.379)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Absence of) physical violence^a</td>
<td>0.733*** (0.0860)</td>
<td>0.794*** (0.114)</td>
<td>7.420*** (2.150)</td>
<td>4.213*** (1.197)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor civil war onset^b</td>
<td>0.733*** (0.0860)</td>
<td>0.794*** (0.114)</td>
<td>7.420*** (2.150)</td>
<td>4.213*** (1.197)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major civil war onset^b</td>
<td>0.733*** (0.0860)</td>
<td>0.794*** (0.114)</td>
<td>7.420*** (2.150)</td>
<td>4.213*** (1.197)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor civil war duration</td>
<td>0.733*** (0.0860)</td>
<td>0.794*** (0.114)</td>
<td>7.420*** (2.150)</td>
<td>4.213*** (1.197)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major civil war duration</td>
<td>0.733*** (0.0860)</td>
<td>0.794*** (0.114)</td>
<td>7.420*** (2.150)</td>
<td>4.213*** (1.197)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Minimum years in power

| 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |

Ideological motivation (judgement-based)

| 0.180* (0.0741) | 0.0332 (0.0247) | -0.218 (0.225) | -0.336* (0.200) | -0.486 (0.488) | -0.438 (0.379) |

Dependent variable (entry year)

| 0.733*** (0.0860) | 0.794*** (0.114) | 7.420*** (2.150) | 4.213*** (1.197) |

Length of incumbency

| 0.0369* (0.0221) | -0.0113 (0.0200) | 0.0352 (0.0455) | -0.0157 (0.0274) |

Constant

| -0.508** (0.156) | 0.0245 (0.0302) | -1.580* (0.674) | 2.007* (1.073) | 2.392* (0.920) |

Observations

| 1050 | 1301 | 117 | 125 | 116 | 118 |

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

a. Double-clustered standard errors.
b. Logit model.
Table VIII.26. Ideological Motivation (Judgement-Based) and Repression and Civil War. OLS regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>(Absence of) latent repression*</td>
<td>(Absence of) physical violence*</td>
<td>Minor civil war onsetb</td>
<td>Major civil war onsetb</td>
<td>Minor civil war duration</td>
<td>Major civil war duration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum years in power</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological motivation (judgement-based)</td>
<td>0.113* (0.0499)</td>
<td>0.0138 (0.0143)</td>
<td>-0.109 (0.204)</td>
<td>-0.359* (0.189)</td>
<td>-0.640* (0.341)</td>
<td>-0.458* (0.265)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWF, personalista</td>
<td>0.166 (0.176)</td>
<td>-0.0583 (0.0409)</td>
<td>1.120 (0.752)</td>
<td>0.742 (0.508)</td>
<td>0.600 (1.092)</td>
<td>0.582 (0.649)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWF, militarya</td>
<td>-0.0367 (0.173)</td>
<td>-0.0521 (0.0320)</td>
<td>0.417 (0.742)</td>
<td>0.139 (0.567)</td>
<td>0.0440 (1.031)</td>
<td>0.288 (0.795)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWF, one-partya</td>
<td>0.111 (0.167)</td>
<td>0.00644 (0.0332)</td>
<td>0.701 (0.672)</td>
<td>-0.0658 (1.009)</td>
<td>0.346 (0.571)</td>
<td>0.277 (0.517)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable (entry year)</td>
<td>0.794*** (0.0544)</td>
<td>0.776*** (0.0805)</td>
<td>5.639*** (1.085)</td>
<td>3.247*** (0.787)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0187 (0.0170)</td>
<td>0.0193 (0.0178)</td>
<td>0.0754* (0.0340)</td>
<td>0.0336 (0.0223)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.256 (0.165)</td>
<td>0.0620 (0.0393)</td>
<td>-1.932* (0.824)</td>
<td>-0.943 (0.601)</td>
<td>1.045 (1.001)</td>
<td>0.940 (0.566)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2273</td>
<td>2735</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$, † $p < 0.05$, ‡ $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
a. Double-clustered standard errors.
b. Logit model.
Repression and Civil War: Economic Ideology

Table VIII.27. Exclusionary Ideology and Repression and Civil War. OLS regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent variable</strong></td>
<td><strong>(Absence of)</strong></td>
<td><strong>(Absence of)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Minor civil</strong></td>
<td><strong>Major civil</strong></td>
<td><strong>Minor civil</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>latent repression[^{a}]</td>
<td>physical violence[^{a}]</td>
<td>war onset[^{b}]</td>
<td>war onset[^{b}]</td>
<td>war duration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum years in power</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic ideology</td>
<td>0.0276</td>
<td>0.0122</td>
<td>-0.0822</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>-0.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0417)</td>
<td>(0.00802)</td>
<td>(0.162)</td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
<td>(0.153)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent variable</strong></td>
<td><strong>(entry year)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Minor civil</strong></td>
<td><strong>Major civil</strong></td>
<td><strong>Minor civil</strong></td>
<td><strong>Major civil</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.799[^{***}]</td>
<td>-0.0836</td>
<td>6.185[^{***}]</td>
<td>3.478[^{***}]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0517)</td>
<td>(0.0702)</td>
<td>(1.174)</td>
<td>(0.811)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency</td>
<td>0.0279[^{*}]</td>
<td>0.0173</td>
<td>0.0904[^{*}]</td>
<td>0.0369[^{*}]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0167)</td>
<td>(0.0171)</td>
<td>(0.0377)</td>
<td>(0.0215)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.192[^{*}]</td>
<td>0.0295</td>
<td>-1.478[^{***}]</td>
<td>-1.738[^{***}]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
<td>(0.0234)</td>
<td>(0.435)</td>
<td>(0.378)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.433)</td>
<td>(0.323)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2075</td>
<td>2504</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; \[^{*}\] \(p < 0.1\), \[^{*}\] \(p < 0.05\), \[^{**}\] \(p < 0.01\), \[^{***}\] \(p < 0.001\). Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

a. Double-clustered standard errors.
b. Logit model.
Repression and Civil War: Exclusionary Ideology

### Table VIII.28. Exclusionary Ideology and Repression and Civil War. OLS regression.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minimum years in power</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary ideology</td>
<td>-0.181** (0.0592)</td>
<td>-0.0215 (0.0159)</td>
<td>0.377* (0.172)</td>
<td>0.276 (0.200)</td>
<td>0.717* (0.393)</td>
<td>0.227 (0.276)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable (entry year)</td>
<td>0.727*** (0.0562)</td>
<td>0.814*** (0.0822)</td>
<td>5.442*** (1.312)</td>
<td>3.548*** (0.827)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency</td>
<td>0.0174 (0.0160)</td>
<td>0.0227 (0.0155)</td>
<td>0.0817* (0.0350)</td>
<td>0.0362* (0.0210)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.0322 (0.0697)</td>
<td>0.0913* (0.0429)</td>
<td>-1.836*** (0.388)</td>
<td>-1.917*** (0.410)</td>
<td>-0.751 (0.639)</td>
<td>0.0120 (0.399)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2377</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

a. Double-clustered standard errors.
b. Logit model.

### Table VIII.29. Exclusionary Ideology and Repression and Civil War. OLS regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minimum years in power</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary ideology</td>
<td>-0.192** (0.0685)</td>
<td>-0.0222 (0.0179)</td>
<td>0.306 (0.203)</td>
<td>0.181 (0.227)</td>
<td>0.849* (0.469)</td>
<td>0.303 (0.322)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable (entry year)</td>
<td>0.688*** (0.0668)</td>
<td>0.814*** (0.0921)</td>
<td>6.199** (1.853)</td>
<td>3.932*** (0.967)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency</td>
<td>0.0392* (0.0184)</td>
<td>0.0243 (0.0166)</td>
<td>0.0733* (0.0377)</td>
<td>0.00259 (0.0233)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.0195 (0.0791)</td>
<td>0.0940* (0.0488)</td>
<td>-2.330*** (0.465)</td>
<td>-1.844*** (0.450)</td>
<td>-0.752 (0.739)</td>
<td>0.140 (0.474)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1647</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

a. Double-clustered standard errors.
b. Logit model.
Table VIII.30. Exclusionary Ideology and Repression and Civil War. OLS regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minimum years in power</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Absence of) latent repression</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary ideology</td>
<td>-0.176* (0.0880)</td>
<td>-0.0259 (0.0239)</td>
<td>0.295 (0.263)</td>
<td>0.233 (0.246)</td>
<td>1.245* (0.638)</td>
<td>0.426 (0.448)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>0.638*** (0.0933)</td>
<td>0.803*** (0.122)</td>
<td>0.0424* (0.0218)</td>
<td>-0.00474 (0.0199)</td>
<td>0.0566 (0.0486)</td>
<td>-0.00564 (0.0289)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(entry year)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency</td>
<td>-0.0440 (0.0990)</td>
<td>0.197 (0.0660)</td>
<td>-2.422*** (0.587)</td>
<td>-1.119* (0.514)</td>
<td>-0.772 (1.185)</td>
<td>0.829 (0.721)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1028</td>
<td>1273</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.
a. Double-clustered standard errors.
b. Logit model.
Table VIII.31. Exclusionary Ideology and Repression and Civil War. OLS regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minimum years in power</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary ideology</td>
<td>-0.153''</td>
<td>-0.0162</td>
<td>0.340'</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.841'</td>
<td>0.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0516)</td>
<td>(0.0141)</td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
<td>(0.210)</td>
<td>(0.378)</td>
<td>(0.271)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWF, personalista^</td>
<td>-0.166</td>
<td>-0.0572</td>
<td>0.769</td>
<td>1.035'</td>
<td>0.377</td>
<td>0.604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.188)</td>
<td>(0.0428)</td>
<td>(0.628)</td>
<td>(0.609)</td>
<td>(1.067)</td>
<td>(0.643)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWF, militarya^</td>
<td>0.0136</td>
<td>-0.0494</td>
<td>-0.174</td>
<td>0.610</td>
<td>-0.190</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.186)</td>
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<td>(0.602)</td>
<td>(0.651)</td>
<td>(1.032)</td>
<td>(0.830)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWF, one-partya^</td>
<td>0.00328</td>
<td>0.0244</td>
<td>0.196</td>
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<td>-0.293</td>
<td>-0.0478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.171)</td>
<td>(0.0326)</td>
<td>(0.518)</td>
<td>(0.565)</td>
<td>(0.944)</td>
<td>(0.464)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable (entry year)</td>
<td>0.739***</td>
<td>0.770***</td>
<td>5.149***</td>
<td>3.004***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0531)</td>
<td>(0.0827)</td>
<td>(1.94)</td>
<td>(0.789)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of incumbency</td>
<td>0.0149</td>
<td>0.0271</td>
<td>0.0886'</td>
<td>0.423'</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0168)</td>
<td>(0.0180)</td>
<td>(0.0389)</td>
<td>(0.0252)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>0.0967'</td>
<td>-1.995***</td>
<td>-2.067***</td>
<td>-0.978</td>
<td>-0.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.154)</td>
<td>(0.0451)</td>
<td>(0.522)</td>
<td>(0.576)</td>
<td>(1.054)</td>
<td>(0.599)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>2667</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; 'p < 0.1, ''p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with country-clustered standard errors.

a. Double-clustered standard errors.
b. Logit model.