The Power to Control

How State Capacity and Economic Control Condition the Effect of Authoritarian Elections on Regime Stability

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PhD Dissertation

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Acknowledgments

Although I at several points throughout the course of my PhD have dreamt of camping on red dirt somewhere in the Australian outback rather than hanging out in my office in the company of Stata, an Australian dirt road was also the very place that I first decided that research was what I wanted to do. Armed with some outdated copies of *The Economist* and a special edition of *The Journal of Democracy* from 2002, I also knew that the curious phenomenon of elections in authoritarian regimes was what I wanted to work on. Hence, a roadtrip came to an end and a research project was born.

At the Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, I have found what I suspect is one of the best research and work environments that the world of academia has to offer. I wish to thank the department for financial support for my endeavors ranging from stat courses to field work. My advisor team, Jørgen Elklit and Svend-Erik Skaaning, have been encouraging, supportive, and constructive in their criticism throughout my research process, but at no point infringed on my sense of ownership of the project, and I am very thankful for that. I am also indebted to Kate and Annette for all their work with editing and layout in the final stage of the project. I wish to thank the Comparative Politics section for being good colleagues and critics of my work over the past six years. In particular, I am thankful to Jakob Tolstrup and Jørgen Møller for their brilliant comments on my work throughout the process. Above all, thank you to the outstanding PhD group – both previous and current members – who excel in both constructive criticism and themed office parties, and in particular to Helene, Lasse(basse), Fenja, Jakob (når man er rigtig rar, må man godt nævnes to gange), David (L dér), Christian, Johanne, Michael and Camilla for making the department an even better place to work.

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After many years of reading the acknowledgements of various Cambridge publications because I was too tired to dive straight into the extensive formal models that typically extend from page 17 onwards, I have noted that academics, at least in the social sciences, often thank their children. My children have in no way contributed to my academic work nor have they been the least bit overbearing with me throughout the process. In fact, I think I

would have gotten a lot more work done had it not been for colicky infants, long nights pacing the floors with a child suffering from the zillionth inner ear infection of the season, and hours spent building Lego rather than writing. But of course, I am eternally grateful to Harald and Bjørk for making all aspects of my life apart from academia so much more joyful.

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Chapter 1.
Introduction: The Puzzle of Authoritarian Elections and Why It Needs a Solution

The Puzzle

Dictators hold elections. They have done so throughout the 20th century, and in many instances they have allowed the opposition to participate. The trend is so clear that today, multi-party elections are the rule rather than the exception in authoritarian regimes. While non-electoral authoritarian regimes still exist, the majority of autocracies today have recently held a national-level election in which parties from outside the ruling front fielded candidates and were allowed to run. While dictators also win these elections thanks to various means of repression and manipulation – they are dictators, after all – the effects of elections on authoritarian regime stability are disputed.

In the aftermath of the Serbian parliamentary and presidential elections of September 2000, hundreds of thousands of protesters stormed the federal parliament building in Belgrade. While the electoral commission abandoned the tallying of votes as they realized that the results were not in favor of incumbent President Slobodan Milosevic, and a second round was hastily prepared, the people took to the streets to protest electoral manipulation (Birch 2002, 505). Coal miners went on strike, thus threatening the continued running of major power plants, and key elites of the authoritarian regime defected (Kuntz and Thompson 2009, 167–168; Bunce and Wolchik 2011, 110–111). Within weeks of the elections, Milosevic had given up power in what was to be known as the "Bulldozer Revolution." The dramatic events allowed observers to link together the holding of non-democratic elections with the breakdown of the authoritarian regime.

Although perhaps less dramatic, the Senegalese President and dictator Abdou Diouf also gave up power in the context of elections in the very same year. In Senegal the process was slower as "the gradual creation of democratic institutions precede[d] and contribute[d] to political culture change" (Vengroff and Magala 2001, 129). After a string of authoritarian elections, manipulated and won by the regime, and a gradual process of reform, the opposition won the second round of the democratic elections in 2000 and Diouf graciously handed over power to opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade.

The authoritarian regime had broken down and a process of democratization had started, exemplified by the competitive elections in 2000.

These, and numerous other cases, including the "Rose Revolution" in Georgia, the "People Power Revolution" in the Philippines, and the gradual liberalizations in sub-Saharan Africa, have spurred a belief in elections as a force for transforming dictatorships. In this research tradition, elections are theorized to destabilize and sometimes even democratize authoritarian regimes (e.g., Lindberg 2006; Lindberg 2009; Howard and Roessler 2006; Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Levitsky and Way 2010; Schedler 2006a; Kuntz and Thompson 2009).

But while some autocrats have given up power following a manipulated election or have gradually liberalized elections to the degree that they have become democratic, other rulers show no signs of conceding power in spite of multi-party elections; quite the contrary. From Asia to the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, multi-party elections have been used to sustain authoritarian rule. In Zimbabwe, President Robert Mugabe, to the surprise of many observers, cemented his rule by winning the heavily manipulated yet relatively peaceful 2013 elections. The ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front's (ZANU[PF]) 62% majority robbed the largest opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T), of 30 parliamentary seats and sent the opposition into a tumultuous period of internal squabbles. Disagreeing over electoral tactics and blaming the electoral loss on opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai, the opposition split in April 2014, leaving ZANU(PF) as Zimbabwe's strongest party in spite of a looming succession crisis. Similar dynamics have been witnessed in cases as different as the party regimes of Malaysia and Singapore, Egypt under Hosni Mubarak, and Mexico in the 20th century. Although some of these regimes eventually collapsed, the rulers used regular, multi-party elections to their advantage, sabotaging the opposition, creating legitimacy, and demonstrating superiority. Such cases have led many scholars to conclude that authoritarian elections are just another tool adopted and adapted to sustain authoritarian rule (e.g., Magaloni 2006; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Blaydes 2011).

The two claims are seemingly paradoxical: authoritarian elections both stabilize and undermine authoritarian rule. The paradox of authoritarian elections is the topic of this dissertation. But rather than arguing that the effect of authoritarian elections on regime stability always works in a particular direction, the dissertation asks: Why do multi-party elections sometimes stabilize authoritarian regimes while at other times they lead to their demise? The argument is summarized in the following section.

The effect of authoritarian elections on regime stability does present a puzzle. But why is it important to disentangle this effect? Why does the puzzle need a solution? In an interview in 2007, Adam Przeworksi deemed dictatorships the most "understudied area in comparative politics" (Munck and Snyder 2007, 473). In particular, he referred to the prevailing notion in 20th century comparative politics that institutions in authoritarian regimes are *pro forma* and have no actual effects on regime dynamics. But ever since the publication of a seminal article by Geddes (1999), the research on authoritarian institutions has increased dramatically. This development is dubbed "the institutional turn" of a subfield now known as "comparative authoritarianism" (Pepinsky 2014; see also Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Brancati 2014). As researchers have acknowledged that "the end of history" (Fukuyama 1992) did not put an end to authoritarianism, and that this regime form is prevalent across the globe, focus has turned to the inner workings of authoritarian regimes, and Geddes has pointed out how "different kinds of authoritarianism differ from each other as much as they differ from democracy" (Geddes 1999, 121; see also Svolik 2012, 27–28; Gandhi 2008, 18–21; Ulfelder 2005; Weeks 2012; Wright 2009; Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). The fact that the majority of the world's population lives under some form of authoritarian rule in itself justifies an increased focus on the dynamics of authoritarianism.

This dissertation contributes to the research agenda on institutions in authoritarian regimes. It focuses not only on the workings of authoritarian systems and the effect of institutions, but more specifically on the effect of authoritarian institutions on the prospects for change. Just as there is a need to know how one of the world's most prevalent political systems works, we must also know more about how and why it sometimes ends.

The aim of this dissertation is to disentangle the conditional effect of authoritarian elections on regime stability. But the outcomes of authoritarian regime breakdowns vary. Whereas some electoral authoritarian regimes, such as Mexico in the 20th century, collapse and emerge as democracies, many others, such as Egypt following the Arab spring, make room for a new form of authoritarian rule. The end result of an authoritarian regime breakdown greatly affects the lives of many people. Why authoritarian regimes break down, and what takes their place once they have succumbed, however, are two different research questions, and I cannot fully account for both within the scope of this dissertation. By focusing on the determinants of authoritarian stability through elections, and thus also the conditions under which electoral authoritarian regimes collapse, I leave aside the equally interesting and perhaps even more important question of the circumstances under which

authoritarian elections may promote democratization. The analyses restrict the focus to the circumstances under which autocracies break down regardless of what comes in their place, be it democracy, a new authoritarian system, or collapse into civil war. After all, the end of an authoritarian regime is a necessary precondition for the emergence of a new democracy. In the conclusion, I reflect upon the prospects for democratization by elections and avenues for further study.

The Argument

Why do multi-party elections sometimes stabilize authoritarian regimes while at other times, they lead to their demise? I argue that the effect of authoritarian elections on regime stability depends on the central capacities that the rulers have at their disposal. Such capacities enable autocrats to carry out strategies of electoral manipulation that shape the choices of key actors, thus impacting the long-term effects of elections. Specifically, this dissertation argues that higher levels of administrative and coercive capacity, jointly referred to as state capacity, and control over the economy increase the probability that authoritarian multi-party elections will stabilize the regime. Where these capacities are lacking, the regime is more likely to succumb in the face of elections.

Thus, in the parliamentary elections in Malaysia in March 2004, the party regime drew on both its strong administrative and coercive force and control over the economy to dominate the election and control its long-term effects. Its strategies were targeted at voters, opposition, and internal elites. Leading opposition figure Anwar Ibrahim was in prison, convicted of sodomy. His opposition *Reformasi* movement that had challenged the ruling United Malays' National Organization (UMNO) in the late 1990s had partly been co-opted into the regime and the remaining opposition was split (Welsh 2005, 154–155). The media was biased (Case 2005) and opposition campaigning was obstructed by police and special branch personnel (Julian Lee 2007). The ruling group's control over resources was abused to persuade voters to support the party, and in case this was not enough to secure a supermajority victory, the Electoral Commission was dominated by UMNO loyalists and constituency boundaries were drawn to the advantage of the ruling coalition (Wong 2005, 317). In the end, the *Barisan National* (BN), the coalition dominated by UMNO, secured 63.9% of votes, its largest majority in 25 years, and no major post-electoral protests occurred.

Only two years later in Singapore, a similar scenario played out. The ruling People's Action Party (PAP) relied on its state capacity and economic

monopoly to limit opposition activity and lure voters into supporting the ruling party. Although the coercive apparatus was less visible, one of the major opposition parties was sued for defamation, leading to a rupture of its campaign and deterring others from representing the opposition (Chin 2007, 704–705). Gerrymandering of districts and ethnic quotas have traditionally been used to restrict the opposition, and the ruling party's control over resources was used to secure votes, as housing upgrades were reserved for districts that supported PAP (Ong and Tim 2014; Chin 2007; N. Tan 2013). As a result, the ruling party won over 66.6% of votes and 82 out of 84 seats.

These dynamics stand in contrast to the elections that toppled dictators in the post-communist world in the 2000s. In Georgia, incumbent President Eduard Shevardnadze was unable to curb elite defections and former Minister of Justice Mikheil Saakashvili headed the opposition in the 2003 parliamentary elections. The ruling elites' attempts to take over the media and to inhibit opposition parties' ability to gain parliamentary seats through changes to the constitution failed (Bunce and Wolchik 2011, 156–157). Instead, the rulers relied more heavily on visible and blatant electoral fraud (OSCE/ODIHR 2004), thus spurring the post-electoral protests that became known as the Rose Revolution. Facing angry citizens and with pro-opposition media broadcasting the "revolution" 24 hours a day, the poorly paid security forces proved disloyal and defected (Mitchell 2004; Bunce and Wolchik 2011, 165). Within weeks of the election, President Shevardnadze had resigned and the opposition took over power.

These contrasting cases illustrate the argument that the capacities available to ruling elites, namely levels of state capacity and control over the economy, condition the effect of authoritarian elections. Such capacities enable and constrain electoral strategies aimed at affecting choices made by internal regime elites, opposition candidates, and ordinary citizens, and in turn affect the likelihood that the regime stabilizes through elections. The theoretical argument and its relation to the existing literature are briefly unfolded below.

The literature on electoral authoritarianism has, to an increasing degree, recognized the paradox of authoritarian elections. Schedler argues that elections are arenas of struggle between regime and opposition actors. Where the regime wins, elections may serve to stabilize its rule. But if the opposition comes out victorious, elections cause change (Schedler 2013). I agree with Schedler's notion that elections are a double-edged sword, holding the potential to both sustain and subvert authoritarian regimes. But I disagree with Schedler's main claim that the result of this struggle between opposition and regime, playing out in the context of authoritarian uncertainty, is

determined solely by actor choices (Schedler 2013, 141). Rather, I argue that deeper-running factors affect the probability that elections support authoritarian regimes because they affect the choices made by central actors. Just as Svolik argues that the occurrence of personalist rule is not only a function of the individual leader's ambitions and personal abilities to concentrate power or the elites' attempts to reign him in, but depends on the conditions of authoritarian rule (Svolik 2012, 55), this dissertation presents the claim that the effect of authoritarian elections is shaped by the circumstances under which the elections play out. This approach turns the "paradox" of authoritarian elections into a theory of a conditional effect of authoritarian elections.

But why focus on authoritarian capacities? A number of factors may likely affect electoral dynamics. The international environment, the strength of the ruling party, and the existence of an opposition coalition have previously been proposed as factors affecting whether electoral authoritarian regimes democratize (Howard and Roessler 2006; Levitsky and Way 2010; Donno 2013). I argue that in investigating the effects of authoritarian elections on the likelihood of regime breakdown, we have failed to take into account the capacities available to the ruling group – in particular, the strength of the state apparatus and the rulers' degree of control over the economy. These factors matter because they affect the electoral strategies available to rulers when they are challenged by the opposition in what Schedler terms a two-level game of authoritarian elections (Schedler 2013, 115–117). By presiding over a strong state apparatus, both its administrative and its coercive arm, and by dominating the economy, autocrats may affect the electoral game (the fight over votes) and the institutional game (the fight over rules).

The electoral strategies employed to do so are targeted at the three main actor groups of the authoritarian regime: the internal elites, the opposition, and the voters. Relying on state capacity and control over the economy to conduct electoral strategies of voter manipulation and opposition repression, autocrats affect the individual-level choices made by regime elites, opposition actors, and citizens. Thus, the UMNO leadership in Malaysia was dependent on its strong coercive force, both the police corps and the special branch, to subtly and effectively disrupt the opposition's political campaign, thus attempting to affect voters' preference formation, intimidate potential opposition activists, and prevent regime elites from defecting (Julian Lee 2007). And in both Malaysia and Singapore, a loyal civil service and resources stemming from the ruling party's control over the economy were crucial in diverting economic benefits to supporters of the incumbents, thus subtly manipulating voters' preference formation (Ong and Tim 2014; Chin 2007).

In Georgia, unlike in Malaysia and Singapore, the opposition was not effectively harassed by the courts, and the collapsing state apparatus did not allow for subtle manipulation of voters' preference formation or discreet rewriting of electoral laws to the ruling party's advantage. Instead, the state apparatus was employed to steal votes on Election Day (OSCE/ODIHR 2004). While this maneuver ensured an electoral victory, the failing coercive apparatus could not prevent citizens from taking to the streets, and when protests escalated, the underpaid military was not willing to put them down. The autocrat did not have the capacities to manage elections.

Thus, Schedler may be right when he states that actor choices determine the effect of authoritarian elections. But my theoretical apparatus attempts to identify the structures that shape these choices. For instance, the theoretical argument is not at odds with Howard and Roessler's (2006) and Donno's (2013) findings that opposition coalitions are crucial in bringing down electoral authoritarian regimes. Rather, the theory highlights that high levels of state capacity and control over the economy enable repressive and manipulative strategies that affect the likelihood that such a coalition occurs in the first place.

Thus, by assessing the effect of authoritarian capacities on electoral dynamics, the theory does not rule out actor-centered explanations. Rather, these are taken into account as the capacities available to autocrats are theorized to impact the effect of elections exactly because they affect choices at the actor level. Furthermore, the dissertation does not claim that authoritarian capacities are the sole factors conditioning the effect of authoritarian elections. Indeed, the strength of the party and the involvement of the international community may also affect the two-level game of elections. These explanatory factors are not universal, however. The organization and strength of the ruling party may indeed be relevant in party regimes, but as shall be demonstrated in Chapter 2, numerous authoritarian regimes without a dominant ruling party, including personalist and military regimes, hold elections. Furthermore, elections have undergirded authoritarian stability in electoral autocracies both with and without the involvement of the international community. Thus, whereas additional factors affecting the role of elections undoubtedly exist, the claim of this dissertation is that by not analyzing the conditioning effect of authoritarian capacities, namely the capacity of the state and the control over the economy, we have overlooked important factors that can help explain the apparent paradox of authoritarian elections.

The theoretical argument is developed in Chapter 4, and the structure of the dissertation is laid out below. First, however, I briefly present the main concepts and relate them to the literature on electoral authoritarianism.

The Core Concepts

The literature on democratization in general, and that on electoral authoritarianism in particular, has been haunted by debates over the definition of democracy as well as a plethora of labels for regime types that inhabit the borderline between democracy and authoritarianism (see D. Collier and Levitsky 1997; D. Collier and Adcock 1999; Møller and Skaaning 2011a; Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2010). It is crucial to reflect on the choice of concepts and how it relates to the existing literature, as the definition and operationalization of core concepts determine which cases are included in analyses and thus also affect results (D. Collier and Adcock 1999). The following section unfolds what is meant by the terms *regime, authoritarianism, elections,* and *stability,* and relates them to those commonly used in the literature on authoritarianism and elections. The core concepts are operationalized in Chapters 2 and 5.

Authoritarian regimes

A *regime* is defined as the set of formal and informal rules that structure the access to political power (Mazzuca 2010, 342; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a, 314–315). As discussed below, a regime change occurs when changes are made to the rules through which the power over the polity is accessed.

When is a regime authoritarian?[1] Following the conventions in the recent literature on authoritarianism, *authoritarianism* is defined as a residual category (e.g., Svolik 2012, 20; Gandhi 2008, 7–8). All regimes that are not democratic are authoritarian, and the definition of democracy thus sets the boundaries for the group of authoritarian regimes.[2] Here, I rely on the Schumpterian understanding of democracy, defining democracy as an "institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the

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[1] Throughout the dissertation, the terms authoritarian regime, autocracy, and dictatorship are used interchangeably.

[2] However, periods in which the central authority lacks control over the territory, such as during periods of foreign occupation, are defined as neither authoritarian nor democratic. This is spelled out in the operationalization in Chapter 2.

people's vote" (Schumpeter 1974 [1942], 269). Thus, autocracies are defined as regimes in which leaders are not chosen through elections with uncertainty over outcome.

This minimalist, procedural understanding of democracy contrasts with the Dahlian view that reserves the term "democratic" (or "polyarchic") for those regimes that hold free and fair elections upheld by certain political rights, namely freedom of expression, association, and the right to seek alternative information (R. A. Dahl 1989, 220–222). For Dahl, competition is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for democracy. The consequence of Schumpeter's very minimalist definition of democracy, on the contrary, is that competitive electoral regimes are considered democratic despite the elections not being fully free and fair (Schumpeter 1974 [1942], 271). This minimalist definition is chosen to enable a focus on truly *authoritarian* elections. Much work on authoritarian elections and their effects on democratization rests on a Dahlian definition of democracy (e.g., Brownlee 2009a; Hadenius and Teorell 2007; Donno 2013; Levitsky and Way 2010). Thus, the term *competitive authoritarianism* emerges, covering regimes that are authoritarian yet hold competitive elections (Levitsky and Way 2010; Diamond 2002). While this is in sync with a Dahlian definition of democracy, it leaves students of the effects of authoritarian elections on regime breakdown and democratization processes with a problem. If competitive elections are included in the group of authoritarian elections, the analyses become vulnerable to endogeneity claims. Did competitive elections lead to democracy or was democracy already present – partly in the form of competitive elections – and spurred by a completely different process than the one promoted by the authors? A minimalist definition of democracy ensures that authoritarian elections are uncompetitive and the concept does thus not overlap with aspects of a democratization process. Below, I spell out the definition of multi-party elections in authoritarian regimes further, but first, I turn to the concept of authoritarian regime stability.

Authoritarian regime stability and breakdown

When are authoritarian regimes stable? Regime stability, like consolidation, is difficult to gauge. The clearest evidence of instability is the collapse of the regime and vice versa – if the regime does not break down, it is likely stable. To simplify matters, regime stability is here defined as continuity. Stability is the absence of breakdown. Thus, when analyzing the effect of multi-party elections on regime stability, the dissertation investigates how the holding of elections affects the likelihood that the regime breaks down.

A regime breakdown is any transition from one regime to another; that is, a change to the rules guiding the access to power (Mazzuca 2010, 336). The most well-researched transitions in authoritarian regimes are democratizations, but the most common forms are the transitions from one authoritarian regime to the next (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a). Such transitions between autocratic regimes may occur as a government elected in uncompetitive elections is ousted, exemplifying a change to the formal rules of access to power. But transitions from one authoritarian regime to the next also occur when a coup changes the informal rules of power so that rulers following the coup are selected from a new group of people (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a, 315). This dissertation analyzes the effect of authoritarian multi-party elections on the likelihood of any of these types of transitions, as they all exemplify the breakdown of the existing regime.

Authoritarian multi-party elections

The main explanatory variable investigated here is the holding of elections in authoritarian regimes – but not just any type of elections. I focus on the effect of multi-party elections. The role played by one- and no-party elections has been the topic of an older literature on authoritarian elections (see Hermet, Rouquie, and Rose 1978), and a few prominent pieces have also brought the role of one-party elections into the recent literature on authoritarian institutions (see Malesky and Schuler 2010; 2011). However, the vast majority of the recent literature on authoritarian elections or "electoral authoritarianism" centers on some form of multi-party elections (e.g., Schedler 2006a; Schedler 2013; Brownlee 2009b; Lindberg 2009; Lindberg 2006; Howard and Roessler 2006; Levitsky and Way 2010; Donno 2013; Magaloni 2006; Greene 2007; Blaydes 2011). Whereas some of the effects of elections may be identical independent of the number of parties participating, others will be unique to multi-party elections. These effects are discussed in Chapter 4. But throughout, the dissertation focuses on the effect of elections in which opposition parties are allowed to participate. Such regimes are both the most common form of authoritarianism today, as discussed in Chapter 3, and they are also the form most closely resembling democracy. Thus, it is critical to evaluate how these pseudo-democratic contests affect authoritarian rule.

Multi-party elections are defined as elections in which competitors from outside the ruling front participate. They are distinct from one-party elections or no-party elections, where all registered competitors support the ruling front. Multi-party elections occurring under authoritarian rule as defined

above are authoritarian. They may break with only a few of the characteristics of "free and fair" elections (Elklit and Svensson 1997) or with most of the. Most importantly, given the definition of authoritarianism, multi-party elections in authoritarian regimes, although characterized by multiple participants, are in essence uncompetitive. If the opposition were to win, the regime would have been classified as minimalist democratic rather than authoritarian in the first place.

But how does the concept of multi-party elections relate to previous work on elections in authoritarian regimes – what has been dubbed "electoral authoritarianism"? To situate the multi-party elections under study here in the broader landscape of authoritarian elections, I briefly relate the concept of multi-party authoritarian elections to the various regime labels suggested by the literature.

Schedler introduces the term "electoral authoritarianism" to cover regimes that hold multi-party elections yet "violate the liberal-democratic principles of freedom and fairness so profoundly and systematically as to render elections instruments of authoritarian rule rather than 'instruments of democracy'" (Schedler 2006a, 3). But the notion of electoral authoritarianism covers great variation in especially the competitiveness of elections. Diamond divides electoral authoritarianism into two subgroups (Diamond 2002, 5). The non-competitive group, *hegemonic* authoritarianism, Sartori originally described as "A two-level system in which one party tolerates and discretionally allocates a fraction of its power to subordinate political groups…The hegemonic party formula may afford the appearance but surely does not afford the substance of competitive politics" (Sartori 2005, 205). Thus, hegemonic regimes are non-democratic according to a Schumpeterian definition of democracy: there is no uncertainty over who will hold power after the election.

The conceptualization of the competitive subgroup, *competitive* electoral authoritarianism, is developed by Levitsky and Way. These regimes are characterized by the lack of free and fair elections (Levitsky and Way 2002, 53). But they stress that "arenas of contestation exist through which opposition forces may periodically challenge, weaken, and occasionally even defeat autocratic incumbents" (Levitsky and Way 2002, 54). In contrast to their hegemonic counterparts, their level of competition qualifies at least some competitive autocracies as democratic when a Schumpeterian notion of democracy is applied.

The definition of multi-party authoritarian presented above largely corresponds to that of hegemonic autocracies. However, rather than distinguishing hegemonic autocracies from competitive autocracies based on the in-

cumbents' margins of victory, as is common in the literature on electoral au-
thoritarianism (e.g., Diamond 2002; Roessler and Howard 2009; Brownlee
2009b), both hegemonic regimes and those competitive regimes that do not
have uncertainty over electoral outcome would qualify as multi-party elec-
toral authoritarian according to the definition presented here. But those of
Levitsky and Way's competitive regimes in which elections have uncertainty
over outcomes are considered democratic following the Schumpterian defi-
nition of democracy and are thus excluded from the analysis.

This restriction of the category of authoritarian multi-party elections al-
lows me to explore the effect of multi-party elections in authoritarian regimes
regardless of the incumbent's margin of victory in such elections. Instead,
both margins of victory and the effect of elections on regime stability may be
explained by other factors. The theoretical argument of Chapter 4 takes ad-
vantage of this approach and theorizes how the capacities available to the
autocrat condition the effect of multi-party elections, among other things be-
cause they enable supermajority victories. In Chapter 2, the operationaliza-
tion of multi-party elections is unfolded and the spread of these multi-party
contests in relation to one- and no-party elections and non-electoral autoc-
racies is explored.

The Plan of the Dissertation

Chapter 2 sets the stage by depicting the development of authoritarian elec-
tions. Relying on data tracking elections in authoritarian regimes from 1946-
2008, the chapter shows that 62% of authoritarian regimes had held a recent
multi-party election in 2008. While such elections were also in existence ear-
lier – in the immediate aftermath of World War II, more than a quarter of au-
thoritarian regimes had held recent multi-party elections – the trend took off
after 1991, and in the same period, both the share of authoritarian regimes
that held elections with only one or no parties and non-electoral regimes
declined sharply. Although there are slight regional variations as well as dif-
ferences across authoritarian regime types, the overall trends remain the
same. Since the second half of the 20th century, multi-party electoral authori-
tarianism has been on the rise.

Having established that multi-party elections in authoritarian regimes are
a widespread phenomenon, Chapter 3 reviews the literature on authoritari-
an elections. Zooming in on the three core actor groups of an authoritarian
regime – the regime elites, the opposition, and citizens – the chapter unfolds
the theoretical mechanisms through which elections should work to either
sustain or subvert authoritarian regimes. Against this background, the chap-

ter reviews what empirical, cross-national investigations on the topic have taught us so far.

Chapter 4 then presents the theory of a conditional effect of authoritarian elections. The chapter takes its starting point in the choices made on the individual level by voters deciding whether to support the regime or the opposition, regime elites deciding whether to defect or stay loyal, opposition candidates pondering whether to mobilize for the opposition or be co-opted into the ruling group, and citizens deciding whether or not to engage in post-electoral protests. It argues that administrative capacity, coercive capacity, and control over the economy shape the strategies available to autocrats wishing to affect these individual-level choices, and thus the effects of authoritarian elections. The higher these capacities are, the more likely it is that rulers subtly and successfully manipulate elections, and the less likely it is that the regime will break down following an election. The chapter results in eight hypotheses and a number of observable implications that guide the quantitative, cross-national analyses of Chapters 6-7 and the case studies of Chapters 8-9.

Chapter 5 operationalizes the core concepts of the quantitative analyses and presents the data employed in Chapters 6-7. The conditional effect of state capacity, both administrative and coercive, is put to the test in Chapter 6. Based on quantitative data on all authoritarian regimes from 1960-2006, the chapter finds evidence of a negative, conditional effect of administrative capacity on the relationship between elections and regime breakdown. As administrative capacity increases, authoritarian regimes are less likely to break down following an authoritarian election. Where administrative capacity is higher, elections are associated with stability. This corroborates theoretical expectations. But no such effects can be found for coercive capacity. Higher levels of coercive capacity, at least as proxied by measures of military capacity, do not reduce the risk of electoral breakdown.

Chapter 7 subjects the hypotheses on economic control to the same type of tests. Relying on data for all authoritarian regimes from 1970-2006, the analyses support the theoretical framework and find that the higher the degree of economic control, the less likely it is that regime collapse will follow a multi-party election. Regimes with high degrees of economic control are less likely to break down if they have recently held a multi-party election than if no elections have been held. These results hold with various measures of economic control.

Chapters 8-9 subject the theory to a qualitative test. Based on observable implications of the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 4, Chapter 8 assesses the theory of a conditional effect of authoritarian elections

against the cases of the Philippine election in 1986 and the Malaysian election in 1990. Whereas the Philippines was a case of breakdown by elections, Malaysia exemplified a case of stabilization by elections. Indeed, the strategies employed by the ruling UMNO and the effects of the electoral victory of 1990 on Malaysian elites, opposition, and citizens correspond well with the theoretical framework. The party leadership relied primarily on its administrative capacity but also its control over the economy to subtly manipulate elections. In the Philippines, the dynamics were more nuanced. In spite of low levels of capacities, President Marcos' ruling elite pulled off a number of manipulative strategies. But in correspondence with theoretical expectations, the strategies eventually failed and the regime did not have the coercive power to quell the anti-Marcos protests, resulting ultimately in post-electoral collapse. The case studies do not test the overall correlations between elections, capacities, and stability, but they lend credence to the suggested theoretical mechanisms through which capacities are argued to affect electoral dynamics.

Chapter 9 nuances these findings by tuning in on another high-capacity case. Comparing the elections in Zimbabwe in 2008 and 2013, the chapter shows that the possession of authoritarian capacities does not correlate perfectly with the use of these capacities. In spite of its high degrees of economic control and moderate levels of administrative capacity, Mugabe and his ruling group in the 2008 elections – contrary to expectations – relied primarily on overt repression strategies and a strong coercive force to win elections. But in correspondence with expectations, these strategies backfired. The regime survived but did not experience the full range of stabilizing effects of an electoral super-majority victory. Thus, the case also demonstrates the potential importance of coercive capacity. Although no conditional effect of coercive capacity was unraveled in Chapter 6, it is worthwhile to test this relationship with new measures of coercive capacity that go beyond the military. In the 2013 elections, Mugabe and his partners seemed to have learned their lesson and relied more heavily on subtle manipulation tactics afforded by both the state apparatus and control over the economy. These strategies largely worked as expected, contributing to the post-electoral stability of the regime.

Finally, Chapter 10 concludes and reflects upon the findings. It reflects upon the probabilities of democratization following an electoral authoritarian regime breakdown, discusses the implications of the findings for the promotion of democracy and elections, and suggests avenues for future research.

Chapter 2.
The Spread of Authoritarian Elections

For parliamentary elections in Zaire on November 3, 1975, candidates stood in front of audiences of unregistered "voters" in public places and were approved by hand-clap so as to avoid the "costly and complicated" electoral process (Lodge, Kadima, and Pottie 2002; Nohlen, Thibaut, and Krennerich 1999, 285). Almost 40 years later, farce elections still exist. In March 2014, Kim Jong-un of North Korea oversaw the dictatorship's 13th parliamentary election. With only one candidate on the ballot in each district, the choice for voters was between crossing out or endorsing the regime candidate. The act of declining the candidate was to be performed in a special booth to which the secrecy of the ballot did not apply. According to the official results, no citizens made that choice.

In other contexts, competition is perhaps more real, but the object of competition is not power over the polity. An increasing number of Middle Eastern monarchies conduct parliamentary elections today – but as these parliaments have hardly any substantial powers, elections in these contexts have been dubbed merely an institutionalization of patron-client relationships (Lust 2009a). Still others have real power at stake but have severely circumscribed competition, as when Uzbekistan's President Karimov's Liberal Democratic Party fights three so-called opposition parties that all support the president. Some authoritarian regimes, such as Malaysia and Mexico in the 20th century, have allowed regular, multi-party elections that were flawed yet did embrace the overall idea of a secret ballot. In Malaysia, the ruling coalition continues to win such elections to this day. In other dictatorships, multi-party elections have proven more unpredictable, often resulting in massive fraud and violence. This scenario played out in the parliamentary elections in Zimbabwe in 2008, when a near-tie between incumbent and opposition unleashed large-scale violence directed by the ruler.

This dissertation examines the effect of authoritarian multi-party elections on regime stability. But how common are such elections? Are authoritarian elections a new phenomenon? Are some authoritarian regime types or some regions more prone to holding elections? And do autocrats perhaps prefer one-party elections over more risky multi-party competitions, such as those investigated in the following chapters? This chapter paints a clearer picture of the world of authoritarian elections before the following chapters turn to analyzing the effects of multi-party elections in autocratic regimes. First, I op-

erationalize the concepts of authoritarianism and multi-party elections. Second, I analyze the spread of elections in authoritarian regimes over time, across regions and across authoritarian regime types.

Authoritarianism

The regimes of interest for the analyses of this chapter, as well as the dissertation as a whole, are authoritarian. I analyze the effect of elections in authoritarian regimes, and the analyses include all authoritarian regimes – with or without elections. The first distinction to be made is between authoritarian and non-authoritarian regimes, or between autocracy and democracy. In the previous chapter, autocracies were defined as those regimes in which leaders are not chosen through elections with uncertainty over outcome. Such a minimalist definition of democracy is essential when exploring the effect of elections on regime outcome, in order to separate the dependent variable (breakdown of the authoritarian regime) from the independent variable (elections) and potential confounders (such as "democratic" openings, i.e. improvements of civil liberties, within authoritarian regimes).

But how can one operationalize a minimalist definition of democracy? Existing studies, when distinguishing between electoral autocracies and democracies, have primarily relied on aggregate measures of democracy or authoritarianism, including those supplied by Freedom House (Freedom House 2014), Polity IV (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2011), and combinations of the two, as originally suggested by Hadenius and Teorell (Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius 2013; Hadenius and Teorell 2009) (see for instance Schedler 2006a; Diamond 2002; Howard and Roessler 2006; Hadenius and Teorell 2009; Lindberg 2006).[3] However, an established literature has unfolded a number of problems pertaining to aggregate democracy measures: Although impressive in scope, Freedom House and Polity fall short of commonly accepted standards of conceptualization, measurement, and aggregation (e.g., Coppedge and Gerring 2011; Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Treier and Jackman 2008; Munck 2009; K. S. Gleditsch and Ward 1997).

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[3] Brownlee criticizes this approach and instead opts for Freedom House's categorization of "electoral democracy" to account for democratic regimes (Brownlee 2009a). However, since Freedom House's qualitative categorization of electoral democracy depends on relatively arbitrary thresholds applied to some of the Freedom House sub-category scores (Freedom House 2014), his approach does not differ significantly from previous operationalizations.

Most importantly, the chosen operationalization should comply as closely as possible with Goertz' standard of concept-measure consistency: The measure must reflect the theoretical, defining attributes of the concept (Goertz 2006, 95). To measure authoritarianism according to the above definition, an indicator of whether leaders were chosen in elections with uncertainty over outcome is necessary. One cannot identify these regimes by deciding on a numeric cut-off point on an overall measure that conflates various regime characteristics, as it is unclear whether uncertainty in elections, protection of civil liberties or a third factor has led to a regime being scored high or low on the scale.

Two classifications of authoritarian regimes, both dichotomous, reflect more closely the Schumpterian distinction between democracies and autocracies. One is from Cheibub et al.'s Democracy-Dictatorship (CGV) dataset, built on Przeworski and collaborators' original measure (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010). For a regime to be democratic, they require *ex ante* uncertainty, *ex post* irreversibility, and repeatability. Regimes are coded as democratic if the legislature is popularly elected, the chief executive is either popularly elected or appointed by a popularly elected body, more than one party competes in elections, and finally, an alternation in power has occurred under electoral rules similar to those under which the incumbent won in the first place (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010, 69). In other words, regimes are democratic if more than one party competes in an election in which there is uncertainty over the outcome but certainty that the winner of the election will take office (Przeworski 1986, 56–61).

The CGV measure is minimalist and its coding rules require limited judgement by the individual coder (only the assessment of changes to electoral rules may require some subjectivity). However, the CGV dataset also has three important drawbacks. First, by relying on alternations in power, the measure captures competitiveness (Bogaards 2007, 1231–1232). However, the defining feature of minimalist democracy is not competitiveness or alternation as such, but simply the potential for competitiveness; that is, competition or uncertainty in elections (Sartori 2005, 193–197). Whereas cases in which an alternation has occurred are clear cases of competition, other cases in which competition exists may be overlooked if competition has not yet manifested itself in an actual transfer of power. Thus, there is a risk of misclassification of cases such as Botswana and South Africa where no alternation has been seen under the current regime, but it is perceivable that one would occur if the majority of the population wished for it. Second, this also implies that the CGV measure is dependent upon retrospective coding. If an authoritarian regime experiences an electoral transfer of power without a

change to electoral rules, it was not authoritarian after all and its status on the variable is changed retrospectively. Thus, uncertainty applies to the most recent cases of authoritarianism, as their status may change if the data were updated.

Finally, while the CGV data register changes from authoritarianism to democracy and from one authoritarian regime type to another, it does not capture authoritarian regime breakdowns as such (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a). If one personalist regime falls and is followed by a new personalist regime, a classic example being the shift from Mobutu to Kabila spurred by the civil war in the DRC in 1997, this is not detected by the CGV dataset. This poses a problem when identifying electoral authoritarian regimes. If a country is authoritarian and has held a recent election, one needs to know whether this election was actually held under the current or a previous regime. If it was held under a different authoritarian regime that has since left power, such an election would not be expected to affect the stability of the new, non-electoral regime.

For these reasons, I instead rely on another well-established, minimalist dichotomous measure of authoritarianism. In the Autocratic Regimes Dataset (GWF), Geddes and collaborators code a country-year as authoritarian if the leader did not acquire power through a reasonably competitive election in which at least ten percent of the population had the right to vote or succeeded a democratically elected leader following constitutional rules; if a democratically elected government circumvents electoral competition (for instance by banning opposition parties or annulling results); or if the military wields substantial power, for instance by banning parties from participating in elections or dictating economic policies (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014b, 6–7).

In many respects, this measure is closely connected to the CGV measure, and the two are highly correlated (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a). With the requirement of at least ten percent suffrage, the measure departs slightly from the strictly Schumpterian definition of democracy, but few electoral regimes fall short of this requirement in the covered period (after World War II). With formulations such as "reasonably competitive" or "substantial powers," the measure is undoubtedly less objective than the CGV measure. But it still closely corresponds to the definition of authoritarianism employed here, and it has the great advantage of capturing all authoritarian regime breakdowns regardless of whether they lead to democratization or another authoritarian regime. Further, the measure excludes from the category of authoritarian regimes country-years in which no government controlled the majority of the territory, the regime was foreign-occupied, or a provisional government was

in place to oversee a transition to democracy. In this and the following chapters, I include in the analyses all country-years classified as authoritarian based on GWF data.[4]

The GWF data count 4,587 authoritarian country-years from 1946-2010. Authoritarian spells – that is, periods of authoritarian rule – occurred in 118 different countries. Figures 2.1a-2.1f illustrate authoritarian regime spells across countries. Grey areas indicate authoritarian rule. These countries include classic cases of authoritarian rule, such as Cuba and North Korea; well-known examples of electoral autocracies such as Mexico until 2000, Russia since 1994, and Zimbabwe since 1980; and also cases that some datasets would count as democratic, perhaps the most prominent example being Venezuela since 2006.

Figure 2.1a: Authoritarianism, elections, and regime breakdown by country, 1946-2008

Note: grey =authoritarian. □ = breakdown. ✘ = Multi-party election.
Based on election data from NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012a) and CGV (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010) and data on authoritarianism and breakdown from GWF (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a). The figure does not show the exact periods in which a regime is coded as multi-party electoral, but these periods will include the election year and the following six years unless a regime breakdown occurs in between.

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[4] To test the robustness of the results of the causal analyses, I also rely on the CGV data and combine it with alternative data on leadership entry and exit to take into account transitions from one authoritarian regime to the next. The approach is described in Chapter 5 and applied in robustness checks in Chapters 6-7.

Regime breakdown is marked by a dark grey square in Figures 2.1a-2.1f and thus serves to indicate not only transitions to democracy but also changes from one authoritarian regime to the next. For instance, the transition from Mobutu to Kabila in the DRC is marked in Figure 2.1d by a dark grey square in 1997 punctuating the grey area of authoritarian rule in the DRC. The transition from the authoritarian regime under PRI to democracy in Mexico in 2000 is marked by the dark grey square in Figure 2.1a, and the following years of democratic rule are white rather than grey.

But how many of these authoritarian regimes held elections? This is the question to which the following section turns.

Authoritarian Elections

The independent variable of this dissertation is multi-party elections. But before exploring the spread of multi-party elections in authoritarian regimes, let alone their effects, multi-party authoritarian elections must be identified and distinguished from other types of authoritarian elections. In the previous chapter, I defined multi-party elections as those in which competitors from outside the ruling front participate. There are thus two questions to be answered: first, what counts as an election? And second, how does one know that a real competitor is represented?

Figure 2.1b: Authoritarianism, elections, and regime breakdown by country, 1946-2008

Note: grey =authoritarian. □ = breakdown. ✖ = Multi-party election. See note to Figure 2.1a.

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To answer the first question, I rely on the NELDA dataset, which identifies all direct, national elections in countries with more than 500,000 inhabitants between 1945 and 2010 (Hyde and Marinov 2012a). Thus, it includes both executive and legislative elections, including constituent assemblies, as long as these were directly elected by the people (regardless of franchise requirement) as opposed to election by members of a council or the like (Hyde and Marinov 2012a, 1). Indirect elections are thus excluded, with the exception of those electoral colleges that "mechanically implement[s] the outcome of a popular vote" (Hyde and Marinov 2012a, 2), a common example being US presidential elections. Referenda are only included when they are votes on the continued rule of the incumbent.

Figure 2.1c: Authoritarianism, elections, and regime breakdown by country, 1946-2008

Note: grey =authoritarian. □ = breakdown. ✗ = Multi-party election. See note to Figure 2.1a.

The unit of analysis in the NELDA dataset is elections or election rounds, whereas I am interested in whether the holding of an election affects the stability of the authoritarian regime in years that follow. I have therefore collapsed the data to country-year format, with each country-year scoring one if at least one executive or legislative election occurred in the country during that year.

The consideration of the unit of analysis leads to another important issue in coding electoral authoritarian regimes. Hadenius and Teorell rightly point to the confusion over the independent variable in studies of the effect of au-

thoritarian elections. Is it the holding of a single election or the cumulative number of elections that affects authoritarian regime outcomes (Hadenius and Teorell 2009)? However, as shall be discussed in the following chapter, it is primarily theories of elections as levers of democratization that are concerned with the cumulative number of elections held in a country (e.g., Lindberg 2006). For studies of elections as causes of stability or breakdown of autocracies, the dependent variable is often the regime's status as "electoral" (e.g., Brownlee 2009a; Magaloni 2008).[5] But that still leaves the question: how many elections, or at what frequency, does it take for a regime to count as electoral?

Rather than scoring a regime as electoral if it has held an election at any point during its rule, I code regimes as electoral if they have held more recent elections. The threshold for what counts as a recent election will inevitably be somewhat arbitrary. In this chapter, I code regimes as electoral if they have held at least one executive or legislative election within the past seven years. Seven years is a rather large interval, but it ensures that autocracies holding regular elections, yet with intervals larger than what is the most common in democracies, are still classified as having elections (e.g., Mexico held presidential elections every six years during the 20th century – see Figure 2.1a).[6] Furthermore, only elections held under the current authoritarian regime count. That is, elections held within the past seven years but during a democratic phase or held under a previous authoritarian regime do not qualify a regime as electoral authoritarian.

For every year in which both a regime change and an election occurred, I have gathered information on the timing of the election and the date of regime change and ascribed the election to the regime in place when the election occurred. As the GWF data code the regime in place on January 1, some regimes will only be classified as electoral in the year following the election. For example, the Azerbaijani leader as of January 1, 1993, Elchibey, was ousted in August following a military coup in June. In October, Aliyev

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[5] Unless the focus is on electoral outcomes, in which case the unit of analysis is the election and the independent variables take on other forms, such as actors' strategies or international interventions (e.g., Donno 2013; Howard and Roessler 2006).

[6] For the causal analyses in the following chapters, however, I code as electoral those regimes that have held at least one election at some point during the previous five years, as this is the interval in which both the short- and longer-term effect of elections on regime breakdown is expected to play out. I also run robustness checks on the effect of elections held within the past one and seven years. This decision is discussed further in Chapter 5.

was elected President, and these presidential elections are thus coded under the new regime (that in place on January 1, 1994) rather than that of 1993. These decisions do not affect results, but simply reflect the choice of whether to code regimes as of January 1 or December 31. Choosing January 1 ensures that for the causal analyses, the independent variable, elections, actually records the electoral regime in place when the breakdown occurs and not the one that takes over following the breakdown.[7]

Figure 2.1d: Authoritarianism, elections, and regime breakdown by country, 1946-2008

Note: grey =authoritarian. □ = breakdown. ✘ = Multi-party election. See note to Figure 2.1a.

Finally, I have checked the record of elections in all regimes that I code as non-electoral when the analyses begin in 1946 (additional information from Nohlen, Thibaut, and Krennerich 1999; Nohlen, Grotz, and Hartmann 2001a; Nohlen, Grotz, and Hartmann 2001b; Nohlen 2005a; Nohlen 2005b; Nohlen and Stöver 2010). If an election had in fact occurred under that regime in the prior seven years and no coups or the like interrupted the regime in the meantime (data on irregular leadership changes from Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009), I have recoded the regime as electoral.

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[7] In Figures 2.1a-2.1f, elections are marked in the actual year in which they occur, and if a country-year saw both a regime breakdown and an election, it is not possible to read from the figure which came first.

Multi-party elections

Elections taking place in regimes recorded as authoritarian by the GWF measure are counted as authoritarian elections. But are they multi-party elections? To answer the second question and capture whether an election featured competitors from outside the ruling front, I rely on two variables from the CGV data. "Defacto2" registers whether parties outside the ruling front exist and "lparty" records whether non-ruling front parties are represented in the legislature (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010).[8] Multi-party electoral regimes score 2 on both of these variables, indicating that even though the winner of the elections is known *a priori*, opposition candidates run and win votes. An example would be Singapore since 1984 or Egypt from 1981 until the ousting of Mubarak in 2011, where the opposition ran and won votes, yet the regime remained authoritarian as there was no real uncertainty over electoral outcomes (Kassem 2004, 1–3).

Figure 2.1e: Authoritarianism, elections, and regime breakdown by country, 1946-2008

Note: grey =authoritarian. □ = breakdown. ✖ = Multi-party election. See note to Figure 2.1a.

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[8] The CGV data is coded as of December 31 and GWF data as of January 1. This does not pose a problem, as the information extracted from the CGV data concerns the election (i.e. whether the election installed non-regime parties in the legislature) and should thus be coded after the elections. There is thus no need to shift CGV data forward.

To sum up, a multi-party authoritarian election is one in which non-ruling front parties are elected into the legislature. Multi-party elections occurring in authoritarian regimes are marked by a black cross in Figures 2.1a-2.1f. If there was more than one election in a single year, this is only marked by one cross. Following up on the above examples, it is possible to read from Figure 2.1f that Singapore was authoritarian from 1966 (independence) but held its first multi-party election in 1984. It continued to hold elections and did not experience regime breakdown. Similarly, Egypt (Figure 2.1e) was authoritarian throughout the entire period but started its most recent period of multi-party elections with the 1979 election. The breakdown of the Mubarak regime following the Arab Spring is not recorded, as data on regime breakdowns are only available until 2010 (and data on opposition parties in parliament are only available until 2008). In contrast to these two cases, a regime such as Ethiopia in Figure 2.1d is authoritarian throughout but does not hold a multi-party election at any point.

In the following analyses, a regime is counted as having multi-party elections if such an election has been held under the regime within the past seven years. Relying on these measures, all authoritarian regimes from 1946-2008[9] can be classified as either having or not having multi-party elections.

One- and no-party elections and non-electoral regimes

Multi-party elections are the independent variable of the causal analyses of the following chapters. But the group of regimes without multi-party elections also cover variation. In Chapter 1, the concept of multi-party elections was distinguished not only from non-electoral regimes but also from those in which elections are held but no parties from outside the ruling front are allowed to participate. For the purpose of the causal analyses, no distinction will be made between non-electoral and one- and no-party electoral regimes. But to assess the spread of authoritarian multi-party elections to other categories of authoritarian regimes, the concepts of non-electoral and one- and no-party elections are briefly operationalized here.

The regimes in which no national elections were recorded in the past seven years according to the NELDA data are counted as non-electoral. An example would be Saudi Arabia, a monarchy that holds local but no national elections. Along with the multi-party regimes that have been operationalized above, this leaves a residual group that holds elections yet does not feature parties from outside the ruling front in the legislature. In their typology of

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[9] The CGV data are coded from 1946-2008.

authoritarian regimes, Hadenius and Teorell include a category for one-party regimes, regimes in which "all parties but *one* are forbidden (whether formally or de facto) from taking part in elections," and one for no-party regimes, defined as electoral regimes in which "*all* political parties (or at least candidates representing a party) are prohibited" (Hadenius and Teorell 2007, 147). This residual group can be termed one- and no-party electoral regimes, and it comprises both Hadenius and Teorell's one-party electoral regimes and no-party electoral regimes.[10] This category includes cases such as Syria (before the ongoing civil war), which held regular legislative and executive elections yet tolerated no opposition to the incumbent president, and Uzbekistan, formally a four-party system but with all parties belonging to President Karimov's ruling front.

Figure 2.1f: Authoritarianism, elections, and regime breakdown by country, 1946-2008

Note: grey =authoritarian. □ = breakdown. ✖ = Multi-party election. See note to Figure 2.1a.

In Figures 2.1a-2.1f, non-electoral and one- and no-party electoral regimes are indistinguishable, as none of them have held multi-party elections. But

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[10] Although interesting nuances indeed exist between one-party regimes on the one hand, and partyless regimes on the other, I nonetheless conflate them into one subgroup here, as I am primarily interested in comparing the development in authoritarian elections to that of non-electoral and non-multi-party electoral autocracies.

the distinction between non-electoral, one- and no-party electoral, and multi-party electoral autocracies is summarized in Table 2.1. In comparison to the existing literature, this classification has a number of advantages: First, as discussed in Chapter 1, the Schumpterian distinction between democracy and authoritarianism ensures that no semi-democratic or hybrid regimes are included in the group of autocracies. Second, by employing an indicator for each of the defining attributes separating one class of electoral regime from another, it strives to achieve concept-measure consistency. Third, as argued in Chapter 1, aspects of elections, such as margins of victory, that may themselves be part of the process through which elections affect authoritarian regime outcomes, are not part of the definition or measurement of the electoral categories.

The development of all three subgroups of autocracy is explored in the following analysis. But in the chapters that follow, the focus is on the effect of the third class of elections. That is, the independent variable is the holding of multi-party elections (those indicated in Figures 2.1a-2.1f), and regimes in which no such elections are held are conflated into one group whether they hold one-party elections or no elections at all.

Table 2.1: Classification of autocracies, electoral dimension

	Non-electoral autocracy	One- and no-party electoral autocracy	Multi-party electoral autocracy
Elections	-	+	+
Multi-party elections	-	-	+
Uncertainty in elections	-	-	-

Time Period

The data enable the study of the spread of authoritarian elections since the end of World War II. This is an improvement over many studies of electoral autocracies that are limited to the post-Cold War era, in which a unique liberal hegemony has undoubtedly shaped regime developments, and in particular the spread of democratic institutions across the globe (Schedler 2013, 57). Thus, in some respects, these analyses meet the call for studies of authoritarian elections that go further back in time (Møller 2014).

On the other hand, the Cold War period may very well be as unique a period – if not, historically speaking, even more unique – as the last decade of the 20th century. Authoritarian politics across the globe, including their institutional characteristics, capacities, and longevity, were profoundly shaped

by the two superpowers of the East and the West, both of which supported, inspired, and in other ways affected their share of authoritarian regimes. Thus, the time period under study will likely affect both descriptive and causal inferences (Boix 2011). In the causal analyses of Chapters 6-7, a control for the Cold War era is introduced to account for the changing world order. But as data on elections, capacities, and regime stability before 1946 are not yet available, the scope condition for this dissertation is the post-World War II era, spanning both a bipolar world order and a period of liberal hegemony.

The Spread of Authoritarian Elections from 1946 to 2008

How have authoritarian elections developed over the course of the past half century? Figure 2.2 presents developments in authoritarian elections from 1946-2008 in frequencies and Figure 2.3 provides the same development in percentages. As revealed by Figure 2.2, the absolute number of authoritarian regimes peaked in the late 1970s, when 97 of the world's regimes did not have leaders selected through competitive elections. In earlier periods, autocracies likely comprised a greater percentage of the world's regimes, but decolonization from the early 1960s onwards produced an increase both in the overall number of independent regimes and in autocracies. However, as has also been found by previous studies mapping the development of democracy in the late 20th century (see Møller and Skaaning 2013; Hadenius and Teorell 2007), the effects of the third wave of democratization are undeniable: since the late 1970s, authoritarianism has been on the decline, as exemplified by the collapse of the Latin American military dictatorships, the democratization of a great number of the post-communist regimes and the spread of somewhat free and fair multi-party elections across sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. In 2008, there were 58 autocracies worldwide.

Thus, the trend of authoritarian decline did not kick in following the end of the Cold War, but started even earlier. Yet if we turn instead to the distribution of elections across authoritarian regimes, the breakdown of the Soviet empire and the beginning of liberal hegemony has clearer effects.

Figure 2.2: Development in authoritarian elections, 1946–2008, count

Figure 2.3 shows that just as the number of autocracies peaked in the late 1970s, this was also the period in which the greatest part of these regimes did not feature elections (apart from the few years immediately following World War II). In 1977, 44% of authoritarian regimes were non-electoral. The non-electoral regimes of the 1970s include China, Cuba under Castro, and the military regimes of Guatemala, Peru, Chile and a number of other Latin American countries, but also a few of the Communist party regimes of eastern Europe, such as Yugoslavia, and a range of personalist regimes in Africa, including Libya and Uganda, as well as the Middle Eastern monarchies.

Previous studies, dating back to 1972 at the earliest (the year in which the first Freedom House rating was released), have shown a marked decrease in the number of what is often termed "closed authoritarianism", comprising non-electoral, no-party electoral and one-party electoral autocracies (e.g., Roessler and Howard 2009). My data confirm the trend and date the beginning of the decline of non-electoral authoritarianism to the mid-1970s – but the drop in non-electoral regimes is accompanied by the general decline of authoritarianism worldwide. Thus, although non-electoral autocracies disappear, the number of electoral authoritarian regimes does not increase until 1991. Throughout the 1990s, however, electoral autocracies as a share of authoritarian regimes increased dramatically. Whereas 33% of au-

tocracies had not held an election within the past seven years in 1992, this was only the case for 14% of autocracies in 2008.

Figure 2.3: Development in authoritarian elections, 1946–2008, percent

But the most noticeable development is not the decline of non-electoral regimes. Rather, it is the rise of multi-party, or hegemonic, autocracies. Regimes in which authoritarian rule was mixed with multi-party elections comprised 23% of autocracies in 1991. But in the following two decades, when the liberal world order became dominant, international institutions started to attach conditions of at least formal democratic-institutional progress to aid and loans. As there was no longer a rival superpower that distressed dictatorships could turn to for support (Joseph 1997; Levitsky and Way 2010; Carothers 2002), multi-party elections in authoritarian regimes expanded by no less than 39 percentage points. Authoritarian regimes from Singapore to Senegal introduced multi-party elections during this period (indicated by the crosses in Figures 2.1a-2.1f) and in 2008, 62% of autocracies had held a multi-party election within the past seven years.

This trend largely corresponds to the findings of Roessler and Howard, who present a marked increase in the two groups they term hegemonic and competitive authoritarian regimes (Roessler and Howard 2009). My data confirm that although the number of minimalist democracies did grow rapidly in the very same period (Møller and Skaaning 2013; Seeberg 2013), the

increase found by Roessler and Howard in electoral authoritarian regimes cannot be accounted for by the minimalist democracies that they include in this subgroup under the label of competitive authoritarianism. Instead, it is indeed an increase in authoritarian elections. Furthermore, by distinguishing between non-electoral and one- and no-party electoral regimes, my analysis reveals that in opposition to the decline of non-electoral regimes, one- and no-party regimes flourished until the end of the Cold War. But following 1990, the group of one- and no-party electoral regimes rapidly declined to the same level as the non-electoral subgroup. This corresponds to the trend unveiled by Hadenius and Teorell, although it is slightly conflated in their analysis due to their partly overlapping groups of military and monarchic regimes that may also hold one- or no-party elections (Hadenius and Teorell 2007). Thus, the rise of electoral authoritarianism does not represent an increase in autocratic elections as such. Rather, it is an increase in multi-party competition under authoritarianism.

Two important points should be made. In spite of the renewed focus on electoral authoritarianism, non-democratic elections are not a new phenomenon. In the aftermath of World War II, elections were held in almost half of all authoritarian regimes. The more striking development, and perhaps the empirical catalyst of the renewed research on the effect of non-democratic elections, is the recent rise in multi-party elections in authoritarian regimes. While non-electoral and one- and no-party electoral regimes have steadily declined since the 1970s, multi-party elections have been on the rise. Indeed, this finding may also be an artefact of the time period under investigation – multi-party elections in authoritarian regimes were also known before World War II. But regardless of whether the new increase in authoritarian multi-party elections simply represents a return to the pre-Cold War norm, the fact that multi-party elections are now taking place in more than 60% of the world's autocracies merits a study of their effect.

Elections across regions

Is the tendency to hold authoritarian elections confined to certain regions? Can the increase in multi-party authoritarianism be attributed to stalled democratization processes in Africa and the post-communist world after 1990? Figure 2.4 shows the development in authoritarian elections over time across

six politico-geographic regions.[11] Western Europe is not represented in the figure as there were only three Western European dictatorships after World War II (Greece, Portugal, and Spain) and the region did not host any autocracies after Franco's death in 1975. None of the Southern European dictatorships ever hosted multi-party elections. But apart from this region, the figure clearly illustrates that authoritarian multi-party elections are not confined to certain regions. In the dictatorships of the post-communist world, there were no multi-party elections held during the Cold War, as most of the communist regimes instead featured elections with only one party represented. But all regions (except the West) experienced all types of authoritarian regimes at some point after World War II.

The figure also reveals that the increase in multi-party electoral authoritarianism is driven by its expansion as a share of autocracies in the post-communist world, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and sub-Saharan Africa. The post-communist world in particular experienced a great increase in multi-party elections and a decline of one-party elections following the dissolution of the USSR. Whereas many Eastern European regimes democratized after the fall of the Berlin Wall, other post-communist regimes, such as Belarus, Armenia, and Georgia, opened up for opposition candidates but did not allow the real competition that would qualify them as minimalist democracies. Similarly, in the 1990s, elections were opened up for multiple parties across the African continent, from Kenya and Tanzania to Senegal. The tendency also spread to the monarchies of the Middle East, some of which eventually allowed multiple parties to compete in parliamentary elections. In 2008, 78% of autocracies in the post-communist world had held multi-party elections within the past seven years (the only exceptions were Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and in sub-Saharan Africa, 83% had held a recent multi-party election (exceptions being Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the Ivory Coast). In the MENA region, 43% of autocracies were multiparty electoral in 2008.

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[11] Data on regions are from Hadnius and Teorell (2005). I have collapsed South Asia and East Asia into the category termed "Asia" but it remains separate from Southeast Asia (SEA).

Figure 2.4: Development in authoritarian elections across regions, 1946-2008, percent

A: Post-communist world

B: Latin America

C: The Middle East and North Africa

D: Sub-Saharan Africa

E: Asia

F: Southeast Asia

■ Multi-party electoral　　One- and no-party electoral　　■ Non-electoral

The other regions did not see a similar increase in multi-party authoritarianism in the 1990s. But this does not mean that multi-party elections were not common in the remaining regions. Even in the region with the smallest proportion of multi-party electoral autocracies, Asia, 25% of autocracies had held a recent multi-party election in 2008. In Latin America, multi-party elections have been relatively common since the 1960s or 1970s, and there was thus no significant increase after the Cold War. But one should be careful with the interpretation of shares in the regions where few authoritarian regimes exist after the end of the Cold War. In Latin America, there were only two autocracies left in 2008, multi-party electoral Venezuela and one-party electoral Cuba, and the shares would change dramatically if one of these regimes were to democratize or abandon elections. Thus, the disappearance of multi-party electoral autocracies from Latin America in 2005 stems from the fact that Haiti, the only multi-party electoral regime in the region in the early 2000s, experienced a coup in 2004 and was ruled by a provisional government in the following years. The share of multi-party electoral regimes then increased to 50% again in 2006, when Venezuela is coded as authoritarian because of increasing repression and electoral manipulation. Importantly though, although not all regions experience an increase in the share of multiparty regimes, such elections have taken place in authoritarian contexts across all regions.

In spite of the global spread of multi-party elections, non-electoral regimes are still in existence. Whereas there were no non-electoral regimes left in Latin America in 2008, the greatest share was found in Asia (25%) and MENA (29%). In Asia, these are accounted for by regimes such as China, but also the Nepalese monarchy of the early 2000s. In the MENA region, more recent non-electoral regimes are the Gulf monarchies of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Oman until 2002, as well as Libya. However, the share of non-electoral regimes declined in all regions.

Similarly, one- and no-party electoral regimes as a share of all authoritarian regimes have also diminished in all regions, although they are still relatively common in MENA, Asia and Southeast Asia.[12] They include both one-party elections such as those that took place under Saddam Hussein's Baath party in Iraq and the Communist parties of Laos and Vietnam, and parliamentary elections in Kuwait where political parties are illegal and candidates run as individuals, perhaps with an attachment to a looser alliance

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[12] That 50% of all autocracies in Latin America in 2008 were one- and no-party electoral covers the aforementioned fact that the region saw only two autocracies in that year with one of the being the Cuban one-party regime.

(Koch 2001, 162). In spite of different tendencies across regions, authoritarian multi-party elections are thus not confined to certain regional settings. This finding underscores the importance of a global inquiry into the effect of multi-party authoritarian elections. Before engaging in such analyses, however, I briefly explore whether multi-party elections – although they have spread across all regions of the globe – remain confined to certain authoritarian regime types.

Elections across authoritarian regime types

In the new literature on authoritarian institutions, authoritarian regime type is commonly explored as the cause of phenomena as different as regime stability (Geddes 2003; Magaloni 2008), civil war (Fjelde 2010), investment and growth (Wright 2008), property rights (Knutsen and Fjelde 2013), and the propensity to go to war (Weeks 2012). But are some authoritarian regime types more likely to host elections than others? As different types of authoritarian regimes are argued to have different propensities to break down, authoritarian regime types could confound the relationship between elections and regime stability if some types of autocracies are more likely to hold elections than others.

Authoritarian regime type is most commonly used to refer to the organizational roots or origins of the people in control of policies and political appointments (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a, 5). I explore whether elections map differently across the four different types of authoritarian regimes identified by Geddes. Where a royal family controls policy and leadership selection, the regime is a monarchy. If control instead subsides with the military (or a group thereof), a ruling party or a narrow circle of the dictator's supporters, the regime is classified as military, party, or personalist, respectively (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a, 15). Combining this regime classification with the categorization of elections results in the simple typology illustrated in Table 2.2.

The table illustrates how the authoritarian regimes marked in grey in Figures 2.1a-2.1f may not only be split into various types of elections but also demarcated based on the ruling group. Some authoritarian multi-party elections, such as those in Algeria after 1995 and in Brazil prior to 1985, took place under military rule, while others have been held under a party regime, a personalist ruler or even a monarch, as is the case in Jordan and Morocco. Importantly, all three types of elections have occurred under all four types of authoritarian rule. Figure 2.5 thus proceeds to examine the development in authoritarian elections over time in each of the four authoritarian subtypes.

Table 2.2: Elections across authoritarian regime types, illustrative examples

		Party	Military	Monarchy	Personalist
Non-electoral		China, 1950-2008	Chile, 1974-1987	Nepal, 2003-2006	Spain, 1952-1976
		Cuba, 1960-1992	Nigeria, 1984-1991	Saudi Arabia, 1946-2008	Uganda, 1967-1993
		Eritrea, 1994-2008	Pakistan, 1978-1984		Libya, 1970-2008
				Swaziland, 1979-1992	
One- and no-party electoral		Poland, 1947-1988	Myanmar, 1974-1988	Afghanistan, 1947-1973	DRC, 1965-1993
		Tanzania, 1965-1994	Panama, 1972-1982	Ethiopia, 1957-1974	Iraq, 1980-2003
		Turkmenistan, 1992-2008	Rwanda, 1978-1994	Kuwait, 1963-2008	Philippines, 1973-1980
Multi-party electoral		Egypt, 1979-2008	Algeria, 1995-2008	Iran, 1960-1977	Cameroon, 1992-2008
		Mexico, 1946-2000	Brazil, 1966-1985	Jordan, 1993-2008	Haiti, 2000-2004
		Zimbabwe, 1981-2008	South Korea, 1963-1987	Morocco, 1993-2008	Russia, 1995-2008

In each subtype, the distribution of elections largely follows the trends described above: non-electoral regimes declined and the tendency to hold multi-party elections increased after 1990 (although for monarchic and military regimes, it should be noted that there are only very few regimes in each group after 1990). This development is particularly striking for personalist regimes. There were no multi-party personalist regimes in 1991, whereas in 2008, there were 19. In the same period, non-electoral personalist regimes dropped from 11 to 3.

Although the different types of elections follow largely the same trend over time in the various subtypes, Figure 2.5 also reveals that party, military, personalist, and monarchic autocracies have different propensities to hold elections. Monarchic regimes form a curious sub-group, in which one- and no-party elections are still the most common and the proportion of non-electoral regimes equals that of hegemonic electoral. The relationship between regime type and election type is explored further in Table 2.3.

Figure 2.5: Development in authoritarian elections across regime types, 1946–2008, count

Panel A: Party

Panel B: Military

Panel C: Monarchic

Panel D: Personalist


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·········· Non-Electoral          ──── One- and no-party electoral
- - - - Multi-party electoral     ─── All autocracies
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Monarchies were indeed the group of regimes with the greatest share of non-electoral country-years in the post-Cold War era (although military regimes were only slightly less likely to be non-electoral). Thus, after 1989, 42% of all country-years in monarchic regimes were non-electoral compared to 40% of military country-years and only 13% of country-years in which a party-led regime ruled (Table 2.3, Panel B). This is not surprising given the fact that legitimacy in monarchies is derived not from popular elections but mainly from the historic roots of the dynasty, and that succession issues are largely resolved within the royal family (Gandhi 2008, 23–25), rendering elections as a means for solving elite crises obsolete. Thus, in spite of its regular parlia-

mentary elections, the Moroccan monarchy emphasizes its genealogical descent from the Prophet Muhammad and "an unbroken dynastic history stretching back to the seventeenth century" (Joffe 1988, 201). And in Saudi Arabia, where no national elections are held, in 2006 King Abdullah instated the Allegiance Council, consisting of princes of the Al Saud to advise the king on succession and lead the process if the king dies (Henderson 2009, 13–15).

Table 2.3: Elections across authoritarian regime types

Panel A: Cold War era, 1946-1989

	Party	Military	Monarchy	Personalist
Non-electoral	23%	53%	43%	42%
	(371)	(242)	(179)	(268)
One- and no-party electoral	55%	20%	39%	42%
	(887)	(91)	(165)	(269)
Multi-party electoral	22%	27%	18%	17%
	(354)	(124)	(74)	(109)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(1,612)	(457)	(418)	(646)

Panel B: Post-Cold War era, 1990-2008

	Party	Military	Monarchy	Personalist
Non-electoral	13%	40%	42%	20%
	(80)	(44)	(62)	(96)
One- and no-party electoral	32%	22%	32%	14%
	(199)	(24)	(48)	(68)
Multi-party electoral	55%	38%	26%	66%
	(337)	(41)	(38)	(323)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(616)	(109)	(148)	(487)

Note: Observations are country years.

In contrast, in party regimes, here included in the group of civilian regimes, the right to rule is based on a claim of serving "on behalf of 'the people'" (Ulfelder 2005, 17), a claim that – unlike the historical source of legitimacy in monarchies – can be underpinned by constructing elections (or rather, elec-

tion victories, as shall be discussed in Chapters 3-4). Indeed, party regimes were the group most likely to have held some form of election within the past seven years (adding together the groups holding one- and no-party and multi-party elections), both during and after the Cold War (Table 2.3). A large number of the one- and no-party elections that occurred in these party regimes took place in communist systems across the regions, as discussed above.

However, the limited expansion of elections within the group of monarchies is also striking. Whereas the other groups saw a marked decline in non-electoral regimes, 43% of monarchic country years had not seen an election within the past seven years during the Cold War. After the Cold War, the number was 42%. Thus, the prevalence of non-electoralism could also be seen as a manifestation of the fact that most of the monarchies are oil rich states in the Middle East that may be less susceptible to international pressure for democratization and thus less likely to implement elections.

In the post-Cold War period, personalist regimes were most likely to feature multi-party competition (66% of country-years did so), followed by party regimes (55%) (Table 2.3, Panel B). The increase in multi-party elections among party regimes includes both post-Soviet states discussed above and African regimes in which elections were opened up for competitors, as happened in Kenya in 1992 and Tanzania in 1995. The increase in multi-party elections among personalist regimes in the post-Cold War era is accounted for primarily by the introduction of multi-party elections in Africa and Central Asia under personalist leaders such as Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and Biya of Cameroon, but also the multi-party elections of Russia under Putin. The same trends are visible for military regimes: while the share of military country-years that were non-electoral has declined, 32% of all military country-years after the Cold War had witnessed a multi-party election within the prior seven years.

Thus, although each of the regime types largely follows the pattern of a decline in non-electoralism and an expansion of multi-party elections, they differ markedly in their propensity to hold multi-party elections, with personalist and party regimes being more likely to do so. This is taken into account in the causal analyses of Chapters 6-7, where I control for regime type when I analyze the effect of elections on regime breakdown.

Conclusion

How common are authoritarian elections? Are authoritarian elections a new phenomenon? Are some authoritarian regime types or some regions more

likely to hold elections? And do autocrats perhaps prefer one-party elections over the riskier multi-party competitions investigated in the following chapters? This chapter has attempted to paint a picture of the world of authoritarian elections by providing answers to these questions.

The analysis demonstrated that authoritarian elections are common not only today, where they occur in 84% of all autocracies: they are also not a new phenomenon. Going back to the end of World War II, almost half of all autocracies had held some form of election within the past seven years. What is new, on the other hand, is the dramatic increase in multi-party authoritarian elections – what the literature terms hegemonic (and in some instances competitive) regimes. Since the end of the Cold War, multi-party competition has increased its share amongst autocracies by 35 percentage points, and in 2008, more than 60% of authoritarian regimes had seen a multi-party election within the past seven years. Thus, whereas authoritarian regimes in the Cold War era were more likely to have elections with no competitors than to feature multi-party elections, multi-party elections are the modal form of elections in authoritarian regimes today.

Moreover, multi-party authoritarian elections are occurring in all regions in which authoritarian regimes exist and across all types of autocracy. They have been introduced in the personalist regimes of sub-Saharan Africa, in the monarchies of the MENA region, and in party regimes across the globe. Even among the handful of military dictatorships left by 2008, both Algeria and Pakistan held multi-party elections. But they are most common in personalist and party regimes, whereas the smaller group of monarchies is still more likely to hold one- or no-party elections. The quantitative analyses of the following chapters take this into account by controlling for the effect of region (through fixed effects models) and regime type.

But what happens when autocrats open up for multi-party competition in elections? Do they open a window of opportunity for the opposition to challenge the rulers? Is it the first step towards authoritarian collapse? Or is it just another tool employed by adaptive autocrats to tie in the elite, co-opt the opposition, and dress the whole thing in a veil of legitimacy? It is to the effect of these authoritarian multi-party elections that the dissertation now turns.

Chapter 3.
The Paradox of Authoritarian Elections

When Serbian dictator Milosevic called early presidential elections for September 2000, he prepared himself for an easy win (Bunce and Wolchik 2011, 105–106). But in the immediate aftermath of the elections, the electoral commission dominated by Milosevic' foes suspended the tallying as it became clear that Milosevic had not secured the outright majority needed to declare victory after the first round. Milosevic prepared for a second round, while parallel vote tabulation by civil society groups documented a first round majority victory to the opposition candidate (Birch 2002, 507). More than 300,000 people entered the streets of Belgrade to protest fraud, and soon thereafter, coal miners went on strike. Protests escalated and key elites, including the army chief of staff, defected to the opposition (Thompson and Kuntz 2004). Less than two weeks after the election, Milosevic stepped down and his authoritarian regime collapsed.

Just two years later, in Cameroon, authoritarian multi-party elections had quite different effects. The ruling Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) "re-established itself as the dominant political party" as it secured 149 out of 180 seats in parliamentary elections (Takougang 2003, 423). The elections were neither clean nor were the results uncontested. But president Biya and his party successfully bought voters, co-opted opposition politicians, and ensured the support of the army (Takougang 2003). The National Assembly later moved on to alter the constitution and abandon presidential term limits so as to enable the president to run for reelection. Biya and the CPDM still rule Cameroon at the time of writing.

The previous chapter described the spread of authoritarian multi-party elections. The Serbian and Cameroonian elections are just two out of many such multi-party contests. But they serve to illustrate an apparent paradox: Authoritarian multi-party elections seem capable of both sustaining and subverting authoritarian regimes. This chapter reviews the literature on the effect of authoritarian elections. It shows that an apparent paradox is present not only in contrasting, illustrative examples but also in theoretical work and statistical analyses of the long-term effects of authoritarian elections. First, existing theoretical micro-level mechanisms through which elections are expected to either support authoritarian regime stability or lead to the regime's demise are presented. Second, the chapter summarizes the empirical investigations of the relationship between elections and authoritarian regime sta-

bility offered by the existing literature. This review serves as the basis for deriving a theory of the conditional effect of authoritarian elections on regime stability in the following chapter.

Elections as Causes of Authoritarian Regime Developments

For a long time, authoritarian elections were dismissed as window dressing: institutions implemented to satisfy outside observers without altering the dynamics of the authoritarian regime (Joseph 1997). But throughout the 2000s, more researchers have insisted that authoritarian elections play a distinct role in determining authoritarian regime stability and the prospects for democratization. This claim has been challenged by those who suggest that elections should be viewed as symptoms rather than causes of authoritarian regime strength (Brownlee 2007, 30–32), or that even if they are causes of regime developments, we have yet to see proof thereof (Pepinsky 2014). But strong theoretical arguments backed by case material support the claim that elections affect regime stability. Paradoxically, though, multi-party elections have been argued to both sustain and subvert authoritarian regimes.

One argument highlights the inevitable uncertainty introduced by elections, a formally democratic institution that interferes with the concentration of power practiced by authoritarian regimes, and thus stresses the destabilizing and even democratizing powers of these elections (Lindberg 2006; Howard and Roessler 2006; Hadenius and Teorell 2009; Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Kuntz and Thompson 2009). Others see formally democratic institutions as tools that dictators may adapt to reinforce their rule (Magaloni 2006; Gandhi 2008; Lust-Okar 2006; Blaydes 2011). In the following, I ask why and how authoritarian elections might affect authoritarian regime stability and the prospects for democratization. For both arguments, I focus on the way in which elections may alter the relationship between the rulers and the three remaining actor groups of the authoritarian regime: internal regime elites, opposition, and citizens (Gerschewski 2013, 18).

Regime-Sustaining Elections

The idea that authoritarian elections serve the interests of the ruler is not new. In a 1978 volume on *Elections Without Choice*, Linz stated that "[...] if there are elections they must have some functions from the point of view of the leadership [...]" (J. J. Linz 1978, 36). In recent years, the literature on authoritarian institutions has proliferated, and numerous scholars have come to see

formally democratic institutions as tools available to the ruling elite in their quest to hold on to power and maintain regime stability (Brownlee 2009a; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Magaloni 2006; Geddes 2005; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Blaydes 2011; Gandhi 2008). The literature generally takes its starting point in two fundamental needs of the dictator: the co-optation of other elites and the cooperation and compliance of the citizenry (Gandhi 2008, xvii–xviii; Magaloni 2006, 44). Elections are essential in securing the cooperation of the masses and in deterring the ruling elite from defecting to the opposition. A number of potential mechanisms through which nominally democratic elections may help sustain the authoritarian regime have been proposed. They concern the three main actor groups of the authoritarian regime: the internal elites, the opposition, and the masses.

With rebellion from within the highest ranks of the regime recognized as the greatest threat to autocrats (Svolik 2012, 4–5), a main concern of any autocrat is controlling the internal elites and avoiding defections. Following Schedler's logic of the twin uncertainties of authoritarian regimes, rulers need not only to exercise power but also "to demonstrate it" (2013, 41). This need to demonstrate power is what lies behind the primary mechanism through which elections are argued to help rulers manage the elite: *signaling*. When the leadership is successful in winning (or creating) large majorities, it *signals* that there is no political future outside of the ruling front, and would-be defectors are thus discouraged (Magaloni 2006, 4–10, 16–19; Geddes 2005, 11–12). In order for this strategy to work, supermajorities and high voter turnouts (to signal that there is no remaining pool of votes for the opposition to tap into) are necessary (Magaloni 2006; Geddes 2005, 12).

Based on extensive research on Mubarak's Egypt, Blaydes argues that signaling is not the only – or even the most important – way in which dictators control elites through elections (2011, 18). Rather, a second function of elections underscored by a number of authors is the role of serving as a form of *credible commitment* between ruler and elites. To decrease the risk of violent rebellion from his own elite, a dictator must make an unbreakable contract that limits his personal rule. Multi-party elections offer elites a credible threat of challenging the leadership in elections and simultaneously commit rulers to distributing power positions to the lower-level elites (Magaloni 2008, 724, 728).

Third, elections allow the incumbent to *monitor* elites and *distribute power*: they offer the leadership information on candidates' popularity among voters (or their ability to manipulate or coerce voters into supporting the incumbent) (Malesky and Schuler 2011, 495–497), they help distribute spoils and jobs amongst the elite (Magaloni 2006, 16–19; Gandhi and Lust-Okar

2009, 405), they can solve the potentially damaging issue of succession, and they can function as a recruitment device for lower-level officials (Geddes 2005, 13).

The main goal of all three tactics is to avoid elite defections. The argument is not only that the risk of elite defections is high during election time and must thus be diminished, but that elections, through *signalling*, *credible commitment*, and *monitoring and power distribution*, can actually lower the likelihood of elite defections so that the risk of defections becomes lower than if elections had not been held.

Autocrats presiding over elections usually employ two types of strategies towards the opposition: *exclusion* and *co-optation*. If the opposition takes part in elections, they contribute to the legitimization of the system (J. J. Linz 1978, 60; Magaloni 2006, 9–10, 258). But if they boycott elections, they automatically *exclude* themselves from potential influence and visibility. Elections also provide rulers with an effective divide and rule strategy through *co-optation*. The access to either limited policy influence or spoils, through for instance an authoritarian parliament, may be offered to only parts of the opposition or to prominent opposition figures, thus containing them and leaving the rest of the opposition out (Malesky and Schuler 2010, 482; J. J. Linz 1978, 62; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, 405; Schedler 2013, 91; Bunce and Wolchik 2011, 95).[13] Excluding the opposition through provoking electoral boycotts is perhaps an attempt to avoid elections spiraling out of control rather than a directly stabilizing effect of elections. But the generation of supermajority victories that signal invincibility can be argued to further the process of co-opting prominent opposition figures into the ruling front.

The most common voter-oriented argument for why elections sustain the regime is *legitimation* – the mere fact that voters can, at least supposedly, express their political preferences at the ballot box may serve to legitimate the regime and prevent public uprisings (Schedler 2002a, 36; Hermet 1978, 16). But perhaps more important today is the role of elections as a tool for *rent distribution*. Elections deliver information about supporters and opponents or about whole districts that are either opposition strongholds or ruling party bases. This information allows the ruling elite to distribute spoils and punishments among constituents accordingly, thus tying voters to the ruling front and making citizen protests – or even voter defections in elections – even more unlikely (Magaloni 2006, 4–10; Lust 2009a, 124–131; Blaydes

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[13] Elections are also argued to provide rulers with information on opposition strength, allowing them to judge the level of concessions necessary to co-opt and successfully quell dissent (Gandhi 2008, 167–168).

2011). This system of competitive clientelism also undermines public support for democratically oriented candidates: voters only vote for candidates who can deliver state spoils, and state resources are only available to the candidates of the incumbent party (Lust 2009a, 124–131).

Elections thus affect all important internal actor groups in an authoritarian regime, and there are numerous mechanisms through which elections can not only be tamed into relatively unharmful creatures, but even play an active part in sustaining an authoritarian regime.

Regime-Subverting Elections

In spite of the numerous arguments for why non-competitive, multi-party elections sustain authoritarian regimes, several authors argue for a new path towards regime change and in some instances even democratization through elections (Hadenius and Teorell 2009; Howard and Roessler 2006; Schedler 2006b; Lindberg 2006; Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Thompson and Kuntz 2004). This has been guided by the idea that uncertainty is introduced through elections, or that elections open a window of opportunity for change (Schedler 2002b, 109). Like the regime-sustaining electoral effects, the mechanisms connecting elections to regime subversion also work through the three main actor groups of an authoritarian regime.

First, internal elites may abuse the *informational role* played by elections in a traditionally information-scarce society. If elections signal leadership weakness, there is a risk that the elite will split and turn against the dictator (Magaloni 2006, 258; Schedler 2009a, 305–306). Second, opposition forces will respond to these same signals. If they perceive victory as being within reach, they are more likely to fight (Howard and Roessler 2006, 369). A weak opposition has been identified as the main obstacle to democratization in many semi-authoritarian regimes (Rakner and van de Walle 2009, 205). But elections can become *focal points* that enable the opposition to overcome coordination problems (Pop-Eleches and Robertson 2009, 13). Further, even though non-competitive elections are defined by the very fact that the opposition does not win them, opposition candidates may still take advantage of the election and the *visibility* they may gain from it and seek to become "opinion leaders" (J. J. Linz 1978, 54–55).

Third, elections also have the capacity to spark massive *protests* among voters that can in turn trigger regime breakdown (Kuntz and Thompson 2009; Tucker 2007). A state of chaos is more likely in electoral autocracies, according to Schedler, because elections in non-democracies involve all the structural opportunities for collective action: grievances (over lack of demo-

cratic rights), repertoires of collective action (demonstrations, strikes, etc.), and political opportunities are all present at the same time (Schedler 2009a, 306–307; see also Bunce and Wolchik 2011, 15–16). But even in the absence of large-scale protests, the mere holding of repetitive elections may instil *democratic norms* in voters and spur the development of civic associations that, in turn, bolster citizens' capabilities. As the individual citizen is exposed to the norms of equality through elections, these ideas will spread in society. Groups will form and campaign for rights outside of elections, and the media often becomes more outspoken during elections, which may promote further democratization (Lindberg 2006, 111–115). Schedler emphasizes how these mechanisms may be strengthened as the opposition actively engages in civic education (Schedler 2009b, 183).

The contrasting effects of elections are summarized in Table 3.1: Through *signalling*, *credible commitment*, and *monitoring and power distribution*, elections may bind elites to the ruling front – but they may also reveal *information* that spurs elite defections. Elections can de-fang the opposition through *exclusion*, *co-optation and divisions,* but they may become *focal points* for opposition mobilization and provide opposition *visibility*. And elections may either tie in voters through *legitimation* processes and *rent-distribution* or they may push voters away from the regime by provoking *protests* and spreading *democratic norms* throughout society.

Table 3.1: Mechanisms linking elections to authoritarian regime stability

Actor group	Actor choices	Mechanisms of stability	Mechanisms of subversion
Elite	• Loyalty or defection?	• Signalling • Credible commitment • Monitoring and power distribution	• Information on regime weakness
Opposition	• Co-optation or mobilization?	• Exclusion • Co-optation and division	• Focal point for mobilization • Visibility
Voters	• Voting for regime or opposition? • Protesting or staying quiet?	• Legitimacy • Rent distribution	• Post-electoral protests • Spread of democratic norms and capabilities

Empirical Evidence

Scholars have developed theoretical arguments for both a regime-sustaining and a regime-subverting effect of authoritarian elections. Some have ventured so far as to argue that unfree elections may even spur democratic developments (Lindberg 2006). But what have we actually seen? This section reviews existing, cross-national, empirical investigations of the relationship between authoritarian elections and regime developments.

Existing studies differ on several levels (see also Schedler 2013, 149–172 for a discussion of this). Some studies test the effect of all types of authoritarian elections, some focus only on multi-party elections, and some restrict the focus further, zooming in on only competitive multi-party elections. Further, some researchers explore the effect of cumulative numbers of elections whereas others look at the propensity for regime breakdown based on the holding of elections regardless of electoral history. As for the dependent variable, some have explored the effect of elections on breakdown propensities, survival rate or average age of authoritarian regimes, or, in some instances, individual dictators' tenure rates. Others have supplemented this with studies of elections' effects on a regime's propensity to transition to democracy after a breakdown. And still others have traced the effect of elections on developments in political rights and civil liberties. Drawing together this body of knowledge, this section proceeds to ask what we know about the effect of authoritarian elections on regime breakdown.

In the literature on democratization, the most pressing question has been whether the holding of non-democratic elections affects the likelihood of democratization. The debate was sparked with Lindberg's findings that the cumulative number of consecutive multi-party elections improved levels of civil liberties in Africa between independence and 2003, regardless of the democratic qualities (or lack thereof) of these electoral contests (Lindberg 2006). Along those same lines, Hadenius and Teorell, in their study of transitions from different regime types, find that democratization is most common in authoritarian multi-party regimes without a dominant party (i.e. competitive regimes) (Hadenius and Teorell 2007, 152–153).

However, in later studies, neither Hadenius and Teorell (2009) nor McCoy and Hartlyn (2009) corroborate Lindberg's findings. Although Hadenius and Teorell state that they find "significant support" for a democratizing effect of elections (2009, 98), their results do not support this conclusion. The holding of a multi-party election only significantly increases democracy scores and ratings of civil liberties in a country in the year of the election, not in the fol-

lowing year (Hadenius and Teorell 2009, 91–95), leaving one wondering whether such results were driven by democracy rankers' positive responses to the holding of an election. With regard to the effect of the cumulative number of elections, they have a significant effect on civil liberties ratings, but at a level that is hardly substantially interesting (it would take 269 multi-party elections to improve a given country's Freedom House's civil liberties rating by one point) (Hadenius and Teorell 2009, 95–98).

McCoy and Hartlyn's study of elections in Latin America from 1945 up until the third wave transitions leads them to conclude that for this given sample, "there is no relationship between the number of elections a country has held and its democratic experience" (2009, 49). And more recently, Bogaards has evaluated the claim based on Lindberg's original sample. He finds that of the 48 African cases, only two – Senegal and Ghana – have transitioned to democracy following repetitive multi-party elections (Bogaards 2013, 155). In fact, the overall pattern amongst African electoral autocracies is one of stability (Bogaards 2013, 158). Although this critique was immediately challenged by Lindberg, arguing that Bogaards' investigation obscures evidence of movements towards democracy within authoritarian regimes (2013), his point remains that evidence for elections as causes of democratic transitions in Africa is scarce.

The studies that focus on certain types of electoral regimes are a little more positive towards the "democratization by elections" thesis. Thus, in his worldwide study of regimes from 1975 to 2004, Brownlee finds that competitive regimes may be more likely to democratize following an authoritarian breakdown (2009a). However, whether this result is driven by the minimalist democracies – those regimes with uncertainty over electoral outcomes – that are often included in the group of competitive authoritarian regimes is unknown.

The remaining studies focus on regimes that hold multi-party elections (and in some instances competitive multi-party elections) and enquire into factors that make stability or liberalization more likely in electoral regimes. They do not compare the effect of holding elections to that of not holding elections. Howard and Roessler (2006) and Donno (2013) take quantitative approaches. Howard and Roessler identify the forming of an opposition coalition as the most important factor for making "liberalizing outcomes" more likely during an authoritarian election (Howard and Roessler 2006). But they do not explore whether the holding of elections over time correlates with democratic developments. Donno finds no support for the claim that the repeated holding of elections makes democratization more likely, but like Brownlee, she does find competitive authoritarian regimes to be more likely

to democratize than hegemonic regimes (Donno 2013, 8). However, this effect is in itself dependent on international pressure or the existence of an opposition coalition.

Bunce and Wolchik (2011) and Levitsky and Way (2010) explore similar questions through a qualitative approach. Bunce and Wolchik deliver qualitative evidence that authoritarian elections in post-communist regimes have contributed to democratization but only in some cases, an outcome they ascribe to the strategies pursued by opposition activists (2011, 332–334). Levitsky and Way analyzed developments of competitive authoritarian regimes in the post-Cold War era and found that linkage to the Western world, exemplified by trade flows, immigration, and Western-educated domestic elites, increased the likelihood that competitive authoritarian regimes democratized. When such international linkage to the West was limited, the strength of the state and the ruling party, along with the leverage that Western powers held over rulers, decided whether regimes remained stable or evolved into unstable, electoral autocracies (Levitsky and Way 2010).

Thus, theoretical and empirical accounts exist, documenting that whether competitive or hegemonic authoritarian regimes democratize depends on a number of factors related both to the opposition, the ruling group, and the international environment. But there are two important caveats. First, since these studies only find results for the competitive subgroup, it is unclear whether the effect is driven by what I, in the previous chapter, termed minimalist democracies. And second, since most of the studies only include electoral authoritarian regimes (or even competitive regimes), it remains unknown whether the elections (as opposed to no elections) actually positively affect democratization processes. We may know that electoral regimes are more likely to democratize under some circumstances than others, but we do not know whether they are more likely to do so than are non-electoral regimes. In other words, we know very little about the causal effect of elections.

The literature on authoritarianism has often taken a slightly different vantage point. Setting aside the democratizing potential of non-democratic elections, researchers have asked whether elections stabilize or destabilize an authoritarian regime. But again, there are no clear indications of a stabilizing or a destabilizing effect of elections. Brownlee finds that although competitive regimes are more likely to democratize, the holding of competitive or hegemonic elections does not significantly affect a regime's likelihood to break down (2009a). Similarly, Gandhi demonstrates that the presence or absence of a multi-party legislature does not affect dictators' rates of survival in office (2008, 175–176). Hadenius and Teorell find that multi-party authori-

tarian regimes have the shortest average life span of all authoritarian regime types (2007, 150), but Magaloni identifies the survival probability of hegemonic autocracies to be greater than that of military regimes (2008). Under all circumstances, it is not clear whether these survival rates and life spans are an effect of holding multi-party elections.

Towards a New Theory of Authoritarian Elections

What might explain the mixed results of empirical studies on the effect of authoritarian elections? One possibility is the problems of generating sound data on authoritarian regimes. However, this has not inhibited fruitful studies of other aspects of authoritarian politics, ranging from investment and growth rates, conflict behavior and electoral manipulation to determinants of democratization and authoritarian survival (a few examples from an ever-expanding literature include Wright 2008; Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010; Weeks 2012; Higashijima 2014; Svolik 2012; Malesky and Schuler 2010).

Another explanation suggested is the plethora of definitions of both dependent and independent variables that make results extremely hard to compare across studies (Schedler 2013, 149), a point that is also supported by the debate between Bogaards and Lindberg on how to measure democratic progress following elections in sub-Saharan Africa. I argue, however, that the problem is more fundamental than simply diverging definitions of cause and outcome. The literature presents directly opposing hypotheses on the effect of elections that cannot be explained away by their different choices of dependent variables. A third option is that elections simply have no substantial influence on authoritarian regime dynamics. In light of the sound theoretical arguments discussed above, as well as numerous case studies documenting an effect (whether positive or negative) of elections on regime outcomes (see for instance Magaloni 2006; Greene 2007; Bunce and Wolchik 2011), this postulate should be tested more thoroughly rather than taken for granted.

This dissertation suggests a fourth explanation. Aligning with a prominent new book on electoral authoritarianism by Andreas Schedler, I argue that rather than elections exerting no real influence on the stability of the regimes in which they play out, authoritarian elections could potentially have all of the aforementioned effects. Perhaps elections will sometimes stabilize authoritarian systems while at other times de-stabilize and potentially even democratize them. Schedler states that autocrats may perceive elections as a potential tool for stability, but they face a dilemma because, "Unless political institutions are granted minimal margins of power and autonomy, they can-

not make an independent contribution to authoritarian governance and survival; and as soon as political institutions are granted minimal margins of power and autonomy, they can turn against the dictator" (Schedler 2013, 73).

According to Schedler, elections are arenas of struggle between regime and opposition actors. The effect of elections depends on the outcome of that struggle. Where the incumbents win, elections may serve to stabilize their rule. If the opposition is successful, elections bode change. This game is complicated by its two-level character – actors fight both over electoral rules and electoral outcomes – and by the immense uncertainty that is political reality in authoritarian regimes. But this leads Schedler to draw a conclusion that is essentially voluntarist: "At each election, authoritarian success is the rule (the probable outcome), opposition success the exception (the possible outcome)" (Schedler 2013, 141).

I support Schedler's notion that elections are a double-edged sword: they hold the potential to propel regime breakdown but can also be abused to sustain authoritarian rule. But I disagree with his notion that a theory of the effect of authoritarian elections should be essentially voluntarist. Rather, I propose that if we state that elections may both support authoritarian regimes and cause their demise, we should immediately ask ourselves under what conditions either scenario is likely to play out. What affects the effect of elections? This approach turns the "paradox" of authoritarian elections into a "contingent effect" of authoritarian elections. The lack of conclusive results of empirical, cross-national investigations should thus stem from an underspecification of the model.

The theoretical approach follows Levitsky and Way, who ask why some competitive authoritarian regimes break down, others remain stable, and yet others develop into democracies. They seek an answer to this question in the internal and external environments of post-Cold War authoritarian regimes (Levitsky and Way 2010). In the following chapter, I develop a theory of the conditions under which elections may contribute to authoritarian domination and when they may spiral into regime breakdown. These conditions are not deterministic, but they do affect the probabilities of elections being regime stabilizing or regime subverting. In the succeeding chapters, I proceed to empirical tests of this argument of a conditional effect of authoritarian elections.

Chapter 4.
How Authoritarian Capacities Enable Regime Stabilization through Elections – a Theoretical Framework

In the Georgian parliamentary elections in November 2003, incumbent President Shevardnadze's support parties secured a combined majority of votes. But they were only able to do so by relying heavily on blatant electoral fraud. The quality of the state apparatus was summed up by an old joke: "The government was bad, but at least there was not much of it" (Mitchell 2004, 348; see also Bunce and Wolchik 2011, 153–154). With Shevardnadze declaring his victory in spite of national and international allegations of voting irregularities, voters took to the streets to protest the stolen elections. Protesters never numbered the hundreds of thousands known from other electoral revolutions, but pro-opposition media broadcast the "revolution" to the population 24 hours a day, and Shevardnadze's underpaid security forces quickly defected (Mitchell 2004; Bunce and Wolchik 2011, 165). The former minister of justice, Saakashvili, who had defected to head the opposition, presented Shevardnadze with a letter of resignation, and within three weeks of the election the president had abandoned his post. The authoritarian regime had succumbed to what was later termed the "Rose Revolution."

Four months later, the Malaysian ruling coalition, the Front National (BN), won a landslide victory by taking 65% of votes and 90% of seats in parliamentary elections. The opposition leader was in prison; the ruling coalition controlled the media, the electoral commission, and the police force; it enjoyed economic support from major businesses who were favored by the granting of contracts and licenses; electoral districts were gerrymandered in favor of the incumbents; and state support was doled out in return for votes (Julian Lee 2007). Hardly any protests erupted following the elections, which had largely been successful in co-opting the opposition *Reformasi* movement into the regime (Welsh 2005, 154–155). The BN is still in power today and continues to win elections, as it has done since independence.

These tales of two very different electoral settings neatly illustrate what the last chapter hinted: Elections with very different consequences often take place under autocrats endowed with different levels of capacities, thus allowing for different levels of electoral control. Perhaps the paradox of authoritarian elections is not so paradoxical after all?

This chapter develops a theoretical framework aimed at clarifying the conditions under which elections may stabilize dictatorial rule. It sets out by clarifying the underlying assumption of actor behavior in dictatorships, sketching the groups that compose the main threat to dictatorial survival in office and the strategies available to power-hungry dictators. It then moves on to theorize how the capacities available to the autocrat, namely state capacity (both administrative and coercive) and control over the economy, enable him to control elections by affecting individual citizens' and politicians' decisions about whether to support or oppose the ruling front. The main argument is that the greater the administrative capacity or economic control an autocrat has at his disposal, the more likely elections are to be regime-stabilizing. Where administrative capacity and economic control are limited, autocrats may rely on their coercive apparatus to ensure short-term survival. When an incumbent controls neither the administrative or coercive apparatus nor the economy, he is more likely to succumb in the face of multiparty elections. The chapter results in eight hypotheses to be tested in Chapters 6-7 and a number of observable implications that will guide the case studies of Chapters 8-9.

Threats to Power and Survival Strategies in Authoritarian Regimes

This dissertation works from the assumption that, whether democratic or authoritarian, rulers are office-seeking. For dictators in particular, holding office enables the ruler to accumulate rents whereas losing office has dire consequences, including the prospects of exile, imprisonment, or even death (Goemans 2008). From Syria's Bashar Assad, who is, at the time of writing, literally fighting for his grasp on power, to the leadership of Malaysia's ruling coalition, BN, which recently secured another term in office, authoritarian leaders want first and foremost to ensure regime survival and entrench their position in power. This assumption of office-seeking rulers underlies much classical work on both democracy and dictatorship (Wintrobe 1998; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Downs 1957).

In their quest for power and regime stability, authoritarian rulers face three domestic groups that might wish to overthrow them.[14] These are the

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[14] Threats from external actors have become increasingly important in recent years but are not considered here. According to data from Geddes et al., breakdowns following foreign interventions have accounted for 4% of regime breakdowns in authoritarian regimes since 1946 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a).

three actor groups discussed in Chapter 3. The first group, the internal elite, has been identified as the greatest threat to the regime: In the second half of the twentieth century, more than two-thirds of dictators who lost power unconstitutionally[15] were overthrown by elites internal to the ruling coalition (Svolik 2012, 4–5; see also Tullock 1987). This regime elite – the ruling coalition (Svolik 2012, 63), launching organization (Haber 2006, 696), or winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) – is the group "whose support is essential if the incumbent is to remain in power" (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 38). The internal elite, often the very group that brought the dictator to power, is integrated into the state apparatus, the military, and the economy to a degree that makes it able (though not necessarily willing) to bring down the regime (Haber 2006, 696).[16]

Second, dictators also face a vertical threat, a pressure from the masses. Indeed, whereas Svolik establishes the greatest threat against dictators *in general* to be that of the elite, personalist dictators (or established autocrats in Svolik's terms), who have centralized power in their own person, should be more likely to be overthrown by popular rebellion (Svolik 2012, 63). Although popular uprisings have been established as neither necessary nor sufficient for a transition to take place (Ulfelder 2005, 313; Goldstone 2001, 168), pressure from below has been identified as an initiator of elite splits that in turn bring down the regime (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, chap. 3; O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986; Przeworski 1991; Diamond 1994). The so-called Colored Revolutions of the post-communist world and the Arab Spring provide recent empirical examples of this phenomenon.

Although the most common distinction is between the regime elites and the populace (Svolik 2012, 3–6; Gandhi 2008, 164; Magaloni 2006, 44; Blaydes 2011, 9), a third actor group also exists in multi-party autocracies: the established opposition. The threat constituted by this group becomes particularly prominent in multi-party electoral regimes (Schedler 2013, 118–119). Defecting regime elites often become the most prominent opposition

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[15] "Unconstitutionally" refers to transfers of power that do not follow an officially endorsed process (Svolik 2012, 40).

[16] Indeed, embedded in the very notion of the succession dilemma is the idea that whereas dictators need strong allies, these allies are also their biggest threat: Having established a second in command who is destined to take over power might free the regime of elite splits should the leader fall ill, but dictators often shy away from appointing such a successor because "If a man occupies a clear second place, every opponent of the top man will tend to rally around him, and he will then become a serious rival to the man on top" (Burling 1974, 256).

leaders, and the active opposition draws heavily on the populace. Thus, the borders between regime elites and opposition elites on the one hand, and opposition elites and the populace on the other hand, are blurred. But established opposition figures can threaten the rulers by running against them in elections, stirring public protests, provoking anti-regime sentiments at home or abroad, or simply presenting a possible future alternative to the current regime.

An office-seeking leadership facing these three groups is generally assumed to have three strategies at its disposal. The first two are captured in Machiavelli's dictum "men must be either pampered or crushed" (Machiavelli 1961, 37). Thus, the strategies of repression and co-optation are commonly emphasized in studies of authoritarian regimes (Haber 2006, 698–702; Svolik 2012; Schedler 2013, 56; Fjelde and Soysa 2009). Co-optation is a strategy to tie pivotal elites to the regime by supplying them with spoils either in the form of rents or policy concessions. It covers strategies as varied as inclusion of opposing groups in an authoritarian parliament (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Malesky and Schuler 2010) to various forms of patrimonialism, for instance by providing parliamentarians with ample opportunities for corruption, perhaps even combined with immunity from prosecution (Blaydes 2011, 10–11). Repression, the "actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities" (Davenport 2007, 2), may be targeted at both elites and the masses, the aim simply being to pressure people to refrain from regime-threatening activity.

A third strategy, legitimation, has received less attention in recent years but is still argued to serve important functions in securing authoritarian regime survival (Gerschewski 2013; Schedler 2013, 56–57; see also Fjelde and Soysa 2009 on civil war). It is targeted primarily at the masses and is an attempt to secure consent, compliance, or at least toleration of the regime (Gerschewski 2013, 18). It can take the form of anything from ideological indoctrination to attempting to create specific support by delivering economic growth.

These strategies have varying costs and benefits, are available to dictators to differing degrees, and are usually employed in unison, albeit with some regimes relying more heavily on one strategy than the others.

When Elections Enter the Equation

This is the environment in which authoritarian multi-party elections are entrenched. Whether adopted by a power-hungry dictator hoping to derive some benefit from the electoral institution, forced upon the regime by democracy-promoting foreign powers, inherited from a preceding democratic regime, or installed by colonial rulers, Chapter 2 showed that 62% of all dictators today play out their fight to maintain power in a context that also involves multi-party elections.

How do multi-party elections affect the game played out between regime leadership, elites, opposition, and population? Chapter 3 reviewed two different sides of the argument on the effect of elections on authoritarian regime stability (see the summary in Table 3.1). The stability-generating mechanisms derived from the literature review include both strategies of legitimation and co-optation of elites (both internal and opposition) or even whole segments of the voting population through rent distribution. In this tradition, elections are not only rejected as a hindrance to an authoritarian ruler's grab on power, they are a tool to promote regime stability. The regime-subverting mechanisms underscore how elections may actually change the playing field in favor of the opposition. They may serve not only to delegitimate the regime, but also to provide voters and opposition with a tool to gain visibility and demonstrate dissatisfaction. Rather than generating regime stability, elections introduce some level of uncertainty into the political process and may thus spark regime breakdown.

In a nutshell, this is the paradox of authoritarian elections. Elections have the ability to change the game in favor of both rulers and challengers. But what determines whether the authoritarian leadership succeeds in abusing elections to entrench its own rule? When might elections spin out of control and produce regime breakdown rather than promote endurance? In the following sections, I theorize how central capacities of an authoritarian regime condition the effect of elections on regime stability. I argue that the likelihood of a stabilizing effect of elections increases with higher levels of administrative capacity and economic control, and thus that elections are associated with regime stability in regimes with strong bureaucracies and/or extensive control over the economy. Where administrative capacity and economic control are limited, autocrats may still survive elections by relying on their coercive capacity. Where these central capacities are lacking, elections are associated with regime breakdown.

The argument proceeds in five steps. First, I argue that choices made by the three main actor groups of the authoritarian regime – elites, opposition,

and the population – are crucial in shaping the effect of authoritarian elections, and I spell out the factors that affect each of these choices on the individual level in turn. Second, I present the concepts of state capacity and economic control and their overall effect on authoritarian regime stability through elections and briefly relate it to the existing literature. Third, I introduce eight strategies through which autocrats may control elections. Each strategy is targeted at affecting the choices made by at least one of the actor groups so as to increase the likelihood of stabilization by election. Furthermore, for each strategy, I discuss how it is dependent on either administrative or coercive (state) capacity or control over the economy. Fourth, this synthesis of the micro and macro levels leads to eight hypotheses of the overall relationship between elections, authoritarian capacities, and stability that lend themselves well to quantitative testing. Here, I also reflect upon the differing effects of the eight strategies, which are not all equally attractive to autocrats. Fifth, I also derive a number of observable implications that allow for a test of the theoretical mechanisms (the relationship between capacities, strategies, and actor choices) in case studies.

Voting Choices, Elite Defections, Opposition Mobilization, and Voter Protests

To clarify how the effect of elections plays out, I focus on important choices made by the main actor groups of an authoritarian regime: (1) the choice of voters of whether to support the rulers in elections; (2) the choice of (a) elites of whether to stay loyal to the leadership or defect, and of (b) defected regime elites and opposition politicians to run for elections on the opposition slate or be co-opted into the ruling front; and (3) the choice of citizens of whether to protest fraudulent elections (see Table 3.1). The effect of these actor choices on regime stability following elections is briefly discussed below before I elaborate on each actor choice in turn.

The first choice, voters' decisions of whether or not to support the ruling front on Election Day, is important because it affects the likelihood of the rulers winning elections with supermajority victories. Granted, an autocrat has other strategies to create supermajority victories absent the actual votes needed, as shall be discussed in detail below. But convincing or manipulating voters into supporting the ruling front at the ballot box is an integral part of such strategies. As spelled out by the literature reviewed in Chapter 3, supermajority victories in turn are an important feature of stabilizing elections, as these victories serve to signal the autocrat's invincibility and thus affect the

likelihood of elite loyalty (rather than defections) and opposition co-optation (rather than mobilization) (see for instance Magaloni and Kricheli 2010, 128; Magaloni 2006).

The choices made by politicians of whether to go with the ruling front or actively support the opposition form the second set of choices discussed in the following. As spelled out in Chapter 3, avoiding elite defections and successfully co-opting the opposition are vital strategies for stabilizing a regime through elections. Finally, the third choice is that of citizens deciding whether to protest a (perceived) fraudulent election. Such protests are a crucial mechanism through which elections may destabilize an authoritarian regime, and have been argued to play an important part in convincing central regime elites to defect (Beissinger 2009, 75). These dynamics are illustrated in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1: Actor choices and regime stability and breakdown

The main claim of this thesis is that central capacities available to autocrats shape the likelihood that elections either support or subvert the regime on the macro level because they affect the three sets of choices made on the micro level. To illustrate this argument, I rely on acknowledged models of vote choices, candidate choices, and protester choices. The aim of the following section is not to develop a full model of all choices made by all relevant actors in an electoral authoritarian setting or of the whole range of factors that affect such choices. The more humble goal is to sketch simple versions of these choices. Against this background I illustrate how state capacity and economic control may alter these micro-level choices, potentially allowing elections to have differing effects.

(1) Voter choice

Models of voting behavior in multi-party electoral authoritarian regimes generally agree that the expected utility of voting for either party is a function of one's ideological congruence with that party, the benefits one might receive as a function of voting (whether being material spoils received in the form of patronage or a form of satisfaction of democratic values attained from voting for one's favored party), and the costs of voting (Pfutze 2013; Greene 2007, chap. 2; Magaloni 2006, chap. 1).[17] I take as a starting point Greene's model for vote choice in a dominant party regime (2007, 48–50), which is in turn adapted from Downs' and Cox's original baseline models of vote choice in democracies (Downs 1957; Cox 1997). However, as Greene's basic utility functions include only the voter's policy congruence with the party in question, patronage received if voting for the ruling party, and what he terms "patronage-related uncertainty" (Greene 2007, 49), I make a few modifications. Consider the very simple game tree presented in Figure 4.2.

Figure 4.2: Voter choice (1)

Disregarding the option of abstaining, voters have a choice between supporting either the rulers (R) or the opposition (O). The expected utility of voting for the ruling front, $EU(V_R)$, or an opposition party, $EU(V_O)$, respectively, is represented by:

$$EU(V_R) = -\alpha(x_i - x_R)^2 + (1-\alpha)S_R - C_R \qquad (4.1)$$

$$EU(V_O) = -\alpha(x_i - x_O)^2 - C_O \qquad (4.2)$$

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[17] The utility functions or the values attached to the different components are often argued to be affected by voters' income levels, to show how economic crises or remittances may affect voting behavior in autocracies (see for instance Pfutze 2013). However, the purpose here is not to fully account for voting behavior in autocracies but merely to sketch why incumbent control over the economy or high levels of state capacity may affect vote choices and thus form part of a strategy towards attaining supermajority victories and using elections to stabilize the regime. I thus stick with the simple version.

As in Greene's model, I expect the utility of electorally supporting the auto-crat to be a function of the voter's ideological congruence or policy congru-ence with the ruling party, represented by $(x_i - x_R)^2$. In Greene's model, which is based on 20th century Mexico, policy or ideological congruence is largely thought of in terms of a left-right continuum, but the existence of party com-petition on, for instance, economic policy is not a necessary condition. Ideo-logical congruence may just as well refer to the individual voter's attitudes towards, for instance, democratization or regime change. But preferences are assumed to be formed in a one-dimensional policy space. x_i represents the ideal policy position of the voter and x_R that taken by the incumbent. α denotes the weight attached to policy or ideology by the given voter.

The second component, S_R, covers the material spoils attached to voting for the ruling front, be they economic transfers given to the individual in di-rect forms of vote-buying, or goods – whether welfare benefits, a new clinic, or tractors – delivered to an entire village or district based on the ruling par-ty's performance there. $1-\alpha$ is the weight the individual voter ascribes to ma-terial benefits.[18] The third component, C_R, is the costs of voting for the ruling party. In an authoritarian system, it may only involve the costs of transporting oneself to the nearest ballot box and casting the vote, but can also potential-ly cover harassment of those ruling party supporters who live in opposition strongholds. In general, though, these costs will be lower than those of voting for the opposition, discussed below. All variables are positive numbers.

The expected utility of voting for the opposition in this simplified setting involves no material gains. Obviously, there are instances of vote buying or other forms of patronage conducted by opposition candidates, but in gen-eral, opposition parties in authoritarian regimes have very few resources at their disposal (Greene 2007, 122–123). Instead, the benefits of voting for the opposition may be ideological, captured by the policy congruence between the voter and her chosen opposition party, $(x_i - x_O)^2$, multiplied by the weight she attaches to ideology, α. The second component of Equation 4.2 is the costs of voting for the opposition, C_O, including the physical and economic harassment that rulers may target at suspected opposition voters. Obviously, numerous other factors could also be said to influence a person's party choice, yet these basic models capture the general components that most voters consider before casting their vote in an authoritarian election. Before

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[18] $1-\alpha$ will thus be affected by factors such as a voter's income level, as higher earn-ings will make voters less dependent on political patronage, and even this very simple model thus reflects the arguments of, for instance, Pfutze (2013), Magaloni (2006), and Greene (2007).

discussing the effect of state capacity and economic control on these utility calculations, I turn to the choices made by potential candidates and protesters.

(2) Candidate choice

To understand the choice of the individual politician on whether to run under the ruling party banner or to participate as an opposition candidate,[19] I approximate Magaloni's model of elite defections in hegemonic authoritarian regimes (Magaloni 2006, 44–46) with some alterations. In Magaloni's work, what matters is not the likelihood of the opposition gaining a majority, but the likelihood of the individual candidate winning a parliamentary seat. Her framework is simplified by assuming that the utility of attaining a seat is not affected by the overall election results – opposition candidates gain utility from winning a seat regardless of how the remaining opposition performs.

My theoretical framework is simplified by a different assumption, as I tie the utility of the individual to the performance of the party, or front, as a whole. I assume that candidates gain utility only if their front wins the election. In the case of regime change, I find it plausible that candidates of the previous dictatorship do not harvest many benefits from a regime-changing election, even if they personally gain a seat in spite of their party's overall losses. In the more common case of ruling party victory, it is more problematic to assume that an opposition candidate does not derive utility from gaining a seat unless the opposition as a whole wins the elections. Many personal benefits could be assumed to follow from being an opposition member of parliament. Furthermore, it may also be problematic to expect a candidate's benefits to be tied strictly to that of the party, as a party may win elections without all individual candidates gaining seats. However, for simplicity, I have disregarded these potential benefits and assume that opposition candidates are driven by the benefits they expect to gain, whether ideological or material, from opposition takeover. The simplifying assumption does not affect the conclusions as the purpose is not to explain candidate motivation as a whole but to track the effect of the capacities available to rulers on individual-level decisions to run for the opposition or the incumbent.

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[19] Here, the choice is presented in the form of a potential candidate deciding which party to run for. But assuming that elites, regardless of whether they run for parliament or not, are forced to make clear their commitment (or lack thereof) to the incumbent regime, the model may easily be extended to also depict the choice made by those elites who do not run for parliament but are known regime or opposition supporters.

Figure 4.3: Candidate choice (2)

The choice of politicians is illustrated in Figure 4.3. First, a (prospective) politician chooses whether to run for the rulers (R) or the opposition (O). When this choice is made, nature determines whether the incumbent wins (W; with probability $P(V_R)$) or the opposition wins (L; with probability $1-P(V_R)$). The candidate's expected value of running for the ruling front, $EU(R_R)$, and the opposition, $EU(R_O)$, are expressed in the following equations:

$$EU(R_R) = P(V_R) \, (\alpha S_R + (1-\alpha)I_R - C_{RV}) - (1-P(V_R)) \, C_{RL} \qquad (4.3)$$

$$EU(R_O) = 1-P(V_R) \, (\alpha S_O + (1-\alpha)I_O - C_O) - P(V_R)C_O \qquad (4.4)$$

$P(V_R)$ denotes the probability of an incumbent victory in elections rather than the probability of the individual candidate gaining a seat.[20] $1-P(V_R)$ equals the probability of an opposition victory.[21] $\alpha S+(1-\alpha)I$ summarizes the gains of office accruing to candidates from the ruling front and the opposition respectively. S denotes the material spoils associated with holding office for either the incumbent or the opposition in the event of opposition victory (determined by $P(V_R)$) and I the ideological or policy gains attained from officeholding. The ideological differences amongst incumbents and opposition

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[20] As this probability is, among other things, affected by the degree of electoral manipulation, fraud is implicitly included in this probability rather than being incorporated in the utility function as a separate term, as Magaloni does.

[21] As authoritarian regimes in Chapter 1 were defined as those regimes where there is no uncertainty over outcome, an opposition electoral victory followed by a peaceful handover of power will per definition not occur in the cases analyzed in the following chapters. However, the individuals engaged in these elections do not know at the time whether an opposition victory might occur, and the perceived likelihood of opposition victory thus affects their choice sets.

could refer both to differences on a classical left-right dimension of economic policies or to pro- or anti-incumbent sentiments often directly connected to a preference for preserving the status quo or for democratization. α and $1-\alpha$ denote the individual's value attached to material spoils and ideology, respectively.

Finally, C denotes the costs associated with campaigning for either the ruling front or the opposition. C_{RV} is the cost of running for the ruling party in the most common case, i.e. where the ruling party wins. It mainly involves material costs such as paying for posters, rallies, and employees. C_{RL} is the cost of having run for the ruling party in the case where the ruling party loses and the opposition takes over. It is constituted of both the material costs of campaigning (C_{RV}) and additional and more serious costs, such as economic and physical punishments for being on the losing side following regime turnover. Thus, $C_{RL} > C_{RV}$. Finally, C_O is the cost, both material and physical (including various forms of harassment), incurred by active opposition candidates. As a great part of this harassment occurs during the campaign period, the individual opposition candidate can expect to pay this cost even in cases of regime turnover. Whereas $C_o > C_{RV}$, it will vary from case to case whether C_{RL} exceeds C_O.

Regime elites will remain loyal where the expected utility of running for the ruling front is higher than expected utility of defecting to the opposition. And opposition candidates will mobilize for the opposition rather than being co-opted into the ruling coalition where the expected utility of representing the opposition exceeds that of running for the ruling front. Before turning to the effect of state capacity and incumbent economic control for $EU(R_R)$ and $EU(R_O)$ respectively, I clarify the expectations of when voters choose to protest.

(3) Protester choice

The individual's choice to engage in protests has been described and modeled in various ways over the years (see for instance Oliver 1993; Kuran 1989; 1991; Lichbach 1998; Lohmann 1994; Tucker 2007; Lorentzen 2013). But protesting is commonly recognized as a collective action problem with high incentives to free ride, as the individual citizen's participation is unlikely to change results and the achieved goods if protests are successful are public and non-excludable (Tullock 1971). Citizens who do not partake receive the same goods at those who do partake but without paying the costs (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005, 123).

However, protests have occurred throughout history, and numerous factors that can potentially solve the collective action problems of protesting or rebelling – such as ideologically motivating people to partake or attempting to exclude non-participators from the benefits of the new political order – have been highlighted (for a short summary see Acemoglu and Robinson 2005, 126–128). With these potential solutions to the collective action problem in mind, I assume that the collective action problem can be solved.

In general, the individual citizen's choice to engage in anti-regime protests is expected to depend on "the costs of participation, the benefits of the goal being sought, and beliefs about the likelihood that the goal can be achieved" (Tucker 2007, 540). Still, models are often complex and disagreement prevails over the importance of both the individual's expected utility derived from a changed social order as well as the importance of the individual's personal sentiments towards the rulers (Kuran 1991, 47). A common extension of the basic model is the argument of a "tipping logic;" the assumption that the number of other people taking to the streets matters greatly to the individual's decision to protest either because higher numbers of protesters lower the costs incurred by the individual protester (Kuran 1991, 17–18), because an increasing number of dissatisfied protesters affects the evaluations of the regime made by other citizens (Lohmann 1994, 51), or because an increasing number of protesters signal that enough opposition exists to make regime change likely (Kricheli, Livne, and Magaloni 2011, 8–9).

To avoid engaging in the overly complex models needed to formalize the choice to protest, I present citizens' choices about whether to participate in protests along simpler lines and I do not outlay the game tree or the utility calculations. I expect the individual citizen's choice to engage in protest to be affected positively by the probability of regime change $P(RC)$ and her expected utility derived from regime change $(EU(RC))$. The expected net utility of regime change, $EU(RC)$, expresses the level of spoils the individual citizen receives from the incumbent relative to those expected from a new regime, and the citizen's ideological congruence with the existing rulers relative to that expected with a new regime (see for instance Kricheli, Livne, and Magaloni 2011, 10). The net utility, $EU(RC)$, will be positive for regime supporters and negative for regime opponents. The probability of regime change, $P(RC)$, depends in large part on the number of protesters, as described by Kricheli et al. (2011), Lohmann (1994), and Kuran (1991), but also on the capability of the regime to crush protests, as shall be discussed below.

But the choice to engage in protest will be affected negatively by the costs (C_P) the individual citizen expects to incur, such as the risk of imprison-

ment, death, or deprival of economic benefits associated with being caught in anti-regime protests. These costs can in part be argued to depend on the number of fellow protesters (Kuran 1991), but as shall be argued below, they also depend on the capacities of the autocrat to impose physical and economic costs on protesters (see also Lorentzen 2013).

Given the ruler's goal of staying in power, he will seek to minimize elite defections and maximize the potential for opposition co-optation. This requires maximizing the expected utility of voting for the incumbent, $EU(V_R)$, in relation to voting for the opposition, $EU(V_O)$, in order to enforce supermajority victories, and simultaneously maximize the expected utility of running for the ruling front, $EU(R_R)$, relative to the expected value of running for the opposition, $EU(R_O)$. Finally, he will minimize the likelihood of voter protests, thus minimizing the individual voter's expected utility of protesting.

The remainder of this chapter theorizes how administrative and coercive capacity along with economic control enable a ruler to carry out these tasks, and thus increase the likelihood of elections becoming a regime-stabilizing tool.

Authoritarian Capacities and Electoral Strategies

I argue that the choices made by authoritarian elites, opposition actors, and citizens are partly shaped by the capacities available to rulers. By using and abusing their capacities, autocrats can influence individual-level decisions within the key actor groups. Thus, the effect of elections due to actor choices on the micro level is conditioned by authoritarian capacities. Before presenting such a theory of authoritarian capacities to account for the differing effects of authoritarian elections, I briefly relate this argument to the existing literature.

Presenting the effect of authoritarian elections in terms of their micro-foundations matches the core theoretical idea of Andreas Schedler's new book on electoral authoritarianism, which stresses elections as arenas of struggle between rulers and opposition actors. I support Schedler's notion that elections are a double-edged sword, and as discussed in the previous section, I also agree that this effect depends in large part on the choices made by regime elites, opposition, and citizens. However, I argue that this does not call for a strictly voluntarist theory. Rather, we should inquire into the factors that influence actor choice in authoritarian elections.

The literature on the differing outcomes of competitive (and sometimes also hegemonic) authoritarian elections discussed in the previous chapter has been dominated by two views. On the one hand, Levitsky and Way

(2010) and Donno (2013) have promoted the importance of the international environment. Either direct international involvement in election processes (Donno 2013) or more indirect international linkage and leverage (Levitsky and Way 2010) matter to the stability of electoral autocracies. On the other hand, actor strategies, such as opposition coalitions, have been stressed as crucial if elections are to liberalize an authoritarian regime (Howard and Roessler 2006; Donno 2013; Bunce and Wolchik 2011). And clearly, these two levels are interlinked, as the international community may affect the strategies of particularly opposition actors (Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Levitsky and Way 2010; Donno 2013).

But Levitsky and Way also highlight that "Authoritarian governments vary considerably in their ability to control civil society, co-opt or divide oppositions, repress protest, and/or steal elections" (2010, 54). In other words, when autocrats perform their strategies of coercion, co-optation and legitimization, they do so based on their capacity in each discipline. As Schedler, in spite of his rather voluntarist approach, states, autocrats are endowed with varying levels of state, economic, and ideological capacity on which they may draw (Schedler 2013, 56–57; see also Levitsky and Way 2010).

Whereas Levitsky and Way highlight the organizational power of a competitive authoritarian regime, namely its coercive capacity and the strength of its ruling party, as central for regime stability in authoritarian regimes without substantial international linkage, I focus on the importance of central authoritarian capacities across all authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, I stress that these capacities matter because they shape actor choices. And vice versa, when we find that actor strategies determine regime outcomes, these choices are influenced by the capacities available to the incumbents.

I analyze the effect of the two most prominent authoritarian capacities on the effect of elections: state capacity and incumbent control over the economy. This is not to say that the ideological power of the autocrat or other factors such as party strength (Magaloni 2006; Brownlee 2007; Levitsky and Way 2010) or international factors (Donno 2013; Levitsky and Way 2010) do not affect the role of elections. Rather, the argument is that we have severely overlooked how power constellations relating to the state and the market influence the degree to which autocrats may abuse institutions such as elections, and this neglect has caused confusion over the effect of elections. Thus, the first hypothesis to be tested is

H1: Multi-party elections do not directly affect the likelihood of regime breakdown

Without conditioning the effect of elections on the central capacities of an authoritarian regime, I do not expect to find a clear effect of elections on the risk of regime breakdown. In the following section, I first define the central concepts of state capacity and economic control before I move on to discuss how these capacities may alter the micro-level decisions of the three central actor groups and thus the effect of authoritarian elections. The overall model is depicted in Figure 4.4.

Figure 4.4: The conditioning effect of state capacity and incumbent economic control

State capacity

State capacity has long been identified as vital in determining authoritarian regime stability (Skocpol 1979, 32; Bellin 2004, 142–144; Crystal 1994, 264; Slater 2003; Herbst 2001, 361). An authoritarian regime can endure even in the face of widespread protests if the state is sufficiently strong (Skocpol 1979, 32; Way and Levitsky 2006, 389–390). It is thus plausible that high state capacity may serve the authoritarian leadership in pursuing various strategies targeted at controlling the two main actor groups that threaten the regime.

But state capacity is also likely to affect the outcome of authoritarian elections. Levitsky and Way have stressed the importance of state and ruling party capacity where international linkage is low (Levitsky and Way 2010, 54–68). These capacities affect authoritarian rulers' ability to handle elections (Way 2005; Schedler 2009a, 305; Way and Levitsky 2006). But how do they do so? The connection still needs to be established both theoretically and empirically. The following section theorizes how state capacity may condition the relationship between multi-party elections and authoritarian regime stability. Importantly, I distinguish between two different types of state ca-

pacity, administrative and coercive, and stress their differing roles in sustaining authoritarian regimes through elections.

The definition of state capacity employed here is Migdal's notion of a state's "capacities to penetrate society, regulate social relations, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways" (1988, 4). This concept of state capacity does not depend on the rule of law or other traits of liberal democracy; rather, it is "about the performance of agents in carrying out the wishes of principals" (Fukuyama 2013, 350). It covers both the capabilities of the state apparatus and the ability of the rulers to use and control this apparatus. A strong state is unlikely to support an authoritarian system unless the autocrat controls the state. Thus, most autocrats disposing over highly capable states also display high degrees of control over the state apparatus as they are otherwise likely to lose power to exactly those elites controlling the state.

To spell out the role of state capacity in the context of authoritarian elections, I split the concept into two dimensions: administrative capacity and coercive capacity (Skocpol 1979, 29). Administrative capacity is the territorial reach of the bureaucracy, its competences, and the autocrat's degree of control over it; that is, the ability and will to effectively implement the orders of the rulers. While a positive relationship may exist, competences should not be equated with professionalism of the bureaucracy in a Weberian sense but rather with the mere ability to implement policies, regardless of the means (Soifer and Hau 2008, 223). Coercive capacity is the reach as well as the ability and will to implement the rulers' orders within units such as the army, the police, or a presidential security guard.

I argue that state capacity, administrative as well as coercive, affects the authoritarian leader's ability to remain in power not only in general but, in particular, in a context of authoritarian elections because it allows the ruler to affect voters', regime elites', opposition candidates', and citizens' calculations of whether to support the ruling front, defect, mobilize, and protest, respectively. Administrative and coercive capacities are often but not always aligned. The two types of state capacities can, to some extent, be seen as substitutable in the game of electoral control. An autocrat lacking in one capacity may still control elections by relying on the other capacity, as shall be explicated below. First, however, I turn to another important authoritarian capacity.

Economic control

Control over the economy has been shown in case studies to supplement – or even substitute for – state capacity (see for instance Greene 2007; McMann 2006; Magaloni 2006). It should not be confused with administrative capacity. In his discussion of the importance of "administrative resources" in post-communist politics, Wilson stresses that "money helps, but it is not essential" (Wilson 2005, 74). Power, the control over the administration, is a capacity in its own right. But controlling the economy is another and equally important capacity.

The link between economic factors, including modernization, growth, and economic crises, and regime developments has preoccupied researchers for decades (see for instance Lipset 1959; Haggard and Kaufman 1997; Bermeo 1990; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Geddes 2003; Reuter and Gandhi 2011). But the effect of economic performance on authoritarian regime stability is complex, as captured by Magaloni: "Autocratic ruling parties are helped by economic growth but hurt by economic development" (2006, 70). Whereas growth initially supports authoritarian rule by inclining voters towards supporting the incumbent, sustained growth creates wealth and thus "liberates voters from their dependence on the state" (Magaloni 2006, 70). In recent years, case studies of electoral authoritarian regimes have touched upon the concept of incumbent economic monopoly (Greene 2007) or the degree to which the economy is autonomous from the rulers (McMann 2006).[22]

Hence, it might not be the overall level of economic growth but rather the degree of incumbent control over the economy that affects the role of authoritarian elections in promoting regime stability. I extend this argument and propose that where autocrats lack the administrative capacity necessary to subtly control elections, control over the economy may substitute for bureaucratic capacity and be employed to dominate elections. Whereas several studies have pointed to the importance of an incumbent resource advantage for controlling elections (Levitsky and Way 2010; Lust 2009b; Greene 2007), none have systematically theorized it, nor tested the claim on cross-national data.

According to Greene, the incumbent's resource advantage or control of the economy hinges on two factors: a big public sector and a politicized bu-

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[22] Although Blaydes argues that the Egyptian regime under Mubarak depended less on "state largesse" (Blaydes 2011, 10–11), the ample opportunities for corruption among parliamentarians still depended on a certain state dominance over the economy.

reaucracy (Greene 2007, 28). Taking this as the definition of incumbent economic control, however, would let the concept overlap with the above definition of administrative capacity. Indeed, when the bureaucracy is controlled by the ruler, as entailed in the concept of high administrative capacity in an authoritarian regime, a large public sector directly contributes to the incumbent's degree of economic control. But incumbent economic control is here defined more broadly as the ruler's domination of economic resources, including natural resource revenues, land, and employment opportunities. Thus, a large public sector clearly allows for some degree of control over employment opportunities, particularly when combined with a weak private sector or an economic crisis. And a politicized bureaucracy can leave the incumbent in control of import and export licenses, thus controlling international trade. But underlying economic structures, such as the holding of natural resources under government control — in democratization studies known as the "resource curse" (Ross 2001, 328) — may also contribute to an incumbent economic monopoly (Levitsky and Way 2010, 66). Importantly, economic control is literally about the control of whatever resources are there, rather than about an abundance of resources in the first place.

I argue that control of the economy affects the authoritarian leader's ability to remain in power not only in general but in particular in a context of authoritarian elections. A high degree of incumbent economic control may supplement administrative capacity in conditioning the effect of elections, or it may substitute for administrative capacity.

The following sections theorize how administrative capacity, coercive capacity, and economic control condition the relationship between elections and regime stability by enabling eight strategies of electoral control that affect the choices of the three central actor groups: (1) vote choice and thus the probability of supermajority victories, (2) ruling elites' and opposition choices of running for the incumbent party or the opposition, and (3) citizens' choice of whether to protest. The capacities, strategies and attempted effects are summarized in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Strategies of electoral control and their effects

Strategies	Micro-level Effects	Macro-level Effects	Capacities	Character
a) Systemic manipulation	Increased utility of running for the incumbent, $EU(R_R)$; decreased utility of running for the opposition, $EU(R_O)$		Administrative capacity	Subtle
b) Manipulation of voters' preference formation	Increased utility of voting for the incumbent, $EU(V_R)$; decreased utility of voting for the opposition, $EU(V_O)$	Elite defections less likely, Opposition mobilization less likely, Opposition co-optation more likely, Opposition splits more likely	Administrative capacity, economic control	Subtle
c) Manipulation of voters' preference expression	decreased utility of voting for the opposition, $EU(V_O)$		Coercive capacity, economic control	Overt
d) Restricting access to the vote	Increased utility of running for the incumbent, $EU(R_R)$; decreased utility of running for the opposition, $EU(R_O)$		Administrative capacity	Subtle
e) Manipulation of vote counting	decreased utility of running for the opposition, $EU(R_O)$		Administrative capacity	Overt
f) Legal and economic harassment of opposition	Decreased utility of running for the opposition, $EU(R_O)$	Opposition mobilization less likely, Elite defections less likely	Administrative capacity, economic control	Subtle
g) Physical harassment of opposition			Coercive capacity	Overt
h) Violent crackdown on protesters	Decreased utility of protest, $EU(P)$	Voter protests less likely	Coercive capacity	Overt

Authoritarian capacities, vote choice, supermajority victories, and the effect on candidate choice

In this section, I briefly discuss how the actor choices and the likelihood of a supermajority victory affect authoritarian regime stability before moving on to the theoretical mechanisms through which authoritarian capacities affect the likelihood of a supermajority victory. In the following section, I carry out the same exercise but focus on the relationship between authoritarian capacities, the costs of being in opposition and protesting, and regime stability.

As discussed in Chapter 3, supermajority victories signal invincibility, deter elites from defecting, and lure the opposition into the ruling front, in turn making multi-party elections more likely to stabilize the regime (Magaloni 2006, 16–19; Geddes 2005, 11–12). To understand how supermajority victories have stabilizing effects on electoral authoritarian regimes, consider the choice of elites about whether to run for the incumbent or the opposition as expressed in Equations 4.3 and 4.4.

By continuously winning elections with supermajority victories, autocrats decrease the perceived likelihood of an opposition victory, $1\text{-}P(V_R)$, as the ruling group is seen as superior in terms of winning elections. Thus, the expected utility of running for the opposition, $EU(R_O)$, decreases. More precisely, it approaches the costs of running for the opposition, $-C_O$, as the benefits of running for the opposition, $\alpha S_O + (1\text{-}\alpha) I_O$, multiplied by the probability of an opposition victory, $1\text{-}P(V_R)$, approaches 0: a scenario that is not unlikely in hegemonic authoritarian regimes. The expected utility of running for the ruling party, $EU(R_R)$, on the other hand, increases: it approaches $\alpha S_R + (1\text{-}\alpha) I_R - C_{RV}$, as $P(V_R)$ approaches 1. As the expected utility of staying with (or being co-opted into) the ruling front increases, and that of being in opposition falls, supermajority victories deter elites from defecting and potential opposition politicians from mobilizing while at the same time increasing the likelihood of opposition candidates being lured into the ruling group.

But how are such supermajorities attainable? In authoritarian regimes, vote shares are a function of both citizen preferences and electoral manipulation (Schedler 2013, 124). The regime can thus target voters' preference formation, their ability to express their preferences, and the counting and weighting of votes when trying to secure a supermajority. In the following, I discuss five strategies aimed at generating supermajority victories and in turn controlling opposition and elites, and spell out how these strategies depend on state capacity and economic control (see *Strategies a-e* in Table 4.1). Not all autocrats apply these strategies in equal measure, but few have generat-

ed supermajority victories without employing at least one and typically more than one of these strategies. Furthermore, some of these strategies are also employed in more modest forms in democracies – according to Birch, there are both legitimate and illegitimate forms of electoral manipulation, and the boundary between them is not crystal clear (2011, 26–27). Here, however, I consider the illegitimate forms. By enabling these strategies, authoritarian capacities increase the likelihood that elections stabilize the regime.

Strategy a: Systemic manipulation is defined as the use and abuse of legal provisions to distort electoral outcomes (Vickery and Shein 2012, 2). It includes tactics such as gerrymandering of electoral districts, restrictions on candidates and parties registering for elections, and restrictions on campaigning. It does not directly affect individual voters' preferences (Equations 4.1-4.2) but rather the weights given to individual votes and the possible alternatives among which voters can choose. It thus alters the ruling front's chances of a supermajority victory, which will affect the utility calculations of individual candidates in Equations 4.3-4.4. Where systemic manipulation is extensive, the chances of the opposition winning are small, and the relative utility of running for the ruling front, $EU(R_R)$, will increase.

Electoral gerrymandering is employed to various degrees both by authoritarian and more democratic regimes. An example from the authoritarian camp is contemporary Malaysia, where the ruling party has systematically abused its ability to construct districts with unequal numbers of voters. Predominantly Malay districts have been much smaller than non-Malay districts, allowing the dominant party, United Malays National Organization (UMNO), to secure a dominant role in government as long as it was the most popular party among ethnic Malays (Hing and Ong 1987, 122; Crouch 1996a, 117–118; Rachagan 1987, 217–219). Legal barriers to entering the electoral race are common in the post-Soviet world and in present-day Russia; banning opposition candidates from entering the race due to technicalities or ordering parties to reregister through complicated legal procedures is common (Wilson 2005, 82–83).

Although such gerrymandering and legal meddling does not require great capacity once set in place, the construction of a biased system necessitates detailed knowledge of the voter composition in various areas of the country as well as expert knowledge on electoral laws. An effective bureaucracy is key. Thus, whereas economic control and coercive capacity will not influence the success rate of this strategy, administrative capacity will heighten the likelihood that it succeeds.

Strategy b: Manipulation of voters' preference formation (Birch 2011, 31–34, 89–90) corresponds to altering the individual voter's generic preference,

x_i in Equations 4.1 and 4.2, to move it closer to the position of the rulers, x_R, and further away from that of the opposition, x_O. It thus makes a vote for the incumbent relatively less costly in terms of ideology and increases the expected utility of a vote for the ruling front, $EU(V_R)$. Examples of autocrats' attempts to manipulate voters' preference formation include the use of propaganda, abuse of state spending, or preventing the opposition from campaigning.

In conducting these tasks, there are huge incumbent advantages (Birch 2011, 92) and administrative capacity is again key. Few autocrats can rely solely on the ruling party machine when they campaign, distribute patronage, create propaganda and slander, obstruct opposition candidates from bringing their message to the people, and gather information on potential opposition voters to urge them to cast their votes for the incumbent. High administrative capacity enables the autocrat to manipulate preference formation by abusing access to state personnel and facilities. Already embedded in the community and often enjoying the respect of the locals, public employees can deliver information to the ruling front, target spoils at supporters and target propaganda at potential opposition voters and the population at large.

In the aftermath of the 2004 presidential election in Ukraine, the OSCE election observation mission reported that local officials had campaigned for the incumbent in 22 regions (Birch 2011, 125). Similarly, during the 1995 Zimbabwean election campaign, the Minister of Agriculture claimed that "No one should say I work for the government and not for the party" (quoted in Kriger 2005, 23). Privileged access to state facilities may allow the incumbents to hold larger campaign rallies, and printing facilities may also be exclusively available to the rulers (Schedler 2013, 68), again allowing the incumbent's message to reach voters more effectively than that of the opposition.

However, in carrying out manipulation of voters' preference formation, administrative capacity is supplemented by – or potentially substituted by – incumbent control over the economy. An incumbent economic monopoly comes in handy when attempting to manipulate preference formation because it offers a number of campaigning advantages to the ruling front's candidates. Above all, it provides the rulers with the funds necessary to campaign. Money can be generated from state-owned enterprises, public money can be funneled to incumbents directly from the budget, and candidates may receive contributions from private businesses with links to the state (Greene 2007, 40–41). Prior to the 1994 elections in Mexico, for instance, a newspaper revealed that a private reception had been hosted in which

prominent businessmen, many of whom also happened to profit from the government's privatization program, had been asked to donate millions of US dollars to the ruling PRI's election campaign (Lawson 2002, 143). An economic monopoly is also an effective way to put pressure on opposition-friendly media outlets: McMann describes how private businesses in the Russian province of Ul'ianovsk, in order to stay on friendly terms with the local government (which they depend on for licenses, etc.), avoid advertising in independent newspapers, thus depriving the independent media of essential sources of finance (McMann 2006, 74). All these tactics serve to promote the ruling party and alter individual voters' intrinsic preferences.

By reducing voters' perceived ideological costs of voting for the ruling party, $(x_i - x_R)^2$, the utility of placing one's vote with a ruling party candidate, $EU(V_R)$, is increased, and that of supporting the opposition, $EU(V_O)$, is reduced. Therefore, incumbent control of the economy and administrative capacity increase the probability of an incumbent victory, $P(V_R)$ in Equations 4.3 and 4.4. At the same time, it also lowers the costs of campaigning under the ruling party's banner, C_{RV}, thus further increasing the expected utility of running for the ruling front, $EU(R_R)$, relative to the opposition, $EU(R_O)$.

Strategy c: Manipulation of voters' preference expression on Election Day is another and less subtle form of voter manipulation. It could be targeted at raising the spoils attained by voting for the ruling party, S_R in Equation 4.1, by offering particularistic benefits (for instance through vote buying), again increasing the utility of voting for the incumbents, $EU(V_R)$. Or it could be aimed at increasing the costs of voting for the opposition, C_O in Equation 4.2, by intimidation or coercion, thus decreasing the utility of voting for the opposition, $EU(V_O)$.

Whereas administrative capacity is a central capacity for autocrats carrying out more subtle forms of voter manipulation (*Strategies a and b*), the more obvious manipulation of voters' expressed preferences – the party they actually vote for on Election Day – hinges on coercive capacity and extensive control over the economy. First, the coercive apparatus can be employed to harass voters into altering their vote choice in favor of the ruling party on Election Day. The threat of beatings and arrests and the presence of military officers at voting stations raise the costs of voting for the opposition, C_o in Equation 4.2.

Second, extensive control over the economy is essential for buying votes or pressuring voters into voting for the ruling party. An important way of containing both voters and incumbent elites is by turning elections into exercises in competitive clientelism (Lust 2009b, 123–125). In studies of North Africa and the Middle East, Lust argues that voters recognize that elections are not

about politics and support candidates that can deliver spoils, jobs, and goods – in this way, S_R in Equation 4.1 is increased, again increasing the utility of voting for the incumbent, $EU(V_R)$. Candidates in turn support the ruling front, as this is the only way to satisfy voters' demands for patronage (Lust 2009b, 127–129). Without relying heavily on repression, the incumbent maintains control of both the elite and the voters (Lust 2009b, 130). But since the rulers are dependent on handing out spoils, control over a vast amount of re-sources is vital (Lust 2009b, 133).

The examples of autocrats' abuse of state money to secure votes are many. Unity in Russia has benefited from doling out money to public sector workers at election time (Colton and McFaul 2003, 57). Blaydes has demon-strated the existence of budget cycles and their connection to the central-ized economy in Mubarak's Egypt (Blaydes 2011, chap. 5), and Magaloni presents convincing evidence of the Mexican PRI's abuse of state funds through the PRONASOL, a poverty-relief program, to reward swing munici-palities that did not elect an opposition candidate (Magaloni 2006, chap. 4). Thus, the mechanism of rent distribution forms part of a strategy to construct supermajority victories. Rent distribution affects not only the probability of in-cumbent victory but also the spoils associated with supporting the incum-bent. Thus, if citizens are tied to the ruling front through patronage networks, the spoils associated with the incumbent are higher, and the net utility of re-gime change, $EU(RC)$, is lower, leaving the individual citizen less likely to pro-test.

Finally, a large public sector and few options of employment outside of the reach of the ruling group provide rulers with a final tool to pressure voters into compliance by manipulating their preference expression. Both UMNO in Malaysia and ZANU(PF) in Zimbabwe have traditionally made sure to inform public sector workers that a vote for the opposition could entail job loss or a transfer to the outskirts of the country (Crouch 1996b, 127; Kriger 2005, 23). Such punishments are captured by C_O in Equation 4.1, and in this way, in-cumbent control over the economy may raise the costs of voting for the op-position.

Strategy d. Restricting access to the vote involves technical maneuvers such as manipulation of voter registration and limiting access to the ballot. It does not affect the utility calculation of the individual voters but prevents en-tire groups of voters deemed likely to support the opposition from voting, and thus increases the likelihood of a supermajority victory. This likelihood in turn increases the utility to candidates of running for the ruling party, $EU(R_R)$, rela-tive to the opposition, $EU(R_O)$, in Equations 4.3 and 4.4. Restricting access to the vote is here distinguished from other forms of fraud that take place on

Election Day, as *Strategy d* is usually a carefully planned strategy whereas the stealing of votes on or after Election Day is an emergency measure applied by autocrats who are surprised by a strong oppositional performance.

Restricting access to the vote by legal maneuvers is a more subtle measure that requires high administrative capacity. In Cameroon in 2007, the ruling party controlled voter registration on the ground in local districts through mayors' offices, police stations, and local chiefs, and the government thus severely restricted the access to voter identity cards in opposition strongholds (Albaugh 2011, 399–402). In the 1999 elections for the Russian Duma, the Central Electoral Committee (of which one third of members were appointed by the President, the rest by the houses of government) restricted access to the ballot for parts of the opposition (Colton and McFaul 2003, 19–21). Here, economic control or coercive capacity is not necessary as long as the ruling party has the knowledge and administrative infrastructure to limit access to the vote to selected parts of the population – namely the opposition.

Strategy e: Manipulation of vote counting includes ballot-stuffing and all types of deliberate, incorrect counting and tabulating of votes. This strategy is a more overt form of fraud as it often involves visible ballot-stuffing in voting stations or delays in the announcement of results. When successful, it increases the likelihood of incumbent victory and thus the expected utility of running for the ruling party, $EU(R_R)$, relative to the opposition, $EU(R_O)$. In the 2008 parliamentary and presidential elections in Zimbabwe, the opposition performed surprisingly well in elections for the House, upon which the announcement of presidential election results were postponed for five weeks, leading to massive accusations of fraud in the counting and tabulating process (ZESN 2013). Like *Strategy d*, this strategy primarily hinges on an efficient administrative infrastructure.

Authoritarian capacities and increased costs of being in opposition and protesting

The previous section described how an autocrat with high administrative capacity and/or control over the economy may carry out a number of electoral strategies and how coercive capacity may sometimes supplement or substitute these. The above strategies are all targeted at controlling the vote, and many autocrats have relied on these strategies to ensure supermajority victories and sustain the regime. But an authoritarian election may also cause opposition mobilization or provoke post-electoral protests that can spiral until the regime falls (see Chapter 3). To prevent elites from defecting and opponents from mobilizing, and to avoid post-electoral protests, autocrats

may – on top of the strategies described to secure a supermajority victory – employ their capacities to harass the opposition and potential protesters using various degrees of outright repression. Here the coercive apparatus plays a more direct role. In the following, I present an additional three authoritarian strategies, aimed at increasing the costs of being in opposition and of protesting.

Strategy f: Legal and economic harassment of opposition candidates are the non-violent aspects of what Levitsky and Way term low-intensity coercion. This strategy is simply to increase the costs of being in opposition, C_O in Equation 4.4, thus decreasing the expected utility of running for the opposition, $EU(R_O)$. This more subtle type of repression relies primarily on administrative capacity and economic control. To legally harass opposition members, autocrats rely on their administrative capacity. Opposition candidates may be surveyed, have licenses revoked, and be harassed by public officials in various ways (Levitsky and Way 2010, 58). Especially in the post-Soviet space, tax officers and even fire inspectors are employed to harass the opposition by closing down establishments or demanding excessive paperwork (Wilson 2005, 84).

Economic harassment, on the other hand, is dependent upon control over the economy. In her investigation of differing degrees of democracy on the sub-national level in Kyrgyzstan and Russia, McMann explains how "The ability to make a living independent of the state is critical to the practice of democracy; otherwise, citizens will avoid activism for fear of economic reprisals by the government" (McMann 2006, 4; see also Levitsky and Way 2010, 66–67; Allina-Pisano 2010). The explanation is simply that the individual will not risk her livelihood for political activism. Thus in order for the opposition to thrive in electoral authoritarian regimes, there must be a sufficient supply of jobs outside of the public sphere and hence outside of incumbent control. Where citizens have economic autonomy, McMann finds them more prone to oppositional activities (2006, 4). Thus, an incumbent economic monopoly will prevent elites from defecting and limit potential opposition candidates.[23] In Belarus, the authoritarian government of Lukashenka limited

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[23] According to Greene, this does not mean that there are no opposition candidates left. But due to the opportunity costs – combined with the risks of intimidation – of joining the opposition, only individuals who strongly disagree with the status quo, and are not strictly office-seeking, join the opposition (Greene 2007, 5). As a result, policy-seeking opposition parties become niche parties typically placed on either side of the dominant party on the political spectrum – a structure that discourages opposition unity and alienates many voters (Greene 2007, 5–6).

employment at state-owned enterprises to one-year contracts that could be extended at the will of the management and declared that academic degrees could be withdrawn based on opposition activism (Silitski 2005, 91–92).

Strategy g: Physical harassment of opposition candidates corresponds to Levitsky and Way's category of high-intensity coercion and is also aimed at increasing the costs of being in opposition, C_O in Equation 4.4. It necessitates a strong coercive apparatus. Fear of the rulers' coercive capacity may in itself have a preventive effect on dissent. If not, active coercion such as assassinations of key opposition politicians, disappearances and long prison sentences for opposition activity is often employed (Way and Levitsky 2006, 392). Such tactics have been witnessed across electoral authoritarian regimes from Russia to the Philippines to Zimbabwe. Whereas the assassination of one prominent opposition figure does not require a full coercive apparatus but often only a few loyal troops, in order to run a full terror regime aimed at repressing the entire opposition violently, the state must control a coercive apparatus able and willing to commit such atrocities. This again corresponds to raising the costs of being in opposition, C_O in Equation 4.4, and thus decreases the risks of opposition mobilization and elite defections.

Strategy h: Violent crackdown on protesters is a strategy employed to prevent or stop post-electoral protests. Contrary to the above three strategies, it does not target opposition candidates but protesters. It is a last resort but one that is regularly employed nonetheless, as demonstrated in Iran following the 2009 elections, where riot police and the ruler's paramilitary force, the Basij, quelled post-electoral protests with violence, causing between 37 and 200 deaths (US Department of State 2010). Display of brute force – and the willingness to use it – increases citizens' perceived costs of protesting, C_P, reducing the expected utility of protesting, and thus decreasing the likelihood of large-scale post-electoral protests.

In cases where such capacity does not exist and incumbents lack the tools to keep the people off the streets, the regime may break down following mass public displays of dissatisfaction. In Georgia during the 2003 "Rose Revolution", president Shevardnadze lacked the control of the military and security forces that was necessary to repress the post-electoral demonstrations (Mitchell 2004, 348; Wilson 2005, 87), leading to the breakdown of the authoritarian regime. The strategies, the required capacities, and their intended effects on the micro and macro levels are summed up in Table 4.1.

Hypotheses

Together, these eight strategies, dependent on the regime's degree of administrative capacity, coercive capacity, and economic control, link authoritarian capacities, elections, and regime stability. On the macro level, the theory results in the following hypotheses:

> H2: The effect of authoritarian multi-party elections on the likelihood of regime breakdown will decrease with higher levels of *administrative capacity*.

> H3: The effect of authoritarian multi-party elections on the likelihood of regime breakdown will decrease with higher levels of coercive capacity.

> H4: The effect of authoritarian multi-party elections on the likelihood of regime breakdown will decrease with higher levels of economic control.

Hypotheses 1-4 summarize the theoretical solution to the paradox of authoritarian elections. Administrative capacity, coercive capacity, and economic control are expected to sharpen an autocrat's ability to create supermajority victories (and thus deter elites from defecting and promote opposition co-optation), hinder opposition mobilization, co-opt and split the opposition, prevent voter protests, and effectively silence these protests where they do arise. This should make high-capacity authoritarian regimes more stable and, in turn, breakdown less likely to occur. However, not all strategies of electoral control are equally attractive to a dictator, and the implications of this hierarchy of strategies will be discussed below. The discussion leads to another three hypotheses on the differing effects of the three types of capacities.

The costs of violence and fraud

The strategies summarized in Table 4.1 should be available to a dictator presiding over a highly capable state and controlling the economy. However, the strategies vary both in terms of their costs and effectiveness, and from the viewpoint of an office-seeking dictator, some strategies are thus preferable to others.

Birch argues that the manipulation of the legal system (here termed *Strategy a*) will be preferable to most dictators as "this strategy carries a relatively low level of risk" (Birch 2011, 60). This less obvious type of fraud is not as likely to provoke rage and condemnation either nationally or internationally. In this category, I also include *Strategy d*, the restriction of access to the vote, as this includes various measures of disenfranchising the opposition by

use of the administration and the legal apparatus rather than by stationing soldiers at the polls. However, in only a few cases are these strategies sufficient to ensure electoral victory, and they are thus often combined with the other measures.

According to Birch, from among the strategies of manipulation that directly concern the electoral process, the second most attractive strategy is the subtle manipulation of vote choice (and in Birch's typology, this actually includes what I have termed legal and economic harassment of opposition figures, *Strategy f*). I argue that subtlety is only a trait of the manipulation of voters' intrinsic preferences (*Strategy b*) – the stationing of soldiers at voting stations and the direct buying of votes (*Strategy c*) is a more overt strategy that has a higher risk of sparking protests after the elections as well as being condemned by international observers.

While the more subtle types of manipulation of the legal framework, of voters' intrinsic preferences, and of discrete harassment of the opposition and potential protesters are often preferable for dictators (*Strategies a, b, d, and f* in Table 4.1), they are not always attainable. An autocrat may thus be forced to rely on cruder strategies, such as blatant fraud on Election Day or violence towards voters or the opposition (*Strategies c, e, g, and h* in Table 4.1). But these strategies are more costly. Rather than strengthening the regime, a stolen election may increase grievances in the populace, with the potential for raising dissent (Kuntz and Thompson 2009, 257–258; Magaloni 2006, chap. 6; Birch 2011, 110; Tucker 2007, 542–543; Lehoucq 2003). This happened following blatant fraud in the counting process of the 2003 Azerbaijani presidential election, forcing the president to "brutally suppress[ed]" the resulting protests (Wilson 2005, 86). But open repression is also a costly endeavor that may compel elites to defect and the opposition to mobilize (Haber 2006, 699; Mason and Krane 1989; Bellin 2004). Both obvious fraud and intimidation are also more likely to catch the eye of the international community and lead to condemnation (Kelley 2009).

The expectation that the presence of security services at voting stations, violent crackdowns, and blatant electoral manipulation increase the costs of elite defections, opposition mobilization, and voter protests but also alienate voters and elites can be expected to affect the strategies of the rulers, as it urges them to employ blatant manipulation of the administration of elections and violent crackdowns on opposition and voters only when no other options are available. These dynamics were exemplified in the 1985 Zimbabwean presidential race, when – in the midst of extensive pro-regime violence – incumbent President Mugabe encouraged his supporters to refrain from blatant acts of violence (Kriger 2005, 8–9). "We don't want the support-

ers of the minority parties to have any excuse to call the elections unfair when they lose…Do not force them to join ZANU-PF because after the election they will have no option but to join ZANU-PF as it is the majority and all their parties will have lost" was the official statement from the secretary of administration of the ruling party, Nyagumbo, at a rally in 1985 (quoted in Kriger 2005, 9). Although violence continued on a lower scale, the Mugabe leadership clearly preferred to base its victory on less costly arrangements, such as systemic manipulation and vote-buying, as was seen in 1985 and subsequent elections (Kriger 2005).

The hierarchy amongst strategies to some extent translates into a hierarchy amongst capacities. I argue that if the more subtle strategies of systemic manipulation, manipulation of voters' intrinsic preferences, restriction of access to the ballot, and legal and economic harassment of the opposition are successfully carried out, they should be enough to produce supermajority victories and prevent elite defections and opposition mobilization. Furthermore, they are seldom sufficient to trigger massive post-electoral protests and thus raise the need for a violent crackdown after elections. These strategies are primarily dependent on administrative capacity or economic control, and each of these capacities in and of themselves should thus increase the likelihood that elections are stabilizing. If the ruler is able to exploit fully either a strong administrative force or extensive control over the economy, coercive capacity will seldom be necessary. Thus,

> H5: The effect of authoritarian multi-party elections on regime breakdown will be negative for high levels of administrative capacity irrespective of coercive capacity and economic control.

> H6: The effect of authoritarian multi-party elections on regime breakdown will be negative for high levels of economic control irrespective of administrative and coercive capacity.

That is, regimes with high levels of administrative capacity and/or economic control will be more likely to stabilize through elections. In this case, elections – as opposed to no elections – will be associated with lower risks of regime breakdown.

The expectations with regard to the effect of coercive capacity are different. Coercive capacity is essential where the more subtle forms of manipulation have failed. It is an emergency measure employed where the autocrat otherwise runs the risk of losing power either at the ballot or during post-electoral protests:

H7: The negative effect of coercive capacity on the likelihood of regime breakdown by elections is higher in regimes where administrative capacity and economic control are low.

Thus, I do not necessarily expect regimes to break down following elections due to a lack of administrative capacity or economic control. Here, regimes may remain stable through several electoral cycles, relying instead on coercive capacity. However, autocrats that lack all capacities are not even able to carry out the emergency measures, such as violent crackdowns or large-scale fraud. In these cases, elections will be destabilizing:

H8: The effect of authoritarian multi-party elections on regime breakdown will be positive when levels of administrative capacity, coercive capacity and economic control are all low.[24]

Table 4.2 summarizes the hypotheses. The following section explicates the tests of the theory.

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[24] By deducting these more precise hypotheses of the circumstances under which the effect of elections on regime breakdown should be either negative or positive, I comply with Berry et al.'s suggestion to derive the maximum number of observable implications for interaction hypotheses (2012).

Table 4.2: Hypotheses

General effect		
	H1	Multi-party elections do not directly affect the likelihood of regime breakdown.
State capacity		
Administrative	H2	The effect of authoritarian multi-party elections on the likelihood of regime breakdown will decrease with higher levels of administrative capacity.
	H5	The effect of authoritarian multi-party elections on regime breakdown will be negative for high levels of administrative capacity irrespective of coercive capacity and economic control.
Coercive	H3	The effect of authoritarian multi-party elections on the likelihood of regime breakdown will decrease with higher levels of coercive capacity.
	H7	The negative effect of coercive capacity on the likelihood of regime breakdown by elections is higher in regimes where administrative capacity and economic control are low.
Economic control		
	H4	The effect of authoritarian multi-party elections on the likelihood of regime breakdown will decrease with higher degrees of incumbent control over the economy.
	H6	The effect of authoritarian multi-party elections on regime breakdown will be negative for high levels of economic control irrespective of administrative and coercive capacity.
Joint effects		
	H8	The effect of authoritarian multi-party elections on regime breakdown will be positive when levels of administrative capacity, coercive capacity, and economic control are all low.

Testing the Argument

The following chapters test the hypotheses in global, quantitative analyses and case studies. The hypotheses are the main focus of the quantitative analyses, and the strategies for testing them are laid out in Chapters 5-7. However, the quantitative tests focus on the overall relationships and do not delve into the mechanisms: the ways in which authoritarian capacities enable various electoral strategies, in turn impacting the effect of elections.

Thus, I also turn to four cases: the Philippines in 1986, Malaysia in 1990, and Zimbabwe in both 2008 and 2013. The selection of cases is discussed in Chapters 8 and 9. The goal of the case studies is twofold. First, whereas the quantitative analyses test the correlations between elections, capacities, and

stability, the case studies assess other aspects of the theoretical apparatus, particularly the interaction between capacities and strategies. The research strategy resembles what Mahoney, building on Campbell (1975), terms pattern-matching: "evaluating whether patterns derived from cross-case analysis can be matched with observations from within specific cases" (Mahoney 2003, 361). If the observable implications of the theory expected to lie behind the cross-case findings are detected in specific cases, the within-case analysis increases our belief in the theory (Campbell 1975, 182). Thus, both the research strategy and its goal resemble that of process-tracing: a thorough within-case analysis is performed to further assess the causal argument. But unlike process-tracing, the case studies do not trace the causal mechanism understood as a system of interlocking entities (see Beach and Pedersen 2013, 23–45). Instead, they assess evidence of whether various indications of the underlying theoretical mechanisms are present in the four cases. To enable this strategy, the following section sketches the observable implications of the theoretical argument for various combinations of authoritarian capacities. Chapters 8-9 then attempt to identify these implications in selected cases.

Another advantage of the case studies is that they allow for more nuanced measurement of the conditioning variables (Gerring 2007, 49). Thus, an assessment of coercive capacity in a single case may take into account the police force and government-sponsored militias rather than simply relying on data on military expenditure, thus capturing aspects of authoritarian capacities that are not measurable across countries over time.

Three Scenarios of Authoritarian Capacities

There are two opposing effects of authoritarian elections that I should be able to detect in case studies. One scenario, *stabilization by election*, is more likely to play out when either administrative capacity or economic control is high (H5 and H6). Another, *breakdown by election*, is theorized as more likely where all capacities are low (H8). However, as discussed in the section on the costs of the more overt strategies of electoral fraud and violence, cases are not necessarily high or low on all three capacities. Where levels of administrative capacity and economic control are low but coercive capacity is high, elections may be won by emergency measures (H7), but due to the costs of the more overt strategies supported by coercive capacity, such a victory will not result in long-term, stabilizing effects. This combination of capacities is thus more likely to result in what could be termed *electoral survival*.

In the following, I go through the three theorized combinations of authoritarian capacities and derive the observable implications of the theory that should be detectable in each of these cases in order to lend support to the theoretical mechnism. These scenarios and the observable implications are derived directly from the theoretical framework above along with that of Chapter 3. They are in correspondence with all hypotheses tested in Chapters 6-7. They are meant to flesh out the logic to enable a systematic application of the theory to qualitative data in order to asses not only the general relationship between elections, capacities, and regime stability, but also the underlying mechanisms that may drive this relationship. However, the three scenarios are ideal types. Not all authoritarian elections will fall clearly into one of these categories. Nonetheless, the degree to which selected cases conform to these observable implications can help assess the theoretical framework. The theory is put to the test in the case studies of Chapters 8-9.

Stabilization by election: High administrative capacity and/or economic control

As specified in H5-6, high levels of administrative capacity or incumbent economic control should in themselves increase the likelihood of authoritarian control through elections, independent of the levels of the other capacities. A high-capacity case that complies with the theory should display the following characteristics. First, the autocrat should have extensive control over a strong administrative apparatus and/or extensive control over the economy. The level of coercive capacity could be high or low, but the coercive apparatus should not play a very visible role in elections.

Second, the rulers should rely on a range of the more subtle strategies of electoral manipulation, namely systemic manipulation (*Strategy a)*, manipulation of voters' intrinsic preferences (*Strategy b*), restrictions of access to the ballot (*Strategy d)*, and economic and legal harassment of the opposition (*Strategy f*). Third, these strategies should be directed from above, carried out by agents of the ruling front, and draw on the ruling group's resources or capacities. Fourth, they should lead to an incumbent victory in elections. And fifth, the electoral victory should have the stabilizing effects suggested by the literature on authoritarian elections presented in Chapter 3, namely preventing elite defections and opposition mobilization, provoking opposition splits and causing opposition co-optation into the ruling front, preventing post-electoral protests, and creating domestic and international legitimacy.

Breakdown by election: Limited capacities

As explicated in H8, autocrats are expected to be more likely to experience breakdown following elections if they have low levels of both administrative and coercive capacity and are unable to yield control over the economy. The first implication of the theory in these cases is thus low levels of both administrative and coercive capacity and limited economic control. Second, these autocrats are not expected to carry out any of the subtle strategies of electoral manipulation (*Strategies a, b, d,* and *f*), although there may be sporadic fraud or violence against the opposition and voters (limited versions of *Strategies c, e,* and *g*). Third, the opposition will mobilize, the elite will defect, elections will not generate legitimacy, and voter protests may arise if the rulers do not lose the election outright. Fourth, rulers will either lose elections outright or succumb to domestic or international pressure afterwards, with regime breakdown as the result. Fifth, if domestic protests arise, rulers are not expected to successfully quell them (strategy h).

Electoral survival: High coercive capacity but limited administrative capacity and economic control

The above two scenarios were the ideal cases of what presents us with the "paradox" of authoritarian elections. Different levels of authoritarian capacities may solve this paradox. But what happens if the autocrat does not have high administrative capacity and/or economic control but does not lack all capacities either? I have theorized that administrative capacity and economic control both have a positive effect on the relationship between elections and regime stability independent of the other capacities. But coercive capacity is not without use. It plays an important part in enabling the regime-sustaining strategies of authoritarian elections summed up in Table 4.1. However, as discussed above, there is a hierarchy amongst electoral strategies, and the ones that are solely dependent on coercive capacity happen to be the least attractive strategies in the long run.

The observable implications of the theory for these cases are as follows. First, these regimes have high levels of coercive capacity without correspondingly high levels of administrative capacity or economic control. An extensive coercive machinery may win the autocrat an election by orchestrating large-scale fraud (*Strategy e*), pressuring voters and opposition into compliance through violence (*Strategy c* along with *Strategy g*), and quelling popular protests (*Strategy h*). Thus, the second observable implication of the theory in these cases should be the extensive use of one or more of these strategies. Third, the strategies should be directed from above and carried

out by agents of the coercive apparatus. Fourth, they should lead to an incumbent victory in elections. Fifth, this election should have some but not all of the desired effects. Whereas elite defections and opposition mobilization should indeed be deterred through violence, and popular protests should either be prevented or quelled once they appear, legitimacy should not follow. The regime may have survived but not necessarily stabilized – it should not be able to survive on these strategies in consecutive elections.

Table 4.3 outlines the observable implications of the theory that will structure the case studies. In Chapters 8-9, I select cases that conform to these scenarios and test whether the observable implications are present in the cases, thus lending support to the theoretical apparatus presented here. Before proceeding to the case studies, the following chapters assess the hypotheses in time-series, cross-sectional analyses.

Table 4.3: Observable implications of the theory for each combination of capacities

	Stabilization by election	Breakdown by election	Electoral survival
Authoritarian capacities	High administrative capacity and/or economic control	Low administrative capacity, coercive capacity, and economic control	High coercive capacity, low administrative capacity and economic control
Observable implications	Employment of subtle manipulation strategies (a, b, d, f)	No use of subtle strategies (a, b, d, f), potential use of limited versions of overt strategies (c, e, g)	Extensive use of one or more of the overt strategies (c, e, g, h)
	Directed from above and carried out by government agents	Destabilizing effect of elections such as - Elite defections - Opposition mobilization - Legitimacy loss - Voter protests	Directed from above and carried out by agents of the coercive apparatus
	Incumbent victory in elections	No successful quelling of protests if they arise (h)	Incumbent victory in elections
	Stabilizing effect of elections such as - preventing elite defections and opposition mobilization - provoking opposition splits and causing opposition co-optation into the ruling front - preventing post-electoral protests - creating domestic and international legitimacy	Regime breakdown	Some but not all of the stabilizing effects - preventing elite defections and opposition mobilization - popular protests should either be prevented or quelled - but loss of legitimacy

Chapter 5.
Operationalization and Measurement

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) exemplifies a state with limited administrative capacity. The country is geographically challenged (Herbst 2000, 145): it is vast, covered in rain forests, and intersected by rivers. The nationalist rebels who conquered the colonial forces did not succeed in taking over the colonial state apparatus, rebellions and ethnic tensions continued to prevail, and a coup by long-ruling dictator-to-be Mobutu did not change this pattern for the better: a "shrinkage in the competence, credibility, and probity of the state" followed (Young and Turner 1985, 45). Following a prolonged civil war and with both domestic and foreign rebels roaming its territories, the state apparatus is still struggling today, and service delivery capacities are limited (Takeuchi, Murotani, and Tsunekawa 2011, 136–139). This stands in clear contrast to the authoritarian regime in place in the small island-state of Singapore. Here, the ruling party controls an effective, well-educated, and well-paid civil service and delivers everything from security to housing and economic growth to its citizens (James Lee 2009; Moon and Hwang 2013).

Similar contrasts are found between the coercive capacity of the military regimes of Latin America and that of the Marcos regime in the Philippines, with meritocratic procedures for selection into the armed forces, professionalized and well-educated soldiers, and a highly disciplined army in the former (Rouquié 1987, 101–104) and a coercive apparatus that was underpaid, disloyal, and rife with ethnic tensions in the latter (Overholt 1986; Thompson 1995). Similarly, many post-Soviet autocracies still exhibit effective control over the economy through state-owned enterprises, large public sectors, and in some instances state-controlled natural resource rents, while many autocrats in sub-Saharan Africa after decolonization are not endowed with natural resources but dominated by large informal sectors over which the central government holds no control.

Apart from the more clear-cut examples, how can one identify differences in authoritarian capacities? Does Zimbabwe have high state capacity? Does Singapore exhibit economic control? How can one measure administrative and coercive capacity and control over the economy across countries and over time? And how can one measure regime breakdown?

In Chapters 1 and 4, I defined the central concepts of authoritarianism, multi-party elections, regime stability, administrative and coercive capacity, and economic control. Whereas authoritarianism and the independent vari-

able, multi-party elections, were operationalized in Chapter 2, this chapter outlays and discusses the choices made in trying to find measures for the dependent variable, authoritarian regime stability, and the conditioning factors, administrative capacity, coercive capacity, and economic control. Table 5.1 provides an overview of the main concepts and their operationalization. In the following, I discuss the choices behind the operationalizations of each of these concepts as well as alternative measures used for robustness checks.

Table 5.1: Operationalizations

Concept	Indicator	Source	Coverage	Robustness
Authoritarianism	Regime type	Geddes et al. 2014a	1946-2010	Cheibub et al. 2010
Stability	Absence of breakdown	Geddes et al. 2014a	1946-2010	Cheibub et al. 2010 and Goemans et al. 2009
Multi-party election	Elections with competitors from outside the ruling front	Hyde and Marinov 2012 and Cheibub et al. 2010 and	1946-2010	
Administrative capacity	Tax-to-GDP ratio	Hendrix 2010	1960-2006	Relative political extraction (Kugler and Tammen 2012)
				Bureaucratic quality (Political Risk Services 2013)
Coercive capacity	Military spending	Singer et al. 1972	1816-2007	Military personnel (Singer et al. 1972)
Economic control	Index of:			
	Government share of GDP	Penn World Table, 2013	1950-2010	
	Index of regulations	Gwartney et al. 2013	1970-2010	
	Income from natural resources	Haber and Menaldo 2011	1900-2006	

Regime Breakdown

As discussed in Chapter 1, regime stability is here defined as the absence of regime breakdown. To capture regime breakdown, a change to the formal or informal rules that structure access to political power, I again rely on the

GWF dataset that was also used to identify authoritarian regimes in Chapter 2.

In contrast to the most prominent alternative, the CGV dataset, the GWF data have the advantage of coding regime breakdowns as changes to the existing regime regardless of whether the following regime is of the same type (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a). Thus, the variable "gwf_fail" records regime breakdowns, the instances where the rules for accessing power are changed, by identifying cases where someone outside of the ruling front wins elections and is allowed to take power, when a coup puts in place a new ruling group that changes the rules for accessing power, or where the leadership themselves change these rules, for instance by changing the group from which the members of its inner circle are drawn (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014b, 7–8). In contrast to the CGV data, which only identify transitions from autocracies to democracies, the GWF data identify breakdowns where one authoritarian regime ends and another appears – and they do so even if the leader persists but rules according to markedly different rules or where the leadership changes but the regime type remains the same, i.e. a transition from one personalist regime to the next.

As the analyses in Chapters 6-7 have country-years as the unit of analysis, the dependent variable is scored 1 if one or more breakdowns occurred in the given year. If no breakdowns occurred, the variable is scored 0. 221 of the 4,587 observed authoritarian country-years saw at least one regime breakdown according to the GWF coding rules. These breakdowns were illustrated by a grey box in Figure 2.1, which also plotted authoritarian elections and spells of authoritarian rule.

The authoritarian breakdowns were spread across 93 different countries. It is evident that breakdowns – as well as long spells of stability – occurred in both electoral and non-electoral regimes (elections marked by a cross in Figure 2.1). For example, the communist party dictatorship of China has ruled in the entire period under investigation without holding national, multi-party elections and without breaking down. The party dictatorship of Malaysia displays the same level of stability (understood as the absence of breakdown) but has seen regular multi-party elections (see Figure 2.1f). During the uninterrupted period of authoritarian rule in Bolivia lasting until 1979 (marked by the grey shaded area), both elections and breakdowns occurred, and in Uruguay in 1984, the military regime broke down without ever having held an election (see Figure 2.1a). Thus, there is great variation in terms of both elections and breakdown.

Furthermore, far from all breakdowns led to democratization – a great number of the breakdowns occurred during a prolonged period of autocra-

cy, marked by the grey color in Figure 2.1. Returning to the example of the DRC, Mobutu's autocracy collapsed in 1997 following the civil war of the 1990s but was replaced by another dictatorship led by Kabila (See Figure 2.1d). In other cases, such as Senegal in 2000, authoritarian breakdowns were followed by democratic rule (see Figure 2.1c; note that democratic rule and other non-authoritarian periods such as foreign occupation are not distinguishable in Figure 2.1). The prospects for democratization following breakdown by elections is discussed in the conclusion.

However, in most of the cases where a democratic regime immediately followed the breakdown of the autocracy, the case was coded as an instance of regime breakdown *because* the autocrat accepted election results and handed over power. But to estimate the effect of authoritarian elections on the likelihood of regime breakdown, I need to exclude elections in which there was uncertainty over outcome, as these, according to the definition in Chapter 1, would be classified as minimalist democratic. The GWF dataset codes regime breakdowns in the year where an election was held in which the incumbent lost and peacefully transferred power to the opposition. This was exactly what occurred in Senegal in 2000, where the opposition candidate, Wade, won the second round of the presidential election and incumbent president Diouf handed over power (see Figure 2.1c). Whereas it is intuitive to register the breakdown of the regime on the date where power is formally transferred, this poses a problem when analyzing the effect of authoritarian elections. Elections that lead to a peaceful transfer of power due to an opposition victory are, according to a minimalist understanding of democracy, not authoritarian. As there is uncertainty over electoral outcomes, the election is minimalist democratic. This also implies that the election is not necessarily the catalyst of the breakdown. Uncertainty was introduced prior to the election, and the actual transfer of power following the election is an observable indicator that the previous autocrat had accepted uncertainty over who would hold power after elections. It is the manifestation of a process that was already underway prior to elections. If these elections are included in the analyses, there is a real risk of overestimating the correlation between elections and breakdown. As the elections are the reason that the democratization of the regime became apparent, the breakdown is per definition coded at exactly the same time as the election.

But this is not to say that these cases of breakdown should be excluded from the analyses. The elections are not authoritarian, but the regime did break down. When exactly this breakdown occurred is hard to code – and this is indeed one of the primary reasons why breakdowns are typically coded on the day of the election. In the descriptive analyses presented in Figure

2.1, I follow this convention. But to avoid bias in the causal analyses, I identify all instances of authoritarian regime breakdowns that are coded as such because the rulers peacefully transferred power following electoral defeat or where the rulers did not even contest elections (a score of 2 or 3 on the variable "how_end" in the GWF dataset). The latter scenario has occurred in many military regimes, where the rulers – after a shorter or longer period of military-led dictatorship – have agreed to transfer power to civilians through elections that they do not themselves contest. Particularly in this situation, it is obvious that the elections are not themselves drivers but rather signs of democratization, and including them as instances of authoritarian elections would cause an overestimation of the relationship between elections and breakdown.

For these two types of breakdown, 59 country-years out of a total of 221 breakdowns, I recode the breakdown to occur in the year prior to the election in which there was uncertainty over outcome. In some cases, the autocrat may have decided to allow uncertainty in elections only in the weeks prior to Election Day, and in others, it may have happened years earlier. Even with careful study of all the cases, it would likely still be difficult to establish the exact date. Here, however, the concern is to distinguish the breakdown from the subsequent elections in the causal analyses, or – in other words – to ensure that the competitive elections are not coded as authoritarian. Thus, although Mexico and Senegal are commonly understood to have transferred to democracy in 2000, when the opposition in both cases won elections (see Figures 2.1a and 2.1c), I code the breakdowns as occurring in 1999, so as not to include the elections in the analyses as authoritarian. I then exclude the subsequent year, in which the minimalist democratic election occurred, from the analyses.[25]

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[25] In this process, the total number of years with breakdown is reduced to 215. Some of the recoded regimes already had a breakdown occurring in the year prior to the election in which a transfer of power occurred and others were democratic in the prior year. In both cases, as the regimes only last one year, it is not possible to separate the breakdown, which occurred prior to the elections, from the elections, and I thus exclude these cases from the analysis. An example is Thailand, where a military coup ousted democratically elected Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra from power and promised to hold democratic elections within a year. Competitive elections, in which the coup plotters did not compete, returned the country to civilian rule in 2007. Coding the breakdown in 2007 would include the competitive elections that the military rulers did not contest as an authoritarian election, thus overestimating the effect of elections on breakdown. But the breakdown cannot be

Hence, authoritarian regime breakdown is not a rare phenomenon. It has occurred across a great number of countries around the world, and its relationship with authoritarian elections, a phenomenon that is also on the rise, merits further study. Furthermore, the frequency of breakdowns within countries also varies. Of the countries that experienced authoritarian breakdown (excluding the cases where a regime that was only one year old broke down and competitive elections were then held in the same year), the mean number of breakdowns is 2.1. As depicted in Figure 5.1, 44% of the countries experiencing authoritarian breakdown in the period saw only one breakdown, and another 18% only two. At the other end of the spectrum we find the countries that tend to host extremely instable authoritarian regimes: Bolivia experienced eight breakdowns in the period and Haiti seven. In the analyses, I take precautions to avoid allowing such extreme cases to drive the results. Although I rely on fixed effects models in the following chapters and thus within-country differences that should not be affected by differences between countries, I still run robustness checks excluding each country from the analysis in turn to ensure that single cases are not driving results.

Figure 5.1: Number of breakdowns across breakdown-countries

Note: X-axis is number of breakdowns. Y-axis is share of breakdown countries (93 in total).

For robustness checks, I again rely on CGV data. To identify regime breakdowns through the CGV dataset, I exploit a variable on transitions to democracy. But since the CGV dataset does not capture transitions from one authoritarian regime to the next, I utilize a variable on irregular leadership entry

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coded as occurring in the year prior to elections either, as this country-year is registered as democratic. Thailand in 2007 is thus excluded from the analyses.

from the Archigos database (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009) in a manner similar to that described in Chapter 2 to identify ruptures of authoritarian regimes. First, years of leadership change without democratization are identified in CGV. Second, a regime breakdown (in the specific form of a transition from an authoritarian regime to a new authoritarian regime) is recorded for that year if at least one leader entered into power irregularly or by foreign imposition. From 2005 to 2008, I coded the variable myself using multiple sources (Keesing's Record of World Events; LexisNexis; U.S. Department of State; Freedom House). Thus, an authoritarian regime breaks down either when it transitions to democracy or when a new authoritarian regime takes over.

Multi-Party Elections

The data on elections are described in Chapter 2. I use NELDA data to identify elections (Hyde and Marinov 2012b) and data from the CGV dataset to determine whether an election featured multiple parties including parties from outside the ruling front.

In the coming chapters, the focus is on the effect of such multi-party elections. But when is such an effect to be expected? Hadenius and Teorell (2009) discuss differences in theories focusing on the effect of elections as single events, such as those centering on the colored revolutions (i.e. Bunce and Wolchik 2010; Kuntz and Thompson 2009) and those who expect experience with elections, expressed by the cumulative number of elections, to affect regime outcomes (i.e. Lindberg 2006). In the theoretical argument presented in Chapter 4, it is the occurrence of elections, and not necessarily the number of times such elections have been conducted, that matters. But in contrast to analyses that test the effect of whether regimes are "electoral" or not (e.g., Brownlee 2009b), the theoretical argument here makes clear that certain time dynamics are likely to be at play.

First of all, the occurrence of an election two years earlier is unlikely to matter to regime stability if the country has witnessed a regime breakdown in the intervening period. Thus, previous elections only matter if they were held under the regime in question. Furthermore, the various mechanisms of Chapter 4 are likely to play out at different stages following the elections. Some of the potentially regime destabilizing effects, such as the threat of post-electoral protests, are likely to have consequences for regime stability within a year or so from the election. But other mechanisms, both stabilizing and destabilizing, including the spread of democratic norms in society, the potential for generating legitimacy, and the avoidance of elite defections by

demonstrating electoral superiority, will likely last for a few years after the election. However, an autocrat is unlikely to reap benefits of legitimacy or supremacy from an electoral outcome that is, say, eight years old, as the electorate will likely be expecting a new electoral contest and the democratic learning thesis also assumes some regularity of elections. There is thus also an upper time limit to the effect of elections.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the choice of time horizon is pragmatic. The theoretical predictions are not precise enough to indicate the exact number of years within which an effect of elections is expected to set in. To accommodate the varying time horizons of the different theoretical mechanisms, I work with a five-year time horizon in the main models: The dependent variable is scored 1 if at least one de facto multi-party election has been held within the past five years under the current regime. Otherwise, it is scored 0. In alternative specifications, I also test for the effect of elections being held within the past year and the past seven years but expect these effects to be non-existent or at least weaker.

Administrative Capacity

Administrative capacity was defined as the territorial reach of the bureaucracy, its competences, and the autocrat's degree of control over it. In cross-national studies, administrative state capacity is typically proxied either by surveys and expert evaluations or by national data on extractive capacity (Hendrix, 2010: 275). The former approach often draws on concepts such as the rule of law, and measures of for instance government effectiveness increase when the administration is independent of the leadership (World Bank 2014a). But rulers' control over the administration is a precondition for autocrats' being able to abuse an effective administration to manipulate elections. For the present purpose, a measure of administrative capacity that does not increase with higher independence of public servants is needed, and I thus reject the various measures of government effectiveness and bureaucratic quality that increase with administrative independence and lower levels of corruption, as this would typically also imply that the autocrat had limited control of the bureaucracy.

I also refrain from employing performance-based proxies of state capacity, including public goods provisions such as primary school enrolment or infrastructure. In an authoritarian context, where rulers' continued stay in power is dependent on a smaller section of the population, the distribution of private rather than public goods is often sufficient for survival in office (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). It is not guaranteed that leaders will provide public

goods just because they can, when private goods may be a less costly alternative. The provision of public goods will thus indicate the presence of administrative capacity, but the absence of public goods provisions is quite likely to simply reflect a policy choice. The rulers may have the capacity to provide goods but chooses to survive on the basis of private goods, resulting in more resources left for the leadership.

I instead choose the approach of proxying administrative capacity by an authoritarian regime's extractive capacity. The logic for employing tax extraction to proxy state capacity is that "the development of state power, or the state's authority over society and the market economy, is usefully examined by highlighting its ability to get citizens to do something that they would rather not do—namely, pay taxes" (Lieberman 2002, 92). This perspective also underlies Besley and Persson's concept of fiscal capacity, where the actual tax rate upheld is expected to correlate strongly with the underlying ability to administer, monitor, and enforce tax payments (2013, 6, 91–92; see also Thies 2005). Furthermore, the taxes extracted should themselves contribute positively to the level of state capacity (Fukuyama 2013, 353; Slater 2010). To proxy administrative capacity, I use a measure of the tax-to-GDP ratio scaled from 0 to 1. Data are from Hendrix (2010) and available from 1960-2005. As the election variable indicates whether elections were held within the past five years, I construct a five-year running average of administrative capacity.

This measure will not increase with elements associated with a democratic state such as rule of law and low corruption levels. But proxying administrative capacity by the tax extraction rate may be seen as problematic for several other reasons. First, actual extraction rates do not necessarily accurately proxy the state's capacity to extract, as extraction also depends on willingness to extract. However, this argument is often employed with respect to advanced democracies that may have ideological preferences for low extraction rates (Fukuyama 2013, 353). Whereas autocrats may be viewed as unlikely to invest in public goods as they are less dependent on these as a survival strategy, they are commonly viewed as more likely to extract as many resources as possible for their own benefit as long as it does not endanger their position in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Svolik 2012). Studying autocracies, it seems valid to assume that the state will extract to the maximum degree that its capacity allows, and extractive capacity will

thus more closely reflect administrative capacity in authoritarian than in democratic regimes.[26]

Second, there is likely to be a bias in the reporting of tax figures. It is quite plausible that tax figures are more unreliable for exactly those countries that have low administrative capacity. Whether the bias pushes the measure upwards or downwards, however, is hard to say. It could potentially cause the weakest states to have missing data on these types of variables. This has prompted some researchers to suggest using rates of "missingness" on key indicators as a proxy for capacity. However, an initial study for which data are not yet released has found that missingness patterns on the World Development Indicators show low levels of correlation with underlying dimensions of state capacity (Hanson and Sigman 2013, 24).

Instead, I conduct robustness checks with two alternative measures of administrative capacity. The first is a measure for "relative political extraction" (RPE) (Kugler and Tammen 2012). It captures a country's actual tax extraction in relation to the predicted tax extraction (scaled 0-1). A country's predicted tax extraction is assessed for every year using an algorithm that takes into account the country's agricultural revenues, mining, and exports relative to GDP and OECD membership (TransResearch Consortium 2013, 11).

The second is an indicator of bureaucratic quality from the International Crisis Research Group compiled by the Political Risk Services (Political Risk Services 2013). It is based on expert evaluations and judges bureaucratic quality based on stability of government service, independence of the administration and recruitment and training procedures. I do not rely on this measure for the main analyses as authoritarian regimes in which the leader has high degrees of control over the state apparatus may score lower on this measure. Furthermore, the measure is only available from 1984 onwards and thus excludes even more observations than the tax data. But it may provide an alternative background against which to test the role of administrative capacity, and I thus report some models where administrative capacity is captured by the Bureaucratic Quality indicator.

Another issue with the tax data is coverage. Whereas the data cover a time span of more than four decades, there are no data available on the

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[26] In the same vein, the tax-to-GDP ratio is also dependent on the level of GDP. Thus, countries with high GDPs will have lower extraction rates than low-GDP countries if they extract the same amount of taxes (Saylor 2013, 20–21). But if we again assume autocrats to extract as many resources as possible without endangering their position in power, richer autocrats should extract more resources, all else being equal, and the tax ratio should thus still capture administrative capacity.

post-communist countries as well as a number of other authoritarian regimes. States such as Russia, Poland, Romania, Kazakhstan, and Cuba cannot be included in the analyses. To avoid excluding these cases, I artificially assign values on the tax ratio variable to cases where data are missing. I perform multiple imputation as described in Appendix 1 in an attempt to construct time-series of tax data on all the countries that are missing from the original data. Analyses based on imputed data are often less biased than those excluding cases due to missing data (King et al. 2001). However, as countries are not missing at random and as there are no observations of the tax-to-GDP ratio for any of the countries for which I impute tax data, the results should be interpreted with caution. I thus only rely on the imputed data for robustness checks.

Finally, tax extraction rates may capture the efficiency or capability of the administrative arm of the state but not necessarily the autocrat's degree of control over the bureaucracy. However, the same problems apply to performance-based measures of capacity, and as discussed above, government quality measures may actually proxy the bureaucracy's independence. I thus rely on tax extraction rates as the best available measure of administrative capacity: It speaks to the core definition of administrative capacity, it is comparable across countries, it has reasonable coverage both across countries and over time, and it is one of the most common proxies for state capacity used in the literature (Hendrix 2010). In the qualitative analyses of Chapters 8-9, I rely on other types of evidence to assess both the strength as well as the loyalty of the administrative force and thus perform a fuller evaluation of administrative capacity in the selected cases.

Figure 5.2 presents descriptive statistics of the main measures of administrative capacity. The shaded area displays the distribution of observations across the variable, the dark grey box is the first to third quartiles of the range, and the light dot marks the mean. The tax-to-GDP ratio approximates a normal distribution around the mean of 0.15. The measure of relative political extraction is also normally distributed around the mean of 0.98 albeit with a tail to the right. But as bureaucratic quality is an ordinal measure, observations are grouped around the five values that observations may take, with a score of two being the most common. Although observations take on all five values, 50% of observations score one or two (indicated by the dark grey box).

Relying on the tax-to-GDP ratio to classify authoritarian regimes according to their administrative capacity, countries including Kuwait, Nigeria, and Uganda in the 1960s-1980s are at the very bottom. At the very top are Saudi Arabia and Libya in the 1970s and 1980s. Around the mean of 0.15 are a

host of countries including Egypt in the early 2000s, Jordan in the 1990s, and South Korea in the 1970s. Restricting data to the 2000s, Myanmar, Sudan and the DRC are found at the bottom of the range and Angola, Namibia, and the UAE at the top, and Malaysia and Tunisia, among others, around the mean.

Figure 5.2: Descriptive statistics of administrative capacity

Note: White dot: mean. Grey box: first to third quartiles. Shaded grey area: distribution.

Coercive Capacity

The other aspect of state capacity, coercive capacity, was defined as the reach as well as the ability and will to implement the rulers' orders of units such as the army, the police, or a presidential security guard. To capture a state's degree of coercive capacity, I use a measure of military spending per capita (measured in thousands of current year USD) from the National Material Capabilities v.40. Dataset of the Correlates of War Project (COW) (Singer et al. 1972). I take the logarithm of military spending per capita to normalize its distribution. As for administrative capacity, I construct a five-year running average.

The measure has two obvious drawbacks. First, high levels of spending on the military do not necessarily reflect the incumbent's degree of control over the armed forces. We do not know if they will obey him if worst comes to worst. As for administrative capacity, the issue of control will be discussed in the qualitative analyses. Second, the measure captures military capacity but not spending on security services, police, militias, para-military troops, presidential security guards, etc. These groups are often the backbone of

low-intensity coercion in authoritarian regimes, and the measure may thus be biased.

On the other hand, the military is often the only force large enough to deal with potentially regime-toppling mass protests like the ones that can occur after fraudulent elections (Svolik 2012, 127; Albertus and Menaldo 2012). From Tiananmen Square in China's capital to Hama in Syria, the armed forces of authoritarian regimes have been employed to suppress public protests. Thus, this measure of coercive capacity should affect regime stability through one of the most important mechanisms of elections discussed in the previous chapter. As there are no cross-national measures of the size of the police or other arms of the repressive apparatus, I rely on military spending in all main analyses and run robustness checks with data on military personnel, also from COW (Singer et al. 1972). I use the logarithm of military personnel (in thousands) per capita. But it should be noted that the cases in which strong coercive apparatuses exist outside of the armed forces, the Iranian Basij militia that quelled the post-electoral protests of 2009 being one example, will not be captured by this measure.

Figure 5.3: Descriptive statistics of coercive capacity

Note: White dot: mean. Grey box: first to third quartiles. Shaded grey area: distribution. Variables are log transformed.

Descriptive statistics of the main measures of coercive capacity are presented in Figure 5.3. The logarithms of both military spending and military personnel approximate a normal distribution, but on both measures, a group of countries score 0, and the distributions are thus skewed to the left. Using the logarithm of military spending to proxy coercive capacity puts newly inde-

pendent African states with no military spending, such as Lesotho and Botswana in the 1960s-1970s, at the bottom of the range. At the top are UAE and Kuwait in recent years, but also countries such as Singapore. Hovering around the mean of 9.55 are a large group of countries including Senegal in the 1990s and Indonesia and Guatemala in the 1980s.

Economic Control

In the previous chapter, I defined economic control as the rulers' domination of economic resources including natural resource revenues, land, and employment opportunities. Parallel to the concept of state capacity, the incumbent's degree of control is extremely hard to gauge. Economic control is a potentially all-encompassing concept, and I break it down into three measurable dimensions.

First, the size of the public sector gauges citizen's dependence on the rulers both for jobs and benefits. There are no time-series cross-sectional measures available on public sector jobs, but if the public sector is larger, citizens will – everything else being equal – be more likely to earn their living in public jobs. Furthermore, money can be directed from the state budget to the rulers and be spent for partisan purposes (Greene 2007, 40–41). Alternative measures that would be highly relevant to capture this dimension of economic control are the number of state-owned enterprises or data on (lack of) privatization (Greene 2007). Again, such data are not available on a cross-national basis for authoritarian regimes, and particularly Africanist scholars have highlighted that privatization does not necessarily equal a broader distribution of resources. Rather, in cases such as Angola, privatization has caused ownership to shift hands from the state to loyalists of the ruling group, contributing to rather than reducing incumbent control (Messiant 2001). Instead, I use government spending as a share of GDP from the Penn World Table to capture government size (Penn World Table 2013). The measure is log transformed to normalize the distribution. Although data are missing for some authoritarian regimes, the measure has reasonable coverage dating back to 1950.

Second, regulations on private business give an insight into the degree to which the government controls private endeavors to earn a living. Where private business is heavily controlled – or can be bullied by the government – economic freedom is restricted and citizens are more dependent on the government. To capture the degree of regulation, I use an index of regulation from the Economic Freedom in the World Dataset (Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall 2013). The index captures regulation on credit markets, labor mar-

kets and business, including information on the costs of starting a business (including for instance bribery), licensing restrictions, and ownership of banks (Gwartney, Lawson, and Block 1996, 243–248). The aggregate measure of regulation is available for some regimes as early as 1970 and for other regimes at a much later date. Until 2000, regimes are scored every five years, and thereafter, the measure is available on a yearly basis. I have inversed the index so that a higher score equals greater levels of regulation.[27]

Third, income from natural resources is a factor that is commonly stressed as one that increases leaders' control over the economy. Such resources can be extracted with little reliance on labor and often provide for rent windfalls to the dictator that can be distributed to loyal followers. Levitsky and Way rely, among other measures, on information on the mineral sector when coding autocrats' organizational power (Levitsky and Way 2010, 378). Such resources have also been highlighted as easily captured by (or at least in various ways profitable for) rebels and thus potentially undermining to incumbent control (Ross 2003, 30–34). In that case, resources would actually lower incumbent control and potentially cause instability. This risk is partially circumvented as I only include in the analyses regimes in which the majority of the territory is in government hands (see Chapter 2), and thus assume that natural resources in most of the cases will contribute to the incumbent's degree of control. I use the logarithm of total income from natural resources per capita from Haber and Menaldo (2012).

As the index on regulation only provides data every five years from 1970 (at the earliest; some authoritarian regimes only have data from later years onwards) to 2000 and yearly measures thereafter, and measures for a number of the other main variables (including the tax ratio) are only available until the mid-2000s, relying only on observed regulation data will significantly restrict my ability to conduct analyses over time. To enable the fixed-effect analyses of the following chapters, I perform both multiple imputation (generating values for missing data based on the values of other variables for the same country in the same year) and interpolation (generating average values for the missing data from the observed values of the same variable in the same country in the year before and after the missing observations) on the regulation index. The multiple imputations are reported in Appendix 1.

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[27] As one of the subcomponents of the index, regulation of credit markets, is available earlier than the full index for many regimes, I rely solely on this subcomponent for years where the full index is missing so as not to exclude that country-year from the analysis. Whenever the full index is available, I rely on this rather than the subcomponent.

Since the imputation method creates outliers in the time-series, as illustrated in Appendix 1, that can affect the results of the fixed effects analyses, I rely on the interpolated data instead. The interpolation procedure works well with the data structure where I have observed data every five years. It does not introduce spikes in the interpolated values in between the observed values but creates a smooth time trend. However, if there were in fact shocks to the level of regulation in one of the unobserved four-year periods that are not reflected in the observed values (for instance, sudden restrictions to business start-ups put in place after 1980 and rolled back before 1985), this will not show in the interpolated data. However, such patterns are unlikely to emerge and disappear within four years, and would thus typically be captured by the observed values. The data, which are reported below and used in the analyses in Chapters 6-7, include the interpolated values for the unobserved four-year intervals occurring between 1980 and 2000.

In the analyses of Chapter 7, I employ both the individual dimensions as well as an index comprising public sector size, regulation, and income from natural resources. For comparability, I standardize all three dimensions to have mean 0 and variance 1.[28] I reverse the index on regulation so that for all three dimensions, high scores equal higher degrees of economic control. The dimensions are not necessarily expected to correlate, as an autocrat may control one dimension without the regime scoring highly on the others (indeed Pearson's correlations vary between -0.15 and 0.58). That is, resource-rich countries do not necessarily have heavy restrictions on business. Rather, the index is additive: taken together, the dimensions express an overall level of economic control. A ruling group that controls business and disposes over a large public sector and natural resources has very high degrees of economic control. But medium degrees of economic control may be attained both by scoring high on one or two dimensions or having mean values on all three. I construct the index simply by summing all three variables and dividing by three, letting each dimension have equal weight in the final index. As for administrative and coercive capacity, I construct a five-year running average of economic control.

Descriptive statistics are presented in Figure 5.4. Whereas the index of regulation is slightly skewed to the right, the measure of natural resource income is skewed to the left due to the group of countries with no resource rents. The overall index approximates a normal distribution around the mean. Based on the overall index, authoritarian regimes with high degrees of eco-

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[28] Setting the standardized variable $z = (\ln (1 + x) - \text{mean} (\ln (1 + x)))/ (\text{standard deviation}(\ln (1 + x)))$.

nomic control include Syria, Iran, and China in the 1980s and 1990s. At the bottom are Singapore in recent years and Malawi in the 1980s and 1990s. Around the mean of 0.04 are Tunisia and Botswana.

Figure 5.4: Descriptive statistics of economic control

Note: White dot: mean. Grey box: first to third quartiles. Shaded grey area: distribution. Variables are standardized. Resource income is log transformed.

Whereas some autocrats may have high levels of all types of capacities, some may be stronger on administrative capacity, others on coercive capacity, etc. Pairwise Pearson's correlation coefficients reveal that the correlation between the three capacities are all relatively low. Those between economic control and administrative and coercive capacity respectively are even negative (-0.05 and -.28), implying that regimes scoring highly on economic control tend to score lower on administrative and coercive capacity and vice versa. The correlation between administrative and coercive capacity is positive but low (0.27). Thus, although high levels of tax extraction could be expected to also affect coercive capacity or economic control by adding to the resources available for the coercive apparatus or public sector spending, these measures do not show high degrees of correlation.

Sample

The following chapters employ these measures in cross-national time-series analyses of the relationship between election, authoritarian capacities, and

regime breakdown. I include in the analyses all authoritarian country-years, whether they have elections or not, in order to assess the effect of having elections (as opposed to not having elections) given different levels of authoritarian capacities. However, as most of the following analyses rely on fixed effects, countries that did not have a multi-party election or countries that did not experience regime breakdown (i.e. panels with no variation on either the dependent or independent variables) are automatically excluded from the analyses as fixed-effect estimates are based on changes in variables over time.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the time frame of the analyses is the post-World War II era. But the exact period included in each analysis depends on data availability. Most analyses include authoritarian country-years between 1960 and 2006 as these are the years for which the main measure of administrative capacity is available. Most other measures go back to 1946, but since administrative capacity is included in most models, most analyses start in 1960. For the analyses of economic control that include indicators of regulations and trade restrictions, analyses only start in 1980.

Chapter 6.
State Capacity and the Effect of Elections in Authoritarian Regimes

In Singapore, the People's Action Party (PAP) has ruled since independence. Whereas impressive economic performance has arguably contributed to the regime's durability (Chua 1997), studies show that its strong state exemplified by the highly efficient bureaucracy has allowed for the ruling party to carry out a number of strategies to dominate elections (Slater 2012). PAP draws on extensive security laws and the police has regularly detained opposition members and activists (Nasir and Turner 2012). Throughout the years, the opposition has been harassed to the extent that until the 2000s, PAP ran un-contested in more than half of all districts (Slater 2012, 28–29).

Where the opposition does run, systemic manipulation is subtly applied through the gerrymandering of districts, ethnic quotas, limits to fund-raising, and restrictions on rallies – all designed to limit the opposition's chances to campaign and be elected (N. Tan 2013; Li and Elklit 1999). In the 1997 elections, decentralized counting of votes was introduced, allowing the ruling party full information on which precincts supported its candidates, and the prime minister promised to distribute public resources, such as upgrading of public housing, accordingly (Li and Elklit 1999; Ong and Tim 2014). As a result, PAP continues to win more than 60% of votes translating into an even larger seat share. In this chapter, I ask whether this observed relationship between state capacity, elections, and regime stability is a more general phenomenon. Does state capacity condition the relationship between elections and authoritarian regime breakdown?

This chapter seeks the answer to this question through quantitative tests based on the data presented in Chapter 5 covering all authoritarian regimes from 1960-2006. First, I discuss the problems pertaining to tracing effects of institutions in cross-national studies and present the tools employed to avoid these issues. Second, I conduct a number of statistical tests to evaluate the hypothesis that administrative capacity conditions the relationship between elections and regime breakdown. Third, I conduct similar tests of the hypotheses pertaining to coercive capacity. I discuss the findings and relate them to the theory of the conditional effect of authoritarian elections as well as existing work in the field before turning to the effect of economic control in the following chapter.

Sources of Bias in the Study of Authoritarian Institutions

The argument presented here is essentially institutionalist. An institution, multi-party elections, conditioned by authoritarian capacities, affects regime dynamics. This approach, referred to as the "institutional turn" in research on comparative authoritarianism, has recently come under fire. An important criticism points to the tendency for theories to regard institutions as open to authoritarian manipulation and at the same time constraining the autocrat (Pepinsky 2014; Brancati 2014). Institutions may be mere epiphenomena, affected by the very same factors that also influence the downstream outcomes that institutions were theorized to create. Although theoretical predictions about the effect of institutions may be correct, research on authoritarian institutions has so far been unable to invent designs that can circumvent this problem of endogeneity and isolate and control for the factors that are likely to shape both institutions and their theorized effects (Pepinsky 2014).

In this study, two types of bias could potentially follow from the relationship between institutions, regime stability, and a number of potential confounders related to the country, the regime, or the strength of the autocrat. One type of bias would arise if certain countries or regions were more (or less) likely to hold elections and at the same time more (or less) likely to see regime breakdown without elections themselves affecting regime stability. This would be a classic case of omitted variable bias. We could rid ourselves of the potential bias by controlling for all possible factors that could be related to both the holding of elections and regime stability.

I deal with the risk of omitted variable bias by relying on country fixed effects models. Each country is expected to have certain traits that cannot be accounted for by quantifiable variables, but which are likely to influence the holding of elections and regime breakdown. Fixed effects models avoid this source of bias as they estimate effects solely based on variation within countries (Cameron and Trivedi 2009, 257–259). In contrast to the random effects estimator, the fixed effects estimator is consistent even if countries display certain un-modeled generic features. On top of that, it also does a better job of testing the claim of causality as it assesses how changes to the holding of elections and levels of state capacity and economic control over time within a country affect its likelihood of breakdown.

Whereas the fixed effects estimates, being based solely on changes within countries over time, are cleansed of biases generated by omitted variables that vary across countries, it does not free us from the risk of bias cre-

ated by changes in the propensity to hold elections and of regime break-down over time within each country. A second type of bias arises if autocrats can introduce and abandon elections at will and their choice to hold elections correlates with the risk of regime breakdown – what could be termed self-selection bias. This is the type of bias that Pepinsky more concretely points to in his recent criticism. It is exemplified by the suspension of the Malaysian parliament following the 1969 elections. An ideal solution to this problem would be to use instrumental variable estimation (Angrist and Pischke 2009, chap. 4). That is, to identify a variable that correlates with the holding of elections within a regime over time, but which is independent of the risk of regime breakdown. Unfortunately, it is hard to imagine such a factor let alone find data on this across authoritarian regimes over time. I have settled for the second best solution, which is to control for factors that could drive both the autocrat's choice to hold elections and the tendency for regimes to break down.

Controlling for potential confounders

The first three control factors relate to the economy. *Wealth* could both have a negative effect on the likelihood of authoritarian regime breakdown by offering more sources of patronage to the ruler and a positive effect as famously stated in the "modernization thesis" (Lipset 1959). At the same time, if a dictator is thought to hold elections only when he thinks he might control them, wealth could be one factor indicating incumbent superiority. As wealth is also likely to affect administrative and coercive capacity, for instance by dictating the resources available to develop a bureaucratic and repressive apparatus and to gain control over these arms of the state, wealth is also a necessary control factor in a test of the conditional relationship. Thus, all analyses include a control for wealth measured as the logarithm of GDP per capita lagged by one year. The measure is from Haber and Menaldo (2011).

Closely related to wealth, *economic growth*, or its inverse, economic crisis, is often hypothesized to raise the likelihood of authoritarian breakdown. Crises undercut the rulers' efforts to secure performance legitimacy, cause grievances that may provoke mass protests, and drain the resources available to co-opt elites and sustain the repressive apparatus (Haggard and Kaufman 1997, 268–269). In the context of authoritarian elections, such crises may be particularly influential (Reuter and Gandhi 2011, 90–91). Growth is also likely to affect a dictator's timing of elections and determine the resources available to sustain and co-opt the state apparatus, whether admin-

istrative or repressive. The change in GDP/capita from one year to the next (lagged by one year) is thus included in the analysis.

Resource income, rents that can be monopolized by the rulers without dependence on the population at large, is often expected to further authoritarian resilience – the so-called "resource curse" (Ross 2012). But these resources could also be argued to affect the leader's choice to hold elections, either by contributing to his belief that he can control the electoral institution or, conversely, by making him independent of international and domestic pressure for elections, leaving him more likely to abandon them. However, because such rents directly proxy the degree of economic control that the autocrat exhorts, a measure for rents is already included in the index of economic control (see Chapter 5). I thus only include resources as a control in the models where the economic control index is not included. I measure resource income as the logarithm of total income per capita from oil, gas, petroleum, and metals (lagged by one year) (data from Haber and Menaldo 2011).

Three more factors, relating to the political environment, could also affect both the likelihood of breakdown and the choice to hold elections or the capacities available to the ruling group. The first such factor is *societal unrest*. Societal protests hold the potential to provoke regime breakdown (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Ulfelder 2005; Epstein et al. 2006), but it is also likely that higher degrees of unrest would correlate with the dictator's timing of elections – leading him to call early elections or postpone them in response to public protests. Furthermore, particularly degrees of state capacity are likely to affect the public's willingness to protest.

To control for this, an index of societal unrest or protests is created relying on data from The Cross-National Time-series Data Archive (Banks and Wilson 2012). The index includes counts of four different types of incidences, namely riots, general strikes, demonstrations, and revolutions. These counts have been standardized and combined into an index with equal weights given to each type of unrest as described by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010, 940–941).[29] As noted by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, as the Banks data are based on media reports of incidents of unrest, data are likely to be biased with more reports of incidents in certain countries or in later years. I therefore operate with a variable calculating the change in reported inci-

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[29] Specifically, I standardize each dimension so that the standardized variable z = (ln(1+x)-mean(ln(1+x))/(standard deviation (ln(1+x))) with a mean of 0 and a variance of 1. The standardized variables are summed and divided by four to achieve the overall index of political unrest.

dents over the past five years (unrest at time t_0 minus unrest at time t_{-5}) under the assumption that autocrats will respond not primarily to the levels of unrest but to large changes in such threats from the masses.[30]

The second political factor is the overall level of "democraticness" of the authoritarian regime. Proponents of the "democratization by elections"-thesis in particular have been challenged by the risk of endogeneity. What if elections do not cause breakdown and democratization, but rather other forces set in motion a process that both causes regimes to open up for multi-party elections and in the long run spurs democratization? This has caused recent studies of the effect of authoritarian elections to include a control for the protection of civil liberties as measured by Freedom House (Brownlee 2009b). However, as discussed in Chapter 2, such aggregate measures are likely to capture not only liberalization tendencies unrelated to the holding of elections but rather to correlate with the holding of elections and in particular multi-party elections. To capture underlying liberalization tendencies independently of the holding of elections, I instead employ a measure of *media freedom* (Whitten-Woodring and Belle 2014).[31] Second, Polity's indicator of *executive constraints* is chosen as a measure that at least does not specifically tap into the holding of elections, but could be expected to capture the degree of openness of the political system (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2011). These controls are included in selected models.

The third political factor is *authoritarian regime type*. As shown in Chapter 2, elections are more common in certain types of regimes. Furthermore, an established finding in the literature on regime stability is the tendency for some types of regimes to be more stable than others (Geddes 1999; Magaloni 2008). Finally, capacities are also likely to vary across regime types as for instance military regimes are often expected to have large coercive apparatuses, and party regimes in for instance the post-communist space have tended to dominate the economy. As regime types do not exhibit a great deal of variation within countries over time and I primarily rely on fixed effects models, I do not include regime type dummies in all specifications. But I report all main results with a control for the four most common authoritarian

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[30] I also exclude this control from selected models as it could be argued that one mechanism through which elections affect regime stability is precisely by provoking protests. Controlling for protest may thus rob the election-variable of explanatory power.

[31] I have recoded the measure so that 0 equals no effective national media, 1 indicates a press that is not free, 2 is imperfectly free, and a score of 3 is attained by a free press (for further information, see Whitten-Woodring and Belle 2014).

regime types, party regimes, military regimes, personalist regimes, and monarchies, as operationalized by Geddes et al. (2014a).

In addition, I include a control for engagement in *interstate war* in model in which coercive capacity proxied by military spending or personnel is the primary conditioning variable. If a state is pre-occupied with war, this could drive up military spending and personnel although these capacities would be used outside of the state and would thus not be available for intrastate repression and should not be expected to affect electoral dynamics. The data on interstate war are from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (N. P. Gleditsch et al. 2002).

I also introduce a set of variables to control for changes over time. In the standard model, I use a cubed version of *time* (including time, time squared, and time cubed with 1960 as baseline) to ensure that the relationship between elections, capacities, and breakdown are not driven simply by time trends (Carter and Signorino 2010; N. Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998).[32] In robustness checks, I include a Cold War-dummy to account for the fact that electoral dynamics may play out differently in the Cold War and the post-Cold War era as discussed in Chapter 2. Finally, the *age of the regime* (including regime age squared and regime age cubed) is often included in time series cross sectional studies of regime breakdown as regimes are expected to be more likely to break down in the very early years and after prolonged rule (Geddes 2003; Svolik 2012).

In spite of the risk of bias, I have limited control factors to only include the most important, potential confounders. Including control variables presents a trade-off as it serves to alleviate the bias arising from confounding but at the same time increases the risk of bias arising from the exclusion of observations (King et al. 2001). If control variables are unavailable for certain countries or regimes, e.g. the most authoritarian ones, and these are thus excluded from the analysis, this causes a bias that may be as serious as the risk of confounding. Therefore, in the standard model, I have restricted controls to wealth, growth, changes in level of political unrest, time (including its squared and cubed expression), and regime age (including its squared and cubed expression). The other potential confounders are included in selected analyses to demonstrate the robustness of the findings. Variables that are time-invariant (e.g. region) or nearly time-invariant (e.g. ethnic fractionalization) are not included because these factors cannot confound the relationship when only within-country variation is used to estimate effects.

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[32] In alternative specifications, year-dummies are included.

As it is practically impossible to control for all time-variant factors that could affect the relationship between elections and breakdown, the risk of bias is reduced but not eliminated. The debate about the effect of institutions will likely roar for a while, as the perfect design is impossible to attain. However, it is important to remember that although Pepinsky makes a valid and very important objection to the study of the effect of authoritarian institutions, we should not underestimate the constraints that institutions put on modern autocrats. Pepinsky himself stresses the emergency measures put in place by the Malaysian ruling party, UMNO, after the opposition's gain in the 1969 election. But the Malaysian parliament reconvened only two years later, and regular elections have been held every four to five years since independence. In spite of the huge pressure the ruling coalition faced in the most recent electoral contest in 2013, and the preceding loss of their supermajority, it was unthinkable that the BN should have called off Malaysian multi-party elections today.

Similarly, whereas then dictator of the neighboring Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, abandoned multi-party elections during the martial law period of 1972-1981, he went on to re-establish elections and lose power due to protests over electoral fraud in 1986. Thus dictators may to some extent control the timing of elections, but in many of the multi-party electoral authoritarian regimes of today – and the past – elections have proven hard to remove once introduced and opened up to multiple other contenders.

Furthermore, Pepinsky's criticism is directed at theories that hold authoritarian institutions to be both malleable to and at the same time constrain autocrats. The idea on which this dissertation is based is that dictators may control the electoral institution *under some circumstances,* but not under others. In my analyses, the effect of elections is explicitly modeled as conditional on a number of societal factors, namely the capacities available to the dictator. The analyses aim to test not the claim that elections strengthen regimes, but rather the claim that elections will serve at the will of dictators who dispose over strong states and tightly controlled economies, but that elections will deal unexpected blows to dictators who are not as fortunate. Figure 6.1 illustrates the spread of elections across various levels of capacities. It shows that elections occur in both high- and low-capacity regimes, and are not solely introduced by strong dictators expecting to win them – nor for that matter solely by weak dictators pressured into holding elections. A clear pattern of self-selection – of dictators with certain levels of capacities choosing to hold elections – is not evident. With the discussion of sources of bias in mind, and with various precautions taken to avoid bias, I proceed to the analysis of the conditional effect of elections.

Figure 6.1: The spread of elections across levels of capacities

Panel A: Administrative capacity

Levels of administrative capacity, percentiles

Panel B: Coercive capacity

Levels of coercive capacity, percentiles

Panel C: Economic control

Levels of economic control, percentiles

Note: Number of elections across levels of authoritarian capacities. Columns represent percentiles on administrative capacity, coercive capacity, and economic control respectively.

A note on interaction effects in limited dependent variable models

For all hypotheses, I estimate logistic regression models with country fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered on country with the described control variables included. The clustered standard errors take into account the fact that observations from different years within the same country may cluster rendering regular standard errors incorrect. However, as H2-H8 are interaction hypotheses, most models include an interaction term. Due to the binary dependent variable, logistical regression models are a form of limited dependent variable (LDV) models. Given the non-linear nature of these models, the use and interpretation of interaction terms in LDV models in general (Ai and Norton 2003; Berry, DeMeritt, and Esarey 2010; Bowen 2012) and in panel-data LDV models in particular (Karaca-Mandic, Norton, and Dowd 2012) is both complicated and contested. Interaction effects in LDV models will vary with the levels of the covariates and one cannot rely only on the coefficient of the interaction term but must plot effects of changes in one variable for various levels of the other variable, and the interaction effect should be calculated as the cross-partial derivative of the expected value of the dependent variable (although this has yet to become standard practice in applied studies) (Ai and Norton 2003; Norton, Wang, and Ai 2004).

Software packages are now available to solve this problem for pooled LDV models (Norton, Wang, and Ai 2004; Bowen 2012), but these approaches do not apply to panel models, particularly to those where there is no constant term (i.e. fixed effects models) (Karaca-Mandic, Norton, and Dowd 2012). This leaves two options. Estimating the interaction effect and calculating marginal effects on the probability scale (although sometimes not even so) seems to be the norm in applied research (Donno 2013; Howard and Roessler 2006; Wright 2009; IDRE UCLA 2014).

Alternatively, given the criticism of this approach, one may instead rely on odds ratios. The odds ratio scale has the advantage of being linear and the effects of a given variable (or the interaction term) will not vary with the covariates – the interaction effect can thus be read directly from the coefficient on the interaction term (Buis 2010). On the other hand, this approach has been deemed both uninterpretable and invalid (Norton, Wang, and Ai 2004; Lovasi et al. 2012). In the following, I run main models both on the probability and the odds ratio scale and discuss results accordingly. Secondly, I rely on plots of the marginal effect of multi-party elections across various levels of authoritarian capacities. To achieve more correct confidence inter-

vals, I also plot marginal effects on the linear logit scale and derive significance levels from here rather than from the plots on the probability scale.

Administrative Capacity, Elections, and Regime Breakdown

Based on the described analytical setup, I proceed to analyze the effect of state capacity on the relationship between elections and regime breakdown. Due to the differing roles expected to be played by the two different arms of the state apparatus – the administrative and the coercive – I analyze each dimension in turn. In all models, I include the remaining authoritarian capacities as controls. In Chapter 4, I developed two hypotheses on the role of administrative capacity in authoritarian elections and a more general hypothesis on the direct effect of elections:

> H1: Multi-party elections do not directly affect the likelihood of regime breakdown.

> H2: The effect of authoritarian, multi-party elections on the likelihood of regime breakdown will decrease with higher levels of administrative capacity

> H5: The effect of authoritarian multi-party elections on regime breakdown will be negative for high levels of administrative capacity irrespective of coercive capacity and economic control.

Do elections affect regime stability unconditional upon state capacity and economic control?

H1 states that the holding of multi-party elections does not directly affect the likelihood of regime breakdown. As the effect of elections depends in part on the capacities available to autocrats, these capacities should be taken into account if one is to understand how elections affect regime stability. The direct effect of having held a multi-party election within the past five years on the likelihood of the regime breaking down is modelled in Table 6.1, Model 1.[33] The coefficient is negative but statistically insignificant. Thus, with-

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[33] The dependent variable is scored 1 if regime breakdown has occurred in the given year (and was not coded as a result of an electoral transition of power) as operationalized by the GWF dataset (See Chapters 2 and 5). The explanatory variable indicates whether a at least one multi-party election has been held under the

out controlling for the levels of state capacity or rulers' control over the economy, the holding of elections does not systematically affect authoritarian stability. Hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected: there is no evidence of a direct effect of elections on the likelihood of regime breakdown.

This finding holds in spite of controls for GDP, growth, changes in the level of protest over the past five years, time trends and regime age. Of the control variables, only growth (and time trends) has a significant direct effect on regime stability, but it performs as expected: A higher growth rate reduces the risk of breakdown.

The finding supports not only the theory of a conditional effect of authoritarian elections, but is also in sync with the mixed findings in the literature on the effect of authoritarian elections (Lindberg 2006; McCoy and Hartlyn 2009; Hadenius and Teorell 2009; Magaloni 2008; Donno 2013) and in particular Brownlee's (2009a) cross-national study in which authoritarian elections are associated with democratization but not with regime breakdown. But what happens when authoritarian capacities are taken into account?

Does administrative capacity condition the effect of elections?

Does the effect of elections on regime breakdown change when one controls for authoritarian capacities? Model 2 of Table 6.1 includes administrative capacity proxied by a lagged five year running average of the tax-to-GDP ratio. This model also includes a control for coercive capacity proxied by the logarithm of military spending and economic control measured as an index of the logarithm of income from natural resources and government share of GDP.[34]

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current regime during the past five years including the present with election data from NELDA (see Chapters 2 and 5).

[34] As the index of economic control has limited data availability, I rely on a reduced index so as not to exclude from the analyses all the country-years in which I have data on all variables except the economic control index. I conduct robustness checks with the full index reported below.

Table 6.1: Multi-party elections, administrative capacity, and regime breakdown

	(Pr)	(Pr)	(Pr)	(Odds ratios)
	1	2	3	4
Multi-party election	-0.168	-1.064**	0.350	1.419
	(0.318)	(0.491)	(0.777)	(1.103)
Tax-to-GDP ratio		-0.499	1.133	3.104
		(3.483)	(3.674)	(11.401)
Multiparty-election * Tax-to-GDP ratio			-11.992*	0.000*
			(6.404)	(0.000)
Log of military spending		0.961**	0.940**	2.560**
		(0.403)	(0.393)	(1.006)
Economic control (reduced index)		-0.416	-0.374	0.688
		(0.734)	(0.735)	(0.506)
Log of GDP per capita	-0.035	-0.164	0.041	1.042
	(0.575)	(1.271)	(1.304)	(1.358)
GDP growth	-0.039**	-0.041**	-0.044**	0.957**
	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(.0207)
Protest	0.166	0.264**	0.283**	1.327**
	(0.105)	(0.131)	(0.125)	(0.166)
Time	-0.043	-0.381**	-0.393**	0.675
	(0.027)	(0.181)	(0.178)	(0.120)
Time squared	0.004**	0.012	0.013*	1.012
	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Time cubed	-0.000*	-0.000	-0.000	0.100
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regime duration	0.016	0.337***	0.329***	1.390
	(0.039)	(0.117)	(0.118)	(0.164)
Regime duration squared	0.001	-0.016**	-0.016**	0.984
	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Regime duration cubed	0.000	0.000***	0.000***	1.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	2,549	1,330	1,330	1,117
Breakdowns	161	104	104	104

Note: Based on regime breakdown data from GWF (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a) and election occurrence data from NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012b). Unit of analysis is country-year. Dependent variable is regime breakdown, coded 1 if breakdown occurred once or more in the given year. Explanatory variable is coded 1 if one or more multi-party elections were held during the past 5 years, 0 if not. Tax ratio, military expenditure, and economic control are five year running averages lagged one year. All other covariates except time trends are lagged one year. Logit model with country fixed effects (*clogit* command in Stata) and robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

The direct effect of elections turns significant when controls for authoritarian capacities are introduced. It thus seems that, overall, the holding of an authoritarian multi-party election within the past five years reduces the likelihood of breakdown when one controls for differing levels of capacities that themselves affect regime stability. Thus, there may indeed be a direct effect of elections, and one reason this effect has not been encountered by previous studies could be the neglect of controls for authoritarian capacities.[35]

The core claim, as expressed in hypotheses H2-H8, however, is that the effect of elections on regime stability will change as levels of authoritarian capacities change. Before devoting the remainder of the section to the conditional effect of administrative capacity (H2 and H5), I briefly dwell on the direct effect of the authoritarian capacities on regime breakdown. It is interesting to find that coercive capacity has a significant direct effect on the likelihood of regime breakdown but that this effect is positive. Increases in coercive capacity are associated with greater risks of breakdown. This result will be discussed in the second half of this chapter. Furthermore, there is no direct effect of administrative capacity on authoritarian stability as has been suggested in previous studies. Thus, Andersen et al. find that administrative capacity, proxied by the tax-to-GDP ratio, enhances the stability of authoritarian regimes (Andersen et al. 2014). However, Andersen and collaborators rely on random effect estimates, and the discrepancy in results could be explained if their results are driven by differences between countries rather than changes within countries over time. Table 6.a of Appendix 2 reproduces Table 6.1 but employs random effect estimators. Model 2 of Table 6.a illustrates that assuming that all relevant control factors are included and that the independent variables thus do not correlate with the error term (a dubious assumption as discussed in Appendix 2), the effect of administrative capacity is indeed negative. However, the p-value is just above conventional levels of significance (p-value of 0.114). Furthermore, this effect is driven by differences between countries. The fixed effect estimates of Table 6.1 indicate that changes to levels of tax extraction ratios within countries over time do not directly affect the likelihood of the regime breaking down.

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[35] However, rerunning the analysis of the effect of elections uncontrolled for authoritarian capacities (as in Model 1), but restricting the sample to that of the model including authoritarian capacities (Model 2), the direct and uncontrolled effect also turns negative and statistically significant (not reported). Thus, the significant effect of elections uncovered in Model 2 could be a result of the sample rather than the control for capacities.

I move on to test H2: that administrative capacity *conditions* the relationship between elections and breakdown. The conditioning effect of administrative capacity is taken into account by multiplying the tax ratio with the multi-party elections dummy in Model 3 of Table 6.1. Now, elections have a positive but insignificant effect on breakdown. This represents the effect of elections in the unlikely situation where the tax ratio is 0 – a scenario that does not occur in the data. The tax ratio also has an insignificant, but positive effect, reflecting that there is no systematic effect of administrative capacity on breakdown propensities in regimes that have not held a recent election. The control variables for economic and political environment largely perform as expected, strengthening our belief in the model: economic growth has a significant, reducing effect on the risk of breakdown, while an increase in protests heightens the risk of breakdown.

But such effects do not eliminate the effect of elections and administrative capacity. The coefficient on the interaction term is significant at the 0.1 level and negative, indicating that as the tax ratio increases, the effect of elections on the likelihood of regime breakdown decreases. This lends initial support to H2. Judged solely by the coefficient on the interaction term, elections become more likely to stabilize authoritarian regimes when administrative capacity increases. But due to the non-linear nature of the logistic regression model, the effect of administrative capacity on the relationship between elections and breakdown will change across values of both the constituent terms and the covariates, and the coefficient on the interaction terms is thus not sufficient to estimate interaction effects. One cannot evaluate H2 solely by relying on the coefficient on the interaction term. I circumvent this problem in two ways.

First, I interpret the same results in terms of odds ratios reported in Model 4 of Table 6.1. As this scale is linear, it allows me to interpret significance levels directly from the coefficients. But the interpretation of the coefficients is different from Model 3. The coefficient of 1.4 for multi-party elections indicates that for a hypothetical regime with no administrative capacity, the odds of breakdown are almost one and a half times higher if an election has been held within the past five years than if it has not. But the effect is not statistically significant. The odds ratio of the interaction term, on the other hand, is below zero and significant, indicating that the odds of breakdown decrease for electoral regimes when administrative capacity increases. Thus, interpreted in terms of odds ratios, there is a clear and significant interaction effect, and it is in the expected direction. As administrative capacity increases, elections become less likely to lead to breakdown.

However, it is hard to grasp the exact meaning of changes in terms of odds ratios. To further unravel the size and direction of the interaction term on the probability scale, which provides for easier interpretation of results, I proceed to plot the marginal effect of having held an election within the past five years across various levels of administrative capacity. This not only serves as a further test of H2 but is also a test of the more specific H5: that elections held under high levels of administrative capacity are more likely to contribute to stability regardless of the level of the other authoritarian capacities.

The effect of elections across levels of administrative capacity

The marginal effects of elections for various levels of administrative capacity are calculated on the probability scale (based on Model 3 of Table 6.1) and displayed in Figure 6.2. As the probability scale does not provide correct standard errors, the effect is also plotted on the linear logit scale (Panel B), and the significance levels are drawn from this plot.

How does the holding of an election versus not holding an election affect the likelihood of regime breakdown for various levels of administrative control? Panel A of Figure 6.2 illustrates the marginal effect of multi-party elections on the likelihood of regime breakdown for various tax-to-GDP ratios while all other variables are held at their observed value for each observation.

Figure 6.2: Marginal effect of elections for different levels of administrative capacity

A: Probability scale

B: Logit scale

C: Distribution of observations across tax ratio

Note: Panel A-B: Average marginal effects of multi-party elections on likelihood of regime breakdown for various levels of administrative capacity. Graph based on the logit model with fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered on country and all controls included as in Model 3 of table 6.1. The country fixed effects are set to zero. Due to problems with generating marginal plots after FE-models in Stata, the plot is based on a regular xtlogit command with country-dummies included. Panel C: Distribution of observations (country-years) across the full range of administrative capacity measured as tax-to-GDP ratio.

For very low levels of administrative capacity, the effect of elections is positive but insignificant. This is visible as the line is above zero in Panel A but the

90% confidence interval of Panel B includes zero. But for higher levels of administrative capacity the relationship changes. The line crosses zero and the effect turns statistically significant for higher levels of administrative capacity. Here, holding elections decreases the likelihood of breakdown. And the more so, the more administrative capacity increases. The mean tax ratio across countries and years is 0.14, and the marginal effect of elections on the likelihood of breakdown is negative and significant for observations with tax ratios above 0.10. This is the case for 65% of the sample and includes countries such as Malaysia, Angola, and Tunisia. For these 65% of countries that have the highest levels of administrative capacity, electoral regimes are significantly less likely to break down than are non-electoral regimes. And the difference grows as administrative capacity increases. The results support both H2 and H5: administrative capacity proxied by tax extraction rates conditions the effect of elections negatively. And independent of the level of coercive capacity and economic control, elections in regimes with high administrative capacity are associated with regime stability.

Figure 6.3: Predicted probability of breakdown for electoral and non-electoral regimes at high and low levels of administrative capacity

Note: Predicted probability of regime breakdown based on model 3, Table 6.1. Low administrative capacity is a tax ratio of 0.05 corresponding to its 5th percentile for the sample of model 3, Table 6.1. High administrative capacity is a tax ratio of 0.16, corresponding to its 75th percentile. All covariates are held at their observed values.

Figure 6.3 further substantiates the results by presenting the predicted probability of breakdown for two fictive regimes. In Panel A, administrative capacity is held at its 5th percentile (a tax ratio of 0.05 corresponding to that of Haiti in the 1990s or Pakistan in the 1960s). The likelihood of regime

breakdown for a low capacity regime is 9.4% if it does not hold elections. If an election had been held under the same regime, the risk of breakdown would decrease to 8.2% but the difference between these two is not statistically significant (see confidence interval in Figure 6.2b). The scenario is different if the regime were to increase its administrative capacity to the 75th percentile of the sample, corresponding to a tax ratio of 0.16, such as Malaysia and Libya in the 2000s (Panel B). In this case, the electoral regime's risk of breakdown would decrease from 8.2% to 3.3%. But had a multi-party election not been held within the past five years, the regime would have a significantly higher predicted probability of breakdown (11.3%). In other words, high administrative capacity lowers the risk of breakdown for electoral regimes but not for non-electoral regimes. And holding elections only lowers the risk of breakdown where administrative capacity is high. Where administrative capacity is low, breakdown propensies do not differ significantly between electoral and non-electral regimes.

In comparison, a similar increase in levels of economic growth, a common predictor of authoritarian regime breakdown, from the 5th to the 75th percentile, would reduce the risk of breakdown slightly less. Whereas this increase in administrative capacity would lead to a reduction in breakdown propensity of 4.9 percentage points, the increase in growth levels would decrease the risk of breakdown by 3.3 percentage points. Thus, in support of H2 and H5, the effect of changes to administrative capacity on the risk of breakdown following authoritarian elections is substantial.

The results are robust to controls for authoritarian regime type, prior levels of liberalizations (captured by levels of media freedom and executive con-straints), the Cold War period, and to alternative measures of economic con-trol. These results are reported in Appendix 2, Table 6.b and Figure 6.b. The results are also unchanged when country-year dummies rather than time-trends (not reported) are employed. I have also run analyses excluding each panel (country) in turn to ensure that no influential observations are driving the results (not reported). For these models, the coefficient of the interaction term varies from -10.00 to -14.81 with the great majority of models showing a coefficient of -11.99 and all coefficients significant at least at the 0.1 level (not reported). This leads me to conclude that the results are not driven by single countries.

As the models do not include the post-communist countries due to the lack of tax data for this region, I also rerun the analysis relying on imputed data on administrative capacity. Imputation, the generation of artificial val-ues for missing data based on the country's score on the remaining variables in the dataset, has become standard practice to avoid the bias stemming

from the exclusion of observations with missing data (King et al. 2001). The imputation procedure is described in Appendix 1. The results are reported in Table 6.2 and Figure 6.4. For simplicity, and to enable a plot of the marginal effects of elections, the imputed values on the tax ratio across 20 imputed datasets have simply been average and the model includes this average imputed value for all countries that lack observed tax data. In this specification, the sample increases from 1330 to 1505 observations. The coefficient on the interaction term remains negative but is reduced and statistically insignificant (Model 3, Table 6.2). However, the plot of the marginal effects in Panels A-B of Figure 6.4 reveals that having elections significantly reduces the risk of breakdown for regimes with tax extraction rates between 0.04 and 0.27, the majority of the sample, and the more so, the more administrative capacity increases. Thus, although significant for a slightly smaller part of the sample, the results hold when imputed data for the post-Communist countries are included. However, as discussed in Appendix 6, the imputation procedure is problematic. For each country, the entire time-series is imputed based on the values of the other variables of the model as there are no data available for the post-communist countries at any point in time. The model includes no actual knowledge of tax extraction rates in this region, but based on imputed data for this region, the hypotheses do find support.

Table 6.2 Multi-party elections, administrative capacity, and regime breakdown, imputed tax data

	1	2	3
Multi-party election	-0.188	-0.552	-0.262
	(0.319)	(0.435)	(0.731)
Tax-to-GDP ratio (imputed)		-0.964	-0.397
		(3.168)	(3.326)
Multiparty-election * Tax-to-GDP ratio			-2.345
			(5.325)
Log of military spending		1.068***	1.055***
		(0.400)	(0.397)
Economic control (reduced index)		-0.595	-0.573
		(0.659)	(0.670)
Log of GDP per capita	-0.058	-0.491	-0.455
	(0.581)	(1.368)	(1.369)
GDP growth	-0.039**	-0.043**	-0.043**
	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Protest	0.154	0.121	0.127
	(0.104)	(0.124)	(0.124)
Time	-0.043	-0.399**	-0.399**
	(0.027)	(0.161)	(0.161)
Time squared	0.004**	0.014*	0.014*
	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Time cubed	-0.000*	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regime duration	0.016	0.164*	0.162*
	(0.039)	(0.086)	(0.086)
Regime duration squared	0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Regime duration cubed	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	2,549	1,505	1,505
Breakdowns	161	117	117

Note: Based on regime breakdown data from GWF (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a) and election occurrence data from NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012b). Unit of analysis is country-year. Dependent variable is regime breakdown, coded 1 if breakdown occurred once or more in the given year. Explanatory variable is coded 1 if one or more multi-party elections were held during the past 5 years, 0 if not. Tax ratio, military expenditure, and economic control are five year running averages lagged one year. All other covariates except time trends are lagged one year. Logit model with country fixed effects (*clogit* command in Stata) and robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Finally, a random effect model, assuming that all the independent variables do not correlate with the error term (Cameron and Trivedi 2009, 238), or alternatively, that changes to state capacity within countries have similar effects on the risk of breakdown than do differences in levels of state capacity between countries, delivers substantially identical results. Although the coefficient on the interaction term is slightly reduced in the random effects model, the marginal effects are not. The results are reported in Appendix 2, Table 6.a and Figure 6.a. In fact, Figure 6.a illustrates that relying on random effects, not only are elections negatively associated with breakdown where administrative capacity is high, where administrative capacity is at it lowest, holding elections increases the risk of breakdown.

Figure 6.4: Marginal effect of elections across administrative capacity, imputed tax data

A: Probability scale

B: Logit scale

Note: Average marginal effects of multi-party elections on likelihood of regime breakdown for various levels of administrative capacity measured as the tax-to-GDP ratio and including imputed data for the post-Communist countries. Graph based on the logit models with fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered on country and all controls included as in Model3 of Table 6.2. The country fixed effects are set to 0. Due to problems with generating marginal plots after FE-models in Stata, the plot is based on a regular xtlogit command with country-dummies included.

In sum, the tests have lent some support to H1. There is no direct effect of elections when controls for the capacities available to the ruling group are left out. But when authoritarian capacities are taken into account, elections significantly increase the risk of breakdown. However, in support of H2 and H5, this relationship changes as levels of administrative capacity change. In correspondence with H2, there is evidence that as administrative capacity increases, regimes become more likely to stabilize through elections. And corroborating H5, in high capacity regimes, introducing elections has a negative effect on regime breakdown. Thus, the results are in sync with case studies that point to the importance of the state in electoral authoritarian re-

gimes (Slater 2010; Slater 2012). At least when I proxy administrative capacity by tax extraction ratios, there is evidence that autocrats such as the current rulers in Singapore may rely solely on their efficient bureaucracies to stabilize through elections. But if the PAP leadership in Singapore were to abandon elections, the risk of breakdown would increase. And if its administrative capacity deteriorated but PAP continued to hold elections, the result would be the same: a greater risk of breaking down would likely follow.

In the following, I run a number of additional tests of the main hypotheses. I first vary the time horizon of the effect of authoritarian elections before rerunning the main models with alternative operationalizations of administrative capacity and regime breakdown.

Long- and short-term effects

The above analyses found support for the claim that administrative capacity conditions the effect of authoritarian elections. But when does an effect of elections set in? Whereas some autocracies hold regular elections with short time intervals, others have more sporadic electoral contests. According to the theoretical apparatus, some – particularly destabilizing – effects of elections set in immediately after the election has ended. A breakdown caused by an election often occurs in the aftermath of the election itself spurred by popular protests or elite defections. But the stabilizing effects of for instance a super-majority victory are likely to last for years after the election, as elites remain loyal and the electoral mandate provides legitimacy to leaders. In the longer term, however, the effects will likely wear off. To demonstrate superiority or generate legitimacy, a new electoral contest will be needed. To capture both stabilizing and destabilizing effects of elections before they wear off, Table 6.1 estimated the effect of having held at least one election at any point during the past five years. But can identical effects be identified in the shorter or longer term? Table 6.3 presents further tests of the claims of H2, that administrative capacity conditions the relationship between elections and breakdown in a negative direction, by focusing on the effect of more recent and more distant elections. In both the longer and shorter term, the effect of elections is expected to be weaker.

In Model 3 regimes score 1 on the explanatory variable if they have held at least one election within the past seven years.[36] Thus, the model tests whether an election held at any point within the preceding seven years affects the likelihood of breakdown. The coefficient on the interaction terms is insignificant and reduced. Panel C-D of Figure 6.5 reveals that there is no interaction effect – the marginal effect of having held an election within the past seven years does not change as administrative capacity increases. That is, administrative capacity does not significantly condition the relationship between elections held within the past seven years and regime breakdown.

The short term effect is tested in Model 1. The explanatory variable counts whether at least one multi-party election has been held within the given year and under the regime in place on January 1st.That is, elections that occurred during the year but after a regime breakdown are not coded as belonging to the regime in place at the beginning of the year. Thus, the models test whether elections occurring in one year affect the likelihood of regime breakdown in the following year. Again, the coefficient on the interaction term is in the expected direction but insignificant.

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[36] For these different versions of the dependent variable, I also change the measurement of administrative capacity. Thus, for one-year models, administrative capacity is measured as the tax-to-GDP ratio lagged by one year. In the seven-year model, administrative capacity is proxied by a seven-year running average of the tax ratio lagged by one year.

Table 6.3: Multi-party elections and administrative capacity, short- and long-term effects

	Election during past year		Election during past 7 years	
	1	2	3	4
Multi-party election	0.477	0.637	-0.357	-0.302
	(0.702)	(0.695)	(1.068)	(1.010)
Tax-to-GDP ratio	2.038	1.586	-0.593	-0.075
	(2.319)	(2.078)	(4.179)	(3.689)
Multiparty-election * Tax-to-GDP ratio	-7.820	-8.881*	-0.868	-0.321
	(4.897)	(5.046)	(7.468)	(7.388)
Log of military expenditures per capita	0.488*	0.461**	0.622	0.525*
	(0.267)	(0.197)	(0.391)	(0.312)
Economic control (reduced index)	-0.393	-0.407	-0.362	-0.577
	(0.456)	(0.389)	(0.922)	(0.876)
Log of GDP per capita	-0.566	-0.342	0.681	0.837
	(0.951)	(0.695)	(1.452)	(1.187)
GDP growth	-0.037**	-0.020**	-0.050**	-0.049**
	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.025)	(0.023)
Protest	0.273*		0.220	
	(0.143)		(0.134)	
Time	-0.106	-0.179*	-0.323	-0.425*
	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.249)	(0.250)
Time squared	0.005	0.008	0.012	0.016
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Time cubed	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regime duration	0.165**	0.114*	0.293***	0.195**
	(0.072)	(0.068)	(0.108)	(0.099)
Regime duration squared	-0.009**	-0.007*	-0.015**	-0.011*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Regime duration cubed	0.000***	0.000**	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	1,588	1,818	1,249	1,333
Breakdowns	115	131	95	103

Note: Based on regime breakdown data from GWF (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a) and election occurrence data from NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012b). Unit of analysis is country-year. Dependent variable in all models is regime breakdown, coded 1 if breakdown occurred once or more in the given year. Explanatory variable is multi-party election coded 1 if the regime held a multi-party election in the given year (model 1), in the past five years (model 2), or in the past seven years (model 3). Tax ratio, military expenditure, and economic control are lagged one year in model 1-2 and are seven year running averages lagged one year in model 3-4. All other covariates except time trends are lagged one year. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Panel A-B of Figure 6.4 illustrates that the effect of having held an election within the past year does change as administrative capacity increases, but the marginal effects are insignificant. However, the short-term effect of elections is primarily theorized to depend on the risk of breakdown associated with post-electoral protests. And indeed, if the control for protests is excluded from the analyses, the coefficient on the interaction terms is negative and significant on the 0.1 level (Model 2). In comparison, leaving out the control for protests does not change the insignificant conditioning effect of administrative capacity on elections held in the previous seven years (Model 4).

Figure 6.5: Marginal effect of elections across administrative capacity, short- and long-term effects

A: One year period, probability scale

B: One year period, logit scale

C: Seven year period, probability scale

D: Seven year period, logit scale

Note: Average marginal effects of multi-party elections on likelihood of regime breakdown for various levels of administrative capacity. Graph based on the logit model with fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered on country and all controls included as in Model 1 and 3 of Table 6.3. The country fixed effects are set to zero. All covariates are held at their observed values. Due to problems with generating marginal plots after FE-models in Stata, the plot is based on a regular xtlogit command with country-dummies included.

Thus, administrative capacity does not condition the effect of elections held further back in time, but the relationship between very recent elections and the risk of breakdown does seem to be conditioned by administrative capacity. This relationship disappears when a control for protests is included indicating that the means through which administrative capacity affects the risk of breakdown following elections is perhaps by reducing the likelihood of facing protests. In the following sub-section, the robustness of results to alternative operationalizations of the core variables is assessed before I move on to investigate the conditioning effect of coercive capacity.

Robustness checks: Alternative operationalizations of administrative capacity and regime breakdown

The above analyses show that administrative capacity proxied by tax extraction rates conditions the effect of elections held within the past five years, as well as in the prior year if the control for protest levels is excluded. Chapter 5 discussed the choice of tax extraction rate as the best available measure for administrative capacity. But to test the robustness of the findings, I rerun analyses with a measure of tax extraction adjusted for expected tax extraction, called relative political extraction, as well as a non-tax based measure of administrative capacity, namely an indicator of bureaucratic quality (data from Political Risk Services 2013; Kugler and Tammen 2012, the measures are discussed in Chapter 5). The results are reported in Table 6.4.

For bureaucratic quality, the coefficient on the interaction term is – contrary to expectations – positive, but it is also statistically insignificant. Due to limited availability of data on bureaucratic quality, the number of observations is reduced to 231, including only 34 breakdowns, and it is not possible to plot the marginal effects relying on a country-dummy model. Therefore, I am unable to test whether the conditioning relationship is significant for parts of the spectrum in spite of the insignificant interaction term. But it is not surprising that bureaucratic quality does not condition the effect of elections in the same way that tax extraction rates do. First, the indicator of bureaucratic quality among other things captures bureaucratic independence – a factor that should actually reduce the autocrat's ability to abuse the administration to manipulate elections. Second, the drop in observations from 1330 in Table 6.1 to 231 means that the sample is so reduced it can hardly produce a robustness check of the results.

For relative political extraction, however, the sample roughly corresponds to that of Table 6.1. And the coefficient on the interaction term is negative as expected. But it is also insignificant. Again, I turn to a plot of the marginal ef-

fects to assess whether the effect of election changes as relative political extraction increases, in spite of the insignificant coefficient on the interaction term. Figure 6.6 reveals that there is an interaction effect: the negative marginal effect – that is, the difference in breakdown propensity between electoral and non-electoral regimes – increases as relative political extraction increases, and the effect is significant for levels of relative political extraction between 0.7 and 2.4, corresponding roughly to the top-70% of the sample. Furthermore, the marginal effects are even greater than when administrative capacity is proxied by the tax-to-GDP ratio. Whereas an electoral regime at the 75th percentile of administrative capacity proxied by the tax-to-GDP ratio was 8 percentage points less likely to break down than a non-electoral one (see Figure 6.3), the difference is almost 13 percentage points for an electoral regime at the 75th percentile of relative political extraction. The conclusions are thus robust to applying an adjusted tax measure to gauge administrative capacity, but not to an indicator of bureaucratic quality.

Table 6.4: Multi-party elections, relative political extraction, bureaucratic quality, and regime breakdown

	1	2
Multi-party election	-0.092 (0.872)	-2.560 (3.119)
Relative political extraction	0.656 (0.911)	
Multi-party election* Relative political extraction	-1.043 (0.941)	
Bureaucratic quality		-2.793* (1.625)
Multi-party election * Bureaucratic quality		0.407 (1.581)
Log of military spending	0.819** (0.404)	2.399** (1.095)
Economic control (reduced index)	-0.574 (0.805)	-1.825 (2.367)
Log of GDP per capita	-0.007 (1.405)	3.518 (6.276)
GDP growth	-0.044** (0.021)	-0.012 (0.071)
Protest	0.173 (0.131)	0.743*** (0.265)
Observations	1,369	231
Breakdowns	106	34

Note: Based on regime breakdown data from GWF (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a) and election occurrence data from NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012b). Unit of analysis is country-year. Dependent variable is regime breakdown, coded 1 if breakdown occurred once or more in the given year. Explanatory variable is coded 1 if one or more multi-party elections were held during the past 5 years, 0 if not. Bureaucratic quality, military expenditure, and economic control are five year running averages lagged one year. All other covariates except time trends are lagged one year. Polynomials of time and regime duration included but nor reported. Logit model with country fixed effects (*clogit* command in Stata) and robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure 6.6: Marginal effect of elections for different levels of relative political extraction

A: Probability scale

B: Logit scale

Note: Average marginal effects of multi-party elections on likelihood of regime breakdown for various levels of administrative capacity measured as relative political extraction. Graph based on the logit model with fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered on country and all controls included as in Model 1 and 2 of Table 6.4. The country fixed effects are set to zero. Due to problems with generating marginal plots after FE-models in Stata, the plot is based on a regular xtlogit command with country-dummies included.

Finally, I assess the robustness of results against an alternative operationalization of regime breakdown. In Table 6.5, I employ data from the CGV dataset (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010) to identify regime transitions between democracies and autocracies. To capture transitions from one authoritarian regime to the next, I rely on data on irregular leadership change from the Archigos database (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009). The coding procedures are described in Chapter 5. The election variable is also adjusted so that it corresponds to the alternative operationalization of regimes.

This alternative specification is tested in Model 3 of Table 6.5. The coefficient on the interaction term is negative, but it is reduced and statistically insignificant. The results are corroborated in Figure 6.7, which illustrates that the marginal effect of elections, although decreasing as administrative capacity increases, does not change as rapidly across the range of administrative capacity as when breakdown was measured through the GWF data (the slope is less steep than in Figure 6.2) and it is insignificant throughout (Panel B). Thus, relying on an alternative operationalization of regime breakdown, the results do not lend support to H2 and H5.

Table 6.5: Administrative capacity and an alternative operationalization of regime breakdown

	1	2	3
Multi-party election	-0.140	0.127	0.367
	(0.405)	(0.675)	(1.525)
Tax-to-GDP ratio		-0.271	-0.223
		(3.489)	(3.498)
Multiparty-election * Tax-to-GDP ratio			-1.812
			(9.245)
Log of military spending		0.832**	0.837**
		(0.336)	(0.341)
Economic control (reduced index)		-0.107	-0.104
		(0.748)	(0.746)
Log of GDP per capita	-0.806	-2.142*	-2.112*
	(0.611)	(1.267)	(1.251)
GDP growth	-0.010	-0.015	-0.015
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Protest	0.198*	0.255*	0.255*
	(0.119)	(0.132)	(0.132)
Time	0.046	0.118	0.117
	(0.030)	(0.220)	(0.220)
Time squared	-0.001	-0.007	-0.007
	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Time cubed	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regime duration	-0.028	0.094	0.094
	(0.071)	(0.128)	(0.128)
Regime duration squared	0.003	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Regime duration cubed	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	1,813	995	995
Breakdowns	126	80	80

Note: Based on regime- and leader transition data from the CGV dataset (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010) and Archigos (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009) and election occurrence data from NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012b). Unit of analysis is country-year. Dependent variable is regime breakdown, coded 1 if breakdown occurred once or more in the given year. Explanatory variable is coded 1 if one or more multi-party elections were held during the past 5 years, 0 if not. Tax ratio, military expenditure, and economic control are five year running averages lagged one year. All other covariates except time trends are lagged one year. Logit model with country fixed effects (*clogit* command in Stata) and robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Figure 6.7: Marginal effect of elections, alternative operationalization of regime breakdown

A: Probability scale

B: Logit scale

Note: Average marginal effects of multi-party elections on likelihood of regime breakdown (operationalized through the CGV and Archigos data) for various levels of administrative capacity. Graph based on the logit model with fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered on country and all controls included as in Model 3 of Table 6.5. The country fixed effects are set to zero. Due to problems with generating marginal plots after FE-models in Stata, the plot is based on a regular xtlogit command with country-dummies included.

The results are thus not robust to this alternative operationalization of regime breakdown. But there are several issues with the alternative operationalization. These are the reason why the GWF measure was chosen in the first instance and that may also explain the discrepancy in results. First, whereas the GWF data were coded with the intention of capturing changes to the ruling group or in the rules through which the ruling group is appointed, precisely the definition of a regime breakdown employed here, the CGV data do not do so. Rather, it focuses on transitions to democracy. The Archigos data were used in an attempt to identify transitions from one authoritarian regime to the next, but the measure is not precise. A leader might prevail while the rules for allocating power positions change. Or a leader may be ousted in an irregular fashion, for instance in a coup in a military regime, without the constitution of the ruling group or its rules for appointment having changed. Both of these types of cases will be misclassified with the current coding relying on the CGV and Archigos data.

Second, there is no information in the CGV and Archigos datasets that identifies the instances of breakdown that were coded due to an electoral transfer of power as is the case with the GWF data. Thus, some of these cases will be included as cases of authoritarian elections in Table 6.5 – although this problem should not be too common as the CGV dataset adheres more strictly to a minimalist definition of democracy. It is hard to assess the extent

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of the problems, but the alternative measure of regime breakdown is likely less precise than the GWF measure, and this may influence results.

Third, likely due to the more minimalist definition of democracy, there are fewer cases of authoritarianism, and the number of both observations and breakdowns is reduced. Thus, in Model 3 of Table 6.5, there are only 80 breakdowns amongst 995 observations compared to 104 breakdowns and 1330 observations in the original analyses (Table 6.1). In this light, it is not surprising that the confidence intervals widen and the results lose significance.

Thus, while the finding that administrative capacity conditions the effect of authoritarian elections is corroborated when I rely on an adjusted tax measure to proxy administrative capacity, the finding cannot be reproduced with an indicator for bureaucratic quality to capture capacity nor with an alternative measure of regime breakdown. However, in both these cases, the number of data points was also significantly reduced by reliance on the alternative data. If the robustness of the finding that administrative capacity conditions the effect of authoritarian elections on regime stability is to be tested further, new data are needed. For now, H2 and H5 find support when I rely on the best available measures.

Coercive Capacity, Elections, and Regime Breakdown

In addition to the claim that administrative capacity conditions the effect of elections, the theoretical framework also includes two hypotheses on the effect of coercive capacity:

> H3: The effect of authoritarian, multi-party elections on the likelihood of regime breakdown will decrease with higher levels of coercive capacity

> H7: The negative effect of coercive capacity on the likelihood of regime breakdown by elections is higher in regimes where administrative capacity and economic control is low.

Thus, authoritarian regimes may be more likely to stabilize through election if the autocrat disposes over a strong administrative apparatus. But the same may be true for the coercive force. And particularly where administrative capacity is lacking, the coercive apparatus may be the only solution to maintain power through elections. In the following section, I test H3 before proceeding to H7.

Does coercive capacity condition the effect of authoritarian elections? The relationship is investigated in Table 6.6. Models 1-2 are identical to those of Table 6.1 and assess the relationship between multi-party elections and regime breakdown. A control for engagement in interstate war is introduced as an increase in military expenditure or personnel due to war activity is not expected to reflect a stronger coercive apparatus available for domestic repression.[37] As in Table 6.1, the direct effect of elections is insignificant but turns negative and statistically significant when controls for authoritarian capacities are introduced and the sample reduced. The control variables largely perform as expected although only growth has a significant, direct effect on the likelihood of breakdown.

The conditional effect of coercive capacity is tested in Model 3 where the election-dummy is multiplied by coercive capacity, proxied by a five year running average of the logarithm of military expenditures lagged by one year.[38] The direct effect of coercive capacity is the effect of increasing military spending in a non-electoral regime. As was also found in Table 6.1, apparently, strengthening the military increases the risk of breakdown. This finding will be discussed below. First, I turn to the interaction effect of coercive capacity.

Although the interaction effect is insignificant, it is negative as expected. As discussed above, an insignificant coefficient on the interaction term does not rule out interaction effects in non-linear models, and I thus proceed to plotting the marginal effect of elections for the entire interval on coercive capacity in Figure 6.8.[39] The marginal effect of having held an election does decrease when military spending increases, as expected in H3, but only until a certain point, where the marginal effect of elections, contrary to expectations, decreases when military spending increases further. However, for these extreme cases, the marginal effect is not significant. But in spite of the insignificant coefficient on the interaction term, military spending does signifi-

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[37] As coercive capacity is measured as a five year running average of military expenses lagged one year, this is also the case for the war variable.

[38] As for administrative capacity, a five year running average of military expenditure is chosen because the dependent variable captures the holding of elections over a five year period, and I am interested in the level of coercive capacity in place when elections were held.

[39] Interpreting the results in odds ratios is redundant, as the insignificant effect on the probability scale implies that there is no statistically significant effect on the odds ratio scale.

cantly affect the relationship between elections and breakdown for certain levels of military spending.

Table 6.6: Multi-party elections, coercive capacity, and regime breakdown

	1	2	3
Multi-party election	-0.162	-0.789*	0.857
	(0.317)	(0.458)	(3.357)
Log of military spending		1.107***	1.154***
		(0.429)	(0.437)
Multiparty-election * Log of military spending			-0.181
			(0.365)
Tax-to-GDP ratio		-1.638	-1.614
		(3.699)	(3.724)
Economic control (reduced index)		-0.588	-0.578
		(0.810)	(0.807)
Log of GDP per capita	0.168	-0.660	-0.607
	(0.655)	(1.415)	(1.412)
GDP growth	-0.045***	-0.038**	-0.038**
	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Protest	0.152	0.200	0.201
	(0.100)	(0.131)	(0.132)
War	-1.184	-0.757	-0.814
	(1.109)	(1.368)	(1.383)
Time	-0.090*	-0.394**	-0.405**
	(0.048)	(0.187)	(0.189)
Time squared	0.006**	0.013	0.013
	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Time cubed	-0.000*	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regime duration	0.029	0.349***	0.348***
	(0.042)	(0.128)	(0.128)
Regime duration squared	0.001	-0.016**	-0.016**
	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Regime duration cubed	0.000	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	2,398	1,317	1,317
Breakdowns	155	102	102

Note: Based on regime breakdown data from GWF (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a) and election occurrence data from NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012b). Unit of analysis is country-year. Dependent variable is regime breakdown, coded 1 if breakdown occurred once or more in the given year. Explanatory variable is coded 1 if one or more multi-party elections were held during the past 5 years, 0 if not. Tax ratio, military expenditure, economic control, and war are five year running averages lagged one year. All other covariates except time trends are lagged one year. Logit model with country fixed effects (*clogit* command in Stata) and robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. $^* p < 0.10$, $^{**} p < 0.05$, $^{***} p < 0.01$.

Figure 6.8: Marginal effect of elections for different levels of coercive capacity

A: Probability scale

B: Logit scale

C: Distribution of observations across military spending

Note: Panel A-B: Average marginal effects of multi-party elections on likelihood of regime breakdown for various levels of coercive capacity. Graph based on the logit model with fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered on country and all controls included as in Model 3 of Table 6.6. The country fixed effects are set to zero. Due to problems with generating marginal plots after FE-models in Stata, the plot is based on a regular xtlogit command with country-dummies included.
Panel C: Distribution of observations (country-years) across the full range of coercive capacity measured as military expenditures.

At first, the interval appears to be rather small, but Panel C reveals that the interval on the range of military spending for which the marginal effect of elections is significant, covers a substantial part of observations: for military

spending between the 53rd and the 92nd percentile, 39% of the sample, elections are associated with a decreased risk of breakdown compared to not having held an election. And this difference grows as military spending increases. This lends some support to H3. Although the range for which the relationship holds is smaller than for administrative capacity, there is evidence of the expected relationship for 39% of observations. Curiously though, the relationship does not hold for the 8% of observations where the most money was pumped into the military. This finding will be discussed further below.

Robustness checks show that the coefficient of the interaction term remains insignificant when controls for regime type, civil liberties, and executive constraints respectively are included (See Appendix 2, Table 6.c). But again, plots of the marginal effects reveal that the interaction is significant and in the expected direction for parts of the sample (plots not reported). However, this result cannot be reproduced when control for protests is excluded. Here, the marginal effects are reduced and insignificant. This is surprising as the prevention of protests is one of the ways in which coercive capacity is expected to reduce the likelihood of breakdown by election, and excluding the control for protests should thus boost the explanatory power of elections. On the other hand, an increase in protest may also generate an increase in military spending, and this may explain why the relationship changes when the control is excluded,

To test H3 further, the predicted probability of breakdown for an electoral and a non-electoral regime at high and low levels of coercive capacity respectively are compared in Figure 6.9. Interestingly, the interaction effect seems to be driven not by coercive capacity reducing the risk of breakdown for electoral regimes, but rather by elections reducing the heightened risk of breakdown that seems to follow with high military spending. For a regime with military spending at the 5th percentile, the risks of breakdown differ neither statistically nor substantially between electoral and non-electoral regimes. But for high capacity regimes, those with military spending around the 75th percentile, the risk of breakdown is increased for both electoral and non-electoral regimes. However, it is increased much more for non-electoral regimes. Now, the breakdown propensities are significantly lower, both statistically and substantially, for electoral regimes as compared to non-electoral regimes. But these illustrative examples highlight the nature of the interaction relationship: coercive capacity does not lower the risk of breakdown following authoritarian elections as posited in H3. Rather, an electoral regime moving from the 5th to the 75th percentile on military spending would face a breakdown risk that had increased by 9.7 percentage points, a 776% increase. Thus, in spite of the significant marginal effects, the evidence does

not support H3. Rather, for electoral regimes, high military spending is not as strongly associated with breakdown as it is in non-electoral regimes.

Figure 6.9: Predicted probability of breakdown for electoral and non-electoral regimes at high and low levels of coercive capacity

Note: Predicted probability of regime breakdown based on Model 3, Table 6.6. Low coercive capacity corresponds to its 5th percentile of military spending for the sample of model 3, Table 6.6. High coercive capacity corresponds to the 75th percentile. All covariates are held at their observed values.

The results thus indicate that although there is some evidence for the importance of coercive capacity as a conditioning factor, there is no evidence that higher levels of coercive capacity, proxied by military spending, decrease the likelihood of breakdown by election – quite the contrary. On this background, H3 is rejected. In other words, it could be the strength of Singapore's bureaucracy rather than its coercive apparatus that helps sustain the regime through its multi-party elections.

Alternative operationalizations of coercive capacity and regime breakdown

The analyses have revealed a number of apparently counterintuitive findings: military spending has a positive, direct effect on breakdown in Models 2 and 3 of Table 6.6. Autocrats that have spent more resources on the coercive apparatus over the past five years are more likely to experience breakdown independent of holding elections. This same effect was visible in the plots of predicted breakdown probabilities in Figure 6.9: As military spending increases, so does the risk of breakdown, although less so for electoral regimes.

Furthermore, although insignificant, the marginal effect of holding elections approaches zero for regimes with very high military spending.

This evidence points to a rejection of H3. However, the results not only run contrary to theoretical expectations but also to the existing literature. Previous studies have argued that a strong coercive apparatus stabilizes authoritarian regimes (Bellin 2012; Andersen et al. 2014) and that high levels of repression prevent democratization (Albertus and Menaldo 2012). Thus, it is worth discussing whether military spending is a valid proxy for coercive capacity. There are two reasons why it may not be, and these could perhaps explain the counterintuitive findings. First, the military is just one of many possible arms of an autocrat's coercive apparatus. Measures relating to military capacity may thus not accurately proxy coercive capacity as they leave out the power of the police, para-military forces, private militias, etc. This would explain why the negative conditioning effect of military spending on the relationship between elections and breakdown was found to be limited. I will return to this point in the conclusion as well as in the case studies.

However, the imperfect measure cannot account for the direct, positive effect found in Model 2 and 3 of Table 6.6. Rather, another dynamic may be at play. It is possible that some authoritarian leaders pump money into the military, either to strengthen it against internal threats or as a coup-proofing strategy (Quinlivan 1999), not preventively to avoid being in the risk zone but only when they already feel threatened. Thus, in his role as president of a country previously plagued by military coups and public protests, and amidst dropping popularity rates and soaring inflation, Venezuelan president Maduro in October 2014 announced a 45% pay raise for the armed forces ("Venezuela to Raise Minimum Wage" 2014). An analyst at a consulting firm stressed that "as the economy continues to deteriorate, so will the political and security situation and the armed forces will be key in deciding the outcome" ("New Cars for the Army as Venezuelans Line Up for Food" 2014). Thus, according to this logic, military spending would actually increase with the dictator's perceived risk of regime breakdown, and this could lead to a positive correlation between military spending and breakdown. This dynamic may explain the apparent positive effect of military expenditure on regime breakdown displayed in models 2 and 3 of Table 6.6 and perhaps also the change in the marginal effect of holding elections for regimes with very high military spending.

To take this potential confounding effect into account, I run the analyses with the logarithm of military personnel rather than spending as the conditioning variable. When dictators feel threatened, they are more likely to increase military spending, whether to buy off soldiers or to strengthen the

forces, than to allow a greater part of the population into the military. If military spending is expected to increase with dictators' threat perceptions, but military personnel should not necessarily increase in spite of a heightened threat against the regime, military personnel may better capture the conditioning effect of coercive capacity on the relationship between elections and breakdown. Indeed, Albertus and Menaldo, when they find that coercive capacity makes a transition to democracy less likely, employ data on military personnel to gauge coercive capacity (2012).

The results are reported in Table 6.7. Indeed, the direct, positive effect of military personnel on breakdown is insignificant. However the coefficient of the interaction term is now positive (though insignificant). A plot of the marginal effects confirms that the effect is insignificant throughout (not reported). Thus, the finding that higher coercive capacity increases the likelihood of breakdown is likely caused by the measure of military spending, which might proxy autocrats' risk perceptions rather than their coercive strength. Increasing levels of military personnel are not associated with higher risks of breakdown. But there is no evidence that coercive capacity, proxied by military personnel, conditions the relationship between elections and regime breakdown. Thus, at least relying on data on military capability, H3 is rejected.[40]

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[40] Operationalizing regime breakdown through the CGV and Archigos datasets does not change this conclusion. Both the coefficient on the interaction term between elections and military personnel and the marginal effects are insignificant throughout. Furthermore, the interaction effect of military spending also turns insignificant, as there is no longer a strong association between high military spending and risk of breakdown (not reported).

Table 6.7: Multi-party elections, military personnel, and regime breakdown

	1	2	3
Multi-party election	-0.162	-0.884*	-1.654
	(0.317)	(0.490)	(2.110)
Log of military personnel		0.294	0.255
		(0.331)	(0.348)
Multiparty-election * Log of military personnel			0.134
			(0.366)
Tax-to-GDP ratio		2.050	2.091
		(3.812)	(3.794)
Economic control (reduced index)		-0.674	-0.666
		(0.841)	(0.840)
Log of GDP per capita	0.168	-0.138	-0.128
	(0.655)	(1.060)	(1.063)
GDP growth	-0.045***	-0.044***	-0.044***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Protest	0.152	0.160	0.162
	(0.100)	(0.119)	(0.118)
War	-1.184	-0.897	-0.909
	(1.109)	(1.237)	(1.231)
Time	-0.090*	-0.379**	-0.378**
	(0.048)	(0.183)	(0.183)
Time squared	0.006**	0.018**	0.018**
	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Time cubed	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regime duration	0.029	0.230**	0.231**
	(0.042)	(0.112)	(0.112)
Regime duration squared	0.001	-0.012*	-0.012*
	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Regime duration cubed	0.000	0.000**	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	2,398	1,453	1,453
Breakdowns	155	109	109

Note: Based on regime breakdown data from GWF (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a) and election occurrence data from NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012b). Unit of analysis is country-year. Dependent variable is regime breakdown, coded 1 if breakdown occurred once or more in the given year. Explanatory variable is coded 1 if one or more multi-party elections were held during the past 5 years, 0 if not. Tax ratio, military personnel, economic control, and war are five year running averages lagged one year. All other covariates except time trends are lagged one year. Logit model with country fixed effects (*clogit* command in Stata) and robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Long- and short-term effects

The analyses have rejected the hypothesis that coercive capacity conditions the effect of elections held within the past five years. But the theoretical apparatus lends importance to the coercive apparatus not just as a source of soft repression during the election campaign but also – and perhaps in particular – as a force that can put down, or preferably prevent, post-electoral protests. The Chinese military's brutal suppression of the protesters in Tiananmen Square in June 1989 represents one such incidence. While the Chinese military's clamp-down on civilians was unrelated to electoral dynamics, post-electoral protests elsewhere, such as those following the Cambodian elections of 2013, have also caused dictators to revert to repression by the armed forces (Thul 2013).

But using the military as an emergency measure against electoral protests should affect stability positively only in the short term – right after the holding of elections. Although the violent strategy may buy an incumbent victory in one or two elections it should have adverse effects, potentially leaving the regime less stable in the longer run (Bellin 2004). In the statistical tests, I do not measure whether elections that are won by relying primarily on the coercive apparatus have adverse effects on stabilization in the longer run. But such effects could cancel out a potential effect of coercive capacity on regime stability through elections in the short run thus explaining the insignificant interaction effects in Tables 6.6-6.7.

The effect of elections held within the past year conditioned by military expenditure and military personnel, respectively, are therefore estimated in Table 6.8 Model 1-2. In both cases, the coefficient on the interaction terms is positive but insignificant. But plotting the effect, it turns out that the positive coefficient on the interaction term is a product of a sharp increase in the marginal effect of holding elections for very high levels of military capacity (see Figure 6.10, only the plot for military expenditure is reported).

Table 6.8: Multi-party elections and coercive capacity, short- and long-term effects

	Election during year		Election during past 7 years	
	1	2	3	4
Multi-party election	-4.330	-3.712	-2.130	-2.762
	(3.462)	(2.489)	(3.725)	(2.574)
Log of military expenditures per capita	0.505*		0.742*	
	(0.283)		(0.379)	
Multiparty-election * military expenditures	0.410		0.229	
	(0.369)		(0.399)	
Log of military personnel per capita		0.108		-0.062
		(0.312)		(0.315)
Multiparty-election * military personnel		0.551		0.449
		(0.424)		(0.433)
Tax-to-GDP ratio	1.444	1.956	-2.567	2.647
	(2.310)	(2.246)	(5.250)	(4.648)
Economic Control (reduced index)	-0.507	-0.468	-0.621	-0.557
	(0.437)	(0.460)	(1.054)	(1.000)
Log of GDP per capita	-0.923	-0.676	0.185	0.068
	(1.046)	(0.854)	(1.538)	(1.016)
GDP growth	-0.034**	-0.038***	-0.047**	-0.047***
	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.016)
Protest	0.230	0.183*	0.135	0.140
	(0.141)	(0.110)	(0.133)	(0.119)
War	-0.152	-0.285	-1.524	-1.920
	(0.729)	(0.726)	(1.370)	(1.191)
Time	-0.105	-0.071	-0.346	-0.309
	(0.111)	(0.113)	(0.256)	(0.247)
Time squared	0.005	0.006	0.013	0.016
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Time cubed	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regime duration	0.182**	0.166**	0.299***	0.181*
	(0.076)	(0.073)	(0.116)	(0.100)
Regime duration squared	-0.008*	-0.008**	-0.014**	-0.010
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Regime duration cubed	0.000**	0.000**	0.000***	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	1,571	1,592	1,236	1,390
Breakdowns	113	116	93	103

Note: Based on regime breakdown data from GWF (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a) and election occurrence data from NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012b). Unit of analysis is country-year. Dependent variable in all models is regime breakdown, coded 1 if breakdown occurred once or more in the given year. Explanatory variable is multi-party election coded 1 if the regime held a multi-party election in the given year (models 1-2), or in the past seven years (models 3-4). Military expenditure, military personnel, tax ratio, economic control, and war are lagged one year in model 1-2, and are seven year running averages lagged one year in models 3-4. All other covariates except time trends are lagged one year.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

As discussed above, if autocrats do indeed tend to increase their military spending when they are on the verge of breaking down, this could perhaps explain this finding. However, for these levels of military capacity, the interaction effect is insignificant. In fact, the effect is only significant for different levels of military expenditure, not for military personnel, and furthermore, it is only significant for medium-low levels of spending. Thus, for countries ranked from the 9th-50th percentile on military spending, having held an election within the past year is significantly and negatively associated with breakdown. But as was also found above, this effect largely stems from increased military spending being associated with an increased risk of breakdown. Thus, there is no evidence of a short term conditioning effect of coercive capacity either.

Figure 6.10: Marginal effect of elections for different levels of coercive capacity, short-term effects

A: Military expenditure, probability scale   B: Military expenditure, logit scale

Note: Average marginal effect of multi-party elections on the likelihood of regime breakdown for various levels of coercive capacity measured as military spending. Graph based on the logit model with fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered on country and all controls included as in Table 6.7, Model 3. The country fixed effects are set to zero. All covariates are held at their observed values. Due to problems with generating marginal plots after FE-models in Stata, the plot is based on a regular xtlogit command with country-dummies included.

In model 3-4, the same test is performed focusing on the effect of having held an election within the past seven years. Again, the coefficients on the interaction terms are positive and insignificant, and plots reveal that the marginal effect is insignificant throughout (not reported). Again, as the seven-year effect was expected to be weaker than the effect playing out over five years, this is not surprising. But since there was no evidence of a strong effect in the short term either, the analyses do not point to an adverse long-

term effect of relying on coercive capacity cancelling out a potential, short-term stabilizing effect.

Does coercive capacity only have an effect where administrative capacity and economic control is limited?

There is no evidence of coercive capacity increasing the stabilizing effect of elections. Could it be that the conditioning effect of coercive capacity is limited because the coercive apparatus is primarily employed by dictators who do not dominate the economy or control a strong bureaucracy? Perhaps autocrats refrain from relying on their coercive power unless they have no other options? H7 proposes that the effect of coercive capacity should be stronger, the lower the level of the other authoritarian capacities. In other words, we might not necessarily expect coercive capacity to matter for stability following elections in a country such as Singapore, where the ruling party has other means to control elections. But authoritarian leaders in countries such as the DRC may be more likely to rely on the coercive apparatus both before and after elections.

To test this hypothesis, a third order interaction term is modelled between first coercive capacity, administrative capacity, and elections in Table 6.9, Model 1, and then between coercive capacity, economic control, and elections in Model 2. In both cases, the coefficients on the third order interactions are insignificant. At first glance, the levels of administrative capacity and economic control do not significantly change the relationship between elections, breakdown, and coercive capacity. For instance, the negative coefficient on the second order interaction term between military spending and elections (Model 1) indicates that when coercive capacity increases, the direct, positive effect of elections on the likelihood of breakdown decreases as demonstrated in Table 6.6 and Figure 6.8 (although, as above, this would need to be plotted in order to be verified). But the difference is insignificant. The positive coefficient on the third order interaction term between elections, coercive capacity, and the tax ratio, which is greater than the coefficient on the second order term, then implies that as the tax ratio increases from zero, the effect of coercive capacity on the relationship between elections and the likelihood of breakdown increases and is no longer negative.

Table 6.9: The effect of coercive capacity where other capacities are limited

|	(1)	(2)
Multi-party election	2.411	-0.140
	(7.003)	(3.188)
Log of military spending	0.456	1.128**
	(0.644)	(0.445)
Election*Military spending	-0.189	-0.076
	(0.756)	(0.350)
Tax ratio	-42.809	-1.381
	(34.623)	(3.447)
Election * Tax-to-GDP ratio	-26.022	
	(52.622)	
Military spending * Tax-to-GDP ratio	4.895	
	(4.154)	
Election*Military spending*Tax-to-GDP ratio	1.363	
	(5.542)	
Economic control	-0.557	-1.062
	(0.716)	(4.731)
Election*economic control		-2.304
		(7.979)
Military spending*Economic control		0.078
		(0.591)
Election*Military spending*Economic control		0.169
		(0.871)
Log of GDP per capita	-0.539	-0.631
	(1.502)	(1.513)
GDP growth	-0.039*	-0.038**
	(0.021)	(0.018)
Protest	0.215	0.193
	(0.131)	(0.132)
War	-0.921	-0.842
	(1.495)	(1.418)
Observations	1,317	1,317
Breakdowns	102	102

Note: Based on regime breakdown data from GWF (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a) and election occurrence data from NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012b). Dependent variable is regime breakdown, coded 1 if breakdown occurred once or more in the given year. Explanatory variable is coded 1 if one or more multi-party elections were held during the past 5 years, 0 if not. Tax ratio, military spending, and economic control are five year running averages lagged one year. All other covariates except time trends are lagged one year. Polynomials of time and regime duration are included but not reported. Logit model with country fixed effects (*clogit* command in Stata) and robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure 6.11: Marginal effect of elections across coercive capacity when other capacities are low

Administrative capacity and economic control at 10th percentile

A: Probability scale

B: Logit scale

Administrative capacity and economic control at 75th percentile

C: Probability scale

D: Logit scale

Note: Average marginal effect of multi-party elections on the likelihood of regime breakdown for various levels of coercive capacity measured as military spending while administrative capacity and economic control are fixed at the 10th percentile in Panels A-B and the 75th percentile in Panels C-D. Graph based on the logit model with fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered on country and all controls included as in Table 6.6, Model 3. The country fixed effects are set to zero. All remaining covariates are held at their observed values. Due to problems with generating marginal plots after FE-models in Stata, the plot is based on a regular xtlogit command with country-dummies included.

This implies that higher levels of administrative capacity do indeed seem to result in a limited effect of coercive capacity. However, the effect is again insignificant. The same is the case in Model 2, where economic control is introduced instead of administrative capacity but again, the effect is insignificant. There is thus no immediate evidence of a conditioning effect of coercive ca-

pacity for low levels of administrative capacity or economic control. But to rule out a significant conditioning effect, the relationship needs to be plotted.

Graphically illustrating a third order interaction effect in an LDV model is notoriously difficult. To further test H7, Figure 6.11, Panel A-B, instead plots the marginal effect of holding elections for various levels of coercive capacity, measured as military spending, while administrative capacity and economic control are held at the 10th percentile. Again, the marginal effects are significant for parts of the spectrum. Countries falling from the 33th-95th percentile of military spending are more likely to break down if they have held an election within the past five years than are countries that have not held a recent election. And again, this relationship becomes stronger as military spending increases. But as was also the case above, this finding is driven by the increased risk of breakdown associated with higher military spending (predicted probability plot not reported).

Compare this to Panel C-D, which plot the same effect when administrative capacity and economic control are instead held at their 90th percentile. The conditioning effect of coercive capacity is still negative and significant for the same interval, and the marginal effects associated with holding elections do not change. More importantly, neither does the change to the risk of breakdown following elections when coercive capacity increases. Thus, the figure illustrates that the effect of increasing coercive capacity on the marginal effect of elections is largely the same whether the other capacities available to rulers are low or high. There is no evidence that coercive capacity becomes more important where administrative capacity and control over the economy are lacking, and H7 is thus rejected. In other words, there is no evidence that a strong military is more important to boost regime stability following elections in regimes with low levels of administrative capacity such as Congo DRC or Myanmar than in high capacity cases such as Singapore.

However, it remains possible that such findings are an artefact of the available measures of coercive capacity. Although the military has indeed been employed against – or failed to clamp down on – post-electoral protests in countries as different as Georgia, the Philippines, and Cambodia, it is clear that other arms of the coercive apparatus are likely to have a tremendous effects. Returning to the example of Venezuela, although the army is boosted with pay rises in times of crisis, late President Chavez also made a point of stressing that, should the army dessert him, he had a loyal, private militia numbering hundreds of thousands of men and women to which he might turn (Romero 2010). The case study in Chapter 9 investigates the role of other arms of the coercive force, including the police, youth militias, and

war veterans, in Zimbabwean elections. The case study thus nuances the quantitative (non-)findings that are limited to the effect of military capacity.

Conclusion

In Chapter 4, I pointed to the markedly different contexts in which authoritarian elections take place and suggested that perhaps the paradox of authoritarian elections is not so paradoxical after all. The analyses in this chapter have lent credence to this argument. I have presented quantitative evidence that administrative capacity conditions the effect of multi-party elections on the likelihood of authoritarian regime breakdown. In regimes where tax extraction rates are above 0.10, corresponding to the top 65% of the sample, holding elections decreases the likelihood of breakdown and more so the more tax extraction rates increase. The same relationship is not found when I analyze the effect of elections held in the prior year or within the past seven years, which indicates that on one hand, the effect of elections is not immediate, and on the other hand, the effect of elections also wears out over the years. However, there is a smaller interaction effect of administrative capacity for elections held within the past year if control for protests is excluded, perhaps indicating that the limited effect of elections on regime stability in the short term works through a reduction in the level of protests which may be partly achieved through an efficient and loyal administrative apparatus.

The relationship is not driven by fluctuations in wealth, growth, or control over the economy, nor by political conflicts, prior levels of liberalization, authoritarian regime type, changes to the international environment, or the age of the regime. The results are insignificant when I rely on bureaucratic quality as an alternative proxy for administrative capacity and when I employ alternative data to gauge authoritarian regime breakdowns. This may be explained by issues with the alternative operationalizations – neither the data on bureaucratic quality nor the alternative data on regime breakdown capture the concepts as neatly as the original measures – or by the reduced samples resulting from the alternative data. The results are robust to proxying administrative capacity by an adjusted taxation measure and to the inclusion of imputed tax data for the post-Communist countries.

The relationship between administrative capacity, proxied by tax extraction rates, elections, and regime breakdown corroborates the theoretical claims of Chapter 4. There is evidence that the variation in the effect of elections that has puzzled the literature on electoral authoritarianism can be explained when administrative capacity is taken into account. However,

whereas one arm of the state, the administrative, seems to influence the effect of elections, no such effect of the coercive arm of the state was found.

Operationalizing coercive capacity as military spending yields a significant interaction effect. But this effect is driven by the association between high military spending and an increased risk of breakdown. Thus, coercive capacity, proxied by military spending, does not reduce the risk of breakdown by elections – it increases it. The interaction is driven by the fact that this positive relationship between military spending and breakdown for some reason is less strong in electoral regimes. Proxied by military personnel instead of overall spending, coercive capacity has no such direct effect on the risk of breakdown. But the effect on the relationship between breakdown and elections held within the past five years also turns insignificant. Thus, there is no evidence that coercive capacity, proxied by measures on military capacity, conditions the effect of elections. The rejection of H3 is robust to the inclusion of alternative controls, to different operationalizations of key variables, and to exploring the effect of elections over various time horizons.

Returning to the example of Singapore, given its high levels of administrative capacity (a tax-to-GDP ratio averaging 0.18 in the past decade), it is unsurprising that Singapore remains stable in the face of regular, authoritarian, multi-party elections.[41] In fact, based on the results presented here, were Singapore to experience a significant blow to its administrative apparatus (without a corresponding increase in levels of economic control), resulting in a markedly lower extractive capacity, the regime would be more likely to destabilize following the holding of elections. On the other hand, if Singapore were to continue with similar levels of administrative capacity but abandon elections, this would also be expected to increase the likelihood of regime breakdown. But there is no evidence from the quantitative studies that Singapore's coercive capacity would also have contributed to this regime-stabilizing effect of elections.

That coercive capacity does not reduce the risk of breakdown by elections is perhaps not surprising in cases such as Singapore, where the rulers can rely on other capacities to control elections. But based on the quantitative findings, there was no evidence of a conditioning effect of coercive capacity at low levels of administrative capacity or economic control either. H7,

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[41] Note, however, that highly stable countries such as Singapore are not driving results. In fact, such countries are not included in the analyses, as the fixed effect estimators are based on changes in key variables and thus exclude countries that do not experience breakdown.

implying that coercive capacity would have a stronger conditioning effect on elections when other capacities were lacking was also rejected.

Yet two questions remain. First, an important caveat to the rejection of H3 and H7 is the available measures of coercive capacity. These only include the army. Thus, it remains possible that a more full proxy for coercive capacity, including information on police, paramilitary forces and private militias, would yield different results. Second, the analyses have demonstrated a general pattern linking administrative capacity to authoritarian regime stability. But the question remains whether it is indeed a capable bureaucracy that allows authoritarian leaders in cases such as Singapore to control elections through the various strategies spelled out in Chapter 4. Does administrative capacity allow autocrats to rely on more subtle measures of electoral manipulation? And do these strategies ensure legitimacy and elite loyalty while preventing opposition mobilization and mass-protests? The case studies in Chapter 8 and 9 focus on these two issues. The main purpose is to assess the degree to which selected, typical cases conform to the patterns laid out in the theoretical framework. But they also contribute to nuancing the findings on coercive capacity. By focusing on the two most recent elections in Zimbabwe, Chapter 9 analyzes a case where both the military and the non-military arms of the coercive force have played an important role in elections. But before the dissertation turns to the underlying mechanisms of the conditioning relationships, Chapter 7 analyzes the effect of economic control.

Chapter 7.
Economic Control and the Effect of Elections in Authoritarian Regimes

From 1929 to 2000, the leadership of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in authoritarian Mexico held regular elections without experiencing a transfer of power. The PRI repeatedly acquired more than 60% of votes until the opposition started gaining ground in the 1980s. To uphold electoral dominance, the ruling party pursued a number of strategies. Informal patron-client relationships pervaded politics and candidates delivered infrastructure and electricity to neighborhoods in return for votes (Camp 1990; Langston and Morgenstern 2009). Early state-supported programs, including food stores and infrastructure development, were targeted at potential areas of insurgency to divert support from opposition movements to the PRI (Fox 1994). Loyalists were given jobs in the large bureaucracy – and were in turn expected to work for the party (Greene 2007, 98). Government resources were employed in ruling party campaigns and when the PRI's popularity declined following the economic crisis of the early 1980s, the state-sponsored poverty relief program, PRONASOL, was targeted at potential swing states to avoid defection to the opposition and removed from opposition-supporting districts (Cornelius and Craig 1991; Magaloni 2006, chap. 4).

What these strategies have in common is their foundation in the ruling party's economic monopoly, built up through years of dominating the system. In the early 1980s, state-owned enterprises accounted for almost a quarter of GDP and the federal government employed more than three million people (Greene 2007, 101–103; Magaloni 2006; Camp 1990). This chapter asks whether this dynamic of sustaining power by winning elections through economic domination extends beyond the Mexican case. Does economic control condition the relationship between elections and authoritarian regime breakdown?

The previous chapter demonstrated that conditioned on administrative capacity, measured as the ability to collect taxes, elections have a significant effect on regime breakdown. The more administrative capacity increases, the more likely are authoritarian regimes to remain stable following an election. However, coercive capacity does not increase the likelihood of stability following an election. Here, I first conduct similar statistical analyses but condition the effect of elections on various measures of economic control. Sec-

ond, I estimate the effect of elections in authoritarian regimes that are low on all types of capacities.

Testing the Effect of Economic Control

This chapter tests Hypotheses 4 and 6 on the relationship between elections, economic control, and regime breakdown and Hypothesis 8 on the role of elections in regimes where rulers are low on all capacities. To recap,

> H4: The effect of authoritarian multi-party elections on the likelihood of regime breakdown will decrease with higher degrees of incumbent control over the economy.

> H6: The effect of authoritarian multi-party elections on regime breakdown will be negative for high levels of economic control irrespective of administrative and coercive capacity.

> H8: The effect of authoritarian multi-party elections on regime breakdown will be positive when levels of administrative capacity, coercive capacity, and economic control are all low.

Economic control is defined as the rulers' domination of economic resources including mineral revenues, land, and employment opportunities and measured through three subcomponents: the size of the public sector, regulation of private business, and income from natural resources. An additive index of these three dimensions should capture the autocrat's overall control over the economy. In the following assessment of the relationship between the degree of incumbent control over the economy, elections, and regime breakdown, I rely both on simple measures of economic control, represented by one or two of the dimensions, as well as the full index.

The potential sources of bias discussed in the previous chapter also apply here. I take the same precautions in this chapter as in the previous. By relying on fixed effects estimators, the effect is estimated based on changes to the autocrat's control over the economy within countries over time rather than the variation in economic control between countries. All models, unless otherwise stated, are logistical regression models with fixed effects estimators and robust standard errors clustered on country. The same control variables as in previous analyses are included, namely wealth, growth, changes in level of political unrest, time trends and regime age (including its squared and cubed expression). Selected models also exclude the control for protest and include controls for prior levels of democratization, the Cold War period, and authoritarian regime type.

Does economic control condition the effect of authoritarian elections?

If the mechanisms presented in the theoretical framework – drawing on extensive case studies of the role of economic dominance in electoral authoritarian regimes – hold, economic control should condition the relationship between elections and the likelihood of breakdown in authoritarian regimes. Some regimes may be more likely to stabilize through elections because the rulers can rely on an effective administrative apparatus to control numerous aspects of elections (e.g. Singapore), but other ruling coalitions may supplement, or possibly substitute, such administrative effectiveness with economic dominance, as was the case to a large extent in 20th century Mexico. To test H4 – that the likelihood of breakdown following an authoritarian election will decrease with higher levels of control over the economy – I employ the same dataset as in Chapter 6. As coverage is more limited for indicators on economic control, the analyses roughly cover the period 1970-2006, but for some countries, data on regulation are only available at a much later date.

To estimate the conditional effect of economic control, I multiply the index of economic control and an indicator for multi-party elections in Table 7.1. The election dummy indicates whether one or more multi-party elections were held within the previous five years, and the index of economic control is a five-year running average lagged one year. All controls except time and age variables are lagged one year.

Model 1 (similar to that of Table 6.1) repeats the finding that multi-party elections hold no direct effect on breakdown. Model 2 adds the capacities available to the ruling group, but in contrast to the analyses in the previous chapter, Model 2 of Table 7.1 introduces the full index of economic control, for which data are only available after 1970 and for most authoritarian regimes even later than that. Accordingly, the number of observations drops from 2,549 to 775.[42] As in Table 6.1, the direct effect of elections is negative and turns significant when controls for the capacities available to rulers are included. Controlling for administrative capacity, coercive capacity, and control over the economy, having held a multi-party election within the past five years reduces the likelihood that the regime will break down. The direct effect of economic control on the likelihood of breakdown is positive but insignificant.

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[42] The results in Model 1 remain substantially unchanged when reducing the sample to that of Models 2 and 3 (not reported).

Although insignificant, this positive effect is intriguing. The existing literature has demonstrated a direct, negative effect of various aspects of economic control on authoritarian regime developments. Perhaps due to the difficulties of measuring other aspects of economic control, most quantitative studies have centered on the effect of generating rents from natural resources or other types of "windfall" including foreign aid. For instance, non-tax based revenue, including revenue from natural resources, has been shown to stabilize authoritarian regimes (Morrison 2009). But case studies have also explored other aspects of economic control, such as for instance McMann's study arguing that economic autonomy – the antithesis of economic control, exemplified by citizens' ability to make a living independent of the rulers – contributes to democratization on the sub-national level in Russia and Kyrgyzstan (McMann 2006). Like McMann, however, most studies focus on the likelihood of democratization, and oil revenue in particular has been highlighted as inhibitive of democratization (Ross 2012). That resources prevent democratization, however, does not necessarily imply that they reduce the risk of the regime breaking down. Furthermore, natural resource rents are also linked to a greater likelihood of experiencing civil war – an aspect of regime breakdown (Ross 2006). Thus, although a direct, negative effect of economic control on the likelihood of regime breakdown is expected, other factors, such as the relationship between resource rents and conflict, may explain why this general pattern is not reproduced here. Below, I explore this further, as I disaggregate the economic control index and test the effect of each subcomponent individually.

First, I turn to H4 and test the conditional effect of economic control. Model 3 includes an interaction term between elections and economic control. The negative but insignificant coefficient on elections estimates the effect of elections when economic control is 0 (roughly its average). The positive and insignificant coefficient on economic control is the effect of an increase in economic control for non-electoral regimes. Finally, the coefficient on the interaction term between elections and economic control is negative and significant at the 0.1 level, indicating that there may indeed be an interaction effect of economic control.[43] This finding lends initial support to H4. But as discussed in the previous chapter, an interactive relationship cannot be interpreted directly from the coefficient of a logistic regression when it is estimated on the probability scale.

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[43] Running Model 3 with year dummies rather than the time trends, the coefficient on the interaction term remains significant and increases.

Table 7.1: Multi-party elections, economic control, and regime breakdown

	1 (Pr)	2 (Pr)	3 (Pr)	4 (OR)
Multi-party election	-0.168 (0.318)	-1.638* (0.912)	-1.654 (1.043)	0.191 (0.110)
Economic control		1.210 (1.287)	1.931 (1.372)	6.893 (9.460)
Multi-party election* Economic control			-2.416* (1.440)	0.089* (0.129)
Tax-to-GDP ratio		-4.181 (2.545)	-4.219 (2.832)	0.015 (0.042)
Log of military spending		1.712*** (0.570)	1.639*** (0.624)	5.149*** (3.212)
Log of GDP per capita	-0.035 (0.575)	1.630 (2.340)	1.559 (2.322)	4.752 (11.032)
GDP growth	-0.039** (0.015)	-0.058* (0.030)	-0.057* (0.030)	0.945* (0.028)
Protest	0.166 (0.105)	0.304 (0.229)	0.257 (0.218)	1.293 (0.282)
Time	-0.043 (0.027)	-1.928* (1.168)	-1.979 (1.241)	0.138 (0.172)
Time squared	0.004** (0.002)	0.068* (0.040)	0.070* (0.042)	1.073* (0.045)
Time cubed	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.001* (0.000)	-0.001* (0.000)	0.999* (0.000)
Regime duration	0.016 (0.039)	0.291** (0.148)	0.355** (0.175)	1.426** (0.250)
Regime duration squared	0.001 (0.001)	-0.013 (0.008)	-0.015* (0.009)	0.985* (0.009)
Regime duration cubed	0.000 (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	1.000** (0.000)
Observations	2,549	775	775	775
Breakdowns	161	63	63	63

Note: Based on regime breakdown data from GWF (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a) and election occurrence data from NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012b). Unit of analysis is country-year. Dependent variable is regime breakdown, coded 1 if breakdown occurred once or more in the given year. Explanatory variable is coded 1 if one or more multi-party elections were held during the past five years, 0 if not. Tax ratio, military expenditure, and economic control are five-year running averages lagged one year. All other covariates except time trends are lagged one year. Logit model with country fixed effects (*clogit* command in Stata) and robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Instead, Model 4 presents the effect in terms of odds ratio. The odds ratio on the election variable indicates that for a regime with levels of economic control of 0 (very close to the average), having held an election within the past

five years decreases the odds of breakdown by 0.191, but this effect is statistically insignificant. The odds ratio on the interaction term of 0.089 indicates that if economic control were to increase, however, the odds of breakdown for electoral regimes would decrease further (compared to those for non-electoral regimes), and this change is statistically significant. Thus, in support of H4, there is evidence of a significant conditioning effect of economic control.

To further test H4 and to ease the interpretation of the interaction effect, I proceed to plot the marginal effect of having held an election within the past five years for various levels of economic control. This also serves as a test of the more specific H6: that elections held under high levels of economic control are more likely to contribute to stability regardless of the level of the other authoritarian capacities.

The marginal effect of having held an election within the past five years (as opposed to no elections) for various levels of economic control is plotted in Figure 7.1. The figure builds on Model 3 of Table 7.1. It illustrates how the effect of having held an election changes when levels of economic control increase (Panel A). For low levels of economic control, being an electoral regime is associated with a greater risk of breakdown than being non-electoral, but this marginal effect is insignificant (confidence intervals from the plot on the logit scale, Panel B). For higher levels of economic control, the marginal effect changes and becomes significant. For levels of economic control above 0.10, corresponding to the top 60% of the sample, having elections reduces the risk of breakdown, and this effect is statistically significant. At these levels of economic control, elections reduce the likelihood of breakdown – and more so the more economic control increases. This group includes countries such as Kenya in the 1990s, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates. The results thus indicate that for a non-electoral regime at the 75th percentile (a score of 0.52 on the index of economic control), such as Syria before the ongoing civil war, introducing elections would – all else equal – reduce the likelihood of breakdown by 12 percentage points.

Figure 7.1: Marginal effect of elections for different levels of economic control

A: Probability scale

B: Logit scale

C: Distribution of observations across economic control index

Note: Panels A and B: Average marginal effects of multi-party elections on likelihood of regime breakdown for various levels of economic control. Based on the logit model with fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered on country and all controls included, as in Model 3 of Table 7.1. The country fixed effects are set to 0. All covariates are held at their observed values. Due to problems with generating marginal plots after FE-models in Stata, the plot is based on a regular xtlogit command with country dummies included. Panel C: Distribution of observations (country-years) across the full range of economic control.

The marginal effect captures the difference in breakdown risks for electoral versus non-electoral regimes. But how will an increase in economic control affect an electoral authoritarian regime? The predicted probability of breakdown for an electoral and a non-electoral regime at high and low levels of economic control respectively is illustrated in Figure 7.2. As was also the case for the interaction effect between coercive capacity and elections, it is evident that the interaction effect between elections and economic control is partly driven by the peculiar, positive direct effect of economic control: In non-electoral regimes, greater degrees of economic control are associated with a substantially and statistically significant increase in the risk of breakdown. A non-electoral regime, in which the rulers were to increase their levels of economic control from the 10th to the 90th percentile, corresponding to a change from the levels of Kenya in the 1970s to those of Russia in the 1990s, would also see an increase in the risk of breaking down from 5.1% to 28%. This effect matches the positive yet insignificant direct effect of economic control found above for both electoral and non-electoral regimes and will be discussed further below.

Figure 7.2: Predicted probability of breakdown for electoral and non-electoral regimes at low and high levels of economic control

Note: Predicted probability of regime breakdown based on Model 3, Table 7.1. Low economic control is a score of -0.66, corresponding to the 10th percentile for the sample of Model 3, Table 7.1. High economic control is a score of 0.73, corresponding to the 90th percentile. All covariates are held at their observed values.

However, in contrast to the results for coercive capacity in Chapter 6, where an increase in coercive capacity was never associated with a reduction in the risk of breakdown, economic control does condition the effect of elec-

tions on breakdown negatively. While increasing economic control raises the risk of regime breakdown for non-electoral regimes, it reduces it for electoral autocracies. This corresponds to the theoretical expectations, arguing that economic control serves a special purpose in the context of authoritarian elections (although the theoretical apparatus cannot explain why the effect of economic control on regime breakdown is positive in non-electoral regimes). An electoral regime in which the autocrat increases his level of economic control from the 10th to the 90th percentile experiences a drop in the risk of breakdown from 5.2% to 2.6%, according to the model. While a reduction of 2.6 percentage points seems modest, it corresponds to a reduction of 50%. Thus, although a substantial part of the interaction effect between elections and economic control can be attributed to the increase in breakdown risk for non-electoral regimes with high levels of economic control, holding elections reduces the risk of breakdown for regimes with high levels of economic control. At low levels of economic control, electoral and non-electoral regimes are equally likely to break down. When levels of economic control increase, not only do non-electoral regimes face a greater risk of breakdown, electoral authoritarian regimes become significantly less likely to break down. These findings support H6.

But recall from Figure 6.3 that an increase in administrative capacity from the 5th to the 75th percentile would reduce the risk of breakdown for an electoral regime from 8.2% to 3.3% – a decrease of 60% for a smaller change in capacities. Thus, for high levels of economic control regimes are significantly and substantially more likely to remain stable if an election has been held within the past five years than if no election has been held. But the effect of an increase in economic control within an electoral regime holds a smaller effect on the risk of breakdown than does administrative capacity.

The findings lend support to H4: For higher levels of economic control, the more incumbent control over the economy increases, the less likely it is that an authoritarian regime breaks down in the aftermath of elections. Thus, the cross-national patterns point to a greater risk of breakdown following an authoritarian election when control over the economy diminishes, as was witnessed in Mexico from the 1980s onwards when the debt crisis sparked a turn towards neo-liberal policies, causing state-owned enterprises to be privatized and public sector employment to be reduced, in turn diminishing the PRI's control over elites and voters (Greene 2007, chap. 3; R. Collier 1992; Magaloni 2006). However, the substantial effects are smaller than for administrative capacity.

Furthermore, the effect is only present for higher levels of economic control. But this is in correspondence with H6: Holding elections significantly re-

duces the likelihood of authoritarian regime breakdown where economic control is high, independent of the levels of administrative and coercive capacity. This matches what was witnessed in Mexico in the heydays of PRI one-party rule: Regardless of levels of administrative and coercive capacity, as long as the ruling party dominated the economy, elections worked to stabilize it. However, it should be noted that this result, as discussed above, also reflects the greater tendency for non-electoral regimes to be unstable at high levels of economic control – a rather curious finding that cannot be explained by the theoretical framework of Chapter 4.

The results hold when controlling for authoritarian regime type, prior liberalizations, media freedom, and the Cold War period, and when leaving out the control for protests to take into account that elections may cause regime breakdown exactly because they spark an increase in the level of protest (see Table 7.a and Figure 7.a, Appendix 3).[44] Finally, a random effect model, assuming that the effects of changes to economic control within countries have similar effects on the risk of breakdown as do differences in levels of economic control between countries, provides a negative and significant but reduced coefficient. Plots of the marginal effect reveal that there is still a significant and negative conditioning effect, although for a narrower part of the spectrum on economic control (see Table 7.b and Figure 7.b, Appendix 3).

The subcomponents of economic control

When economic control increases, regimes are slightly more likely to remain stable after an election has been held. But what is it about economic control that matters to the effect of elections on regime stability? As discussed in Chapter 5, the index of economic control comprises three quite different aspects of economic control that are each expected to increase the likelihood of stabilization by elections. But an autocrat needs not control all dimensions of the economy in order for him to stabilize the regime through elections. In the following, I break the index of economic control into its constituent parts to see if they are separately sufficient to condition the effect of elections.

Table 7.2 displays results with each of the three dimensions of economic control employed in turn as conditioning factors in Models 1-3. Only the in-

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[44] I do not run robustness checks relying on CGV and Archigos data as an alternative operationalization of regime breakdowns. As the sample is already small and the more minimalist definition of democracy underlying the CGV measure reduces the number of authoritarian regimes further, the resulting sample includes only 30 cases of authoritarian regime breakdown.

dex of regulation displays a significant direct effect on the likelihood of breakdown (Model 2). Curiously, it indicates that greater government regulation of business increases the likelihood of authoritarian breakdown in non-electoral regimes. Thus, it could be this part of the index that drives the positive, direct effect of economic control on regime breakdown discovered in Table 7.1. There is no immediate evidence that an increase in resource income could destabilize regimes by increasing the risk of civil war – the direct effect of resource income on the risk of breakdown is negative and insignificant.

For all three subcomponents, the coefficient on the interaction term is negative but insignificant. But significant effects are revealed in plots of the marginal effects in Figure 7.3. Panels A-B illustrate the marginal effect of elections as government share of GDP increases. For countries with a government share of GDP above the 30th percentile, holding elections significantly reduces the risk of breakdown, and the effect increases as government share of GDP increases. It thus seems that dominating the economy through a large public sector may in itself condition the effect of elections on breakdown. This is in line with Greene's theory that a large public sector is one of the main components of economic control that underlies one-party dominance (Greene 2007).

A similar effect is visible in Panels C-D, plotting the effect of elections on regime stability as regulation of business, labor, and credit markets increases. Just like a large public sector, regulation of business and credit also in itself negatively conditions the effect of elections, as increased levels of regulation are associated with a reduced breakdown risk in electoral regimes. But the effect is not as great as it appears. Part of the effect is accounted for by the positive, direct effect of business regulation on regime breakdown (Model 2). The negative marginal effect of elections for high levels of regulation is partly explained by the increased risk of breakdown in non-electoral regimes with high levels of economic control. It is not immediately obvious what explains the positive association between regulation and regime breakdown in non-electoral regimes.

Table 7.2: The conditioning effect of the subcomponents of economic control

	1	2	3	4	5
	Government share of GDP	Regulation	Natural resources	Government share and resources	Government share and regulations
Multi-party election	1.896	-1.235	-0.793	-1.115**	-1.761*
	(1.846)	(0.897)	(0.745)	(0.509)	(0.957)
Economic control	0.822	0.708*	-0.087	-0.179	1.180
	(0.890)	(0.394)	(0.094)	(0.750)	(0.747)
Multi-party election*Economic control	-1.057	-1.086	-0.018	-1.011*	-2.279
	(0.690)	(0.723)	(0.079)	(0.615)	(1.510)
Tax-to-GDP ratio	-0.285	-4.131	1.517	-0.132	-4.978*
	(2.733)	(3.151)	(2.441)	(3.464)	(3.008)
Log of military spending	0.899**	1.199*	0.447	0.925**	1.759***
	(0.382)	(0.644)	(0.406)	(0.403)	(0.625)
Log of GDP per capita	-0.220	0.776	0.575	-0.066	1.589
	(1.258)	(2.096)	(1.105)	(1.284)	(2.224)
GDP growth	-0.043**	-0.053*	-0.045***	-0.041**	-0.057*
	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.030)
Protest	0.257**	0.210	0.249**	0.249*	0.273
	(0.130)	(0.232)	(0.118)	(0.128)	(0.235)
Time	-0.384**	-1.318	-0.355**	-0.413**	-1.952
	(0.189)	(1.199)	(0.176)	(0.188)	(1.343)
Time squared	0.012	0.050	0.014*	0.013*	0.070
	(0.008)	(0.041)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.046)
Time cubed	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regime duration	0.336***	0.161	0.292***	0.342***	0.363*
	(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.100)	(0.120)	(0.201)
Regime duration squared	-0.016**	-0.003	-0.015***	-0.016**	-0.016
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.010)
Regime duration cubed	0.000***	0.000	0.000***	0.000***	0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	1,330	820	1,444	1,330	775
Breakdowns	104	64	108	104	63

Note: Based on regime breakdown data from GWF (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a) and election occurrence data from NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012b). Unit of analysis is country-year. Dependent variable is regime breakdown, coded 1 if breakdown occurred once or more in the given year. Explanatory variable is coded 1 if one or more multi-party elections were held during the past five years, 0 if not. Tax ratio, military expenditure, and subcomponents of economic control are five-year running averages lagged one year. All other covariates except time trends are lagged one year. Logit model with country fixed effects (*clogit* command in Stata) and robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure 7.3: Marginal effect of elections across subcomponents of economic control

A: Government Share of GDP, probability scale

B: Logit scale

C: Regulations, probability scale

D: Logit scale

E: Natural resource income, probability scale

F: Logit scale

Figure 7.3. continues

Figure 7.3. continued

G: Government size and resources, probability scale   H: Logit scale

I: Government size and regulations, probability scale   J: Logit scale

Note: Average marginal effects of multi-party elections on likelihood of regime breakdown for various levels of the subcomponents of economic control. Based on the logit model with fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered on country and all controls included, as in Table 7.2. The country fixed effects are set to 0. All covariates are held at their observed values. Due to problems with generating marginal plots after FE-models in Stata, the plots are based on a regular xtlogit command with country dummies included.

Panels E-F reveal that resource income also has an individual conditioning effect, but it is in the opposite direction of what was expected. For medium levels of resource income, regimes become more likely to break down following a multi-party election the more income from natural resources increases, and the effect is statistically significant. Thus, increasing levels of resource income do not ensure stabilization by election without other aspects of economic control being present. On the one hand, it is surprising that a factor that is generally associated with authoritarian regime stability independent of elections has the opposite effect on stability in electoral regimes. On the other hand, as discussed above, natural resources may be captured or otherwise exploited by rebels (Ross 2003) and have been shown to corre-

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late with civil war (Ross 2006), which might explain why more natural resources increases the risk of breakdown following an authoritarian election. Thus, whereas the full index of economic control has the greatest conditioning effect, rulers' control over the economy merely through a large public sector or business regulation may be sufficient for an election to reduce the likelihood of breakdown. But relying on natural resource income has the opposite effect.

Finally, Model 4 plots a reduced version of the index, consisting only of government size and natural resource income as this allows for the maximum number of observations to be included, and Model 5 plots the effect of public sector size and regulations, leaving out the dubious effect of natural resources. The coefficients on the interaction terms are negative as expected, and the coefficient is significant in Model 4. Panels G-H of Figure 7.3 confirm that measuring economic control solely through the size of the public sector and natural resource income and thus including more observations confirms the overall results achieved when estimating the effect of the full index: as economic control increases, the risk of breakdown following elections decreases. But the marginal effects, the difference in risk of breakdown between electoral and non-electoral regimes, are substantially smaller than when conditioning them on the full index of economic control that also included a measure of business regulation. Panels I-J show that in spite of the insignificant coefficient on the interaction term in Model 5, excluding the effect of natural resources from the index, the effect is roughly equal to that of the full index. Thus, apart from the curious conditioning effect of natural resources, both the subcomponents individually and in combination condition the effect of elections in the expected direction.

Long- and short-term effects

To further test the hypotheses and circumvent the problem of a small sample, I rerun models with shorter time horizons. In Table 7.3, the full index of economic control is the conditioning variable, but in Model 1, the main explanatory variable is the holding of a multi-party election within the past year rather than five years. As discussed previously, although the sample size increases when the election variable is no longer accumulated over five years, the effect is not expected to be as strong for the short interval. Put simply, not all the potential effects of elections are expected to play out within months of the contest taking place, and the conditioning effect of economic control – as with administrative capacity – should thus be stronger when playing out over five years.

Table 7.3: Multi-party elections and economic control, short- and long-term effects

	1 Election during past year	2 Election during past seven years
Multi-party election	-0.391 (0.760)	0.949 (1.013)
Economic control	0.742 (0.785)	2.327 (1.505)
Multi-party election* Economic control	-0.137 (0.749)	-2.275 (1.472)
Tax-to-GDP ratio	0.637 (2.916)	-8.626** (3.735)
Log of military spending	0.551 (0.396)	1.955** (0.786)
Log of GDP per capita	0.750 (1.413)	2.172 (2.824)
GDP growth	-0.065*** (0.024)	-0.068* (0.038)
Protest	0.303* (0.179)	0.175 (0.262)
Time	-0.892* (0.494)	-3.028* (1.596)
Time squared	0.034* (0.018)	0.103* (0.054)
Time cubed	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.001* (0.001)
Regime duration	0.258** (0.122)	0.262** (0.131)
Regime duration squared	-0.017** (0.008)	-0.009 (0.007)
Regime duration cubed	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)
Observations	985	684
Breakdowns	84	60

Note: Based on regime breakdown data from GWF (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a) and election occurrence data from NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012b). Unit of analysis is country-year. Dependent variable in all models is regime breakdown, coded 1 if breakdown occurred once or more in the given year. Explanatory variable is multi-party election, coded 1 if the regime held a multi-party election in the given year (Model 1) or in the past seven years (Model 2). Tax ratio, military expenditure, and economic control are lagged one year in Model 1 and are seven-year running averages lagged one year in Model 2. All other covariates except time trends are lagged one year. Logit model with country fixed effects (*clogit* command in Stata) and robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. $^*p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Indeed, the coefficient on the interaction term is negative but insignificant and reduced. But Panels A-B of Figure 7.4 reveal that the marginal effect of having held an election within the past year is significant and changes across the range of economic control. For the 8% of countries scoring lowest on the index of economic control, the risk of breakdown is greater when they have held an election in the previous year, but as economic control increases, the risk decreases. Furthermore, for the 40% with the highest levels of economic control, having held an election within the past year reduces the risk of breakdown, and the more so the more economic control increases. This was also the case for elections held within the past five years. But the difference in breakdown propensity for high-control regimes with and without an election within the past year (Figure 7.4, Panel A) is smaller than the difference between high-control regimes with and without an election in the past five years (Figure 7.1, Panel A). The results do not change when the control for protests is excluded (not reported).

That the marginal effects of having held an election in the previous year are significant even at very low levels of economic control, which was not the case for elections held within the past five years (Figure 7.1, Panel B), could reflect two things. First, it could be that the destabilizing effects of elections are simply strongest in the short term. Regimes that break down following an authoritarian election often do so in their immediate aftermath. And economic control is, as spelled out in Chapter 4, expected to affect these dynamics, as opposition activism and voter protests should be rarer in regimes in which the rulers exhibit tight control over the heights of the economy. Second, the increased range for which the interaction relationship is significant could also be a result of the increase in sample size when the election variable is not summed over five years but is allowed to change value potentially every year.

In Model 2, the independent variable is the holding of at least one multi-party election over the course of the past seven years. Again, the effect should not be as strong as for the five-year interval, as the effect of an election is expected to wear out over time as central actors instead expect a new election to take place or tune their strategies to a non-electoral setting. Indeed, the coefficient on the interaction term is reduced compared to that of Table 7.1 and insignificant. However, Panels C-D of Figure 7.3 show that the effect is significant for the regimes with the highest levels of economic control. Thus, regimes that have levels of economic control within the top 40% of the sample have a lower risk of breaking down if they have held an election within the past seven years, and the risk decreases when their level of economic control increases.

Figure 7.4: Marginal effect of elections across economic control, short- and long-term effects

A: Election in the past year, probability scale

B: Logit scale

C: Election in the past 7 years, probability scale

D: Logit scale

Note: Average marginal effects of multi-party elections on likelihood of regime breakdown for various levels of economic control. Based on the logit model with fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered on country and all controls included, as in Table 7.3. The country fixed effects are set to 0. All covariates are held at their observed values. Due to problems with generating marginal plots after FE-models in Stata, the plots of the fixed effects models are based on a regular xtlogit command with country dummies included.

The results support the theoretical expectations: the conditioning effect of elections is stronger when elections have been held within the past five years than the effect of a very recent or a more distant election. However, economic control does condition the effect of elections on the risk of breakdown after one, five, and seven years alike. And interestingly, in the year following an election, not only are regimes with high degrees of control less likely to break down than if no elections were held – low-capacity electoral regimes are more likely to do so than are non-electoral regimes.

Testing the Effect of Elections Where All Capacities Are Low

So far, the analyses have focused on the cases where rulers were high or low on a single capacity, and demonstrated that either administrative capacity or economic control in themselves are sufficient to make elections stabilizing, whereas coercive capacity does not condition the effect of elections. In support of H5 and H6, authoritarian capacities primarily condition the effect of elections where these capacities are high. Electoral regimes are less likely to break down than are non-electoral regimes where administrative capacity or economic control is higher. And regime breakdown in electoral regimes becomes less likely the more these two capacities increase.

Thus, where either administrative capacity or economic control is high, elections are associated with authoritarian stability. But as spelled out in the theoretical framework, the absence of one authoritarian capacity may not necessarily increase the likelihood of breakdown by elections; if the autocrat lacks control over the economy, he may still exploit his administrative capacity to dominate elections. This expectation also found support in the cross-national analyses. Only for electoral regimes with very low levels of economic control did the holding of an election make the regime more likely to break down than if such an election had not been held – and this was only the case in the year immediately following the election. So what explains why some authoritarian regimes break down following elections? According to the theoretical apparatus, in regimes where all capacities are low, rulers are unable to employ the strategies of electoral dominance, and in these cases, elections should be associated with breakdown. This proposition was spelled out in H8: The effect of authoritarian multi-party elections on regime breakdown will be positive when levels of administrative capacity, coercive capacity, and economic control are all low.

This final hypothesis is tested in Table 7.4, presenting a four-way interaction between the three authoritarian capacities and a dummy variable indicating whether a multi-party election was held within the past five years. The complex four-way interaction is difficult to interpret and to plot, but to get as close to a test of the hypothesis as possible, the three variables capturing the authoritarian capacities are rescaled. On the tax-to-GDP ratio, the logarithm of military spending, and the index of economic control, a score of 0 is given to all country-years falling on or below the 10th percentile on the respective variable. On each of these variables a score of 0 therefore indicates a very low level of administrative capacity, coercive capacity, or economic control.

This eases the interpretation of the coefficients. Thus, the coefficient on the election dummy represents the effect of elections on the likelihood of regime breakdown where all capacities are at or below the 10th percentile. As expected, the effect is positive and significant at the 0.05 level. Where all capacities are low, authoritarian regimes are significantly more likely to break down if they have held an election within the past five years.

Table 7.4: The effect of elections when all capacities are low

	1	
Multi-party election	8.899**	(3.724)
Tax-to-GDP ratio	38.747**	(18.013)
Log of military spending	5.382***	(1.928)
Economic control index	8.597**	(3.589)
Election*Tax	-120.009	(76.311)
Election*Military spending	-4.296**	(1.827)
Election*Economic control	-12.035**	(4.925)
Election*Tax*Military spending	39.925	(27.250)
Election*Tax*Economic control	129.279	(80.796)
Election*Military spending*Economic control	4.013	(2.450)
Election*Tax*Military Spending*Economic Control	-40.060	(24.508)
Tax*Military spending	-20.682*	(11.412)
Tax*Economic control	-36.149**	(17.120)
Military spending*Economic control	-3.759**	(1.909)
Tax*Military spending*Economic control	12.978	(11.141)
Log of GDP per capita	2.482	(3.224)
GDP growth	-0.065*	(0.039)
Protest	0.217	(0.264)
Observations	775	
Breakdowns	63	

Note: Based on regime breakdown data from GWF (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a) and election occurrence data from NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012b). Unit of analysis is country-year. Dependent variable is regime breakdown, coded 1 if breakdown occurred once or more in the given year. Explanatory variable is coded 1 if one or more multi-party elections were held during the past five years, 0 if not. Tax ratio, military expenditure, and economic control are five-year running averages lagged one year. All other covariates except time trends are lagged one year. Polynomials of time and regime duration are included but not reported. Logit model with country fixed effects (*clogit* command in Stata) and robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

This finding supports the claim of H8. Furthermore, the significant and negative coefficient on the two-way interactions between elections and military spending and economic control respectively indicate that as one of these capacities increases, while the other capacities remain at or below the 10th percentile, the positive effect of elections on breakdown propensity decreases. Breakdown by elections becomes less likely as economic control and coercive capacity increase. But curiously, although administrative capacity was found to have the strongest conditioning effect on elections in the individual analyses, its conditioning effect (the two-way interaction between administrative capacity and elections) is insignificant in the four-way model. This could be an effect of the new estimation (interacting all capacities at once rather than one at a time) or of the reduced sample following from limited availability of data on the index of economic control. None of the coefficients on the three-way interaction terms or on the fourth-order interaction are statistically significant. Unfortunately, a plot of the four-way interaction is not feasible and it is not possible to further investigate the nature of the conditioning relationship. Thus, the results are precarious and difficult to compare to the individual analyses of each of the capacities. But they do lend initial support to H8, stating that where all capacities are low, authoritarian regimes are more likely to succumb following elections.

Conclusion

Extensive control over the economy through natural resources, business regulation and a large public sector should allow an autocrat to subtly manipulate elections. Patronage may be distributed, votes may be bought, and potential opposition members kept at bay fearing economic ruin as a result of government punishment. Case studies have illustrated these dynamics at play across the world from Latin America to the post-Soviet space. I argue that these dynamics should ensure that autocrats in tight control of the heights of the economy should be able to stabilize through elections.

This chapter has tested this claim in cross-national analyses and found support for the argument. As stated in H4, economic control conditions the effect of elections, although the effect of an increase in economic control is smaller than that of administrative capacity. In correspondence with H6, the conditioning effect is significant for higher levels of economic control. For regimes with levels of economic control above the 40th percentile, elections correlate with stability – and the effect increases with higher levels of control. However, this is partly explained by the greater tendency for non-electoral regimes to be more unstable when economic control increases.

The conditioning effect also holds individually for two of the three sub-components of economic control: Both public sector size and regulation of business, labor, and credit markets condition the effect of elections. But the same effect is not found when estimating the conditioning effect of the third subcomponent, natural resource income. In fact, although this applies to a smaller part of the sample, increasing levels of resource rents increase the risk of breakdown in electoral authoritarian regimes. While the analyses do not attempt to explain this curious effect, it may stem from the fact that although resource rents have been demonstrated to inhibit democratization, they may also increase the risk of civil war – and thus regime breakdown.

As expected, the conditioning effect of economic control holds for multi-party elections held within the past five years. But although the differences in breakdown propensities between electoral and non-electoral regimes are slightly smaller, economic control also conditions the effect of very recent and more distant elections.

The quantitative analyses thus lend support to the argument that either a strong administrative apparatus or extensive control over the economy may help autocrats stabilize their rule through elections. But the absence of one of these capacities does not correlate significantly with regime breakdown. This is also in line with theoretical expectations, as autocrats who lack one type of capacity may simply rely on another. The destabilizing effect of elections should thus primarily increase where all capacities are low, as spelled out in H8. This hypothesis found support in the final test, although the results are precarious. It was not possible to move beyond logistical regression analyses of the four-way interaction between the three types of capacities and the holding of elections. But the coefficients of the model indicate that where authoritarian capacities are all low, elections are positively and significantly associated with regime breakdown.

Thus, the quantitative analyses support the claim that the central capacities available to autocrats can help explain why elections are found to have differing effects across regimes and over time. The conditioning effect is strongest for administrative capacity, but can also be documented for economic control, although no such effect is found for coercive capacity. But can these general patterns be attributed to the theoretical mechanisms presented in Chapter 4? In the following chapters, I assess the theoretical claims in two studies of three countries representing four different cases. I ask whether the breakdown that followed the authoritarian elections in the Philippines in 1986 can be attributed to the ruler's lack of capacities. Was there evidence that President Marcos was unable to carry out the necessary electoral strategies due to his lack of capacities? And I investigate whether the

stabilizing effect of elections in Malaysia is related to the ruling coalition's effective administrative and coercive apparatus. Did the ruling party, UMNO, employ its authoritarian capacities to subtly dominate elections? Finally, I analyze the role of coercive capacity further in the cases of Zimbabwe in 2008 and 2013. What strategies finally won Mugabe and his ZANU(PF) the chaotic 2008 elections and did they have the expected effects on regime stability? And what changed prior to the calmer 2013 elections? The case studies thus seek to both test the theoretical apparatus and lend nuance to the quantitative findings of this and the preceding chapter.

Chapter 8.
State Capacity, Economic Control, and Two Divergent Elections in Malaysia and the Philippines

In the 1980s, electoral authoritarianism persisted in the Southeast Asian regimes of Malaysia and the Philippines. Malaysia had held regular multi-party elections since independence in 1957 (and still does so), but these contests had been heavily biased in favor of the main Malay party, United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), and its ruling coalition Barisan National (BN), a multi-ethnic alliance. Muhammad Mahatir became prime minister in 1981 and continued the tradition of regular yet biased elections. In the Philippines, Fernando Marcos gained the presidency in democratic elections in 1965. He turned the regime increasingly autocratic, culminating in the declaration of martial law in 1972, but he later reinstated elections and continued to hold them until his departure from power in 1986. However, whereas Mahatir presided over an effective administration and an imposing coercive force and extended his grip of the economy through distributive policies and public enterprises, authoritarian capacities were limited in the Philippines. Marcos' army slowly disintegrated in the face of corruption and political patronage, and the administrative force was underpaid.

This chapter examines the dynamics of elections that occurred under autocrats endowed with such different capacities. In the quantitative analyses, I found that both administrative capacity and economic control condition the effect of authoritarian elections – primarily where these capacities are high – but that coercive capacity has no such general effects. Where all capacities are lacking, the analyses indicated that authoritarian elections are more likely to be followed by breakdown.

The aim of this chapter is twofold. First and foremost, it examines whether there is evidence that it was indeed the capacities available to the ruling groups that shaped electoral outcomes and regime developments in Malaysia and the Philippines. Whereas this chapter does not claim to reveal causation, it seeks to assess whether the general argument finds support in case material. Did Mahatir employ his administrative apparatus to subtly manipulate elections? And did elections contribute to regime stability? Did Marcos fail to carry out discreet manipulation of elections because he lacked the capacity to do so? And did that cost him power? Second, the case studies

also seek to nuance the quantitative findings, as they allow for better assessments of the conditioning factors: the authoritarian capacities.

Method and Case Selection: Malaysia and the Philippines in the late 1980s

The aim of this and the following chapter is to assess whether the correlations found in the quantitative analyses conform more closely to the theoretical mechanisms that are expected to drive them. It is an attempt to identify the mechanisms through which elections affect regime stability. The method employed to do so approximates what Campbell (1975) and Mahoney (2003) term pattern-matching. The goal is not to carry out a thorough process-tracing study that attempts to trace the causal chain (see Beach and Pedersen 2013, 14–16). Instead, in each case I examine whether there is evidence of the observable implications of the theoretical apparatus. These implications were summarized in Table 4.3. In addition to a more detailed assessment of the "master" variables included in the general model (i.e., regime stability, elections, and capacities), the qualitative analyses also investigate the strategies employed by the rulers and responses by the main actor groups (citizens, opposition, and regime elites). If the case material supports theoretical expectations, this does not in itself constitute a full test of the theory, nor does it rule out alternative explanations for regime stability or breakdown. But in combination with the cross-national findings, such evidence can enhance one's confidence in the theoretical apparatus. And vice versa, if the case material does not provide evidence of the expected mechanisms, the credibility of the theory has suffered in spite of the cross-national correlations.

As authoritarian regime stability is argued to depend both on elections and capacities, case studies could focus both on the effect of having elections or not having elections (either in a low- or a high-capacity regime) or on the effect of having high or low levels of authoritarian capacities in the context of elections (or, alternatively, in a non-electoral regime, but that would be a curious choice for a theory of the effect of authoritarian elections). I have chosen to explore the effect of varying levels of capacities in electoral regimes, rather than the effect of elections (versus no elections) in regimes with a certain level of capacities for the following reasons. First of all, the main puzzle driving this dissertation is the opposing effect of elections discovered by the existing literature on electoral authoritarianism. Second, as a majority of autocrats today hold multi-party elections (Chapter 2), it is cru-

cial to identify what differentiates these electoral regimes from one another.[45]

As the main goal is to examine whether there is evidence of the expected theoretical mechanisms when the explanatory factors take on certain values, the cases are chosen based on their values on the main explanatory factors. I choose cases in which elections were held but authoritarian capacities varied according to the scenarios sketched in Chapter 4. Thus, the cases are not picked at random among the cases that fall closest to the regression lines of Chapters 6-7, but are chosen to shed light on particular scenarios of authoritarian electoral dynamics. They are, however, still an approximation of typical cases. As the expected correlation between explanatory and dependent variable is present, they lend themselves neatly to assessing whether the theoretical mechanisms derived in Chapter 4 may indeed be what lies behind the correlations of Chapters 6-7 (see Gerring 2007, 92–93). In this chapter, I investigate whether the Malaysian election of 1990 and the Philippine election of 1986 conform to the suggested theoretical mechanisms. As shall be discussed below, Malaysia, with high levels of state capacity and the ruling party's control over the economy, should approximate the scenario of *stabilization by elections*, whereas the Philippines, where the capacities available to the leader were limited, appears to be a case of *breakdown by elections*. The expectations regarding these two scenarios are summarized in the following section.

Looking at the main control factors employed in the quantitative analyses – namely wealth, growth, societal unrest or protests, and time period – these two Southeast Asian regimes are arguably alike on some of the parameters. Societal unrest or protest occurred in both cases, taking the form of Muslim uprisings and communist insurgencies in the Philippines and clashes between ethnic Malay and Chinese in Malaysia, to which both countries' leaderships referred in order to defend their authoritarian practices (Thompson 1995, 75; Crouch 1996b, 22–24). But there are also important differences between the two cases, particularly in terms of economic growth and the international environment. The 1986 election in the Philippines was preceded by two years of economic crisis, and interference from the former colonial power, the United States, in support of both the regime and the opposition occurred (Bonner 1987, 420, 432; Adesnik and McFaul 2006, 13–15). Malaysia, on the other hand, experienced modest growth and little intervention

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[45] Although recall that the quantitative analyses compared both periods with high levels of capacities to periods with low levels of capacities as well as electoral to non-electoral spells within countries.

from the outside, although its 1990 election occurred in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Berlin Wall. These differences between the cases do not pose a problem to the analyses, as the attempt is not to approximate a most similar system design in which alternative explanations of regime change are controlled for. This exercise was undertaken in the quantitative analyses. Rather, the goal here is to assess whether the observable implications of the theory are visible in what ought to be two typical cases of opposing effects of authoritarian elections. That is, the study examines whether the cases render probable the claim that authoritarian state capacities conditioned the effect of elections, but it does not rule out alternative explanations in these particular cases.

State capacity and economic control in Malaysia and the Philippines

Judged by the data employed in Chapter 6, Malaysia and the Philippines exemplify a high- and low-capacity state respectively. By the Philippine election of 1986, the country's tax extraction rate placed it in the 28th percentile of all authoritarian regimes, whereas Malaysia was in the 78th percentile. Similarly, Malaysia's military expenditures were in the 64th percentile for authoritarian regimes whereas the Philippines' was in the 25th. Malaysia and the Philippines also differed in terms of economic control, but less strikingly so. On the index of economic control used in Chapter 7, the Philippines was among the quarter of authoritarian regimes that had the lowest degree of economic control in 1986, the year of its final authoritarian election and following breakdown. Malaysia in that same year was slightly higher (the 29th percentile), but was as low as the Philippines during its 1990 election. Going beyond these simple measures to more fully account for levels of administrative and coercive capacity and economic control in these two regimes largely supports this overall pattern.

When Mahatir became Prime Minister in 1981, he inherited a strong state. Malaysia's administrative capacity is reflected in the reach of its civil service as well as in the economic policies implemented since independence. The managerial and professional division of the Malaysian civil services went from 9,545 members in 1975 to 58,000 in 1990, and the expansion was especially pronounced in the Prime Minister's Department, leaving him in control of a large part of the bureaucratic workforce (Puthucheary 1987, 102–104; Crouch 1996b, 132–133). Whereas these bureaucrats were not necessarily directly involved in elections, public employees still played a significant role in Malaysian elections, as discussed below.

Furthermore, programs such as the New Economic Policy (NEP), a large-scale policy initiative intended to shift ownership of the corporate sector from ethnic Chinese to Malay hands (and which largely succeeded in doing so), reflect both the capacity of the Malaysian leadership to implement its desired policies and also contributed to increase government control over state resources, as is discussed below (Jesudason 1989, 78–79). Furthermore, Malaysia's extractive capacity demonstrates the existence of a machinery capable of monitoring and extracting resources – skills that also make the control of elections seem achievable (Hamilton-Hart 2002, 148). This is exemplified by the Employees Provident Fund (EPF), a government agency that extracts and administrates pension savings for private and some public enterprises from both the employees and their employers. It had some of the highest contribution rates in the world, and in 1993 "the Malaysian state was collecting 22 percent of the salaries of 89 percent of the Malaysian workforce through the EPF, in addition to the country's already high rates of direct taxation" (Slater 2010, 153). In addition to reflecting an effective and wide-reaching bureaucracy, the taxes collected also helped enforce both the administrative and coercive powers of the state.

Malaysia's effective administrative machinery stands in contrast to that of the Marcos leadership, which was increasingly dependent on patronage networks, family, and friends rather than strong institutions (Thompson 1995, 4–5). From 1972-1981, Marcos upheld a period of martial law, citing a threat from communist insurgents. During this period, the president opted to divide up power positions and patronage between his narrow circle of supporters rather than strengthen state institutions (Hutchcroft 2000, 300; Slater 2010, 175–176). Technocrats were left "constantly undercut by the presidential favors bestowed on cronies" (Thompson 1995, 4). Although Wurfel reports that the early Philippine bureaucracy was fairly well educated, the salaries of top-level civil servants were less than half of those in Malaysia, and corruption became so widespread that it "undermined the normal functioning of government" (Wurfel 1988, 79–80; see also Noble 1986, 101–102; Overholt 1986, 1144). The low administrative capacity of the Philippines was also illustrated – and further exacerbated – by its lack of a strong revenue collection authority: the Philippine tax extraction-to-GDP ratio in the early Marcos era was estimated to be 36% below the expected ratio (Cheetham and Hawkins 1976, 396–397, 391–393).

Although military expenditures, personnel, and salaries were increased both prior to and during the martial law period, and the Philippine Armed Forces benefited from significant financial support from the United States (Wurfel 1988, 140–141; Thompson 1995, 65), the military budget of the Phil-

ippines was lower than Malaysia's. From 1980 to 1985, Philippine military spending averaged slightly below 13 USD per capita per year compared to 120 USD in Malaysia (Singer et al. 1972). The military was, in some instances, deployed against citizens. Thus, under the Preventive Detentions Act, citizens accused of constituting a threat to national security were frequently arrested and could be incarcerated by military units while awaiting government charges (US Department of State 1985, 853). However, the Philippine Armed Forces faced problems relating to the de-professionalizing and demoralizing effects of political patronage. Marcos favored officers from his home region, Ilocos, instated his relative, Fabian Ver, as army chief of staff, and distributed patronage (Overholt 1986, 1148; Wurfel 1977, 24–25). While ensuring the loyalty of parts of the military, the strategy also caused grievances among those who did not benefit and left the military de-professionalized and split (Noble 1986, 101; see also Slater 2010, 178–179; Thompson 1995, 54–55).

Malaysia's military expenditures were not only significantly higher than those of the Philippines but also the second highest per capita in the region, surpassed only by that of Singapore (Singer et al. 1972). In addition to the well-organized army built up under British rule, Malaysia was home to an effective Special Branch force, a Federal Reserve Unit and Light Strike Force, a paramilitary wing, and a police force that covered all of Malaysian territory (Barraclough 1985, 800; Ahmad 1987, 116–117). Its army, paramilitary, and police force were supplemented by legal measures allowing for widespread government responses to opposition, including the Internal Security Act (ISA), allowing ample room for detentions of any person considered a threat to the security, functioning, or economic development of Malaysia (Barraclough 1985, 807; Crouch 1996b, 79–82; Munro-Kua 1996, 31–36); the Sedition Act, prohibiting public debate of "sensitive" issues (Crouch 1996b, 82–84); and the Universities and University Colleges Acts that prohibited political activities and party affiliations for students and university faculty (Crouch 1996b, 92–93).

Although the differences in terms of economic control are less striking, they are still present. Traditionally, the Philippine economy "was controlled and dominated by the private sector" (Cheetham and Hawkins 1976, 387), and public enterprises played a modest role (Cheetham and Hawkins 1976, 411–412). Although this gradually changed throughout the 1970s, government expenditure as a share of GDP decreased again from the mid-1970s, and at the time of the 1986 elections, government spending accounted for 12% of GDP, leaving the Philippines amongst the quarter of authoritarian regimes with the lowest public spending that year (data from Penn World Table 2013).

The public sector budget in Malaysia was not markedly higher. With 16% of GDP accounted for by public spending in 1986, Malaysia was ranked higher than the Philippines (the 49th percentile), but it was not among the authoritarian regimes that had large public sectors. But the strong Malaysian state discussed above was used to intervene in the economy in many respects, particularly to eliminate wealth disparities between ethnic Malays and Chinese dating back to the colonial period (Pepinsky 2009, 62–63). Exemplified by the NEP, with its target of indigenous (primarily Malay) ownership of 30% of the corporate sector, the government in the early 1970s shifted towards active involvement in the economy (Jesudason 1989, 76–80; Gomez and Jomo 1997, 24). The Economic Planning Unit, which was responsible for steering the NEP, was situated under the Prime Minister, giving that office a greater say in choosing the projects that benefitted from the NEP. Thus, government control over the economy expanded and the opportunities for political patronage, which could potentially be employed to strengthen the stabilizing effect of elections, increased (Gomez and Jomo 1997, 25–26). The NEP was also followed by the creation of large state-owned enterprises such as the national oil company, PETRONAS, and investment trust funds (e.g. Pernas), through which benefits and jobs were biased towards ethnic Malays, again allowing the rulers control over large parts of the economy (Pepinsky 2009, 65, 69–74; Jesudason 1989, 84–100; Gomez and Jomo 1997, 29–39).

In terms of natural resource income, there were also discrepancies between Malaysia and the Philippines. Whereas Malaysia's oil resources placed it in the top 20% of authoritarian regimes in terms of resource income as a share of GDP in the period, the Philippines was more modestly placed at the 50th percentile in 1986 (data from Haber and Menaldo 2011). Malaysia's oil production took off in the late 1970s and increased markedly throughout the 1980s, leaving extra resources in government hands (Jesudason 1989, 82–84).

Thus, when Marcos and Mahatir both conducted authoritarian elections in the 1980s, they did so with no intention of giving up power but also with varying levels of administrative and coercive capacity at their disposal and with varying degrees of control over the economy. But did these capacities affect rulers' strategies, electoral outcomes, and regime stability?

Theoretical Expectations

In terms of the capacities available to rulers, Malaysia and the Philippines approximate two of the three different scenarios sketched in Chapter 4. Ma-

laysia, with its substantial levels of state capacity and non-negligible control over the economy, is expected to be a case of *stabilization by elections*. Recall from Chapter 4 that if the theoretical mechanisms are indeed what drives the relationship between elections, capacities and authoritarian regime stability, the following implications follow: A high-capacity case (where rulers' preside over a strong administrative apparatus and/or control the economy) such as Malaysia should show the employment of subtle manipulation strategies (*a, b, d, f*), namely systemic manipulation, manipulation of voters' preference formation, restricted access to the vote, and legal and economic harassment of the opposition. These strategies should be directed from above, carried out by agents representing the ruling group, and lead to an incumbent victory. Finally, according to the existing literature on authoritarian elections, the election should have a number of stabilizing effects, including the prevention of elite defections, co-optation of the opposition, and generation of legitimacy (See Table 4.3, first column).

The Philippines, on the other hand, with the ruler's limited capacities both in terms of the administrative and coercive apparatuses and control over the economy, is a case of expected *breakdown by elections*. In this scenario (a regime where the autocrat is low on all capacities), some of the more overt strategies of electoral dominance, manipulation of voters' preference expression, manipulation of vote counting, and physical harassment of opponents (*c, e, g*), could come into play, although they should largely fail to achieve the overall goal of regime stability. The use of subtle strategies (*a, b, d, f*) should be limited. Rather than stabilizing the regime, a number of the destabilizing effects of elections, including elite defections, opposition mobilization, loss of legitimacy, and protests (which the rulers should not be able to effectively suppress – *Strategy h*), should play out, resulting in the breakdown of the authoritarian regime (See Table 4.3, second row). In the following, I assess whether these observable implications of the theory were visible in the cases of Malaysia and the Philippines.

Electoral Dynamics

Managed elections and authoritarian stability in Malaysia

Approaching the 1990 elections, the Malaysian party regime was (and still is) run by UMNO through the BN. Earlier elections under Mahatir were won with roughly 60% of votes and had been used to both legitimate the new prime minister and co-opt important parts of the opposition. However, the 1990 general election followed a tumultuous period of elite defections. In 1987,

two prominent ministers, Razaleigh and Musa, split with Mahatir's forces and ran for UMNO's presidency and vice presidency. Following an extremely close vote, Razaleigh and Musa lost the internal UMNO elections to Mahatir's team. A court dispute in 1987-1988 left Mahatir in control of the majority of the old UMNO, now "UMNO Baru," while Razaleigh and other prominent former UMNO members formed the opposition party Semangat '46.

When Mahatir called elections for 11 October 1990, BN faced its greatest opposition challenge so far. Semangat had negotiated alliances with both major opposition parties, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and the Party Islam SeMalaysia (PAS), and offered voters an alternative to BN that also spanned ethnic divides. Although deprived of UMNO's resources and control over the state apparatus, Semangat had an extensive network of members (Nathan 1990, 213). In the face of this new competition, it is perhaps not surprising that for the first time in its history, the BN did not succeed in winning a true supermajority victory. It won 53.4% yet, thanks to gerrymandered districts, still attained 127 seats, amounting to more than two-thirds of the 180 total seats in parliament (K. Tan 2002).

Even lacking a supermajority of votes, the victory was substantial enough to have important stabilizing effects. First, it clearly signaled continued BN dominance and thus deterred further elite defections while co-opting the newly founded opposition back into UMNO. Brownlee reports how "Razaleigh's partisans […] reaffiliated when they saw that their success depended on renewed loyalty to the ruling party rather than autonomous, ineffectual action among the opposition" (Brownlee 2007, 144). The BN had effectively demonstrated its monopoly on power and celebrated the 1995 general election with an impressive supermajority victory, gaining 65.2% of the votes. After the 1995 defeat, Razaleigh himself returned to UMNO. Second, the election legitimated continued BN rule by giving it yet another electoral mandate in the face of real opposition (Case 1993, 187–188). Thus, the election did indeed seem to have the stabilizing effects expected by the literature on electoral authoritarianism. But was this victory dependent on the subtle strategies of electoral dominance? And was the effectuation of these strategies dependent upon BN's administrative capacity and/or economic control?

Strategy a, systemic manipulation, was a great contributor to BN's large victories under Mahatir. Malaysia's system of plurality victories in single-member constituencies was highly skewed in favor of UMNO, in part because of the side-lining and co-optation of the Electoral Commission in the 1950s and 1960s (Hing and Ong 1987, 118–123; Rachagan 1987, 217–218). By using the ability to construct districts with unequal numbers of voters, the

rulers ensured that predominantly Malay districts were much smaller than non-Malay districts. This allowed UMNO to secure a dominant role in government as long as it was the most popular party among ethnic Malays, who comprised over 50% of the population (Hing and Ong 1987, 122).

Other types of systemic manipulation also worked in favor of the rulers. The nine-day campaign period, set by the incumbent, was the shortest yet. While this did not pose a problem to the BN candidates, who had already been campaigning for months, it was a huge disadvantage to the new opposition. The 1974 ban on open-air rallies left the opposition seriously disadvantaged. The opposition had to hold more meetings to reach the same number of people and faced additional costs as indoor facilities needed to be hired and transport organized (Hing and Ong 1987, 124–125; Khong 1991, 21). BN candidates, on the other hand, could still spread their message through the largely government-owned press, and BN ministers were allowed to address large crowds (Crouch 1996b, 84–88; Khong 1991, 21; Milne and Mauzy 1999, 116; Jomo 1996, 94–95).

The campaign also provides numerous examples of *Strategy b*, the manipulation of voters' preference formation, founded in both administrative capacity and economic control. Some tactics were underpinned by control over state personnel. Workers at the Community Development Program (Kemas), a unit under the Ministry of Rural and National Development providing adult education, conducted pro-BN propaganda, and the Minister for Education ordered local officials to defend the government (Crouch 1996b, 62–63). The BN's appointees at the municipal level would not let the opposition book community halls for indoor rallies, and the BN-controlled Village Security and Development Committees (JKKK) projected the BN as the provider of the community services (Hilley 2001, 86; Khong 1991, 21) and surveyed the population to identify opposition. If members of the JKKKs did not support the BN, they were threatened with removal (Crouch 1996b, 62). Another invention for the 1990 election was the "adopted daughters" strategy, in which young, unemployed women who had been partaking in a state-sponsored training program were placed as "adopted daughters" with local families who were potential swing voters. The families received $200 and were expected to vote for UMNO – and if still in doubt as to whom to vote for on Election Day, the families were followed to the polling station by their adoptee (Crouch 1996b, 63).

The large public sector also allowed BN excessive control over voters. The BN directly targeted constituencies with development projects and state support to win over voters (Khong 1991, 21–22; Crouch 1996b, 61–62). Prior to the 1990 election, Pillai reported how "The government is freer with its fi-

nances now, giving extra income to civil servants and upgrading long-forgotten or long-promised services in areas where major blocks of votes are at stake" (Pillai 1990, 1387). And the Information Ministry admitted spending 172,000 USD "to encourage the voters to go to the polls" (Crouch 1996b, 63; Khong 1991, 22). The change to the voting act prior to the 1990 election allowed for more effective targeting. Reducing the number of voters at each station to a maximum of 700, moving the vote-counting process to the polling stations, and giving each ballot a separate number allowed the incumbents to better monitor constituencies, identify opposition strongholds, and distribute state spoils accordingly (Crouch 1996b, 60–61; Milne and Mauzy 1999, 116).

Strategy c, the more overt tactic of manipulating voters' preference expression, was not as widespread but did occur. The incentives used were largely economic and drew on the state's access to public resources. In some places, voters were threatened with the removal of state support were they to support the opposition and decisive vote-buying was also reported in the most competitive districts (Khong 1991, 42).

In the 1990 election, flaws in the electoral roll – either registered voters whose names were missing from the roll or "phantom" voters included on the roll – affected around 300,000 voters. But rather than being a systematic attempt at manipulating access to the vote (Strategy d), the flaws were largely accepted as stemming from human error (Lim 2002, 115–116). Furthermore, in correspondence with theoretical expectations, Strategy e, manipulation of vote counting, was not widely reported (Case 1991, 473; US Department of State 1990, 959–960). It thus seems the BN was more focused upon subtle manipulation of preference formation and electoral institutions than restricting access to the vote or conducting fraud on Election Day. Given the effective abuse of the state's administrative apparatus and economic control, fraud was not necessary (Khong 1991, 47).

But BN's electoral strategies were not solely targeted at voters. Particularly Strategy f, legal and economic harassment of the opposition, was widely used. DAP faced an administrative hassle when it initially attempted to register as a party, and both DAP and PAS have been threatened with de-registration (Barraclough 1985, 809–810). DAP in particular was targeted and was refused permits to hold meetings and prosecuted for illegal assemblies and for raising "sensitive issues" (Barraclough 1985, 809–811). In 1990, opposition forces cancelled large meetings in three cases because of a lack of police permits (US Department of State 1990, 957). Throughout the 1980s, legal sanctions were implemented and the police force was deployed against opposition parties and members. Although prosecution against op-

position members was largely unsuccessful, its financial, emotional, and reputational costs still hampered opposition politicians (Barraclough 1985, 809).

However, in the context of the 1990 election, such repression remained largely legal and economic. Observers stress the preventive effect of the massive coercive apparatus, which was "always ready to intervene" (Crouch 1996b, 95; see also Case 1993, 186–187; K. Tan 2002, 145), but instances of police violence were rare in the period (Ahmad 1987, 114). The use of the coercive apparatus to physically harass opposition members, *Strategy g*, was not widely used.

Following BN's victory, Semangat slowly dissolved. No major post-electoral protests arose, and thus *Strategy h*, the full employment of the coercive apparatus following the election, never occurred. Prior and later events – the declaration of emergency law in 1969 and the violent crackdown on Anwar Ibrahim and his *Reformasi* movement in the late 1990s – suggest that both the ability and willingness to intervene by force were present, but given UMNO's electoral dominance fed by more subtle forms of manipulation, it simply was not necessary.

Thus, in many ways, the Malaysian elections of 1990 exhibit signs of the expected theoretical mechanisms. The case is summarized in Table 8.1. The ruling coalition employed its administrative capacity and control over the economy to dominate elections. All of the more subtle strategies of manipulation apart from deliberate tampering with access to the vote were widely used. In particular, the ruling front relied on systemic manipulation, manipulation of voters' preference formation, and legal harassment of the opposition. The strategies were carried out by agents of the government, including a biased electoral commission, the police force, and a range of public servants at the national and local levels who worked to sustain BN rule. The strategies were thus dependent upon the rulers' control over an effective administrative apparatus as well as extant public resources. However, one more overt strategy was also used, as manipulation of voters' preference formation – primarily in the form of vote buying – was carried out in certain districts.

These strategies were sufficient to buy the BN a supermajority victory, and the remaining overt strategies of electoral dominance, election day fraud and violence against opposition and protesters, were not employed. The subtle manipulation strategies effectively limited the opposition and the electoral victory served to both cement and legitimate UMNO rule and drive defected elites back into the fold. Could this incumbent victory be accounted for simply by UMNO's popularity? UMNO did indeed enjoy the support of a large part of the population, particularly the ethnic Malays. But this support was in part secured exactly through the coalition's control over the admin-

istration and the economy, which served to bind voters to the BN through preference manipulation. Furthermore, in spite of its public appeal, the coalition still unfolded the panoply of electoral manipulation – including the more overt strategy of vote buying – indicating that authoritarian capacities played an important part in securing electoral victory. In the case of Malaysia in 1990, most of the observable implications derived from the theoretical apparatus are present, indicating that the conditioning effect of authoritarian capacities on the relationship between elections and regime stability could indeed stem from the electoral strategies that the rulers can carry out when endowed with such capacities. But is a different pattern visible in the low-capacity case of the Philippines under Marcos?

Post-electoral collapse in the Philippines

The Philippines has a long history of elections, but in contrast to Malaysia, the Philippines actually had electoral turnovers until Marcos took power in a democratic election in 1965. He declared martial law in 1972, and in the following years elections took the form of plebiscites engineered to support Marcos' rule. After multi-party elections were reintroduced, the opposition boycotted the 1981 elections. The 7 February 1986 election was thus the first presidential election since 1969 in which Marcos and his newly invented New Society Movement (KBL) faced true opposition. The opposition was personified by Corazon Aquino, the widow of Marcos' long-time political enemy, Benigno Aquino, who had been assassinated, and by a former Marcos ally-cum-opponent, Salvador Laurel, who ran for Vice President. On paper, Marcos won the violent and fraudulent elections. But rather than consolidate his rule, the election had the opposite effect. Before assessing signs of the effect of the flawed election on the final regime developments, I discuss the extent to which the Marcos leadership failed to employ not only the more subtle manipulation strategies that were heavily used in Malaysia, but was also restricted in carrying out even the more overt tactics due to lack of capacities.

In correspondence with theoretical expectations, the ruling group did not rely much on *Strategy a*, systemic manipulation. Marcos initially called elections for mid-January, but in order to achieve opposition acceptance, he was forced to postpone Election Day by three weeks, allowing the opposition more time to prepare (Timberman 1987, 240). Although the media was heavily biased against the opposition, there were no legal restrictions on opposition campaigning (Bonner 1987, 402; Thompson 1995, 146; US Department of State 1985, 849). The opposition campaigned vigorously across the archipelago, and two days before the election, they staged what was then

the biggest rally in Philippine history, gathering between half a million and one million supporters in Manila.

However, other more subtle – and more capacity-demanding – strategies were carried out. Even though the Philippine government at the time could not be said to preside over a strong administrative apparatus nor efficiently control the economy, manipulation of voters' preference formation, *Strategy b,* was still attempted. Government resources were employed as development projects were targeted at Marcos strongholds and local governments were handed extra money to distribute (Bonner 1987, 242; Wurfel 1988, 298; Aquino 1986, 156).

Overt manipulation of voters' preference expression, *Strategy c,* also took place as an estimated USD 500 million was set aside for vote buying (Thompson 1995, 142). But "the machinery didn't work quite as it had in the past" (Overholt 1986, 1161). Less fearful of army reprisals, government employees increasingly turned against the ruling front, carrying out their tasks less efficiently. Following the assassination of Benigno Aquino, Overholt reports how the rulers' attempt to arrange a pro-government demonstration amongst public employees backlashed when participants showed up with anti-Marcos posters (1986, 1157). Thus, the manipulation of voters' preference formation and expression were hampered by the decreasing threat from the coercive apparatus and the declining control over the bureaucracy. In desperation, the Marcos leadership resorted to violence, not only against opposition activists as shall be discussed below, but also on Election Day in an attempt to hamper voters' preference expressions: on Election Day, four volunteers for the independent public poll watcher NAMFREL and close to a hundred other civilians died (Bonner 1987, 369–370; US Department of State 1985, 851; US Department of State 1986, 795; Villegas 1987, 195).

Instead of subtle manipulation of voters' preference formation, two other strategies became central. The more subtle *Strategy d,* restriction of access to the vote, was widespread. Various observers estimate that between two and four million voters were disenfranchised (Timberman 1987, 245; Villegas 1987, 195; Thompson 1995, 143–144; US Department of State 1986, 801; Bonner 1987, 414–415). The procedure was not random but deliberately carried out by Marcos' agents, who collected information from previous elections to determine opposition strongholds and eliminate names from the voters' roll (Thompson 1995, 142–144; Aquino 1986, 156–157).

But in spite of the use of some of the more subtle forms of manipulation, including of voters' preference formation and their access to the vote, it was primarily outright fraud (*Strategy e*) that secured Marcos his nominal victory. Whereas little fraud was reported in Malaysia, Marcos "won" the 1986 elec-

tion in the counting process. The vote counting and tabulation process saw massive irregularities: Ballot boxes were stuffed and stolen, tabulation sheets were bought for manipulation, teachers serving as electoral inspectors were paid off to ignore obvious fraud, and 30 computer operators quit the tallying, claiming that the results they had arrived at did not match the ones publicized in favor of Marcos (Bonner 1987, 424; Thompson 1995, 142; Timberman 1987, 245; Villegas 1987, 195). In the end, the official result gave Marcos 53.6% of the votes, whereas NAMFREL claimed that Aquino had won with 52% of the vote (Hartmann, Hassall, and Santos Jr 2002, 228) and the CIA put the share of votes won by the opposition even higher (Bonner 1987, 425). The importance of election day fraud for Marcos' victory is also highlighted by the discrepancies between observed and unobserved districts. In both the 1984 and 1986 elections, the ruling front fared markedly better in unobserved districts, where no independent forces were present to report on election day manipulation (Thompson 1995, 129, 150).

Marcos still controlled an administrative apparatus capable of mustering the money and manpower to steal the elections through both overt and subtle manipulation strategies. But the lack of capacity to fully pressure citizens into compliance before Election Day contributed to his vulnerability both internally and internationally (Thompson 1995, 150). He was forced to rely on blatant fraud under the eyes of national and international observers (Wurfel 1988, 299). Rather than subtly securing a victory, the ruler's desperate measures heightened the grievances felt among the people. The results were heavily and openly contested by the opposition, the Church, and NAMFREL.

Working against the discreet generation of a supermajority victory was also the successful mobilization of an otherwise weak opposition. Rather than divide and rule, the elections "gave new purpose and focus to the widespread but fragmented opposition" (Timberman 1987, 241; see also Villegas 1987, 195). Pressured by the election, the opposition candidates, Aquino and Laurel, were forced to work together and agreed to run on the same slate despite disagreements (Bonner 1987, 391–392). Whereas the Islamic authorities in Malaysia were tightly controlled by the bureaucracy and prevented from supporting the opposition, the Catholic Church in the Philippines played a prominent oppositional role in the mid-1980s and, led by Manila's archbishop Cardinal Sin, consistently spoke out against Marcos' rule without retaliation (Wurfel 1988, 279–280, 199; Thompson 1995, 117–118, 151–152). In the famous 1986 walkout from the official Philippine vote tallying process, the protesting computer operators sought refuge in a nearby convent, whereas "the Malaysian state's longstanding tight control over Islamic prac-

tice and organization meant that mosques could not become 'free spaces' for oppositionists" (Slater 2010, 215).

Thus, incapable of effectively preventing opposition from emerging through legal and economic harassment (*Strategy f*), the Marcos leadership was forced to crack down violently (*Strategy g*). A wide variety of high-intensity coercion tactics were reported, ranging from the killings of groups of protesters and violence against opposition supporters in the years preceding the elections to the assassination of opposition politician Javier in the aftermath of the 1986 election (Bonner 1987, 369–370; US Department of State 1985, 851; US Department of State 1986, 795; Villegas 1987, 195). These developments are especially striking in comparison to the limited reports of army and police brutality in Malaysia. But as with the instances of obvious fraud, these demonstrations of violence caused grievances that helped set in motion post-electoral protests. While such grievances are not unheard of in stable authoritarian regimes, the Philippine leadership no longer had the coercive power to effectively deal with them.

Although the heavy reliance on high-intensity coercion documents that Marcos possessed coercive capacity, the coercive apparatus was slowly disintegrating. A significant part of the political violence against both voters and opposition activists was committed by warlords who were affiliated with Marcos, but not fully under his control (Thompson 1995, 142; US Department of State 1985, 850–851). Military officers were embarrassed by their low public standing and demoralized by the corruption of the military and its complete subservience to Marcos and his cronies (Overholt 1986, 1160).

On 22 February 1986, military leaders Enrile and Ramos defected, and the people, infuriated by blatant electoral fraud and violence, moved in to protect them. Within 24 hours, at least 20,000 people were on the streets in front of the camps in which the defectors had taken refuge. On several occasions throughout this so-called "People Power" revolution, the Marcos leadership could have retaliated but proved incapable of cracking down. Immediately after the defections and before the people took to the streets, the remaining part of the military could still have overwhelmed the rebels, but General Ver, appointed as army chief because of his loyalty rather than his professionalism, was unable to deliver a successful strategy (Thompson 1995, 156; Timberman 1987, 247; Overholt 1986, 1163). Similarly, when the crowds dispersed during the night several days after the defections, the military still proved incapable of attacking (Timberman 1987, 247; Wurfel 1988, 303). When Marcos finally deployed his army against the people, by now numbering hundreds of thousands, officers refused to shoot and deserted (Overholt 1986, 1162–1163; Villegas 1987, 196; Wurfel 1988, 303). Thus, the

"People Power" revolution is not only a story of massive post-electoral popular protests but also of a "hollow regime's inability to deploy force against an adversary" (Overholt 1986, 1162). *Strategy h*, crackdown on protesters, was never accomplished. Marcos and his allies departed the presidential palace in a helicopter and sought refuge in Hawaii while Aquino assumed the presidency.

In many respects, the 1986 Philippine election is the antithesis of the 1990 contests in Malaysia. The dynamics are summarized in Table 8.1. The leadership's capacities were limited, and that seemed to affect its electoral strategies. But rulers were not incapable of manipulating elections. In fact, through manipulation of voters' preference expression, access to the vote, and vote counting, and by physically harassing opposition politicians, they secured an electoral victory. In this process, the ruling group did to some extent rely on its own agents, but it also experienced mass defections from both its coercive and administrative apparatus and had to draw in more loosely affiliated warlords to generate chaos on Election Day. Thus, contrary to expectations, Marcos' leadership succeeded in some attempts at both subtle and overt manipulation. But, conforming to expectations, the overt strategies resulted in widespread protests and a loss of legitimacy. Marcos did not muster the capacities to either prevent or quell expressions of opposition activity and mass dissatisfaction, and the electoral victory ended in regime breakdown.

In contrast to theoretical expectations, it thus seems that even in the low-capacity case of the Philippines, Marcos and his ruling front could carry out more subtle forms of manipulation. But in line with the theoretical expectations, since these strategies were not sufficient and had to be combined with more overt measures, the result was a backlash that the rulers did not have the capacity to handle. There is also evidence that this relationship stems from a low-capacity autocrat's inability to successfully dominate elections. But the ruler is not necessarily as incapacitated as expected: at least in the Philippines, a range of electoral manipulation – even more subtle forms – still unfolded.

Table 8.1: Capacities, election strategies, and effects, Malaysia and the Philippines

		Malaysia		Philippines	
IV	Multi-party election	+		+	
DV	Regime breakdown	-		+	
Conditioning variables	Administrative capacity	High		Low	
	Coercive capacity	High		Low	
	Economic control	Medium/high		Low	
	Electoral victory	+		+	
	Stabilizing effects	Legitimacy Signaling Opposition co-optation Rent distribution			
	Destabilizing effects			Information on incumbent weakness Opposition mobilization Post-electoral protests	
	Strategies		Carried out by government agents?		Carried out by government agents?
Observable implications / Subtle	Systemic manipulation (*a*)	+	+	-	
	Manipulation of voters' preference formation (*b*)	+	+	+	+
	Restricting access to the vote (*d*)	-		+	+
	Legal and economic harassment of opposition (*f*)	+	+	-	
Overt	Manipulation of voters' preference expression (*c*)	+	+	+	+/-
	Manipulation of vote counting (*e*)	-		+	+
	Physical harassment of opposition (*g*)	-		+	+/-
	Violent crackdown on protesters (*h*)	N/A		-	

Conclusion

These two typical cases representing the differing effects of authoritarian elections have supported the claim that the capacities available to the authoritarian ruling group shape the effect of elections because they enable or limit manipulative and repressive strategies. The ruling front in Malaysia during the 1990 election relied heavily on its administrative apparatus and control over the economy to carry out subtle forms of manipulation that secured a supermajority victory. Its impressive coercive apparatus was never put to use, as the rulers could dominate elections without it. The elections underpinned regime stability in numerous ways. On the contrary, in the Philippines, limited capacities restricted the room for manoeuver. The leadership did attempt a number of strategies, both overt and more subtle, but in the end, these largely backfired. Although they resulted in an election victory, this victory had all the adverse effects on stability that have been listed by the literature on authoritarian elections. And the rulers did not have the capacity to prevent subversion by elections, including the coercive apparatus needed to quell protests. Instead, the regime succumbed in the aftermath of elections.

Thus, the cases not only reveal an overall pattern; they also show that the correlation between elections, capacities, and stability established in Chapters 7-8 can potentially be explained by the theoretical framework on electoral strategies spelled out in Chapter 4, although alternative explanations for regime stability cannot be ruled out in the individual cases.

However, the cases also reveal a number of nuances. In spite of its low level of capacities, Marcos' ruling group was able to "win" an election, and it did carry out some of the more subtle strategies. But its heavy reliance on the more overt strategies, and ultimately, its failure to fully accomplish these strategies, namely the full-scale crackdown on opposition and protesters, led to its demise. In Malaysia, on the other hand, although the ruling coalition primarily relied on more subtle manipulation strategies, some more overt measures were also taken, such as the intensive buying of votes. But in all, elections were so subtly manipulated and widely controlled that no major protests erupted. It thus seems that although the deployment of successful strategies of manipulation may secure a regime stabilization by election, this effect can be undermined if the leadership is forced to combine these strategies with more overt measures that can cause backlash. In the following chapter, I examine whether the destabilizing effects of such a backlash may be avoided if the autocrat masters the coercive capacity necessary to clamp down on opposition and protesters, as exemplified by Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe.

Chapter 9.
Electoral Ups and Downs, State Capacity and Economic Control in Mugabe's Zimbabwe

The pressure was on for the 2008 parliamentary and presidential elections in Zimbabwe. President Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU[PF]) had ruled the country and regularly won non-democratic elections since independence in 1980. But opposition to Mugabe's authoritarian rule had built up through civil society since the mid-1990s. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) headed mediation efforts aimed at free, fair, and peaceful 2008 elections. Indeed, the first election round was deemed relatively peaceful and when the election results were finally released, they revealed an opposition victory for the two separate fronts of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in combination. The presidential election results put opposition candidate Morgan Tsvangirai ahead of incumbent President Mugabe. But the official results did not give Tsvangirai the required majority, and a second round was needed. Widespread violence orchestrated by the ruling party followed. In the end, Tsvangirai withdrew from the second round and Mugabe proceeded to win the presidency. Prolonged negotiations headed by SADC resulted in a Global Political Agreement (GPA), laying out the rules for a coalition government with Tsvangirai as Prime Minister and Mugabe as President, with continued control over the security apparatus.

Under the framework of the GPA, Zimbabwe headed toward the 2013 elections under the so-called Inclusive Government (IG). The road was bumpy and plagued by power struggles both within and between the MDC and ZANU(PF) as well as a severe economic crisis. But when the 2013 elections approached, although ZANU(PF) continuously sought to dominate the process and prominent SADC figures declared that sufficient electoral reforms had not been implemented (Research & Advocacy Unit 2013a), the MDC factions agreed to proceed with the election, believing that they would win (Raftopoulos 2013a, 977). The elections were, in comparison with the post-electoral violence in 2008, peaceful (Raftopoulos 2008; ZESN 2013). But the results revealed a sound incumbent victory. Mugabe had attained 61% of votes and ZANU(PF) had secured a great majority of parliamentary seats.

The MDC parties declared the elections fraudulent and exited the IG, leaving Zimbabwe once again to authoritarian one-party rule by ZANU(PF).

This chapter investigates electoral dynamics in Zimbabwe in 2008 and 2013. The claim is not that authoritarian capacities were the sole cause of the electoral outcomes in the particular cases. Rather, the chapter employs pattern-matching and assesses the degree to which the strategies used by the incumbent, and the results thereof, conform to the theoretical expectations of Chapter 4. As was the case for Malaysia, Zimbabwe can in many respects be classified as a high-capacity regime. In this chapter, I first analyze the extent to which the strategies leading to the 2008 victory were similar to those proposed in Chapter 4 – and thus to those of Malaysia. Second, I ask whether and how the victory and the employed strategies affected regime stability. For this purpose, the analyses are extended to include the 2013 elections. Noting that the 2008 elections involved heavy reliance on the security apparatus, I ask how Mugabe – following widespread violence and a resulting loss of legitimacy in 2008 – moved on to secure victory in largely peaceful elections in 2013 and whether the changed tactics proved to have a different effect on long-term regime stability.

Method and Case Selection: Zimbabwe in the 2000s

In Chapters 6 and 7, the quantitative analyses supported the claim that the relationship between elections and regime stability is conditioned by administrative capacity and economic control. But unlike administrative capacity and economic control, coercive capacity was not found to condition the effect of authoritarian elections. However, these findings could be dependent on the proxies available to capture coercive capacity on a cross-national scale. Whereas coercive capacity was defined as encompassing all arms of the coercive apparatus, including the police and private militias, only data on military capacity are available across countries and over time. Chapter 8 showed that in the high-capacity case of Malaysia, coercive capacity was not put to use and the ruling party – in correspondence with theoretical expectations – relied primarily on administrative capacity and economic control. In the Philippines, these capacities were too low for the ruling group to dominate elections through subtle measures, and when protests erupted, the coercive apparatus failed. However, the counterfactual – that an efficient and loyal coercive force could have secured an incumbent victory (the sce-

nario of *electoral survival*) – cannot be confirmed from this scenario of *breakdown by election*.

The case of Zimbabwe is chosen to allow for a more thorough assessment of the role of the coercive apparatus. At least on paper, Zimbabwe in 2008 was a typical case of *stabilization by election*. The capacities available to the ruling coalition were high, the election was won, and the regime did not break down. But as the analysis will demonstrate, the use of the coercive apparatus was markedly more abundant than expected from a high-capacity case. Employing the strategy of pattern-matching, the first part of this chapter analyzes the degree to which the dynamics surrounding the 2008 election correspond to the observable implications of the scenario of *stabilization by election* derived in Chapter 4. The expectations are summarized below. In the second part of the chapter, I turn to the 2013 elections and ask what changed over time as the costs of relying on repression became evident. Throughout, the analyses rely on a combination of academic literature, reports from human rights activists, newspaper material, and interviews conducted in Harare and Bulawayo in May-June 2014.[46]

The 2008 Elections in Zimbabwe: Winning Office, Losing Legitimacy

Zimbabwe has been ruled by Mugabe and his ZANU(PF) since independence from white rule in 1980, and multi-party elections have been held throughout the period. In the 1980s, parliamentary multi-party elections were primarily between ZANU(PF) and its rival guerilla movement from the independence struggle, PF-ZAPU. But after a period of hardboiled ZANU(PF) repression of PF-ZAPU, the party was merged into ZANU(PF) in 1987, and Mugabe was sworn in to the new post of President. In the following elections, now for both Parliament and the presidential office, only smaller parties

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[46] Interviewees were chosen based on their knowledge of and experience with the elections of 2008 and 2013. Interviews capturing as broad a representation of the political spectrum as possible were attempted, but interviewees overrepresent the opposition and civil society, as these groups are easiest to gain access to. Therefore, the analyses present relatively little evidence on how the internal regime elites responded to regime strategies and electoral outcomes, and more information on the choices and actions of voters and opposition. The true identities of interviewees are revealed whenever the interviewees agreed to this. Whenever possible, arguments presented by interviewees were confirmed by other sources. Where further evidence was difficult to find, this is reported in the analysis.

competed against Mugabe and ZANU(PF) (Darnolf 2000; Baumhögger 1999).

But in 1999, a new party, the MDC, sprang out of the union movement, and with Morgan Tsvangirai as leader it formed an opposition to ZANU(PF). The two parties contested non-democratic elections in 2000, 2002, and 2005, which ZANU(PF) won with 49-60% of the vote. In 2005, the MDC split into two factions, the smaller MDC and the larger MDC-T led by Tsvangirai. But although the MDC parties led separate campaigns, they both remained in staunch opposition to ZANU(PF), and when Mugabe faced the 2008 elections, he was thus up against an established opposition. Before examining electoral dynamics in the 2008 elections, I assess the level of capacities prior to the elections.

Authoritarian capacities in Zimbabwe prior to the 2008 elections

Administrative capacity

Judged by the available government statistics, the Zimbabwean administrative force was strong compared to many of its African neighbors. The tax-to-GDP ratio averaged 0.34 between 1984 and 1999, far higher than neighboring countries (0.23 in South Africa and 0.18 in Mozambique) and the East African states of Tanzania (0.16), Kenya (0.21), and Uganda (0.03) (Data from Hendrix 2010). Although preferences for taxation are partly determined by ideology and not merely capacity, this level of extraction also demonstrates a capacity on the part of the administration to extract resources. Furthermore, Zimbabwe had registered 168,000 central government employees in 1990 and 174,000 in 1996 (Therkildsen 2001 App 3), translating into a little less than 2% of the population. In comparison, the roughly equally sized neighboring countries of Zambia and Mozambique employed less – between 0.6 and 1.4% of the population – while South Africa employed a little more – between 3 and 3.5% (Therkildsen 2001 App 3). However, it is generally noted that national accounts data are often unreliable in African developing countries in particular, and a qualitative assessment of the strength of the administrative force is therefore also necessary (Jerven 2013).

Zimbabwe's administrative apparatus has traditionally been described as strong and well-developed. Upon independence, Zimbabwe inherited a strong, centralized, technocratic state from the previous Rhodesian regime (Alexander and McGregor 2013, 751; Bratton and Masunungure 2011, 8). The state was expansive in comparison to many African regimes of the 20th and 21st centuries. But the increasingly tumultuous post-independence peri-

od also saw an erosion of the state apparatus and the severe economic crisis in particular resulted in "the loss of the state's capacity to supply basic services for its citizens" after 2000 (Raftopoulos 2008, 226; Bratton and Masunungure 2011, 16–17; Meredith 2002, 159–161). The economy collapsed and governance was widely criticized. The traditionally high public sector wages were undercut by hyperinflation, and the crisis – both economically and politically – also led to a massive brain drain, pushing well-educated Zimbabweans to migrate (Naing 2012, 215–217). Thus, in spite of Zimbabwe's tax extraction rate-to-GDP ratio of 0.26 in 2006, placing it in the 85th percentile of all authoritarian regimes that year, Zimbabwe's administrative capacity had been dealt a blow over the past decade. Although its administrative capacity may have remained higher than that of many other African regimes, it was clearly at a lower level than at any previous point in the post-independence period.

But ZANU(PF) remained in tight control over the administrative resources still available. Since independence, ZANU(PF) had sought to establish its control over the state, compromising local government structures and allowing the party's central Politburo to control government ministries (Muzondidya 2008, 178). In parallel to the crumbling of parts of the state apparatus, the 2000s saw an increasing politicization of the civil services and the courts (Alexander and McGregor 2013, 752; Bratton and Masunungure 2011, 45–46; Naing 2012, 217–218). Mugabe retained control over appointments to all important positions in the civil service (Meredith 2002, 79). Veterans of the liberation struggle, along with military officers and other known ZANU(PF) supporters, were placed across the administrative force and judges were appointed on a partisan basis (Raftopoulos 2008, 213). Thus, ZANU(PF) slowly merged itself with the state (interview with Eldred Masunungure, political science professor). As one civil society activist repeatedly explained, "ZANU is the state and the state is ZANU" (interview with anonymous civil society activist, Harare).

In sum, while Zimbabwe has traditionally presided over a strong state and still controls networks of public employees that span its territory, its administrative capacity had eroded during the decade leading up to the 2008 elections, both due to the economic crisis and the politicization of the state apparatus. Nevertheless, the state structures and employees that remained were tightly controlled by and interwoven into the ruling party.

Coercive capacity

The coercive apparatus of Zimbabwe has its origins both in its predecessor, the colonial state of Rhodesia, and in the guerilla movements of the liberation war. Many mercenaries and soldiers of the colonial regime left after independence, and there are large discrepancies in reports on the size of the army following independence (Jackson 2014, 53–54). But British advisers stayed on, and the creation of a national army was successful (Jackson 2014, 57).

Military spending per capita had steadily decreased since independence and in 2007 was significantly lower than that of most neighboring countries, reflecting the economic crisis (Raftopoulos 2008, 211). Nonetheless, Zimbabwe's military spending placed the country just above the 50th percentile for authoritarian regimes in 2007 (data from Singer et al. 1972), and the only country in the region with greater military capability is South Africa (Jackson 2014, 62).

Today, the army boasts manpower, a strong organizational structure, and an array of repressive laws inherited from the colonial era. The Joint Operations Command (JOC), originally set up by the Rhodesian rulers, retains its position as the central organ coordinating the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), the air force, prison service, the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), and the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP). There is also a special military wing, the Fifth Brigade, which was active in the 1980s and was behind the killings of 20,000 civilians during Operation *Gukurahundi,* aimed at oppressing ZAPU, the other liberation-era guerilla group and ZANU(PF)'s only competitors for power in the early post-independence period (Jackson 2014, 58–59). The brigade was trained in North Korea, had the specific purpose of dealing with internal trouble, and answered directly to President Mugabe (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006, 66).

The army and police can refer to a great selection of repressive laws covering everything from public order to privacy, such as the Law and Order Maintenance Act retained from colonial times, the Public Order and Safety Act (POSA), instated in 2002 and aimed at regulating public meetings and gatherings, and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, also introduced in 2002 to regulate the media environment. One activist in Bulawayo, when I asked which law he was typically detained under, referred to an array of different laws that the police would usually invoke (interview with anonymous journalist and civil society activist, Bulawayo).

But a great part of the coercive apparatus is of a more informal character and is not captured by measures of military spending. The veterans of the

liberation struggle, some 40,000 of whom were not integrated into the army upon independence (Human Rights Watch 2002, 8), are organized in the Zimbabwe Liberation War Veterans' Association (ZLWVA), tied to ZANU(PF) through pensions and land, and supplied with military arms (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006, 72; Kriger 2003). They were the main force behind the land evictions of the "Fast Track" land reforms discussed below. Furthermore, ZANU(PF) controls the youth militias such as Chipangano, which is known to control the Mbare Township in Southern Harare. The coercive capacity of Zimbabwe's current government is thus not solely dependent on the army – the security services have several important branches complimented by private militias.

The control that ZANU(PF) exerts over the administration is even more pronounced in the security sector, leading one expert to state that "the factor that best explains the regime is the symbiosis between the party and the security sector" (Masunungure 2011, 47; see also Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006). After independence, the army was dominated by ZANU(PF)'s military wing, ZAN-LA, and ZANU(PF) remains in control of the army, air force, intelligence, police, and the prison services (Bratton and Masunungure 2008, 48). The loyalty of every branch of the security apparatus is secured in part by the history of the liberation struggle, ensuring that most top ZANU(PF) politicians throughout the 2000s had fought side by side with serving high-ranking military personnel (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006, 74). The then-head of the Zimbabwe Defense Force (ZDF), the army and air force in combination, General Vitalis Zvinavashe, famously stepped forward in 2001 to announce that the armed forces supported ZANU(PF) and would not tolerate leadership by anyone who had not fought in the war for independence (Tendi 2013; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006, 52–53). The history of the liberation struggle is also used as propaganda when training youth militias (interview with Eldred Masunungure; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006, 72–73).

But patronage also plays an important part (Bratton and Masunungure 2008, 47; Jackson 2014). Military officers are offered lucrative contracts and leading positions in, among others, the Reserve Bank, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), the National Oil Company, and ZANU(PF)'s central organs (Bratton and Masunungure 2008, 49; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006, 75–76; Dawson and Kelsall 2011, 20). Additionally, war veterans benefit from government subsidies as well as the land reforms discussed in the following section (Raftopoulos 2008, 211–212; Bratton and Masunungure 2011, 22).

Thus, while Zimbabwe's coercive force contributed to its control over the economy, as discussed below, economic resources also helped ensure the

loyalty of the coercive apparatus – a coercive apparatus that is among the strongest in the region.

Economic control

According to two observers, "The major prize that ZANU-PF won at independence was the apparatus of the state, including its military machinery and economic resources" (Bratton and Masunungure 2008, 44). Based on the index of economic control employed in Chapter 7, combining data on government share of GDP, business regulations, and natural resources, Zimbabwe in 2007 was placed at the 77th percentile of all authoritarian regimes. Although the Zimbabwean economy has dipped several times since independence, this section argues that the government to a large extent controls economic activity within its territory, including farm land, exports, mineral revenues, trade, and employment opportunities.

The state inherited by the Mugabe and his ruling group was one "that deeply penetrated the economy" (Bratton and Masunungure 2011, 8), but sources suggest that two-thirds of the economy was still in foreign hands at independence (Dawson and Kelsall 2011, 8). From 1980 onwards, ZANU(PF) moved to gain control over the economy (Magure 2012, 69), and during the 1990s, the policy of "indigenization" of the economy was used to distribute patronage through a system not unlike that of Malaysia's pro-Malay economic policies (Raftopoulos and Compagnon 2003, 24–26). The government set in place state-owned enterprises or companies held by the party itself, such as the M & S Syndicate, which held party properties, and Zidco Holdings, focused on the import and export business. The latter was said to employ 10,000 people by 1992 and had favorable access to government contracts (Dawson and Kelsall 2011, 18–19; Meredith 2002, 82). The government gained control over the prices of agricultural outputs, controlled salaries, and attempted to regulate the mining sector through the Minerals Marketing Corporation (Markowitz 2013, 140–141; Raftopoulos and Compagnon 2003, 19). In 1992, then-Minister of Justice Emmerson Mnangagwa estimated ZANU(PF)'s assets and businesses at around USD 75 million (Meredith 2002, 82).

These economic activities contributed to the party's funds and allowed ample room for patronage (Bratton and Masunungure 2011, 28–29; Muzondidya 2008, 171–172; Dawson and Kelsall 2011, 9, 19). Mugabe's closest companions became some of the richest people in the country through lucrative business contracts and opportunities to trade foreign currency (Bratton and Masunungure 2011, 28; Meredith 2002, 82; Dawson and Kelsall

2011, 13). The network of patronage extended across the country, as ZANU(PF) supporters on the ground received farming supplies, government funding, and housing (Markowitz 2013, 141; Zamchiya 2013; Raftopoulos and Compagnon 2003, 19–20).

But the Structural Adjustment Packages and economic crisis of the 1990s limited this original state control over the economy (Dawson and Kelsall 2011, 13) and the trend of economic decline continued more or less uninterrupted. Going into the 2008 elections, the Zimbabwean economy was in a state of crisis. The early 2000s saw recession, hyperinflation, a shortage of foreign currency, a collapse of the agricultural sector, food shortages, shortages of basic commodities and farming inputs, enormous poverty, an unemployment rate above 80%, and a corresponding upsurge in the informal sector (Tarisayi 2009, 12–14). Such economic decline could potentially unsettle a government, but it can also render more citizens dependent on the resources controlled by the rulers (Alexander and McGregor 2013, 758). Zimbabwe's recent history provides several examples of this latter dynamic. According to Le Bas, ZANU(PF)'s power from 2000 onward was increasingly based on "the extralegal appropriation and redistribution of resources along partisan lines" (LeBas 2014, 57).

Most prominent among the resources controlled by the ruling group in Zimbabwe is perhaps land. A great part of arable land was in the hands of white commercial farmers throughout colonial times and by 2000, white farmers still occupied nearly 30% of land while more than a million black Zimbabweans were restricted to arid "communal areas," resulting in "a significant land hunger" (Human Rights Watch 2002, 2). Land redistribution schemes had been in place since independence but did not succeed in significantly redistributing land (Muzondidya 2008, 172; Human Rights Watch 2002, 6–7; Meredith 2002, chap. 7). Some observers speculate that one reason why the land question was not settled in the 1990s was the government's desire to use it for political gains (Hellum and Derman 2004).

In 2000, the Mugabe government took advantage of the sensitive process of land redistribution through the so-called "Fast Track" land reforms. First, property rights were weakened through legal measures, and the right to compensation following land acquisitions was limited (Hellum and Derman 2004). Government control over the Supreme Court helped speed up this process. Second, farms were designated for acquisition and war veterans and youth militias, sometimes with the help of the CIO, army or police and guided by ZANU(PF), invaded commercial farms and evicted both owners and farm workers, with stories of violence and other human rights violations reaching the international press (Human Rights Watch 2002; Sachikonye

2003, 30–32; Meredith 2002, 169). Thus, the ruling front's coercive capacity contributed to strengthening its economic control. By 2002, 90% of white farmers had had their land acquired by the government, totaling 11 million hectares (Sachikonye 2003, 15).

On top of the multiple and much-debated consequences for the Zimbabwean economy in the long term, these land acquisitions had political effects that also matter to electoral dynamics. First, they were a form of harassment of the opposition and sought to discourage opposition activity, as white farm owners and black farm workers were predominantly opposition supporters (Human Rights Watch 2002, 20–23; Meredith 2002, 169). Second, the land acquisitions provided ZANU(PF) with enormous resources for patronage. Numerous studies document how the land was distributed on a partisan basis and how particularly ZANU(PF) and military elites along with the war veterans, but also lower-level ZANU(PF) supporters, have benefitted from it (Marongwe 2011; Human Rights Watch 2002, 27–31; Dawson and Kelsall 2011, 14–15; Matyszak and Reeler 2013, 12–13). Third, of at least 320,000 people employed on white-owned commercial farms before 2000 (and up to two million people who depended on these for their livelihood, equaling 20% of the population), 200,000 were evicted by 2003 (Sachikonye 2003, 15). The farm invasions thus diminished the economic independence of a great part of the population (Sachikonye 2003, 39–41). Land thus forms an important source of government control over the economy that can be exploited at election time.

In addition to its firm control over land, the government controls the economy in a number of other formal and informal ways. The granting of business licenses and access to foreign currency has been discussed above, and privileged access to trading in foreign currency became an especially attractive perk during hyperinflation (Bratton and Masunungure 2011, 28). The scarcity of essential goods during the economic crisis also made other strategies even more valuable. Price regulations were used to supply ZANU(PF) supporters with cheap goods (Dawson and Kelsall 2011, 16) and privileged access to import licenses became even more attractive (Bratton and Masunungure 2011, 28).

On top of its control over business licenses, trade agreements, foreign currency, and various forms of formal government benefits such as agricultural support and housing, the government also sought to control the informal sector, especially through its coercive apparatus. ZANU(PF)-controlled youth militias continued to dominate the informal economy even in MDC-run areas. In Mbare in central Harare, stalls at the market – on which thousands of people depend for their living – were distributed (for a significant fee) by the

Chipangano militia to known ZANU(PF) supporters, and the militia also financed its activities by demanding fees from intercity buses for accessing the local bus terminal (McGregor 2013; LeBas 2014, 62; Dawson and Kelsall 2011, 10–11; interview with Eldred Masunungure; interview with Eddie Cross, MDC-T parliamentarian, Bulawayo).

In sum, in spite of economic catastrophe, Mugabe and his ruling group retained control over rents from land, trade, and natural resources (Dawson and Kelsall 2011, 22). And while the continuing economic crisis pushed more people into the informal sector and left fewer dependent on the government for salaries (Tarisayi 2009), people still depended on the government for patronage in the form of everything from land and farming equipment to subsidies, housing, or access to stalls at the local Harare markets.

Theoretical expectations for the 2008 elections

In sum, judging by the statistics employed in Chapters 6-7, Zimbabwe was a high-capacity regime. Approaching the case qualitatively with a broader range of evidence may detract slightly from this assessment. The state apparatus had undoubtedly eroded prior to the 2008 elections and the economy was in shambles. But Zimbabwe was not a low-capacity regime. It scored at least moderate to high on all three types of capacities. Thus, in the following sections, I hold the evidence of first the 2008 and then the 2013 elections against the observable implications of the *stabilization by elections* scenario presented in Chapter 4. Recall that the following implications of the theory were derived: A high-capacity case (where rulers control a strong bureaucracy and/or dominate the economy – coercive capacity could be either high or low) should rely on subtle manipulation strategies (*a, b, d, f*), namely systemic manipulation, manipulation of voters' preference formation, restricted access to the vote, and legal and economic harassment of the opposition. The strategies should be directed from above, carried out by agents of the ruling group, and lead to an incumbent victory. The overt manipulation strategies (*c, e, g, h*) should not prove necessary. Finally, according to the existing literature on authoritarian elections, the election should have a number of stabilizing effects, including the prevention of elite defections, co-optation of the opposition, and generation of legitimacy (See Table 4.3).

Electoral dynamics in 2008

The 2008 elections proceeded in two rounds. The first round was for the presidency, Parliament, Senate and local councils and was held on March 29. The main contestants were the ruling ZANU(PF), led by President Mugabe,

and the two opposition parties, MDC-T, headed by presidential candidate and original opposition leader Tsvangirai, and MDC, led by Mutumbara. The presidential contest also saw Makoni, a former ZANU(PF) Finance Minister, running as an independent with support from Mutambara.

The first electoral round was described as the most peaceful in Zimbabwe's recent history (Masunungure 2009a, 61; Matyszak 2009, 137–138). The government did employ its capacities to manipulate elections, and reported issues include propaganda and hate speech, a biased media, the banning of opposition rallies, abuse of government funds for vote buying, and a biased voter registration (Matyszak 2009; Masunungure 2009a; ZESN 2008). But on polling day, the domestic observer organization, ZESN, noted major problems at only three percent of polling stations (ZESN 2008, 42) and the results were generally recognized as representing the will of the people (Masunungure 2009b, 79). The result was astonishing: MDC-T had won 99 seats, MDC had won 10, and ZANU(PF) 97. ZANU(PF) had thus lost its parliamentary majority. However, the results of the presidential election were not immediately announced, and things changed dramatically in the second round and the aftermath of the first round, on which this analysis focuses.

Government strategies and resources in the second round of the 2008 elections

The most notable issue of the first round of the presidential election was the delayed announcement of results, and this shaped the second electoral round. ZEC, with its six members as well as its head appointed by the President, is not recognized as an unpartisan institution (Linington 2009, 98–99). After the announcement of parliamentary results, the release of presidential results was postponed and they did not reach the public until 32 days later – a process that observers judged should have taken no more than 36 hours (Matyszak 2009, 141). In comparison, the announcement of the results of the second round, which Mugabe won, took only 24 hours (ZESN 2008, 65).

When the first round results of the presidential elections were finally revealed, Tsvangirai had attained 47.9% of votes, with 43.2% for Mugabe. But seeing that no presidential candidate had achieved 50 percent plus one additional vote, a run-off presidential election was announced to take place on June 27.

Whether the period in which results were withheld was used to tamper with tabulation procedures in order to ensure that the opposition did not come out with a 50 percent plus one victory is debated (Matyszak 2009, 141–142; Makumbe 2009, 128–129). But the prolonged period between the

two rounds of the presidential election – the constitution allows for only 21 days between the two rounds (ZESN 2008, 21–22) – with the government allegedly having had access to the results from the outset (Masunungure 2009b, 81; ZESN 2008, 51; International Crisis Group 2008, 3), allowed the government to prepare its strategies in the second round (Matyszak 2009, 141–142). *Strategy e*, overt manipulation of the administration of elections, thus initiated the second electoral round of 2008 and the accompanying tactics that were enabled by the ruler's dominance over the administrative apparatus, including the electoral commission. The following section discusses which strategies were used and whether administrative, coercive, and economic resources were essential in ensuring incumbent President Mugabe his eventual victory in the second round in June 2008.

Whereas systemic manipulation, *Strategy a*, has not been raised as an issue in the second round of the 2008 elections, manipulation of voters' preference formation and expression, *Strategies b and c*, are emphasized throughout reports. A range of more subtle ways of manipulating voters' preference formation (*Strategy b*) was observed and reported. Some relied on the abuse of government funds. Government food relief, and in particular the resources of the Grain Marketing Board, were distributed on a partisan basis and at ruling party rallies in an attempt to manipulate vote choice. The availability of government funds for the ruling party's campaign was made even more important when in early June the government banned NGOs from carrying out humanitarian tasks (Matyszak 2009, 146–147). This move served to leave an even greater part of the population economically dependent on the rulers and susceptible to manipulation of vote choice.

Government facilities were also widely available for the ruling party's – and only the ruling party's – campaign, and the opposition was denied permits to hold rallies (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2008, 3; ZESN 2008, 57). But it was not only the administrative apparatus that was put to use. ZANU(PF) abused its economic dominance as well as its coercive force as its youth militias had strict control over Harare markets. For instance, it was reported how street vendors were forced to wear ZANU(PF) t-shirts in order to maintain their stalls (ZESN 2008, 54). Furthermore, the ruling party's control over the media also allowed its propaganda to reach the population (ZESN 2008, 60–61). Thus, both the administrative and coercive apparatuses and the rulers' control over the economy served the strategy of manipulating voters' preference formation.

But the dominant strategy in this electoral round was overt manipulation of voters' preference expression, *Strategy c*, and the tool was state-sponsored violence. With the run-off described as "a one-race contest in an

environment drenched in blood" (Masunungure 2009b, 94), and ZESN reporting that 171 deaths, 16 rapes, and 9,148 assaults – all related to the elections – had been verified and many more recorded (ZESN 2008, 54), it is clear that coercive capacity played the most central role in this election.

Electoral violence was visibly carried out by ZANU(PF) agents and directed from above (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2008, 4). According to observers, the JOC took over the planning of the run-off campaign as soon as the government realized that the first round of elections was lost (Bratton and Masunungure 2008, 51; Eppel 2009, 969; Alexander and Tendi 2008, 10; International Crisis Group 2008, 5). 200 army officers were spread across the country to oversee the electoral violence, primarily carried out by war veterans and youth militias while the police either looked the other way or even actively participated in the harassment (International Crisis Group 2008, 6; Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2008, 4–5; Alexander and Tendi 2008, 11; Solidarity Peace Trust 2008, 27–30; Bratton and Masunungure 2008, 51).

The manipulation of voters' preference expression occurred both by threats and outright violence. Ruling party politicians, including the President, and army officers made references to the liberation war in public speeches and assured the public that they would not be defeated by an electoral loss but rather take up arms (Masunungure 2009b, 83). The police erected road blocks in certain areas and confiscated mobile phones and looked through their contents (ZESN 2008, 55). But the ruling front did not rely on threats alone. Operation *Makavhoterapapi* (meaning "Where did you put your cross?"), a voter intimidation campaign to punish first-round MDC voters and make sure that the ruling party would win the second round, was initiated (International Crisis Group 2008, 6). Base camps were set up across the country, to which suspected MDC supporters would be taken for torture and reeducation by youth militias and war veterans (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2008, 2).

In urban areas, especially in Harare, voters were forced to attend political meetings, whereas rural areas were "sealed off" for both opposition candidates and observers (Tarisayi 2009, 22). Curfews were put in place and there were serious restrictions on freedom of assembly, movement, and expression (Tarisayi 2009, 22). Opposition supporters were barred from participating in MDC-T rallies by youth militias and police (ZESN 2008, 62). When polling day finally arrived, and in spite of Tsvangirai at that point having withdrawn his candidacy, there were still reports of voter intimidation in polling stations. These included the presence of weapons in voting stations, local chiefs interfering with the vote, opposition voters being "assisted" in the vot-

ing booth, and voters being forced to hand over the serial number of their ballots along with their personal information, and being threatened with violence if it turned out that they had not supported the incumbent (Masunungure 2009b, 94; ZESN 2008, 64–65).

Strategy d, restriction of the access to the vote – not on Election Day but through disenfranchisement prior to elections – was not carried out in the second round, as the primary registration of voters occurred prior to the first round. In the first round, however, allegations of manipulation with the voter roll conducted by ZEC and the Registrar-General were widespread. The 5,934,768 people who had officially registered to vote comprised 45% of the population in a country where 50% of the population is below voting age and millions have emigrated. Along with the final – alleged – voter turnout of the second round of around 2.5 million people, this is taken as evidence that the ZEC inflated the voter list (Makumbe 2009, 122).

Strategy e, manipulation of the administration of elections, which was crucial in the first round of elections with ZEC's maneuver to postpone the announcement of results, was not widely reported in the second round. As described below, Tsvangirai withdrew before Election Day because of widespread violence, and Mugabe therefore ran uncontested even though Tsvangirai appeared on the ballot. However, election results are still questioned, as observers argue that the reported turnout rate was surprisingly high, given that many observed polling stations were virtually empty on Election Day (Makumbe 2009, 126)

Strategy f, economic and legal harassment of opposition members, was widespread (interview with Eddie Cross, Bulawayo; interview with David Colthart, former MDC minister and current member of Senate). Party officials were targeted and arrested, the MDC headquarters in Harare were raided by police, and campaign vehicles were confiscated (International Crisis Group 2008, 6; ZESN 2008, 57). Both Tsvangirai and the Secretary-General of MDC-T, Tendai Biti, as well as numerous other opposition politicians, were arrested several times during the run-off campaign, charged with treason and other offenses (Tarisayi 2009, 22; ZESN 2008, 55).

But in this election, subtle manipulation of opposition figures was overshadowed by the heavy use of *Strategy g,* overt, physical harassment of opposition candidates. The campaign of violence, in particular in the ruling party's original strongholds but reaching across the country, brought "the opposition party's network of activists to the verge of oblivion" (Masunungure 2009b, 85). Houses of alleged MDC supporters were burned and political activists were intimidated, arrested, abducted, and in some instances killed (Solidarity Peace Trust 2008, 32–36; Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum

2008). Public employees, especially teachers and ZEC officials, suspected of supporting the opposition were harassed, attacked, and beaten by youth militias (Tarisayi 2009, 19; Solidarity Peace Trust 2008, 24, 43). An opposition politician described how houses were burned in his home village, where he had initiated opposition politics, and his elderly father was forced to hide in the mountains for weeks (interview with Sesel Zvidsai, parliamentarian for MDC-T). By Election Day, "more than 80 opposition supporters were dead, hundreds were missing, thousands were injured and hundreds of thousands were homeless" (Masunungure 2009b, 85).

By mid-June, Tsvangirai withdrew from the race, citing the violence and the bleak prospects for a fair vote, and took refuge at the Dutch embassy. Mugabe proceeded to win the election. After the coercive capacity of the ruling group had been on full display for several months, post-electoral protests did not occur, and *Strategy h*, violent crackdowns on protesters, was rendered obsolete.

The government's strategies in the 2008 elections are summarized in the first column of Table 9.1. It is clear that the ruling group, contrary to expectations, did not restrict itself to the use of subtle manipulation strategies. In fact, if one includes the first electoral round, in which the registration of voters occurred, there is evidence of all types of manipulation apart from the more subtle, systemic kind. And all types were carried out by government agents, whether the police, the army, youth militias, ZEC, or public servants. The rulers were relying on both administrative and coercive capacity as well as control over the economy. But in contrast to theoretical expectations for a high-capacity autocracy, the subtle types of manipulation, such as limiting access to the vote prior to Election Day and altering voters' preference formations, were not the dominant strategies. Rather, the elections were dominated by more overt manipulation of voters' preference expression on Election Day and physical intervention in the opposition's campaign by members of the coercive apparatus.

Table 9.1: Capacities, election strategies, and effects, Zimbabwe

		2008		2013	
IV	Multi-party election	+		+	
DV	Regime breakdown	-		-	
Conditioning variables	Administrative capacity	Medium		Medium	
	Coercive capacity	High		High	
	Economic control	High		High	
	Electoral victory	+		+	
	Stabilizing effects	Opposition demobilization Voter protests prevented		Legitimacy Signalling Opposition split	
	Destabilizing effects	Lost legitimacy		Rent distribution	
Observable implications	Strategies		Carried out by government agents?		Carried out by government agents?
Subtle	Systemic manipulation (*a*)	-		+	+
	Manipulation of voters' preference formation (*b*)	+	+	+	+
	Restricting access to the vote (*d*)	+ (1st round)	+	+	+
	Legal and economic harassment of opposition (*f*)	+	+	+	+
Overt	Manipulation of voters' preference expression (*c*)	+	+	+	+
	Manipulation of vote counting (*e*)	+	+	(+)	+
	Physical harassment of opposition (*g*)	+	+	(+)	
	Violent crackdown on protesters (*h*)	N/A		N/A	

Thus, although the Mugabe government should have had the capacities to subtly manipulate elections, the strategies employed in the second round were more overt and correspond more closely to the scenario of *electoral survival*. Recall from Chapter 4 that in the scenario of electoral survival, the rulers do not have the administrative capacity or control over the economy

to subtly manipulate elections, but instead rely primarily on the coercive apparatus to carry out overt manipulation and avoid electoral loss (see Table 4.3). Given the common assumption that autocrats wish to hold onto power and act rationally according to that wish, the possession of capacities will make the domination of elections through subtle manipulation more likely. Yet the case of Zimbabwe in 2008 illustrates that possessing the capacities to subtly dominate elections does not always imply using them.

It is beyond the scope of this analysis to explain why the Mugabe government, in spite of its significant capacities, did not subtly manipulate elections to secure a victory in the first round. An authoritarian leader may either choose not to employ his capacities (an unlikely scenario in Zimbabwe in 2008, given the ruler's willingness to manipulate the second electoral round a few months later); be restrained in doing so, for instance by international actors (also unlikely in the case of Zimbabwe in 2008, where the capacities were put to use a few months later in spite of the heavy presence of, for instance, SADC); or he may simply miscalculate his popularity and refrain from manipulating elections to the degree required to win. Evidence indicates that this is what happened in Zimbabwe in 2008. Believing that he was sure to win (International Crisis Group, 2008), Mugabe did not apply his full force in the first round of elections. According to two observers, "ZANU(PF) had not lost its capacity to mobilise […] However, the relative lack of violence, and the opening of political space it allowed, was sufficient for ZANU(PF) to lose its advantage" (Alexander and Tendi 2008, 9). The ruling group failed to see the seriousness of the situation and lost the relatively peaceful yet flawed first round.

But Mugabe learned a lesson. The second round was just around the corner and there was no time to change to long-term, subtle strategies of well covered-up manipulation (interview with Eldred Masunungure; interview with anonymous civil society leader, Harare). Unlike Marcos in the Philippines, Mugabe controlled his coercive apparatus, and he used it to secure electoral survival. ZANU(PF)'s electoral victory was thus attributed to the "sheer force of the state" (Raftopoulos 2013a, 984). The strategies used were thus heavily reliant on authoritarian capacities as was expected, but the employed strategies did not comply with the expected mechanisms, likely because the government miscalculated its popularity. But did the presidential victory have the expected effects?

The effect of the 2008 electoral turmoil

The electoral victory did not have all of the stabilizing effects that could likely occur in the case of stabilization by elections. Mugabe won the presidential elections, but the loss of ZANU(PF)'s parliamentary majority robbed the ruling front of its ability to legislate uninterrupted (Masunungure 2009a, 77). Furthermore, it also dealt a severe blow to their image of invincibility (Bratton and Masunungure 2008, 42). Yet the opposition victory in parliamentary elections did not constitute a regime breakdown. In the aftermath of elections, mediators from SADC negotiated a power-sharing deal, with Mugabe as President and Tsvangirai as Prime Minister. But as shall be discussed below, the resulting Inclusive Government (IG) was heavily criticized for leaving Mugabe and ZANU(PF) in control.

Furthermore, Mugabe's victory in the presidential race brought some stabilizing effects. The opposition was clearly demobilized by the massive violence that had succeeded in undermining their structures and raising the costs of opposition activism (Masunungure 2009b, 85, 92–93; interview with David Colthart; interview with Eddie Cross, Bulawayo). Large-scale violence left the population in a state of shock, ensuring that no protests occurred (Matyszak 2009, 135).

But as expected in the scenario of *electoral survival* to which the government's strategies in 2008 more closely correspond, the use of violence rather than subtle manipulation, although perhaps from the rulers' perspective less expensive than losing the elections, was nonetheless costly. They won the presidential contest but lost their legitimacy both internally and externally (Raftopoulos 2013a, 972; Masunungure 2011, 57; Bratton and Masunungure 2008, 51–52; Alexander and McGregor 2013, 757).

Thus, in spite of the presence of authoritarian capacities, the Mugabe government relied on overt manipulation. The conducted strategies correspond to those expected in the scenario of *electoral survival* rather than that of *stabilization by elections*, and the effects also approximate those expected where rulers secure electoral victory through violence rather than subtle manipulation: the ruling front survived but it was wounded. The analysis now turns to the 2013 elections. Had Mugabe's and ZANU(PF)'s capacities changed? And did the strategies and effects conform more closely to theoretical expectations?

The 2013 Elections in Zimbabwe: Reinstating Power through a Supermajority Victory

Analyzing the July 2013 elections in light of what happened in 2008 serves to further test the theoretical arguments of Chapter 4. After the 2008 parliamentary defeat and the widespread violence that followed, and with a continued economic crisis and a power-sharing agreement, many observers, including the opposition itself, expected an opposition victory that could only be quelled by another round of intense, government-directed violence (Raftopoulos 2013a, 978; interview with Sesel Zvidsai; interview with Eddie Cross, Harare). Neither occurred. Mugabe and ZANU(PF) secured a supermajority victory in a much more peaceful one-round election. Mugabe attained 60.6% of votes compared to Tsvangirai's 33.7%, and ZANU(PF) secured 160 seats against 49 for MDC-T and none for MDC. What strategies did Mugabe and ZANU(PF) rely on? What resources contributed to this superior strategy in the 2013 elections? And have the electoral dynamics had the expected effects? These are the questions pursued in the following sections.

The GPA and the Inclusive Government

Before assessing the 2013 electoral dynamics, I briefly turn to the so-called power-sharing period that occurred in the intermezzo of the 2008 and 2013 elections. Following the second round of the violent 2008 elections, SADC intervened and negotiated the tripartite Global Political Agreement (GPA), inspired by the recent settlement in Kenya following its violent 2007 elections. The power-sharing agreement was signed by ZANU(PF) and the two MDCs in September 2008 and implemented in February 2009. It formed an inclusive government (IG) by preserving Mugabe as President, instating Tsvangirai as Prime Minister, and splitting the ministries amongst the three parties. But the agreement was criticized for being biased from the outset as executive power remained in the hands of Mugabe, who also held on to "hard power" through important ministries such as Defense, Mining, and Land, and the staff of many government agencies remained loyal to ZANU(PF) (Muzondidya 2013, 49). Furthermore, throughout the GPA, Mugabe's ruling front succeeded in upholding a parallel structure of government, redirecting important decisions from the cabinet to a tight group centered around the JOC and the President, and Mugabe retained and expanded his informal patronage networks (Muzondidya 2013, 50; Kriger 2012). These issues will be discussed further in the following section on Mugabe's and ZANU(PF)'s capacities in the 2013 elections.

The GPA was designed to steer Zimbabwe towards free and fair elections, originally scheduled for 2012, and to "normalize" the political environment. But throughout, Mugabe and ZANU(PF) used a number of strategies to dominate the political landscape, stall the reform process, and prepare for victory in the upcoming elections. While the ruling group upheld its tactics of legal harassment of the opposition, now its coalition partner, through arrests, detentions, and court cases (Mazarire 2013, 90–93), they also turned to various other forms of manipulation. The reforms of the security sector, the civil service, and the media environment were halted (Mazarire 2013, 110; Kriger 2012), and the constitutional reform process was hijacked. One of the important aspects of the GPA was the drawing and signing of a new constitution prior to the next election round. Following both fights between the parties of the IG and numerous ZANU(PF)-designed obstacles, including a redraft of the original constitutional draft in the summer of 2012, a compromise constitution was finally put to the vote in a referendum in March 2013 (Raftopoulos 2013a, 973; Mazarire 2013, 83–83). The constitution was accepted by an overwhelming majority, but also with allegations of an inflated voter roll (Matyszak 2013). The debacle around the constitutional reform had postponed the elections and a full "normalization" of the political environment was still to be attained. Following the referendum, SADC warned that in spite of the new constitution, the necessary reforms to ensure free and fair elections had not been "adequately implemented" (Raftopoulos 2013a, 976; ZESN 2013, 19). Nonetheless, Mugabe moved to rush through elections – a process which is analyzed below.

This was the environment in which the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2013 occurred. There were numerous indications that although ZANU(PF) had not given up on its more overt and repressive tactics, it had not wasted the time since the 2008 elections but instead subtly worked the system to its advantage. In the following sections, I analyze the changes to the Mugabe's and ZANU(PF)'s capacities during the course of the IG before turning to the dynamics and effects of the July 2013 elections.

A changed environment? ZANU(PF)'s coercive and administrative capacity and economic control during the IG

The four-year IG affected to some extent the capacities Mugabe and ZANU(PF) had at its disposal in the 2013 election campaign. The administrative apparatus was, as discussed above, affected by the economic crisis that peaked in 2008. But the quality of the administration does not appear to have changed markedly during the IG. What could potentially have

changed is Mugabe and ZANU(PF)'s control over the apparatus. From 2009-2013, ZANU(PF) governed along with the opposition, which ran a number of ministries. But ZANU(PF) retained its control over the administration. Top civil servants remained loyal to ZANU(PF) as the permanent secretaries even in MDC-led ministries were not replaced during the IG, and MDC ministers and mayors experienced obstructions from ZANU(PF)-loyal staff throughout their governing period (McGregor 2013; Mazarire 2013, 89–90; Bratton and Masunungure 2011, 38; interview with David Colthart; interview with Eddie Cross, Bulawayo; interview with Sesel Zvidsai). In 2012, Kriger reported that nearly 40% of civil servants were youth militia members taken in by ZANU(PF) in 2008 (2012, 15). While MDC ministers were present at cabinet meetings, the ZANU(PF)-appointed Registrar-General was in charge of voter registration, Mugabe and ZANU(PF) still had the option of moving administrative issues surrounding the elections into the offices of the military and the CIO, and ZEC remained dominated by ZANU(PF)-loyal staff (LeBas 2014, 59; interview with Sesel Zvidsai; interview with Eldred Masunungure; Muzondidya 2013, 49–50).

The coercive apparatus remained under Mugabe's leadership (LeBas 2014, 56; Raftopoulos 2013b). As one local confided in me: "The old man held on to all ministries with guns – even the national parks services" (Interview with anonymous businessman, Bulawayo). ZANU(PF) thus controlled the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Justice, and the army reported directly to Mugabe, who retained the presidency (Bratton and Masunungure 2011, 34; Mazarire 2013, 88–89). Both Tsvangirai as Prime Minister and the MDC Co-minister of Home Affairs had limited influence on the running of the police, as they were by-passed by police reporting to the ZANU(PF) Co-minister or directly to the President (interview with Eldred Masunungure; LeBas 2014, 58). The remaining branches of the coercive apparatus, the youths and war veterans, remained active and loyal to ZANU(PF) (Mazarire 2013, 81–85).

As discussed above, the economic crisis throughout the 2000s did not rob the ruling group of all its patronage resources, but instead served to make the rents under ZANU(PF)'s control even more attractive. Approaching the 2013 elections, observers stated that in spite of the IG, ZANU(PF) still held a strong resource advantage and had retained and expanded its patronage networks (International Crisis Group 2013, 1; Raftopoulos 2013b, xvi). The dollarization of the economy that followed from the GPA from 2009 onwards worked to stabilize the economy, but this stabilization also benefitted ZANU(PF) as it worked to undergird its patronage system and support ZANU(PF) loyalists' business ventures (Muzondidya 2013, 43–44). Whereas

state-owned enterprises fell under the MDC-T portfolio, their boards were still loyal to ZANU(PF) (Mazarire 2013, 89–90).

When asked what had changed the economic situation from 2008 to 2013, a great number of interviewees agreed on one factor: diamonds (interview with Eldred Masunungure; interview with Sesel Zvidsai; interview with anonymous civil society leader, Harare; interview with anonymous civil society activist, Harare). Diamond production increased dramatically from late 2008 onwards, and at the same time, the decrease in agriculture meant an increase in the mining sector's share of exports, leaving it to account for nearly half of external revenues by 2010 (Bratton and Masunungure 2011, 39).

According to some sources, ZANU(PF), desperately wanting to perform better in the next election but inhibited by the power-sharing agreement that had put Tendai Biti of the MDC-T at the head of the Finance Ministry, strategically moved to secure control of the mining sector (Nyamunda and Mukwambo 2012, 164; interview with Eldred Masunungure; interview with anonymous civil society activist, Harare). In the Marange diamond fields, discovered in 2006 and estimated to be the largest diamond discovery in history, small-scale miners had been allowed to operate freely until the 2008 elections (Nyamunda and Mukwambo 2012, 148; Bond and Sharife 2012, 356). But in late 2008 and early 2009, the army was deployed to evict small-scale miners from the area, and the diamond industry was taken over by companies that had shared ownership between the Zimbabwean government and foreign companies (Bond and Sharife 2012, 357–358). In spite of the potential yield of the Marange diamond fields being estimated at at least 1 billion USD a year, MDC-T Minister of Finance Biti complained of few diamond rents reaching the treasury (Bond and Sharife 2012, 355; International Crisis Group 2013, 24–25; interview with David Colthart; interview with Sesel Zvidsai). Instead, diamond money was said to find its way to high-profile army officers and ZANU(PF) politicians and on to the ruling party, where it could be spent for patronage, political campaigns, and election rigging (Bratton and Masunungure 2011, 39; International Crisis Group 2013, 24–25; interview with Eldred Masunungure; interview with Eddie Cross, Bulawayo; interview with Sesel Zvidsai; interview with anonymous civil society activist, Harare). However, it must be underscored that whereas the abuse of the diamond industry appears to be common knowledge in Zimbabwe, there is very little documentation on the actual output and its use.

Nonetheless, a pattern emerges in which ZANU(PF) by 2013 had retained control over great parts of the state, in particular the coercive appa-

ratus, and in spite of an economy in a state of permanent crisis, had found new resources over which it had secured control.

Theoretical expectations to the 2013 elections

The IG did not change the capacities of Mugabe's ruling front significantly. ZANU(PF) still largely controlled the administration and had full control over the coercive apparatus. The party's domination of the economy had not been rolled back either – rather, evidence points to a ZANU(PF) takeover of the diamond trade that can potentially have provided the ruling group with a great inflow of extra resources. Thus, if Zimbabwe was a high-capacity regime in 2008, this was still – if not even more so – the case in 2013, despite the contested 2008 elections. Thus, the theoretical expectations remain the same. The Zimbabwean elections should largely conform to the scenario of *stabilization by elections*. The rulers should rely on subtle manipulation strategies (*a, b, d, f*), namely systemic manipulation, manipulation of voters' preference formation, restricted access to the vote, and legal and economic harassment of the opposition. The strategies should be directed from above, carried out by government agents, and lead to an incumbent victory. The overt manipulation strategies (*c, e, g, h*) should not prove necessary. The elections should have a number of stabilizing effects, including the prevention of elite defections, co-optation of the opposition, and generation of legitimacy.

Electoral dynamics in 2013

The following sections investigate the use of state capacity and economic resources in the 2013 election campaign. However, it is important to state that these manipulative strategies were not the sole cause of the 2013 incumbent victory. There were signs of increasing popularity ratings for ZANU(PF). A 2012 public opinion poll by Freedom House showed that 31% of respondents would vote for ZANU(PF) (an increase of 14 percentage points since 2010) while 20% would support MDC-T (a drop of 18 percentage points from 2010) (Booysen 2012). However, only 53% of respondents wished to express whom they would vote for, so it is hard to estimate the scale of ZANU(PF)'s increased popularity. Furthermore, former opposition supporters expressed disappointment with the perceived corruption and lack of delivery on policy promises by ministers from the two MDCs during the IG (Interview with David Colthart; interview with anonymous journalist and civil society activist, Bulawayo). It thus seems that the ruling party's campaign on indigenization and land reform had an appeal for parts of the population (in-

terview with Hasu Patel, political science professor), that their status as liberators should not be underestimated (interview with Hasu Patel; interview with Eldred Masunungure), and that the opposition was being punished for internal skirmishes and being held accountable for four years in coalition government (LeBas 2014, 60; Raftopoulos 2013a, 985).

In spite of this, manipulation did occur and was estimated to have significantly affected the results (ZESN 2013; Matyszak and Reeler 2013; interview with anonymous civil society leader, Harare). But it is debated whether this manipulation secured ZANU(PF) a victory or simply made the difference between a majority victory and a supermajority victory (Matyszak and Reeler 2013, 10).

Undoubtedly, the electoral defeat and descent into violence in 2008 had taught Mugabe and ZANU(PF) a lesson (interview with Eldred Masunungure; interview with anonymous civil society leader, Harare), and they dealt with it effectively. In spite of the fact that the IG allowed the opposition to take substantial part in government, Mugabe's ruling group went to work on its 2013 electoral strategy immediately after the electoral shock of 2008 (interview with Eldred Masunungure). Their tactics were visibly different than in previous campaigns. Whereas ZANU(PF) seemed surprised by their first round loss in 2008 and could only revert to violence in order not to lose, they were well aware that they could not afford to secure another electoral victory through violence (interview with anonymous civil society leader, Harare). In the following, I investigate whether the employed manipulation strategies correspond to those expected in the theoretical framework.

Systemic manipulation (Strategy a)

The setting of the date for the 2013 elections for local councils, the Senate, Parliament, and the presidency constitutes an example of the ruling group relying on *Strategy a*, systemic manipulation. Whereas Mugabe and ZANU(PF) wanted elections held before the original date set for the expiry of the IG, the opposition upheld that this was not possible, as the reforms agreed upon in the GPA were not yet implemented and the government did not have the funds to hold elections. But the ruling front was aided by its control of the state apparatus. On May 31, the Constitutional Court, controlled by ZANU(PF) (Raftopoulos 2013a, 976–977; International Crisis Group 2013, 3–6), ruled that elections should be held by July 31, and this date was confirmed by the President on June 13 in spite of protests from SADC (Matyszak and Reeler 2013, 2; Raftopoulos 2013a, 976; ZESN 2013, 19). Regardless of whether the setting of the election date broke with the constitution, it was a

form of systemic manipulation: The swift elections were an advantage to Mugabe and ZANU(PF), as they inhibited the final moves towards a free and fair electoral environment. There simply was not enough time to revise media laws or allow the time demanded in the constitution for voter registration and campaigning, and the rushed election caused chaos in ZEC (LeBas 2014, 59; ZESN 2013, 19; Matyszak and Reeler 2013, 2).

Other examples of systemic manipulation include gerrymandering of election districts and the disenfranchisement of the diaspora. Gerrymandering was not noted as an issue by the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), the independent election observation organization that reports on Zimbabwean elections, and there was no formal delimitation process prior to the 2013 election (Research & Advocacy Unit 2013b, 5). But opposition politicians accuse ZANU(PF) of having pushed the boundaries of urban districts, typical opposition strongholds, to include rural areas or communal land, inhabited by ZANU(PF) supporters, so as to tip the balance in those particular districts (interview with Eddie Cross, Bulawayo). Furthermore, international election experts who visited Zimbabwe prior to Election Day expressed concerns that the electoral system had been designed to give ZANU(PF) an advantage in the distribution of reserved seats in Parliament and the Senate (interview with Jørgen Elklit, election expert). Finally, the Constitutional Court supported Mugabe and ZANU(PF) and denied voting rights to Zimbabweans in the diaspora (ZESN 2013, 31) – a great part of whom are opposition supporters.

But observers agree that the strategies that contributed to distorting electoral results were neither systemic manipulation nor the more brute forms of harassment. Rather, it was the manipulation of voters' preference formation and expression (*Strategies b and c*) and of their access to the vote (*Strategy d*) that mattered.

Manipulation of voters' preference formation (Strategy b)

Strategy b, manipulation of voters' preference formation, took many forms. With the elections being called before the revisions of the media laws, state media was still dominant. A clear bias towards ZANU(PF) was documented (ZESN 2013, 37; Matyszak and Reeler 2013, 11), and the opposition reported that their advertisements were rejected by news outlets, which were dominated by ZANU(PF) or worried about their future if they allowed room for the opposition (interview with Sesel Zvidsai). Mugabe and ZANU(PF) used the biased media as a channel for propaganda, continuously depicting the MDC as "puppets of the West" (Matyszak and Reeler 2013, 11).

ZANU(PF)'s control over the economy, including the rents acquired from the diamond trade, were also used to finance the election campaign. Sources reported that ZANU(PF) had 100 million USD to spend on the campaign (interview with anonymous civil society activist, Harare; interview with Eddie Cross, Bulawayo). ZANU(PF) candidates were equipped with vehicles, posters, and t-shirts to distribute to potential supporters at a level where opposition parties could not compete (interview with Eldred Masunungure; interview with anonymous civil society activist, Harare). In his Bulawayo constituency, MDC candidate David Colthart described a "t-shirt battle": "Here, there are no TV debates. Our main way of communicating with people is through visibility on the streets," he said, and continued "I was able to purchase 400 t-shirts. ZANU was driving around with trucks literally full of t-shirts, handing them out" (interview with David Colthart).

There were also stories of ZANU(PF) handing out gifts, such as kitchen utensils (interview with David Colthart; interview with Eddie Cross, Bulawayo), and the First Lady donating food (although this was also attempted by the opposition) (ZESN 2013, 38). Public resources were abused as ZANU(PF) distributed food relief on a partisan basis and took credit for the canceling of utility bills just one week before the elections (LeBas 2014, 62; Raftopoulos 2013a, 983; ZESN 2013, 37). These various forms of clientelism were perceived as having great effects on voter preferences (interview with Sesel Zvidsai). As a civil society activist explained to me:

> Zimbabwean citizens no longer believe in the democratic role of casting a ballot. They see elections as places where you trade something for something else. We are all clients of the state now. The state brings us something. We buy it with our vote or by beating up someone. Because ultimately, we do not have the power to change anything (interview with anonymous civil society activist, Harare).

The administrative and coercive apparatus was also put to use: civil servants, the police and uniformed soldiers were used to campaign for the ruling party, and chiefs were encouraged to gather votes for ZANU(PF) in their districts (ZESN 2013, 37–38; interview with Sesel Zvidsai; interview with anonymous civil society activist, Harare).

Manipulation of voters' preference expression (Strategy c)

But even more important in affecting vote choice was perhaps *Strategy c*, the manipulation of voters' preference expression. However, this typically overt form of manipulation occurred in a more subtle fashion. Most observers agree that there was little violence on or before Election Day (LeBas 2014,

52; ZESN 2013; Research & Advocacy Unit 2013a, 3; interview with Hasu Patel). But Zimbabwe's history of political violence, not just from the 2008 election, where whole districts that supported the MDC were targeted after the elections, but dating back to the *Gukurahundi*, should not be underestimated (ZESN 2013, 19). ZANU(PF) drew on what has been dubbed the "harvest of fear" (Alexander and McGregor 2013, 761; International Crisis Group 2013, 5; interview with Eldred Masunungure; interview with Eddie Cross, Bulawayo; interview with David Colthart, Bulawayo; interview with anonymous civil society activist, Harare). The subtle threat of violence being unleashed, for instance by army officers advising the population to vote for ZANU(PF) (Zimbabwe Peace Project 2013, 2) or the presence of police at some polling stations (ZESN 2013, 44), could have pushed many voters to support ZANU(PF). When asked what went wrong in the 2013 elections, Eddie Cross, MP for MDC-T, told me that:

> Insecurity could do more than we had expected. We are talking about a population who is dependent on the state and who feels that there is no alternative to ZANU(PF)[…]. We underestimated the issue of money, we underestimated the power of financial resources (interview with Eddie Cross, Harare).

Another sign of manipulation of voters' preference expression was the high number of assisted voters and issues with special voting. At 38% of polling stations, more than 25 people were reported to require assistance to vote, resulting in around 300,000 assisted voters. ZESN estimates that, given Zimbabwe's literacy rate of 95%, there should have been only 30,000 (ZESN 2013). Assisted voting is a common type of vote manipulation, especially in rural areas, where local chiefs can easily identify MDC supporters and coerce them into requesting voting assistance by someone identified by the chief, who will then make sure that ZANU(PF) receives the vote (ZESN 2013, 42–43, 51) (interview with Sesel Zvidsai).

Thus, in carrying out *Strategies b and c*, the manipulation of voters' preference formation and expression, Mugabe's ruling group drew on its dominance of the administrative apparatus, on the threat supplied by the huge coercive apparatus that it commands, and on its control over the economy, including the newfound diamond resources. But in this election, even the more overt manipulation of preference expression on Election Day was conducted in a more implicit and subtle way. Violence was not dominant, and the most emphasized manipulation strategy turned out to be the restriction of access to the vote prior to Election Day (*Strategy d*).

Restricting access to the vote (Strategy d)

Issues with the voter roll, the document listing those eligible to vote, and the voter registration process is discussed in every report and was mentioned by all interviewees I spoke with in Zimbabwe in May-June 2014. The bias in the registration of voters, a variant of *Strategy d*, is understood to have affected the election results significantly (Matyszak and Reeler 2013, 5–6). The voter roll was controlled by the Registrar-General, which also ran the voter registration process jointly with ZEC (Research & Advocacy Unit 2013c, 3). On top of not making the voter roll publicly available in electronic form for everyone to inspect as demanded by the Constitution (it was released in hard copy on the night of the election), the roll had many flaws. Zimbabwean think tank The Research and Advocacy Unit estimated that new voters, those under 30, were systematically underrepresented, and that for all age groups above 30, there were more people on the voter roll than in the population, including 116,000 people over 100, in a country with life expectancy rates just above 50 (Research & Advocacy Unit 2013d, 5–6).

Furthermore, the voter registration process was biased, with the bulk of disenfranchisement being borne by opposition strongholds. According to Sesel Zvidsai, MP for MDC-T, there were 19 registration centers in the country's largest province, Harare, compared to 100 centers in each of the traditionally ZANU(PF)-dominated provinces of Mashonaland East, West, and Centre (interview with Sesel Zvidsai). ZESN found that registration rates ran at 99.97% in rural areas, ZANU(PF)'s traditional strongholds, and 67.94% in urban areas, where the opposition dominates, leaving an estimated 750,000 people disenfranchised in the opposition's urban strongholds (ZESN 2013, 22).

The debacle of the registration process also manifested itself on Election Day, where a large number of voters were turned away from polling stations in spite of having registered. This was more prominent in opposition areas, where ZESN observers reported more than 25 people turned away on Election Day in 82% of all wards (ZESN 2013, 42). A local businessman in Bulawayo told me how he had driven one of his employees from the polling station where she had always voted to one at the other end of the city, at which she was suddenly registered on Election Day. Had he not had a car to offer her, her vote would have been lost. According to my source, this was a common phenomenon in opposition strongholds (Interview with anonymous businessman, Bulawayo).

This strategy of more subtle manipulation of access to the vote through the voter registration process was based on the ruling group's control of the

administration, in particular the Registrar-General and elements of ZEC. However, sources state that the coercive apparatus and the economic resources available to Mugabe and ZANU(PF), in particular the diamond windfall, were essential in carrying out this strategy. Thus, manipulation of the voter roll is seen as a calculated strategy chosen by the ruling group in the realization that ballot-stuffing or other more obvious types of fraud would be picked up by election observers and denounced by the international community (interview with anonymous civil society activist, Harare).

Instead, the JOC is said to have worked closely with the Israeli security company, Nikuv, at the army headquarters (KGVI) in Harare, to design a more subtle strategy for electoral manipulation, including the "massaging" of the voter roll ("Election Rigging Scandal Deepens" 2014; interview with Eldred Masunungure; interview with MDC-T parliamentarian Eddie Cross, Bulawayo). It is, as with the diamond windfalls, hard to find evidence for these allegations, but Nikuv was in charge of issues such as the voter roll, and the Home Affairs Department confirmed hiring Nikuv in 2000 to handle the computerization of the central registry ("Election Rigging Scandal Deepens" 2014). The national newspaper, *Zimbabwe Independent*, has revealed details of money transfers from the Registrar-General's office to Nikuv, and parts of the press have referred to Mugabe's victory as a "made-in-Israel landslide" ("Nikuv Polls Rigging Saga Takes New Twist" 2014). Thus, the subtle manipulation of voter registration seems to have depended on Mugabe and ZANU(PF)'s full range of authoritarian capacities.

Manipulation of tabulating and counting (Strategy e)

Strategy e, manipulation of tabulating and counting, was not widely reported. The only sign of ballot stuffing is discrepancies in the number of special voters. Special voting taking place in advance of Election Day is allowed for those parts of the police force who are on duty on Election Day. ZEC registered 69,322 voters as eligible for special voting, while the MDC-T Co-minister of Home Affairs reported that the police force totaled only 38,000 (ZESN 2013, 27). This led to speculations of attempts at ballot stuffing, but it was the debacle surrounding voter registration that was estimated to have affected results, and ballot-stuffing was not reported as a problem by national observers.

Economic and legal harassment of the opposition (Strategy f)

Economic and legal harassment of opposition candidates (*Strategy f*) was less pronounced than in 2008. ZESN reported of a relatively free campaign-

ing environment "with no extra-judicial impediments against those wishing to submit their papers to the nomination courts" (ZESN 2013, 35). However, being an opposition member in Zimbabwe still involves much hassle. Former MDC minister David Colthart recounted how a leader of his youth campaign in Bulawayo had been arrested under accusations of ripping up a ZANU(PF) poster, but when ZANU(PF) party activists tore down every MDC poster on the main road leading to Bulawayo Airport, the police did not intervene, in spite of the MDC reporting the incident (interview with David Colthart). Similar reports of brief arrests of numerous civil society and opposition activists abound (Zimbabwe Peace Project 2013, 5–9; US Department of State 2013, 14). There was also an abundance of stories of opposition supporters being refused business licenses and foreign exchange licenses and of companies losing customers and public contracts (interview with Eddie Cross, Harare).

Physical harassment of the opposition (Strategy g)

In sharp contrast to previous elections, *Strategy g*, physical harassment of the opposition, was limited. Intimidation tactics were "tempered" (International Crisis Group 2013, 2) and the opposition candidates with whom I met reported being much less fearful than in previous years and that assassination attempts had dwindled (interview with Eddie Cross, Bulawayo; interview with David Colthart). But human rights organizations still reported of politically motivated abductions and torture, primarily against MDC candidates, and often carried out by plain-clothes police officers (US Department of State 2013, 2–5). Thus, although markedly reduced, *Strategy g* was still employed.

In the end, subtle manipulation of voters' preference formation, manipulation of voters' preference expression, and in particular, manipulation of access to the vote, supported by the strong security sector and heavy control over the economy, served to boost the votes for Mugabe and ZANU(PF). A supermajority victory resulted without a descent into violence, and the results, although initially contested by the opposition, were not taken to the courts nor protested by the public. S*trategy h*, violent crackdown on protesters, was not necessary given the complete lack of post-election protests – the reason for which shall be discussed in the following section.

Mugabe and ZANU(PF)'s use of strategies is summed up in Table 9.1. They do not fully conform to theoretical expectations: Whereas the employed strategies were carried out by agents of Mugabe's ruling group, it was not only the subtle strategies expected from a high-capacity regime that were used. ZANU(PF) also relied on more overt measures such as manipulation of voters' preference expressions, partly through threats of violence, and

physical harassment of opposition figures. However, there were marked changes from the previous election. Relying on an extensive coercive apparatus and allegedly drawing on newfound resources thanks to control over diamond fields, the ruling group's dominant strategy was subtle manipulation of access to the vote through the voter roll. Furthermore, as had also been witnessed throughout the GPA and the constitutional referendum, subtle systemic manipulation also played an important part in the 2013 election, in contrast to the previous contest.

Thus, at first sight, the case does not conform to expectations because all types of strategies, subtle and overt (with the exception of clamp-down on protesters), were used. On the other hand, apart from the manipulation of voters' preference expression, the overt strategies were much more limited than in previous elections. Observers stress that the two most influential strategies were the more subtle strategy of restricting access to the vote and the more overt attempt at affecting voters' preference expression on Election Day. But even this more overt strategy was in fact carried out in a much more subtle way. Rather than relying on outright violence, ZANU(PF) employed the "harvest of fear" and needed only hint at violent previous elections. The mere sight of a military officer in the presence of a ZANU(PF) candidate was, in some districts, enough to affect voters' choice on Election Day. But unlike the more overt type of manipulation of preference expression that involves outright threats and acts of violence, this new strategy left very little direct evidence for the opposition and international actors to point to. Mugabe and ZANU(PF) still used overt strategies, in contrast to theoretical expectations. But along the lines of the theoretical apparatus, the more subtle strategies – or more subtle versions of typically overt strategies – were the most widely used and proved most important for altering outcomes. But the question remains whether the tactics had the expected effects on actor choices and thus on regime stability.

The effect of the 2013 electoral dominance

First of all, the strategies seemed to have affected vote choice as ZANU(PF) and Mugabe, in contrast to previous elections, gained a majority of votes. One obvious effect of the electoral victory was ZANU(PF)'s regained ability to legislate uninterrupted and change the constitution at will due to its two-thirds majority in Parliament. But the clear victory in what many judged to be relatively free – and indeed much more peaceful – elections also served to boost Mugabe and ZANU(PF)'s legitimacy, both internally and externally (interview with anonymous civil society activist, Harare; interview with Eldred

Masunungure). SADC and the African Union (AU) endorsed the elections (Raftopoulos 2013a, 978). Although the freedom and fairness of the elections were not complimented by the EU and the United States, the EU proceeded to ease its sanctions against the country (Croft 2014).

Electoral dynamics also affected both rulers and opposition in various other ways expected in the scenario of stabilization by election. Thus, the victory boosted the ruling party's attractiveness in the eyes of internal elites. One civil society leader explained to me how, outside of ZANU(PF), politicians are "fish out of water" (interview with anonymous civil society activist, Harare). Votes matter, and as has clearly been demonstrated, voters follow Mugabe. Therefore, ZANU(PF) elites hedge their bets on promotions inside the party rather than challenging it from the outside, and defections remain limited (interview with anonymous civil society activist, Harare; interview with Eldred Masunungure).

Furthermore, continued electoral losses have seriously inhibited opposition progress. In 2005, the MDC split during debates over whether to compete in flawed senatorial elections. In early 2014, eight months after the 2013 electoral defeat, MDC-T split again, with Secretary-Genral Tendai Biti challenging Tsvangirai. Both high-ranking opposition politicians and outside observers named the electoral defeat as one of the main catalysts of skirmishes and criticisms of MDC-T leader Tsvangirai (interview with Eddie Cross, Bulawayo; interview with David Colthart, Bulawayo; interview with diplomat at the Danish Embassy to Zimbabwe, Jakob Bugge). While opposition politicians and civil society leaders still hope for change through elections and not in spite of elections, and note improvements in, for instance, civil liberties throughout recent decades (interview with anonymous journalist and civil society activist, Bulawayo; interview with anonymous civil society activist, Harare), many observers agree that it will be a while before the Zimbabwean opposition has recovered from its latest electoral defeat (interview with Jakob Bugge).

Finally, citizens never challenged Mugabe and ZANU(PF) through post-electoral protests. The lack of protests could be attributed to the fact that opposition support was dwindling and electoral manipulation was more subtle and less overt, and the population thus to a large extent saw elections as reasonably free (interview with anonymous journalist and civil society activist, Bulawayo; interview with Sesel Zvidsai; interview with Hasu Patel). But it could also be caused by the "dividend of fear" from previous campaigns of violence directed against opposition activists and ordinary voters alike (interview with anonymous civil society activist, Harare). When I asked a local Harare taxi driver who had expressed doubts in the electoral results why there

were no anti-ZANU protests, he looked at me in disbelief: "Protests? Do you think we want the kind of trouble that follows?"

Thus, the effects of the ruling group's strategies widely correspond to the scenario of stabilization by election. Although the Mugabe and ZANU(PF) mixed subtle with more overt measures, the elections seemed to have a stabilizing effect, binding in elites and splitting the opposition. Whether the more overt electoral tactics on which the rulers still relied will have adverse effects in the longer term remains to be seen.

Conclusion

The case of Mugabe's Zimbabwe is not a clear-cut fit with theoretical expectations. But the diverging dynamics of the 2008 and 2013 elections demonstrate a number of points. First, the cases illustrate that – at least in some autocracies – coercive capacity does matter. Although the importance of coercive capacity could not be documented in statistical analyses relying on measures of military capacity, the coercive apparatus clearly played a great role – albeit in different ways – in the last two elections in Zimbabwe. In 2008, a strong and loyal coercive force bought Mugabe his second-round victory. In 2013, the presence of the coercive apparatus was less clear, and violence was limited. But the military had an important role to play, both in securing the so called "harvest of fear" and in coordinating the more subtle manipulation of elections, for instance the manipulation of the voter roll.

Second, the cases also underscore that the finding in Chapter 6 that coercive capacity does not significantly condition the effect of elections could be biased by the limited measure of coercive capacity. Measuring coercive capacity solely through the military apparatus would neglect the role, for instance, played in Zimbabwe by a stanchly pro-Mugabe police force, a great number of loyal war veterans, and active youth militias. Thus, Zimbabwe's coercive capacity was just around the 50th percentile among authoritarian regimes prior to the 2008 election when relying solely on a measure of military spending. But a qualitative approach reveals that the coercive force of the Mugabe government was likely greater than what was revealed by statistics of military expenditure. Thus, based on case evidence from Zimbabwe, it is worth developing a more full-fledged measure of coercive capacity in future studies of the relationship between state capacity and regime stability.

Third, the 2008 elections in particular serve to nuance the theory of authoritarian strategies. Although Mugabe and ZANU(PF) enjoyed high levels of capacity – both state and economic – they did not focus their attention on subtle manipulation strategies. Thus, a high-capacity regime will not neces-

sarily conform with the scenario of *stabilization by elections*. It is more likely to do so, as the more subtle manipulation strategies will often be the rational choice. But in some instances, such as Zimbabwe in 2008, the incumbent may overestimate his own popularity or underestimate his opponent, and face an immediate electoral threat that demands more overt measures if it is to be eradicated. When the Mugabe government realized the seriousness of the situation, it drew on all its authoritarian capacities, but particularly its coercive force, to ensure electoral survival through more overt strategies. Thus, the case illustrates how a high-capacity autocrat may sometimes misjudge the situation and find himself in the scenario of *electoral survival* rather than *stabilization by elections*. But the effects of the elections and the strategies employed – the demobilization of the opposition on the one hand, but the loss of legitimacy and the blow to the ruler's image of invincibility on the other – conformed quite well to the scenarios of *electoral survival* expected where the ruling group employs more overt measures to win elections.

Fourth, in line with expectations, the ruling group learned a lesson in 2008, and the 2013 elections conform more closely to the expectations for a high-capacity ruler and his ability to stabilize his rule through elections. But they still differed from the more clear-cut, subtle strategies applied by a high-capacity ruling group such as the UMNO leadership in Malaysia. Thus, although the Mugabe government primarily used its capacities to generate a victory through subtle strategies such as restricting the access to the vote, the case also reveals a number of nuances to the theoretical expectations. One of the more overt strategies, manipulating voters' preference formation, was used, but in a more subtle version. Thus, the distinction between subtle and overt measures of manipulation is not always clear-cut. And although subtle strategies dominated, Mugabe and ZANU(PF) did not fully refrain from employing overt strategies, such as the physical harassment of the opposition. In the short run, this did not seem to alter the stabilizing effects of elections, but the long-term effects are not yet known.

Finally, in carrying out subtle types of manipulation, the ruling front relied not only on administrative capacity and economic control. The infrastructure of the armed forces seems to have played a significant role in some of the more subtle manipulation strategies, including the tampering with the voter roll that disenfranchised a significant part of the opposition's voters. Thus, just like the distinction between manipulation strategies is not clear-cut, the coercive force may also be employed for some of the more subtle strategies. Again, this finding hints at the potential importance of coercive capacity and thus supports the call for further studies on the effect of coercive capacity on authoritarian electoral dynamics across the globe.

Overall, the case underlines the quantitative findings. Although not always through the measures expected, in the high-capacity regime of Zimbabwe, the ruling front succeeded in stabilizing authoritarian rule through elections, and its strategies depended in part on its state capacity and control over the economy. The long-term effects of the most recent supermajority victory are still to be seen. But in the short run, these elections have bought Mugabe and ZANU(PF) more time in power and taken the air out of the opposition, which, after 15 years in existence, is still struggling.

Chapter 10
Conclusion: Authoritarian Elections, Capacities, and Regime Stability – Where to go from Here?

The literature on authoritarian elections has encountered an apparent paradox. While some researchers have found a destabilizing and in some instances even a democratizing effect of authoritarian multi-party elections, others argue that such elections contribute to authoritarian regime stability. Why do multi-party elections sometimes stabilize authoritarian regimes while at other times they lead to their demise?

This dissertation has argued that the effect of authoritarian multi-party elections on regime stability is conditional upon the capacities available to rulers. Administrative capacity, coercive capacity, and control over the economy increase the probability that elections will contribute to authoritarian regime stability. Autocrats who preside over strong states and/or exhibit extensive control over the economy are more likely to see their regimes stabilize when holding authoritarian elections. But authoritarian rulers who have limited capacities will be more likely to experience breakdown following a multi-party election.

Authoritarian capacities enable and constrain electoral strategies aimed at affecting choices made by internal regime elites, opposition candidates, and ordinary citizens. In carrying out these strategies, autocrats attempt to ensure that the elites remain loyal, the opposition is demobilized or co-opted into the ruling front, voters support the ruling party, and protesters stay quiet following elections, thus leaving elections as tools to secure authoritarian regime survival. Thus, when we take account of the capacities that autocrats possess, the paradox of authoritarian elections is not so paradoxical after all.

This concluding chapter reflects upon this claim, the tests of the claim performed throughout the dissertation, and the implications of the results for both theory and practice. First, I briefly summarize the findings before I turn to the implications for the literature on authoritarianism and elections. Second, I ask what happens once an authoritarian regime has broken down following elections, and what other ramifications multi-party elections under autocracy might have. Finally, I briefly reflect upon the implications for democracy promotion efforts. Throughout, I suggest a number of avenues for future research.

The Dissertation's Findings

Authoritarian elections are neither a new nor a rare phenomenon. Chapter 2 showed that in 2008, 84% of all autocracies held some form of elections. 62% held multi-party elections. But authoritarian multi-party elections were rarer during the Cold War. Only since 1991 have we witnessed a dramatic increase in multi-party authoritarian elections – what the literature terms *hegemonic* (and in some instances *competitive*) regimes. Today, however, authoritarian multi-party elections occur across regions and across authoritarian regime types. But what happens when autocrats open up for multi-party competition?

In Chapter 6 I found that at low levels of administrative capacity, elections do not significantly affect the risk of regime breakdown. But when administrative capacity, proxied by the tax-to-GDP ratio, increases, the likelihood that an authoritarian regime breaks down following a multi-party election decreases. For medium and high levels of administrative capacity, holding elections reduces the risk of breakdown – and increasingly so as administrative capacity increases. The results are statistically significant and substantial: An increase in administrative capacity from the 5th to the 75th percentile would decrease the risk of breakdown following an authoritarian election by almost five percentage points – more than would a similar increase in the economic growth rate.

A similar conditional effect of economic control was found in Chapter 7. Proxying the incumbent's degree of control over the economy by an index comprising information on regulation of business, labor, and credit, income from natural resources, and the size of the public sector, the analyses showed a significant, negative conditional effect of economic control on the relationship between elections and regime breakdown. As an autocrat's control over the economy increases, the likelihood of breakdown in the first five years after a multi-party election decreases. For medium and high levels of control over the economy, electoral regimes are less likely to break down than are non-electoral regimes. The effect is not as strong as that of administrative capacity, but the risk of the regime breaking down following an authoritarian election would still decrease by 2.6 percentage points if economic control were to increase from the 10th to the 90th percentile.

Furthermore, the analyses also reveal that the absence of one capacity does not necessarily mean that elections are associated with breakdown. But when all three capacities are lacking, results indicate that autocrats are more likely to experience regime breakdown following an election. The findings support the macro-level argument: At least two of the three theorized

capacities, administrative capacity and economic control (I return to the effect of coercive capacity below), condition the effect of elections. But what about the micro-level mechanisms?

The dissertation does not test the micro-level theoretical framework in quantitative, cross-country analyses. But in Chapters 8-9, I rely on qualitative analyses to assess whether selected cases display the dynamics expected if the suggested micro-level mechanisms are indeed what underlie the macro-level correlations. The dynamics surrounding the elections in Malaysia in 1990 and the Philippines in 1986 largely support the argument. The evidence suggests that the ruling UMNO in Malaysia relied on its large and effective public workforce, control over the electoral commission, and its control over public resources to subtly manipulate elections. The strategies of systemic manipulation, manipulation of voters' preference formation, and legal harassment of the opposition were predominant in securing a supermajority victory, in turn co-opting defected elites back into the ruling party and sustaining legitimacy.

In the Philippines, contrary to expectations, more subtle manipulation strategies such as restricting the access to the vote by disenfranchising suspected opposition supporters were carried out in spite of a lack of administrative capacity and control over the economy. But as expected, the Marcos leadership's primary measures were overt fraud on Election Day and physical harassment of the opposition, and the result was a backlash of public protests. Lacking the control over the coercive forces necessary to quell this "People Power Revolution," the regime collapsed. Thus, although the case studies do not rule out alternative explanations for electoral outcomes and regime survival in Malaysia and collapse in the Philippines, the dynamics in the cases are in line with theoretical expectations, thus lending further support to the theory.

However, whereas conditioning effects of administrative capacity and economic control were detected in Chapters 6-7, no such effect of coercive capacity was found. Based on data on military capacity, Chapter 6 rejected the hypothesis that coercive capacity conditions the effect of authoritarian multi-party elections on regime stability. Not even where administrative capacity and control over the economy were limited was an effect of coercive capacity found.

This finding, however, is nuanced in the case studies, particularly by the evidence of the authoritarian leadership's strategies in Zimbabwe during the 2008 and 2013 elections, presented in Chapter 9. With medium levels of administrative capacity and high levels of coercive capacity and control over the economy, Zimbabwe was a high-capacity case. In this light, it is

surprising that Mugabe's ruling front relied primarily on overt strategies of Election Day fraud and physical harassment of the opposition to survive the 2008 elections. The case thus demonstrates that merely possessing capacities does not necessarily mean that the rulers will use these capacities. In the case of Zimbabwe in 2008, it seems the government underestimated the threat from elections, and that once it realized its precarious position, its only option was to turn to emergency measures of overt repression.

The analysis of the elections in Zimbabwe thus serves to nuance the findings on the role of coercive capacity. At least in Mugabe's Zimbabwe, the coercive force of the ruler proved decisive for electoral dynamics. Had it not been for its colossal coercive apparatus, including the military, the police force, the war veterans, and the youth militias, Mugabe and ZANU(PF) most likely would have been unable to turn what looked like an electoral loss in the first round of the 2008 elections into a victory and a power sharing agreement that ultimately turned out to their advantage. Similarly, although the dynamics that unfolded in the 2013 elections correspond more closely to the theoretical apparatus – ZANU(PF) drew on its dominance of the administration as well as its economic resources from the diamond fields to restrict access to the polls in opposition strongholds and to obstruct the opposition campaign – the coercive apparatus still played an important role. Thus, whereas the coercive apparatus played only a minor role in Malaysia, where UMNO instead relied on its administrative capacity and control over the economy, the Mugabe government in Zimbabwe kept turning to its coercive apparatus even though it had other capacities on which to rely.

The contrasting findings of the quantitative and qualitative studies on the role of coercive capacity could easily be explained if Zimbabwe is simply considered a unique case in which the coercive apparatus played an exceptionally large part. This is indeed the case to some degree. But it is also likely that the quantitative analyses simply cannot fully take into account the effect of coercive capacity, as only cross-national data on military spending and personnel are available. In Zimbabwe, the loyal police force that carried out the day-to-day harassment of the opposition, the large group of war veterans who were the main actors behind the farm invasions, and the youth militias in charge of parts of Harare all played an important role in both the 2008 and 2013 elections. However, such groups are not captured in the cross-national analyses that rely solely on data on military capacity.

Thus, it could provide a fruitful avenue for future studies to develop more complete measures of coercive capacity. Relying on measures of military personnel, Albertus and Menaldo have investigated the effect of coercive capacity on the prospects for democratization in authoritarian regimes

(2012) and Andersen and collaborators have looked at the effect of military spending on the likelihood of authoritarian breakdown (2014). But there is still a need to further explore the effect of coercive apparatuses beyond military capacities on regime stability – in both electoral and non-electoral regimes. Such endeavors would line up neatly with the blossoming research agenda on state repression (e.g., Davenport 2007; Wood 2008; Bhasin and Gandhi 2013; Regan and Henderson 2002; Escribà-Folch 2013).

Implications of the Results for the Literature on Authoritarian Elections

Supporting the claims made by researchers such as Geddes (1999) and Svolik (2012), this dissertation has demonstrated that it can be rewarding to take seriously the many traits that vary across dictatorships. Both administrative capacity and control over the economy have been shown to affect the relationship between multi-party elections and authoritarian regime stability. Thus, taking the capacities available to rulers into account, the paradox of authoritarian elections is not so paradoxical after all. Rather, the effect of authoritarian elections on regime stability is conditioned by the administrative capacity at the disposal of the autocrat as well as his control over the economy.

The findings have several implications for the future study of authoritarian regimes. First, researchers have realized that the great variation among authoritarian regimes matters to both durability and a wide range of policy decisions. But the focus has primarily been on the effect of authoritarian regime type (e.g., Geddes 2003; Magaloni 2008; Wright 2008; Fjelde 2010; Knutsen and Fjelde 2013; Weeks 2012, 2). Researchers have argued that the group from which leaders are drawn and the structure for accessing power and making policy decisions matter, i.e., party regimes behave differently from personalist or military regimes. This dissertation has demonstrated that other traits, in the form of capacities and their interactions with elections, also matter to regime dynamics. Thus, it would be fruitful to look at other variations across authoritarian regimes in addition to the various regime types.

A potential avenue for further research would be to apply the distinction between various levels of capacities to existing findings in the literature on authoritarian elections. For instance, the literature on electoral authoritarianism has commonly separated regimes that hold multi-party elections into competitive regimes, those with unfair elections but some level of uncertainty over electoral outcomes, and hegemonic autocracies, in which the in-

cumbent always wins, and argued that hegemonic regimes are more stable than are competitive regimes (e.g., Schedler 2013, 167–168). This finding, however, is hardly surprising (regimes in which rulers do not lose elections are more stable than those in which they occasionally do), and it is also unclear what is driving the relationship. The proposition almost begs the question why some authoritarian regimes remain hegemonic while others turn competitive. While most of the regimes that the literature classifies as competitive are excluded from the analyses of this dissertation because they feature uncertainty over electoral outcomes and are thus classified as democratic, the distinction between different levels of capacities may still help shed light on the relationship. Could the observed differences between the so-called competitive and hegemonic autocracies be explained by differing levels of capacities? Perhaps the rulers of hegemonic regimes (i.e., Singapore) are successful in generating supermajority victories, and thus having their regime classified as hegemonic, precisely because they have, on average, higher levels of capacities than do competitive regimes (i.e., Kenya during the 1990s).

Second, the dissertation also challenges the voluntarist perspective that the effect of authoritarian elections depends on actor choices (Schedler 2013). Whereas the choices of central actors may indeed be decisive in the two-level game of authoritarian elections, this does not mean that we should not attempt to unfold the factors that shape such actor choices and search for more general patterns. The claims made by Howard and Roessler (2006), Bunce and Wolchik (2011), and Donno (2013) that opposition party mobilization and unity matters to the effect of authoritarian elections or the notion that the people's choice of protesting electoral fraud brings down authoritarian regimes (Kuntz and Thompson 2009) may indeed be true. But this dissertation has demonstrated that the capacities at the disposal of the autocrat can affect the choices made by the opposition, the citizens, and the internal regime elites. In doing so, these capacities also condition the effect of elections.

Thus, the possibility of a transfer of power following elections in Zimbabwe was diminished by the opposition's splits in 2005 and 2014. But these internal opposition skirmishes did not occur in a vacuum. They reflect the choices of opposition leaders, but they were also affected by the strategies of opposition harassment and manipulation carried out by ZANU(PF). Relying on its strong coercive apparatus and a loyal bureaucracy, even during the coalition government from 2009-2013, Mugabe's leadership was able to continuously inhibit opposition activity and attempted to portray the opposition as incompetent. These strategies have undoubtedly contributed to the

opposition's current state of crisis and thus also to the diminished prospects for regime change. Moving forward, this link between the micro and the macro levels, between actors and structures, must continue to be taken seriously.

One way of doing so would be to test the interaction between actors, capacities, and strategies further by performing quantitative, cross-national tests of the theoretical mechanisms linking the micro to the macro level. In this dissertation, I have assessed such claims against the evidence provided by selected cases, but a number of these questions could – and should – be tested across countries. For instance, judged on data across countries and over time, are elite defections rarer where state capacity and control over the economy abound? Are opposition splits or co-optation of opposition figures more common in regimes where the state apparatus and control over the economy is used to harass the opposition? Do autocrats with high levels of administrative capacity tend to use more subtle forms of electoral manipulation? Although attaining such data across authoritarian regimes is tricky, it can indeed be done, as has been proven by Gandhi and Reuter, who analyze the effect of economic crises on the likelihood of elite defections in electoral autocracies (2011), as well as Bhasin and Gandhi, looking into the timing and targeting of authoritarian repression during election campaigns (2013). Such analyses would contribute to further testing the claims of this dissertation, and generate new knowledge on authoritarian regime dynamics on the micro level.

What Happens When Authoritarian Regimes Break Down?

This dissertation has focused on the effect of elections on authoritarian regime stability. But breakdown, the absence of stability, comes in many forms. The regime may be thrown into civil war or experience foreign occupation, it may give way to a new – and perhaps even more repressive – autocracy, or it may democratize. Where a new autocracy emerges, it could take on various forms (i.e., a party regime, a military dictatorship, a monarchy, or personalist rule) and the leadership could abandon or maintain multi-party elections. The result of an authoritarian regime breakdown is not trivial, but the question of what happens next has not been covered in the analyses of this dissertation. Here, however, I briefly reflect upon the results of authoritarian regime breakdowns.

As described in Chapter 5, the full dataset covering the period 1946-2008 includes 215 country-years that saw at least one authoritarian regime breakdown (after excluding the breakdowns that occurred in a regime lasting for less than a year as described in Chapter 5). 62 of these breakdowns occurred in regimes that had held a multi-party election within the past five years. The rest occurred in regimes with no recent multi-party elections. But what followed these breakdowns, which were potentially spurred on by – among other things – electoral dynamics? Table 10.1 shows that 58% of breakdowns in electoral regimes (those with a multi-party election within the past five years) resulted in a democratic regime in the following year. This group includes cases such as the collapse of the Marcos regime in the Philippines in 1986 and the following democracy led by Aquino, and the existing Mexican democracy that followed 71 years of PRI rule. Another 34% were replaced by a new authoritarian regime. One example is Cote d'Ivoire in 2000, where protests over a flawed election unseated the military leader and paved the way for Laurent Gbagbo to take over power and run another dictatorship until he was unseated in 2011.The remaining cases ended in a provisional regime, a foreign occupation, or instances where the regime did not control the majority of the territory.

Table 10.1: Regime type following breakdown

	Old regime	
New regime	Electoral	Non-electoral
Democracy[***]	58%	27%
	(36)	(41)
Autocracy[**]	34%	48%
	(21)	(74)
Other[**]	8%	25%
	(5)	(38)
Total	100%	100%
	(62)	(153)

Note: Regime type that follows a breakdown. Electoral regimes have held a multi-party election within the past five years. Non-electoral regimes have not. Significance levels refer to the difference between the electoral and the non-electoral group. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

In regimes that had not held a recent multi-party election, the outcome is different. Here, only 27% of breakdowns resulted in democracy in the following year. This difference in propensity to democratize between electoral and non-electoral regimes is both substantial (31 percentage points) and statistically significant. 48% of the non-electoral breakdown cases saw a new au-

tocracy emerge, in contrast to only 34% of the electoral, and this difference is again statistically significant. Finally, an additional 25% of the non-electoral cases broke down only to see a regime that was neither authoritarian nor democratic emerge instead. This propensity is greater than for electoral regimes and the difference is statistically significant.

Thus, these initial analyses leaving out any form of controls indicate that regime transitions following a multi-party election are more likely to result in democratization than are transitions from a non-electoral regime. When multi-party electoral authoritarian regimes broke down, democratization was the most likely outcome. Where non-electoral regimes broke down, the most common result was a new autocracy. These results corroborate previous findings that whereas elections do not directly affect breakdown propensities, electoral autocracies are more likely to democratize (Brownlee 2009a; Hadenius and Teorell 2007). However, it is worth noting that 34% of the breakdowns following an authoritarian election paved the way for a new authoritarian regime. Thus, although democracy was the most common result, breakdown by elections was by no means a certain way of getting there.

Of the 21 electoral regimes that broke down and were followed by another authoritarian regime, 12 (57%) held a new multi-party election within the following five years; the remaining did not. Thus, there is no clear tendency that taking over from an electoral regime forces an autocrat to maintain elections. Furthermore, of the 21 regimes that turned authoritarian, eight saw military rule in the following year, 12 experienced personalist rule, and only one turned into a party regime. Thus, there are no indications from the data available here that the holding of elections fosters party-based regimes either. Rather, it seems that electoral regimes tend to turn personalist or give up power in the face of a military coup.

Such findings need to be controlled for the type of regime that broke down. If military regimes were more likely to break down following elections, and also more likely to be followed by another military regime, this could explain this relationship. However, the preliminary findings match the recent finding that authoritarian elections increase the likelihood of coups (Wig and Rød 2014).[47] But the question remains how the holding of elections, or perhaps accumulated experience with elections, affects future authoritarian re-

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[47] This analysis could also be qualified by testing whether the relationship is conditioned by authoritarian capacities. It is possible that the likelihood of coups following authoritarian elections is, just like the likelihood of breakdown in general, dependent on the capacities and strategies of the authoritarian rulers.

gimes in the longer term. Are autocrats who rule a country in which citizens are accustomed to multi-party elections perhaps more likely to reinstate elections and reintroduce party-based rule in the longer term? The effect of elections on authoritarian regime dynamics following breakdown merits further study.

Turning instead to the electoral autocracies that broke down and democratized, another range of questions arises. If authoritarian regimes are more likely to democratize if they have held recent elections, and breakdowns are more likely to occur in electoral regimes with low levels of administrative capacity and economic control, what does that imply for the relationship between authoritarian capacities and the prospects for democratization? On the one hand, low levels of capacities may increase the likelihood that a transition will occur. On the other hand, a democratization process may be inhibited by low levels of capacities. The importance of particularly state capacity, not only for democratic survival but also for the transition to democracy, has received increasing attention (e.g., Mazzuca and Munck 2014; Andersen et al. 2014; Cornell and Lapuente 2014). Whereas some argue that a strong administrative apparatus need not necessarily be in place prior to democratization – after all, this was not the case in most of the democracies of today (Mazzuca and Munck 2014, 1236) – others have found that although we do not know how state capacity affects the prospect for democratization, it does promote stability of both authoritarian and democratic regimes (Andersen et al. 2014).

Studies emphasizing state capacity as instrumental for democratic development or stability often focus on administrative capacity, and stress aspects such as an independent and meritocratic bureaucracy (Cornell and Lapuente 2014; Andersen et al. 2014). This conceptualization of administrative capacity is different from the one employed here, where the administrative capacity of an authoritarian regime is perceived as higher if the bureaucracy is controlled by the autocrat rather than independent. Nonetheless, it remains crucial to unfold the role of state capacity in democratic transitions.

While this is outside of the scope of this dissertation, Table 10.2 summarizes the average levels of administrative capacity, coercive capacity, and economic control for authoritarian regimes that broke down following multi-party elections. Furthermore, it does so separately for those electoral regimes that democratized and those that did not. Since only 62 authoritarian country-years saw a breakdown following a recent election and some of these regimes do not have data on the indicators of capacities for the given year, the number of observations in each cell is small. Generally speaking, the regimes that democratized had on average higher levels of state capacity,

both administrative and coercive, and higher levels of control over the economy than did the regimes that collapsed only to give way to a new authoritarian regime or some form of interim regime. For administrative and coercive capacity, these differences are statistically significant. This lends initial support to the notion that although state capacity may prevent autocracies from breaking down, it may support democratization processes once they do. Whether these results are robust to controls for confounding factors and can be supported by theoretical mechanisms remains to be tested. But the preliminary findings speak to Levitsky and Way's recent observation that authoritarian crises caused by weak or failed states rarely bring democratization (Levitsky and Way 2015, 49–50). An important avenue for future research would be to investigate how the capacities available to authoritarian rulers, whether they hold elections or not, affect the probability not only that the regime will break down but also that it will be followed by a democracy.

Table 10.2: Average levels of capacity for electoral regimes in the year of experiencing breakdown

Average capacities in the year of breakdown	New regime	
	Democracy	Non-Democracy
Tax-to-GDP ratio[*]	0.13	0.11
	N=20	N=18
Log of military spending[***]	9.86	8.76
	N=31	N=27
Economic control index	-0.05	-0.08
	N=22	N=13

Note: Average levels of capacities held by the electoral authoritarian regimes in the years they experienced breakdown. Significance levels refer to the difference between democracies and non-democracies. [*] $p < 0.10$, [**] $p < 0.05$, [***] $p < 0.01$.

What Other Effects Could Follow from Authoritarian Elections?

Moving beyond the type of regime that follows an electoral authoritarian breakdown, there are still a number of factors that may be affected by the holding of elections. The links between democratizing elections or post-conflict elections and violence are already being investigated (e.g., Brancati and Snyder 2013; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Hug 2013; Höglund 2009), and as mentioned above, Wig and Rød have recently shown that authoritarian

elections increase the risk of coups (2014). Furthermore, Fjelde and Höglund examine the link between majoritarian political systems and electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa and find that both majoritarian institutions and ethnic exclusion increase the risk of electoral violence, but they do not distinguish between democratic and authoritarian regimes (2014). And Bhasin and Gandhi (2013) find that prior to presidential elections, autocrats target repression at leading opposition figures rather than the public. But do multi-party elections increase not just inter-ethnic violence but also the prevalence of government-directed violence in authoritarian regimes? Or do elections force rulers to give up on violent repression so as not to lose votes? In other words, is violence more or less common than in non-electoral or one-party electoral autocracies? And do elections have differing effects on violence in authoritarian and democratic systems? Many questions about the link between authoritarian elections and violence – not to mention how electoral violence may be prevented through pressure from the outside – are still unanswered.

Furthermore, it could also be argued that multi-party elections hold the potential to improve standards of living, for instance by increasing the responsiveness of the autocrat. Supporting this perspective, a recent study by Miller (2014) finds that the holding of elections as such does not affect policy choices, but where autocrats perform poorly in elections, they respond by increasing social spending while cutting military spending. Thus, while this dissertation has argued that the effect of elections on authoritarian regime stability is in part dependent on the capacities available to rulers, a wide range of questions about the broader effects of multi-party competition in authoritarian regimes remain unanswered.

What Are the Implications for Democracy Promotion Efforts?

When autocrats lack central capacities, holding elections increases the likelihood of regime breakdown. In some instances, regimes democratize after authoritarian elections. But the likelihood of a new authoritarian regime taking over is also large. In regimes where authoritarian leaders prevail over strong states and control the economy, on the other hand, elections are associated with regime stability. What do these findings imply for domestic and international efforts at democracy promotion?

First, the findings show that holding multi-party elections does not necessarily bring a regime closer to democratizing. Whereas practitioners and

scholars alike have promoted the idea that flawed elections are better than no elections because multi-party regimes have a greater tendency to democratize (Lindberg 2006; Schedler 2013, 380–381; Hadenius and Teorell 2007, 154), this dissertation has shown that where authoritarian rulers have a strong administrative apparatus and control the economy, they are more likely to secure authoritarian rule if they hold multi-party elections than if they do not. This would lead us to caution against the unrestricted effort to promote multi-party elections in authoritarian regimes. In low-capacity regimes, such contests may spark breakdown – although it remains unclear whether such a breakdown has a significant chance of leading to democratic stability – and in high-capacity regimes, elections increase authoritarian durability. This finding supports Dahl's original warning that "it is a grave mistake to assume that if only leaders of a non-democratic country can be persuaded to hold elections, then full democracy will follow" (R. Dahl 1992, 246). Rather, before pressing for the introduction of elections, it is essential to survey the context in which these elections will operate, and to think of other types of reforms that could potentially change the patterns of authoritarian electoral manipulation – and support democratic developments if the authoritarian regime collapses.[48]

Second, the finding that strong administrative apparatuses may enable authoritarian rulers to hold on to power through elections should also cause us to pay more attention to the ongoing debate on the sequencing of democratic reforms, particularly competitive elections and state capacity. Some researchers argue that certain levels of state capacity are necessary or at least beneficial to acquire prior to the introduction of multi-party competition in order for democracy to emerge (Zakaria 1997; Mansfield and Snyder 2007; Fukuyama 2007; see also Svensson 2012). But others criticize this call for democratic sequencing and argue that rather than wait around for dictators to reform their states, it is necessary to push for democratization, including the introduction of multi-party elections in authoritarian regimes, and then attend to state-building on the go (Carothers 2007a; Carothers 2007b). Sometimes, democratization processes may in fact be conducive to state-building (Carothers 2007a; Mazzuca and Munck 2014). The debate remains

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[48] Although advocating for the introduction of multi-party elections in order to promote democratization regardless of the authoritarian context, Carothers stresses a number of reforms that domestic or international democracy promoters may push for to ensure that elections do not merely serve the will of the autocrat, including the introduction of an independent electoral commission and support for domestic election observers (Carothers 2007a, 26).

unsettled, but the findings presented here lend insight to the relationship between state capacity, elections, and democratization.

In particular, the type of capacity building will matter to electoral dynamics and their effect on authoritarian rule. Thus, the analyses demonstrate that building state capacity in the form of *restrictions* to authoritarian rulers' control over the state apparatus and the economy may make them less likely to manipulate the electoral contest to their own advantage. Such limits to the autocrat's control could increase the chances that the authoritarian regime breaks down in the face of multi-party elections. As argued by Carothers, autocrats rarely take such initiatives without facing substantial pressure to do so (2007a). But democracy promotion efforts in authoritarian contexts are increasingly focused on supporting pluralism and strengthening the market and the state independently of rulers (Carothers 2015, 62–63). However, as discussed above, even where electoral autocracies collapse, democracy will not necessarily follow. On the other hand, strengthening the state apparatus while an autocrat *remains in control* of it may in fact enable the autocrat to take advantage of electoral institutions to prolong his rule. Such capacity building could support authoritarian rule rather than increase the prospects for democratization.

Thus, some aspects of the state, such as agreement on citizenship rights and a monopoly on the use of force, are seen as preconditions for a functioning democracy (e.g., J. Linz and Stepan 1996; Møller and Skaaning 2011b). And other factors, such as reforms that secure meritocracy or some degree of independence of the bureaucracy, that thus restrict the autocrat's control over state institutions, may increase the likelihood of the autocrat losing power in the context of multi-party elections. But if a strong state that is controlled by the autocrat is combined with the holding of multi-party elections, these institutions will contribute to authoritarian stability. These findings do not provide concrete guidelines on how to promote democracy in authoritarian contexts. Rather, they point to further challenges to democracy promotion and capacity building. But in doing so, the analyses bring us closer to understanding the specific dynamics of non-democratic elections and their relation to authoritarian regime stability and the prospects for democratization.

Summary

An apparent paradox of authoritarian elections prevails. While some researchers have argued that multi-party elections in dictatorships may destabilize and sometimes even democratize the regime, others have found that authoritarian multi-party elections contribute to regime stability. This dissertation poses the question: Why do multi-party elections sometimes stabilize authoritarian regimes while at other times they lead to their demise?

Rather than accepting the apparent paradox of authoritarian elections, this dissertation argues that the effect of multi-party elections on the likelihood of regime breakdown depends on the central capacities of the authoritarian regime. The greater the administrative capacity or economic control an autocrat has at his disposal, the more likely elections are to be regime-stabilizing. Where administrative capacity and economic control are limited, autocrats may rely on their coercive apparatus to ensure short-term survival. When an incumbent controls neither the administrative or coercive apparatus nor the economy, he is more likely to succumb in the face of multiparty elections. Authoritarian capacities affect electoral dynamics because they enable and constrain electoral strategies aimed at affecting choices made by internal regime elites, opposition candidates, and ordinary citizens over whether to support the rulers or challenge them. Thus, when we account for the capacities that autocrats possess, the effect of authoritarian elections is not so paradoxical after all.

These claims are tested through cross-national, quantitative analyses and in studies of selected cases of authoritarian multi-party elections. Relying on data for all authoritarian regimes from 1960-2006, the dissertation shows that when administrative capacity, proxied by tax extraction rates, increases, the likelihood that the authoritarian regime breaks down following a multiparty election decreases. At medium to high levels of administrative capacity, holding elections reduces the risk of breakdown. A similar conditioning effect of economic control, proxied by an index containing information on the size of the public sector, regulation of business, and income from natural resources, is also found. As the autocrat's control over the economy increases, the likelihood of regime breakdown in the aftermath of a multi-party election is reduced. But no such effect of coercive capacity, gauged by various measures of military capacity, is found. However, when all three capacities are lacking, results indicate that autocrats are more likely to experience regime breakdown following an election. The findings support the macro-level

argument: two of the three theorized capacities, administrative capacity and economic control, condition the effect of elections.

Four case studies then assess the claim that the macro-level correlation between capacities and breakdown propensities following elections appears because authoritarian capacities affect the autocrat's ability to carry out manipulative and repressive electoral strategies aimed at internal elites, the opposition, and citizens. An analysis of the 1986 elections in the Philippines, a case of breakdown by elections, and one of the Malaysian elections of 1990, a case of stabilization by elections, support the overall claim. The strategies employed by the ruling party and the effects of the electoral victory of 1990 on Malaysian elites, opposition, and citizens correspond well with the theoretical framework. The party leadership relied primarily on its administrative capacity but also its control over the economy to subtly manipulate elections. In the Philippines, contrary to expectations, President Marcos' ruling elite pulled off a number of manipulative strategies. But in correspondence with theoretical expectations, the strategies eventually failed and the regime did not have the coercive power to quell the anti-Marcos protests, resulting ultimately in post-electoral collapse.

A second set of cases nuances the findings. In spite of high degrees of economic control and moderate levels of administrative capacity, President Mugabe of Zimbabwe and his ruling group did not stick to subtle manipulation strategies in the 2008 elections. Rather, they relied primarily on overt repression strategies and a strong coercive force to win elections. But in correspondence with expectations, these strategies backfired. The regime survived but did not experience the full range of stabilizing effects of an electoral super-majority victory. In the 2013 elections, on the other hand, Mugabe and his partners seemed to have learned their lesson and relied more heavily on subtle manipulation tactics afforded by both the state apparatus and control over the economy. These strategies largely worked as expected, contributing to the post-electoral stability of the regime. Thus, at least in the case of Mugabe's Zimbabwe, coercive capacity did matter to the effect of authoritarian elections.

The dissertation finds support for the claim that the differing effects of authoritarian multi-party elections on regime stability can be partly explained by the variation in administrative capacity and control over the economy across autocracies. No general effect of coercive capacity was found, although it did indeed affect electoral dynamics in Zimbabwe in 2008 and 2013. In general, the case studies support the idea that the capacities autocrats preside over work to support authoritarian rule because they allow autocrats to subtly manipulate elections, keep elites loyal, co-opt and divide

the opposition, and prevent protests from appearing. Thus, authoritarian capacities condition the effect of elections on regime stability.

The findings have several implications for the literature on authoritarianism. First, they demonstrate the importance of acknowledging the role actor choices play in regime transitions while still searching for the structures that shape such choices to better understand regime dynamics. Even though the actions of leaders and opposition seem decisive, underlying structures, such as authoritarian capacities, shape these actions. Second, the dissertation demonstrates that although distinguishing between various types of authoritarian regimes has taught us much about regime dynamics, other factors, such as authoritarian capacities, are equally important to take into account. Finally, the findings present a warning to democracy promoters: Neither the introduction of multi-party competition nor the building of state capacities in authoritarian regimes are unproblematic routes to democracy. In combination, these factors may contribute to authoritarian durability.

Danish summary

Effekten af autoritære flerpartivalg synes paradoksal: Mens nogen forskere fremhæver den destabiliserende og potentielt demokratiserende effekt, som afholdelsen af flerpartivalg i autokratier kan have, har andre påpeget, at autokrater kan benytte flerpartivalg til at stabilisere regimet. Denne afhandling stiller spørgsmålet: Hvorfor bidrager autoritære flerpartivalg nogen gange til regimets stabilitet og andre gange til dets sammenbrud?

Fremfor at acceptere tilstedeværelsen af et paradoks argumenterer denne afhandling for, at effekten af flerpartivalg på autoritær regimestabilitet afhænger af regimets centrale kapaciteter. Hvis en diktator besidder et effektivt bureaukrati (administrativ kapacitet) og et stærkt repressivt apparat (repressiv kapacitet) og kontrollerer økonomien, vil det øge sandsynligheden for, at afholdelsen af valg bidrager til at stabilisere regimet. Hvor disse kapaciteter er fraværende, vil der være større risiko for regimesammenbrud umiddelbart efter afholdelsen af valg. Det sker, da diktatorer kan udnytte statsapparatet og deres kontrol over økonomien til at foretage subtil valgmanipulation og målrettet repression, der påvirker centrale aktører. Hvor disse strategier udføres, vil den interne elite have en større tilbøjelighed til at forblive loyale overfor lederen, oppositionen vil oftere splitte eller lade sig bestikke til at støtte den siddende regering, og befolkningen vil undlade at protestere mod det autoritære regime. Når regimets kapaciteter tages i betragtning, vil effekten af autoritære valg ikke længere synes paradoksal.

Teorien testes i tværnationale, kvantitative analyser og i studier af udvalgte cases. På baggrund af data for alle autoritære regimer fra 1960-2008 viser afhandlingen at administrativ kapacitet, målt som landets skatteinddragelsesprocent relativt til BNP, betinger effekten af valg. For moderate og høje niveauer af administrativ kapacitet svinder sandsynligheden for regimesammenbrud, når der afholdes valg. Og jo mere den administrative kapacitet stiger, jo stærkere bliver denne effekt. Der findes en tilsvarende effekt af økonomisk kontrol målt på baggrund af informationer om størrelsen af den offentlige sektor, regulering af det private marked samt indtægter fra naturressourcer. Hvor kontrollen med økonomien er moderat til høj, bidrager valg til regimestabilitet, og når kontrollen stiger, øges denne effekt. Men der findes ikke en tisvarende effekt af repressiv kapacitet målt som hverken militærudgifter eller antallet af militærpersoner. Dog indikerer analyserne, at hvor både administrativ kapacitet, repressiv kapacitet og kontrol med økonomien er begrænset, vil autoritære regimer være mere tilbøjelige til at kollapse, hvis de afholder flerpartivalg.

Mens de tværnationale studier således støtter hovedargumentet – to ud af tre kapaciteter har en signifikant, betingende effekt på forholdet mellem valg og regimestabilitet – så undersøger casestudierne mikroniveauet. Skyldes korrelationen mellem kapaciteter og stabilitet, at autokraten udnytter sine kapaciteter til subtilt at manipulere valgene og dermed påvirke den interne elite, oppositionen og befolkningen? En analyse af valget i Filippinerne i 1986, et valg der udfoldede sig under en diktator med begrænsede kapaciteter og førte til regimesammenbrud, samt et studie af valget i Malaysia i 1990, hvor et højkapacitetsregime forblev stabilt, støtter det overordnede argument. Regeringspartiet i Malaysia udnyttede både det stærke bureaukrati og sin kontrol med økonomien til subtilt at manipulere valget til sin egen fordel. Eliten forblev loyal, oppositionen blev obstrueret i sine kampagneaktiviteter og den solide valgsejr stabiliserede regimet. I Filippinerne formåede Præsident Marcos på trods af begrænsede kapaciteter at stjæle valget. Men den åbenlyse valgsvindel gav bagslag, og Marcos kunne ikke trække på et loyalt repressivt apparat og måtte i stedet forlade magten, da folkelige protester blussede op.

Det andet sæt af cases nuancerer både teorien og de kvantitative fund. På trods af et relativt stærkt statsapparat og kontrol med økonomien forlod Zimbabwes diktator, Mugabe, sig primært på sit repressive apparat under valgkampen i 2008. Den forventede, subtile manipulation, som Mugabe havde kapaciteterne til at udføre, forekom ikke. Denne alternative strategi gav dog bagslag. Regimet vandt valget, men opnåede ikke den ønskede legitimitet. I valget i 2013 var Mugabes strategier tydeligt ændret. Selvom Mugabe stadig anvendte sit repressive apparat, benyttede styret en lang række mere subtile teknikker med fundament i den ekstensive kontrol med økonomien og det administrative apparat. Denne gang havde valgsejren en række af de forventede effekter, og regimets fortsatte eksistens blev ikke truet af valget. Valgene i Zimbabwe understøtter det teoretiske argument, men demonstrerer også, at på trods af de insignifikante resultater af de tværnationale studier, så har repressiv kapacitet stor betydning i visse elektorale autokratier.

Afhandlingen finder støtte til det teoretiske argument: De divergerende effekter af flerpartivalg i diktaturer kan delvist forklares med varierende niveauer af administrativ kapacitet og økonomisk kontrol på tværs af autoritære regimer. Der blev ikke fundet nogen betingende effekt af repressiv kapacitet, selvom dette uden tvivl havde betydning under de analyserede valg i Zimbabwe. Overordnet set støtter casestudierne desuden mikroniveauargumentet om, at kapaciteter betinger effekten af valg, fordi de påvirker

centrale aktørers beslutninger om at støtte regimet eller udfordre det. Autoritære kapaciteter betinger effekten af valg på regimestabilitet.

Resultaterne har implikationer for litteraturen om autoritære regimer. For det første demonstrerer de vigtigheden af ikke blot at påpege betydningen af aktørvalg i regimetransitioner, men også at søge efter de strukturer, der former og begrænser aktørers valg. Selvom elitens og oppositionens handlinger synes afgørende, så er de formet af underliggende strukturer såsom regimets kapaciteter. For det andet påpeger afhandlingen, at selvom en sondring mellem forskellige regimetyper har tilført megen ny viden til studiet af autoritære regimer, så er det vigtigt at tage andre faktorer, såsom regimekapaciteter, i betragtning, når man søger at forstå diktaturer. Endelig understreger resultaterne yderligere kompleksiteter i forsøget på at promovere demokrati: Hverken introduktion af flerpartivalg eller kapacitetsopbygning udgør sikre måder at udbrede demokrati på. Derimod kan disse to faktorer i kombination bidrage til opretholdelsen af diktaturer.

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Interviews

Interview with anonymous businessman, Bulawayo, May 25 2014.

Interview with anonymous civil society activist, Harare, May 27 2014.

Interview with anonymous journalist and civil society activist, Bulawayo, May 24 2014.

Interview with David Colthart, former MDC minister during the IG and current member of Senate, Bulawayo, May 24, 2014.

Interview with Eddie Cross, MDC-T parliamentarian, Bulawayo, May 24 2014.

Interview with Eddie Cross, MDC-T parliamentarian, Harare, May 30 2014.

Interview with Eldred Masunungure, political science professor, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, May 21 2014.

Interview with Hasu Patel, political science professor, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, May 28 2014.

Interview with Jakob Bugge, diplomat at the Danish Embassy to Zimbabwe, Harare, May 23 2014.

Interview with Jørgen Elklit, election expert visiting Zimbabwe for IFES, Aarhus, Denmark, December 16, 2014.

Interview with Sesel Zvidsai, MDC-T parliamentarian, Harare, May 30 2014.

Appendix 1. Imputation of Data on Administrative Capacity and Economic Control

Appendix 1 describes the procedures used when imputing the two conditioning variables, the tax-to-GDP ratio and the index on regulations, for which data are missing for part of the sample. The imputations are conducted using Amelia II (Honaker, King, and Blackwell 2012). For the tax variables, I only impute data for the time period 1960-2006, for which the original data are available. For the variables on economic control, I only impute data for the period covered by the original data, namely 1970-2006. I run 20 imputations and restrict the range of the imputed variables to the values allowed by the original variables.

The imputation of both variables relies on data on regime breakdown, duration, and regime type from Geddes et al. (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a), Polity score and data on civil liberties and political rights from Freedom House, ethnic fractionalization (Alesina et al. 2003), literacy rates, birth rates and agricultural dependence (Hendrix 2010), data on the protection of property rights, legal enforcement of contracts, the data on multi-party elections, the logarithm of GDP per capita and income from natural resources (Haber and Menaldo 2011), the logarithm of military expenditure and personnel (Singer et al. 1972), the tax-to-GDP ratio and trade tax-to-GDP ratio from an alternative source with limited coverage (Cagé and Gadenne 2014), an index of bureaucratic quality (Political Risk Services 2013), occurrence of protests (Banks and Wilson 2012), the logarithm of total population, government revenue, exports, mining, and government consumption from the World Bank (World Bank 2014b), the logarithm of government share of GDP and of total exports and imports (Penn World Table 2013), the logarithm of government expenditure and government expenses on wages from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014b), and time trends. The imputations also include the variables to be imputed, namely regulations of credit, labor and business from the Economic Freedom in the World Dataset (Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall 2013), and the tax-to-GDP ratio (Hendrix 2010).

Imputation of the Tax-to-GDP ratio

The most common form of imputation is to fill in randomly missing values or "gaps" in time-series data. But for the tax-to-GDP ratio, observations with missing values are either country-years before 1960 for which no tax data are available (I do not include the imputed values for the years prior to the availability of tax data in the analyses) or the post-communist countries, as the entire region lacks tax data. Thus, for every post-communist country, it is not just randomly missing values but the entire panel that is imputed. This makes the imputation procedure problematic. Whether the other variables included in the imputation model are sufficient to construct valid proxies of the tax extraction rate for each post-communist country is dubious and the imputed values will thus only be employed in robustness checks and should be interpreted with caution. Post-imputation diagnostics reveal that the mean of the imputed data is slightly higher than that of the observed data and that the imputed data points have a narrower distribution (red line) – most of the missing country-years have received imputed tax-to-GDP ratios close to the mean of the imputed data and slightly above the mean of the observed data (Black line; see Figure 5.a). It is not meaningful to plot time-series of observed and imputed variables across selected countries since each country either has only observed or only imputed data on the variable. I employ the imputed tax data in robustness checks in Chapter 6.

Figure 5.a: Distribution of imputed and observed values, tax to GDP ratio

Imputation of the Regulation Index

Whereas the tax-to-GDP ratio had missing values for whole time-series in selected countries, the economic indices miss data for all countries for selected years. For the period 1980-2000, data are available every fifth year. For both these indices, the distribution of imputed values closely resembles that of observed values. However, plots of data for randomly selected countries reveal problems. Figure 5.b plots the observed values (the black dots) along with the imputed values (the red dots) on the regulation index for Senegal. Focusing on the time interval for which observed data exist, the imputed values clearly break with the trends implied by the observed values. From 1980-2000, imputed values are markedly higher than observed values. Since I employ fixed effects models in the analyses of Chapters 6-7, fluctuations in conditioning variables within countries will greatly affect the results. As I do not want the artificial jumps created by the imputation procedure to dictate results, I run the main analyses of Chapters 6-7 based on linearly interpolated data for the economic indices rather than the imputed data.

Figure 5.b: Imputed and observed values on Regulation for Senegal

Note: Black dots: Observed values. Red dots: Imputed values.

Appendix 2.
Supporting Information for Chapter 6

This appendix presents additional analyses of the hypotheses tested in Chapter 6. First, the appendix introduces a random effects model, and second, alternative specifications including additional control factors are introduced.

Administrative Capacity, Elections, and Regime Breakdown, Random Effects

In Chapter 6, H1, H2, and H5 are tested relying on fixed effects models. In this section, I assess the relationship between elections, administrative capacity, and the likelihood of regime breakdown in a random effects model. The random effects model assumes that the error term is uncorrelated with the covariates. In other words, there are no un-modeled generic features on the country level, i.e. the within-and between-country effects are identical (Cameron and Trivedi 2009, 255–259; Wooldridge 2008). If this is the case, the random effects estimator is efficient. Furthermore, it includes more information than the fixed effect estimator as it relies not only on within-country differences but also between-country variation. However, the underlying assumption is rarely fulfilled and the random effects estimator is often inconsistent in cross-country analyses. This is the reason that Chapter 6 relies on the fixed effect estimator, which is the only consistent estimator when the random effects assumption is not fulfilled.

But Table 6.a and Figure 6.a demonstrate that including between-country differences in the analyses expands the sample from 1,330 to 2,074 and does not change the overall conclusions. The coefficient on the interaction term (Model 3) is negative and significant at the 0.01 level. The marginal effect of having held an election is significant, negative and decreasing for the majority of the sample (Figure 6.a). The results thus support H2 and H5.

Table 6.a: Elections, administrative capacity, and breakdown, random effects

	1	2	3
Multi-party election	0.148	-0.083	1.058**
	(0.210)	(0.286)	(0.439)
Tax-to-GDP ratio		-2.195	-0.302
		(1.388)	(1.366)
Multiparty-election * Tax-to-GDP ratio			-8.280***
			(3.105)
Log of military spending		-0.063	-0.060
		(0.067)	(0.068)
Economic control (reduced index)		0.133	0.161
		(0.163)	(0.164)
Log of GDP per capita	-0.107	-0.096	-0.116
	(0.090)	(0.157)	(0.159)
GDP growth	-0.035***	-0.036**	-0.036**
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Protest	0.257**	0.338**	0.352***
	(0.112)	(0.135)	(0.135)
Constant	-1.092	0.598	0.638
	(1.242)	(2.197)	(2.270)
Lnsig2u constant	-2.626	-12.463	-12.583
	(2.159)	(1.0e+05)	(1.3e+05)
Observations	3,439	2,074	2,074

Note: Based on regime breakdown data from GWF (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a) and election occurrence data from NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012b). Unit of analysis is country-year. Dependent variable is regime breakdown, coded 1 if breakdown occurred once or more in the given year. Explanatory variable is coded 1 if one or more multi-party elections were held during the past five years, 0 if not. Tax ratio, military expenditure, and economic control are five-year running averages lagged one year. All other covariates except time trends and regime type are lagged one year. Polynomials of time and regime duration are included but not reported. Logit model with random effects and robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. $^*p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Figure 6.a: Marginal effect of multi-party elections across administrative capacity, random effects

A: Probability scale

B: Logit scale

C: Distribution of observations across tax ratio

Note: Panels A-B: Average marginal effects of multi-party elections on likelihood of regime breakdown for various levels of administrative capacity. Graph based on the logit model with random effects and robust standard errors clustered on country and all controls included as in Model 3 of Table 6.a.

Panel C: Distribution of observations (country-years) across the full range of administrative capacity measured as tax-to-GDP ratio.

Administrative Capacity, Elections, and Regime Breakdown, Additional Control Variables

In Chapter 6, the analyses include controls for wealth, growth, prior levels of protest, regime age, and time trends. Here, I introduce alternative controls. Model 1 of Table 6.b is similar to Table 6.1, Model 3, but excludes the control for protest. Since protest is one of the mechanisms through which an election can potentially destabilize an authoritarian regime, it is worth observing the relationship without the effect of changes in protest levels detracting from the overall destabilizing effect of elections. However, this does not change the interaction effect of administrative capacity markedly – in fact, the coefficient is slightly reduced rather than increased. Model 2 includes a control for regime type (monarchy, military, personalist, and party regimes). Here the coefficient of the interaction term is larger than that of Table 6.1, Model 3, and it is now significant at the 0.05 level. Military, monarchic, and personalist regimes are not significantly more or less likely to experience breakdowns than are party regimes, but controlling for these regime types strengthens the conditioning effect of administrative capacity.

Models 3 and 4 include a measure of media freedom and executive constraints respectively. The variables attempt to capture movements towards democracy or liberalizations that could potentially lie behind both the holding of multi-party elections and regime breakdown. However, controlling for either media freedom or the degree of executive constraints does not alter the negative and significant interaction effect of administrative capacity. The coefficient on executive constraints is itself positive and significant, indicating that in non-electoral regimes, more checks on the executive increases the likelihood of breakdown.

Whereas this result at first glance discredits the theories of credible commitment by autocrats as a precondition for stability (see for instance Magaloni 2008; Svolik 2012), it is likely that the measure of executive constraints from Polity is conflated by aspects of democracy and thus captures something closer to "degree of democratization" or liberalization. This, however, is exactly what the measure is used to control for in these analyses and this therefore does not pose a problem here. However, it should be noted that it is sometimes hard to rely on the subcomponents of the disaggregate democracy measures as it can be hard to ascribe individual meaning to each subcomponent.

In Model 5, the polynomials of time are excluded and a dummy indicating whether the observation occurred during or after the Cold War is includ-

ed instead. Authoritarian regimes were significantly more likely to break down in this period, but the conditioning effect of administrative capacity is unchanged.

Model 6 reports results with the simplest possible measure of economic control, the logarithm of income from natural resources, so as to avoid data loss. This model results in more observations and the interaction effect of administrative capacity is still negative and significant at the 0.05 level. In Model 7, I have instead included the full index of economic control, comprising government share of GDP, regulations on private business, trade regulations, and income from natural resources. Due to limited coverage of some of these measures, the sample size drops to 309 and unsurprisingly, this reduction of data points also renders the effect insignificant. But the coefficient on the interaction term remains negative and of roughly the same size.

Table 6.b: Elections, administrative capacity, and breakdown, alternative controls

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Multi-party election	0.375 (0.690)	0.441 (0.739)	0.320 (0.786)	-0.128 (0.867)	0.473 (0.787)	0.421 (0.685)	-0.796 (2.014)
Tax-to-GDP ratio	1.870 (3.595)	1.005 (3.431)	1.003 (3.668)	-0.403 (3.531)	0.765 (3.817)	3.172 (2.610)	-3.931 (5.587)
Multi-party election * Tax-to-GDP ratio	-11.014* (5.830)	-12.188** (6.135)	-11.928* (6.419)	-12.047* (7.277)	-11.756** (5.655)	-11.046** (5.290)	-8.876 (13.265)
Log of military spending	0.663** (0.327)	0.929** (0.401)	0.948** (0.392)	0.848** (0.401)	0.646** (0.301)	0.442 (0.386)	1.099 (0.751)
Economic control (reduced index)	-0.537 (0.686)	-0.403 (0.690)	-0.364 (0.738)	-0.335 (0.826)	-0.480 (0.712)		
Log of resource income per capita						-0.080 (0.068)	
Economic control (full index)							-1.000 (1.370)
Log of GDP per capita	0.548 (1.041)	-0.180 (1.323)	0.034 (1.304)	0.758 (1.342)	-0.509 (1.343)	0.655 (1.093)	2.117 (2.758)
GDP growth	-0.048** (0.019)	-0.042* (0.023)	-0.045** (0.022)	-0.051** (0.023)	-0.042** (0.020)	-0.046** (0.018)	-0.062* (0.037)
Protest		0.278** (0.121)	0.285** (0.126)	0.225 (0.137)	0.252** (0.127)	0.268** (0.115)	0.398 (0.252)
Military regime		-0.071 (0.638)					
Monarchy		0.778 (3.994)					
Personalist regime		-0.639 (0.915)					
Media freedom			0.171 (0.431)				
Executive constraints				0.505** (0.238)			
Post-Cold War					1.269*** (0.397)		
Observations	1,445	1,330	1,330	1,242	1,330	1,444	495

Note: Based on regime breakdown data from GWF (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a) and election occurrence data from NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012b). Unit of analysis is country-year. Dependent variable is regime breakdown, coded 1 if breakdown occurred once or more in the given year. Explanatory variable is coded 1 if one or more multi-party elections were held during the past five years, 0 if not. Tax ratio, military expenditure, and economic control are five-year running averages lagged one year. All other covariates except time

trends and regime type are lagged one year. Polynomials of time and regime duration are included but not re-ported. Logit model with country fixed effects (*clogit* command in Stata) and robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. [*] $p < 0.10$, [**] $p < 0.05$, [***] $p < 0.01$.
[1]Imputed tax data.

Figure 6.b plots marginal effects on both the probability and logit scales for the models of Table 6.b. The marginal effects are very similar to those displayed in the main model of Figure 6.2. The only exception is Panels G-H, which report results including a control for the full index of economic control rather than the reduced version. Here, the sample is reduced markedly, and, contrary to expectations, the marginal effects do not decrease as administrative capacity increases. However, the marginal effects are insignificant for most of the spectrum, and the results are likely affected by the very small sample.

Figure 6.b: Marginal effect of elections across administrative capacity, alternative control variables

A: Protests excluded, probability scale

B: Protests excluded, logit scale

C: Control for media freedom, probability scale


D: Control for media freedom, logit scale

Figure 6.b continued

E: Control for constraints, probability scale

F: Control for constraints, logit scale

G: Reduced economic control index, probability scale

H: Reduced economic control index, logit scale

Note: Average marginal effects of multi-party elections on likelihood of regime breakdown for various levels of administrative capacity. Graph based on the logit models with fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered on country and all controls included as Tables 6.1 and 6.b. The country fixed effects are set to 0. Due to problems with generating marginal plots after FE-models in Stata, the plot is based on a regular xtlogit command with country-dummies included.

Coercive Capacity, Elections, and Regime Breakdown, Additional Control Variables

The analyses of the relationship between coercive capacity, elections, and regime breakdown of Chapter 6 include controls for wealth, growth, prior levels of protest, ongoing wars, regime age, and time trends. Table 6.c first excludes the control for protests, and then introduces controls for authoritarian regime type, media freedom, and executive constraints respectively. One of the alternative control factors – executive constraints – holds a direct, positive effect on the likelihood of breakdown. Where the power of the executive is circumscribed, autocracies are more likely to succumb. But the interaction effect of coercive capacity remains insignificant regardless of the alternative controls. This is also confirmed by the marginal plots in which the marginal effect of elections is insignificant throughout the spectrum of coercive capacity (not reported).

Table 6.c: Elections, coercive capacity, and breakdown, alternative control variables

	1	2	3	4
Multi-party election	0.874	-1.458	0.904	0.312
	(3.208)	(2.752)	(3.369)	(4.331)
Log of military spending	1.148***	0.729**	1.175***	1.078**
	(0.437)	(0.348)	(0.436)	(0.448)
Multiparty-election * Log of military spending	-0.178	0.102	-0.190	-0.167
	(0.352)	(0.308)	(0.366)	(0.470)
Tax-to-GDP ratio	-1.683	-0.738	-1.853	-3.294
	(3.865)	(3.865)	(3.710)	(3.773)
Economic control (reduced index)	-0.601	-0.728	-0.558	-0.644
	(0.803)	(0.694)	(0.814)	(0.934)
Log of GDP per capita	-0.691	-0.022	-0.641	-0.051
	(1.434)	(1.095)	(1.391)	(1.563)
GDP growth	-0.038*	-0.042**	-0.038**	-0.043*
	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.023)
Protest	0.200		0.205	0.148
	(0.132)		(0.132)	(0.137)
War	-0.771	-0.516	-0.855	-0.072
	(1.396)	(1.368)	(1.392)	(1.222)
Military regime	0.103	0.859		
	(0.710)	(0.695)		
Monarchy	0.582	-0.171		
	(4.971)	(5.164)		
Personalist regime	-0.199	0.139		
	(0.992)	(0.840)		
Media freedom			0.267	
			(0.431)	
Executive constraints				0.525**
				(0.232)
Observations	1,317	1,431	1,317	1,230

Note: Based on regime breakdown data from GWF (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a) and election occurrence data from NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012b). Unit of analysis is country-year. Dependent variable is regime breakdown, coded 1 if breakdown occurred once or more in the given year. Explanatory variable is coded 1 if one or more multi-party elections were held during the past five years, 0 if not. Tax ratio, military expenditure, and economic control are five-year running averages lagged one year. All other covariates except time trends are lagged one year. Polynomials of time and regime duration are included but not reported. Logit model with country fixed effects (*clogit* command in Stata) and robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Appendix 3.
Supporting Information for Chapter 7

Economic Control, Elections, and Regime Breakdown, Additional Control Variables

The results of Table 7.1 and Figure 7.1 hold when controlling for authoritarian regime type, prior liberalizations gauged by media freedom, and the Cold War period (Table 7.a, Models 2 and 3 below and Figure 7.a). When leaving out the control for protests to take into account the possibility that elections may cause regime breakdown exactly because they spark an increase in the level of protest, the estimate on the interaction term increases (Table 7.a, Model 1). This is illustrated by Panels A-B of Figure 7.a, but the effect is substantially similar to that of Figure 7.1 (including a control for protest) and is significant for the same range of the sample. When controlling for authoritarian regime type (Model 2), the coefficient is equal in size but just below conventional levels of significance (p-value = 0.110). The coefficient remains negative, significant at the 0.1 level, and roughly equal in size when controlling for media freedom and executive constraints respectively (Models 3-4), indicating that the effect of elections is not driven by an ongoing liberalization process that underlies both the holding of elections and the propensity for authoritarian regimes to break down. Finally, a control for the post-Cold War era does not change the conditioning effect of economic control either, although authoritarian regimes were significantly more likely to break down after 1989 (Model 5).

Table 7.a: Elections, economic control, and breakdown, alternative controls

|	1	2	3	4	5
Multi-party election	-1.429	-1.686	-1.657	-1.981	-1.434**
	(0.972)	(1.115)	(1.052)	(1.284)	(0.646)
Economic control	2.159	1.630	1.931	2.000	1.583
	(1.355)	(1.173)	(1.373)	(1.393)	(1.470)
Multi-party election* Economic control	-2.762*	-2.712	-2.420*	-2.179*	-2.383*
	(1.514)	(1.711)	(1.443)	(1.180)	(1.301)
Tax-to-GDP ratio	-4.411	-5.270*	-4.254	-7.692	-4.894*
	(3.019)	(3.122)	(3.170)	(5.646)	(2.972)
Log of military spending	1.653**	1.633***	1.640***	1.707***	1.668***
	(0.661)	(0.583)	(0.624)	(0.532)	(0.527)
Log of GDP per capita	1.565	2.141	1.561	2.715	1.436
	(2.720)	(2.277)	(2.341)	(2.969)	(2.130)
GDP growth	-0.060*	-0.052*	-0.057*	-0.057*	-0.060*
	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.031)
Protest		0.259	0.258	0.083	0.195
		(0.237)	(0.220)	(0.246)	(0.199)
Military regime		1.000			
		(1.355)			
Monarchy		-1.464			
		(5.361)			
Personalist regime		1.986			
		(2.257)			
Media freedom			0.023		
			(0.553)		
Executive constraints				0.393	
				(0.409)	
Post-Cold War					1.987***
					(0.552)
Observations	782	775	775	742	775

Note: Based on regime breakdown data from GWF (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a) and election occurrence data from NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012b). Unit of analysis is country-year. Dependent variable is regime breakdown, coded 1 if breakdown occurred once or more in the given year. Explanatory variable is coded 1 if one or more multi-party elections were held during the past five years, 0 if not. Economic control, tax-to-GDP ratio, and military expenditure are five-year running averages lagged one year. All other covariates except time trends and regime type are lagged one year. Polynomials of time and regime duration are included but not reported. Logit model with country fixed effects (*clogit* command in Stata) and robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure 7.a: Marginal effect of elections across economic control, additional control variables

A: No control for protests, probability scale


B: logit scale

E: Control for media freedom, probability scale

F: logit scale

G: Control for executive constraints, probability scale

H: logit scale

Note: Average marginal effects of multi-party elections on likelihood of regime breakdown for various levels of the economic control. Based on the logit model with fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered on country and all controls included as in Table 7.2. The country fixed effects are set to 0. All covariates are held at their observed values.

Economic Control, Elections, and Regime Breakdown, Random Effects

Table 7.b estimates the conditional effect of economic control in a random effects model. As discussed in Appendix 2, the random effects model assumes that there are no un-modeled country-specific effects and that the error term is thus uncorrelated with the covariates (Cameron and Trivedi 2009, 255–259; Wooldridge 2008). As this is rarely a valid assumption in cross-country analyses, Chapters 6-7 rely on the fixed effect models. But to include the extra information provided by a random effect model that estimates effects based on both within- and between-country effects, Table 7.b replicates the results of the analysis in Table 7.1 but with random effects.

The sample is increased from 775 to 1,240 but the overall results remain the same. The coefficient on the interaction term (Model 3) is reduced but negative and significant at the 0.1 level. The marginal effect of having held an election is significant (albeit for a smaller part of the sample), negative and decreases as economic control increases (Figure 7.b). The results support H4 and H6.

Table 7.b: Elections, economic control, and regime breakdown, random effects

|	1	2	3
Multi-party election	0.148	-0.234	-0.266
	(0.210)	(0.295)	(0.310)
Economic control		-0.160	0.045
		(0.215)	(0.261)
Multi-party election* Economic control			-0.771*
			(0.410)
Tax-to-GDP ratio		-1.375	-0.837
		(1.501)	(1.571)
Log of military spending		-0.330***	-0.350***
		(0.116)	(0.115)
Log of GDP per capita	-0.107	0.291	0.294
	(0.090)	(0.208)	(0.211)
GDP growth	-0.035***	-0.047**	-0.047**
	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Protest	0.257**	0.355**	0.344**
	(0.112)	(0.172)	(0.167)
Constant	-1.092	-1.717	-1.598
	(1.242)	(5.692)	(5.847)
lnsig2u constant	-2.626	-14.851	-13.652
	(2.159)	(.)	(.)
Constant	3,439	1,240	1,240
Breakdowns	161	65	65

Note: Based on regime breakdown data from GWF (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a) and election data from NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012b). Dependent variable is regime breakdown, coded 1 if breakdown occurred once or more in the given year. Explanatory variable is coded 1 if one or more multi-party elections were held during the past five years, 0 if not. Tax ratio, military expenditure, and economic control are five-year running averages lagged one year. All other covariates except time trends and regime type are lagged one year. Polynomials of time and regime duration are included but not reported. Logit model with random effects and robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. $^* p < 0.10$, $^{**} p < 0.05$, $^{***} p < 0.01$.

Figure 7.b: Marginal effect of multi-party elections across economic control, random effects

A: logit scale

B: logit scale

C: Distribution of observations across the index of economic control

Note: Panels A-B: Average marginal effects of multi-party elections on likelihood of regime breakdown for various levels economic control. Graph based on the logit model with random effects and robust standard errors clustered on country and all controls included as in Model 3 of Table 7.a.

Panel C: Distribution of observations (country-years) across the full range of the index of economic control.