Regime Transitions Revisited:
Concepts, Correlates, and Incumbent-led Processes

Vilde Lunnan Djuve

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PhD Dissertation

Politica

Acknowledgements

The multiple crises and worrying political developments of 2020 has made it both a challenging and an inspiring year to finish a dissertation on the correlates of regime change in general, and the causes of incumbent takeovers in particular. There have been more bumps in the road this year than I had predicted, but I have also found in the incessant news cycle a renewed drive to contribute, in some small way, to our collective understanding of these processes. 2020 has also served as a reminder of how ridiculously fortunate I am. Learning to do good research and managing the ins and outs of academia is a daunting process to go through alone. I am hugely grateful to a great many people for making sure I was not alone at all, and for their support in my pursuit of this degree. Thanks to them, I have learnt not only that doing good research takes patience and diligence, but that it can also be tremendously rewarding, and just plain fun. It has been a privilege to learn from you all.

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Oslo, November 2020
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Preface

This report summarizes the dissertation: "Regime Transitions Revisited: Concepts, Correlates, and Incumbent-led Processes." It consists of this summary and the following four self-contained articles:

Paper 1: Patterns of Regime Breakdown Since the French Revolution
Comparative Political Studies vol. 53, no. 6, pp. 923–958, May 2020
Co-authored with Carl Henrik Knutsen and Tore Wig

Paper 2: Economic Crisis and Regime Transitions From Within
Under review
Co-authored with Carl Henrik Knutsen

Paper 3: Executive Constraints and Incumbent Takeovers
Under review

Paper 4: Types of Political Regime Transitions and their Economic Consequences
Under review

Contents

Chapter 1

Introduction

Regimes break down in many ways. From the external pressure of coups, revolutions and wars but also from internal shifts: Democracy can break down when elected leaders thwart the institutions through which they were elected, and non-democracies can break down when incumbents pursue, e.g., personalization of the regime. Democracy itself often emerges as a result of negotiated transitions by sitting regime leaders. Consider, for example, Hafez al Assad's coup in Syria in 1970, the Lebanese civil war ending 30 years of parliamentary rule in 1976, and the 2011 Jasmine revolution in Tunisia: These are all examples of tumultuous regime transitions that were dominated by forces outside the leadership of the preceding incumbent regimes. Now consider, in stead, transitions that are led in some way by the incumbent: The negotiated democratization of Honduras after the transitional Micheletti government in 2010; Charles de Gaulle's inauguration as President of the French Fifth Republic in 1959; or even Alexander Lukashenko's consolidation of personal dictatorial rule in Belarus with the 1996 constitutional amendments. Driven by incumbents or not, all regime transitions constitute dramatic events in the life of a polity.

The causes of these transitions are diverse, but there are certainly common themes. The economic situation was rather dire across these cases (with the exception of de Gaulle's France), and particularly so in Syria, Lebanon, and Belarus before their mentioned transitions. Where institutional instability had mired the political scene in both Syria and Honduras, the Tunisian and Lebanese systems had been largely stable for decades. In combination, Hafez al Assad's coup in 1970 — taking place in a polity marred by previous instability, painfully slow economic development and unconsolidated half-authoritarian institutions (Galvani 1974; Maoz and Yaniv 2013) — illustrates several of the most prominent explanations of regime change.

For political scientists, explaining why regimes change, and particularly why they democratize, is a core concern. After the seminal theoretical and empirical

contributions of Lipset (1959), scholars have suggested income, inequality (Bollen and Jackman 1995), economic growth (Gasiorowski 1995; Bratton and van de Walle 1997), international influence (Levitsky and Way 2006), diffusion (Weyland 2010), institutional characteristics of the preceding regime (Brownlee 2009; Knutsen and Nygård 2015) and a myriad of other factors as core explanations of various forms of regime change. One perspective that is still lacking in this literature, however, is an effort to systematically compare the ways in which the correlates of regime change might apply to particular *types* of transitions and perhaps not at all to others. In this dissertation, I argue that one particularly under-researched factor can substantially distinguish between transition types, as well as the factors we can use to explain them: the extent to which they are driven by incumbents.

On the theoretical level, there are several seminal contributions to understanding the role of incumbents in regime transitions (see, particularly, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Albertus and Menaldo 2018), but besides a few notable exceptions in the recent autocratization literature (Svolik 2015; Pérez-Liñán, Schmidt and Vairo 2019; Lührmann and Rooney 2020), empirical contributions to understanding these transitions have been scarce. As I will demonstrate in Chapter 3, incumbent-led transitions dominate both democratizing transitions and recent worrying autocratizing transitions, and are overall persistently common phenomena. Therefore, I argue that this lack of empirical research is primarily due to a lack of data. Filling this gap, with both data and analysis, is the aim of this dissertation. In other words, I ask: What are the causes and consequences of different types of political regime transitions? And more specifically: What correlates of regime transitions apply to incumbent-led transitions, and do these transitions have different consequences?

To answer these questions, and answer them well, I leverage the Historical Regimes Data (HRD), a novel dataset of political regimes and their modes of breakdown, with unprecedented resolution and temporal coverage. HRD covers modern political history back to the French Revolution and includes almost 200 polities — which makes up most all existing polities in the period covered. This results in information on the identity, start and end dates, and modes of breakdown, of over 2000 regimes, of which I have coded the large majority of cases. Mode of breakdown in HRD is coded in a scheme of 14 categories, enabling descriptive analysis and causal investigation of different transition types with mutually comparable scopes in a way that has been previously impossible.

Delving into the causes of regime transitions, the first paper of the dissertation starts out by broadly investigating the explanatory power of income, growth, and semidemocracy across the time period, and within sub-samples of the period, covered by HRD (1789-2017). Then, I proceed to more detailed analyses of

Executive Constraints
(Paper 3)

Transition Effects:

Economic Crisis
(Paper 2)

Economic Growth
(Paper 4)

Historical Patterns
(Paper 1)

The Historical Regimes Data
(Paper 1)

Figure 1.1: Building blocks of the dissertation

two specific explanations of regime transitions that are previously unexplored for incumbent-led transitions: economic crisis and institutional constraints on the executive.

The effect of economic crisis on regime breakdown broadly, and more specific externally induced transition types such as coups or revolutions, has been substantially researched (Gasiorowski 1995; Knutsen 2014; Krishnarajan 2019). The broad theoretical background for assuming such a relationship is that crises aggravate populations, disgruntle allied elites, and eventually translate into substantial oppositional challenges to regimes. In Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), a core claim is that those same mechanisms will lead to incumbents hedging their bets and negotiating democratization because they expect to otherwise be forced from power. Whether that effect on incumbent-led democratization is empirically detectable, however, has not been investigated.

By contrast, the effects of institutional constraints on the executive are not thoroughly investigated in the literature[1] and feature in this dissertation as an explanation that should be particularly relevant for a specific type of incumbent-led transitions, namely incumbent takeovers. While some studies investigate, e.g., the economic effects of legislative constraints in autocracies (Wright 2008), little attention has been given to how those constraints influence the longevity of their regimes. Assuming that executive constraints should particularly relate to the transitions that are *led* by executive branch incumbents, I develop a hypothesis of how executive constraints at medium levels both incentivize and leave

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[1]For a notable recent exception, see Meng (2020).

opportunities open for hopeful autocrats.

Finding that there are both unique and more generic approaches that explain different prevalences for incumbent-led transitions, I also ask whether the type of transition a polity undergoes matters for its subsequent economic development. By developing a typology of all regime transitions, I investigate the differences and commonalities across different types of transitions and show that the contradictory literature on the effects of political regime instability on growth might stem from an over-reliance on operationalizations based on coups.

Figure 1.1 illustrates how the four papers contribute to the overall project. Starting from the bottom, the Historical Regimes Data, presented in Paper 1, serves as a common feature of the entire dissertation and is used as either dependent or independent variable in all four papers. Then, I sort the empirical contributions of the dissertation into two columns: the first, left-hand, column, contains studies of the *causes* of regime transitions. The bottom solid rectangle contains the empirical contribution of Paper 1, which is to analyze historical patterns of regime transitions, both in descriptive frequencies and determinants. Then, the second solid rectangle contains the contribution of Paper 2, which is to investigate the relationship between economic crisis and incumbent-led regime transitions. The top solid rectangle contains the contribution of Paper 3: the inverted u-shaped relationship between executive constraints and incumbent takeovers. Finally, on the right-hand side, the contribution of Paper 4 is to disentangle the effects of various types of regime transitions on economic growth.

Overall then, this dissertation explores differences and similarities among various types of regime transitions, presents a novel dataset covering all political regimes since the French Revolution, and provides analyses of key determinants of the type of regime transition most under-represented in the empirical study of regime transitions, namely regime transitions from within. As such, its key contributions lie in conceptualizing and investigating incumbent-led transitions as well as addressing the gap in the literature on understanding these transitions by combining conventional and novel approaches to explaining their causes. Furthermore, the dissertation includes a data contribution: HRD is the largest and most comprehensive data resource on the life spans of regimes and their modes of breakdown to date. By extension, another key contribution of HRD and this dissertation is the ability to study the causes and consequences of regime transitions across a larger swathe of modern political history — not constrained by the availability of data to the common backwards limitation of the Second World War, and not constrained by the incomparability of types of regime transitions across varying operationalizations and samples.

In the following, this summary expands upon the issues mentioned here

and provides a conceptual, theoretical and methodological framework for the dissertation as a whole. Chapter 2 discusses the main conceptual challenges in defining regime transitions broadly and incumbent-led transitions specifically. Chapter 3 presents the Historical Regimes Data. Chapter 4 reviews the literature and elaborates on the theoretical perspectives of the dissertation. Chapter 5 discusses the methodological considerations that shape the dissertation's analyses. Chapter 6 presents the empirical contributions, and Chapter 7 discusses the implications and scope conditions of those contributions.

Chapter 2

Conceptualizing regime transitions: Conventional and novel distinctions

When the Berlin wall fell in 1989, and the massive structure that was the Soviet Union subsequently dissolved, it was clear that we were witnessing regime change. The diverging paths then taken by the post-Soviet states varied from establishing solid democratic systems, such as in Estonia, to solidifying harshly repressive authoritarian states, such as in Turkmenistan. In yet others, like the small Caucasian state of Georgia, the political regime has been shaped and bent several times since. The declaration of Georgian independence in 1991 was followed by civil war, a military coup d'état, and — by some accounts — a legislative self-coup by would-be President Shevardnadze with the adoption of the September 1995 constitution (see e.g., Dawisha and Parrott 1997; Kandelaki 2006; Rayfield 2013). These chaotic events unfolded as several conflicts worsened across Georgian society. Ethnic and cultural differences with administrative regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia fueled clashes with Soviet foreign policy in the wake of Georgian independence and put pressure on Zviad Ghamsakhurdia's elected government. In the months leading up to the coup of 22 December 1991, anti-government sentiment had broadened and eventually split the National Guard into pro- and anti-government factions. It was anti-government members of the National Guard along with armed militias that eventually stormed the parliamentary palace and ousted Ghamsakhurdia. Eduard Shevardnadze was instated in his place. In 1995, the constitution he suggested was passed by parliament, installing a very strong presidency with him elected president (Allison 1996).

In 2003, Georgia yet again made international headlines with the onset of the "Rose Revolution". After years of semi-authoritarian rule under Shevardnadze, a brief series of non-violent popular protests forced his resignation (Fairbanks 2004; Wheatley 2017). In the following years, subsequent president Sakashvili also faced controversy, and the dominant parliamentary party has initiated a process

Figure 2.1: Timeline of regime transitions in Georgia, 1991-2017

of transitioning into complete parliamentary proportional representation in 2024. Hence, determining how many actual regime *transitions* Georgia has seen since independence is much more controversial than, e.g., the fall of the Soviet Union and importantly relies on a set of conceptual decisions. So what is a regime transition? What definitorial thresholds should we invoke when specifying relevant cases? And what does regime transitions signify for the peoples of the polities in which they take place? These are the questions I aim to elucidate in this chapter. Figure 2.1 shows the four transitions that, according to my definition, have occurred there since independence in 1991.

First of all, in this dissertation, a political regime is defined following Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) as "the formal and informal rules of selecting regime leaders". In democracies, formal rules typically correspond rather closely to informal rules, making democratic institutions straightforward to follow. In autocracies, however, formal rules can be largely irrelevant, referring to elections that are held, but never free and fair, or norms of alternation that are either never followed or never meaningful. Therefore, the inclusion of informal rules in this definition ensures that we look at the de facto rather than de jure structures of regimes. By extension, regime transitions are here defined as *substantial changes* to the formal and informal rules of selecting regime leaders. Tracking de facto regime transitions therefore entails both tracking formal institutional developments and informal developments in the power structures of regimes. As they are understood here, regime transitions are not defined by the way in which they alter, or do not alter, a polity's level of democracy. Regime transitions can end authoritarian regimes, substitute a military junta with another, or thwart a democratic system into a personalized dictatorship. Determining a regime's *type* is therefore not a prerequisite for determining when a given regime transitions, but yet helpful in chiseling out the various processes relevant for diagnosing various types of transitions.

This brings us to the core challenge in measuring regime transitions: determining

(and consistently maintaining) appropriate thresholds for observing substantial changes to the rules of a regime. Most all thresholds established for observing political phenomena are somewhat arbitrary. For the binary democracy indicator in Boix, Miller and Rosato (2012), for example, the question is what year any emergent democracy fulfils their democracy definition. For transitions such as coups, identification of relevant episodes can be easier, but there is still an underlying continuum: when are leadership changes, e.g., in a military junta regime, substantial enough to constitute a coup? I argue that the most sustainable answer is to thoroughly evaluate each event. For coups in military dictatorships, the regime leadership should typically be rather personalistic for a leadership change to constitute regime change. For many of the remaining transition types, and perhaps especially for incumbent-led transitions, the full transition can be a drawn-out, incremental process. This further complicates the challenge of setting appropriate thresholds for observing regime change. I will return to this as an operationalization issue in Chapter 3.

Another central conceptual issue in this dissertation is how we understand aggregation — and disaggregation. These terms are always somewhat relative. To a devoted student of the Rose Revolution, any grouping of that case with other popular uprisings can be seen as aggregation. However, at the other end, students of large waves of regime change might see the categorization of regime changes into smaller, more particular groups, as an act of *dis*aggregation. The perspective of this dissertation lies closer to the second example.

2.1   Regime transitions and regime instability

The terms regime transitions, regime change and regime breakdown are used rather interchangeably throughout this dissertation, and this is, arguably, uncontroversial. What takes a longer elaboration is positioning these terms with political instability. This is an important endeavour because the latent instability of regimes takes a central position in many, if not most, theoretical explanations of transitions. Accordingly, this section reflects on the larger notion of political instability and its central tenets.

Understanding the causes and consequences of political instability is a critical concern to political scientists and has therefore inspired a large and ever-evolving literature. As a concept, it is examined both explicitly and implicitly through the use of a wide range of more specific phenomena. Consequently, existing measures of political instability focus on a myriad of indicators ranging from number of coups or assassination attempts, leadership changes, civil unrest, government duration,

and outright regime changes.

Given that the different uses of the instability concept differ substantially, what is it that each of them is trying to capture? And how crucial must "instability events" be for them to capture something important about ongoing change in their respective political systems? In other words, what thresholds should we establish for including an event in our conceptualization of instability, and under what circumstances? Finally, what features should be included in the definition, and what is a consequence and/or precipitant?

In prominent contributions to the literature on regime types and propensity for breakdown, the concept of instability features in theoretical frameworks as both a structural explanation, a characteristic of certain regimes, and a manifest outcome (Sanhueza 1999; Bueno de Mesquita 2000; Gates et al. 2006; Brownlee 2009; Knutsen and Nygård 2015). In Gates et al. (2006), for example, it is hypothesized that institutionally consistent polities are significantly more stable than their inconsistent counterparts. They claim and find that the most vulnerable systems are dictatorships that still feature high levels of political participation. Here, the dependent variable is based on both the Polity IV (2010) dataset and Vanhanen (2000) and is defined as the time between substantial changes in one of the three factors constituting the independent variable.

For other approaches in related literature, irregular leader removal is emphasized. In Miller (2012), for example, it is argued that the strength of the autocratic regime mediates the effect of development on democratization. In his approach, the vulnerability, or instability, of the regime is indicated by a lower likelihood of violent leader removal. In Bienen and Gersovitz (1986); Lagi, Bertrand and Bar-Yam (2011) and Smith (2014), political instability is gauged through the prevalence of mass protest. Bienen and Gersovitz (1986) study how austerity measures in developing economies stir up the public and ultimately challenge the sitting leadership. They use the term "riot-induced" political instability to describe the outcome in their analyses.

The notion of instability is what these approaches have in common. Some explicitly set out to study specific events, but the majority use the term instability to capture something *latent* about the political system. Still, though we might be interested in latent instability, we must always rely on observable instability to operationalize it. In the words of Feng (2003), "the probability of government change is not observable [...]. What we observe in reality is the discrete phenomenon of government change" (Feng 2003:51). Either an instability event occurred, or it did not occur. So what are the observable implications of instability?

From the literature surveyed here, we can derive three different, but partly related, observable implications of instability: one that observes popular unrest,

one that observes leader turnover, and one that observes the outright breakdown of regimes.[1] Leadership instability is the observable implication captured by measures such as Archigos Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza (2009) and leveraged in a large literature. By this implication, instability is captured by gauging the tenure of leaders. This enables not only the study of the determinants of leader removal, but also many key derivative notions of political instability including policy volatility and ruling coalition fragmentation. An important benefit of this implication in analyses is its ability to capture more subtle instability than that represented by both popular protest and regime breakdown.

When used as an exploration of wider instability, this dimension of course risks overextending the instability term. There are many situations, in both democratic and autocratic systems, where a change in leader does not signify a large instability event at all. Even irregular leader removal *can* occur without signifying a broad instability event when the result of the removal is simply that another leader from the same ruling coalition immediately replaces the removed leader. Specific subcategories of leadership instability can include events as diverse as rule-following regular removals through outright coups where leaders are violently deposed. Several measures available explicitly focus only on coups, including both successful and failed coup-attempts (Przeworski et al. 2013; Powell and Thyne 2011). The failed coup category is especially interesting because it can pick up on "latent" instability to a degree: where opposition to the sitting leader is strong enough to inspire such attempts but without an actual change in leadership.

Popular instability is the focus of, or included in, measures such as those used by Jong-A-Pin (2009) and Smith (2014). By this observable, the political instability of a polity is gauged through the presence or absence of broadly based protests, uprisings and popularly based challenges to the established leadership of a polity. This focuses on the outsiders of established political life and makes it possible to study the wider setting of a polity's stability. In democracies, the established leadership includes the opposition that forms part of the parliamentary structure. Combined with the right to participation in these systems, the boundary between insiders and outsiders is especially blurred in democracies.

On the sub-category level of popular instability, we particularly find events such as protest (non-violent and violent) (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013), revolutions,

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[1]Moreover, it can be argued that yet another perspective on instability is featured in the literature on coup attempts. In Wig and Rød (2016), elections are treated as information transactions where the ruling coalition makes itself vulnerable through increasing oppression or the inner fragility of the regime is revealed. In other words, electoral outcomes are signals that contain information about opposition strength, and indirectly about the likelihood of a successful full-scale regime removal that would compromise the positions of sitting elites. An underlying assumption in this scenario is that strong opposition serves as an analogue concept to that of instability; the only phenomenon then separating the sitting regime from danger is an election.

and different degrees of civil war (Sundberg and Padskocimaite 2010). Though substantively different, all these phenomena share one essence: they are expressions of instability stemming, at least partly, from the popular masses. A complicating factor of using these indicators across regime types is of course the differing repression levels across regimes. It is not unlikely that especially protest measures are capable of capturing popular dissatisfaction to a much greater degree in democracies than in autocracies. In parallel, protest might be a much stronger signal of discontent in autocracies when protesters defy personal risks to take to the streets. This makes the significance of protest rather heterogenous across regimes.

Finally, regime instability is covered in a very wide range of measures. There are several democracy-centred measures, such as the dichotomous measure by Boix, Miller and Rosato (2012), Polity IV (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 2013) and the Lexical Index by Skaaning, Gerring and Bartusevicius (2016). In addition, there are measures such as GWF (Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014) that combine focus on broader regime-type categories with a more event-based structure. Yet again, a measure such as the Historical Regimes Data (HRD) (Djuve, Knutsen and Wig 2020) focuses quite strictly on the events that alter the composite traits of the regime. [2, 3]

Regime instability is the dimension that to the largest degree includes, at least partly, the other two dimensions. Regime instability can be a product of, or outright measured by, either leadership instability (more common) or popular upheaval (less common). Regime instability *events* include subcategories concretely of the other two observables: irregular, but not regular, leader removal from leadership instability, and civil war and revolution from popular instability. In addition, regimes can break down from inter-state wars, foreign intervention and, importantly, from changes at least partly instigated by the sitting regime.

2.2   Incumbent-led transitions

In light of the literature on instability, the distinct properties of incumbent-led transitions are particularly interesting. These transitions, like all others, end regimes and pave the way for new political systems. But do incremental transitions led by incumbents represent or communicate uncertainty and instability in the same way as, e.g., coups or revolutions? To answer that question, further conceptual clarity on these particular transitions is in order.

In distilled definition, transitions that are guided partially or fully by regime

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[2]There are also approaches to regime instability that do not express it dichotomously. Kaufmann and Kraay (2016), for example, use a set of important determinants to express regime instability as the continuous probability of breakdown, based on the given factors, and recalculated for each year.

[3]For a full discussion of HRD and comparable datasets, see Table 1 and related text in Paper 1.

incumbents are all incumbent-led transitions. They can represent changes that make regimes more democratic, they can make regimes less democratic, and they can represent changes to the basic construction of a polity that do not in themselves alter the democracy levels of a polity. Individually, these three types of transitions are of course distinctive in their effects on democracy. However, they resemble each other in very important ways.

In Paper 4, I develop a typology of regime transitions based on two widely used dimensions in the democratization literature: the actors that dominate the transitions (elites versus oppositional forces) and the nature of the transition (rupture versus reform). On these dimensions, all incumbent-led transitions share the traits of being elite-driven reforms: led by incumbent elites, they typically modify (reform) rather than oust (rupture) the existing regime leadership. When faced with salient challenges as described in the instability literature, incumbent-led transitions therefore serve as reactions to, rather than explicit manifestations of, political instability.

Returning to the introductory examples of this summary, the negotiated democratization of Honduras in 2010, Charles de Gaulle's inauguration as the President of the French Fifth Republic in 1959 and Alexander Lukashenko's 1996 constitutional amendments in Belarus are all incumbent-led transitions. As related to regime type, these examples range from democratizing (Honduras), through structural (France), to autocratizing (Belarus). These transitions are analytically interesting grouped together because — despite their varying outcomes — they are theoretically related. For example, a core element of Acemoglu and Robinson's (2006) theoretical framework is that, in the face of pressure, political elites essentially have two options: to concede and democratize, or to repress. As such, the interest of this dissertation lies both in understanding and contrasting the explanations that apply to these rather under-researched incumbent-led transitions as opposed to externally-led transitions, but also to investigate differences *within* incumbent-led transitions. In this way, I also aim to understand when and why incumbents push their polities in either democratizing or autocratizing directions. Before turning to how the properties of incumbent-led transitions should shape our expectations for their determinants, I now turn to they way they are measured in this dissertation.

Chapter 3

Measuring regime transitions: Introducing the Historical Regimes Data (HRD)

In studying regimes and regime transitions, scholars face a variety of issues. Changes in regimes are relatively rare, involve complex processes, and, due to the stakes involved for relevant actors, the information needed to analyze them can be highly politicized and difficult to decipher. This last concern increases significantly when we are interested in large case universes of transitions extending back through time, as historical sources grow scarcer and proper triangulation becomes difficult. However, keeping the rarity of these events in mind, capturing the larger universe of cases enables scholars to leverage both increased statistical power in analyses and, most importantly, to broaden the scope of interpretation beyond the otherwise common time limit of post-WWII history. Tending to these concerns, this is where the Historical Regimes Dataset comes in.

As described in Paper 1 of this dissertation, the Historical Regimes Data (HRD) is a comprehensive dataset covering almost 200 polities and their transition modes since the French Revolution, resulting in a systematic data resource of over 2000 regimes. Its earliest recorded regime is the Tokugawa shogunate of Japan, inaugurated by the end of the siege of Osaka on January 22nd, 1615, and lasting until it was overthrown in the Meiji Restoration in a drawn-out process ending on January 3rd 1868 (Jansen 2002). The Tokugawa shogunate was a long-lasting regime, ruling with an elaborate feudal system, and overseeing only limited unrest until the mid-1800s. By contrast, other regimes covered in HRD last for mere days, such as General Alberto Natusch's 16-day rule of Bolivia in 1979 (Knudson 1997).

The first key to capturing both rather extreme regimes is high temporal resolution, which ensures that the endurance of regimes is not overstated, and, again, that the complete universe of cases is captured. The second key is attention to all kinds of transition processes, from complicated legislative action

to straightforward military coups, such as the one that brought Natusch to power. In this chapter, I present the principles and practices involved in crafting HRD, highlight its innovations, and present the ways in which it has been leveraged in this dissertation. Finally, I describe the details and difficulties of coding the three transition modes in HRD that make up my definition of incumbent-led transitions.

3.1 Building the Historical Regimes Data

The effort to build the Historical Regimes Data began as part of a project at the University of Oslo, led by my co-authors of Paper 1. The dataset is nested within the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al. 2017) and was originally used as a cornerstone of the Country Expert surveys for the Historical V-Dem project (see Knutsen et al. 2019) covering the long 19th century. Subsequently, we developed the dataset to cover the 20th century and the 21st century — first until 2015, then 2017, and we are now working on the 2019 update.

As mentioned, the scope of HRD covers polities back to 1789 if they exist for the entirety of that period, and much longer if existing regimes in 1789 stretched further back in time. During their coverage, some polities have experienced very few transitions, where others have experienced an astounding amount of changes. In Figure 3.1, I display time lines for five polities as they are recorded in HRD: Mexico, Russia, France, Serbia and China. As illustrated by, e.g., the time line for Russia, large swaths of time can go by between transitions, or 105 years precisely, as occurs between the assassination of Paul I and the partial liberalization of the Empire in 1906. For others, as illustrated by the Mexico time line, there can be periods of incredible turmoil, with regimes lasting less than a year. After the establishment of the Mexican Empire in 1821 until the 1867 constitution, Mexico saw a total of 25 transitions, ranging from coups to democratizing constitutions to broad popular uprisings.

To record these polities as consistently as possible, we have both used formalized reliability testing and extensive internal reviews to ensure that there is as much internal validity as well as cross-coder reliability as possible. To that end, keeping a consistent team over time has also been instrumental. Another critical concern is to responsibly investigate historical incidents by, to the degree possible, triangulating sources on controversial events, and overall not relying too heavily on any one historical source.

Figure 3.1: HRD time lines for Mexico, Russia, France, Serbia and China. Reprint from Appendix C of Paper 1.

Note: x = Coding gap. 0 = A military coup d'etat. 1 = A coup d'etat conducted by other groups than the military. 2 = A self-coup (autogolpe).
3 = Assassination of the sitting leader. 4 = Natural death of the sitting leader. 5 = Loss in civil war 6 = Loss in inter-state war.
7 = Foreign intervention. 8 = Popular uprising. 9 = Substantial political liberalization with guidance by sitting regime.
10 = Other type of directed transition with guidance of sitting regime. 11 = Substantial political liberalization without guidance by sitting regime. 12 = Other process.

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3.2 HRD as the dissertation's foundation

Figure 3.2 shows developments in the relative frequency of five modes of regime transitions as captured by HRD. The moss green line that is consistently on top of the plot is the line for *all* transitions. The red line below represents all *incumbent-led* transitions. Now from the general descriptive patterns detectable in this figure, one particular feature is important in underlining the purpose of this dissertation: In some periods, the prevalence of transitions from within has increased alongside other transitions. At other times, transitions from within are the only prevalent transitions. One such period is the period after the fall of the Soviet Union in the mid-90s. In this period, incumbent-led transitions consistently make up over half of all transitions. The relevance of this transition type has, in other words, not declined over time.

Also included in Figure 3.2 are lines capturing the prevalence of the three subtypes of incumbent-led transitions: guided democratization, self-coups and directed transitions. Of these, directed transitions are the most consistently common, while there are also waves of guided democratization. Self-coups are consistently rather rare but do not decline in prevalence over time. Throughout the dissertation, one or more of these categories are leveraged as part of a larger set of transitions, as in Paper 1 and 4, as the main dependent variable comparing all three, as in Paper 2, or zeroing in on only non-democratizing transitions, as in Paper 3.


Figure 3.2: Relative frequencies of regime transitions 1789-2017

Note: The figure shows Loess smoothed averages (span .075) for five categories of regime transitions from 1789 to 2017.

3.3   Categorizing incument-led transitions

Incumbent-led transitions are primarily defined by whether incumbents as actors are involved in the transition. Though the weighting of different actors' influence in each transition can of course be debated, this definition does clarify the ways in which we can think about the different causes of transitions. For example, protest itself has toppled regimes, but more often protest rather plays a part in communicating threats to incumbent regimes. The transition then recorded therefore often represents the response of the incumbent to increasing protest.

Following protests, any of the three incumbent-led transition types can take place. The regime might democratize in response, it might alter, e.g., a federal system into a centralized one, or it might respond with repression and attempt authoritarian consolidation. These changes might also be driven by a number of other factors. To give a more concrete grasp of the type of events that typically constitute incumbent-led regime change, Table 3.1 shows excerpts from Appendix E of Paper 1. The table lists concrete events and describes how these are interpreted. From the top, the table includes two typical events representing incumbent-led democratization — suffrage extension and democratizing legislation, two typical events representing directed transition — independence from colonial rule and restructuring legislative action, and three typical events representing self-coups: head executive term extensions, autocratic legislation, and fraudulent elections. These are the real-world events we are trying to disentangle as we delve into the next chapter on explaining them.

Table 3.1: List of events of incumbent-led regime change and how they are interpreted in HRD

Regime change event	Description
Suffrage extensions	Suffrage extensions are coded as regime change when they concern large shares of the population and if, and only if, the extension occurs in regimes where the formal rules correspond with the informal rules. These are coded end type 9 - guided liberalization.
Other democratizing legislation	Regime change is coded for instances such as formalization of democratic rights or promulgation of democratic institutions when these mark substantial departures from less democratic forms of government. They are coded if, and only if, they result in regimes where the formal rules correspond with the informal rules. These are coded end type 9 - guided liberalization.
Independence	When polities that have had limited autonomy transfer into independence, this is coded as regime change when the previous non-independent entity still enjoyed a good deal of autonomy and their polities worked differently than its sovereign entity. If the transition is made by creating a democratic constitution that is subsequently adhered to de facto, this is coded end type 9 - guided liberalization. If it does not have democratic qualities it is coded end type 10 - directed transition.
Restructuring legislative action	Legislative action by the sitting regime that is not related to outright democratization or autocratization is coded regime change when they alter the core make-up of the regime such as transitioning from a parliamentary to a presidential system, or transitioning out of transitional regimes into regimes that are no more or less democratic than the previous, e.g. after coups or civil wars. These are coded end type 10 - directed transition.
Head executive term extensions	Extension of presidential term limits is coded as regime change in HRD when this represents a clear move towards consolidating power by the sitting regime. Abolition of presidential term limits is always coded as regime change, if the sitting regime is not already a full-fledged and legislatively consolidated autocracy. They are coded with end type 2 - self-coup.
Other autocratic legislation	Legislative action such as changes to the constitution that do not concern the durability of the head executive office can also be coded regime change. This happens in instances where, e.g., severe restrictions are laid on the opposition, or one-party domination of the legislative branch is formalized. These instances are coded end type 2 - self-coup.
Fraudulent elections	Elections in which substantial reports of vote fraud are given, are coded as regime change when they appear in regimes which have otherwise held elections that are free and fair. Reports of vote buying do not suffice, there must also be deliberate obstructions of the right to a free vote or apparent tampering with election results. These instances are coded end type 2 - self-coup.

Note: Excerpt from Table A-4 in Appendix E of Paper 1.

Chapter 4

Explaining regime transitions: Predominant approaches and a new agenda

Why do regimes change, and when do they change for the better? In pursuit of answering this seminal question, social scientists have crafted innumerable theoretical theses and empirical studies probing the various structures of the state, the movers of public opinion, and the determinants and correlates of transitions. Key foundational contributions to this literature, such as Lipset (1959), particularly focus on the emergence of democracy and democratic systems, zeroing in on legitimacy and economic development ("modernization") as deep and critical democratic building blocks. Following these early foundations, the field has exploded and developed theses on a wide range of correlates — not only concerning the determinants of democratization, but also of autocratization and various types thereof.

Quite broadly, approaches to explaining regime transitions can be sorted into three coarse categories based on the type of explanation they employ. Specifically, they often explain transition either by looking at specific features of the regime's *structural surroundings*, by its *institutional* composition or by some sort of *event* precipitating, or even triggering, the transition. In this chapter, I provide a brief overview of these three strands of the literature, emphasize the most convincing empirical contributions, and highlight the main explanatory gap to be filled by this dissertation, which is understanding the correlates of incumbent-led transitions.

4.1 Structural approaches

The origins of the developmental strand of explaining regime change particularly concerns the emergence of democracy and is typically referred to as modernization theory (Lipset 1959). The empirical foundations of that theory have been systematically examined by various scholars. In 2005, Inglehart and Welzel

launched a reframing of modernization theory that integrated socioeconomic, cultural and institutional dimensions, highlighting the role of self-expression values in driving democratization (Inglehart and Welzel 2005), but subsequent empirical investigations have not provided much support for their findings (Dahlum and Knutsen 2015). In 1997, Przeworski and Limongi found that development does not increase the likelihood of democratization occurring in a polity, but that higher levels of development increase the likelihood of democratic survival in already democratized regimes (Przeworski and Limongi 1997). In 2010, Kennedy found that although economic development generally decreases chances of transitions happening in the first place, higher levels of development increase the chance that the transitions that do happen take a democratizing direction (Kennedy 2010). More disaggregate approaches to this relationship have found, e.g, that economic development particularly relates to the electoral aspect of democracy because increased affluence empowers citizens and enables collective action (Knutsen, Gerring, Skaaning, Teorell, Maguire, Coppedge and Lindberg 2019). Overall, however, evidence to support modernization theory is not overwhelming.

Another important economic theme in the literature is the effect of *inequality* on political instability and transitions — both towards, and away from, democracy. For democratization, influential contributions have found that the effect of inequality is ambivalent (Haggard and Kaufman 2012), depends on the openness of the economic regime (Freeman and Quinn 2012) or the nature of inequality (Ansell and Samuels 2010), and has detrimental effects on consolidation (Houle 2009). Furthermore, inequality, in particular horizontal inequality, is a core tenant of explaining when regimes break down as a result of coups, civil wars and uprisings (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Boix 2008; Houle 2016).

4.2   Institutional approaches

The second main category of explanations pertain to the institutional make-up of regimes. This is a large and evolving literature with contributions on everything from the seminal study by Linz and Stepan (1996) on how different regime types relate to the emergence and consolidation of democracy, through the link between parties in non-democracies and subsequent transitions (Levitsky and Cameron 2003) and the role of specific features such as civil society (Fishman 2017), through issues of institutional consolidation (Svolik 2008) and power-sharing in non-democracies (Boix and Svolik 2013).

One particularly salient debate within the institutional strain of explanations is the relationship between hybrid regimes, or semidemocracy, and overall regime

instability. One the one hand, there is a substantial body of literature examining how semi-democracy can make such regimes more durable (Brownlee 2007; Magaloni 2008; Svolik 2012). On the other hand, extensive empirical research has made clear that mixed regimes, or semidemocracies, are generally *less* stable than both full democracy and full autocracy (Gates et al. 2006; Brownlee 2009; Goldstone et al. 2010; Hegre 2014; Knutsen and Nygård 2015). This result is strikingly robust to alternative model specifications.

From the "structural" and institutional strands of the literature, some findings on overall regime instability stand out: high income increases the stability of regimes, (horizontal) inequality spurs conflict by regime outsiders, and semidemocracy is the most volatile regime type. We should therefore expect low-income semidemocracies with substantial horizontal inequality to be the most unstable. However, since these structural and institutional features typically persist over time, event-based approaches are instrumental in understanding *when* this volatility translates into breakdown.

4.3   Event-based approaches

Among event-based approaches, four explanations of various forms of regime breakdown stand out: protest, elections both as coup-triggers and incremental democratizers, and economic crisis. Starting with protest, there is a body of research that claims and finds, like Ulfelder (2005), that particularly non-violent protest increases risks of breakdown (for single-party and military regimes). However, overall, this literature finds that many democratizing protest efforts fail (Hale 2019), and that few of those efforts spread across boundaries (Brancati and Lucardi 2019). In older work, O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) have suggested that protest should be a more powerful tool in affecting abrupt rather than more incremental regime transitions.

Electoral events can have democratizing effects (see e.g. Schedler 2002; Lindberg et al. 2009; Teorell and Hadenius 2009; Bunce and Wolchik 2010). However, as an expression of collective action and information transaction, protest is also relevant in relation to the literature investigating elections in autocracies as coup-triggers. This literature is a response to the idea that elections stabilize democracies (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007), and by extension, the idea that semidemocracy is a way of stabilizing autocracy, as reviewed in the previous section. In fact, elections are investigated as a source of instability in a substantial body of literature looking at, e.g., the effects of elections on civil war (Cederman, Gleditsch and Hug 2013) and violence (Fjelde and Hoglund 2016). Work such as Wig and Rød (2016) and

Krishnarajan and Rørbæk (2020) find that elections can a) serve as informational cues in autocracies, either triggering divertive coups or coups that exponentiate repression, and b) that the effect of elections on coups depends on the economic situation of a country, importantly exacerbating risks when occurring during crises.

This brings us to the important role of economic crises in the literature. Since the influential synthesis of Geddes (1999), economic downturns have been considered important and robust predictors of regime breakdown. While some work has emphasized investigating the heterogenous effects of crises over time (Gasiorowski 1995) and the terms laid for democratizing transitions by economic conditions (Haggard and Kaufman 1997), the work evaluating how crises should influence incumbent-led transitions is largely theoretical (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).

4.4   Patterns and incumbent-led regime transitions

In summary, we know that high levels of economic development overall stabilize regimes, that semidemocracy is the most volatile regime type and that crisis in particular stands as a critical event precipitating regime change. What we have much less systematic knowledge of is whether and how these factors matter for the all the various ways in which regimes can break down, and whether these explanations are equally important across modern history or have more defined periods for which they matter. By leveraging the novel and extensive coverage of HRD, we are able to investigate these hypotheses systematically.

What is also clear from the review in the previous section is that we know a whole lot about the causes and correlates of externally driven instability and regime change, such as civil wars, coups and revolutions. How conventional and particular causes of regime change relate to regime transitions led by the incumbent have received comparatively little attention. Now returning to the conceptual distinctions made in Chapter 2, incumbent-led transitions include democratizing transitions, autocratizing transitions s well as transitions that do not alter the democratic status of a polity. In the democratization literature, much attention has been given to the ways in which democracies emerge and stabilize, but less attention has been given to the systematic causes of democratizing regime transition *events* that are defined by the involvement of incumbents. As democracy can either emerge incrementally or through non-democratizing transition modes, such as coups, the particular category of incumbent-led democratization is not often singled out.

Similarly, there is a burgeoning literature on various forms of autocratization, or democratic backsliding, but this literature also typically defines autocratization as a particular stint or downwards slope on democracy indices (see e.g., Lührmann et al.

2018), rather than looking specifically at autocratization *events* led by incumbents. Notable contributions here do establish that incumbents are *the* source of democratic setbacks in recent years (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019) and that the causes of incumbent takeovers as opposed to, e.g., coups are distinctive (Svolik 2015), but this literature has merely scratched the surface of the conventional and novel ways in which we can explain these transitions.

In this dissertation, I thoroughly investigate two explanations that should be systematically explored for incumbent-led regime transitions: one explanation from the event-based strand, namely economic crisis (Paper 2), and one that takes cues from the institutional strand, namely constraints on the executive (Paper 3). The foundations of these two explanations can also be separated based on their novelty: while the motivation for investigating the effect of crisis stems from the prevalence of the crisis explanation in the field, the motivation for investigating executive constraints stems from an ambition to develop explanations of incumbent-led transitions that should be particularly relevant for this type of regime transition and therefore are novel.

Crisis has been established as a cause of coups (Gassebner, Gutmann and Voigt 2016) — at least under certain conditions (Krishnarajan 2019), as a cause of civil wars (Hegre and Sambanis 2006) and riots (Ponticelli and Voth 2011), and even rather extensively elaborated theoretically as a cause of incumbent-led transitions in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Bratton and van de Walle (1997). In Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), crises are thought to trigger mass mobilization and external pressure, which subsequently leads to guided liberalization efforts by incumbent regime leaders. In light of the previous instability discussion, a clear expectation in this dissertation is that crises — being markers of instability — should trigger responses from incumbents, much like they should incite opposition and revolt. The question then is what strategy incumbents respond with: do they liberalize or repress? Building on these foundations, Paper 2 investigates whether Acemoglu and Robinson's hypothesized effect is empirically detectable, and whether incumbents can also be pushed into autocratization of the regime by similar forces.

Finally, constraints on the executive is an institutional feature that has received limited attention as a determinant of regime transition. As expressions of horizontal accountability (Mechkova, Luhrmann and Lindberg 2018), constraints on the executive should restrict incumbents from pursuing takeover. But, when analyzed across the regime type spectrum, they might have a contradictory effect at medium levels: by not being sufficiently consolidated, medium constraints may fall short of constraining incumbents, while simultaneously hampering the actions of incumbents to such an extent that they are incentivized to take over. Again tying the nature of the explanation to the instability literature, medium-level constraints

can represent tension within a political system and thereby trigger responses from incumbents.

4.5   Does the type of transition matter?

In light of the relatively sparse attention paid to incumbent-led transitions, this dissertation also investigates the descriptive patterns of transition frequencies over time, the temporal prevalence of some explanations over others, and the consequences that different types of transitions might lead to for the polities in which they take place. Investigating the consequences of transitions acts as a sort of "and so what?"-type question. Does it matter whether the type of transition taking place is incumbent-led or not?

This question is inherently linked to the relationship between regime transitions and regime instability. In the literature on effects of political instability on growth, there have been a lot of contradictory findings. Several studies claim, however, that *regime* instability is the one form that consistently has detrimental effects. Hence, we should expect that all regime instability is bad instability. In those studies, regime instability is often measured with aggregate operationalizations (i.e., all instances of regime change) or by only looking at coups d'état. In more limited studies like van de Walle (1999), however, evidence suggests a much less clear connection between negotiated transitions and economic decline. In this dissertation, I therefore investigate whether the negative relationship between regime instability and economic outcomes holds when regime transitions are disaggregated in a four-field typology and each transition type's effect on growth is systematically assessed.

Chapter 5

Methodological considerations

The study of the causes and consequences of regime transitions relies heavily on observational data. Though there are certain elements to these issues that can be translated into experimental designs, there is just a plethora of questions about regimes that cannot. Hence, efforts to improve the quality of available data are crucial. Still, although better, more extensive, and more precise data, such as the pool of regime data HRD contributes to, expands the kinds of questions we can ask, and the precision with which we can ask them, modelling with observational data still comes with important caveats.

Overall, the use of observational data requires an attenuated approach to robustness testing and an awareness of strategies to combat both omitted variable and post-treatment bias. In addition, observational data that takes the form of repeated cross-sectional observations over time, typically referred to as time series cross-sectional data, introduces its own set of issues. Armed with the theoretical expectations and data foundations described in the previous chapters, it is time to discuss some fundamental methodological challenges. Specifically, this chapter contains discussions of central issues in crafting the different models used and the efforts that have been made to minimize their impact.

5.1   Obervational data and robustness

As mentioned, observational data (as opposed to experimental data) comes with its caveats. Most importantly, observational data cannot achieve random assignment and is therefore inherently susceptible to selection bias (Angrist and Pischke 2010). One response to this problem is the use of quasi-experimental designs, or causal identification strategies, such as instrumental variables, matching and regression discontinuity (Clark and Golder 2014). Yet another response is the pursuit of robustness and extensive sensitivity analysis, with the acknowledgement that no model will ever, perfectly, be the "true" model. In the words of Neumayer and

Plümper (2017): "Given causal complexity, all models — theoretical *and* empirical models — of social outcomes necessarily simplify and no empirical model can ever capture the true data-generating process" (Neumayer and Plümper 2017:11). In their view, all social scientists should therefore operate with the notion of model uncertainty, rather than model misspecification, and should investigate in analyses all important alternatives to their baseline specification. This ambition, to rigorously and consistently investigate all plausible modelling alternatives, is central to the analytical work performed in all the four papers of this dissertation.

The virtue of time series cross-sectional data is that it combines the power of cross-sectional data with the observance of causes prior to effects but simultaneously requires specific econometric adjustments, such as varied intercepts (Kennedy 2008). Two core concerns of any observational analysis are omitted variable bias and post-treatment bias. Omitted variable bias can be defined as the bias in the estimator that arises when a regressor is correlated with an omitted variable that is also a determinant of the regressand (Stock and Watson 2012). This type of bias, if present, *can* make results nonsensical. However, mindless inclusion of too many variables can increase the risk of the other detrimental form of bias, namely post-treatment bias, which can entirely obscure results by "controlling away" the effect we are interested in. For phenomena such as economic growth, this is a particular concern, and the models I use in Paper 4 are therefore purposefully specified with few controls.

For the specific context of modelling with observational data in a cross-sectional time series (TCSC) format, one important strategy for combating the most severe omitted variable bias is the inclusion of fixed effects. As forcefully argued by Green, Kim and Yoon (2001), omitting varying intercepts for each cross-section can lead to entirely nonsensical results where the systematic differences between cross-sections obscure the relationship we are observing. Therefore, country-fixed effects are used in all my analyses, and alternative specifications with, e.g., region-fixed effects are also always included. Region-fixed effects are important alternatives because, as many of my models have binary dependent variables, logistic regression combined with country-fixed effects drops all observations for cross-sections without variation on the dependent variable (Beck, Katz and Tucker 1998). Substantively, country-fixed effects also remove all cross-country comparison. Yet another approach is to use linear probability models (LPMs) rather than logistical models to avoid the caveats of Logistic FE regression. In line with my model uncertainty approach, LPMs are also used in robustness testing.

5.2   Temporal heterogeneity and historical data

A key contribution of this dissertation is that it invokes data covering modern political history back to the French Revolution and thereby can move beyond analyses concentrating strictly on, typically, the post-WWII period. This feature of my analyses serves a very important goal: to investigate whether our empirical conclusions on the correlates of regime transitions are temporally specific to very recent history or rather hold across otherwise heterogenous time periods and thereby ensure that we are learning from the largest case universe possible. This adds to the more technical advantages of a large temporal scope, which improves statistical power to the extent that is possible with rare events data such as regime transitions and enables more diverse model specifications.

Together with these gains, the vast time series invoked here also introduces its own set of corresponding issues. First of all, a concern is whether explanations that do hold for the entire time series also hold for different sub-samples of the data, and particularly whether they hold for the most recent period of history. In other words, one might question whether what we are learning from longer time series makes it less likely that we are learning something that still matters for polities today. That presupposes, however, that the set of conditions that have dominated regimes in recent years are still more likely to occur in years to come. If the set of conditions that dominated regimes at different times during the 19th century again become dominant, learning from this larger time series will, on the contrary, enable better understanding also of future events.

In keeping with the model *uncertainty* perspective, alternative specifications are still in order. In the papers of this dissertation, I primarily invoke two strategies catering to the long time series — both to accommodate concerns of temporal dependence and to substantively learn about how different explanations work in different periods. In Paper 1, which specifically investigates different patterns of frequencies and explanatory power over time, we run change-point models to identify waves and crests of regime change across the period. Second, I run alternative models on different temporal subsets of the data. In Paper 1, we use the identified change-points to delineate between subsets as well as theoretically specified breaks such as World War II.

5.3   Modelling time

In terms of modelling, another TCSC-specific concern that is especially poignant with long time series, is to appropriately model time to avoid confounding time dependence in the analyses. When examining the causes of regime transitions, the

duration of the regime prior to transition might take a u-shaped form, i.e., that risks of transition are higher in both the very short and very long term. But there is also reason to believe that these dynamics are more complicated — especially when modelling across regimes. The risk of transition can even be modelled in itself as a non-linear function of the regime's duration (Svolik 2012). One simple, but powerful, way of approximating a good model of time dependence is to include a linear, squared and cubed time term in each regression, which together serve as a cubic polynomial approximation. As argued by Carter and Signorino (2010), this modelling strategy replicates many of the advantages of using splines, but without the substantial complexity they imply both for modelling and interpretation. In addition, TCSC models need a strategy for dealing with common shocks. To this end, time-fixed effects for each year avoids the confounding bias of including particular and extreme year observations.

Across the analyses of the dissertation, I also pay very close attention to the lag structures invoked. First, robust results should not depend on one specific lag structure (i.e., results should typically hold for IVs measured in both t-1 and t-2). Second, the way the explanatory variables relate to the dependent variables is interesting in its own right. When, as I do in Paper 4, evaluating the persistence of different consequences of regime change, it is interesting to investigate changes in the significance, sign, and size of coefficients over time. Some effects might be strong and short-lived, while others, such as I find between coups and negative economic growth, can persist throughout an entire decade. Related strategies are employed across the papers of the dissertation.

Chapter 6

Empirical contributions

The broader research question of this dissertation is: What factors increase probabilities of regime transitions of various kinds, and what are the consequences of those transitions? Within the scope of that question, there are a myriad of interesting, more specific questions. Particularly, this dissertation aspires to decipher differences in the causes and consequences of transitions that are in some way guided by incumbents. Do classic explanations of regime transitions apply to these transitions? Are there less investigated explanations that particularly apply to transitions involving incumbents? And, finally, does the type of transition matter for societal outcomes — following the transitions — in the polities in which they occur?

In this chapter, I present three empirical contributions to understanding the causes of regime transitions, and one contribution to understanding their consequences. I present the three first contributions in descending order of specification of regime transitions: from the overall findings on major patterns in determinants of *all* regime transitions, through the effects of economic crisis on *incumbent-led* regime transitions, to the effects of executive constraints on only *non-democratizing* incumbent-led regime transitions, which are termed incumbent takeovers in Paper 3. Finally, I present results on the economic consequences of various types of transitions.

6.1 Historical patterns

Alongside its data contribution, Paper 1 also presents findings on a range of patterns of regime transitions including differing frequencies of transitions and transition types over time, and both aggregate and disaggregate analyses of some of the most established correlates of regime breakdown in the literature. The aim of these analyses is to investigate the salience of different explanations over time and describe, rather than explain, both differing frequencies among the breakdown

% regime changes and change-points, 1789–2016

Figure 6.1: Change-points for all regime transitions 1789-2017

Note: The figure shows Bayesian change-points (marked with vertical lines) over frequencies of regime changes in each year (red line) and the Loess smoothed average (grey line). Reprint from Paper 1.[1]

modes as well as how different factors vary in their salience over time.

Through a range of descriptive analyses, including the Bayesian change-points displayed in Figure 6.1, we find that we can overall identify two main waves and two distinctive crests of regime change since 1789. The purpose of this analysis is to identify not waves of democratization, like Huntington (1991), but waves of regime volatility. The waves are rather long: the first lasts from 1796 until 1881, the second from 1913 to 1995. In other words, these waves illustrate that through most of modern political history, regime changes have been similarly frequent. Some particular high points also stand out, like the tumultuous year 1848, which saw transitions across Europe and beyond (Rapport 2008) as well as World War I and II and the decolonization period after 1960. Still, the two crests are perhaps the most fascinating. Starting after the First Boer War and the Congress of Berlin, the first crest lasts until the prelude of WWI, indicating that the turn of the last century was a particularly peaceful era. Likewise, the period after 1995 that we are currently in seems to also be particularly stable.

In our disaggregate analyses, looking at particular regime types and particular periods, two findings are especially interesting to highlight. First, in terms of economic indicators, economic growth seems to safeguard regimes only in wave periods, whereas high income safeguards regimes more or less throughout both waves and crests.[2] Second, incumbent-led democratization cannot be predicted in

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[2]For full prints of the results disaggregated on waves and crests, see Table 5 in Paper 1.

our models with any other correlate than semidemocracy.[3] In light of the rather elaborate literature linking economic downturns to increased popular pressure and liberalizing concessions by incumbents (Such as Acemoglu and Robinson 2006), this is rather surprising. But do downturns affect other types of incumbent-led transitions? This brings us to the next empirical contribution of the dissertation.

6.2 Economic crises

As a rather established theoretical explanation of regime instability in the literature, the effect of crises on incumbent-led regime transitions has not received ample attention in the discipline. As discussed in Chapter 4, the effects of crises on *externally* driven transitions such as coups and civil wars have been investigated rather broadly, finding substantial support for that relationship both directly and dependent on factors such as natural resource dependence (Gurr 1970; Davies 1962; Krishnarajan 2019). For incumbent-led transitions, influential work such as Gasiorowski (1995) expects crises to lead to democratic breakdown, although the role of incumbents in this framework is not discussed. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) expect crises to have great democratizing potential in forcing concessions for incumbents as they choose the ´´lesser of two evils": opening up the political system instead of being forcibly removed. In Paper 2, we find support for the first claim, but not for the second.

The main contribution of Paper 2 is therefore to clarify that for incumbent-led transitions as a whole, crises do have rather robust explanatory power. However, we also find that as far as learning from history, we do not have systematic evidence to support that incumbent-led *democratization* is driven by crises. This mirrors the disaggregate analyses in Paper 1. What we do have empirical support for is that crises create windows of opportunity for incumbents eager to restrict the opposition and consolidate personalized rule. From Paper 2, Figures 6.2 and 6.3 display the growth trajectories of Zambia and Peru, respectively, around the times of their incumbent-led transitions. In Zambia, President Kaunda and his ruling party faced increasing opposition after years of economic crisis and eventually opened up for multiparty elections in 1991. In some specific cases, the "lesser evil" dynamic might therefore be taking place, but our analyses are unable to detect this in a systematic fashion. In comparison, trajectories such as the one leading to the election of Fujimori in Peru (dashed line) and his subsequent self-coup in 1992, seem to be much more common, with significant and robust coefficients across model specifications in Paper 2.

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[3]For full prints of the results disaggregated on transition types, see Table 4 in Paper 1.

Figure 6.2: GDP growth in Zambia

Figure 6.3: GDP growth in Peru

Note: The figures show GDP growth in Zambia and Peru around the time of their incumbent-led transitions. Transitions marked with vertical lines, the election of Fujimori marked with dashed line in Figure 6.3. Reprint from Paper 2.

6.3 Constraints on the executive

So far, the empirical contributions presented in this dissertation have concerned established explanations and determinants of regime transitions. To really map out the distinctive dynamics of incumbent-led as opposed to externally induced transitions, however, it has also been my objective to uncover explanations that are distinctive to this mode of transition. To that end, I have investigated the institutional explanation that should intuitively matter the most for curtailing non-democratizing incumbent-led transitions, namely constraints on the executive. The category of transitions leveraged here therefore does not include democratizing transitions as in Paper 2, and focuses on what can broadly be construed as incumbent takeovers — where the sitting regime leader either suspends the democratic institutions through which he was elected or increases personalization of, e.g., one-party regimes.

Constraints on the executive can take both legislative and judicial forms and are typically formalized in democracies as, e.g., limitations on the types of policy that lies within the jurisdiction of the executive branch or judicial oversight of executive decision-making. In autocracies, these institutions must crucially be observed in how they function de facto, as constitutions are rarely enacted. In Paper 3, I argue that we should expect an inverted u-shaped relationship between executive constraints and incumbent takeover because of their effects on the incentives and opportunities of incumbents. In regimes with low levels of constraints, incumbents might have ample opportunity, but little incentive, to pursue takeover, whereas incumbents with medium levels of constraints are curtailed enough by the opposition to be incentivized but not restricted enough to also lack the opportunity.


Figure 6.4: Judicial constraints   Figure 6.5: Legislative constraints

Note: The figures show predicted margins with confidence intervals with incumbent takeovers (from HRD) as dependent variable and the judicial and legislative constraints on the executive indices (from V-Dem) as explanatory variables. Reprint from Paper 3. Full models printed in the Appendix of Paper 3.

Table 6.1: Constraints on the executive regressed on coups and popular uprisings

	Coups		Uprisings	
	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4
Judicial constraints on the executive	1.297		1.555	
	(0.67)		(0.54)	
Judicial constraints on the executive ^{2}	-1.936		-3.417	
	(-0.96)		(-1.02)	
Legislative constraints on the executive		4.158		4.595
		(1.68)		(1.19)
Legislative constraints on the executive ^{2}		-3.538		-8.548
		(-1.34)		(-1.90)
Polyarchy	12.787***	10.188***	7.521*	10.489
	(5.99)	(3.32)	(1.99)	(1.56)
Polyarchy^2	-15.744***	-13.912***	-15.054**	-17.692
	(-5.90)	(-3.92)	(-2.70)	(-1.81)
Log GDP pc	0.140	0.171	-0.566**	-0.443
	(0.71)	(0.70)	(-2.60)	(-1.76)
Log pop size	0.045	-0.036	0.233*	0.253*
	(0.14)	(-0.09)	(2.31)	(2.11)
GDP pc growth	-0.007	-0.000	-0.030**	-0.109**
	(-0.22)	(-0.02)	(-2.67)	(-2.76)
Cubic duration terms	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓		
Region FE			✓	✓
N	6405.000	4305.000	3406.000	2275.000
ll	-894.875	-668.465	-221.950	-156.011

Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. T-values in parentheses. Dependent variable is coups in Model 1 and 2, and popular uprisings in Model 3 and 4, both variables from HRD. Max time series is 1789–2014. All independent variables are lagged by 2 years. Duration terms, constant and fixed effects omitted from table.

As shown in Figure 6.4 and 6.5, the expected relationship is also very clear empirically. In fact, this relationship is robust to a myriad of alternative specifications, including controlling for medium democracy levels, which should intuitively share some of the same mechanisms. Moreover, findings from this paper suggest that incumbent takeovers are very rare in established democracies and that the narrow conceptualization of takeover has only taken place in polities with V-Dem polyarchy scores of under 0.75.

To further investigate the particularity of this explanation to incumbent-led transitions, I have run additional analyses of whether constraints on the executive can explain externally led transitions as well. Table 6.1 prints results from four logistic regression analyses with the same baseline specifications as the original models used for Figure 6.4 and 6.5, but where the dependent variables are coups (Model 1.1 and 1.2) and popular uprisings (Model 1.3 and 1.4).[4] In contrast to their explanatory power for incumbent-led transitions, constraints on the executive do not have significant effects on externally induced regime transitions. In fact, both the effect sizes and the significance levels are vanishingly small. This makes a lot of intuitive sense, as these institutions affect incumbents and should have little direct

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[4]Data also from HRD. Models with alternative Fixed Effect specifications printed in Table A.1 of the Appendix.

effect on regime opponents. This explanation therefore seems to be quite particular to incumbent-led transitions.

6.4 Economic consequences

Turning to the final empirical contribution of this project, I look at whether the type of regime transition matters for economic outcomes. As previously described, this question is inherently linked to the ways in which transitions represent political instability, and the empirical response presented in Paper 4 takes as its point of departure how inconclusive results are on the economic implications of instability. Existing measures of political instability focus on a myriad of indicators ranging from number of coups or assassination attempts, leadership changes, government duration, and outright regime changes. Work by Jong-A-Pin (2009); Wright and Bak (2016) and Lueders and Lust (2018) has demonstrated the sensitivity of analysis to alternate indicators, and a large systematic discussion of the central tenets of political instability is called for. By disentangling regime transitions based on the drivers (elites vs popular masses) and nature (rupture vs reform) of transition events, I construct a four-field typology. Finally, I demonstrate the empirical implications of the transition typology by modelling the effect of each type on subsequent economic growth.

Figures 6.6 and 6.7 display core results from Paper 4, with irregular leader

Figure 6.6: Irreg. removal, growth avg.   Figure 6.7: Incumbent-led, growth avg.

Note: The figures show coefficients from models with transition types measured in t-1, t-2, ... t-10. Dependent variable in all models is (logged) GDP, with a control for GDP included at the time of transition, so that the effect estimated is on total growth over t+x years. Reprint from Paper 4. Full models printed in Paper 4 Appendix.

removal and incumbent-led transitions, respectively, as explanatory variables. Where the coefficients for irregular leader removal are consistently negative and different from zero, the coefficients for incumbent-led transitions are only different from zero in the first year following transition. In short, I therefore find that particularly elite-driven reforms have much milder economic consequences than both elite-driven and popularly driven ruptures. This result also holds across the different subtypes of incumbent-led transitions.

Chapter 7

Implications and conclusion

In the midst of an exceptional drop in global GDP and growing worries of democratic backsliding and decline, understanding the role of incumbents in changing their regimes is as important as ever. Strongmen in Hungary and Turkey seem capable of thwarting and reversing decades of democratic development, whilst leaders such as Xi Jinping are pushing through personalization agendas in already autocratic regimes. Still, incumbents have also driven, or at least negotiated, notable democratic developments in the same period in countries such as Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic and Honduras. In yet many others, democratic and autocratic regimes have simply persisted. So what is the contribution of this dissertation to understanding these developments?

First of all, the introduction of HRD has enabled re-examination of some of the literature's most established explanations of regime change. In answering the broad first research question — What are the causes and consequences of political regime transitions? — the dissertation has examined four causes: economic development, semidemocracy, crises, and constraints on the executive. Tested with an unprecedented sample reaching across modern political history, I have found that the four causes are all salient explanations, but that their salience varies for different periods and for different transition types. Having also established that there have been two major waves and crests of regime change, economic growth seems, for example, to only safeguard regimes during the two waves, whereas overall income safeguards against regime transitions throughout waves and crests alike.

Moreover, the dissertation has given three major insights to the second research question. What correlates of regime transitions apply to incumbent-led transitions, and do these transitions have different consequences? First, I have found that economic crises significantly increase risks of incumbent-led transitions in non-democratizing directions but do not seem to be at all systematically related to incumbent-led democratization. Second, I have found that medium levels of legislative and judicial constraints on the executive is a very strong predictor of

incumbent takeovers, and that this is a unique explanation of this particular type of regime transition that does not apply to other transitions. Third and finally, I have found that the economic consequences of regime transitions also very much depend on the transition type: only irregular leader removal significantly and consistently has negative effects on growth.

7.1 Implications for 2020 and beyond

The year 2020 is a year of crisis. In fact, organizations such as the OECD predict that the crisis we have entered this year will be the most severe recession the world has seen since WWII, or even WWI (OECD 2020). Recovery will be slow and delayed by recurring outbreaks. The findings of this dissertation, and Paper 2 in particular, serve as a warning call in this context. Quite consistently, we find that crises serve as significant predictors of illiberal incumbent-led transitions. Based a range of models, that effect is relatively strong and robust, travelling across specifications. Our take in Paper 2 is that crises serve as windows of opportunity, creating openings for incumbents eager to consolidate less democratic or more personalized rule. During crises, would-be dictators name extraordinary threats and circumstances and are thereby able to push through their agendas in ways that would otherwise not be feasible.

Inklings of this scenario are already playing out. In Hungary, Orban has imposed a state of emergency that, although at least nominally lifted, might permanently expand the powers of his already dominant presidency. Across the globe, containment strategies imposing unprecedented restrictions on the movements of citizens can invoke similar connotations. And although incumbents can certainly play pivotal roles in the development of democracy as well, the systematic investigation in Paper 2 finds no trace of the kind of crisis-forcing-democratization mechanism suggested by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). So although we might hope that built-up pressures in polities such as Belarus might be galvanized so thoroughly by this crisis that they force the eventual negotiated farewell to Lukashenko, we cannot provide the empirical evidence to suggest that crises on average have that effect.

7.2 Taming the threat from within

Some studies, such as Lührmann and Lindberg (2019), have argued that we are currently living a third wave of autocratization that is empirically detectable and significant. Related literature has found that incumbents and imposed states of

emergency play a significant role in that trend, representing a substantial threat from within the political regime (Lührmann and Rooney 2020). Still, responding literature has contradicted the significance of that third wave, finding that although current illiberal tendencies are certainly worrying, more conventional definitions of democratizing and autocratizing waves do not yield support for any such current wave — or at most, that we are only on the cusp of a wave that is minimal compared to earlier waves (Skaaning 2020).

Relating to this debate, this dissertation provides more reassuring insights than it does on the consequences of crisis. As for the wave perspective, the general waves and crests we identify in Paper 1 indicate that, if anything, the post-1994 period has been one of relative regime stability. Fewer regime transitions have taken place in this period, on average, than in any other identifiable period since the turn of the last century. Overall, then, our findings lend more support to the notion of a relatively stable period with little democratic expansion than to an established watershed of autocratizing regimes.

Furthermore, the findings of Paper 3 indicate that polities with constrained executives beyond medium levels stand at almost zero risk of incumbent takeover. In fact, a point I make in Paper 3 is that throughout the long period covered by HRD, no outright self-coups have happened in a polity with a V-Dem Polyarchy score above 0.75. To contextualize that number, even Hungary currently holds a score of 0.73 on the V-Dem index, with most consolidated democracies coming in at, or above, 0.9. As such, as far as learning from historical averages goes, there is very limited reason to expect incumbent takeovers in advanced democracies. Hence, the threat from within is perhaps not so poignant in these polities, mirroring studies that argue for more optimistic readings of history for the stability of democratic regimes (Cornell, Møller and Skaaning 2020).

For less established democracies, however, and perhaps particularly for hybrid autocracies with only partially implemented democratic institutions, the threat from within is palpable still. For hopeful democrats, the introduction of institutions such as executive constraints in non-democracies should therefore be observed with caution. As the world recovers from crisis in the coming years, the combined findings of this dissertation overall suggest that semidemocracies with income levels that were already underwhelming *and* only partially implemented executive constraints stand at particular risk of autocratizing retreat.

7.3 Directions for future research

While this dissertation has explored some of the most established explanations of regime change and evaluated them for different types of regime transitions, there is still a vast literature of explanations that has not been subjected to the same evaluation. One particularly fruitful institutional perspective to pursue might be to disentangle and disaggregate semidemocracy and investigate that particular features that makes it vulnerable to different types of regime change. This research could investigate whether there are similar systematic differences between factors of semidemocracy as there are between the effects of executive constraints on incumbent-led versus externally induced transitions.

Another particularly interesting phenomenon to evaluate in light of incumbent-led transitions is the occurrence of protest. While the investigation of autocratizing trends has received particular attention in the last decade due to an increased worry of democratic backsliding, that decade has also seen some of the largest and most frequent popular protests in recent history, occurring in cities across the globe from Hong Kong to Beirut to Santiago. Recent work investigating the conditions of effective civil resistance finds that protests, perhaps temporarily, have decreased in efficiency but increased in frequency (Chenoweth 2020). But even if these protests do not often topple regimes in and of themselves, other recent work showing how particular social groups are often more effective in pressuring for democratic development (Dahlum, Knutsen and Wig 2019) inspires questions about how and when incumbent-led transitions are triggered by these movements and in what direction. This would greatly expand our understanding of whether and how revolts in various forms can act as significant triggers of incumbent responses.

Finally, this dissertation's findings on the consequences of different types of regime transitions strongly suggest that disaggregation and systematic evaluation of transition types are crucial for accurately investigating the impact of transitions on the polities in which they take place. Beyond the one outcome of GDP growth evaluated in this dissertation, there are a myriad of fascinating outcomes to consider. For example: How do different types of transitions affect human development in the longer term? Are incumbent-led transitions associated with subsequent higher levels of repression? And when do regime transitions lead to prolonged civil conflict? Whether solved analogously to the typology presented in Paper 4 of this dissertation or in an entirely different fashion, regime transitions in analyses studying these questions should always be disaggregated. Because the type of transition does matter.

English Summary

Political regimes have vastly different lifespans and can last for everything from mere weeks to spanning entire centuries. When they eventually end and transition into other regimes, that transition likewise takes many different forms. These seminal events have inspired a large and ever-evolving literature in political science. However, that literature has devoted relatively little attention to one particular type of regime transitions, namely those that are in some way guided by the regime incumbent. Driven not by a lack of prevalence, as is demonstrated in this dissertation, I argue that this lack of attention is rather driven by a lack of data. In addition, the larger field studying the causes of regime transitions has been limited in scope to the post WWII period, and studies of the various causes and consequences of regime transitions have lacked comparability across transition types. In this dissertation, I address these gaps by leveraging a novel dataset — the Historical Regimes Data (HRD) — to systematically evaluate whether and how some of the most established explanations and outcomes of regime transitions travel across time and compare their salience across types of regime transitions.

Throughout the papers of the dissertation, HRD serves as a common feature and is consistently leveraged for measuring either the dependent or independent variables of the analyses. HRD covers most all polities of the world since the French Revolution, resulting in a dataset of over 2000 political regimes. The improved scope provided by HRD also allows for varied modelling strategies, and it is the explicit aim of each analysis in this dissertation to subject results to all plausible alternative model specifications, particularly in regards to modelling time.

The research question guiding this dissertation is: What are the causes and consequences of different types of political regime transitions? And more specifically: What correlates of regime transitions apply to incumbent-led transitions, and do these transitions have different consequences? To answer these questions, the papers of the dissertation investigate economic growth and development, crises, semidemocracy, and institutional constraints on the executive as causes of regime transitions. In short, I arrive at three contributions to this literature. First, that high income consistently safeguards regimes, whereas high growth only safeguards regimes in periods marred by high regime

volatility. Second, that economic crisis — typically assumed in the literature to be systematically associated with regime breakdown — is a consistent predictor of incumbent takeover, but that it does not increase likelihoods of incumbent-led democratization. And third, that medium levels of judicial and legislative constraints significantly increase the risk of incumbent takeover but does not apply to externally induced regime changes such as coups. Hence, medium levels of constraints is an explanation that is unique to incumbent takeover. Next, I investigate how different types of regime transitions also have different consequences by developing a four-field typology of transitions and empirically investigating how the resulting four types relate to growth. The results of this investigation show strikingly different patterns across the transition types, strongly suggesting that studies of transition consequences always disaggregate regime transitions — because the type of transition does matter.

Dansk resumé

Politiske regimers levetid varierer fra nogle uger til hele århundreder. Når de endelig vælter, kan regimestransitionen også tage mange forskellige former. Disse monumentale begivenheder har inspireret en stor statskundskabslitteratur, der stadig er under udvikling. Denne litteratur har imidlertid haft begrænset fokus på én specifik type regime transition, nemlig den der i stor grad er drevet af siddende regimeledere. Som denne afhandling viser, er denne type regimetransition empirisk dominant. Derfor argumenterer jeg for, at det manglende fokus i litteraturen primært er drevet af mangel på data. I tillæg har det større felt, der studerer årsager til regimetransitioner, typisk begrænset sig til tiden efter anden værdenskrig og har manglet sammenlignelighed på tværs af transitionstyper. I denne afhandling adresserer jeg disse mangler i litteraturen ved hjælp af et nyt dataset — de Historiske Regime Data (HRD) — for systematisk at evaluere, om og hvordan nogle af de mest etablerede forklaringer og konsekvenser af regimeskifte holder, når de testes over lange tidsserier, samt hvor gode de er til at forklare forskellige transitionstyper.

HRD danner det datamæssige grundlag gennem hele afhandlingen og bruges enten som afhængig eller uafhængig variabel i analyserne i de fire inkluderede papers. HRD dækker næsten alle selvstyrede enheder i verden siden den Franske Revolution og inkluderer dermed over 2000 politiske regimer. HRD har dermed en langt større rækkevidde og gør det muligt at variere modelleringsstrategier, og det er et udtalt mål for alle analyserne i afhandlingen at udsætte resultaterne for alle plausible alternative modelspecifikationer, specielt hvad angår modellering af tid.

Afhandlingens forskningsspørgsmål er: Hvad er årsagerne til og konsekvenserne af politiske regimetransitioner? Og mere specifikt: Hvilke samvarierende faktorer med regimetransitioner gælder for transitioner der er drevet af siddende regimeledere, og har disse transitionerne specifikke konsekvenser? For at svare på disse spørgsmål undersøger papirerne i afhandlingen økonomisk vækst og udvikling, kriser, semidemokrati og institutionelle begrænsinger på den udøvende magt som potentielle årsager til regimeskift. Kort sagt laver jeg tre bidrag til litteraturen: 1) Høj indtægt beskytter konsekvent regimer mod sammenbrud, mens økonomisk vækst kun beskytter regimer i historiske perioder præget af høj regimevolatilitet. 2) Økonomisk krise, som litteraturen typisk antager

hænger sammen med regimesammenbrud, har en stærk sammenhæng med selvkup, men kriser ikke er systematisk associeret med demokratisering drevet af regimeledere. 3) Institutionelle begrænsninger på den udøvende magt, der kun er delvist udviklet, har stærk forklaringskraft for selvkup, men ikke på eksternt inducerede kup drevet af fx militære ledere. Dermed er er denne forklaring unik for denne type regimetransition. Derefter undersøger jeg, hvordan forskellige typer regimetransitioner også har forskellige konsekvenser ved at udvikle en firefeltstypologi over transitioner og empirisk undersøge hver types effekt på økonomisk vækst. Resultaterne af denne analyse viser markant forskellige effekter for hver type. Det giver anledning til en stærk opfordring til, at studier af transitioners konsekvenser altid disaggregerer regimetransitioner — fordi typen transition definitivt betyder noget.

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Appendix

Table A.1: Alternative Fixed Effects, otherwise specified like Table 1: Constraints on the executive regressed on coups and popular uprisings

| | Coups | | Uprisings | |
	1	2	3	4
Judicial constraints on the executive index	2.141		1.645	
	(1.73)		(0.28)	
Judicial constraints on the executive index ^{2}	-3.605**		-4.636	
	(-2.87)		(-0.66)	
Legislative constraints on the executive index		2.820		2.853
		(1.38)		(0.32)
Legislative constraints on the executive index ^{2}		-4.297		-14.206
		(-1.89)		(-1.05)
Polyarchy	7.166***	5.663**	12.247	24.545
	(4.73)	(2.66)	(1.66)	(1.62)
Polyarchy^2	-8.696***	-6.967**	-31.412*	-53.348
	(-4.94)	(-2.92)	(-2.48)	(-1.82)
Log GDP pc	-0.157	-0.200	-0.511	-1.628*
	(-1.07)	(-1.16)	(-1.50)	(-2.46)
Log pop size	-0.009	-0.012	0.600	-0.450
	(-0.15)	(-0.17)	(0.61)	(-0.39)
GDP pc growth	0.000	0.003	-0.085*	-0.357**
	(0.01)	(0.13)	(-2.14)	(-2.76)
Cubic duration terms	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE			✓	✓
Region FE	✓	✓		
N	10481.000	8026.000	929.000	515.000
ll	-1024.969	-798.317	-152.633	-83.973

Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. T-values in parentheses. Dependent variable is coups in Model 1 and 2, and popular uprisings in Model 3 and 4, both variables from HRD. Max time series is 1789–2014. All independent variables are lagged by 2 years. Duration terms, constant and fixed effects omitted from table.