STATENESS
AND
DEMOCRATIC STABILITY
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STATENESS AND
DEMOCRATIC STABILITY

PhD Dissertation

Politica
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As a child, I studied world maps and country histories and read random encyclopedia articles. These exercises were certainly never intended to practice for any school test, let alone prepare myself for one day defending a PhD dissertation. Until the day I began studying at Aarhus University, my primary concerns in life were the well-being of my football team favorites of Odense Boldklub and Manchester United and, later in high school, my band’s next gig. But in the spring 2010, I wrote my bachelor thesis about state repression in Colombia. This not only connected well with my childhood’s rudimentary study of comparative politics but also kicked off an academic love affair with the state and democracy that has lasted ever since. However, interest and care, or outright love, are merely small parts of the engine that has brought me this far in academia. I am deeply thankful to my main supervisor Svend-Erik Skaaning, who, since he supervised my bachelor thesis, has been my mentor in doing research and teaching. He has grabbed the steering wheel when I needed guidance; he has shown me how to change gears when I needed to improve; and he has filled the engine with petrol when I needed motivation.

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The intimate relationship between the state and democracy is a classic within political theory. The state is here a two-edged sword which can be the protector as well as suppressor of political liberties (Holmes 1995). In comparative politics, this insight is at the heart of the fundamental contributions of Huntington (1968) and Skocpol (1979). Skocpol found the state to be a key institutional player in the protection against social revolutions and later co-edited the volume *Bringing the State Back In* (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985). However, democratization studies have not appreciated this call sufficiently, as the above quote from Munck indicates (see also Berman 2014).

First, systematic large-n analyses of the state-democracy nexus are surprisingly scarce given their fundamental importance (for a few examples, see Bratton and Chang 2006; Møller and Skaaning 2011), and small-n studies of democratic destabilization, although more profound, often only implicitly connect the state with democratic stability leaving the reader to connect the dots (for a more general critique of the democratization literature, see Bermeo 2016). Second, state-democracy studies typically suffer from an eclectic or unidimensional view of the state even though it is elsewhere recognized as a multidimensional phenomenon (see Linz and Stepan 1996: Chs. 1-2; Hendrix 2010; Saylor 2013; see also the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, BTI 2016).¹ There is thus a need for systematic theorization and empirical investigation of the state-democracy nexus that takes stock of its multiple dimensions and connect these with a basic theory of how the state relates to democracy.

In this study, I seek to improve our knowledge of the state-democracy nexus by focusing on one side of it – that of the state. I thus ask whether and how the state contributes to democratic stability. By democratic stability, I mean the absence of breakdown of a political regime featuring reasonably free and fair elections and suffrage for at least half of the male population. In

¹ The V-Dem data project is promising as it appreciates a disaggregated version of the state in some components (Coppedge et al. 2015a).
other words, the study is neither about democratic quality nor authoritarian stability but zooms in on the issue of maintaining democratic rule once it has been established. The understanding of democracy is minimalistic but the maintenance of free and fair elections is substantively important in itself because such elections have immediate payoffs for people’s political freedom and increase the chances of democratic consolidation and improved democratic quality in the future.

Although the state is intimately connected with the political regime, I distance myself from assuming any inevitable connection between state and regime. Just as the state is not always an enemy of democracy, I contend that it is too simple to assume that the existence of a state is necessary for democracy. Instead of working with such a deterministic relationship, I ask whether the state contributes to stabilizing democracy. But I do so in a disaggregated fashion. Only by disaggregating the state can we answer whether it has any impact on democracy at all. Disaggregation of the state and the existence of a general state-democracy nexus are not mutually exclusive, however. The propositions that I examine are all versions of a broader state-democracy nexus. I specifically argue that the state-democracy nexus is best conceived through matters of stateness. Stateness, in short, is a product of a strong and legitimate state. These qualities of stateness improve the ability of democracies to handle security-related and economic crises and contain extremists. The basic proposition is thus that democracies have a substantially increased chance of surviving if they have high levels of stateness. This proposition is generally applicable but likely too simple. I argue that the allegedly positive effect of stateness on democratic stability may be channeled through either a monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, or citizenship agreement. The absence of these three attributes of stateness may lead to democratic breakdown via such different mechanisms as civil-military conflict, economic performance delegitimation, or ethnic conflict. I formulate seven mechanisms that connect the attributes of stateness with democratic breakdown. Eventually, these propositions help formulate more precise hypotheses for future research about the state-democracy nexus that better serve the multidimensional nature of the state and its complex role in democratic stabilization.

We do not know, a priori, which of the attributes exert the strongest impact on democratic stability and which mechanism is most typically associated with democratic breakdown. The strategy of the study is therefore to empirically interrogate these questions. Three methods are employed: First, I conduct within case analysis of democratic breakdown and stability in interwar Germany, Spain, Czechoslovakia, and Finland. By examining the seven mechanisms in a controlled setting, this analysis provides an indication of
the importance of stateness and whether disaggregation is fruitful. In this way, it functions as a testing ground for a broader empirical application of my propositions. Second, I build a dataset of causal process observations consisting of yearly observations on the existence of the three attributes in all democracies from 1918 to 2010 as well as the existence of the seven mechanisms in the cases of democratic breakdown. Using this dataset, which covers most observations of modern democracy, I then build logit regression models with data on stateness in both cases of democratic stability and breakdown. The purpose here is to statistically examine the average effects of the three attributes on democratic stability from 1918 to 2010 when potential confounders are included. Third, whereas the second endeavor only focuses on correlations patterns between attributes of stateness and democratic stability, I take the investigation of the state-democracy nexus one step further by relying on the coding of mechanisms in the democratic breakdowns from 1918 to 2010. The seven mechanisms are explicitly formulated as a series of intermediate steps (functioning as observable implications) between a specific stateness attribute and democratic breakdown. Observing these steps increases confidence in the validity of the correlational patterns. The distribution of mechanisms also gives an impression of how, substantially, stateness affects democratic stability. I separate the examination of mechanisms in three major international episodes: the interwar, Cold War, and post-Cold War periods. These periods are fundamentally distinct in the way great power politics worked and thus the kind of influence on democratic stability we would expect of the state.

This three-part investigation of the state-democracy nexus comes at a time when democracy is challenged worldwide (Diamond 2015). Following the third wave of democratization from the late 20th century, we still live in an age of democracy in the sense that only very few political leaders today are free from international or domestic pressures to hold popular elections. At the same time, authoritarianism has stabilized or lurks around the corner in virtually every region of the world, except perhaps among the old Western democracies. By the end of 2014, some evidence (see Freedom House 2015) showed nine consecutive years of global democratic decline, partly marked by increasing irregularities in elections (BTI 2014). This is a general development spanning Central America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Eastern Europe to Central Asia. Some of the most famous examples of outright democratic breakdown in the previous decades include Pakistan in 1999, Ecuador in 2000, Putin’s Russia, Chavez’ Venezuela, and the recent military coups in

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2 It also comprises the first and second reverse waves as presented by Huntington (1991) as well as recent cases of democratic regression (see Diamond 2015).
Egypt (2013) and Thailand (2006, 2014). Democracy is similarly in retreat where the quality of elections or protection of civil and political liberties is increasingly questioned such as in Ukraine, Turkey, Nigeria, Mali, and the Philippines. An increasing number of former democratic regimes are based on unfair elections (Brownlee 2009; Levitsky and Way 2010).

Historically, longer episodes of democratic standstill have been frequent and reverse waves, though few, have been significant. Interwar reversals in Europe and in a few Latin American countries are the subject of some of the classics in comparative politics. These works explained the pattern of breakdown and stability by different modernization paths that led to different social class dynamics (e.g. Lipset 1959; Moore 1966; Luebbert 1991; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992) but their explanatory approach and specific factors are still a matter of considerable dispute (compare Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010 with Møller 2013; see also Linz 1978a; Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell 2000; Mann 2004). The post-World War II breakdowns, occurring in post-colonial settings across all regions of the world, were confronted from numerous different angles but with a larger emphasis on institutions rather than on social forces (e.g. Huntington 1968; O’Donnell 1973; Linz 1978a). To this day, post-colonial patterns of democratic breakdown and stability are discussed with new approaches and theories and from different regional angles (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Gasiorowski and Power 1998; Slater 2010; Teorell 2010; Aleman and Yang 2011; Mainwaring and Pérez-Linan 2013).

This study seeks to contribute to these literatures. Rather than explaining democratic stability as such (e.g. Svolik 2008), I focus on the state as one hitherto neglected variable in the explanation of democratic stability. I take seriously Fukuyama’s (2014) recent bold conjecture that democratic declines in the 20th and 21st centuries more than anything else are due to weaknesses in state institutions that delegitimize the democratic regimes and decrease their ability to manage social conflicts. Hence, I am more interested in the effect of the state than in giving a comprehensive explanation of democratic stability. Before we are able to better apply the state as an explanatory variable in cross-case analyses, we must first examine closely whether and how the state affects democratic stability.

The theoretical shortcomings of the distributionist model of democracy

Opening up the state-democracy nexus is not just an isolated theoretical exercise but should have real impact on the current understanding of why democracy is only stable in some places. Adding the state to the battery of ex-
planatory variables involves the potential of greatly improving our understanding of democratic stability and destabilization by closing the gaps where extant theories fall short.

It is hard to theorize the state-democracy nexus without taking stock of modernization theory. Marx and Weber intimately connected the state with the modernization of societies. Yet, in democratization studies, starting with Lipset (1959), modernization is operationalized as the level of socioeconomic development – that is, modernization is a product of economic and social development processes which, over long periods, raise societal demands for political representation. Democratization studies of recent decades have been dominated by the distributionist model (see e.g. Boix 2003; Przeworski 2005; Ansell and Samuels 2014), which is a welcome refinement of modernization theory. I contend that socioeconomic development certainly increases the chances of democratic stability, but following Huntington (1968) and Fukuyama (2014), the next section aims to show that democracies may break down under a diverse set of socioeconomic conditions when stateness is weak. This is basically why the state should have its own place in the universe of explanations for democratic stability.

The distributionist model of democracy originates in the explosion of research on democratization and democratic consolidation in the 1990s and 2000s. With the gradual incorporation of rational choice models, democratization research seems to have settled, more or less, on a model of democratic stability in which democracy endures as a result of a bargaining equilibrium between, basically, three groups: the rich, the poor, and the middle classes (see Przeworski 2005). For democracy to endure, these three groups of actors must see democracy as the regime that maximizes their potential gains (Przeworski 2003: 129-131; Przeworski 2005: 253-254). This equilibrium is stable when overall economic wealth is so great that the costs of rebellion or attempted coups d’état are higher than the benefits of accepting the redistributions that follow from democracy. Some scholars (e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2009) reject the modernization thesis, pointing instead to historical factors during critical junctures as responsible for the peculiar path of prosperity and democracy. Others question the relative importance of economic wealth vis-à-vis equality in enabling the aforementioned equilibrium. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) hold that equality is what makes democracies rise and endure as small income gaps reduce the redistributive demands of the citizenry, thereby decreasing the costs of democracy for the elite. The resulting bargaining agreement is credible because of the nature of democratic elections

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Przeworski et al. (2000) famously found that no democracy with an average per capita income above 6055 $ (Argentina in 1975) has broken down.
as providing de jure institutional certainty that the agreement is not broken tomorrow (see Boix 2003 for a slightly different version of this argument). Ansell and Samuels (2014) show that income inequality (and land equality) rather than income equality promotes democracy.

Despite these disagreements, the literature largely concurs that a certain high level of economic development protects democracy against breakdown, thereby basically corroborating the modernization paradigm. One point of particularly strong agreement is that industrialization drives the social change that puts democracy on the agenda. Assuming that democracies redistribute resources more than dictatorships, Przeworski (2005: 265) argues that more wealth increases the number of potential distributional equilibria between the three groups and increases the cost for each of them of rebelling against democracy. Simply put, it is likely that if democracies are more redistributive than unstable dictatorships, wealth and equality powerfully combine in stabilizing those democracies.4

Although the distributionist model is structural at its base, it does not preclude the importance of institutions and actor effects. In fact, prominent studies have introduced actors and institutions as challenges to the structural explanation of economic development (e.g. Linz 1978a; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010), but more often than not, the literature has settled on an integrative framework that acknowledges that structures shape but do not determine outcomes – actors do (e.g. Kitschelt 1992; Mainwaring and Pérez-Linan 2013). While group compromise is enabled by high levels of economic development, its actual form and implementation are carried out by societal groups that push for institutional and political improvements (e.g. Putnam 1993; Tusalem 2007), political parties that mobilize and order these demands (e.g. Luebbert 1991; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Randall and Svåsand 2002), and key political actors that invent specific policies and pick and choose certain issues over others (e.g. Higley and Burton 1989; Capoccia 2005).

Adding institutions and actors supposedly gives the distributionist model considerable explanatory power. However, it is particularly instructive to see how a broad view of economic and political developments in recent decades is puzzling to the model. Alongside the erosion of the freeness and fairness of elections, it is also well-known that overall income levels in these countries have been on a steady rise while poverty has been successfully combated, particularly from the start of the 1990s (Canuto and Lin 2011). Taking more

4 Ansell and Samuels (2014: 1) find that democracies do not redistribute more than autocracies. Yet, they acknowledge that industrialization sets off the income inequalities that put democratization pressure on the elite.
general stock of modernization theory in this regard, it is worth noting the optimistic conclusion in the *UN Human Development Report 2014* (UN 2014) that “advances in technology, education and incomes hold ever-greater promise for longer, healthier, more secure lives.” How come democracies keep experiencing decay and breakdowns despite an overall trend of economic advancement?

Economic growth fluctuations on a shorter term capture a vital part of the answer to this question: The bargaining equilibria in newly established democracies are often so fragile that they can easily be disturbed by and even completely collapse due to economic crises (Linz 1978a: 38-40; Gasiorowski 1995; Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2003; Svolik 2008). Such crises continue to break the steady pace of economic development among the developing countries. The last three decades produced stable economic growth in Southern Europe, Latin America, South and East Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa, where we also see the majority of third wave democracies, but the Great Recession from 2008 effectively put a hold on growth rates and spurred economic crises in most of these countries (Canuto and Lin 2011: 5; Krugman 2011).

However, developments in levels of and growth in wealth per capita seem to explain only part of the recent democratic decline (or standstill) which, after all, started already in 2005. They unsatisfactorily account for the cases of democratic decline or outright breakdown occurring before 2005 such as in Latin America’s Panama, Ecuador, and Paraguay and Sub-Saharan Africa’s Niger, Nigeria, and Uganda in the 1980s and 1990s, and occasionally in Eastern Europe in the 1990s (see Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2014). It is rightly noted that yearly fluctuations in growth have spurred unemployment and a general feeling of impoverishment pushing the democratic equilibria around the world. Indeed, given the distributionist model developing countries simultaneously making transitions to capitalism and democracy should be particularly vulnerable to these fluctuations. Some examples are Albania’s breakdown in 1997 preceded by a failed pyramid scheme, Russia’s 1998 Ruble Crisis, and the 1998-1999 banking crisis in Ecuador. However, as noted by Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock (2001), Bermeo (2003), and Haggard and Kaufman (1997: 279) among others, institutions are decisive factors in the political handling of such crises. If institutions are strong and make the functioning of democratic governments effective and legitimate, economic crises do not necessarily lead to democratic breakdown.

A much clearer co-variation of factors than that between economics and democracy seems to be at play. During the last nine years, the rule of law, peace, and popular confidence in public institutions and parties have deteriorated in tandem with democracy (BTI 2014; Diamond 2015). To be sure,
these trends may be exaggerated as they may simply be caused by increasing media attention or public demands for transparency and accountability with increasing levels of socioeconomic development. Nonetheless, media and public perceptions are rarely completely disconnected from reality. For instance, civil wars do still occur, as in Mali from 2012, and clientelism still dominates patterns of governance in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. There are thus strong reasons to believe that actual problems of political order and legitimacy, rising from certain institutions, will illuminate the explanation of democratic breakdown (see also Slater 2010: 4; Fukuyama 2014).

In any case, these problems of governance are hard to explain by the mass-level variables related to socioeconomic development (see Huntington 1968; Skocpol 1973). Already from the 1990s, the World Bank’s agenda of ‘Good Governance’, which still dominates much development assistance today, pointed precisely to the need of centralizing forces that balance development and channel people’s claims toward political equality. The weakness of any such centralizing forces was seen as among the greatest challenges to sustained democracy. However, the democratization literature has largely failed to engage with this agenda, learn from it, and improve its conceptual flaws (Pettai and Illing 2004; Grindle 2004; Munck 2009: Ch. 1).

Applying the distributionist model to post–Cold War democratic reversals is thus unsatisfactory. Explanations of interwar and Cold War reversals are similarly insufficient in their focus on the forces of modernization (see e.g. Huntington 1968; O’Donnell 1973; Ertman 1998). Even when modernization theories incorporate variables such as ‘political order’, ‘effectiveness’, or ‘legitimacy’, they often operate as rather crude explanans (see e.g. Lipset 1959; Linz 1978a; Capoccia 2005). Most notably, we miss an examination of their preconditions. This study argues that the institution of the state is such a vital precondition. Yet, it is largely missing from the distributionist model – or rather, the state is assumed in place. In contrast to what the model assumes, I hold that the bargaining equilibrium between the rich, the poor, and the middle classes must be continuously enforced and trusted. The compromise entailing a legitimate distribution of economic and political resources rising from democratic elections is not necessarily implemented and therefore is not by definition credible, but must be maintained by a centralized authority, the state – a point raised by Przeworski (2003; 2005: 266-267) himself. This goes well with the increasingly used concept of performance legitimacy in the studies of democratic stability (see Rothstein 2011; see also Svolik 2013).

Via this critique, the study shows that focusing on a limited state as necessary for democracy (see e.g. Weingast 1997) diverts attention from the active role the state has played historically as enforcer of democratic orders alongside, and indeed sometimes in struggles against, mass movements –
from the implementation of anti-extremist laws by state security forces (Capoccia 2005) to impartially implemented laws and welfare state provisions by the bureaucracy (Skocpol and Finegold 1982; Rothstein 2011) and the processes of identity formation around the notion of a national state in the US and Western Europe in late 19th and early 20th century Europe (Schulze 1998). Many of Latin America’s struggles toward democracy, by contrast, have been associated with weak and constrained rather than strong and active states. Democratic regressions in the region famously captured a more general phenomenon of bureaucracies discarding the general interests of the people, weakly present states with contested notions of citizenship, and uncontrollable or factionalized militaries (O’Donnell 1973; 2010). Similarly, enfeebled states relying on ‘neopatrimonialism’ have been among the most general characteristics of failed African democracies (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Herbst 2000). Ironically, a strong state is thus what makes the limits on state power self-enforcing.

The addition of party and civil society institutions and actors partly makes up for the absence of a state variable in the model (see e.g. Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock 2001; Alemán and Yang 2011). While these theories fruitfully focus on how institutional rules and political bargaining patterns shape the specific content of policies and thus the potential for an enforced and trusted democratic order, the state seems, at most, to play the role of a constant, a background condition, by which the implementation of the policies is ‘black-boxed’. As indicated by studies of party system formation (e.g. O’Dwyer 2006) and civil society (e.g. Putnam 1993), the state interacts with other political institutions in the structuring of politics and implementation of policies in ways that are currently poorly understood (see Alexander 2002a: 1159; Przeworski 2003: 138-141; Rothstein 2011). Whereas this study does not investigate such interactions, we learn how the state likely has an independent effect from parties and civil society on democratic stability.

The basic argument and empirical propositions

I propose a basic argument for how the state relates to democratic stability. This is not meant for empirical examination but for providing a theoretical framework from which one can derive testable propositions regarding the state-democracy nexus. The purpose is to provide a theoretical overview that improves the understanding of the wide range of mechanisms of the state-democracy nexus that already exist. This will relate the mechanisms to a common process of democratic destabilization that clearly distinguishes them from the distributionist model.
The argument takes its outset in the distributionist model: I see democracy as a bargaining equilibrium in which higher levels of wealth substantially increase the chances of democratic stability. This is because the actors – whether we are speaking of the masses, elites, government, or opposition and disregarding their initial levels of wealth – want to maximize their economic wealth and personal security. However, I propose that if state institutions are not sufficiently strong and legitimate to actually enforce democratic rules and give credibility to the promise of sustained wealth and security for the vast majority of citizens, the integrity of democracy is threatened. This sometimes, most often amidst certain other straining conditions, leads to democratic breakdown.

I conceptualize four overall paths to stable democracy based on processes occurring after the successful transition to democracy. This is different from the distributionist model in which the outcome is given at democracy’s inauguration. The first path is that of stable democracy via consolidation. Building on Svolik’s (2008; 2013; 2015) work, I understand consolidation as intimately connected with high levels of socioeconomic development and thus use these two conditions interchangeably throughout the study. Following Przeworski, a certain initially high level of wealth makes the democratic equilibrium robust to future poor performance by politicians or economic or domestic security crises, at least in the medium term. In other words, the level of socioeconomic development protects this small group of countries to such an extent that there is an ‘insignificant risk of democratic breakdown’. As there is no credible threat to democracy in the foreseeable future, stateness is less relevant for explaining breakdown. Only an external shock can push the equilibrium by planting doubts about democracy for other reasons than domestic ones. For this reason, I do not analyze consolidated democracies.

Although I do not test the contents of the three remaining paths of unconsolidated democracies directly, they form the theoretical baselines for the mechanisms that I test. To separate the paths, it is fruitful to distinguish between the medium-level and low-level developed democracies regarding their initial likelihoods of breakdown and the different types of explanations of their potential breakdown that are warranted. This distinction is, however, insufficient because it is insensitive to a set of alternative paths, apart from consolidation, through which democracies stabilize (see Svolik 2008). According to Svolik (2013), many democracies stabilize when the political representatives prove themselves accountable to public demands (see also Roth-

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5 The paths are heavily inspired by Linz (1978a), Mann (2004: 38), and Capoccia (2005: 7).
The problem in many, typically young, democracies is that building such accountability hinges on institutional quality, which is not by default provided by an abundance of resources. We may thus fruitfully focus on institutional action by the state and the evaluation thereof by masses and elites alike.

The second path exists in democracies with low levels of socioeconomic development. I make use of Linz’ (1978a) categories of actors in democratic regimes to put some flesh on the paths. ‘Disloyalists’ to democracy (anti-systemic, including anti-democratic and secessionist forces) are likely prevalent in the low-level developed democracies. Because these actors are initially weary of democracy, promises or actual delivery of some alleged goods of democracy will not satisfy them – at least not in the short term. Consequently, stability can only be achieved as a short-term strategy via pure containment (e.g. arrests, ban enactments, protest dissolutions) to curb anti-systemic mobilization.

In the third and fourth paths, we have democracies of medium-level development. This level of development likely implies a prevalence of ‘semi-loyalists’ whose support for democracy is initially indeterminate and thus depends on democracy’s performance. Yet, to distinguish between them we need to take into account the current status of the economy. In the third path, the economy is either stagnant or in recession. Stability can here only be achieved through a combination of containment and crisis management. Medium-level developed democracies are common, and security and economic crises are highly salient and rise frequently (see Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2003; Gilley 2006). The fourth path exists where a genuine economic boom occurs that alleviates the need for crisis management. These democracies are less common.

The level of development and status of the economy are constants in the framework I provide. They are snapshots of the initial structural reality with which actors are faced. When these are set, it is possible, as seen, to distinguish between four processes towards democratic breakdown (or stability). My core theoretical claim is that a high level of stateness increases the ability to contain anti-systemic forces and manage socioeconomic and security-related crises. In turn, it increases the chances that the processes outlined will lead to democratic stability rather than breakdown. The mechanisms integrate the basic assumptions of the paths. Most notably, containment and/or crisis management determines democratic breakdown or stability because it changes the relative number and balance of power between loyalists.

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6 As Svolik (2013) shows, ensuring accountability may in the long run be self-reinforcing and ensure actual democratic consolidation.
semi-loyalists, and disloyalists. There is likely to be feedback mechanisms between the actions of the state and the number of democratic supporters but I am only interested in the initial effects of containment and/or crisis management.

The proposition that stateness determines containment and crisis management builds on three arguments. First, stateness must be disaggregated in the three attributes of monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, and citizenship agreement. As these attributes are conceptually distinct and expectedly yield different effects on democracy, they should be treated separately. Yet, I maintain that all three are the most basic qualities of a strong and legitimate state in modern times (see Tilly 1975a; Gill 2003). The state, in my use of the concept, thus encompasses but extends beyond coercive and administrative capacities by including the interrelationship between ethnic groups and the legitimacy that they attach to the state, as captured by citizenship agreement. The tripartition is one important step in testing the effects of stateness but I argue that further disaggregation is in fact needed to ensure measurement accuracy. Monopoly on violence is thus conceptualized as a product of the resource supremacy and cohesion of the state security forces (military and police) and their subordination on matters of organizational power to the political executive. Administrative effectiveness implies the territorial penetration of the state administration, a meritocratic civil service system, and responsiveness of the civil service. Citizenship agreement implies the mutual acceptance between the ethnic groups inside the state territory and the legitimacy of the state as a common, ethno-cultural symbol.

Extant studies of the state-democracy nexus either take an eclectic stance on the state or focus on only one aspect of it. For instance, Bratton and Chang’s (2006) analysis of Sub-Saharan African democracies conceive of the state in broad terms. Whereas this is not a bad choice in itself, their actual analysis eventually conflates the state and regime in such measures as the rule of law. Other analyses, for instance Putnam’s (1993) on the role of administrative institutions for democratic governance in North and South Italy and Horowitz’ (1985) study of regime change in countries with ethnic conflict, are indirectly or directly informative of the state-democracy nexus but only for one aspect of the state. There are virtually no disaggregated large-n analyses that serve the multiple facets of the state and thus no comprehensive examination of the state-democracy nexus.

As a further weakness, many studies theorize in overly deterministic ways when noting that the state is necessary for democracy. These studies are typically inspired by Linz and Stepan’s (1996) study of citizenship disputes in third wave democracies. Their notion that “without a state, no modern democracy can exist” is less fruitful for empirical analysis which must
handle great variation within states and the multiple cases where democracy continues to appear against the odds of weak stateness. This of course does not preclude that deterministic relationships between the attributes and democratic stability may exist empirically. But I argue that all attributes of stateness are conceptually distinct from democracy and yield interesting, probabilistic influences on democratic stability. Just as there are democracies that survive amidst weak stateness, many democratic breakdowns occur where stateness prevails because the forces that forge breakdown come from outside the apparatus and are motivated by factors unrelated to the state. Stateness is thus no guarantee for democratic stability.

Second, I do not limit myself to one mechanism but identify seven mechanisms connecting a disputed monopoly on violence, administrative ineffectiveness, and citizenship disagreement with democratic breakdown. In short, a disputed monopoly on violence increases the likelihood of 1) authoritarian restoration, whereby containment of coup attempts fails or the military itself stages a coup to restore its organizational powers (see e.g. Nordlinger 1977; Stepan 1988; Capoccia 2005), or 2) security delegitimation, whereby restoration of public order by democratic means gradually becomes less viable (see e.g. Mann 2004; Tilly 2007; Rothstein 2011). Administrative ineffectiveness increases the likelihood of 3) socioeconomic delegitimation, whereby an ineffective civil service fails to implement government policy that may lead to poor performance in socioeconomic matters and a delegitimation of the whole system (see e.g. Linz 1978a; Skocpol 1979: 25; Gilley 2006), 4) elite bias delegitimation, whereby a politicized civil service creates centrifugal party politics (see e.g. O’Donnell 1973; Rothstein and Teorell 2008; Cornell and Lapuente 2014), or 5) mass bias delegitimation, whereby the masses are polarized via the same centrifugal dynamic (see e.g. Lapuente and Rothstein 2014; Wimmer 2013). Citizenship disagreement increases the likelihood of 6) citizenship violence, whereby ethnic groups in or outside the state apparatus engage in violent conflict and competition for control (see e.g. Horowitz 1985; Linz and Stepan 1996), or 7) citizenship injustices, whereby a perceivably unjust distribution of resources between ethnic groups in or outside the state apparatus enfeebles parliamentary politics and nurtures extremist claims to install an allegedly fairer regime (see e.g. Linz and Stepan 1996; Kopstein and Wittenberg 2010; Wimmer 2013).

These are applications of well-known theories of the state–democracy nexus that, however, have generally not been theorized thoroughly or scrutinized empirically as different aspects of the state. The three stateness attributes are thus important in different phases of the process of democratic destabilization and at different levels of socioeconomic development and economic growth.
Third, I argue that the relative importance of the three stateness attributes cannot be hypothesized with any profound certainty a priori. The relative importance could be partly solved by the distribution of medium- and low-level development and economic boom among the unconsolidated democracies but this would weaken the explanatory importance of stateness as such since economic development would be the driver. Substantial arguments centered on the attributes themselves in any case point in adverse directions that preclude a simple ranking of explanatory importance.

While a state monopoly on violence held by the military and police is vital for public order and crime fighting, including the containment of anti-systemic forces, such a monopoly can be too strong. In the absence of societal forces to control the state powers, repression and thus popular delegitimation and destabilization of democracy are likely results (Fukuyama 2005; Davenport 2007). Both citizenship agreement (Linz and Stepan 1996: 33-37) and administrative effectiveness (Rothstein 2011) have advantages in this regard as their legitimizing effects decrease the need for a state monopoly on violence in the first place. Thus, it would seem that monopoly on violence is less stabilizing than citizenship agreement and administrative effectiveness in net terms. Furthermore, in the legitimation of democracy administrative effectiveness is arguably harder to replace than citizenship agreement. Whereas no other entity than the state bureaucracy can take care of coordinated, country-wide, and country-beneficial policy implementation, citizenship agreement may be obsolete if an inclusionary party system exists, political institutions are suitable, or the administration is impartial (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999). In sum, these arguments indicate that administrative effectiveness is the most stabilizing attribute followed by citizenship agreement and lastly monopoly on violence.

However, the assessment is much more complex. First, the three attributes likely condition each other’s effects. Particularly, the effectiveness of administrations’ policy implementation is arguably strongly conditioned by the ability to ultimately enforce those rules (Fukuyama 2004: 6-9; Mann 2008) and the legitimacy to do so (Mann 2008). Thus, monopoly on violence and citizenship agreement should condition the effect of administrative effectiveness. The risk is that if the effect of administrative effectiveness is heavily conditioned by the other stateness attributes, we wrongly assume its explanatory preponderance. Second, it has been suggested that in some cultural settings, fighting administrative ineffectiveness could destabilize democracy because less corruption and clientelism means less political order in some cultural settings (see Della Porta 1997).

There is no a priori solution to such indeterminacies. We instead need the empirics to show the relative importance of, for instance, the few substi-
tutions for administrative effectiveness vis-à-vis the conditioning effects of monopoly on violence and citizenship agreement. Therefore, my examination of the state-democracy nexus must be open to the possibility that any of the three attributes could turn out as the most important stabilizer. However, a full investigation of this large question is beyond the scope of the study. My key purpose is not to explore which particular attribute is the most stabilizing but to empirically examine whether a disaggregated, as opposed to a unidimensional, appreciation of stateness changes our evaluation of the state-democracy nexus.

Research design
My research design is guided by two ambitions: first, to be able to pose qualified and general answers to the question of the state-democracy nexus across all electoral democracies from 1918 to 2010, and second, to come as close as possible to the mechanisms at play across this very large scope of countries. I employ a standard dichotomous distinction between democracy and autocracy based on the existence of free and fair elections and suffrage levels of at least half of the male population (see Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2012). Democratic stability, in my understanding, thus characterizes a regime as long as it bears the two criteria for free and fair elections and suffrage. If any of these are withdrawn, I speak of a democratic breakdown. I deal with issues related to this conceptualization and my measurement strategy in Chapters 2 and 6.

The lengthy period, from 1918 to 2010, decreases the risk of context-specific biases that may moderate the effect of the state. It includes at least three international systems of relevance for democratic stability, the interwar (initially pro-democratic but anti-democratic from 1933, see Boix 2011: 823), Cold War (anti-democratic), and post-Cold War (pro-democratic) periods, as well as at least two global economic crises (the Great Depression from 1929-1939 and the Great Recession from 2008 through 2010) and many regionally and country-specific ones. In addition to such context-specificities, regional biases can be handled in that the sample contains all regions of the world.

As I expect neither crisis management nor containment to be relevant in explaining democratic stability for democracies with very high levels of economic development, I should only include democracies at lower levels of economic development in my analysis. If Przeworski et al.’s (2000) analysis can be trusted, we should in fact expect no democratic breakdowns above a certain level of development. However, their development threshold only relates to countries in the post-WWII period. To make sure that no relevant cases are excluded, I only exclude a small sample of democracies in North-
Western Europe (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Switzerland) and their offsprings, the ‘Neo-Europes’ (USA, Canada, New Zealand, Australia). These were all among the most highly economically developed countries from 1918 to 2010 and characterized by a unique liberal-democratic legacy that sets them apart from all others (see Mann 2004: 38; Capoccia 2005: 7; Møller 2013). In addition, any effect of stateness would most likely be insignificant or marginal because the outcome of democracy was simply overdetermined from the start. Comparing them with less developed democracies would, statistically speaking, breach the assumption of unit homogeneity and lead to biased conclusions (see Mahoney and Goertz 2006).

My design contains three methods that shed light on the research question but this does not imply genuine method triangulation (see Mahoney 2010; Brady and Collier 2010). I simply draw three kinds of inference of each method considering only partially overlapping case samples: a controlled comparison of a few cases, a statistical analysis for both the democratic survivors and breakdowns, and causal process observations (CPO) for the breakdowns. While not wholly integrative, the methods partly make up for each other’s weaknesses, and I argue that the sum of their strengths is needed for a thorough investigation of whether and how the state stabilizes democracies. I base all three examinations on my own codings of stateness because existing measures of state capacity and proxies of citizenship agreement are generally limited in coverage and suffer from low concept-measure consistency and/or unreliability (see e.g. Hendrix 2010; Giraudy 2012; Saylor 2013).

First, in a preliminary study I choose a classic setting, namely interwar Europe – specifically, Germany, Spain, Czechoslovakia, and Finland - to examine the mechanisms connecting disputed monopoly on violence, administrative ineffectiveness, and citizenship disagreement with democratic breakdown. This examination in itself contributes to answering the research question. It thus goes to the core of the distributionist model of democracy and one of its vital case universes but shows that understanding variations in

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7 Notable among these supplementary cases of high level of economic development are France, Belgium, Israel, India, and Japan. For interwar France and Belgium, it has been shown that crisis management was vital for democratic stability (Luebbert 1991: 37-48; Dobry 2000: 166-170; Mann 2004: 41; Capoccia 2005: 14). Israel, Japan, and India have been stable for over half a century, but they all lack the particular liberal-democratic legacy of the North-Western and Neo-European democracies.

8 A few other democracies qualify in terms of high levels of economic development but in Chapter 6, I argue for their inclusion on the basis that they were in risk of breakdown due to a weak liberal-democratic legacy.
Stateness between the four countries improves our ability to explain their regime outcomes considerably. While the democracies of Germany and Spain broke down, the democracies of Czechoslovakia and Finland survived even though the systemic and anti-systemic forces were of roughly equal size and strength in all four countries (see Mann 2004: 38; Capoccia 2005: 7). Concretely, I show that extant theories of economic recession, economic development, and inequality are insufficient in explaining why democracy broke down in Germany and Spain but survived in Czechoslovakia and Finland. Germany and Spain were considerably different on these variables, and Czechoslovakia and Finland in many ways were just as strained as Germany and Spain (see also Bermeo 1997). I then analyze the existence of the mechanisms in Germany and Spain and thus show a variety of state influences.

The comparative study also functions as a testing ground for wider empirical application. By looking into cases where all kinds of weaknesses in stateness are covered, the study may raise confidence in the usefulness of the seven mechanisms, including whether some new ones should be added.

Second, I build a dataset with two tiers of data: 1) the status of each case of democratic breakdown and stability on the three stateness attributes (and components) and 2) the existence of the theorized mechanisms in each case of democratic breakdown. I then employ the codings of stateness in a statistical, logistic regression analysis to examine the average effect of each stateness attribute on the dichotomous measure of either democratic stability or breakdown when a standard set of controls is included. This establishes average effects of the stateness attributes on the risk of democratic breakdown.

Third, I examine the existence of the seven mechanisms across all cases of democratic breakdown in the period from 1918 to 2010. The exclusive focus on democratic breakdowns here is a pragmatic analytical choice based on the expectation that the mechanisms are likely to appear more clearly in breakdown than in cases of stability (see e.g. Ross 2004; Brady 2010; Haggard and Kaufman 2012). The seven mechanisms are explicitly formulated as a series of intermediate steps (observable implications) between a specific stateness attribute and democratic breakdown. I treat each step as a variable that may or may not be present (see Gerring 2010). The whole chain must be observed to increase confidence in the theory. This procedure respects the

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9 I use second-hand material for the coding. For each case, I visit historical case studies and comparative accounts to verify the general validity of the codings. To avoid biased readings, I use reviews of each case if possible. In the absence of any review summarizing and discussing extant literature, I include accounts of both older and newer generations of historians. The reliability of my coding is checked by a research assistant I engaged to code 13
correct sequencing of cause and effect in the process leading from weak stateness to democratic breakdown. Relative to the within case analyses of the preliminary comparative study, the level of detail obviously needs to be compromised here (see George and Bennett 2005; Beach and Pedersen 2013).

Examining the mechanisms nevertheless brings us closer to causation if the frequency of the mechanisms of a given stateness attribute among the democratic breakdowns corroborates the average effect of that attribute in the statistical analysis. If, for instance, the average effect of administrative effectiveness turns out to be stronger than that of monopoly on violence and citizenship agreement, the frequency of mechanisms of administrative ineffectiveness among the democratic breakdowns must also be higher. Notably, the average effects may misconceive democratic breakdowns with weak stateness as supportive of the theory even though no mechanisms can be found. Examinations of mechanisms in any case substantiate the average-effect findings that may cover only a few of a diverse set of mechanisms (see George and Bennett 2005). Engaging in mechanisms analysis finally follows the sequencing of X and Y through the entire democratic spell and thus addresses reversed causality, potential actor contingencies, or context-specificities more thoroughly (see Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010).

Altogether, the three empirical examinations contribute to a more comprehensive and precise understanding of the state-democracy nexus. They inform whether and how the state stabilizes democracies because they can answer whether a disaggregated view on stateness matters, and what the relevant mechanisms are.

Plan of the book

The book contains ten chapters following this introduction. Part I contains three chapters dedicated to the theoretical framework. In Chapter 2, I carry out a conceptual analysis of the state and stateness and argue for the disaggregation into the three attributes of stateness. In Chapter 3, I set up a theory of the role of the state in processes of democratic destabilization. On that basis, I present the propositions as summarized above. In Chapter 4, I theorize the mechanisms and their observable implications.

Part II contains the empirical examinations of the study’s propositions. Chapter 5 provides a comparative case study of interwar Germany, Spain, Czechoslovakia, and Finland. Chapter 6 presents the CPO dataset of demo-
cratic breakdowns and survivals from 1918 through 2010, how the stateness attributes and mechanisms are identified, and, finally, the logic of how the propositions are evaluated using the dataset. The online appendix and Appendix I are directly attached to this chapter in that they contain discussions of the codings of stateness and mechanisms (online appendix) as well as accounts for the coding procedure, reliability tests, and threshold ambiguities (Appendix I). Chapter 7 presents the statistical analysis including a descriptive and explanatory part using logistic regression. Appendix II contains supplementary statistical tests. Chapters 8-10 contain empirical analyses using the dataset of CPO to examine the mechanisms. Chapter 8 focuses on the interwar democratic breakdowns. Chapters 9 and 10 repeat the procedure for the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, respectively. In each of these three empirical analyses, I analyze the development of state weaknesses and the frequency of the mechanisms.

Chapter 11 discusses and concludes on whether and how the state has affected democratic stability from 1918 through 2010, how my findings should be interpreted in terms of the sequencing of state and democracy and the distributionist model, and what this implies for state-democracy research. I find that the three attributes of stateness develop in different pace and at different levels. They thus do not correlate particularly strongly. There are particular differences between the two state capacities of monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness on the one hand and citizenship agreement on the other hand. Also, the components attached to the extension of state power and control (resource supremacy and territorial penetration) differ markedly from those attached to the organizational quality of this power and control (cohesion and subordination as well as meritocracy and responsiveness). All three attributes of stateness stabilize democracies but their effects differ substantially in terms of size and significance. Monopoly on violence is the most stabilizing factor followed by administrative effectiveness and, lastly, citizenship agreement. The mechanism of authoritarian restoration is the most commonly observed among the democratic breakdowns. The study thus improves our understanding of the sources of democratic stability by taking a disaggregated approach to the state in terms of attributes and mechanisms. I finally point out some promising venues for future state-democracy research.
PART I: THEORY

The distributionist model of democracy is weak in its account of how the bargaining equilibrium between social classes is continuously enforced and trusted. Most significantly, the state is largely assumed in place and, by implication, treated as a constant. However, the state is a variable and no blunt instrument. The state is more generally still weakly theorized or simply absent in democratization studies (Munck 2011; Berman 2014). In this Part I of the study, I present the theory which sets the framework for my attempt at better integrating the state in the distributionist model. It grapples with four theoretical questions: 1) What are the relevant dimensions of the state? 2) What is the theoretical relationship between the relevant dimensions and democratic stability? 3) How does the state fit into the distributionist model? 4) What are the mechanisms that connect the dimensions of the state with democratic stability?

In this chapter, I treat the first of these four questions. This entails an account of what I mean by ‘the state’, which leads me to a conceptual analysis of the concept of stateness as well as a definition of democracy and democratic stability. Chapter 3 deals with the second and third questions and develops two hypotheses to be tested in the study. Chapter 4 engages with the fourth question by setting up a causal process framework for analyzing democratic breakdowns. Whereas the first three questions regard whether stateness stabilizes democracies (the establishment of an X-Y relationship), question four regards the ‘how’-question of building mechanisms connecting stateness with democratic stability.
Chapter 2.
Conceptual Distinctions of Stateness and Democratic Stability

Democracy is a form of governance of a modern state. Thus, without a state, no modern democracy is possible [...] If one accepts [...] Weber’s injunction about an organization needing to claim binding authority successfully in a territory before it is a state and Tilly’s requirement that a state be ‘autonomous,’ it should also be clear that these are severe [...] limits to democracy unless the territorial entity is recognized as a sovereign state (Linz and Stepan 1996: 17-18)

It is a truism that we need to define concepts clearly before engaging in measurement and analysis. This is valid in both quantitative and qualitative research (Sartori 1970; see also Goertz 2006; Gerring 2012). However, the quality of the definitions of the state employed in democratization research generally suffers in a number of ways. They are either too eclectic or focus on only one dimension of the state; they conflate the state with democratic attributes such as the rule of law; and they tend to focus exclusively on state capacities at the expense of the relationship between the state and the political level. Indeed, as the quote above shows, two of the leading scholars on the state-democracy nexus, Linz and Stepan, amidst their impressive synthetic work present a somewhat eclectic stance on the state by mixing dimensions of capacity and legitimacy, and they come close to conflating the state with democracy. In this chapter, I attempt to mitigate these problems in three ways.

First, a disaggregated approach to the state as a variable may pave the way for better understanding of the relationship between the state and democratic stability (see Dietrich and Bernhard 2015). However, democratization analyses often focus on only one aspect of the state (e.g., Gasiorowski and Power 1998; Alemán and Yang 2011; for a notable exception with multiple aspects included, see Bratton and Chang 2006: 1073). If multiple aspects are included, the most typical distinction is between military and administrative capacities.

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10 The chapter, notably the conceptual analysis of stateness, is partly based on an article published in Democratisation, which I have written in collaboration with Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik Skaaning (see Andersen, Møller, and Skaaning 2014). With their consent, I have generally substituted “we” with “I”.
capacity (see Hendrix 2010). Yet, the quantitative measures relied upon are often crude (Saylor 2013). In other cases, the state definition is rather broad but does not distinguish between, for instance, different types of state agents and their functions (e.g. Linz and Stepan 1996: 17-18; Tilly 2007: 15-24; Fukuyama 2014). Finally, central empirical contributions to the field have stressed the importance of institutions of order, rule of law, and performance for democratic stability, but they have not connected these institutions systematically to any state features (e.g. Weingast 1997; Alexander 2002a; Haggard and Kaufman 2012; Svolik 2013). As law and order and social and economic policy implementation are core functions of states, state concepts must be developed with an eye on these phenomena.

Second, the state should be conceptually distinct from the political regime. The politicians in cabinet and parliament should be distinguished in their functions and interests from state employees to open for the analytical possibility that state agents may both stabilize and destabilize democracies (see Fishman 1990). Yet, even Linz and Stepan’s Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, which is a constant point of reference for state-democracy scholars, slide back and forth between the state and political regimes in their conceptualization and theorization, by, for instance, stating: “Democracy is a form of governance of a modern state. Thus, without a state, no modern democracy is possible” (Linz and Stepan 1996: 17). Similarly, Bratton and Chang’s promising distinction between regime and state seems to be somewhat lost when they use variables such as ‘political stability’ as indicators of stateness, thereby producing near-tautological relationships with democracy (Bratton and Chang 2006: 1066-1069).

Among conceptions developed for broader purposes than explaining democratic stability, the concept of ‘Good Governance’ in some applications collapses regime and state characteristics by incorporating both components of ‘government effectiveness’ and ‘voice and accountability’ (Repnik and Mohs 1992; see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009: 6). To some extent, the same can be said of the concept of impartiality in governance which stresses impartiality as a feature on the ‘output side’ of the political system but still sees it as partially overlapping with political equality on the input side (Rothstein and Teorell 2008: 169-170). Finally, the dominant conception of state capacity as the state’s “capacities to penetrate society, regulate

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11 Grindle (1996: 8) employs a more fine-grained distinction between institutional, technical, administrative, and responsive capacity. Here, the technical and administrative capacities resemble Hendrix’ category of administrative capacity.

12 To be fair, Quality of Government scholars have engaged in analyses of, for instance, the nexus between bureaucracy and democracy, where they fruitfully employ impartiality as a mechanism between state and democracy (e.g. Cornell and Lapuente 2014).
social relations, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways” (see Migdal 1988) does not clearly distinguish between state agents and politicians whereas Michael Mann’s (2008) categories of despotic and infrastructural power are biased towards autocracies and democracies, respectively, even though being conceived of as variants of state power.\textsuperscript{13}

Third, the concept of the state should appreciate the state’s inherently intimate connection with the political level. While dominant conceptions have contributed with strong theorization of the state’s autonomy of societal interests (e.g. Skocpol 1979; Evans 1995; Rothstein and Teorell 2008), they typically refrain from mentioning the relationship between state agents and their political masters. This is paradoxical since one core insight of the public administration literature is the inherent problem of delegation of authority from political principals to bureaucratic agents (see Laffont and Martimort 2002: Ch. 2). Similarly, a substantial literature within the study of democratization has focused on military subordination to civilian rulers as key to peaceful democratic transitions (e.g. Stepan 1988; Valenzuela 1990: 32-37). Extant state conceptions are still highly useful by identifying the agents of the state and their functions and leaving room for agency independent of regime characteristics, as well as clarifying that state agents can manipulate the direction of state actions and the resources at the state’s disposal (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985). However, they should also, to a greater extent, incorporate how state systems of norms and rules limit the actions of state agents and align them with political demands. The state is an institution with agency but also an organization placed in a political hierarchy.

Generally, we need a more dynamic view of the state in interaction with the political level, but research on the state in comparative politics has generally been dominated by a focus on the resources, competences, and autonomy of the state apparatus in which the responsiveness of state agents is assumed a priori (e.g. Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992; Evans 1995; Rothstein and Teorell 2008; Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell 2011; Kurtz 2013). A more balanced conclusion would emphasize that state agents are responsive to their political principal to varying degrees because they have their own interests and the expertise and information to pursue them (Brehm and Gates 1997).

Finally, the concept of infrastructural power has helped us understand that state capacities are worth little in matters such as tax collection in the absence of societal compliance (Kurtz 2013; for a review of the nexus of state capacity and infrastructural power, see Soifer and vom Hau 2008). As one parameter of societal compliance, I point to citizenship agreement. Indeed,

\textsuperscript{13} For a comprehensive critique of Mann’s conception, see Hanson and Sigman (2013).
the territorial component of modern states poses the idea that the degree to which different population groups are integrated in the state affects implementation ability and governance structures in such fundamental ways that it seems essential to include some conception of the cohesion of citizen groups in the concept of the state (Linz and Stepan 1996; Hadenius 2001; Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011).

As a potential solution to the three conceptual challenges outlined, the next section devotes attention to the concept of stateness. Whereas the concept of the state is old, the concept of stateness was only introduced by J.P. Nettl in 1968 to facilitate the measurement of the degree to which a modern state exists and, thus, to bring the state into comparative political analysis (Nettl 1968: 579). After a slow start, the concept of stateness has become hugely influential and is today probably the most prominent concept in state-centred, empirical research on democratic transition and stability. Additionally, Linz and Stepan (1996), who popularized stateness, introduced the component of citizenship agreement while retaining the dimension of capacity to the understanding of the state. Thus, stateness seems to hold the promise of solving the three challenges. But what is stateness then?

For Nettl, the Weberian conception of the modern state was the point of reference for stateness. Most of the key concepts of social science are characterized by ambiguity and the concept of the state is no exception. The first scholar to use the term state in the modern sense was Hobbes, in the preface to *The Leviathan* published in 1651 (Hansen 1998: 108-112). It was this modern, European version of the state that Weber (1978: 909) famously defined as the entity successfully claiming a legitimate monopoly on violence within a specified territory. This definition includes modern institutions such as the military, a police force, a bureaucracy, and courts protecting a legal system. While the definition of the state continues to be debated, the Weberian conception has become so established that scholars are more or less forced to use it as a frame of reference for their own definitions. Indeed, a large number of scholars has simply retained the Weberian definition, albeit with some important elaborations that they argue were underspecified by Weber (e.g. Skocpol 1985: 7; Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985: 46-47; Gill 2003: 2-7; O’Donnell 2010: 51-53).

However, though referring to Weberian thoughts about the state, Nettl did not explicitly define stateness. One might therefore argue that the introduction of the concept of stateness has increased rather than diminished the conceptual confusion. This is illustrated by the fact that scholars following Nettl mean very different things when referring to stateness. To illustrate, Evans (1997: 62) defines stateness as “the institutional centrality of the state” in terms of the “extent to which private power can ... be checked by public
authority”, that is, he construes stateness solely as a matter of capacity. Elkins and Sides (2008: 2) instead argue that “Understanding stateness therefore entails attention to the attitudes and identities of citizens, in particular their attachment to the state”, that is, they perceive stateness solely to be a matter of legitimacy or cultural acceptance. Finally, Bratton and Chang (2006: 1060) define stateness much more broadly as “the bone structure of the body politic or the set of administrative institutions that claim a legitimate command over a bounded territory”. This definition potentially subsumes many diverse forms of capacity and legitimacy.

While I maintain a Weberian conception of the state and embrace the introduction of stateness as a concept that capture its empirical manifestations, the content of stateness needs to be investigated through a comprehensive conceptual analysis. This analysis elaborates three different aspects of the overarching concept of stateness: state monopoly on the use of violence, administrative effectiveness of the state, and agreement on who are the citizens of the state (for similar distinctions, see Mazzuca and Munck 2014; Gill 2003; O’Donnell 2010). These are conceptually distinct properties that are likely to affect democratic stability in different ways.

Mapping definitions of stateness

Table 2.1 maps a general review of the way stateness has entered the comparative politics literature. I searched for ‘stateness’ in ProQuest, JStor, Google Scholar, and Google Books and selected the hits that went beyond simple adoption of a previous definition of stateness by discussing the conceptualization of stateness. The search was narrowed to cover only comparative politics work.

The mapping shows that all extant definitions of stateness include one or more of three defining attributes that I have termed ‘monopoly on violence’, ‘administrative effectiveness’, and ‘citizenship agreement’. Any concept of stateness should thus contain one or more of these attributes and no more than them. Some accounts were challenging to categorize with reference to these attributes. One group of definitions uses other terms or connotations that I believe can be subsumed under the heading of the three attributes. For instance, I take Elkins and Sides’ (2008: 2) attribute of ‘attachment to the state’ as implying citizenship agreement. Similarly, I interpret Nettl’s (1968: 579-580) definition of stateness as ‘saliency of the state’ and his focus on the central administration as a sectoral, specific, and technical matter in countries with high degrees of stateness as indications of monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness. A second group of definitions includes an attribute at the conceptual stage but neglect it in the theoretical and/or em-
pirical analysis, creating some uncertainty about whether or not to include it in the stateness definition. For instance, Linz and Stepan (1996: 16-17) begin by defining stateness as citizenship agreement in a state holding a monopoly of violence, but in the theoretical framework and empirical analyses, they treat citizenship agreement as the most interesting aspect of democratic consolidation (Linz and Stepan 1996: 20-24). In such cases, I include attributes that are present in the conceptualization of stateness so as not to mistake scholars’ definition for their empirical focus or operationalization.

Table 2.1: Attributes of stateness included in extant definitions

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Author[s] (publication year)</th>
<th>Monopoly on violence</th>
<th>Administrative effectiveness</th>
<th>Citizenship agreement</th>
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<td>Migdal (2009)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Møller and Skaaning (2011)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>(X)</td>
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<td>Sojo (2011)</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Ilyin et al. (2012)</td>
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<td>Kurtz and Schrank (2012)</td>
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<td>Carbone and Memoli (2015)</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13 (14)</td>
<td>12</td>
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</table>

None of the sources introduce other attributes of stateness than those presented in Table 2.1, and each of the three attributes is defined in relatively similar ways by most scholars. Monopoly on violence is typically conceived as the *de facto* authority to use physical force to make people comply (Fuku-
yama 2004: 6); administrative effectiveness is “the ability of states to plan and execute policies” (Fukuyama 2004: 7); and citizenship agreement is the absence of “profound differences about the territorial boundaries of the political community’s state and profound differences as to who has the right of citizenship in that state” (Linz and Stepan 1996: 17).

These agreements aside, the most striking aspect of Table 2.1 is surely the massive heterogeneity in terms of combinations of the three attributes. None of the three attributes are present in all the definitions included in the mapping. Of the 20 definitions reviewed, administrative effectiveness is included in 13, monopoly on violence in 16 and citizenship agreement in 12, respectively. Citizenship agreement has been included in most definitions since Linz and Stepan’s book and today seems to be perceived as the core attribute of the concept of stateness, reflected in a growing number of analyses of democratization or democratic consolidation focusing on minority inclusion, border settlement, and the legitimating and integrative potential of the state (e.g. Daskalovski 2004; Lindberg 2006; Kraxberger 2007; Dukalskis 2009; Lemay-Hébert 2009; Möller and Skaaning 2011; Sojo 2011; Ilyin et al. 2012). Other scholars (e.g. Evans 1997; Fukuyama 2004; Kurtz and Schrank 2012) still exclude citizenship agreement from their conceptions. More generally, six of the nine logically possible combinations of the defining attributes are represented in Table 2.1.

In some sense, the heterogeneity of definitions is only natural given that the accounts come from different subfields with different explanatory goals. However, for my purpose of building a better understanding of the role of stateness as an explanatory variable this heterogeneity is analytically enfeebling. Instead of excluding any of the attributes, I argue for exploiting this heterogeneity by fleshing out their differences and pledge for a disaggregated analysis.

On an overall level, two very different approaches to defining stateness can be identified in Table 2.1. Stateness is either conceived of as a matter of capacity, that is, a set of coercive or administrative functions that must be carried out with a certain degree of effectiveness. This conception is also associated with the literature on revenue extraction as a more general indication of state capacity (see Hanson and Sigman 2013; Saylor 2013). Alternatively, stateness is a matter of legitimacy, that is, an integrated whole – a body politics – recognized by its demos. The first approach is represented by Tilly’s (1975a) definition, which pervades influential analyses such as Evans’ (1997: 62-83) and Fukuyama’s (2004). Here, stateness is a product of a monopoly on violence and/or administrative effectiveness. The other approach was introduced by Linz and Stepan who break with the traditional perspective in two ways: They sever the link between stateness and the attribute of
administrative effectiveness, and they introduce citizenship agreement as a hitherto neglected attribute of stateness. More specifically, stateness is defined as a product of monopoly on violence and citizenship agreement – with the main emphasis placed on the latter attribute.

For a comprehensive investigation of the state-democracy nexus, it is obvious from Table 2.1 that all three attributes should be conceived of as dimensions of stateness related with democracy in different ways and to different extents. The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between these three attributes and democratic stability. I am thus not interested in any aggregated conception of stateness. But from my conceptualization of the three attributes, which I present below, we may conceive of the overarching concept of stateness as the state’s degree of capacity to impose law and order within its territory, to construct and implement policies, and the degree to which it claims legitimacy as a political unit.

The proposed definition of stateness as well as its three constitutive dimensions can be placed in perspective through some more general distinctions. Whereas (minimalist) democracy concerns access to power, the common denominator for all three attributes of stateness is that they concern the locus and exercise of power (see Mazzuca 2010). I also emphasize that stateness does not include civil liberty protections at the courts (rule of law) or, less demanding, rational-legal authority (rule by law) (for rule of law distinctions, see, Møller and Skaaning 2014: 145). Many countries, autocratic or democratic, have weak provisions of rule of law, for instance contemporary Colombia, but while it is often related to weak stateness this is not necessarily the case, exemplified by China (see also Fukuyama 2012: Ch. 17). Further, the less demanding notion of rule by law is only intrinsic to state capacity in some cases such as Stalin’s Russia, while in others, typical of post-colonial African cases of sultanistic or otherwise heavily personalized rule, there is no transparent or predictable set of laws that the state apparatus implements or refers to. In my understanding, the effectiveness of the state is measured by its ability and willingness to implement any order that the ‘chief in command’ must have on his mind. Stateness thus means, more minimalistically, that states are able to enforce the orders enacted by the regime across its territory, irrespective of the nature of the regime or the content of the orders (say liberal versus illiberal).

Moreover, stateness refers to the domestic dimensions of the state as opposed to the external (including juridical) dimensions of the state. The overarching concept of stateness thus does not concern the international power position or formal recognition of a state’s sovereignty as a person of international law by other states, which is normally captured by the concept of
statehood (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Clapham 1998). The state must merely be de facto sovereign to meaningfully speak of its stateness.

Disentangling the stateness attributes

Most scholars would probably expect the three stateness attributes, monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, and citizenship agreement, to be empirically associated with each other: Coercive capacity and administrative capacity are closely related phenomena (Mann 2008); states capable of maintaining a monopoly on violence also tend to have no or only politically insignificant citizenship disputes (Rokkan 1975: 578-579); and states characterized by administrative effectiveness tend to foster trust between the citizens and legitimate the state’s presence and jurisdiction (Gilley 2006; Rothstein 2011). Nonetheless, the three properties of stateness capture aspects that are fundamentally different in nature, and their empirical co-variation is unlikely to be perfect.

The two state capacities

The two most closely connected attributes are, arguably, monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness, both of which have to do with capacity. In a very direct sense, they concern the extent to which and means by which states can exercise power across their territories. States are rarely administratively effective in their exercise of power without a monopoly on violence. The two types of state capacity also share a particular conceptual challenge: The organs which hold and appropriate resources in determined ways are intimately connected with the political level of state, pertaining to the government. But since the content of governments’ decisions, whether these governments are autocratic or democratic, are variable and fluctuating, they conflict from time to time with the static, professional competence of security forces and civil servants (Huntington 1957: 72; Brehm and Gates 1997).

How do the security apparatus and civil administration handle this cross-pressure of quality and obedience? Inspired by the large literatures on civil-military relationships and delegation of authority from principal to agent in the public administration, I introduce the concepts of subordination and responsiveness, respectively, and describe how security forces must be subordinated and civil servants responsive to the government of the day to ensure

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14 O’Donnell (1973: 85-87), in his analysis of bureaucratic-authoritarianism in post-WWII Latin America, points out how professional militaries and highly skilled bureaucracies often formed the vital praetorian-technocratic alliance in the advancement of economic authoritarianism.
the most effective use of their competences (for a recent overview of the principal-agent model, see Laffont and Martimort 2009: Ch. 2). For both the security apparatus and the civil administration, subordination and responsiveness should be ingrained all the way upwards through the hierarchical layers of their organization – from agency to department.

In this study, I define monopoly on violence as the capacity of the military and police to impose public order throughout the territory of the state. In identifying a monopoly on violence, I conceptualize three necessary and jointly sufficient criteria. First, it entails that the state is capable of wielding powerful resources vis-à-vis society. Monopoly on violence regards the internal sovereignty of the state and thus superiority in strength relative to all other societal groups combined. Alternatively, monopoly on violence is present in the likely cases where the combined forces of societal groups could in principle threaten the monopoly of the state but where this is no issue because the societal groups cannot coordinate a combined effort (see Svolik 2012: Ch. 5). Monopoly on violence thus does not equal public order in my understanding. Public order may vary according to other factors as well and is treated as an effect of monopoly on violence. Second, monopoly on violence implies high cohesion among the security forces. Effective military and police organizations have established a certain corporate spirit to discipline each member to further the goals of the organization. In modern states, this spirit is best secured by specialized bodies placed in a functioning hierarchy of ranks and an established education of military and police (Huntington 1957: 14-15). The opposite is seen where, for instance, military cadres and factionalization exist.

One may here note that the professional duties of the police and military vary. The former is responsible for internal security matters (including intelligence) while the latter is also and sometimes only responsible for external security matters (see Huntington 1957: Ch. 2). When resistance and demonstrations occur, confrontations with the military could turn violent and start a vicious circle of public disorder because of the military’s propensity for violent action (Gasiorowski and Power 1998: 756, 760; Ulfelder 2005) whereas police confrontations involve less violent means and thus less violent reactions because of the police’s legitimate authority over crime fighting (Bayley 1975: 328).

Third, the security forces accept being subordinated to the government of the day even though government policies may violate the military’s or police departments’ own power position and interests as professions. This is inspired by Stepan’s (1988: Ch. 6) concept of military contestation as a measure of military resistance to key reforms of its own organizational powers such as its mission, structure, budget, and prerogatives in policy-making.
(Stepan 1988: 68, 92-93; see also Nordlinger 1977). A key point of his analysis is that a lack of such resistance does not follow automatically from the cohesion of the security apparatus. In fact, it is likely a strong and coherent security apparatus that comes to think of itself as being beyond the control of its political executive (Nordlinger 1977: 64-76).

To measure subordination, I look for “areas where, whether challenged or not, the military [or police, my insertion] as an institution assumes they have an acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control over its internal governance, to play a role within extramilitary areas within the state apparatus, or even to structure relationships between the state and political or civil society” against the will of the political executive (Stepan 1988: 93). One or two examples are not enough, however, as civil-military conflicts emerge in everyday politics everywhere. What should be observed is a recurring pattern of civil-military conflict. The focus on organizational powers in the conceptualization of monopoly on violence makes sense because the political executive, who by definition must be analyzed as the head of state (whether democratic or not), must be able to control these organizational powers as they constitute the means of public order provision and thus of the state’s monopoly on violence.15

I stress that this does not mean subordination to democratic rule (see Valenzuela 1990: 32-33). This would produce tautological reasoning. Instead, the civilian authority here can be autocratic as well as democratically elected. In reforms of the organizational power structures, the security forces must accept subordination to any executive, whoever he is and however he came to power. Beyond these reforms, the normally acceptable distribution of work between the political executive and the security forces strikes the balance between ‘ends’ as the prerogative of the political executive and ‘means’ as the prerogative of the security forces (see Huntington 1957: 73-77).16

As complaints by security forces over military reform proposals may reflect genuine resistance to democracy as a system of rule rather than merely subordination to a civilian authority, evidence of security force autonomy

15 In turn, the measurement of subordination does not apply logically to military dictatorships. Here, the cohesion of the military forces is rather at stake. However, it does not preclude application to autocratic settings since such regimes can be civilian as well (see Geddes 1999).

16 Note that ‘ends’ are not necessarily ‘laws’ in the tradition of positive law. Thus, security forces may uphold a monopoly on violence without being constrained by any constitution. In this way, regime biases are generally avoided and, particularly, I avoid biasing towards scoring monopoly on violence as weak in historical cases outside the Western hemisphere (see Fukuyama 2012: Ch. 17).
would ideally include reform contestations in the previous, autocratic spell. I would in effect avoid an arguably trivial explanation that democracy broke down because security forces were primarily against democracy. But even if I cannot preclude the possibility of a normative resistance to democracy among the security forces, pointing to prior contestations over organizational powers stands as a valid explanation.

The other state capacity, administrative effectiveness, involves the development of the state’s monopoly on violence to a qualitatively different and higher level of sophistication in terms of social control (Fukuyama 2004: 9; Mann 2008: 113-117; Dryzek and Dunleavy 2009: 2, 5). I understand administrative effectiveness as the capacity of the civil administration, including the judiciary, to construct and implement policies regarding public services and regulations accurately, swiftly, and with high quality throughout the territory.

There are three necessary and jointly sufficient criteria for administrative effectiveness. First of all, administrative structures must penetrate the territory of the state. To make my concept travel across time and space, my understanding of penetration is minimalist. One may focus on sophistication and effectiveness of transportation and communication infrastructures, but I only require that a relatively stable connection is established between center and periphery by which laws, decrees, and other political signals are communicated. The scope of activities is another relevant concern in this regard since I need to somehow lower the demands to capture differences in administrative effectiveness across developing countries. As noted by Grindle (1996) and Fukuyama (2004: 6-9), the most frequent differences between state administrations outside the North-Western European and Neo-European context are related to sector-specific effectiveness. In Evans’ (1995) words, the public sector in developing economies is often characterized by ‘pockets of effectiveness’, whereas all-encompassing administrative effectiveness is very rarely seen. I therefore focus on the existence of administrative effectiveness in the key public sectors of economics and trade, finance, judicial affairs, interior affairs, and social and labor market policy. I thus do not consider sectors such as environment protection, foreign affairs, and church and religion, unless of course they play a particularly important role in politics.

Second, administrative effectiveness fundamentally hinges on meritocratic recruitment procedures (Rauch and Evans 2000; Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell 2012). Meritocracy is a system in which civil servants are recruited on the basis of their qualifications via systematic civil service procedures. In comparison, patrimonial administrations recruit on the basis of personal or political connections (Raadschelders and Rutgers 1996). Be-
cause of the complex nature of designing and executing economic policies and of extending public services, effective implementation requires professionally competent staffs that ensure the legality of their political principals’ proposals and adjust rules to existing institutional settings (Rothstein and Teorell 2008; Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell 2011). Another likely consequence of meritocratic recruitment is that general rules are applied impartially to individual cases. Meritocracy ensures against politicization whereby civil servants are fired to further the success of specific political projects, parties, or persons. Politicization instead enables the government and related interest groups to pursue rents through the administration at the cost of the administration’s more general duties (Miller 2000; Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell 2012; Hyden 2013). Ongoing implementation programs are also likely to stall since the employment period of politically hired servants might end when the incumbent government is ousted from power (Cornell 2014). Contemporary neo-patrimonial regimes are examples of problems of administrative ineffectiveness rising from a lack of administrative competence and autonomy (Bratton and van de Walle 1994).

The third requirement regards the responsiveness of the civil administration. Even though meritocracies often coincide with a strongly hierarchical type of organization and strict codes of conduct and disciplinary measures to ensure obedience, the expertise and corporate spirit of bureaucratic professionals may in fact enfeeble effective administration (Fukuyama 2013: 11). Meritocratic administrations may have the ability and incentives to maximize budgets, slack, shirk, and resist government policies that put their core interests at stake (Nordlinger 1981; Dunleavy 1985).

By nature of their assignments, such as ensuring state survival and containing anti-systemic forces, security forces enjoy a greater level of information asymmetry and discretion in deciding the ends and means of implementation than the average civil servant (Huntington 1957: 77). The content of responsiveness for civil servants is therefore different from security force subordination: Civil servants must to a greater extent respect the ends of the political decisions initiated by the government of the day. I thus measure their responsiveness as a willingness to serve with equal effectiveness any government decision, no matter its content. It is the premise of all agency theory in public administration that there are mechanisms to assure some political control of the administration but that, eventually, compliance comes from the administration itself (see Finer 1941; Aberbach and Rockman 1994). Even though it may be difficult for civil servants to consider both their political responsiveness and professional competence (West 2005), this balance is constantly relevant and often achieved with success in meritocracies (Christensen 1991; Olsen 2008: 16-18). Since civil servants and politicians
interact intensely around the formulation of policies, a secondary way of measuring responsiveness would thus hinge on the character of their working relationship. In some contexts, policy-making is enfeebled by a lack of or a contested dialogue between the political executive and the civil service resulting in a separation of policies treated and implemented by the administration from those forwarded by the executive.

As examples, it is fruitful to recall how civil administrations became effective in the 18th and 19th centuries’ West-Central Europe. In Sweden (Lapuente and Rothstein 2014), England (Silberman 1993: 324-326, 350-354), and Denmark (Knudsen 1995: Ch. 10-11), it was the combination of meritocracy and responsiveness rather than mere meritocracy that formed the backbone of administrative effectiveness decades ahead. Conversely, in the absence of responsiveness, the competence and autonomous status of the administrations in Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany posed a great management problem for shifting autocratic and democratic governments and ultimately caused poor cooperative bonds between government and civil service that turned into obstructive implementation (Mäding 1985: 96; Petzina 1985: 63; Caplan 1988: 94-95; Mommesen 1991: 82-83, 86, 90, 100, 111-112; McElligott 2014: 111, 118). Cases of unresponsiveness and patronage-driven administrations are well known in Sub-Saharan Africa (Bratton and van de Walle 1994), and many Latin American and Southern European countries of the 20th century have had some success in providing administrative responsiveness via the use of local caciques to hire civil servants loyal to the party while meritocracy has obviously suffered under that same system (Piattoni 2001; Kurtz 2013). Today, the issue of political control remains a source of concern and ineffective implementation in autocratic, democratic, developed, and developing countries (Brehm and Gates 1997; Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell 2011). But ‘state capture’ or ‘corruption’ is only an indication of unresponsiveness if it signifies a discrepancy between the policies of the government and the implementation behavior of the civil service.

Nation states and state nations

It appears that monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness are conceptually distinct and more complex concepts than what is typically assumed. Even more important is the distinction between monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness on the one hand and citizenship agreement on the other. Whereas monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness are capacities of the state, citizenship agreement concerns the popular acceptance or legitimacy of the state and whether different ethnic groups accept each other. It is thus an attribute of both state and society.
However, as Linz and Stepan (1996) argued, citizenship agreement is such a vital condition for governance that one can hardly analyse states without considering their relation to their citizens. It is all the more important considering that modern states by definition hold authority within a specified territory, which implies authority over a specified group of people.

I conceive of citizenship agreement as the sheer agreement on who is and could potentially be members of a state. If citizens disagree on who should be members, the borders and the territory are by definition unsettled, and the state is by definition a less salient or weaker social fact (O’Donnell 2010: 73-82; Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011). The content of this definition is basically the same as when Linz and Stepan speak of citizenship agreement as “the absence of profound disagreement about the boundaries of the political community” (Linz and Stepan 1996: 16). For analytical purposes, I turn Linz and Stepan’s definition on its head to focus on a positive rather than a negative definition. Most importantly, however, a specification of their definition is needed. I focus on citizenship agreement as ethnically defined. Indeed, isolated socioeconomic conflicts may lead to citizenship problems such as the exclusion of communists from state power and, at least the wish of, expulsion from the state territory in the 19th and early 20th centuries (see Collier and Collier 1991). But in this study, I regard such conflicts as connected with problems of modernization and socioeconomic development – not stateness. Although sometimes closely related to the origins of states and nations (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009: 32, 118), ethnic and social class conflicts have run along separate lines in the history of modern state- and nation-building (Mann 1986). It is therefore fruitful to distinguish between their effects. Demanding equal citizenship for all socioeconomic classes as a necessary criterion for citizenship agreement would most often imply close to definitional overlap with that of a well-functioning democracy (Przeworski 2005; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009: 114, 118).17

I distinguish between two necessary and jointly sufficient criteria for citizenship agreement. First, as almost every state population contains significant groups divided along ethnic lines (racial, religious, or linguistic), these groups must at minimum accept each other’s presence within the territory of the state (Alesina et al. 2003). This acceptance does not have to involve cooperation, trade, or any democratic dialogue. Although some form of interaction between different groups is typically the case, it should be stressed that citizenship agreement here does not refer to acceptance of a collection of civil and political rights or a certain level of enfranchisement but only to an

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17 For the same reason, I abstain from the use of citizenship as the provision of civil, political, and social rights (see Marshall 1992).
agreement on the criteria for being and becoming members of the state based on ethno-cultural affiliation or similarity. This is often a criterion used for citizenship or naturalization.\textsuperscript{18} Citizenship agreement is thus not a property of the political regime. More generally, citizenship agreement is, at least conceptually, independent of how the state acts towards its citizens by, for instance, providing certain rights and opportunity structures.\textsuperscript{19}

Mutual acceptance between the significant ethnic groups within the territory of the state does not necessarily mean that they accept the supremacy of the state (see Ramet 2006: 35). As the state is the embodiment of its different groups, the state tends to be more legitimate, at least in a minimal territorial sense, than in the case of interethnic disagreements (see Englebert 2000). For instance, this is the case in ethnic exclusionist regimes where a small ethnic minority has captured the state and is thus highly illegitimate among the rest of the population (Wimmer 2013). But mutually accepting groups may live their lives in sharp contrast to or apathy of what the state preaches or symbolizes in terms of ethnicity practices and values. Mutual acceptance between ethnic groups is thus only meaningful in relation to stateness if the agreement entails a measure of state legitimacy – or what can often be observed as a common view of the state as an ethno-cultural symbol (Gellner 2006).

The two criteria of mutual group acceptance and state legitimacy are intimately connected and only together form the overall concept of citizenship agreement. Acceptance can rise between different ethnic neighbours on each side of state borders, or groups may be divided across borders. But citizenship agreement implies that groups placed within the same state territory accept each other as members of that particular state. This has certain implications for measurement: If a group within the state territory wants membership of another state, citizenship agreement is weakened, but if a foreign group wants membership of the state in question, citizenship agreement is not affected – only, of course, if the foreign group upon gaining membership conflicts with other groups of the state. Also, an expanding nationalism wishing to occupy foreign territories and thus engaging in xenophobic acts against very small minorities living in the state is not a case of citizenship disagreement. Racism in itself, despite its detrimental effects on people, society, or even states, is not by definition an indication of citizenship disagreement.

\textsuperscript{18} For a discussion of human rights and fraternity, see Ishay (2008: 47-61).

\textsuperscript{19} This holds even if such provisions might tend to strengthen the affective bonds between groups and between each group and the state (Tilly 1975a; O’Donnell 2010: Ch. 4).
I stress a thin conception of state legitimacy focused on the sheer acceptance of the supremacy of the state. Such acceptance does not necessarily hinge on a thick national identity, old or new, since state does not equal nation (Tilly 1975a; Mann 1986). Depending on the particular configuration of ethnic groups, both unitary and federal governmental systems can form the basis of citizenship agreement (Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011). ‘State nations’ and ‘nation states’, more generally, form two types of citizenship agreement (Rejai and Enloe 1969; Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011). A state nation is multiethnic and sometimes even has significant (and politically salient) multinational components but nonetheless manages to engender strong identification with a state-political community (Elkins and Sides 2008: 7-18; Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011: 4). Consequently, problems of citizenship agreement in state nations rise when significant groups are discriminated on the basis of their ethno-cultural rights (Abizadeh 2012). Examples of successful state nations are Canada, India, Ghana, Belgium, and Switzerland (Rejai and Enloe 1969: 153; Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011: 38). Alternatively, citizenship agreement is obtained in a nation state that privileges one ethnic group over others. This means matching the political boundaries of the state with the boundaries of the nation (Gellner 2006). The medieval European process of state formation through national conflicts was unique in many respects and did not in fact create pure nation states, but – provided that certain conditions are in place – it still bears testimony to the possibility of creating citizenship agreement by means of nation-state building (Tilly 1975b: 601-602). Problems of citizenship agreement in nation states occur when the ethnic composition of the population changes so as to cause clashes between the naturalized ethnic group and the new groups (Kopstein and Wittenberg 2010).

State nations resemble what Lijphart termed ‘consociational states’, that is, multicultural or plural states governed by a grand coalition of the political leaders of all political segments of society, giving each subculture considerable autonomy to handle its own affairs, veto points, and proportionality in representation (Lijphart 1977: 25). However, state nations are conceptually different in my understanding. First, the concept of consociationalism is much thicker than that of state nation by involving institutionalized protection of groups. When there are many and diverging groups, citizenship agreement often only arises and exists because of strategic institutional engineering but it may in principle be based solely on a common set of attitudes toward the state and between the groups.20 Second, due to the way I

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20 State nations are normally only associated with democracies since the means of building functioning state nations are often, and most effectively, democratic (Stepan, Linz, and
conceptualize it, citizenship agreement certainly has a subjective component to it. It may thus be manipulated by actors both within and outside the state – writers, charismatic leaders, and general public opinion – as has often been the case regarding ethnic identity in post-colonial Africa (Hyden 2013: 192). This is reminiscent of consociationalism. Even though ethnicity may have become less important as a life-long identity marker in modern post-colonial politics (see Hyden 2013: 205), I wish to avoid reducing citizenship agreement to a result of fluctuating public opinion but instead focus on the more stable, underlying notions of state and nation. Political engineering of ethnic conflict most often succeeds when the ethnic groups have antagonistic identities and histories. Ethnic relations and the ethno-cultural legitimacy of the state are thus, in my understanding, deep-seated identity markers, and not issue-based opinions.

It is relatively uncontroversial to posit that citizenship agreement correlates far from perfectly with state monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness. Citizenship agreement can definitely be present without a genuine monopoly on violence. States might be weak in coercive capacity and thus prone to (or at least vulnerable in the face of) violent rebellions but still survive because of an entrenched citizenship agreement that makes the incentives to rebel few and weak. Much of Western Europe exemplifies a development where the state has gradually withdrawn from despotic to more subtle forms of coercion and control as civil society groups have come to terms with each other and the state while also building their own capacities (Mann 2008). Moreover, many states are characterized by robust levels of citizenship agreement even though the state apparatus lacks resources and is pervaded by patrimonialism. This is the case in Southern Italy (Putnam 1993) and Brazil (Evans 1995). More generally, states continuously interact with their populations with the aim of expanding or defending their authority, and the sequencing of state capacity and citizenship agreement is therefore not straightforward (Tilly 1975a; Mann 1986; Giddens 1987; Gill 2003).

Conversely, numerous states have been characterized by monopoly on violence or administrative effectiveness amidst citizenship disputes. Many states have been able to endure in spite of intense disagreement about how borders are drawn and which populations should be included within these borders because of the state’s sheer coercive force and the systematic use of state repression (Rokkan 1975; Mann 1986: Ch. 3; Fukuyama 2012; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). One prominent example is the Soviet Union.

Yadav 2011: 8). However, considering the conceptual analysis by Stepan, Linz, and Yadav (2011: 2-22), the criteria for a state nation are actually less bound to a regime than to mechanisms of legitimation (see also Gilley 2006).
Another example is East Germany, where the state penetrated society but cut off the citizens from fraternal West Germany, thereby undercutting its own legitimacy. In present-day Belgium, administrative effectiveness also co-exists with significant citizenship disagreement (Oberschall 2011). The connection between state coercion, state effectiveness, and citizenship agreement cannot be established a priori (Gilley 2006; Davenport 2007).

Finally, the co-variation between monopoly on violence and citizenship agreement is arguably different from that between administrative effectiveness and citizenship agreement. Whereas many states with monopoly on violence have citizenship disputes, fewer states boast administrative effectiveness in the face of such disputes. This is so, at least partly, because of the legitimizing consequences of administrative effectiveness. Perhaps this is most vividly illustrated by the East Asian Tigers, which have achieved legitimacy through economic performance and, contrariwise, by many Sub-Saharan African states suffering from illegitimacy exactly because of dire administrative and economic performance (Evans 1995; Englebert 2000). The increase in administrative effectiveness was furthermore one of the developments paving the way for the cohesive and legitimate national states characterizing most of Western Europe (Tilly 1975a; Mann 1986: Chs. 13-14).

Summing up, Figure 2.1 presents the conceptual structure of the three attributes of stateness. The criteria, or components, of each attribute are situated on the intermediate level in the figure. The components are each necessary and jointly sufficient for the overarching attribute to which they refer. The lowest level in the figure contains the simplified observable implication for coding a given component as present. Considerations of threshold ambiguities encountered during the coding process are presented in Appendix I.
Figure 2.1: Measuring stateness attributes

Monopoly on violence

Resource supremacy

More resources for violence than societal groups combined (or in cooperation)

Resource supremacy

Professionalism and functioning organization in the security forces

Cohesion

Subordination

Substantial contestation between security forces and the government on the organizational powers of the security forces

Territorial penetration

Basic administrative infrastructure throughout the territory of the state

Meritocracy

Civil servants recruited on the basis of merit via systematic civil service procedures

Responsiveness

Swift, accurate implementation of government orders disregarding content

Mutual group acceptance

All significant, ethnic groups within the territory of the state accept communion

State legitimacy

All significant, ethnic groups within the territory of the state see the state as the same ethnocultural symbol

Administrative effectiveness

Citizenship agreement
The concepts of democracy and democratic stability

We now know what is meant by stateness. To investigate the relationship between stateness and democratic stability, we also need to know what democracy and democratic stability is. I employ Boix, Miller, and Rosato’s (2012) conception of democracy as a regime in which the key government offices are filled through free and fair elections in which at least half of the male population is allowed to participate. This definition directs attention to a vital aspect of human life, namely the existence of a competitive election that carries the realistic potential of making incumbents accountable for their actions and, if that is the preference of the electorate, installing a new government to replace the old one. Moreover, it provides a crisp distinction between regime and state that does not make attributes pertaining to the state part of the definition of democracy (see Collier and Adcock 1999; Schumpeter 2010: 241; Mazzuca and Munck 2014).

The definition hinges on Robert A. Dahl’s two fundamental dimensions of democracy: contestation and participation (see Dahl 1973). It is necessary to specify what is meant by the definition in terms of these two dimensions. Przeworski et al. (2000: 15-17) present three conditions elaborating contestation: ex ante uncertainty, ex post irreversibility, and repeatability. I concur with Boix, Miller, and Rosato that elections with ex ante uncertainty can be conceived “as free if voters are given multiple options on ballots and as fair if electoral fraud is absent and incumbents do not abuse government power to effectively eliminate the chance of opposition victory through peaceful contestation” (Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2012: 9). This focus on the ex ante quality of the election means that no government alternation is necessary for an election to be democratic. For instance, Sweden held numerous free and fair elections and was otherwise a consolidated democracy during the period from 1933 to 1976 when only the social democrats held government power. Nor are government alternations sufficient for democracy. An example is Kyrgyzstan’s elections of February and March 2005, which overthrew president Akayev in what became known as the Tulip Revolution but never gave way to any democratically elected government (Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2012: 9-10). Ex post irreversibility simply demands that the result of the free and fair election is transferred into real government power. To make sure that all varieties of presidential and parliamentary systems qualify as democratic, the criterion ‘key government offices’ implies that the executive is directly or indirectly elected and is responsible directly to either the voters or to the legislature and that the legislature is elected directly (Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2012: 8).
As Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2012: 11), I concur with the demand of repeatability as laid out by Przeworski et al. (2000). Note here that repeatability does not imply more than one democratic election but that there must be some regularized mechanism for repeated elections. In other words, the elected government must have an expiration date when it has to call for a new election. If, for instance, the executive changes the constitution or more informally makes moves to preclude future elections, the case is coded as autocratic.

Specifically, Boix, Miller, and Rosato count a year as democratic when the conditions for contestation and suffrage were met on December 31. As an exception, a year is coded as autocratic if democracy breaks down and democratizes again within that year. This is done to capture the full set of democratic breakdowns. The criterion of December 31 thus has measurement benefits but no theoretical upshot and further installs an arbitrary negligence of democratic elections held in January rather than in December. But it also serves the pragmatic purpose of excluding as democratic years cases where first democratization and then democratic breakdown happened. This could potentially limit the number of democratic breakdowns but it makes sense to ensure that all included democratic breakdowns are more than a short-term fluctuation and exhibit a genuine loss of popular sovereignty (Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2012: 26). Altogether, there is no easy solution to coding years as democratic or not, but Boix, Miller, and Rosato’s existing criterion seems to be reasonable.

I further adopt Boix, Miller, and Rosato’s specification of participation. The criterion ‘popular election’ requires a certain level of suffrage (see Dahl 1989: 225-232). Given the time periods to be analyzed here, suffrage must extend beyond the elite level. If only the politically powerful participate in elections, the regime is an oligarchy rather than a democracy. On the other hand, suffrage demands must be pragmatic so as to capture all countries in all periods which are normally coded as democratic. Considering these issues, the suffrage requirement from the interwar to the present period is 50 % of the male population (Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2012: 10-11). Other scholars (e.g., Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock 2001: 784) argue for requiring universal suffrage, that is, at least 50 % of the adult population, which effectively includes female suffrage. Of course, female suffrage is just as important as male suffrage in democratic theory. However, there is no expectation that stateness should be more or less strongly related to female as opposed to male suffrage. Besides, many countries in the interwar period, which the literature would normally consider as part of the original set of modern democracies or at least as democratic at some point during the interwar period, had not given all women the right to participate in elections.
This was the case with France (granted in 1944), Italy (1945), Belgium (1948), Greece (1952), Switzerland (1971), and Portugal (1976), whereas case analyses such as that on England (1928) would be contorted (Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997: 743-744). Exclusion of the countries without female suffrage would decrease the potential to compare across interwar, Cold War, and Post-Cold War democracies (Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2012: 10-11).

Additionally, there are no particular expectations that stateness would yield different effects on democracies dependent on the suffrage level. That is, whether 20, 50, 70, or 90 % of the population or whether certain demographically defined groups are eligible to participate at elections makes no difference for our expectations of how stateness affects democratic stability. Only whether suffrage rights discriminate between socioeconomic groups would make a difference. Yet, the crucial distinction here is between oligarchical (of the most powerful only) and democratic participation where democracy extended suffrage to poor males. This distinction is effectively captured by the suffrage demand for at least half of the male population (see Przeworski 2009; Ansell and Samuels 2014: 98).

Democratic stability is understood dichotomously as the survival or continuous existence of the democratic regime. Conversely, democratic breakdown occurs when the regime de facto withdraws its contestation or participatory edge as outlined above. In other words, democratic breakdown is the event whereas democratic stability is the non-occurrence of the same event.

As should be clear, my definition of democracy approximates what has been termed ‘electoral democracy’. Arguably, requiring free and fair elections risks excluding some more minimalist democracies that exhibit limited, but significant uncertainty (Møller and Skaaing 2011: 31). However, minimalist democracies may be very hard to distinguish from the class of competitive authoritarian regimes where elections exhibit some uncertainty but are skewed in favour of the incumbent (Levitsky and Way 2010: 13). Indeed, the concept of such a ‘skewed playing field’ is vaguely defined and hard to operationalize. Rather than generally employing a doubtful criterion of ‘genuine competition’ that risks invalidating the classifications as such, it thus seems more appropriate to classify on the basis of electoral democracy, which safely excludes all autocracies. In Chapter 6, I discuss whether to include more democracies than Boix, Miller, and Rosato.

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21 See the discussion of Levitsky and Way’s work by Slater (2011: 387) for an illustration of the difficulty in applying level playing fields via incumbent organizational power to distinguish competitive authoritarian from democratic regimes.
Employing electoral democracy as the baseline concept not only ensures safe exclusion of autocracies; since its requirements are still rather relaxed, it better zooms in on the issue of explaining democratic instability, that is, breakdown, instead of democratic regression, which is the deterioration of democratic institutions (see Schedler 1998). Focusing on democratic stability is important since stabilizing the prevalence of continuous democratic elections is a first and necessary condition for establishing greater democratic quality (Schedler 2001: 68). The argument that countries should abandon democratic elections until they have strengthened their legal institutions and until ‘the people are sufficiently democratic’ may open the door to prolonged dictatorship, and elections may in fact strengthen conditions for democratic development (Lindberg 2006).

Elections are thus not only the sine qua non of a democracy (Schumpeter 2010; see also Svolik 2012: 23-24). Even though one might contend that elections do not matter without civil and political liberties (Dahl 1973), most people living in autocratic settings would also confirm that meaningful elections in themselves matter for a host of preferred outcomes (Hadenius 1992: Ch. 2; Lindberg 2006).

The next chapter lays out the theoretical framework of the study by sketching the paths to democratic stability and breakdown and the role of the state therein. This framework implicitly engages with the distinctions above. My theory and empirical analyses should be relevant for most of the literature on democratic consolidation. Despite the unclarity of what it means to be consolidated, I hold that prolonged democratic stability is a vital step towards it (see Svolik 2008; Slater 2010: 288).

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22 Møller and Skaaning’s (2011: 31) global analysis supports this as it corroborates the existence of a hierarchy of democratic attributes in which the attribute of a free and fair election is more fundamental than the full spectrum of political liberties and rule of law: Any regime exhibiting the full spectrum of political liberties and rule of law also exhibits free and fair elections (and contested elections).

23 This is, however, dependent on the quality and thus credibility of the elections themselves (Elklit 1999).
Chapter 3.
The Role of Stateness for Democratic Stability

[B]reakdown is a result of processes initiated by the government’s incapacity to solve problems for which disloyal oppositions offer themselves as a solution (Linz 1978a: 50).

Seymour Martin Lipset captured the essence of the modernization thesis in his famous notion that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy” (Lipset 1959: 75). In the same article, he also touched upon some democratic requisites, which he termed ‘legitimacy’ and ‘effectiveness’, correlated with but historically contingent factors distinct from economic development. By legitimacy he meant “the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society” whereas effectiveness involved “the actual performance of a political system, the extent to which it satisfies the basic functions of government as defined by the expectations of most members of a society, and the expectations of powerful groups within it which might threaten the system, such as the armed forces” (Lipset 1959: 86). Interestingly, effectiveness in his understanding was marked by “an efficient bureaucracy and decision-making system” (Lipset 1959: 86). In this framework, Lipset (1959: 90-91) believed that democratic breakdowns occur when illegitimate democracies undergo some crisis with which they cannot deal effectively.

This argument is illuminating of the way the distributionist model has theorized and still theorizes in an implicit or crude way about how the effect of economic dynamics on democratic stability is dependent on the state. In Lipset’s argument, there are two related theoretical shortcomings. First, it is unclear why democracies that are illegitimate but effective would be stable and how they become ineffective and thus prone for breakdown. In his empirical examples from the Great Depression, it is underspecified how the generally effective and stable German and Austrian political systems of the 1920s could become so ineffective within a few years in the early 1930s as to cause democratic breakdown (Lipset 1959: 87, 90). Could it be they were ineffective all along and only broke down when crisis hit? Second, whereas le-
Legitimacy stands as the most important prerequisite of democracy and as being sufficient for democratic stability, it is not independent of effectiveness as it should be in a typological argument. Indeed, there seems to be a feedback from ineffectiveness to illegitimacy as marked by the interwar examples. Could it be that under certain conditions poor performance rather than economic development or other prerequisites is what drives the legitimacy of democracies?

This chapter grapples with these puzzles of the distributionist model from the perspective of the state-democracy nexus. I first set the scope of the theoretical framework by discussing the relationship of the state with the distributionist model and presenting an extract of the theory. I then outline an overall process of democratic destabilization comprising different pathways to either stability or breakdown. Next, I propose why, expectedly, each of the three stateness attributes should stabilize democracies, and that, a priori, we have no clear-cut expectations that their importance for democratic stability differs. I am here particularly indebted to Juan Linz’ (1978a) classic essay on democratic breakdowns in interwar Europe and Latin America, which remains a dominant framework of democratization studies at least in smaller-n analyses (see Bermeo 2003; Mainwaring and Pérez-Linan 2013). As the introductory quote tells us, Linz applied Lipset’s argument of the importance of effectiveness and legitimacy for democratic stability but, in my view, in a more thorough and correct manner by specifically relating them as separate weapons in the struggle against socioeconomic challenges to be used by groups of actors and explicitly coupling them with the chances of democratic stability. To better understand the behavior of the groups of actors involved in the destabilization process, I employ social movement theory (Tilly 1978: Ch. 4; Oberschall 1996).

Scope of the theory

Whereas Lipset implicitly grapples with the state, many contemporary modernization theorists either neglect it or deal with it in a much more superficial manner than with their economic variables. This eventually casts doubt on the validity of their conclusions. A source of inspiration for most contemporary modernization theories is Przeworski’s single-authored or collaborative works (1991; 1997; 2000; 2003; 2005). Przeworski (1991: 52-53) sets up a framework of logical possibilities for how new democracies are destined for breakdown or survival depending on the initial level of economic development and the contingent choice of institutions to deal with social conflicts. In outlining the path to democratic stability, the overwhelming focus is on constitutional choice and the creation of socioeconomic and political alliances.
Only in other chapters and later writings does he grapple with the state but in a rather crude fashion noting that the state must be strong but controllable for democracies to survive (see in particular Przeworski 2003).

I build on Lipset’s and Przeworski’s insights but seek to provide a more process-oriented understanding of the way democratic legitimacy and effectiveness interact seeing effectiveness as part of what makes democracy enforceable and trustable. I do this by employing the concept of stateness and linking it with Juan Linz’ (1978a) concepts of performance legitimacy, efficacy, and effectiveness.

My argument is historical institutionalist, which to a certain extent implies that I will fuse structures and actors (see Slater and Simmons 2010). In short, the argument is as follows: The level of economic development crucially structures the chances of democratic stability by determining the number of loyal, semi-loyal, and disloyal forces to democracy. Loyalists are more numerous in democracies with high levels of development, disloyalists are more numerous in low-level developed democracies, and semi-loyalists dominate at the medium level (Linz 1978a: 27-38; Mann 2004: 38; Capoccia 2005: 7; Svolik 2008). My point is that below those very high levels of development where loyalists dominate and democracies are likely consolidated, the risk of breakdown is determined by variations in stateness. Economic development here neither guarantees breakdown nor decisively save democracies. Stateness, alongside other institutional factors, does.

Political actors may either choose the appropriate role and organization of the state in the transition phase from autocracy to democracy thus eventually protecting the democratic system. Alternatively, they take the wrong choice given the type of social conflict that needs to be mediated, enfeeble the credibility of wealth creation and redistribution under democracy, and thus destabilize the system (see Przeworski 1991: 25-88; 2003: 100). My focus, however, is on how political actors are constrained in their access to change institutions, including the state, by prior and initial levels of stateness. Given the particular character of the state, it may, for instance, be difficult to construct the right set of political institutions to deal with social conflicts (O’Dwyer 2006; Slater 2010).

While this historical institutionalist argument is at the core of my theory, I stress that this study is not about the forging of stateness. Nor is it about the qualities of different elite alliances for political questions such as socioeconomic distribution. Rather, it is about the effects of different stateness attributes on the credibility of a given socioeconomic distribution. My thesis is that in low and middle income countries stateness contributes to making sure that the bargaining equilibrium that brought about democracy is enforced and trusted by the parties involved. Whether the rich, the poor, and
the middle classes will continue being net beneficiaries of democratic elections and thus respect the agreement is an open question that cannot be answered with reference to the level of economic development at democracy’s inauguration but must also take into account what conditions the effect of democratic elections on their preference for future democratic elections. Specifically, I argue that the three attributes of stateness – monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, and citizenship agreement - are each vital for the efficacy and effectiveness of the democratic regime in delivering socioeconomically and security-related goods. This is an ‘all else equal’ proposition in the sense that stateness’ positive effect on democratic stability may be undermined when political elites adopt poor policies. But it is equally valid that the right set of policies is no better than the quality of its implementation. My theory of stateness concerns only this last argument.

I outline a common theoretical process capturing four paths or processes toward democratic stability, including three leading to democratic breakdown. The three paths to breakdown concur with three kinds of unconsolidated democratic regimes: low-income countries, that is, countries where there is typically no bargaining equilibrium because democracy, for instance, was installed by democratic ‘zeitgeist’ with a naïve hope that democratic elections would somehow solve for the equilibrium (see Przeworski 1991: 52); medium-income countries where, typically, a bargaining equilibrium was struck but most people only support democracy conditional on its future performance; and one subtype of these medium-level income democracies where an economic boom is present. In all three kinds of unconsolidated regimes, the bargaining equilibrium is fragile.

Economic booms are relevant as they preclude the immediate importance of performance even though it is normally a salient concern. Such cases are, however, relatively rare. New democracies are more frequently hit by economic crisis that tests their ability to deliver socioeconomic benefits and security for the people against angry crowds. These democracies are, in other words, dependent on managing the crisis to bolster their performance legitimacy (Linz 1978a: 50). I propose a bolder version of this argument that most of these democracies need performance legitimacy when they experience either a genuine economic recession or stagnation (including situations with very modest growth rates). This is where extant theories are least helpful because the outcome of these cases can neither be determined by the distribution of loyalists and disloyalists in the system nor by economic fluctuations. Given the fragility of a given bargaining equilibrium, only booming economic growth rates, for instance via favorable oil export conditions, may compensate for the lack of an effective economic state administration.
Yet, even the unconsolidated democracies in an economic boom may break down because absolute political power is always attractive. These democracies may thus succumb to a force – a sitting executive, a state military, or a paramilitary group – that simply takes power because existing institutions are ineffective in dealing with questions of divided rule (see Przeworski 1991: 52-53). Such regimes need a state for containment of these forces.

Whereas the first and third variants of unconsolidated democracy need a state for containment of anti-systemic forces, the second variant needs both containment and crisis management. There are thus three paths to democratic breakdown and two ways by which the state affects the prospects of democratic stability: containment and crisis management. In all three paths, acts of containment and/or crisis management mark the moments when the bargaining equilibrium and thus democracy is enforced and trusted: A strong and legitimate state ensures that those who are disloyal to democracy are contained or conversed, the semi-loyal are convinced of democracy as the better alternative, and the loyal have their initial positive inclinations about democracy confirmed.

The process of democratic destabilization

To understand democratic breakdown, one needs to understand its different types, the process leading to breakdown, and the actors driving this process. First, there are different types of democratic breakdowns (see Linz 1978a: Ch. 4; see also Schedler 1998; Bermeo 2016: 6): 1) military coup d’etat by the state military (for instance, Pinochet’s overthrow of Allende’s democratically elected government in 1973 in Chile) - installation of martial law by the military which becomes permanent is a special case; 2) forceful coup d’etat by paramilitary forces (also known as a putsch, inspired by the unsuccessful Kapp and Beer Hall putsches and the March on Rome in interwar Germany and Italy) – both state military or paramilitary coups d’état may be supported by government or oppositional forces; 3) the sitting executive suspends the parliament and elections (also known as ‘autogolpe’ or incumbent takeover exemplified by Hitler’s takeover in 1933 and Lukashenko’s autocratization of Belarus); 4) bloodless coup whereby the democratically elected government deliberately hands over power to a non-democratic government much like an ‘autogolpe’; 5) civil war with the total breakdown of order and no hope of democratic elections in the near future (a rarer form of which the Spanish Civil War in 1936 is an example).

No matter the type of breakdown, I use the terms ‘coup plotters’ or ‘rebels’ to mark those that carry out the breakdown. As Linz (1978a: 80-86, Ch. 5) holds, these different types of breakdown have consequences for the type
of regime that follows and its stability but they typically essentially stem from the same process, whereby democracy is gradually destabilized, and involve the same three categories of actors. In my framework, democracies may thus break down in a variety of ways, by coup plotters or rebels, but for a more specific set of causes.

To get at these causes, let us first sketch out the actors involved: Following Linz, the most important distinction regards whether they are disloyal, semi-loyal, or loyal towards democracy. These categorizations are not particularly helpful in causal analysis but align well with the three categories of high, medium, and low level economic development and thus with the statism of the framework that I provide here. Disloyalists, semi-loyalists, and loyalists typically, but not always, structure along socioeconomic cleavage lines. Ethnic conflict lines may also be important (see Przeworski 1991: 52; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009), which shows that the bargaining equilibrium is vulnerable to multiple types of conflicts. Any party, movement, or organization can be assessed by its policy demands and ways of pursuing power (Linz 1978a: 27–37). A disloyal group openly or secretly agitates via anti-systemic propaganda to reject democracy as a principle. The attitude can be oriented to the right (fascist, monarchist) or left (communist, anarchist), secessionist (rejecting a democratic principle of majority rule because it disfavors the particular group’s interests). Additionally, disloyal groups often, but not always, use violent means to reach their goals. Note here that these anti-systemic forces can be both progressive and conservative. Thus, the terms ‘extremist’ or ‘radical’ are relative descriptions of the distance in attitude and/or behavior of the group to the current system of democracy.

A semi-loyal group gives only conditional support for democracy. Often, it excuses the actions and attitudes of disloyal groups by reference to some conditions that democracy does not meet, and it may even secretly negotiate with disloyalists. However, it does not write off democracy offhand. These groups are initially neutral towards democracy and therefore, given the costs of rebellion, give it ‘the benefit of the doubt’. A loyal group, however, supports democracy as a principle and thus employs the electoral institutions available. It pursues only its political goals through these channels and with constitutional and non-violent means (for similar distinctions developed for contemporary cases as well, see Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 23).

Other relevant distinctions between actors in processes of democratic destabilization go across the parameter of loyalty to democracy. So, we see disloyalists, semi-loyalists, and loyalists among the elite and masses alike, in government and opposition parties alike, among public and private sector employees, and across socioeconomic and ethnic cleavage lines. For instance, while NSDAP in Weimar Germany broadened its claim by mobilizing
the unemployed and impoverished, considerable support was also drawn among civil servants and the military (Caplan 1988) and the median voters (Bracher 1970: 68) enabled by the conservatism of industrial and agrarian elites (Moore 1966). Similarly, anti-systemic forces in second republic Spain came from Castile, Catalonia, and the Basque, thus crossing strong ethnic boundaries (Payne 2006). Given these complex networks of disloyalists, it seems less fruitless to focus on one or a few groups of actors but rather on the factors that generally motivate and enable anti-democratic movements (Ertman 1998; see also Oberschall 1996: 94).
Figure 3.1: The process of destabilization in a given democracy

1. High level of economic development
   - Yes: Democratic stability
   - No: Medium level of economic development

2. Medium level of economic development
   - Yes: Economic boom
     - Yes: Mass or elite dissatisfaction
       - Yes: Mass or elite mobilization
         - Nature: Attempt at overthrowing democracy
           - Nature: Democratic stability
             - C: Nature
             - C: Attempt at overthrowing democracy
               - Nature: Democratic stability
                 - C: Democratic stability
                 - C: Democratic breakdown
               - Nature: Democratic breakdown
             - Nature: Democratic breakdown
           - Nature: Democratic stability
             - C: Nature
             - C: Attempt at overthrowing democracy
               - Nature: Democratic stability
                 - C: Democratic stability
                 - C: Democratic breakdown
               - Nature: Democratic breakdown
         - Nature: Democratic breakdown
   - Yes: Attempt at overthrowing democracy
     - Nature: Democratic stability
       - C: Nature
       - C: Attempt at overthrowing democracy
         - Nature: Democratic stability
           - C: Democratic stability
           - C: Democratic breakdown
         - Nature: Democratic breakdown
   - Nature: Democratic breakdown

3. Democratic stability
   - Yes: Nature
   - No: Democratic breakdown

4. Democratic breakdown
   - Yes: Nature
   - No: Nature
The point about distinguishing between these groups of varying loyalty to democracy is that a connection between these actors’ preferences and the level of economic development is easily conceivable – with high levels corresponding to a majority of loyalists, medium levels to a majority of semi-loyalists, and low levels to a majority of disloyalists. This allows us to combine a static framework based on economic variables with a dynamic process of democratic destabilization when disloyal, semi-loyal, and loyal groups interact. Figure 3.1 illustrates such a typical process of democratic destabilization over time. It is an overview of how democratic destabilization occurs and how stateness intervenes.

Going through this in a chronological fashion, we may initially put aside democracies with a high level of economic development. Here, loyalists likely dominate, and democracy is likely consolidated. As indicated, I am not interested in these democracies. Instead, the relevant cases are among democracies with medium or low levels of economic development. They are likely unconsolidated democracies and come in two types where either disloyalists (low level development) or semi-loyalists dominate (medium level development). These basic categorizations are relatively uncontroversial as they mirror the premise of modernization theory that the attitude of a social group or class towards political rights and civil liberties, including the system of democratic rule as such, is determined by income (see Przeworski 2005; Inglehart and Welzel 2010). The Linzean actor categories merely mark a broader view on attitudes to democracy as co-determined by national identity and a sense of community within the state of that democracy.

Democracies where semi-loyalists dominate, given the weak legitimacy of their rule as a principle, must hinge on performance for surviving. Performance legitimacy basically involves support given to a system based on the performance of that system. It is typically defined as the ability to create socioeconomic development, including coping with socioeconomic crises and the security issues stemming from them. For instance, scholars have analyzed the fate of new democracies and patterns of electoral volatility and participation in the ‘old democracies’, relying on socioeconomic performance (Gilley 2006; Rothstein 2011). I follow this operationalization and define performance legitimacy as the popular legitimacy derived from handling actual socioeconomic and security-related problems that the citizenry finds salient (see Linz 1978a: 19). Problems of socioeconomic development and distribution as well as security are arguably the most basic concerns for both masses and elites (Gilley 2006). In other words, when semi-loyalists dominate, the performance of democracies in terms of socioeconomic development and distribution and security is a salient issue.
The dynamics of this saliency are challenging for the distributionist model. Performance legitimacy does not necessarily stem from actual performance; it may also stem from perceived performance (Rothstein and Teorell 2008: 175-176). In any case, performance legitimacy concerns the belief that the democratically elected representatives are accountable to their performance. Thus, despite clouds in the present, the future is bright in terms of performance (Svolik 2013). That democracy is an infinite game of repeated elections corresponds well with the basic idea of the distributionist model, but the importance of performance legitimacy challenges the model. Performance means what is done, what has been done, or what can credibly be done by the politicians. This cannot be inferred from the status of the economy at democracy’s inauguration. When crises shake the foundations of a prospering economy, politicians must demonstrate, via actual or promised future performance, their ability to manage these crises (Takenaka 2014: 37-39).

Given that democracy has increasingly been accepted as the only legitimate form of rule around the world through the 20th century (Fukuyama 1992; see also the analysis of waves of democratization by Møller and Skan-ning 2013: Ch. 5), the cases of semi-loyalist democracy have likely increased in number relative to disloyalist cases. Performance legitimacy is therefore probably salient in most of the unconsolidated democracies. Compared to autocracies, democracies have the advantage that they are based on a more legitimate form of rule. Nonetheless, cross-regional surveys have shown that in both old and new democracies, the most important form of legitimacy is not related to democracy as a principle but to performance, that is, the ability of the state to deliver public goods such as economic growth, redistribution, and security (Gilley 2006; Chu et al. 2008). Many democracies break down under the strains of severe economic crises, but there are also crisis-ridden democracies where people, every day and often unconsciously, refrain from violence and instead pin their hopes on the future, either based on a government policy reform or the possibility of voting the government out in the next election.

The process of destabilization in democracies relying on performance follows either of the two right-hand paths in Figure 3.1. Starting with the far-right path, democratic breakdown is usually preceded by a period of destabilization (gradually over some decades or quickly and dramatically over less than a year) because these democracies are faced with one or more crises (Linz 1978a: 50-56).

In Linz’ understanding, the concept of crisis is multifaceted. Crises can be social, spurred by the way democratic elections bring new people to power and open up new cleavage lines, as is well known from the European democ-
ratizations and constitutional crises and reform from 1848 through World War I (see e.g. Przeworski 2009). Crises can also come as economic recessions, as in Allende’s Chile or Albania in the mid-1990s, or purely political problems of government formation or instability, exemplified by Weimar Germany or post-WWII Italy. Crises or economic recessions may be driven by international forces, a so-called ‘black knight’ set on destabilizing the government or system as such (Levitsky and Way 2010; Tolstrup 2014) and they may start out rather small but then grow. They may be exogenous or endogenous to the regime itself. For instance, global economic recessions that spill over to a democracy are beyond the control of the regime, whereas others are almost entirely products of it. Finally, recessions may or may not erupt in violence. The Venezuelan contention from 1983 to 1999 with significant shares of conventional, confrontational, and violent protests and a comparison of economic crises in the 1930s shows the heterogeneity of this phase (Bermeo 2003; Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 52).

I focus on crises as remaining or emerging economic growth problems. As notably the Great Depression and the recent Great Recession from 2008 exemplify, economic recession or stagnation is a fruitful operationalization of crisis in my framework. Recessions may cause numerous other crises related to the consequences of unemployment or inflation (or both): Socially, they often bring new people to power and enrich at the expense of others who become relatively deprived. Politically, they change voting patterns and may thus cause party systemic upheavals and government instability (Bermeo 2003). In new democracies, the same dynamics are expectedly seen under stagnant economic conditions. Any bargaining equilibrium, involving the promise of a certain socioeconomic distribution, is hardly realized from day one of democracy’s inauguration. If the economy stagnates, people’s expectations thus eventually outrun the speed of socioeconomic reform, all else equal (see Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2003).

The process of destabilization likely follows this pattern: Mass or elite dissatisfaction arises because democracy does not seem to be better at delivering economic results than the preceding autocracy (Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2003). This dissatisfaction can draw on pre-democratic grievances but the key point is that the economic situation is responsible for bringing these grievances to the ‘public theater’, as an articulated dissatisfaction with current regime performance. At this point, there is no unified claim or homogenous movement, only individuals with individual problems confronting the regime in scattered and often case-oriented demonstrations or agitations (Oberschall 1996: 94). These groups of people, often initially semi-loyalists, have no solution to the problems but merely act to point them out.
They see the solution as being in the hands of their representatives in parliament and government.

What is then important is the regime’s capacity to manage the economy, what I term ‘crisis management’ (CM). This typically leads to ‘reequilibration’ in which, for instance, specific policies are changed to battle socioeconomic problems and public disorder, a new and seemingly more stable or inclusionary government is installed, or institutions are altered (see Linz 1978a: Ch. 5). In the case of successful crisis management, democracy stabilizes. But since perceived performance might suffice, actual reequilibration may not be necessary – merely the expectation that the regime will reequilibrate in the near future.

If actual or perceived reequilibration does not occur, however, the next phases only escalate the levels of conflict. First, the mass or elite dissatisfaction likely develops into genuinely anti-systemic mobilization. This involves the crystallization of new or reintegration of old undemocratic movements. Their goals vary depending on the particular nature of grievances. Totalitarianism is arguably the most radical goal in any case but beyond the interwar period, alternatives have usually been much more modest yet still fundamentally undemocratic. To name but a few, prevalent alternatives have been military dictatorship (to provide temporary order which may, however, become permanent) (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014), economic authoritarianism (as exemplified by some Southeast Asian economies, see Slater 2010), and competitive authoritarianism (whereby the autocrat gains stricter control but keeps an illusion of functioning democracy, see Levitsky and Way 2010). Less radically, there may be a wish to replace the democratically elected government by force to call for an early election (Powell and Thyne 2011: 250).

At this point, both strategies of crisis management and containment (C) are needed, since the government not only faces grievances but also actual anti-systemic movements that deliberately try to create public disorder and rally more members to their cause. This is the destructive, violent side of social movements (Tilly 1978: Ch. 6). To put it in a different terminology, the motivations of the movements as well as their opportunities to disturb public order and breed anti-systemic forces must be addressed (Tilly 1978: Ch. 4; Gleditsch, Hegre, and Strand 2009). Democratic stability is the outcome if crisis management and containment is exercised (see Capoccia 2005).

The weakness of either crisis management or containment leads to further increases in grievance and conflict levels. The previous passiveness or inability of the regime is at this point likely perceived as a weakness of the regime that lowers the cost of rebellion (Fearon and Laitin 2003). In turn, some parts of the anti-systemic movements, which are likely among the most
crisis-stricken strata with leadership qualities and skills in the use of violence (Linz 1978a: 56), attempt an overthrow of democracy.

As indicated, democracy may then end in five ways. It may be by a paramilitary coup d’état, but most attempted coups involve an alliance between the military and other elites within the state apparatus (Powell and Thyne 2011: 252). Such attempts may fail if the incumbents manage to fight the paramilitaries or regain the control and loyalty of the military or its plotting factions. In Spain in 1981, six years after the transition to democracy, 200 armed Civil Guard officers burst into the Spanish Congress of Deputies and held the parliament hostage in protest against the government’s anti-Francoist course. The siege only lasted 18 hours as it was only supported by a minority of the security apparatus (Fishman 1990: 430). In the Philippines in 1989, thousands of officers loyal to former president Ferdinand Marcos occupied airbases and public institutions, and the incumbent government only regained control with the support of US air force (Kebschull 1994: 571-572).

Similarly, martial law provisions do not always become permanent as, for instance, attempts to withdraw crucial electoral institutions via constitutional amendments may be hindered by arrests of the plotters or containment of the elements that cause public disorder. Closely related, popular movements may become as violent as to threaten first the incumbent government and then the constitutional order by causing chaos and a civil war-like situation. Such events may also be hindered as they were in Ukraine in the spring of 2014 with the help of security forces. However, if any of these attempts succeed, they cause democratic breakdown.

Moving on to the middle-path in Figure 3.1, we have some more extraordinary cases where an economic boom occurs. Indeed, new democracies may also experience an economic boost, which makes them more likely to survive (Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2003). However, a small group of coup plotters may still try to install dictatorship out of pure self-interest, because they perceive their specific share of the bargaining equilibrium to be unfair, or for a variety of other reasons related to institutional insufficiencies. Similarly, rebellions may rise independently of the economy but be exclusively politically or socially motivated. Hitler’s Beer Hall Putsch to end the republic, which he believed enfeebled the German political system, is an example of a coup attempt that was not motivated by economic recession. The democratic breakdown and inception of violence following the inability to find a political solution to the ethnic disputes between Sinhalese, Tamil, and Muslim communities in Sri Lanka in 1977 is another example. Military juntas in Sub-Saharan Africa such as those in Nigeria exemplify political motivations that gradually become self-involved.
The far-left path in Figure 3.1 illustrates the process of democratic destabilization when, initially, disloyalists dominate. Performance legitimacy here cannot save democracy because the issue of performance is simply not salient. The majority of people discard democracy *tout court*. Just as the semi-loyalist democracies, a disloyalist democracy is puzzling to the distributionist model as it may be hard to observe any bargaining equilibrium at any point during its lifetime. More likely, disloyalist democracies were installed without a bargaining equilibrium. This counters the most deterministic version of the distributionist model, which precludes the installation of democracy in the first place in countries with low levels of economic development. But democracies do rise in poor countries. Notable examples include democracies inaugurated on the basis of a ‘zeitgeist’, which was a global phenomenon immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall and arguably also for a few years after WWI (Overy 1994). Democracy has sometimes been inaugurated by foreign decree or at least via considerable foreign pressure without heartfelt democratic demand in the domestic sphere, for example some third-wave democratizations in Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa (Levitsky and Way 2010). Otherwise, democracies, typical of post-colonial settings in the 1960s (Huntington 1968; Jackson and Rosberg 1982) and in Eastern Europe after WWI (Rothschild 1974), have been installed by a coalition that temporarily gained enough political power to force through a democratic election.

These disloyalist democracies are most prone to breakdown. Predemocratic cleavages related to class conflict (Rokkan 1975) or ethnic exclusion (Wimmer 2013) likely still structure politics. These cleavages heavily enfeeble any bargaining equilibrium. Hence, these democracies have very limited support bases and are accordingly attacked from multiple fronts. The process of democratic destabilization in these regimes likely involves attempts by disloyalists to overthrow democracy immediately after its inauguration. For democracy to survive here, it must be able to contain (C) coup plotters and rebels. If not, democracy is very likely to break down, but even if containment is successful, democracy is probably only a temporary state prone to future coup attempts or rebellions.

As containment and crisis management succeed, the number of coup attempts and rebellions likely decrease. Successful containment and crisis management raise the perceived costs of rebellion because potential coup plotters and rebels are better off economically and security-wise under democracy (see Kebschull 1994: 570; see also Tilly 1978: Ch. 4).

Figure 3.1 demonstrates that the process is general across types of breakdown and may be driven by any group of actors, most likely a configuration of many different actors. Three routes to breakdown embody these traits: either 1) non-salience of performance legitimacy → attempt → breakdown; 2)
salience of performance legitimacy → economic boom → attempt → breakdown, or 3) no economic boom → dissatisfaction → mobilization → attempt → breakdown. However, as we are about to see, these paths are sometimes interrupted by successful containment and/or crisis management in turn enabled by stateness.

The basic proposition

What is the role of stateness in the process of democratic destabilization and, eventually, for the likelihood of breakdown? Before appreciating any disaggregated effects, I first propose that the three attributes of stateness are fundamentally alike in their effects on democratic stability because weak stateness in all three variants weakens the regime’s efficacy and effectiveness in managing crises and containing anti-systemic movements. Weak stateness motivates anti-systemic movements and provides an opportunity for them to challenge democracy (Tilly 2007: 16-20).24

To probe the general effect of stateness, the two concepts of efficacy and effectiveness (Linz 1978a: 20-22) are helpful. Efficacy refers to the regime’s capacity to formulate policies that solve the basic problems associated with the economy and security. Effectiveness refers to the capacity to actually implement the formulated policies with the desired results. We saw in Figure 3.1 that democratic breakdowns cannot be explained without reference to the ability to manage crises and contain anti-systemic forces. But efficacy and effectiveness are vital for crisis management and containment. If either efficacy or effectiveness is weak, both crisis management and containment are likely to be weak. This is not surprising given the nature of these tasks: As indicated, neither containment nor crisis management strategies are better than their specific content and the degree to which they are implemented. Importantly, if we only referred to theories of economic development, we would be assuming efficacy and effectiveness and thus crisis management and containment. However, Figure 3.1 shows that this is far from tenable.

The question is then to what degree stateness furthers the efficacy and effectiveness of democratic regimes. I will start with the attribute of monopoly on violence, proceed to administrative effectiveness and finally citizenship agreement.

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24 Whereas motivation can be conceived of as rising from grievances, an opportunity for a social movement can be defined as the combined capacity of collective action (the means at disposal to reach a specified end) as constrained by the political opportunity structure (determines what can be done with the means available) (Oberschall 1996: 94).
Monopoly on violence

For a democracy to function, it must have the ability to carry out general law enforcement throughout its territory. Although the military and police have often not been friends of democracy, a coercive apparatus is necessary to fight crime and uphold civic order, including deterrence of electoral unrest and violence and guaranteeing stable electoral processes more generally. Only the security forces of the state can dissolve violent demonstrations and confrontations and arrest and safely detain anti-democratic forces and coup plotters. Only police intelligence can pick up rumors of coups in due time.

Pure containment is not the only likely effect of monopoly on violence. In situations of social unrest, a disputed monopoly on violence means that conflicts are more likely to spin out of control and criminality more likely to thrive. In turn, this may undermine the legitimacy of democratic regimes, incite rebellion, and strengthen democracy’s opponents in planning and realizing plots and coup attempts (Dahl 1989: 47; Tilly 2007: 16-18). When chaos and public disorder are real or perceived, democracy may succumb to a ‘strongman syndrome’, i.e. political pressure from public or elite demands for an ordered, less scattered, and thus in practice often dictatorial, leadership to reinstall peace. This syndrome has been a recurring phenomenon in, for instance, Russian (Tismaneanu and Turner 1995) and Latin American politics (Valenzuela 1990). Therefore, there is a vital component of crisis management and thus of performance legitimation to the acts of security forces during processes of democratic destabilization.

On the other hand, state repression can be a catalyst for further mobilization to anti-systemic movements. Such movements often use acts of state containment to build a narrative of how the state commits atrocities (Linz 1978a: 58-61) since social movements feed on antagonisms and enemy images (see Oberschall 1996). The professionalism and hierarchical systems of military and police forces, associated with strong monopoly on violence, likely help the intelligence response to this trade-off between immediate and long-term threats. In democracies where security forces are factionalized, individual security agents are less restrained and are thus more likely to commit atrocities (Mitchell 2004).

An additional complication rises because the security forces are by nature capable of thwarting democracy by initiating coups d’état. The subordination to civilian rule is a separate dimension of influence in this regard – also for the effective dissemination of political executive orders and peaceful deliberation of containment strategies (Nordlinger 1977: 64-76; Stepan 1988: 68, 92-93).
In sum, monopoly on violence not only captures the regime’s ability to contain anti-systemic forces but also the ability to legitimize itself during crises via provision of public order and security. This is not only through pure implementation force but also via formulating intelligent strategies to combat the risk of further antagonization. That is, monopoly on violence furthers both efficacy and effectiveness, which then, in combination, further crisis management and containment.

Administrative effectiveness

Despite the virtues of a monopoly on violence, security is insufficient to satisfy people’s needs. They also want the regime to deliver economic growth and administer rules of economic distribution impartially. Especially in new and poor democracies, lack of performance legitimacy may lead to democratic breakdown by spurring frustration at both the elite and mass levels and thereby increase the incentives for coup attempts and popular uprisings (Suleiman 2003; Fjelde and De Soysa 2009). The fate of democratic regimes, especially unconsolidated, poor, crisis-ridden democracies, is therefore generally dependent on effective administrations (Linz 1978a: 14-15, 41; Rothstein 2011; Cho et al. 2013). Effective administration based on meritocratic recruitment, responsiveness, and territorial penetration better secure crisis management because the social hardships of economic crises are alleviated to a greater extent. This reflects upon the government and the political regime as such by ingraining it with performance legitimacy. The effect of administrative effectiveness works in three ways.

First, competence and professional autonomy are obviously important given the social and economic complexities that follow from economic management, including notably during outright economic crises. The administration thus comes into play because during crises the politicians enhance their interaction with bureaucrats to seek their advice. The competence and autonomy of civil servants are then relevant for presentation of suitable solutions and information to the political leadership, including those that run counter to leading political interests inside and outside government. As is known from studies of developmental states in East Asia and South America (e.g. Evans 1995; Grindle 1996: 11; Haggard 2004) and of developed countries as well (e.g. Weiss 1998), meritocratically recruited bureaucratic elites are often crucial, indeed sometimes sidelining politically elected officials and powerful interest groups, for the short-term growth induction and long-term strategies of economic reform and development when economic strains occur. But if civil servants are selected for political or nepotistic reasons, full information of the extent and type of crisis as well as the suitable solution often does not reach decision-makers. One may even see predatory behavior by
bureaucrats seeking to save their private economy instead of serving public interests (Evans 1995). In sum, competence and autonomy favor more prudent – timely and appropriate - policies. ‘Prudence’ is here a relativistic notion since what is perceived as suitable solutions changes from crisis to crisis and economy to economy (see Katzenstein 1985: 21; Gourevitch 1986). Yet, the appropriateness and timing of policies is in any case preconditioned on the quality of information on the crisis and alternative solutions to it.

Second, efficiency is important for the swift implementation of crisis policies in a disciplined fashion. Swiftness is central because, for instance, cyclical unemployment must be combatted before it turns into long-term unemployment, and it is crucial for the deliverance of food, clothes, and shelter to the needy. As examples, such measures were seen to a greater extent in the Scandinavian and Northwestern European countries and eventually in the US than in other European cases during the Great Depression (Skocpol and Finegold 1982; Rothstein 2011: Ch. 6). The discipline of implementation is often closely intertwined with swiftness. Disciplined implementation marks the use of the fewest resources needed for a given task. Whereas meritocracy, responsiveness, and territorial penetration all favor efficiency and thus discipline and swiftness in crisis management, patrimonialism often nurtures the opposite factors such as corruption and clientelism which delay implementation. For instance, the Southern European countries Greece and Italy have had difficulties dealing with the Great Recession in a disciplined and swift manner because of corruption and clientelism (Fukuyama 2013: 5-6). Corruption and clientelism also generally tend to delay public service delivery and tax extraction and thus enlarge budget deficits (Haggard and Webb 1993: 150-152; Fukuyama 2013: 5-6).

Third, civil servants are more likely capable of and willing to implement crisis-measures impartially when they are recruited without adherence to their social status or political affiliation. Impartiality of civil servants is a particularly important quality during crises because it tends to protect the poorest and those most severely hit by crises from power abuse by the elites. When crises hit, the overall amount of resources available decreases, which means that elite exploitation of the lower classes becomes more likely (Przeworski 2005: 265). Specifically, impartiality prevents breaches of the equal treatment of equal cases when a certain crisis measure is to be implemented (Rothstein and Stolle 2008: 445; Rothstein and Teorell 2008; Lapuente and Rothstein 2014). Apart from the abstention from uncritical and biased implementation of policies, impartiality hinges on bureaucratic autonomy from societal forces. In the process of policy-making in a time of economic crisis, such autonomy hinders nepotism, bribing, and favoritism. In this way, meritocratic state administrations were instrumental in forging cross-class com-
promises on welfare benefits and systems of redistribution in the 1930s’ Western Europe (Rothstein 2011: Ch. 6). By contrast, in Latin America and elsewhere with much more widespread politicization of the state administration, polarization and inequality-inducing solutions to crises are recurring (O’Donnell 1973, 1999; Lapuente and Rothstein 2014).

Whereas the monopoly on violence affects elites via containment and masses via legitimation, one might term this performance legitimation of administrative effectiveness a mass-level effect. Yet, administrative effectiveness likely also affects the elite level. As indicated by Cornell and Lapuente (2014), democracy has fluctuated according to the impartiality of the administration. When state administrations are politicized, which means that the majority of high-level civil servants are replaced when government powers shift, a dangerous game of centrifugal party politics starts in which the opposition and incumbents are increasingly antagonized because the courts and judicial civil service engages in heavily biased and even unlawful applications of the law. This results in increased polarization between governments and oppositions or what has been termed ‘centrifugal politics’ (see Sartori 1976).

In less institutionalized democracies, centrifugal politics may outright threaten democracy. Opposition groups may not trust that the regime’s future performance will provide them the benefits they need — neither in terms of socioeconomic benefits or an impartially administered rule of law. They may take preemptive actions, such as military coups, to remove the incumbents from office (see also Cornell and Grimes 2015). Interestingly, this is a reaction to actual or perceived regime performance, which alters the initial calculation of future benefits from democratic elections. Thus, again, we see that weak stateness threatens the credibility of the bargaining equilibrium via deterioration of efficacy and effectiveness.

Citizenship agreement

Regarding citizenship agreement, one may also distinguish between a mass- and an elite-level effect on democratic stability. Whereas the mass-level effect hinges on the effectiveness, the elite-level effect hinges on the efficacy of crisis management and containment. At the mass-level, citizenship disputes increase the level of violence. Citizenship disagreements typically arise in so-called ‘oversized’ states with high ethnic diversity. Such disagreements are often so fundamental that they pose a severe threat to the very order of society within the boundaries of the states (Song 2012). Ethnic identity is fundamental to human beings and gives them a sense of belonging (Baumeister and Leary 1995), and ethnic strife is typically very violent (Huntington 1996:...
Ch.10). States disintegrate, erupt in civil war, or split into different territories. How does this relate to crisis management and containment?

The need for and difficulty of containment obviously increase sharply when citizens engage in disputes over ethnic identity because this often leads to xenophobic, intolerant, and sectarian violence that can initiate a vicious circle of revenge attacks. One can only note the recent horrors of the Central African Republic and the numerous historical cases of such circles of violence in Rwanda, Congo, Nigeria, and Mali. This may radicalize ethnic groups to rebel or take action in a coup attempt to install ‘ethnocracy’ in which one or a few ethnic groups rule over others. Alternatively or in reaction to this coup attempt, the state military may initiate a coup to reinstall public order. Such events occur even during economic booms. Citizenship disagreement can also necessitate and complicate containment in crisis-ridden democracies where performance legitimacy is salient. This is because semi-loyalists and disloyalists may become motivated for coup attempts to install greater fairness of socioeconomic goods across ethnic divides.

The connection between citizenship disagreement and crisis management is arguably less direct as crisis management is mediated by prior patterns of socioeconomic inequality between the ethnic groups (Easterly and Levine 1997). The important thing to note is that any political regime reflects a particular distribution of power, responsibilities, rights, and resources between the different population groups. Citizenship disagreements therefore increase the incentives to mobilize attached to socioeconomic policies (Jensen and Skaaning 2014). In other words, they decrease the effectiveness of crisis management because, all else equal, it is harder to convince previously excluded ethnic groups of the fruits of the crisis management. At some point, secessionist groups may try to break out of the state resulting in civil war or, as a counter-reaction, military factions or other forces wary of the public disorder may opt for a coup d’état (Linz and Stepan 1996: 17; Wimmer 2013: 33).

At the elite level, citizenship disputes affect the efficacy of the democratic regime. As we know from the literature on ethnic exclusivist regimes and their politics (Horowitz 1985; Wimmer 2013), citizenship disputes can enfeeble parliamentary politics because the costs of cooperation, particularly compromise on socioeconomic distributions, are heightened. Parties representing different ethnic groups are likely to diverge on the distribution of goods between the territorial units of the state and between themselves. By contrast, citizenship agreement likely makes people accept mutual dependency and communion around political problems (Giddens 1987: 204; Easterly and Levine 1997). Citizenship disagreements therefore contribute considerably to centrifugal tendencies in the party system – indeed, they might
drive them up, which was exemplified in interwar Czechoslovakia and Poland (Kopstein and Wittenberg 2010). This makes unitary and determined efforts at containment and crisis management by the parliament less likely and may cause dispute between opposition and government (Smooha 2002), in turn driving dissatisfaction, mobilization, and attempts at overthrow alike. If this process does not end in civil war, a political ‘solution’ is particularly likely whereby a strong unifying, charismatic figure dissolves the parliament and installs a military dictatorship or a revolutionary government. In Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, grievances stemming from the ethnic mixtures were often the background of poorly functioning governments that were overthrown by personalist dictators (Jackson and Rosberg 1982).

The main hypothesis

To sum up, high degrees of monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, and citizenship agreement help to stabilize democracies because they strengthen efforts of containment and crisis management. All attributes set in motion the forces of efficacy and effectiveness, which results in strategies of containment and/or crisis management that affect the ‘nature’ conditions in Figure 3.1. This in turn determines the propensity for anti-systemic forces to mobilize, attempt, and succeed in democratic breakdown.

In terms of the distributionist model of democracy, a strong and legitimate state ‘endogenizes’ the bargaining equilibrium to democracy itself. That is, stateness is the condition that enforces the bargaining equilibrium and improves the perception (or actual performance) of democracy and thus the credibility of the equilibrium in the eyes of the poor, the rich, and the middle classes. Stateness in turn increases the costs of rebellion to a point where rebellion is perceived as too costly. The main hypothesis of the study is therefore that all three stateness attributes stabilize democracy.

_Hypothesis 1: High levels of monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, and citizenship agreement decrease the probability of democratic breakdown_

The hypothesis not only concerns a specific co-variation between stateness and democratic stability but also particular mechanisms connecting them. In Chapter 4, I specify observable implications of the hypothesis related to the phases in the process of democratic destabilization as stipulated in Figure 3.1.
But we first need to ask what kind of co-variation between stateness and democratic stability vindicates such a hypothesis. The hypothesis implies that countries with weak stateness have lower chances of democratic stability than countries with strong stateness. This proposition should also hold within countries. In a within-case analysis, a typical case of my theory would thus experience democratic breakdown from a position of weak stateness but if it gradually develops stateness, democracy would remain stable. But the theory is of course not deterministic. Some democracies likely survive despite weak stateness while some break down amidst strong stateness. But if these cases are too numerous, stateness does not seem to be a strong explanation of democratic stability.

Theoretical differentiation?

It is likely wrong to assume that all three attributes of stateness are equally important for democratic stability. First of all, my conceptual analysis of stateness implies that the relationship between each of the stateness attributes and democratic stability needs to be theorized separately. The main weakness of the literature referred to in Table 2.1 is not the conceptual disagreement per se, but rather that previous studies tend to bundle distinct aspects pertaining to the state that are likely to have different effects, notably on democracy (see Munck 1996; Goertz 2006: 242-243; Mazzuca 2010: 336). This is neatly illustrated by the way Bratton and Chang analyze the relationship between stateness and democracy. They examine the disaggregated effects of stateness (includes all three attributes in Table 2.1) on democracy and conclude that stateness is a necessary condition for democracy: “democratization requires a set of state structures that enforce law and order, respect human rights, respond to popular demands, govern by constitutional means, and control official corruption” (Bratton and Chang 2006: 1076-1077). However, this conclusion sheds light neither on the interrelationships between the constitutive attributes of stateness nor on their separate relationship with democracy.

Another example is Linz and Stepan’s (1996: Ch. 21) analysis of democratic consolidation in Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe, which is unclear on the independent effects of citizenship agreement from state capacity. The same can be said of Migdal’s (2009: 164-165) analytical framework for studying the state in Sub-Saharan Africa, whereas studies of democratic breakdowns in the interwar years often employ crude conceptualizations of the state (e.g., Aarebrot and Berglund 1995; Skaaning 2011) or do not theoretically connect their explanatory variables to features of the state (e.g., Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 1994).
The explanatory power of some factor is a weighing of its regularity with a dependent variable in a ‘controlled’ context (all else equal in terms of potential confounders) (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994: Ch. 3) against the number and power of factors that may substitute for its effect (Braumoeller and Goertz 2000). I argue that a priori the result of such a theoretical weighing does not give any clear ranking of the three attributes. I consider three issues related to the weighing: a particular type of outcome selection bias; the regularity or covariation between each attribute and democratic stability, including the number and strength of substitutes for the effect of each attribute; and the interrelationships between the attributes.

First, the empirical reality may itself determine the importance of the three stateness attributes in the sense that some types of democratic breakdown may appear more frequently than other types and that these types are also more frequently associated with one stateness attribute over the others. If this was the case, we would base our conclusions on specific types of democratic breakdowns instead of the given stateness attribute. I contend, however, that all three stateness attributes could be associated with any of the five types of democratic breakdown (state military coup d’état, paramilitary coup d’état, incumbent takeover, bloodless coup, or civil war). The core feature in the process of democratic destabilization is a very general regime dynamic, namely that weak stateness, whether in the case of a disputed monopoly on violence, administrative ineffectiveness, or citizenship disagreement, reduces the chances of successful containment and crisis management. This induces conflict but without preselecting a clear winner in the struggles for political power. More generally, one may argue that other, probably more contingent, factors explain why the opposition or incumbents win (by succeeding in a coup d’état) or why their conflict is unsettled and leads to civil war. What all three stateness attributes structure, however, is whether regime stabilizers or disturbers come out strongest. In effect, it treats any resulting ‘outcome selection bias’ as endogenous to the effect of the attributes.

One example of ‘outcome selection bias’ deserves particular mentioning. State military coups d’état, one of the most frequent kinds of democratic breakdown, will probably tend to be most strongly associated with a disputed monopoly on violence, in particular related to civil-military conflicts. There is, however, no automatic connection between a general pattern of military and police autonomy regarding their organizational powers and their decision to stage a coup or make martial law permanent even though such autonomy certainly increases the risk of such events (Johnson, Slater, and McGowan 1984: 634; Collier and Hoeffler 2007). Since coup attempts are always risky, it is much more radical for the security forces to try to take
power violently or suspend the legitimate government than to complain or obstruct reforms of their organizational power structures. Thus, a coup may not be attempted even though it could have been successful (O’Kane 1981: 288). Conversely, there is no necessary connection between a prior pattern of subordination and the protection of the democratic regime in a given political, social, or economic crisis. The relationship between security autonomy, in my understanding, and state military coups d’état is thus more varied and dynamic than it would seem at first sight (see also Stepan 1988: Chs. 6-7; Collier and Hoeffler 2007). We have good reasons to reject that subordination be either necessary or sufficient for democratic stability.

Second, regarding regularity it would at first seem likely that administrative effectiveness is the most stabilizing attribute followed by citizenship agreement and lastly monopoly on violence. Monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness stabilize democratic stability in parallel ways via performance legitimacy in security and socioeconomic matters, respectively. Yet, exclusive reliance on security forces to maintain order in the face of recurrent challenges likely chips away at the legitimacy of the democratic regime, especially where extrajudicial means are regularly employed. While a state monopoly on violence held by the military and police is vital for public order and crime fighting, including the containment of anti-systemic forces, such a monopoly can thus be too strong. In the absence of societal forces to control the state powers, repression and thus popular delegitimation and destabilization of democracy will be a likely result (Fukuyama 2005; Davenport 2007).

On the contrary, administrative effectiveness provides democracy with a much more comprehensive performance legitimacy regarding socioeconomic development, which is also more viable because it does not hinge on the use of violent means. The legitimacy that rises from administrative effectiveness would in fact diminish the need for public order provision by security forces. This is also the case with citizenship agreement since it creates a foundation for basic trust between different ethnic groups that strengthens the prospects of public order, functioning parliamentary politics, and peaceful societal relations during socioeconomic conflict.

Administrative effectiveness further contrasts with citizenship agreement in being harder to replace in the creation of the legitimacy of democracy. It should first be noted that both administrative ineffectiveness and citizenship disputes seem to exist quite often alongside democratic rule. Some of the most notable and classic examples of citizenship disagreement (in Spain between Catalans/Basques and Castile and Belgium between the French- and Dutch-speaking parts) (Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011: 5) have had stable and rather well-functioning democratic governments for decades – indeed, in
Belgium without democratic breakdowns. Given that citizenship disputes at the mass and elite levels have never disappeared, the strength of Belgium’s and Spain’s state nations seems to have been overestimated and the stability of their democracies underestimated.

Substitutes for citizenship agreement are numerous and powerful. Citizenship agreement may partly be substituted for by an institutionalized and competitive party system that balances the inclusion and expulsion of extremist forces into the mainstream political system while distributing the economic, social, and political goods of society to the relevant population groups in a fair manner (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Moreover, citizenship disputes may partly be substituted by administrative effectiveness. Ethnically fractionalized countries are less likely to experience open ethnic conflict if the civil administration is meritocratic and responsive to any government decisions (Horowitz 1985: 224, 457; Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999). Groups in the population may disagree on fundamental identity issues and not have a sense of belonging to the larger national community or the state, but these disputes will be less salient if democracy processes their demands fairly and delivers public goods (Norris 2011: Ch. 10).

Whereas there are possible substitutes for citizenship agreement, there is little that states can do to overcome deficits in administrative effectiveness and its corrosive effect on democratic stability. Even with innovative businesses and citizens with a strong work ethic, an administrative apparatus is needed to regulate businesses and invest in sustainable economic development (Evans 1995; Evans and Rauch 1999; Dahlström, Laupente, and Teorell 2012). Similarly, resources of a rentier state, such as high levels of development assistance or resource revenues, could be used to cultivate economic growth but corrupt politicians and bureaucrats often siphon off these resources in rent-seeking. Meritocratic administrations are thus essential for the efficient employment of resources (Sandbrook 1986; Cammack 2007; Cornell 2014). Whether performance delegitimation resulting from patronalism leads to democratic breakdown is, however, an empirical question with no clear, prior expectations. Many countries in Southern and Eastern Europe and Latin America have thus had prolonged periods of democratic rule while being plagued by corruption and clientelism. What these countries typically miss is the more demanding condition of democratic quality (Diamond and Morlino 2005).

It would also be wrong to assume the lesser importance of monopoly on violence relative to citizenship agreement and administrative effectiveness.

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25 It should be noted that ethnic conflict increases the risk of patronage seeking in the state institutions.
based on the regularity with democratic stability and the number and power of explanatory substitutes. High levels of monopoly on violence may be destabilizing for democracy, but this is not a necessary connection. Only when a cohesive and subordinate security apparatus with a firm grip on the means of violence supports an incumbent takeover or initiates a coup attempt may we have a case where a genuine monopoly on violence leads to democratic breakdown. Such cases are likely rare and thus not part of my expectations.

In many societies today, the strength of monopoly on violence is moreover exactly known by the absence of frequent and strongly violent confrontations, low crime rates, and general public order. Anti-systemic forces here see violent rebellion as unlikely to succeed or simply do not consider it because monopoly on violence is such an ingrained fact of people’s lives (Mann 2008; Tilly 1978: Ch. 4). In this way, monopoly on violence limits the opportunity and, in effect, the motivation to act. In fact, it is very hard to replace monopoly on violence, which provides at least a potentially coercive reaction to extremism.

As indicated, one may of course argue that monopoly on violence as a means of containment is a trivial, necessary cause of democratic stability (see Braumoeller and Goertz 2000: 854-855). There are, however, numerous countries all over the world where monopoly on violence is disputed or challenged every day. Monopoly on violence is far from a trivial condition. Clearly, the condition of monopoly on violence, including the subordination of the military and police in matters of their organizational power, is a substantially important one that is clearly intimately connected with the stability of democracies (Nordlinger 1977; Johnson, Slater, and McGowan 1984; Stepan 1988: Ch. 6-7; Capoccia 2005). But monopoly on violence is not always a decisive factor in the defense of democracies. In the accounts hinging on legitimacy, as Lipset’s theory outlined, in the grand studies of the development of European democracies (Mann 1986), and even in the Weberian types of legitimation, we see theorization and empirical examples of countries where legitimation is so strong that much less coercion is necessary to enforce state power. An examination of the importance of monopoly on violence critically assesses the extent to which such democracies exist. Few would discard this.

To put it more bluntly, democracies can plausibly survive amidst a disputed monopoly on violence. One example is a democracy, for instance Colombia (Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos 2013), that survives despite the existence of strong groups outside state control, heavily armed and hindering government interference in certain regions. Also, the autonomy of security forces cannot be blamed for an incumbent takeover or a ‘bloodless coup’ if their support for it did not hinge on promised concessions of their organiza-
tional powers. The obvious response of a professional military would be to hinder an overthrow of the constitution.

As a final consideration of theoretical differentiation, monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, and citizenship agreement are likely interrelated. They may reinforce each other but also condition each other’s effects. Among today’s states, there is a strong tendency that monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, and citizenship agreement cluster in the group of strong states while civil war or uncertain public order, patrimonialism, and ethnic conflicts cluster in fragile states (Rotberg 2010: 2-20; Fukuyama 2014). A particular connection is that the effectiveness of administrations’ policy implementation is conditioned by the ability to ultimately enforce those rules (Fukuyama 2004: 6-9; Mann 2008) and the legitimacy to do so (Mann 2008; North, Wallis, and Weingast Ch. 4), indicating that monopoly on violence and citizenship agreement facilitate administrative effectiveness. There is thus a risk that if the effect of administrative effectiveness is heavily conditioned by the other stateness attributes we overstate its explanatory power, which undermines our initial belief, albeit weak, that administrative effectiveness is the most stabilizing stateness attribute.

Further complicating matters, the weakness of some of the attributes may also open up for the strengthening of another attribute. For instance, patrimonial and thus administratively ineffective bureaucracies may strengthen monopoly on violence and citizenship agreement in some cultural settings. This has been the case historically in some Sub-Saharan African states where the use of patronage and clientelism has been the glue that kept heterogeneous societies together in links of mutual dependencies (Smith 2004; Arriola 2009; see also the analysis on corruption in Italy by Della Porta and Vannucci 2012). In turn, reforms towards meritocracy would, at least in the short term, tend to destabilize any political order, including democratic regimes. Just as with monopoly on violence, we may thus see contradictory effects of administrative effectiveness on democratic stability.

To sum up, the question of theoretical differentiation is a complex one that cannot be solved a priori. Hypothesis 2 presents this proposition.

*Hypothesis 2: The effects of monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, and citizenship agreement on the risk of democratic breakdown differ substantially in terms of significance or size*

The empirical examinations of this study will test this hypothesis and thus improve our understanding of the effect of stateness on democratic stability. Both hypotheses are formulated to be tested statistically (in terms of average
effects) and in within-case analyses (the existence of mechanisms in single cases).

This chapter has established the two hypotheses I test in later chapters. They are based on a theoretical framework for the effect of stateness on democratic stability focusing on the factors of containment and crisis management as mediating variables. Stateness may indeed be one of the factors that make the bargaining equilibrium of the distributionist model ‘self-enforcing’ (see Weingast 1997). In this way, stateness explains democratic stability where modernization theory fails (see Fukuyama 2014). I have tried to be as transparent as possible by being explicit at an overall level about the process of democratic destabilization, including the nature of the relationships, the actors involved, and their motivations and opportunities. But I stress that rather than the theoretical framework as such, I test its implications for the influence of the three stateness attributes. In the next chapter, I develop mechanisms connecting each stateness attribute with democratic breakdown and attach observable implications to them.
In studies of the state-democracy nexus, mechanisms are typically under-specified or at least not explicated. This is one of the main reasons why the state-democracy nexus is poorly understood (Munck 2011: 337-338; Berman 2014: 11). Understanding the mechanisms by which the state stabilizes democracies is therefore important in itself. In terms of the specific explanatory exercise in this study, it applies that even if we observe a positive correlation between stateness and democratic stability, it needs to be convincing that such a correlation actually attests to one or more meaningful causal relationships (see Gerring 2005; Hall 2006). This way of answering the how-question of the study is all the more important given that significant strands of research, particularly classic liberal theory, bears witness to a possible contradiction between a strong state and political liberty.

Numerous case studies advance specific mechanisms that connect one aspect of the state with electoral or other types of democracies. A full review is not the purpose here, but among the major contributions is Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens’ (1992) theorization of state autonomy and its role in the power struggle alongside civil society and social classes – a notion that echoes in Luebbert’s (1987: 450) work, although more implicitly. Another particularly important branch of theorization hinges on state capacities for order provision (Huntington 1968) and socioeconomic transformation (Skocpol 1979: 25). With Skocpol, state weakness in terms of ability and willingness to transform socioeconomic relations in society can be a source of regime illegitimacy. These thoughts have been taken up in recent scholarship on state impartiality and good governance (Rothstein and Teorell 2008; see also Tilly 2007: 19, Chs. 4-5). Finally, Linz and Stepan’s work on stateness (1996: Ch. 1, 17-19), although less theoretically persuasive, introduces a different mechanism that focuses less on capacities in the state apparatus as such and more on its territorial legitimation. These theories are among the most important baselines for the mechanisms that I develop here.

The purpose of this chapter is to present the mechanisms and observable implications that enable me to examine hypotheses 1 and 2 using CPO. The mechanisms are integrated with Chapter 3 in that they are about containment or crisis management. In another sense, they flesh out the propositions already presented there. I thus build on extant theoretical knowledge as cited

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26 For a similar argument regarding autocracies, see Slater (2010: 197, 203-204, 276).
in Chapter 3, but I draw more on case studies of processes of democratic destabilization with focus on the behaviour and attitudes of specific actors (what I term the ‘micro-level’). Methodologically, I employ the suggestions in recent methodological work on the evaluation of mechanisms focusing on the uniqueness and certainty of their observable implications (George and Bennett 2005; Bennett 2010; Hedström and Ylikoski 2010; Beach and Pedersen 2013).

After a short presentation of my general explanatory framework, I present seven mechanisms; two for monopoly on violence, three for administrative effectiveness, and two for citizenship agreement. Each attribute entails mechanisms driven by the masses as well as the elite. All seven mechanisms integrate motivations and opportunities but are relevant in different phases of the process of democratic destabilization. Most generally, they show how actors, including masses and elites, are constrained in their behavior by stateness. Lastly, I present the guidelines for evaluating the mechanisms.

The general explanatory framework

It is trivial to state that ‘correlation is not causation’. However, it is less trivial what constitutes a mechanism and the proper within-case techniques to detect it (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010; Beach and Pedersen 2013). I stick to a common understanding of a mechanism as “a delimited class of events that change relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations” (Tilly 2001: 25-26). I take this to mean that a mechanism must explicate the participating actors, their properties, activities, and relations and in that sense connect cause and effect via the attitudes and behavior of the specified actors (see Hedström and Ylikoski 2010: 50-52). In particular, state actors, which are highly relevant for my examinations, are spelled out in all mechanisms: state military and police forces, civil servants, and ethnic groups. These three groups of state actors are constituent of the three stateness attributes (see Chapter 2).
Figure 4.1 illustrates the general framework on which the mechanisms are based. The figure has two arenas: a macro- and a micro-level. At the micro-level, the entity may be individuals, groups, and organizations. Importantly, the macro-level cannot be reduced to such actors but involves holistic structures or institutions such as stateness and democracy. The figure further illuminates that the macro- and micro-connections are ontologically different. In turn, we might observe a macro-correlation between strong stateness and democratic stability in line with the hypotheses. But at the same time, this correlation may not be causal in that the actors on the micro-level think and behave differently from what was expected by the theory. This might mean that the theoretical mechanism should be re-specified but it could also mean that there is simply no connection between stateness and democratic stability. In the latter instance, the processes as expected from the correlation simply do not show in the majority of the cases. The correlation is instead an artefact of other factors or a substantially meaningless pattern. Similarly, even though the expected actors think and behave as expected, such a micro-level process does not make sense if the correlation in the relevant case does not fit, that is, if, for instance, the democracy under study breaks down amidst strong stateness or survives amidst weak stateness. In that case, the actors’ thoughts and behavior likely represent the forces of another explanatory factor than stateness. Only together do correlations and processes amount to a causal explanation (Gerring 2005; George and Bennett 2005; Mahoney 2010; 2012).

In studying a process as stipulated in Figure 4.1, I adhere to the most common methodology of within-case analysis, that is, the unravelling of a narrative that follows attitudes and behaviors of theoretically relevant entities and the proper sequencing of events (see Bennett 2010; Beach and
Pedersen 2013: 86). In the evaluation, each actor (which may be a single person or a collective) is weighed against his/her own data. One evaluation asks whether the actor had the opportunity to contribute to democratic breakdown. As an example, if an ethnic group that turns anti-systemic in the absence of citizenship agreement either had already fled the country at the time of democratic breakdown or was politically insignificant, it did not have the required opportunity. In turn, citizenship disagreement cannot explain the democratic breakdown. Another evaluation asks whether the actor was motivated in the expected way. For instance, industrial workers may have been a politically significant force at the time of breakdown, but if they did not express dissatisfaction with the current government or democracy it is empirically uncertain that their motivation was related to democracy’s weak performance in crisis management. Given this uncertainty, we cannot presume a connection with administrative ineffectiveness.

**Stateness and the connections with democratic stability**

I now present the seven mechanisms connecting weaknesses in the three stateness attributes with democratic breakdown, building on the insights of Chapter 3, specifically Figure 3.1. For each mechanism, I build a chain of events linked to all or some of the following steps: dissatisfaction, mobilization, attempt, and breakdown. In each mechanism, I explicate five elements: 1) the actors involved; 2) their attitudes; 3) their behaviour; 4) the sequencing of events; and 5) the observable implications of the actors, their attitudes and behaviour. If not otherwise described, the whole chain of observations from the stateness attribute to democratic breakdown as described in the text must be present for the particular mechanism to find empirical support. I illustrate each mechanism in a simplified figure.

It is fruitful to sketch out preliminarily how the theories of economic development in the distributionist model would explain democratic breakdown. At the outset, democracy must be able to emerge at a lower level of economic development than is needed for it to survive. As indicated, the premises of the theory in principle preclude this but in Przeworski’s revisions voluntarism enters in the transition phase and opens up for the installation of democracy at lower levels of development (see Przeworski et al. 2000; Przeworski 2005). The mechanisms rising from these sufficiently low levels are also, as I indicated in Chapter 1, basically the same in that they upset the initial bargaining equilibrium. Either the rich elite (the former authoritarian elite) wants to protect its economic privileges by force and thus reinstalls dictatorship with assistance from the military forces, or, if this specific power
alliance is not possible, civil war or a paramilitary coup d’état is likely given the dissatisfaction of the poor and the middle classes (Przeworski 2005: 253-254; see also Przeworski 1991: 52-53).

Note that the state is present by military forces but that the drive stems from socioeconomic classes motivated to regain a previous, already obtained, level of economic resources (the former autocratic elite) or by defending existing or fighting for future levels of economic resources (middle and/or poor classes). As we shall see, the stateness mechanisms differentiate from these scenarios in three ways: First, the relevant actors are state employees or ethnic groups, which are not always arranged along socioeconomic cleavage lines. Second, in the far-right path of Figure 3.1 the theory of stateness points to situations where levels of economic development may be relatively high but where democracy breaks down anyway. This is because rich, poor, and mid-level classes among the loyalists, disloyalists, and semi-loyalists who were initially confident of their economic benefits from democracy experience (or perceive) a reduction in these benefits. In turn, they come to evaluate democracy in a less positive light and turn anti-systemic. This perspective thus, to a greater extent than the modernization perspective, focuses on the post-transition phase as a dynamic process in which regime legitimacy is altered. The distributionist model tends to explain these processes by reference to fixed economic circumstances but the mechanisms all point out how people infer their future economic, social, or cultural payoffs from regime performance in the present or immediate past and grow anti-systemic on this basis. Third, rebellions and coup attempts by anti-systemic forces stall, succeed, or are hindered depending on the strength and qualities of state forces in the military, police, civil service, and judiciary as well as ethnic groups.

Monopoly on violence

A disputed monopoly on violence spurs two mechanisms that affect the process of democratic destabilization via strained efficacy and effectiveness in matters of security. The first, which I call the ‘authoritarian restoration’ mechanism, regards a failed containment of anti-systemic opposition elites or a coup to restore order by incumbents (or the state military). It is inspired by the theories of military power in civil matters in young democracies (Linz 1978a: Ch. 5; Stepan 1988: Chs. 6-7; Valenzuela 1990; see also Loewenstein 1937). The other mechanism, ‘security delegitimation’, concerns a weakening of performance legitimacy in security matters that radicalizes the masses. Research has focused less explicitly on this mechanism (some exceptions are Tilly 2007; Rothstein 2011) but it is likely a relevant one given the importance of security in regime performance.
As a starting point, remember that security forces typically have a large degree of autonomy in security matters because any democratic government, disregarding its ideological stand, has a keen interest in the provision of law and order. Hence, even though implementations are no better than the content of the policies and vice versa, the government’s role in setting the content of policies is disregarded in both mechanisms as it can largely be assumed to have maximum focus on security. Still, the observation of poorly implemented government orders to provide security would increase the uniqueness of the examination.

Since the authoritarian restoration mechanism is focused on containment of elites, it typically plays out in two paths dependent on the level of economic development and whether an economic boom exists. Figure 4.2 displays an upper and lower path. The upper path regards democracies with low levels of development corresponding to the far-left path in Figure 3.1. Alternatively, it regards the middle path comprising medium-level development democracies with an economic boom. The mechanism consequently consists of only two steps where the first one involves the direct transition from stability to an attempt at overthrowing democracy (the ‘attempt step’).

The relevant actors are anti-systemic forces motivated by any of the different autocracy-inducing attitudes like a desire to reinstall a former political order or radically change the existing ethnic, cultural, or economic order of society. Cadres of the security apparatus may constitute this group of actors that stage a coup attempt or they may do so in reaction to attempts from other actors. The observable implications of these motivations are certain expressed attitudes (publicized in speeches, public debates, or recorded by journalists) of conservatism (or for the military, values such as praetorianism or military autonomy) or economic/ethnic radicalism (see Stepan 1988: 92, 100). An important source of inspiration for this step in the mechanism is efforts at an authoritarian rebound that often occur shortly after a democratic transition. It happened repeatedly in Turkey until 1980 (Karpat 1988) and in Argentina and Peru throughout the 20th century (Kurtz 2013: 165, 177-178).

The last step involves the success of the attempt (the ‘breakdown step’). The relevant actors are state security forces. As one can derive from the classic works of Huntington (1957: 73-77) on the American and Stepan (1988: Chs. 6-7) on the Brazilian militaries as well as several works on the role of the military in coups d’état (see e.g. Nordlinger 1977; Zolberg 1978: 78-79; Zimmermann 1979: 393; Collier and Hoeffler 2007), two very different motivations may drive these forces, depending on the specific type of problem pertaining to monopoly on violence. If the disputed monopoly on violence stems from either a lack of resources or cohesion, the security apparatus
cannot overcome or coordinate an effective containment of paramilitary coup attempts. The observable implications are wishes of constitutional protection, which stall in the implementation phase or never move beyond internal debates about the appropriate means. In turn, the security forces want to fight paramilitary coup plotters but without success. This either leads to an overthrow or, if military powers are more balanced between the paramilitary and state military forces, civil war. Civil conflicts are often symptoms of an insufficiently strong state force in the fight against paramilitary forces, as seen for instance in Colombia of the 1990s under Presidents Trujillo, Samper, and Pastrana (Simons 2004: 201). Note that the failure of containment here is not due to a lack of willingness to protect democracy or the constitution as such but rather a weak ability to do so. Otherwise, the mechanism would amount to a somewhat trivial claim that democracy broke down because the military was anti-democratic.

The second motivation is about what happens when the disputed monopoly on violence stems from a lack of subordination. This is a very different dynamic because we are here looking for security forces turning their backs on democracy because they have come to conceive of it as too much of a threat to their organizational powers. They wanted to maintain or increase their powers but have been turned down by the government. Often, these forces align with initially authoritarian cadres of the military. Excessive military autonomy, including in policy-making, ideologies of military authoritarianism, or praetorianism have been notoriously identified among post-independence African generals and officers as they have enabled personalist dictatorships in an effort to revolutionize society (Jackson and Rosberg 1982: 32-38) and among Latin American militaries to reorder economic policy regimes (O'Donnell 1973: 85). Common to them all is that they look to increase the powers of the military. This is a strategic problem in all regimes because the military has particularly powerful weapons to fight political battles. In turn, the state military may support the coup attempt led by oppositional forces or cadres of the military or support an incumbent takeover or ‘bloodless coup’ in return for promised concessions of its organizational powers (see e.g. Mauceri 1995).

In the case where the security forces lack resources, cohesion, and subordination, I would expect to see a cacophony of mixed attitudes to and sorts of coup attempts against the democratic, constitutional order. It may of course also be that a successful military intervention actually saves democracy. This is what happens when martial law is initiated as a legal instrument of the constitution, public order restored, and a date for new elections set within reasonable time. However, I do not expect such a mechanism. Rather, if the
monopoly on violence is disputed, I expect martial law to become permanent and thus end in democratic breakdown.

The actors, their attitudes, behavior, and observable implications are basically the same in low- and medium-developed democracies with an economic boom. The only difference is that the process of destabilization in the latter regimes is less likely to unfold given the boom and the salience of performance legitimacy.

The lower path of the authoritarian restoration mechanism involves the medium-developed regimes where booms do not occur (the far-right path in Figure 3.1). The process of destabilization contains three steps: mobilization, attempt, and breakdown. The mobilization step is the substantial difference between the two paths. As indicated, performance is here a relevant parameter. However, even very effective crisis management in terms of managing the economy and providing security for the citizenry cannot guard completely against dissatisfaction with the democratic system (Gilley 2006). Since democracy has not proven itself yet, it might be given the benefit of the doubt, but at some point, the absence of booms results in crowds of dissatisfied that are too big, varied, and complex to be fully dissolved by crisis management (see Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2003).

So, the relevant actors are anti-systemic forces who mobilize against democracy based on a desire to end socioeconomic and/or security-related grievances (such as widespread criminality and violence) by a certain, allegedly more effective, dictatorship. If the grievances are socioeconomically based, we should observe agitations in front of or directed at the masses for what I term ‘economic authoritarianism’. In contemporary times, economic authoritarianism is an idea of a simpler, oligarchic rule or technocracy led by economic experts, for instance Pinochet’s neo-liberalism in Chile (Kurtz 2013: 139) or the post-WWII Southeast Asian economic booms (Haggard 2004). Historically, it could also include the more radical, historical upheavals of communism and fascism both of which, alongside other political connotations, appealed to economic injustices (Hobsbawm 1994). If the grievances are security-related, the agitations rather point to military rule, including martial law. In any case, these popular mobilizations are anti-democratic.

As is also seen in this step, security forces gain prominence as actors of containment. Even though the need for containment is less pressing in the earlier mobilization step than when an actual attempt occurs, the motivations of the security forces are basically the same: containment of the threat within constitutional boundaries if resource insufficiency and/or factionalism are the problems of the security forces or containment via extra-constitutional means if autonomy is the problem. However, the observed be-
The behavior of underequipped and/or factionalized security forces should be different. At this point in the destabilization process, the need for containment also hinges on the ability to identify the groups or elite factions in society that mobilize on explicitly anti-systemic messages. Security forces with a genuine interest in containment within constitutional boundaries should be observed trying to track down these movements or even to dissolve crowds that are being recruited by the anti-systemic agitators. Many interwar democracies in Western Europe managed such containment although constitutional boundaries were often touched or breached marginally (Capoccia 2005). The behavior of the security forces in the attempt step relates, however, to a lost fight due to weak intelligence work and dissolution of crowds. The behavior by autonomy-seeking security forces is the same as in the upper path as they may try to install military rule with or without direct support of the opposition to restore their organizational powers. However, the coup may occur before an actual paramilitary coup attempt. This leads to breakdown and the process stops before the attempt step.

The actors, their attitudes, and their behavior regarding the second and third steps are the same in both paths of the authoritarian restoration mechanism. The process should be the same as security forces likely react with equal force or lenience to anti-systemic forces no matter their initial level of support for democracy (given that their goal is containment). As implied by Loewenstein’s (1937) analysis of militant democracy and Huntington’s (1957) of the military institution in democracies, professionalized state security forces are often, and should be, uninfluenced by the nature of the opponent in their goal of containment.

Figure 4.2 simplifies the mechanism but represents the main parts of it. The two paths are marked by diverging arrows from the condition of a disputed monopoly on violence. The preemptive coup d’état by the security forces is marked by a solid, vertical line. Thus, the security forces are active in authoritarian restorations in three ways: 1) a paramilitary coup attempt succeeds because of weakly cohesive or underequipped security forces (or civil war occurs if the state military vis-à-vis paramilitary balance of power is more equal); 2) to regain or ensure its organizational powers (via promised concessions), the state military (and/or police) stages a coup that violently removes the government; or 3) the state military (and/or police) supports an incumbent takeover or ‘bloodless coup’ to restore its organizational powers.
Figure 4.2: Authoritarian restoration

- Disputed monopoly on violence
  - Unsuccessful dissolution by security forces
  - Preemptive restoration of organizational powers by the military
  - Anti-systemic forces engage in violent coup attempt or rebellion
    - Unsuccessful containment by security forces of coup attempt or rebellion
    - State military restores its organizational powers
    - Unsuccessful containment by security forces
    - State military restores its organizational powers
  - Democratic breakdown
The security legitimation mechanism is focused on crisis management for the benefit of the masses. It typically plays out in one path, namely the one followed in medium-developed regimes where booms do not occur. This mechanism involves the two first steps in the process of destabilization: dissatisfaction and mobilization. The steps towards attempt and breakdown are of course part of the process of destabilization but in terms of evaluating this particular mechanism, they are not. The unique claim of the security legitimation mechanism is the effect of crisis management, which is only relevant by connecting dissatisfaction with mobilization (see Figure 3.1). By implication, establishing such a connection is sufficient for verifying the existence of the mechanism. This applies regardless of the process of containment that follows in the attempt and breakdown steps.

In the dissatisfaction step, the first relevant actors are the security forces for which I observe the same variation in motivation as in the authoritarian restoration mechanism. Whereas the motivations are the same as in the authoritarian restoration mechanism, the problem with autonomy-seeking security forces in the security delegitimation mechanism is their contribution to arbitrary dissolution of crowds not sanctioned by government orders. In case of both a lack of acceptance of subordination and low resource level/incoherence of the security forces, the behavior to look for bears on weak identification and unsuccessful fighting (via, for instance, arrests) of criminals stealing, committing murders, and spurring violence or the use of violence not backed by government orders. Such criminal or repressive acts are often seen under circumstances of impoverishment and unemployment (see Bourguignon 2001). To simplify matters, I term this an ‘unsuccessful enforcement of monopoly on violence’.

The role of security forces in the dissatisfaction step is more limited than in later steps when the threat against public order is more real. However, even though anti-systemic ideologies, which people may rally around in the mobilization step, often come and go as a result of the economic situation and the management of it, a considerable evaluative aspect may also pertain to the containment of violent acts since people want to be insured against arbitrary violence (Henderson 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996: 8-11). The weakness in providing security under a condition of widespread socioeconomic dissatisfaction may therefore contribute to an atmosphere of regime illegitimacy. This has been the case, for instance, in Jamaica throughout its democratic life (Tilly 2007: 36). In democracies, it might be the specific trigger of public agitation and mobilization of anti-systemic forces for a military rule with easier access to repression. Note that these concerns refer to perceived problems of security. They may thus, in principle, be pure imagination. It is well known that public agitators, including the security forces, may often
twist and turn the realities ‘on the ground’. For instance, security from communist or fascist paramilitary forces was a major factor in support of totalitarian (mostly fascist) movements (Mann 2004). But there is usually some truth to the security problems even though they are exaggerated by the masses or mobilizing elites. As it is also a harder and thus stronger examination of the mechanism, I demand an observation of actual security problems even though theoretically this is not strictly necessary.

The need to manage the now mobilized masses results in one of three outcomes: The paramilitary anti-systemic forces succeed in a violent coup d’état, civil war erupts, or the state military, whether underequipped, incoherent, or insubordinate, initiates a coup to restore order (preemptively or in reaction to a coup attempt by the anti-systemic forces).

Figure 4.3 illustrates a simplified version of the security delegitimation mechanism. Here as in subsequent illustrations of the mechanisms, the last ‘breakdown step’ does not hinge on the given mechanism. It is therefore included but shaded. This is because security forces always become relevant in this phase. Whether they contribute to breakdown as such is, however, solely dependent on the observable implications illustrated in Figures 4.2 or 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Security delegitimation

Disputed monopoly on violence → Unsuccessful enforcement of monopoly on violence → Anti-systemic forces mobilize for restoring public order → Unsuccessful dissolution by security forces

Democratic breakdown

Unsuccessful containment by security forces of coup attempt or rebellion

State military restores order (preemptively or not)
Administrative effectiveness

I expect three mechanisms leading from administrative ineffectiveness to democratic breakdown. These mechanisms reflect how the civil service engages in several different tasks whereas security forces perform a narrower set of duties. The first mechanism, which I name ‘socioeconomic delegitimation’, captures some of the most profound examples of processes of breakdown in democracies strained by economic recession, as stipulated by Linz (1978a), or democracies whose state apparatuses are out of line with the social structures and thus incapable of delivering the demanded socioeconomic transformation (see e.g. Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992; Luebbert 1987; 1991). This mechanism focuses on the performance legitimation of democracy to the masses in socioeconomic matters.

The second mechanism is termed ‘elite bias delegitimation’ to describe the process that may emerge from a certain type of administrative ineffectiveness, namely that of a politicized administration that implements socioeconomic policies, civil liberties, or property rights in a way that biases against the oppositional party elite. The incumbent’s bias against the opposition delegitimizes democracy, and autocracy becomes an assurance for the protection of the opposition’s vital interests. The third mechanism is termed ‘mass bias legitimation’ and describes the specific mass dynamics of this sort of process. While the process in the elite-based mechanism is structured around foreseeable party-political dynamics and is thus relatively easy to predict, the mass-based process is more muddy and has the particular explosive potential of leading to civil war. Both mechanisms are typical of highly unequal democracies, like historically in Southern Europe and Latin America, but as the biases pertain to the state administration, they are potential threats to the quality of government and regime stability in any democracy (see O’Donnell 1973; Rothstein and Teorell 2008; Cornell and Lapuente 2014).

All three mechanisms typically regard one path following the far-right process of democratic destabilization in Figure 3.1. The socioeconomic delegitimation mechanism involves the crisis management of dissatisfaction and mobilization whereas the mass and elite bias delegitimation mechanisms only uniquely regard the mobilization-step.

Socioeconomic delegitimation begins with anti-systemic forces who express concerns about socioeconomic conditions, typically staggering inequalities, unemployment rates, hyperinflation, or general poverty (see Gasiorowski 1995). It is these concerns that the government and civil service address. Since socioeconomic policy issues are deeply ideological, indeed the centerpiece of the traditional left-right dimension in party politics of western
democracies (Downs 1957), the content of the governments’ policy reactions to the public's concerns cannot be taken as a given, as in security matters. For instance, right-wing governments will tend to propose means and ends of fiscal austerity in times of recession while left-wing governments propose countercyclical policies via tax exemptions or public investments. This has also been true of third world countries outside Western Europe (Nelson 1990: 3-4). As civil servants rely on receiving executive orders, governments’ reactions are a varying factor in the mechanisms of administrative ineffectiveness.

The relevance of the mechanism may exist even if the government initiates poorly enlightened or internally contradictory policies since 'good' and 'bad' policies are just as likely, from a conceptual point of view, to be poorly implemented. However, and given that the quality of any policy is inherently difficult to classify a priori, the examination is strongest when it is observed that the government actually initiates policies targeted directly at inequality, unemployment and/or hyperinflation (depending on what is the specific problem of the economy). Only in this case can it be forcefully shown that the civil service is responsible for poor performance.

The behavior of the civil service in socioeconomically relevant ministries and agencies must generally have one or both of the following features: When the civil service is politicized or patrimonial, the implementation of the government proposals is either delayed or inaccurate because of sheer incompetence or corrupt practices. Policy proposals may also be wholly absent or incomplete. This is perhaps most widespread in less developed countries or where state-building has generally been weak or only recently begun (Hirschmann 1999; Kurtz 2013: Ch. 2). Alternatively, implementation is interrupted or sabotaged (circumvented) when civil servants are unresponsive (see O’Donnell 1973: 85-87). As indicated, this may also be augmented by a strongly institutionalized bureaucracy and may thus, for instance, pertain to the older states of Europe as well.

This administrative difference is both behaviorally and attitudinally established. However, I will not observe the attitudes of the civil service as they are expectedly very hard to pinpoint, if any strong ones exist at all. This is due to very basic and old-fashioned demands of strict loyalty of the civil service to the government, which are increasingly becoming legally regulated by bureaucratic reforms in the developing world (Hirschmann 1999). Even in remote settings such as Cambodia, capacity-building and bureaucratization efforts by foreign aid donors are widespread even though such efforts have largely failed (Godfrey et al. 2002). Civil servants are thus likely very well aware of the implications of their behavior. We should also remember that it is hard to generally observe the influence of the civil service on policy con-
tents because policy negotiations between government and civil service are most often closed processes in which influences are hard to dissect. Civil service behavior in implementation is therefore a relatively powerful and, in any case, the most reliable parameter for detecting the difference between an unresponsive and a politicized administration.

In the mobilization step, anti-systemic forces observe the poor performance of the regime in combatting the economic problems and then call for economic authoritarianism. As in the lower path of the authoritarian restoration mechanism, economic authoritarianism can be moderate as well as radical in its specific measures but it is always anti-systemic as it demands an end to democracy.

In reacting to this anti-systemic mobilization, the politicians would obviously be infuriated and set on preserving democracy by co-opting the movements. This stems from the desire to survive in office which follows most, if not all, politicians where political office means power and influence (Strøm and Müller 1999). A likely reaction, with socioeconomic means, openly addresses the more moderate concerns among the crowds in a search for reequilibration (for instance, via increased spending and broader access to social benefits). This is a normal feature of the political business cycle in the more institutionalized democracies but would also expectedly be seen through measures of cooptation in younger democracies with less stable patterns of politician-voter interaction (see Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2003). Again, however, the civil service stalls implementation through either of the two ways described above. From this point on, administrative ineffectiveness is not important but it has already contributed to breakdown by radicalizing segments of the masses to engage in an actual violent coup attempt or a rebellion that may succeed, lead to civil war, or provoke the military to take action (preemptive or not).

Figure 4.4 simplifies the mechanism by skipping the initial dissatisfaction and the conflict escalation and focuses on the behavior of the civil service instead.
Figure 4.4: Socioeconomic delegitimation

- **Administrative ineffectiveness**
  - Government initiates policies that address socioeconomic concerns
  - Inaccurate or delayed implementation by civil service
  - Anti-systemic forces mobilize for 'economic authoritarianism'
  - Interrupted or sabotaged implementation by civil service

- **Unsuccessful containment or restoration by state military**

- **Democratic breakdown**
The elite bias delegitimation mechanism assumes an initial atmosphere of dissatisfaction with socioeconomic conditions as a foundation for the government to engage in undermining the rule of law and initiate particularly discriminating policies against the opposition. Biased policies and state repression can of course also be seen when the economy is improving and even when the opposition is generally satisfied with the conditions of the day, but repression of the opposition is much more likely when societal conditions are worsening because this often contributes to polarizing the opposition from the incumbents in a blame game. It is no coincidence that processes of regime destabilization are often preceded by economic recessions or the enfeeblement of relations between the executive and legislative organs (Linz 1978a: 66-69; Kurtz 2013: Ch. 2).

The mechanism focuses on and begins with the civil servants in politicized administrations whose job depends on the goodwill of the elected incumbents. Such civil servants provide only weak limits on executive power. This enables the government to form and realize particularly biased policies in matters of socioeconomic distribution and rule of law. In turn, the party opposition is antagonized (Cornell and Lapuente 2014: 1287). The problem here is thus not stalled implementation as in socioeconomic delegitimation but rather the opposite, namely overly precise and uncritical implementation. A core feature of meritocracy is the ability to balance responsiveness by concerns for the lawfulness and impartiality of policies – concerns that patrimonial administrations do not favor. I should therefore observe governments initiating policies aimed at hurting the opposition followed by a predominantly politicized civil service, including notably the judiciary, that implements these policies directly and uncritically (despite the inaccuracy and delays that may occur given its incompetence).

The relevant policy areas are socioeconomic rights as well as civil liberties and property rights provision. The civil service might, for instance, give impunity to government party members, violate the rule of law through arbitrary arrests of opposition forces, or illegally seize their property as is typical in Latin American (Cornell and Lapuente 2014: 1291) and, perhaps particularly, Sub-Saharan African contexts. In socioeconomic matters, we might observe unfair distribution of social benefits with easier access for certain social or economic classes (Rothstein and Teorell 2008). This is a well-known phenomenon in Latin America and in Caribbean countries such as Jamaica but has also been recurring in the centuries of democratization and de-democratization in France (Tilly 2007: 35-36).

Politicized administration of elections may also be relevant even though the elections are generally considered free and fair. A salient problem of politicized administrations is often the grievances and impression of authori-
Tarianism generated by attempts of vote buying (the incumbents offer public jobs in return for votes) or vote manipulation (the incumbents use the administration of elections to stack votes in their favor) in and around elections (Seeberg 2014), for instance in Sub-Saharan Africa (Elklit and Reynolds 2002).

Importantly, the government’s biased policies are not sufficient for anti-democratic mobilization to occur. The civil service could stop their implementation on grounds of unlawfulness but its dependence on government patronage hinders this. As a result, I should observe that the opposition party elites, which are already organized, remobilize with internal agitations to end these (perceived) injustices by extra-constitutional means. This could be met with an escalation or continuation of measures by the government and a dedicated implementation hereof by the civil service, as both the government and the civil service perceive the emergence of the opposition threat to their own security, rights, and economic goods. The threat may of course not even be detected before an actual coup attempt by the opposition is carried through. If an attempt does not occur at first, the mechanism would predict the same process to unfold, only with a new set of incumbents and opposition elites, until a coup is attempted.

As illustrated in Figure 4.5, the coup attempt is likely to be paramilitary but the state military may initiate a coup before that to thwart the opposition threat. Again, the figure leaves out the escalation part of the mechanism for the sake of simplicity.
Figure 4.5: Elite bias delegitimation

Democratic breakdown

Unsuccessful containment or restoration by state military

Anti-systemic forces of party elite mobilize to ‘end injustices’

Biased implementation against party elite regarding economic goods, civil liberties, or property rights

Attempts at vote manipulation or vote buying

Administrative ineffectiveness
The mass bias delegitimation mechanism is equal to the elite bias delegitimation mechanism in terms of the sequence of events, behavior, and attitudes. However, the actors and thus the particular arena of action are different since we are at the mass level. I have separated out this mechanism because the masses are more diverse and farther away from executive political power, and their behavior may be less rational and predictable. The issues of the means and timing of government reaction and military coup attempts are therefore harder to determine a priori. Otherwise, the same dynamic applies: A politicized administration may bias against selected population strata based on socioeconomic, ethnic, or other criteria. The unifying characteristic of the targeted groups their status as in opposition to the government. For instance, governments may engage in biased policies because they see executive power as an opportunity to exploit resources and favorize certain groups over others – a typical feature of so-called predatory states or ethnocracies (Evans 1995; Wimmer 2013). The issue of the fairness of elections is arguably more a matter of elite than mass dispute but, expectedly, increased literacy rates of the lower classes and the spread of information technologies make elections a matter of potential public grievances against the incumbent government or regime.

In turn, the opposition is radicalized and driven to rebel or attempt a coup that may, as in the other mechanisms, be preempted or reacted to by the security forces, succeed, or end in civil war. Due to the unpredictable dynamics of radicalization among the masses in this mechanism, civil war is in fact a more likely outcome. Figure 4.6 illustrates this process in the same simplified manner as Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.6: Mass bias delegitimation
Citizenship agreement

The first mechanism connecting citizenship disagreement with democratic breakdown regards the singlehandedly destabilizing effect of ‘citizenship violence’. This mechanism captures the great variety of democratic instability which, for instance, dominates in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Balkans, or in Sri Lanka where religion is a vital source of political conflict. Thus, it relates to the works of Horowitz (1985), Wimmer (2013), and others on the severity of ethnic conflicts and their consequences for civic order (see also Alesina et al. 2003).

It is relevant for all three paths of Figure 3.1 and involves the attempt and mobilization steps. From a starting point of stability, we would expect to observe violence between the ethnic groups that do not accept each other’s presence in the same country. Citizenship disputes may stem from ethnocultural illegitimacy of the state despite relatively peaceful co-existence of different population groups as in Belarus where a nation-building path separate from Russia never took place (Fritz 2007: 232). This parallels how citizenship agreement may be established via a state nation. Citizenship violence may therefore be driven by state illegitimacy alone. We may here observe violent attacks on state symbols and representatives of the competing ethnicity. In any case, it is crucial that violence is interethnic.

The mobilizations rising from the violence can be very different. Inter-ethnic violence may set in motion one of three mobilizations. The more radical the mobilization, the more likely breakdown is. The most radical mobilization is a reversal of the ethnic situation reflected in racist ideas and calls for ethnic apartheid or hegemony. This is of course inspired by the Nazi movement in Weimar Germany but also by numerous movements with apartheid-like or ethnocratic claims, which remain widespread in post-colonial contexts where state borders cross ethnic boundaries (see Herbst 2000; Wimmer 2013). An equally radical mobilization centers on a wish for secession - an exit from the state - that very directly threatens the political unit of the democracy. This was the case with the Tamil Tigers from the 1970s (Bandarage 2009: 66). The least radical mobilization involves the wish for equality for ethnic groups (minority or majority) and their incorporation in the political system. This may seem like a peaceful claim, but equalization of political and economic powers can be a radical demand that requires radical action by a democratic government, or alternatively, an anti-democratic reaction, for instance the Shining Path in Peru (Yashar 2005: 235-239).

It is worth noting a peculiarity of this mechanism. As for the sequence between interethnic violence and ethnic anti-systemic mobilization, I must be open for observing the opposite: Violence between ethnic groups in many
cases rises because of a mobilization based on some kind of ethnic exclusivist ideology – that is, the very idea of ethnic exclusion provokes violence, either by supporters or antagonists of the idea (Wimmer 2013). Either way, citizenship disagreement and violence are still at the core of why democracy breaks down.

A host of different actors may rebel or attempt a coup d’état in case of citizenship disagreement. Other actors with no immediate stake in the conflict may also use the conflict and its violent consequences as an excuse for a coup attempt or simply an opportunity to take power, for instance Suharto in Indonesia (Slater 2010: Ch. 5). Alternatively, the state military takes action (preemptively or not) and installs a military dictatorship to end violence. The mechanism is illustrated in Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7: Citizenship violence

Citizenship disagreement → Violent conflict between ethnic groups ↔ Ethnic groups mobilize for 1) reversed ethnic hegemony, 2) secession, or 3) equalization and incorporation → Unsuccessful containment or restoration by state military → Democratic breakdown
The citizenship injustices mechanism builds on the same literature as the citizenship violence mechanism but captures a different dynamic, namely the often debilitating dynamics of state integration amidst economically strained conditions and the effect on the ability of crisis management in the system. This happened in many countries during the Great Depression, in Latin American democracies, and in Eastern Europe before WWII and after the end of the Cold War where fragile nations were strained by economic crises. Specifically, the mechanism typically regards the steps of dissatisfaction and mobilization of the far-right path in Figure 3.1. Generally, it is more relevant if the citizenship dispute involves disrespect between ethnic groups because this is more disturbing to societal security and more strongly affected by socioeconomic policies. But state illegitimacy conflicts may still be relevant.

In the dissatisfaction step, it must be shown that ethnic groups express concerns over socioeconomic injustices that they perceive to exist between them. Public goods, unemployment, and wages may be skewed against particular ethnic groups or in the extreme cases certain domains of employment may be reserved for certain ethnic groups. The concerns may further be either elite- or mass-based. The heart of the matter is that they become salient issues for parliament and government. Examples of such economic inequalities are widespread, stemming from the path dependencies of slavery in post-colonial settings (Easterly and Levine 1997; Yashar 1997). Ethnic dividing lines are exacerbated or created within or between the parties in parliament (or in a coalitional government) resulting in polarization of members within or between parties as they are driven to opposite extremes on the scale of ethnic socioeconomic distribution. This sort of dynamic was seen in many interwar democracies as well as numerous contemporary African parties emerging as protests against excluding particular ethnic groups from socioeconomic goods (Elischer 2013: Ch. 3).

If this polarization does not occur within the government, it may in principle continue business as usual. However, polarization may be reflected in a coalitional government and even if it is not, the government is likely to take stock of the parliamentary situation to avoid a motion of censure. Either way, this implies that the government fails to promulgate action on the expressed concerns or initiation of half measures – all in all ineffective policy responses as a result of the government’s credence to both polarized positions.

In the mobilization step, anti-systemic forces enter the scene alongside ethnic groups. Actors outside the ethnic groups are radicalized because of the unsatisfactory government policies. They may then align their cause with the ethnic groups. We should thus observe agitations among either elite or mass segments of these groups to make other elites or masses rally for socioeconomic upheaval, which implies regime change. The less radical version is an
economic authoritarian regime but it must be observed that they rally around interethnic redistribution – only in this way does this step connect with the initial dissatisfaction. The more radical version is an ethnocracy involving exclusion of one or more ethnic groups from political and economic power.

This mobilization increases pressure on the politicians to find solutions but it also contributes to the centrifugal politics of parliament. A strongly unique examination of the mechanism expects not only a status quo in the government reaction but also a preceding total enfeeblement of parliamentary workings by factionalization (split-ups) of the parties or coalition failure on the ethnic issue. Only the specific government reaction is a necessary observation, however, as this is the motivation for a rebellion or a paramilitary or state military coup attempt.

There is again potential feedback from the mobilization for an ethnic exclusivist regime to polarization or fractionalization (Wimmer 2013). As with the citizenship violence mechanism, this does not preclude the existence of the mechanism and I must thus be open to observing it.

Figure 4.8 summarizes the mechanism. It excludes the escalation of parliamentary conflict, shortening it to one step of polarization or factionalization, which is the most destabilizing form.
Figure 4.8: Citizenship injustices

- Citizenship disagreement
- Polarization or factionalization within and between parties over socioeconomic benefits to ethnic groups
- Ineffective policy response by the government
- Ethnic groups or anti-systemic forces mobilize for 'economic authoritarianism' with redistribution or ethnocracy
- Unsuccessful containment or restoration by state military
- Democratic breakdown
Examination strengths

In Chapter 5, I engage in a more thorough process analysis than is possible in Chapters 8-10. By looking at the mechanisms across more cases in Chapters 8-10, I can increase general confidence in the theory. Given a correlation between weak stateness and democratic breakdown, only the observation that every step in the chain, as theoretically expected, links actor attitudes and behaviour on the micro-level with breakdown lends support to the theory (see Beach and Pedersen 2013: Ch. 4). I have used this to build a theory in which every conceptualized step in the chain has an observable implication. When looking for the observable implications in Chapters 8-10, the within-case quality of the examinations is preserved but backed by less data.

In accordance with Bayesian logic of inference, I rely on the dimensions of certainty and uniqueness to determine the examination strength of each observable implication in the mechanisms (see Van Evera 1997; see also Bennett 2010: 211; Mahoney 2012). Certainty regards the necessity of the observations for the alleged relationship whereas uniqueness regards the sufficiency of the observations.

Table 4.1: Examination strength of observable implications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Certainty</th>
<th>Uniqueness</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Doubly decisive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Hoop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Smoking gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Straw in the wind</td>
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</table>

Table 4.1 sets up four examination types based on these two dimensions. ‘Doubly decisive’ examinations provide full certainty and uniqueness of the observable implications and thus of the theory under scrutiny. They are very rare, almost ideal-types for which examinations strive. The three other types are more common (Bennett 2010: 211). ‘Smoking gun’ examinations provide a high degree of uniqueness but a low degree of certainty. They produce unique pieces of evidence pointing to a specific suspect and thus lend support to the hypothesis, but provide weak evidence for rejecting alternative hypotheses. ‘Hoop’ examinations provide a high degree of certainty amidst a low degree of uniqueness. They are designed to eliminate the hypothesis, or more positively, show that the hypothesis is one among other potentially cor-
rect ones. By contrast, ‘straw-in-the-wind’ examinations exhibit low uniqueness and certainty and are thus the weakest.

As I demand the presence of all links from X to Y for causation, the examination strength of a given mechanism equals the aggregate (via multiplication) examination value of all observable implications of the mechanism. Given the almost ideal-typical status of doubly decisive examinations, my inferential goal is to establish observable implications that provide examinations with the highest possible degree of certainty and uniqueness of the mechanisms. This is not a simple task. Endogenously to the uniqueness and certainty of an examination, one may also characterize it as either hard or lenient. This amounts to the well-known qualities in statistical analyses of a conservative or an easy examination, respectively (Mahoney 2012: 572-573).

Examination strengths are not absolute truths but they are helpful heuristics in evaluating the mechanisms as the existence of a mechanism is given different explanatory weight dependent on the examination strength. However, it is valid to say that I have generally attempted to maximize the uniqueness and certainty of the examinations by presenting the necessary as well as the unique nuts and bolts of the mechanisms, particularly in terms of integrating both attitudes and behaviors in each mechanism as observable implications. I have further sought to advance the hardness of the examinations by relying on rather strict demands for the existence of the observable implications. Most notably, the mechanisms that regard performance delegitimation (the far-right path in Figure 3.1), provide a hard examination of the role of stateness in raising conflict levels from dissatisfaction to mobilization and attempt by demanding actual instead of merely perceived poor performance by the regime.

As can be seen, the examinations vary in strength across the seven mechanisms. The overall impression is that the examinations provide strong inferential power. In accordance with typical problems finding the ‘smoking gun’, certainty is generally stronger than uniqueness. Thus, my examinations are generally better at falsification than verification. Given that my primary research question hinges on understanding the role of stateness for democratic stability rather than explaining democratic stability comprehensively, such ‘hoop’ examinations are in fact more useful than ‘smoking gun’ examinations. ‘Hoop’ examinations are powerful tools for comparing different explanatory factors whereas ‘smoking gun’ examinations fare better in establishing connections between each explanatory factor and the outcome.

Going about them chronologically, the authoritarian restoration mechanism is examined with high degrees of certainty and uniqueness. The behavior of security forces in the last step before breakdown provides a very unique observation of the influence of monopoly on violence in both paths. It
is hard to imagine any other background factor responsible for either the state military’s weak fighting of a coup attempt or its own participation in one. Also, the preceding steps of conflict increases add to the certainty of the examination in that such conflict is the necessary background for the security forces’ behavior. In the lower path, certainty is further raised by adding the behavior of the security forces in the mobilization step in case of an early forceful coup by the state military. The security delegitimation mechanism, however, exhibits low uniqueness because it hinges on the performance delegitimation by security forces’ weak provision of public safety – something that could stem from numerous other conditions than a disputed monopoly on violence.

The mechanisms of administrative ineffectiveness can be examined with a high degree of uniqueness due to the detailed specifications of government policy and civil service attitudes and behavior regarding implementation. The degree of certainty is also high because the vital actors and the proper sequencing (for instance, poor civil service delivery of public goods preceding the development of anti-systemic claims for economic authoritarianism in the socioeconomic delegitimation mechanism) can be observed. Of course, the fact that elite or mass oppositions rally to end injustices, as in the mass and elite bias delegitimation mechanisms, is not necessarily motivated by government policies. But even though such a psychological motivation cannot be observed very well, some rallying by elite and mass oppositions must be observed to vindicate elite and mass bias delegitimation, respectively.

The citizenship violence mechanism is the only notable exception to the general pattern of strong examinations as its examination resembles a ‘straw-in-the-wind’ examination. It is hard to dissect ethnic conflicts from others and whether rebellions or coup attempts are really motivated by these or other, for instance, purely socioeconomic conflicts. Yet, socioeconomic conflicts often make ethnic conflicts salient. Such an observation increases the scope of relevant observations of the mechanism. In any case, the detection of violence between ethnic groups and their resulting radicalization gives rather unique, and indeed necessary, evidence of a connection.

In contrast to the citizenship violence mechanism, the examination of the citizenship injustices mechanism is strong in certainty and uniqueness because it specifies a long chain of actions and reactions between, first, ethnic groups and parliament and government, and later, other anti-systemic forces. Particularly the sequencing of parliamentary dynamics, from polarization to factionalization, and the resulting detailed political signals of ethnic redistribution provide a strong ground for unique inference as such escalation is hardly explained by more static levels of economic development or socioeconomic conflict alone.
Summing up, the seven mechanisms developed here have theoretical resonance, and each of them shows how actors are constrained in motivation and behavior by levels of stateness. The mechanisms have been theorized by a set of observable implications in specified sequences. This enables evaluations of a relatively high standard in terms of certainty and uniqueness. The mechanisms are developed with the purpose of applying them to a wide variety of countries across time and space, and they should thus be suited for the analyses in the following chapters. The next chapter, however, puts them to work in more detailed process analyses of a select set of four interwar cases: Germany, Spain, Czechoslovakia, and Finland. As I will argue, there are strong reasons to believe that matters of stateness provide valuable insights regarding the democratic fates of these countries while at the same time, these four cases likely represent the variety of stateness problems that we may encounter in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. The next chapter in this way examines the explanatory power of the mechanisms in a concrete empirical setting that, if needed, may generate revisions of them for broader empirical purposes.
PART II: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Part II of the study confronts the theoretical framework of Chapters 2-4, specifically the two hypotheses of Chapter 3 and the seven mechanisms in Chapter 4, with three types of empirical examination: a controlled comparison, a statistical analysis, and causal process observations (CPO). They contribute with vital building blocks in answering whether and how stateness stabilizes democracies.

There is a rather robust finding in the literature that stateness correlates positively with democratic stability. Less clear and sophisticated is the understanding of what particular dimensions and forces of stateness drive the processes of democratic stabilization and destabilization. When engaging in theory development, one can either choose to start with a large-n analysis from which a limited set of cases is chosen for within-case analysis, or one can choose within-case analysis of a selected sample of cases and then examine their generality by analyzing them on a broader set of cases (see George and Bennett 2005). I prefer the first model because I wish to establish whether there is a general effect of each of the attributes on democratic stability checked for potential confounders before examining whether, in terms of mechanisms, any such effects plausibly amount to genuine influences and how these influences play out (see Tilly 2001; Beach and Pedersen 2013). I thus go from the cross-case to the within-case level exploring the possibility that within-case knowledge nullifies an otherwise significant cross-case relationship. Whereas the cross-case analysis establishes average effects, the within-case analyses examine effects in single cases.

Chapter 5 starts with an examination of the explanatory importance of the mechanisms on a small sample of democracies, which gives me the opportunity to conduct close process analyses. This is important no matter the sequencing of cross-case and within-case analysis because it provides a testing ground for a broader empirical application of the two hypotheses and seven mechanisms (see George and Bennett 2005: Ch.1; Beach and Pedersen 2013: Ch. 2). Chapter 6 then sets up the dataset of democratic breakdowns and survivals from 1918 through 2010 as well as the logic of how the hypotheses may combine with the theorized mechanisms of Chapter 4 and be evaluated by CPO. Chapter 7 conducts logistic regressions of the three stateness attributes on democratic stability, including potential confounders, and thus tests both hypotheses. Chapters 8-10 examine the mechanisms attached to the stateness attributes in the interwar, Cold War, post-Cold War periods,
separately. Hence, these chapters test the hypotheses using within-case evidence.
Chapter 5.  
Stateness and Democratic Stability in the ‘Frontier Zone’ of Interwar Europe

What seems to distinguish the casualties from the survivors in the interwar story is less the behavior of an actively anti-democratic public than the state’s capacity to provide what might be called “civic order” (Bermeo 1997: 19)

Why could the democratic system in Weimar Germany succumb to Nazism so easily in a country with such a strong rule of law tradition and high level of economic development? This question has puzzled generations of scholars and is still debated. More generally, the interwar pattern of democratic breakdown and survival has needed serious reviewing for some years now in terms of the dominance of modernization theory and economic explanations. Important contributions to this end have already been made (e.g. Luebbert 1991; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992; Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell 2000; Mann 2004; Capoccia 2005; Weyland 2010). However, as suggested by Bermeo in the quote above matters of stateness are likely to illuminate several of the puzzles that still exist.

This chapter builds on Bermeo’s suggestion by examining the explanatory power of the seven mechanisms developed in Chapter 4 in detailed process analyses. While country experts have analyzed various influences of the state on democracy in Germany and Spain, notably, no comparative examination of the role of the state in interwar democracies has, to the best of my knowledge, been conducted. As a sample of the interwar European universe, I choose the so-called ‘frontier zone’ democracies (see Mann 2004: 38). The frontier zone contains an underdetermined space of cases in that extant theories have difficulties explaining the pattern of democratic breakdown and survival among the countries in this zone.

Among the frontier zone democracies, I choose the democratic breakdowns of Germany and Spain for closer process analysis of the seven mechanisms. I compare Germany and Spain with the frontier zone survivors of Czechoslovakia and Finland to examine whether there is a positive correlation between stateness and democratic stability, and whether any of the mechanisms illuminate how democracy survived in Czechoslovakia and Finland but broke down in Germany and Spain. First, however, I argue in a
more detailed fashion for the case selection and review extant explanations for democratic stability in the four cases.

Case selection and some explanatory puzzles

Why should any of the seven mechanisms developed in Chapter 4 show a state-democracy relationship that is generalizable across time and space? Indeed, the level of detail in the mechanisms requires some theorization beyond what is immediately available from extant theory on the state-democracy nexus. We thus need some empirical hunch as to their relevance. The interwar European setting and the democratic breakdowns of Germany and Spain as well as a controlled comparison with the democratic survivors of Czechoslovakia and Finland provides a unique setting for such hunches.

The interwar period from 1918-1939 involved the first and most infamous cases of democratic breakdown on which the classic theories of democratization were built (see Lipset 1959; Linz 1978a; Huntington 1991) and are still being revised (see Berman 1997, 1998; Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell 2000; Ansell and Samuels 2014; Møller and Skaaning 2015). According to most classifications, around 17-20 or approximately half of the world’s democracies survived while the other half broke down within this short period of time (Mann 2004: 38; Møller, Schmotz, and Skaaning 2015). But all democracies were strained by the repercussions of inflationary crises in the early 1920s and/or the global recession of the Great Depression from 1929 (de Bromhead, Eichengreen, and O’Rourke 2012; Møller, Schmotz, and Skaaning 2015) as well as, for some cases, an emerging multipolar and war-inducing international order from 1933 (Boix 2011; see also Weyland 2010).

Additionally, all political developments in the interwar period took place in light of the consequences of WWI (see also Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell 2000). Of particular interest to my thesis, WWI was a critical juncture that interrupted a path of state- and nation-building across the globe but also delegitimized existing despotic, authoritarian regimes (Mann 2004: 36). The peculiar consequence was that many countries had to engage in large-scale rebuilding of state capacities and basic allegiance to the nation-state while coping with new and fragile democratic institutions whereas others could rely on previous forms of democratic rule and a largely intact state territory and apparatus (Overy 1994: 63; Holzer 2002; Thompson 2002). Coupled with this, the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917 created global pressures for increased working class incorporation and a precedent for communist takeover that shocked the liberals and conservatives, as well as many social democrats, in all the democracies.
Some democracies had the institutional structures to deal with the stresses of communism and post-world war chaos while revolutionary socialism, anarchism, and syndicalism countered by nationalist or fascist movements grew out of the hands of other democracies (Luebbert 1987; Ertman 1998; Capoccia 2005). The interwar setting is thus a controlled comparison that may also zoom in on processes during and after junctures of potential institutional change (see Slater and Simmons 2010; Slater and Ziblatt 2013).

Within this interwar setting, why are the cases of Germany, Spain, Czechoslovakia, and Finland particularly useful? Democracy in Germany and Spain broke down in March 1933 (Hitler’s Enabling Act) and October 1936 (Franco’s appointment as head of state), respectively, while Czechoslovakia’s and Finland’s democracies survived the interwar period. Tables 5.1-5.3 provide evidence that theories emphasizing socioeconomic conditions cannot account convincingly for these democratic trajectories. Specifically, I focus on development levels, inequality, and economic recession. For purposes of qualitative examination and comparability, I rely on extant analyses that have assessed the variables by including data on various kinds of indicators of them.

27 According to Mann (2004: 38) and Capoccia (2005: 7), other frontier zone countries were Italy, Belgium, Austria, and France. However, inclusion of any of these countries would weaken the similarities between the cases and thus the ability to control the comparison. Italy was the first mover of fascism and experienced only a short democratic spell ending in 1922 many years before the Great Depression. Belgium (Mann 2004: 41; Capoccia 2005: 14) and France (Luebbert 1991: 37-48; Dobry 2000: 166-170) were older democracies with considerably stronger liberal traditions. Austria could be another fruitful case but it shared many social and political conditions with Germany and is a case of democratic breakdown and therefore adds little leverage to the analysis (see Gerlich and Campbell 2000: 45-50).

28 The Anschluss of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 has been interpreted as a case of democratic breakdown since the president after Benes, Hacha, was passive towards German occupational approaches. Similarly, the democratic value of the Czechoslovak minority rights protection and the Castle group in which the executive enjoyed extensive control has been questioned (e.g. Bugge 2006/2007: 10-12). However, most assessments point to the 1939 event as a foreign invasion (e.g. Mamatey 1973a: 156-159; Bradley 2000: 104-105; Bryant 2007: 28-29), and accordingly Czechoslovakia is most often coded as a democratic survivor (see e.g. Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell 2000). Also, parliamentary competition in Finland was limited during the 1930s as the Communist Party and various other extremist movements were outlawed or enfeebled in their political rights (Luebbert 1987: 475). But the outlawing focused on their threats to democracy as either fascists or Russian agents. In that sense, the outlawing may be seen as democratically legitimate (Capoccia 2005: 160-161).
The absolute levels of economic development and its trajectory from 1913-1937 may be indicative of the most general pattern of democratic breakdown and stability distinguishing between the most developed democratic survivors in Northwestern Europe and the least developed democratic casualties in Southeastern Europe (Mann 2004: 38; Møller 2013). However, regarding the four countries here, development levels do not bring us much closer to understanding the fate of democracy since Germany was by far the richest country in the whole period while the affluence levels of Spain, Czechoslovakia, and Finland were almost similar.

It should be noted that the development in GDP from 1929 to 1937 shows a marked decline in Spain and a marked increase in Finland. Finland’s better performance may be a result as well as a cause of its democratic stability or perhaps rather the containment of the communist and Lapua threats as opposed to the civic unrest in Spain throughout most of the period. Similarly, Germany’s increased GDP in this period is probably due to changes from 1933 under Hitler’s dictatorship. These uncertainties aside, the dynamics of changes in GDP are better captured by looking at economic recession as an explanation in itself. Table 5.2 presents data on the economic recession of the Great Depression as measured in economic output change and unemployment. It shows that the economic recession was least profound in Finland and most profound in Germany. However, the fact that the economic recession in Czechoslovakia was far worse than in Spain and at least as bad as in Germany devalues it as an explanation for the regime outcomes of all four cases. Indeed, the Depression was disastrous in terms of unemployment, impoverishment, and misery for the Czech economy since it relied heavily on trade and export (Mamatey 1973a: 142-143) – as seen, the unemployment increase was even bigger than in Germany.

### Table 5.1: Per capita GDP for selected years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>1913</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1937</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4,181</td>
<td>4,304</td>
<td>4,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2,057</td>
<td>2,724</td>
<td>1,799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>2,112</td>
<td>2,918</td>
<td>2,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2,288</td>
<td>2,885</td>
<td>3,638</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Broadberry and Klein (2011: 24).*
Inequality theories come in two versions. One focuses on general income inequality, which is also measured in Gini coefficients (e.g. Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006); the other focuses on landholding inequality (e.g. Ziblatt 2008; Ansell and Samuels 2014). Table 5.3 includes measures of income inequality and its change during the interwar period. Income inequality measures for the pre-1945 period are generally scarce and the one data source available for this period is problematic in that several countries’ values of inequality are estimates of other countries (see the discussion by Ansell and Samuels 2014: 100-101). For my purpose of an analysis of a few countries, it thus seems more appropriate to use abstracts of income inequality from case studies. With this in mind, it seems that income inequality was equally high and declining in Finland, Germany, and Spain, whereas it was generally lower and more stable through the interwar period in Czechoslovakia. However, the measure does not capture the separate dynamic of the enormous interregional inequalities in Czechoslovakia instituted by the Czech dominance in state employment, business, and industry over the Slovaks (notably Hungarians in Slovakia), Ruthenians, and, partly, the Sudeten Germans (see Rothschild 1974: 91-92; Glassheim 2005). One should thus be careful in concluding that income inequalities in Czechoslovakia did not matter. But since income inequalities were rather alike across the four cases, they add relatively little to our understanding of the democratic fates among the four cases.
Landholding inequality is another possible explanation. The percentage of family farms relative to all cultivated land indicates equality in rural areas (a family farm employs no more than four people and the family owns and cultivates the land). The agrarian proletariat measures the number of land-poor peasants (working on big estates) relative to the labor force and thus indicates the political significance of this rural proletariat for the entire working class. The family farms measure shows that Spain had the highest rates of landholding inequality by far, followed by Czechoslovakia, Finland, and Germany in close proximity. Again, the rankings should have been different – with Germany being more unequal than Czechoslovakia and Finland – according to a mono-causal inequality explanation. As far as the potential significance of these inequalities for working class movements, Finland had the biggest agrarian proletariat in a highly agrarian economy, closely followed by Spain. Also puzzling is Czechoslovakia’s agrarian proletariat, which was more significant than the German one. The puzzling rankings are thus reproduced.

Inequalities and a predominance of agricultural modes of production and a less educated, less strong middle class sector as indicated by GDP/capita probably played important roles in fueling tensions during the economic crises of the interwar period. But that is not the same as saying that they were the most decisive factors, or even decisive at all, in the destabilization of the four cases examined here. In line with the general theoretical framework of Figure 3.1, the latest thrust of research on interwar democratic stability (e.g. Mann 2004; Capoccia 2005; Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010; Kopstein and Wittenberg 2010) highlights how the socioeconomic stresses and political prob-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Agrarian proletariat (percent of total primary labor force)</th>
<th>Family farms (% 1928)</th>
<th>Income inequality level</th>
<th>Income inequality change from 1919 to 1939 (approx.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Decline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Decline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Stable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Decline</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Luebbert (1987: 462). ‘Agrarian proletariat’ is defined as landless workers or smallholders who are dependent on the agrarian labor market for some part of their income. Income inequality levels and changes are approximations based on historical sources, primarily Jung (2011: 30) (Germany); Prados de la Escosura (2008: 8) (Spain); Rothschild (1974: 9091), Miller (1999: 56) (Czechoslovakia); and Morrisson (2000: 228-229) (Finland). The family farms measure is taken from Vanhanen (2003) and is measured once every ten years (1918, 1928, and 1938). For matters of simplicity, I choose 1928 since this most closely approximates the inequality facing the four cases through the years of political instability.
lems with which democratic leaders were faced were never insurmountable, not even in the most underdeveloped areas of Eastern Europe. Mann (2004: 38) and Capoccia (2005: 7) specifically argue that the frontier zone of democracies was situated between the Northwestern and Southwestern parts of Europe with the peculiar trait that they could go either way because the pro-democratic and anti-democratic forces were of roughly equal sizes and political significance.

Germany, Spain, Czechoslovakia, and Finland were indeed such frontier zone democracies. Mann (2004: 41) notes that Spain experienced the most prolonged period of contest between authoritarianism and democracy even though it was one of the least industrialized countries in interwar Europe. As perhaps the most reliable measure of this, votes were distributed in five lumps during the Second Republic’s democracy from 1931 to 1936-1937: about 30% were outright anti-democratic (10% anarcho-syndicalist abstaining from voting and 20% anti-republican right) and the rest were split in three equally large groups between center and center-left parties. Some conservatives were always ambiguous about democracy as a principle (Mann 2004: 308). In Germany, authoritarian forces peaked at 40% of the vote in 1930-1932 (communists and Nazis were in fact capable of mustering a majority in parliament, thus enfeebling it) while the regime from the start had substantial anti-democratic forces of communists and monarchists. From 1928 in particular, voters left the center-right parties and the Social Democrats notably to join NSDAP (Mann 2004: 41; Capoccia 2005: 9). Anti-democratic support was no less significant in Czechoslovakia and Finland. Support for anti-democratic parties peaked in Czechoslovakia in 1935 at over 30% of the vote. Through the 1920s, communists always achieved around 10%, and from the 1930s, Sudeten German and other minority group parties along with fascist national parties entered the scene (Capoccia 2005: 12, 14, 37-38). Finland seems even more puzzling as anti-democratic parties occupied a stable and significant share of the parliamentary seats in the 1920s, peaking at a third from 1930 to 1931. Unlike in many other countries, the communist threat and the fascist reaction were very real when measured in electoral support (Capoccia 2005: 11, 14, 41).

As these numbers tell us, we may place Germany, Spain, Czechoslovakia, and Finland to the right in Figure 3.1 among the countries with a medium-level development and a large proportion of semi-loyalists positioned to seal the fate of democracy in an otherwise deadlocked competition between loyalists and disloyalists of democracy. In other words, the menu of possible solutions to the problems encountered and the means by which to implement them cannot be explained solely by socioeconomic variables. As I show, matters of stateness must also be taken into account since they determined the
The development of stateness

I begin my analysis with an account of stateness as it developed in the four democracies, starting with monopoly on violence followed by administrative effectiveness and citizenship agreement. This is a first and necessary step in the examination of the seven mechanisms. According to my expectations, stateness should be strongest in Czechoslovakia and Finland and weakest in Germany and Spain – if not, at least some of the mechanisms cannot explain the democratic outcomes of the four countries. If, for instance, monopoly on violence is not disputed, the mechanisms of authoritarian restoration and security delegitimation are logically impossible to observe. Afterwards, I examine the possible existence of any of the seven mechanisms in Germany and Spain. Lastly, I present some of the most widely cited explanations for democratic survival in Czechoslovakia and Finland and how they may be analyzed as mirroring some of the mechanisms.

Any explanation of interwar democracy must somehow deal with the possibility of WWI being a scope condition. As these events shaped domestic and international politics and changed social and economic balances, stateness is of course no exception to such a possibility. I must also deal with the possibility that differences in the specific qualities of the democratic systems in the four countries determined the development and levels of stateness in the interwar period.

But it is not enough to point to WWI or to the qualities of party coalitions and democratic leaderships as explanations for the paths taken by the four countries. Whereas WWI produced grievances in Germany, Spain remained neutral and largely untouched by the war. Czechoslovakia and Finland did indeed contrast both Germany and Spain by emerging from WWI as so-called successor states of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires, respectively, but surprisingly, stateness developed quickly. This contrasts with other Eastern European successor states such as Lithuania and Poland where stateness remained highly problematic.

Czechoslovakia’s and Finland’s largely successful building of stateness could be explained by certain broad national coalitions putting aside political differences for the greater cause of building and preserving a newly independent state. Even though there was a great deal of unity across class divides, particularly in the executive power in Finnish and Czechoslovak politics, around the task of state-building, this was at first formed by force (a civ-
il war in 1918 and a strained process of constitution writing in Finland and the occupation of Slovak and Sudeten lands by Czech armies, Mamatey 1973b: 33; Siltala 2015) and repression (exclusion of communists from forming political organizations in Finland and limits on minority rights and purges of German bureaucrats in Czechoslovakia, Anckar 1986: 266; Alapuro 1988: 204-205; Orzoff 2009). It is thus hard to see the Finnish and Czechoslovak states and nations as the result of democratic elections or deliberate design by democratic leaders. Figuring out and determining how to build new states and nations in these two countries seemed to have preceded the inauguration of democracy.

Coalitions for reform of the state apparatus were also present at key moments during the democratic spells of Germany and Spain. In Germany, pro-democratic coalitions, often led by the Social Democrats, attempted to implement civil service reforms on numerous occasions during the 1910s and 1920s but failed due to resistance from the civil service itself (although it was also largely backed by the conservatives). When some reforms (notably salary cuts) were enforced, the civil service turned against the political leadership (Caplan 1988). Additionally, the alignment between the Social Democrats and the old generals of the Reichswehr in 1918 was an absolute necessity for public order – it was not the preference of the democratic leadership (Haffner 1973: Ch. 7). Similarly, Spain’s republican president Azana was backed by democratic parties in 1931-1932 and successfully implemented extensive reforms of the military, which, however, caused the resentment that later united generals in the fight against the republic (Payne 1967: 281-283, 315).

In sum, one cannot understand the state- and nation-building paths of the four countries taken during and after the war without analyzing their pre-WWI patterns of state- and nation-building under imperial-autocratic leaderships and the path dependencies they established for the interwar period (see Mann 2004: 31-39).

Germany

The monopoly on violence of German security forces was disputed throughout the period. The resource supremacy of the security forces in Germany as it appeared from WWI had its origins in the unification of Germany in 1871. In Wilhelmine Germany (the period until 1914), there was never agreement on the extent of centralization of, particularly, policing systems. Centralization was particularly opposed by Bavaria but also by other large Länder outside Prussia. Each region in the Reich had its own military and police force over which it would like to keep control (Mulligan 2002; Ziblatt 2006: 112).
Even though administrative unity under a federal model was achieved with quite extraordinary success, cooperation and coordination between regions on security matters had to be managed on a fragile case-by-case basis (Ziblatt 2006: 129-130; Palmowski 2008: 549). There was, however, never any doubt that the police had the capacity – though, as we will see, not necessarily the willingness – in every state and locality to strike down on criminals and establish public order (Liang 1969: 159, 162).

The military was more problematic as regards the ability of a centralized command of sufficient resources. The defeat in WWI was a material blow to the German army but it could still muster an overwhelming force against any revolutionary attempt in 1918. To combat communists in the violent revolutionary days of 1918, the army accepted that the Freikorps, originally created in the 18th century as volunteer corps, were revitalized. Yet, the Freikorps remained genuinely paramilitary in nature opposing both civil politics and the rigid hierarchy of the old military elite (Snyder 1966: 27-28, 33; Elias 1996: 217-218; Crim 2007).\(^{29}\) From the very beginning of the republic, the military resources were thus factionalized in paramilitary and ordinary army units (Heiber 1993: 54-55). As Mann (2004: 153) and Gerwath and Horne (2011) note, from 1919 and the early 1920s, Weimar politicians did not have a monopoly on the means of violence since it was the Freikorps outside the control of the Reichswehr that instituted public order. After it became known that the Freikorps had taken part in the Beer Hall Putsch of 1923 on the side of NSDAP (Waite 1952: 196-197), their importance waned and the army and police forces established a firm grip on the monopoly on violence. With the Great Depression from 1929, political violence became the order of the day in the republic, especially in and around Berlin and in Prussian and Bavarian cities, but rather than insufficient resources the problem was a lack of commitment to ending violence (Rosenhaft 1983: 1-3; Elias 1996: 217; Schumann 2009: 251-252).

The professionalism and cohesion of the German army (and police) is widely recognized as one of the strongest in Europe, owing its structures to the Prussian Hohenzollern kings in the 18th century who built it. It was still the backbone of the German empire from 1871 (Braun 1975: 276-277; Weber 1978; Ziblatt 2006). Building on a strict hierarchy, meritocratic recruitment, discipline and loyalty to the emperor, this even remained the great authority and power of German society in 1918 even though WWI, as general Moltke

\(^{29}\) Paramilitary groups were connected with the political parties. Most were organized by right-wing parties (e.g. Stahlhelm and SA) but SPD and the liberal DDP also had close connections with Eiserne Front and Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold while KPD had its own Rotfrontkämpferbund.
noted, was a military disaster of miscalculations and acts of hubris by the “Pan-German-militaristic-conservative combine” (Craig 1978: 395).30

The final assessment of the monopoly on violence of German security forces would thus seem to hinge on relationships with politicians and politics more generally. Were they subordinate, in principle and in mind, to the governments of the Weimar republic? Police forces were generally less politicized than the military forces and, apart from local squads in Bavaria, largely abstained from paramilitary activities. They remained a very visible and strong symbol of law and order (Liang 1969: 159, 162). Police forces cracked down on protests by rightists and leftists alike on various occasions in 1918, 1923, and 1927. And even though problems of control with the police grew from 1930 this is hard to trace back to fundamental disagreements with the Weimar governments over their organizational powers. Rather, the police enjoyed the discretion they preferred and did not interfere in politics. Control issues instead reflected the general turn to the right of German civil servants from 1928 and the emergency decree rule from 1930, which naturally exacerbated authoritarian attitudes in any policing force (see Liang 1969: 172; Mann 2004: 164-165; Goeschel 2013: 68).

The subordination of the military was much more problematic. The relationship between the political governments of Weimar and the Reichswehr was established in the critical years of WWI. Especially during WWI, the executive gradually got out of the hands of the Reichstag and the king. Due to continued disputes with chief of staff of the Reichswehr, Moltke, and the need to rebuild the degenerating Austro-Hungarian army, the government asked the generals, Ludendorff and Hindenburg, for help. By November 1916, these generals and the Reichswehr command had taken full control of the executive and established a military dictatorship. But the Reichstag and the Chancellor did not give up their powers voluntarily (Snyder 1966: 27-28; Schumann 2009: 3). From 1917, the military, the Chancellor, and the Reichstag were constantly negotiating how to organize executive powers (Craig 1978: 380-381). The army high command notably led an openly hostile campaign against Chancellor Bethmann in 1917 on accusations that he was neglecting to mobilize enough military resources (Craig 1978: 386). As noted by Craig (1978: 377-378), the army high command did not trust civil politicians and bureaucrats with executive power in a time of total war.

These disagreements resulted from more than the pure pressure of war. They had their origins in the constitutional settlement of the executive power

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30 Meritocracy did not preclude a certain social class bias in recruitment patterns with the general staff recruiting from aristocratic families while the middle class was limited to reserve officer positions.
in 1848. Bismarck and chief of staff Moltke were famous for their internal disagreements and intrigues. For instance, Moltke kept Bismarck at arm’s length in Prussia’s war with France because he resented any political interference in what he saw as exclusive military-strategic business (Craig 1978: 31). From 1883, the army managed to persuade Bismarck to strip the parliament of all its powers over the military organization and budget. This stemmed from the military conviction that “the army was a church that needed worshippers and expected them to bring gifts but had no intention of giving them vestry privileges” (Craig 1978: 53). But the Reichstag, the crown, the army, and Chancellor remained in constant battle over the means of executive power, not least because of a complicated system of checks and balances and because the Reichswehr simply resented politics, especially parliamentary discussions. This civil-military relationship repeated itself during WWI, and in 1918 the general attitude of the officer corps was that a restoration of the monarchy or a military dictatorship was the better solution (Craig 1978: 32–33, 54; Böckenförde 1985: 10).

On 10 November 1918, the social democratic Chancellor Ebert, against the wishes of most of the now powerful Social Democratic Party, phoned chief of staff, general Gröner, and promised that the army would remain a ‘state within the state’, including the imperial privileges of controlling its own budget and having officers corps organized as independent agencies outside the ministry of war, in return for its support for the Weimar republic, its democratic leadership, and the installation of public order (Haffner 1973: Ch. 7; Craig 1978: 161, 404). In the aftermath, the Social Democrats proposed to make the military a popular militia but Ebert succumbed to the fierce resistance of Gröner and the military’s number two, von Schleicher, in a repetition of what happened at the constitutional negotiations of 1848 (Craig 1978: 405–406). The relationship between the soldier and the politicians of Weimar remained conflictual.

During the critical days at the end of WWI, the army used its unity, power, and strong professional stand to secure its long-established autonomy from political interference against, first, a weak emperor and, second, a chancellor strained by the urgent need for military assistance to hinder revolution – much to the disappointment of the left and center-left parties of the Reichstag (Lepsius 1978: 44, 46; Schumann 2009: 252). The army insisted that this would have threatened its professional autonomy. In turn, it closed around its own priorities and military pride (Carsten 1973: 72–74; Mann 2004: 199). Whereas this was the story of the high-level command, which remained deeply resentful of the Nazi movement and the SA and SS even in 1933, lower-level officers were often easy recruits for the SA and among the NSDAP constituency but only because of the same hatred of parliamentary
politics that guided the whole military body (Mann 2004: 199; see also Huntington 1957: 112).

The German administration was ineffective throughout the period and the ineffectiveness in many ways mirrored that of the security forces. The origins of the Weimar administration lie in late 17th century Prussia when the Hohenzollern kings centralized and refined the military organization and empowered the administration (Fischer and Lundgreen 1975: 510-517; Braun 1975: 276-277). Even though hiring and firing of bureaucrats was managed politically, by the kings personally or by commissions under royal supervision, this process effectively root out patrimonial tendencies at the central levels of administration by recruiting middle-class people on the basis of merits and in-job performance (Fischer and Lundgreen 1975: 521-522; Ertman 1997: 248, 253-254). In 1794, a code established the class of professional civil servants, the Beamtenstand. Only a decade later, in 1807, all state offices were opened to competition on the basis of merit, and the king’s personal advisory board was dissolved and replaced by ministries. The Prussian bureaucracy here gained the meritocratic features that are famous of most analyses of Germany after unification in 1871 (Gillis 1971: 6-7, 11). At the same time, Prussia’s particular power position during the revolutionary period from 1848 to 1871 ensured the penetration of its administrative structures across the now German imperial territory (Ziblatt 2006: 113-115).

To analyze administrative effectiveness in the democratic period from 1919, we must acknowledge the interaction between meritocracy, and notably the accompanying attribute of bureaucratic autonomy, and bureaucratic responsiveness. This is rarely shown in comparative analyses focused on state capacity (see e.g. Ertman 1997; Kurtz 2013: 238), but most historical accounts (see e.g. Muncy 1947; Bracher 1970: 72; Jeserich, Pohl, and von Unruh 1985; Caplan 1988; Mommsen 1991; McElligott 2014) of the development of German bureaucracy, including Max Weber’s (1978: 224), draw a much more complex picture of political-bureaucratic conflict and at least a questionable responsiveness.

From the 18th century, the bureaucracy excelled in revenue collection, was financed and equipped, and thus developed a self-sufficient attitude very well aware that any Prussian king was completely dependent upon its effort and expertise (Fischer and Lundgreen 1975: 510-517). This provoked the king to tie and discipline the bureaucracy via the Calvinist revolution (Sheehan 1989: 63; Gorski 2003: 80) but, somewhat ironically, it was also a primary reason for the further strengthening of bureaucratic autonomy by the civil service acts of 1794 and 1807, in which university-educated bureaucratic elites eroded royal power (for the king’s dilemmas in this regard, see Rosenberg 1958: Ch. 9; Sheehan 1989: 142).
While the responsiveness of the administration of the early 19th century was substantially strengthened at the central levels, the Junkers at the decentralized level retained their local-administrative authority and right to nominate candidates for the main office of local administration, that is, county commissioner in the Landrat (Braun 1975: 273). In matters of land, agriculture, and taxation, the Junkers’ interests differed substantially from those of the king. This reliance on traditional patrimonial institutions worried the kings continuously but, given the Junkers’ economic power and position as controllers of peasants, purging of Junkers was not an option (Sheehan 1989: 40). Based on Heinrich Stein’s reforms in 1807, the Beamten came to see themselves as ‘Plato’s Guardian Class’ and achieved the means to drive out the legislative power of the royal household (Rosenberg 1958: Ch. 9; Gillis 1971: 16, 172; Mommsen 1991:79). The bureaucracy was deeply engaged and sure of its prerogative in policy-making by virtue of its power of knowledge and organization. Through the constitutional process in 1848-1851, it circumvented some of the king’s desires to survive as an independent political force and class (Sheehan 1989: 719-720). A bureaucratic authoritarian system had taken hold (Rosenberg 1958).

Bismarck managed to align bureaucracy by strict enforcement of disciplinary laws and by presenting a conservative-nationalist program that appealed to the bureaucracy (Caplan 1979: 206). But tellingly, as several accounts (e.g. Friedrich 1933: 201; Mann 1985: 85-86; Mommsen 1991: 79) confirm, after Bismarck’s withdrawal from power, various different governments experienced implementation problems because bureaucracy ran its own course. Because Bismarck rarely had reliable control of the Reichstag, he ordered his assistant, Puttkammer, to reform the civil service in the 1880s with the effect of making it completely autonomous in relation to the Reichstag – even purges of civil servants with allegedly working class or liberal preferences occurred (Craig 1978: 157-158). The bureaucracy saw circumvention of parliamentary and government policies to the protection of the nation state as its primary entitlement (Gillis 1971: 33; Mann 1985: 85-86), notably when the Social Democratic Party dominated parliament (Mommsen 1991: 79). The opposition to social democrats and parliamentarism united the high-level bureaucracy and the Junkers in the estates (Bonham 1983: 650). Politics thus stalemate until 1914 as it was organized in two halves: one in the Reichstag and a separate one in the civil service that pursued its own agendas (Craig 1978: 251).

Because of Germany’s peculiar situation in the interwar period of parliamentary inaction, responsiveness is particularly difficult to assess. Let us look at three of the most salient issues in Weimar Germany: civil service reform, socioeconomics, and law and order. First, constitutional negotiation in
1918-1919 was in many ways a replay of earlier political-administrative interaction despite the unusual circumstance of military defeat. SPD and DDP opted for a radical break with the past by democratizing the civil service. They did not trust the old monarchical elite servants and sought to purge them but they met considerable resistance from the Beamten bureaucrats, who were supported by the politische Beamten in the conservative party, DVP, and higher-level servants in the ministries (Runge 1965: 36-38). Reforms eventually stalled as SDP and DDP quickly realized that a rebuilding of Germany demanded the old bureaucracy’s expertise and sheer size (Böckenförde 1985: 15-16). The bureaucracy organized a trade union, DBB, with the clear purpose of protecting civil service interests against parliamentary politics and the working class ideology (Caplan 1988: 59-61). Throughout the 1920s, this union and unorganized lower civil servants simply circumvented reforms that, for instance, would change criteria for career advancement. Otherwise, department heads used their intimate connection with conservative parliamentarians to stall further reform policies (Runge 1965: 119).

From the late 1920s and under Chancellor Heinrich Brüning from 1930, cutbacks and rationalization grew more substantial and were enforced (Caplan 1988: 76-77). As a result, the bureaucracy retained its autonomy from political pressures (Craig 1978: 420). This broke the confidence between these lower-level bureaucrats and the government institution – policymaking between the governments and the ministerial departments was often a knot in the dynamic of parliamentary stalemate (Caplan 1988: 94-95).

Second, fiscal and monetary management was generally very effective despite the difficult economic circumstances, and economic policies were generally closely in line with the political executive (Müller 2014). However, the most radical socialist reforms were often redirected in the ministries (Mäding 1985: 96). An example is the implementation of the 8-hour working day, which was effective at first, but employers quickly led hours increase to the traditionally high levels while the responsible ministries gave their tacit support (McElligott 2014: 79). Not all ministries were opposed to socialist or Keynesian policies as shown in Müller’s (2014) analysis of the ministry of economics. Nonetheless, even the labor ministry, which was dominated by socialists and trade unions, was taken over by conservative civil servants from 1924 (Liu 1997: 363).

Third, judges were among the oldest, most conservative civil servants. They saw the shifting governments inherent in a democracy as a threat to the integrity of their call. Specifically, they saw social democratic governments as a threat to law and order. Therefore, their court rulings became increasingly biased towards conservative values (McElligott 2014: 100-103). This situa-
tion was even more characteristic in the Länder where Junkers still dominated and practiced regular breaches of administrative protocols (McElligott 2014: 172). Generally, it is noted that judges via their rulings and public deliberations sought to undermine the symbols of the republic (Craig 1978: 420).

The professional and meritocratic features of the German administration thus contributed to unresponsiveness in many key respects, most notably on the issue of civil service reform and in court rulings but also to some extent in socioeconomic affairs. Unresponsiveness reached far into the high-level and central ranks but was most severe in local matters. An indication of the unresponsiveness is that civil servants were overrepresented among voters of NSDAP as their “rightism probably blended a very broad sense of occupational self-interest with a more ideological nation-statism” (Mann 2004: 165).

Lastly, citizenship disagreement prevailed in Weimar Germany throughout the period. In 1862, Prime Minister Bismarck of Prussia inaugurated a process of nation-building via federalization of neighboring dynasties with Prussia as the political center (Breuilly 1990: 659; Ziblatt 2006: 12-13). The process continued until 1914 and the components of mutual acceptance between population groups and state legitimacy were thus very much intertwined. Reunion was a fact from 1871 and created strong senses of German nationalism; not so much by ethnic revolution as by negotiation of each German subnation’s economic terms in a greater Germany (Ziblatt 2006: 128). However, some significant traits of citizenship disagreement developed. The population at large, but especially to the east, pledged greater loyalty to their locality, region, or dynasty (Breuilly 1990: 661), and new laws of naturalization caused national divisions among Germans by separating national identities along ethnic lines (see Brubaker 1995: 202) – notably the large Polish minority and the self-assured region of Bavaria. Importantly, the demand of attachment to a historical ethnic-German community only augmented existing ethnic divisions and caused xenophobia, conflicts, and political violence against Jews, Catholics, Slavs, and Poles (Breuilly 1990: 667; Haselbach 1998; Preuss 2003; Gosewinkel 2008).

Most notably, the sometimes excessive and aggressive nationalism reflected the weakness of a common German national identity. As Craig (1978: 55) notes, the unification of Germany could neither be seen as a new creation or a product of the past. The identity of Germans was therefore ambiguous and split between the imperial past and the place of Germany in a modernizing world (Craig 1978: 55). Liberals, intellectuals, and conservatives alike were wary of the new constitution of 1851 and the federal system of 1871.
There was never any agreement on national symbols and only the personal cult of Bismarck could temporarily unite Germans (Craig 1978: 58-59).

Germany’s territorial losses in WWI caused no significant changes to its ethnic composition (Brubaker 1995). The popular and integrative idea of a *Grossdeutschland* was shattered. The combination of this meltdown and the minority protection and territorial concessions of the Versailles Treaty and the Paris Conference nurtured an extreme nationalism among many Germans aimed at national cleansing (Bracher 1970: 68; Breuilly 1990: 667; Schönwälder 1996: 50; Mann 2004: 83; Sammartino 2008: 59). How to interpret this racism in terms of the two components of citizenship agreement? First of all, Germany was an undersized state and much of the attraction of the racist ideology lay in the promise of regaining the lost territories of WWI (and perhaps even more). For instance, the so-called internal threat of the Jews could never be true as Jews constituted 0.76 % of the total population (Mann 2004: 141). There were significant minorities inside the diminished German territory of 1918. One estimate (see Schönwälder 1996: 54) indicates 1.5-2.25 million. Germans were particularly xenophobic towards Poles and conflicts with Slavs were generally profound (Schönwälder 1996: 50; Hanson and Kopstein 1997: 258-259; Gosewinkel 2008: 35). Thus, although ethnic heterogeneity was lower than in many contemporary European states, it would be exaggerated to speak of mutual acceptance among the ethnic groups.

State legitimacy was arguably a much bigger problem. The ambiguity of a German national identity was only exacerbated by the losses in WWI (Craig 1978: 59; Haselbach 1998: 117; Sammartino 2008: 59). Owing to federalism, national identity was based on ethnicity rather than territory but no ethnic unity could be achieved under conditions of changing territorial borders (Breuilly 1990: 666; Preuss 2003: 42). The abstract and empty notion of citizenship rights inherent to the liberal constitution of the Weimar Republic came to symbolize any flaw of the German state and was seen as allied with the minority groups, notably the Jews (Breuilly 1990: 670; Caldwell 2008: 41).

Summing up, the stateness of Weimar Germany was weak in many respects. On balance of the components of each of the three attributes, monopoly on violence was disputed and administrative ineffectiveness and citizenship disagreements prevailed. It is particularly worth noting that monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness were much weaker than studies of Prussia-Germany in comparative politics and democratization normally indicate. Not because these studies underestimate the capacity or professionalism of the security forces and civil servants, but rather because such a focus tends to neglect that military and bureaucratic autonomy sometimes
and in some areas of governance caused unresponsiveness and thus enfeebled the implementation ability of political executives, from Bismarck, through post-Bismarckian Wilhelmine Germany, and into the Weimar Republic. Additionally, a one-sided focus on ethnic demographic composition would lead to the wrong conclusions about Germany’s citizenship agreement. Severe state illegitimacy, resulting from a weak and factionalized national identity, undermined citizenship agreement. As with monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness, we need more than one component to measure citizenship agreement.

Spain

The state and nation of Spain were completely different entities from the German ones. Indeed, it is much clearer from the literature on Spain that stateness was contested on all parameters. However, by virtue of the disaggregated focus on stateness, interwar democratic Spain appears as weak as Germany in terms of the attributes of stateness. It is thus worth it to review Spain’s stateness in a fine-grained fashion as well.

Spain’s monopoly on violence was disputed throughout the period. There is relative agreement in the literature on the inherently weak cohesion and gradual demise of the resource supremacy and subordination of the security forces during the Second Republic. Resource supremacy of the Spanish army and civil guards (police) was intact in 1931 but old legacies of territorial dispute at the outskirts of the Spanish empire made this position incredibly fragile, even in the Iberian core as they were underequipped and threatened by leftist and regional insurgencies (Brenan 1950: 60; Alpert 2013: 2). The fragmented nature of the Spanish state as established during the renaissance and early period of imperialism was only augmented by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which marked the start of the gradual disintegration of the Spanish imperial state. Through the 19th century and culminating in the Cuban War of Independence in 1898, monopoly on violence was dramatically weakened as violent, revolutionary conflicts on the Iberian Peninsula between liberalists and Carlists as well as wars of independence in the colonies decimated the state security forces by roughly 100,000 and provoked the Spanish tradition of guerilla warfare (de Blaye 1976: 15-16; Carr 1982: 108; Payne 2006: 2).

Despite being battled on numerous occasions, the regular Spanish army achieved control over the means of violence from 1840 continuing through Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship from 1923 to 1930 (Carr 1982: 215). To quell urban violence and protect the republic, Prime Minister Azana established the Republican Assault Guard in 1931 – in itself an indication of the fragility
of the resource supremacy against the growing number of Anarcho-Syndicalists (Mann 2004: 337). Yet, it was not until early 1936 that the state security forces lost the ability to essentially muster a unified apparatus of violence with the decisive split between civil guards and the Republican Assault Guard over the aims of their mission as well as the entry of Franco’s Moroccan army (Mann 2004: 38; Payne 2006: 168; Alpert 2013: 21).

The cohesion of the security forces was weak during the democratic spell. Army competence was never maximized since the army functioned as a cadre recruiting the sons of its officers from a very young age (Mann 2004: 301). The army and the civil guards were also notoriously oversized, inefficient, and factionalized (Alpert 2013: 21). Divisions stemmed from different stances on the monarchic-republican divide from the 19th century while oversize was a result of several short-sighted decisions in defense of public order through the 1910s and 1920s as well as a rigid officer class in constant conflict with the ordinary soldier ranks, which were more open to fresh recruits (Brenan 1950: 59-65; de Blaye 1976: 18). Reforms in the first years of the Second Republic changed the balance in favor of the ordinary soldiers and reduced the number of formal army divisions from 16 to 8 (de Blaye 1976: 28; Payne 2006: 18). Nevertheless, military professionalism only dominated in certain ranks of the military while policing was still much of an amateur, guerilla business (Carr 1982: 559; Mann 2004: 313, 339; Parra-Pérez 2013).

Two features of the Spanish security forces grew into severe contestation with the political level from 1932. First, while the police, and especially the Republican Assault Guard, was bound to the republic in appointment and ethics, for instance in effective dissolution of demonstrations and violent crowds in the transition year of 1931 (Brenan 1950: 254), the upper ranks of the military and some parts of the civil guards, with their corporate spirits, soon became alienated from the republic in reaction to Azana’s military budget cuts and creation of the Republican Guard, respectively (Bernecker 2000: 419; Mann 2004: 336-337).

The military’s reaction was ambiguous at first. Many of the most disloyal officers of Rivera’s time were purged by Azana immediately in 1931, and the officer corps was generally tired of engagement in politics. They wanted to ‘return to the barracks’ (Payne 1967: 277). Azana’s reforms were as mild as they could be given the detrimental state of the military organization at the time. Still, considerable changes were made: The officer corps and expenses were radically reduced, and an explicit ‘democratization’ of the military in terms of the initiation of standards of services and compulsory military training for all adult men was carried through in 1932 (Payne 1967: 267, 272). Most of the military quietly accepted these reforms due to a mixture of disillusionment of having to engage in politics and sheer ignorance of the conse-
quences of the reforms. It left the lower cadres in a state of shock; instead of resisting ‘bottom up’, anarchy and moral destitution came to characterize their service from this point (Payne 1967: 267, 274).

The more conservative, typically higher level, officers, reacted with outright resistance. Tellingly, the Moroccan army, the so-called Africanists, was hit the hardest by the reforms and protested most loudly. Three generals, Franco, Sanjurjo, and Mola, became central figures. Franco was deeply resentful of the reforms, which closed the general academy in Zaragoza where he was director. Sanjurjo, alienated in particular by the Catalan Autonomy Statute but for which he shared feelings with most of the Carlist high command, conspired to end republican rule in a failed coup d’état in 1932 (Payne 1967: 281-283).

Africanists were not alone in their resistance to the reforms. Since the 1898 war, the military had developed a comprehensive statist ideology that coincided with the officers’ attraction to ideas of integral modernization, conservatism, and nationalism – all with a class bias against any socialist or republican order (Brenan 1950: 59; Mann 2004: 301, 336). They were used to engaging in the politics of Spain and at times provided the decisive breaks when civilian politicians exhausted their possibilities for action (Mann 2004: 301). Generally, military generals were dissatisfied with inadequate incomes, slow promotions, and misfortunate wars in Morocco along with the decimation of the empire in the 19th and early 20th centuries (Payne 1967: 123). Civilian-military tensions continued through Bieno Negro from 1934 to 1936 although the shift to a more right-centered government, including the return of Franco and other decimated generals to more influential positions, temporarily softened relations somewhat (Payne 1967: Ch. 16). Thus, military contestation was high since it wanted more autonomy than any government was willing to grant.

The story of administrative effectiveness is very similar to that of monopoly on violence: encompassing problems of politicization and a lack of professionalism deeming the administration ineffective throughout the period. Although overlapping jurisdictions and contradictory legislations and hostility between regional administrations allowed considerable local deviations (Irigoin and Grafe 2008: 179), territorial penetration was paradoxically achieved with the 1898 war of independence against Cuba, which established with greater clarity the territory of Spain exclusively to the Iberian Peninsula. Taking territorial penetration as a condition of minimum broadening of administrative orders to the outskirts of the country, much of the administrative dispute with Catalonia was solved by giving Catalonia its own government despite great political conflicts and institutional differences (Linz 1978b: 156; Payne 2006: 21).
Like many other state administrations in Southern Europe at the time, the implementation of meritocratic procedures in Spain was either absent or clustered in certain sectors and regions (Blakeley 2001). This left pockets of relative efficiency and effectiveness, which make it difficult to assess net effectiveness. But at least in the most central economic sector, agricultural production, and the judicial system patronage and politicization dominated as the politically elected civil governors backed the local party bosses, caciques, in the distribution of public jobs and judges (Lapuente and Rothstein 2014: 14). This was an old system from before the 19th century when Spanish monarchs relied on patronage payment of landed elites for decentralized administration but ran dry of administrative compliance whenever patronage became scarce or regional conflicts escalated (Blakeley 2001: 78). As Irigoin and Grafe (2008: 179) note: “Author after author suggests that that the traditional phrase by which officials and subjects could choose ‘to obey but not comply with’ [...] royal orders was not an empty formula. Fragmented and overlapping jurisdictions allowed for legal challenges, negotiation, pleading, or outright refusal of royal demands”.

The introduction of the spoils system (Turno Pacífico) in the 19th century obviously consolidated politicization, now as cycles of party patronage dominating appointment to the civil service. It was refined under the Restoration system from 1874 and reintroduced in 1931 to complete a cleaner democratic transition (Moreno-Luzon 2007: 417-418). Despite the intension to obtain greater control of civil servants and reforms to increase regional uniformity and meritocracy, reforms stalled and corruption lingered on (Carr 1982: 64; Irigoin and Grafe 2008: 180). Similarly, meritocracy was formally established in 1918 with the Civil Act but in practice, the spoils system dominated administrative staffing. Some ministerial positions were protected against political hiring and firing when governments changed during the Second Republic but many, including in local administrations, were politicized (Moreno-Luzon 2007: 417-418).

Implementation consequently stalled and was inconsistent and drained by corruption in central areas such as agrarian reform where politicians, quite to the contrary, seemed steadfast on change (Malefakis 1971: 169, 242; Blakeley 2001: 86). The control of implementation orchestrated by the local party bosses (caciques), the manipulated Jurados Mixtos, and the heavily skewed influence of landowners (latifundistas) formed a typical triangle of administrative politicization (Malefakis 1971: 169; Moreno-Luzon 2007: 418). Similar to this conservation of agricultural interests by patronage elites, the spoils system had the effect of biasing certain sectors of the administration, notably the judicial system and civil governors who applied the law
in biased ways as they were hired party loyalists of either left or right governments (Lapuente and Rothstein 2014: 15-16).

Finally, citizenship disagreements prevailed throughout the period. That interethnic acceptance and state legitimacy were disputed in 20th century Spain is beyond dispute in the literature. Even though the Spanish state matured over several centuries, nationalism remained comparatively weak while regionalism thrived (de Blaye 1976: 16; Payne 1995: 252; Beramendi 1999: 80-81; Cagigal 2008: 1-2). With the Cuban War of Independence in 1898, there were four main, competing national identities based partly on ethnicity and language, partly on economic order: Spanish or Castile, which was the majoritarian and dominant political power, and Catalan, Basque, and Galician, which were all highly organized and territorially specified (Beramendi 1999: 81, 88). Apart from this, Spaniards owed their natural loyalty to el pueblo, that is, the village or province, which created intraregional factions (Carr 1982: 58; Payne 2006: 21).

Spain’s neutrality in WWI only meant that social integrative problems were left unsolved (Carr 1982: 430). In 1919, Lliga, the most important party of Catalonia, could still not agree on a governance model with Madrid. Even worse was the Basque-Madrid relationship. Madrid saw the Basques as backward and uncultivated, and the Basques deeply distrusted Madrid politicians and institutions; some circles outright hated them (Carr 1982: 544, 553-556). During the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera from 1923-1930, Catalans were suppressed and gradually became revolutionary (Carr 1982: 568). So, when Rivera was ousted and the first democratic elections of the Second Republic had taken place in April 1931, deep and widespread conflict remained between the centralists of Castile and the regionalists of Catalonia and the Basque Country (Brenan 1950: 229), the common Spanish national identity was weak, and the central state in Madrid was highly illegitimate (Andrés and Braster 1999: 79; Muro and Quiroga 2004: 26).

Czechoslovakia

Moving on to the two democratic survivors, their status as successor states as indicated draws greater attention to developments during and immediately after WWI. The monopoly on violence of Czechoslovakia’s security forces was disputed in 1918 but became established from 1919 onwards. The consolidation of territorial sovereignty was quickly established after WWI, with the help of the acquisition of old Czechoslovak legionaries and allied support. When power transferred peacefully from the Austrian authorities to the Czechs in the last days of WWI and the independence of the Czechoslovakian Republic was declared on October 18, 1918, there were no armed
forces to extend the sovereignty of the new state (Mamatey 1973b: 27; Wingfield 1989: 10). However, Czech volunteers quickly gathered and extended the territory in swift operations in the winter 1918-1919 and spring of 1919 in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia.

Military takeover of core regions was generally no problem but the German Sudeten lands did not accept the Czechoslovak independence declaration at first. But due to military weaknesses and internal disagreements, the Sudeten could not manage to establish an effective defense and were occupied by the Czechs. This occupation was legitimized in the Treaty of Saint-Germain in 1919 (Wingfield 1989: 10-11). By 1919, the Czech army had increased in number and improved its organization to occupy and subordinate Slovakia and its Hungarian territories, including Ruthenia (Mamatey 1973b: 33). The Paris Peace Conference in 1919 consolidated these borders, including the dispute of the Polish-speaking area of Tesín where Czech occupation had failed (Mamatey 1973b: 34; Rothschild 1974: 76). A combination of allied support (Rothschild 1974: 76-84) and resource advantages secured the Czechs a surprisingly quick and firm grip on the means of violence by 1919. Violent threats to the now Czechoslovak state were few and the upheavals in Ruthenia, Sudeten lands, and Slovakia were effectively contained (Wingfield 1989: 28-33; Orzoff 2009: 62).

Because of this peculiar story of Czechoslovak state-building, and notably the complete dominance of the Czechs in military power and activism as well as the historical importance of Bohemia (see Rothschild 1974: 73-74), the cohesion and subordination of the Czechoslovak security forces must center on the Czechs (or Czechoslovaks). At first, Czech and Slovak legionaries returning from the battle field in Russia formed a strong and effective standing army at the end of WWI. The possibility of setting up militias was precluded (Zückert 2008: 332). In fact, the Czechoslovak army was among the best equipped in Europe at this point (Hrdina III 2005: 23). The military and police were organized along Austrian-Germanic lines as a professional force (Benes 1973: 53; Hrdina III 2005).

Masaryk and the government quickly made it a top priority to ensure the subordination of the forces even though many of them were WWI veterans whose loyalty under the strained war-like conditions during the occupation of Sudetenland and Slovakia was unquestionable (Mamatey 1973b: 29, 34). But as on all other societal matters the strong cult of Masaryk and the Czech ideals of republicanism and egalitarianism helped socialize all security forces into becoming loyal servants of the state (Bradley 2000: 89-92, 96; Zückert 2008: 332). More importantly, the backbone of the Czechoslovak military became the WWI legionaries trained in France and Italy. These soldiers attained a strong sense of Czechoslovak nationalism but unlike the profession-
al ethics of the German army, for example, it had a civic character in which it was biased against no particular societal group but retained an isolated focus on education and merits in military matters, including, as President Benes notes in his memoirs, to “understand all aspects of our political and public life” (Hrdina III 2005: 10-12). This paved the way for a remarkably harmonious relationship with the parliamentary system and the executive power (Hrdina III 2005: 12). The institutionalization of the military as a standing army with the particular professional ethic of the WWI legionaries was consolidated by the Military Law of 1927 and rooted out the few cases of politicization (Wingfield 1989: 82).

The administration was ineffective in 1918 but effective from 1919 onwards. The barrier to administrative effectiveness consisted of disseminating the Prague-based administration to the rest of the new state. This penetration parallels that of extending the power and presence of the security forces. Through 1918 and 1919, the Czech leadership took over the majority of the stationed Austrian civil servants and distributed them alongside police forces in the provinces. In Bohemia and other northern provinces, the pre-WWI administrative structures were maintained only to be occupied by the Czech-Austrian servants whereas the Austrian legal framework and tradition of extensive local administrative autonomy was adopted (Seton-Watson 1945: 146; Benes 1973: 52-53). The Slovak administrative units, relying on much less firm legal frameworks, were occupied by the better educated and organized Czechs (Benes 1973: 82). Through the 1920s, Czech control of Slovak ministerial sections grew, ending in further centralization in 1927. While the dominance of Czechs among the civil servants caused resentment among Slovak servants (Mamatey 1973a: 124, 134), this and other measures of centralized control were generally successful and, at least at first, appreciated by the Slovaks (Seton-Watson 1945: 125; Benes 1973: 93; Hendrych 1993: 43).

The Czech administrative unit, equal to the Czechoslovak administration as such (Rothschild 1974: 113), was professional, relatively competent, law-abiding, conscientious, and free from corruption throughout the interwar period (Seton-Watson 1945: 146; Hendrych 1993: 41; Møller and Skaaning 2010: 338). This was characteristic already before WWI owing to the Austrian-Habsburg administrative structures organized along German principles that dominated in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia (Benes 1973: 88; Møller and Skaaning 2010: 325, 334). Janos (2000: 107-108) notes that on balance Czechoslovakia’s bureaucracy resembled that of East Prussia’s. However, while the court system was firmly autonomous and lived up to ‘Western standards’ of impartiality (Taborsky 1945: 131; Bradley 2000: 97), there was significant politicization of the extant administration during the 1920s and 1930s (Taborsky 1945: 139). As a by-product of the ethnic dominance of
Czechs, what Bradley (2000: 97) has claimed to be the only governmental flaw in the constitutional setup, Germans were purged from the administration in 1919-1920 and substituted by Czechs (Bruegel 1973: 183-186). This ensured remarkable responsiveness to the political signals of the triumvirate of the Castle (a ministerial coordination group led by the president) and Petka (party leaders forging parliamentary coalitions) groups and the presidents Masaryk and Benes (Orzoff 2008; Zückert 2008: 337).

Even though this threatened the impartiality of the administration, the administration generally acted with impartiality, also towards ethnic minorities that were not represented among civil servants – biased policies were generally implemented by order of the government and within legal boundaries (Bruegel 1973: 183-186). Furthermore, the strong Austrian Civil Code kept party patronage to a minimum and directly hindered political hiring and firing (Taborsky 1945: 138). Whereas this Austrian heritage certainly also induced rule focus and stubbornness, the administration generally worked smoothly with shifting government coalitions and in interaction with citizens. The civil servants had become loyal and humble servants of a republican, democratic order from 1918 (Taborsky 1945: 144; Bradley 2000: 97). On balance, meritocracy and responsiveness were strong throughout the interwar period.

Lastly, the entire period was marked by citizenship disagreement. From the start, citizenship agreements were extensive and deep-felt and, as matters of the state-building exercise as such, concerned territory as well as the nature of the state. The numerous and substantial ethnic minorities were incorporated into the Czech state project by force, not consent. In effect, citizenship disagreements were first and foremost territorial conflicts – clashes between different ethnic groups (Rothschild 1974: 76-84). According to estimates, around 50 % ethnic minorities lived inside the Czechoslovak republic that consolidated in 1919 even counting Slovaks as part of the majority (Benes 1973: 39-40; Engman 1989: 122-123). There was a relatively strong unit of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia but millions of Sudeten Germans were scattered in these regions. Additionally, there were Slovaks, Hungarians in Ruthenia, and a small but less problematic Polish minority (Benes 1973: 39-40). The two most problematic groups were the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans. A significant movement for autonomy dominated Slovak politics throughout the interwar period and escalated in the 1920s (Mamatey 1973a: 134). The Sudeten Germans opposed the entire project of Czechoslovakia from the start, became more accommodative in the mid-1920s, but grew actively hostile as reflected in Henlein’s and other secessionist movements from the early 1930s (Leff 1988: Ch. 2; Wingfield 1989).
These were not only different groups by objective criteria temporarily antagonized by the imposition of Czech rules and norms. They were old enemies whose antagonized identities had been shaped and sharpened in interaction with one another. Czechs and Slovaks mutual resentment dated back to their lively and opposing nationalist movements of the 19th century (Mann 2004: 33). During the 1920s, Slovaks increasingly came to see the Czechs as overly confident and disrespectful towards Slovak ethnicity, whereas the Czechs saw the Slovaks as a backward, conservative people (Benes 1973: 46; Mamatey 1973a: 149). Germans and Czechs were old territorial enemies with fundamentally different stances on religious questions and whether citizenship should be an organic, ethnic or a humanistic proposition (Broklova 1998: 188). The issue of national identity embodied in the state was thus a polarized notion. The state only survived on the particular accommodations of Germans and the more pressing internal concerns of the Slovaks (Benes 1973: 44). Yet, even to the Czech policy craftsman of the time, Masaryk, it remained clear that “We need fifty years of undisturbed peace and only then shall we have achieved what we would like to have today” (Benes 1973: 51).

Finland

Until 1925, Finland’s monopoly on violence was disputed but present in the remaining interwar years. The development of the monopoly on violence was largely a product of the dual influences of Sweden and Russia and the civil war in 1918. Originally an autonomous region of the Swedish kingdom, Finland was established by Gustav Vasa as a separate territory under Swedish rule in the late 17th century. In effect, Finland had its own standing army of Finns but with Swedish generals and established on Swedish principles of military organization – at that time, one of Europe’s most effective. Even after Russia’s annexation in 1809, the autonomy and the Swedish organization were maintained (Kirby 2006: Ch. 2, 74). Thus, as Nevakivi (1989: 132) has noted, the Finnish military was of the specific German nature: disciplined, professional, and hierarchically organized. Consequently, the Finnish cadre army reacted with fierce resistance to the illegal Russian 1878 military conscription act and these officers later formed the backbone of general Mannerheim’s army (Puntila 1975: 137).

The Russian revolution in 1917 and the following civil war in Finland in the winter and spring of 1918 interrupted this development. The police disintegrated and the army was either drawn back to Russia or paralyzed by the revolution (Alapuro 1988: 152). In late 1917, a new Finnish police force organized along Finnish, that is, traditional Swedish legal principles was set up. However, the vacuum left by the paralyzed imperial army led to a build-up of
basically two conflicting military forces. Private workers’ militias, the later Red Guards, emerged. As a part bottom-up peasant part bourgeois government reaction to this, the Civil Guards or White Guards were established (Alapuro 1988: 153). None of the three components of monopoly on violence was strong in 1917 and 1918. When the White Guards, and thus the established government and state apparatus, prevailed in the critical months of fighting against the Red Guards in 1918, resource supremacy of the state security forces was established. The terror of the civil war continued until at least 1922 but White terror was now much more prevalent as the White Guards were allied with the political leadership (they were pardoned for atrocities by president Svinhufvud, Siltala 2015: 20). The Civil Guards were supported by the bourgeois government coalition as they were seen as liberators (Alapuro and Allardt 1978: 125), and they were recognized as government troops in January 1918 (Alapuro 1988: 172). However, given the still paramilitary nature of the Civil Guards and their strength relative to the ordinary Finnish army (see Capoccia 2005: 167), neither resource supremacy, nor cohesion, nor subordination was secured.

Whereas the Civil Guards quickly became an institutionalized part of the state apparatus, both officially and in practice, after 1918 and ensured the resource supremacy of the state, the Civil Guards’ internal unity and cooperative relationship with the standing army was a source of political conflict until the mid-1920s. This reflected an undermined cohesion of the military. In the standing army, discussions centered on demands of how to arrange conscription (Ahlbäck 2009) while the Civil Guards were in the middle of a generational shift (Kirby 2006: 163). The debates on conscription were about the very nature of the military but they ended in 1922 with the passing of a bill securing the traditional cadre system and 12 months’ military service (Ahlbäck 2009). The internal disputes of the Civil Guards practically ended in 1924 when the young generation of Jäger officers assumed control, marking the end of power as attained by allegedly Russian-oriented officers, notably general Mannerheim, who was trained in the imperial army (Kirby 2006: 163, 166).

Subordination remained an issue of concern among the governments and parties, particularly the Social Democratic Party, which was suspicious of the rightist preferences of many White Guard officers. Subordination was quickly achieved in the regular army. As a remarkable example of peaceful negotiations albeit high stakes for the military, the enduring discussions of military reform to fit either a cadre or militia system were highly politicized in the early 1920s, with the Agrarians and Social Democrats, but eventually solved in peaceful negotiations in a parliamentary committee. Here, professional officers and military experts participated but acted as mediators with tech-
nical knowledge rather than parties in a conflict (Puntila 1975: 138; Ahlbäck 2009: 9). The Civil Guards remained a separate group. It enjoyed great autonomy until 1944, and when it gained official status in 1927, neither the president, the ministry of defense, nor the regular army had much influence on its organization (Sode-Madsen 2008: 227-228). However, this was less a problem of contestation than a result of governmental trust. The hegemony of the Liberal-Agrarian coalition throughout the 1920s and 1930s ensured that this potential cleavage line was never politicized. Because of their total victory in the civil war against a communist threat, the Civil Guards had achieved basic legitimacy with all parties enabling the development of a peculiar mutual trust between civilian politicians and military officers (Alapuro 1988: 204-205; Kirby 2006: 178, 205). The inaction against the Lapua movement in its first years was far from a military specificity but was also reflected in the attitude of the leading politicians, including ministers and the president (Stubbergaard 1996: 125).

The Finnish administration was effective throughout the period. State formation at the most minimal level was intimately connected with the growth and bureaucratization of the administration. An effective, professional administration was established as an autonomous entity under Swedish rule in the late 18th century. The Swedish nobility in the administration quickly pledged loyalty to the Finnish state (Alapuro 1988: 22; Karvonen 2000: 129; Kirby 2006: 39, 45). Through the upheavals of the 19th and the early 20th centuries, including Russian annexation in 1809 and the liberal movement of Fennomen in the 1880s, this bureaucracy remained the constant in Finnish politics (Kirby 2006: 74). So much so that even as parliamentary elections with universal suffrage to the Diet were introduced in 1907, and the country gained independence in 1917, Finland remained an extremely bureaucratized country led by an ‘iron fist of rationality’ (Nousiainen 1988: 230; see also Alapuro 1988: Chs. 2, 10; Karvonen 2000: 129; Mann 2004: 67). The communes and counties were long established as integrative parts of the central administration in Helsinki and with the adoption of Finnish as the official language of the administration in the late 19th century, the cohesion and lines of command were strengthened (Alapuro 1988: 23, 95).

In the heat of battle in 1917-1918, the Social Democrats, should they win government power, could question the responsiveness of the still bourgeois administration in terms of social legislation, but after the revolution, no elites were excluded from the bureaucracy and the ministries attained the position of a neutral mediator in the State Council (Alapuro 1988: 199, 205; Nousiainen 1988: 230). Servants with Russian loyalties were effectively purged and the administration emerged unaltered from the civil war (Eng-
man 1989: 107, 112). Territorial penetration, meritocracy, and responsivity thus survived the introduction of democracy and the civil war.

The period until 1921 was marked by citizenship disagreement but citizenship agreement was in place after this point. A true Finnish national identity emerged in the 1860s through different channels. First, through rational and intellectual deliberation an ideology of a Finnish fatherland based on linguistic uniqueness and natural law as connected with the treaty of Porvoo in 1809 took a hold in the upper classes and consolidated with the adoption of Finnish as the administrative language (Jussila 1989: 89). Second, this nationalism was also a protest of the lower classes and acted as a civic religion and belief that Finland should never bow to either the West (Sweden) or the East (Russia) (Alapuro 1988: 92). In the minds of the Finns, Finland has ever since placed itself as a borderline between east and west (Nevakivi 1989: 128). While Swedes and Finns developed a common nationalism, they also developed separate ethnolinguistic nationalisms (Hamalainen 1979: 6).

This state legitimacy survived the civil war. Finnish identity was clearly at stake as it undergirded the surface of economic conflict between the bourgeoisie and the working classes in 1917-1918. In that sense, the civil war was also a war of independence against Russia (Jussila 1989: 100; Alapuro 1989: 156). Yet, the civil war in itself was not a symptom of citizenship disagreements internally in Finland. It was an economic conflict caused by the fact that the working classes could no longer maintain their living standards obtained in 1917 when the Russian troops withdrew from Finnish territory (Hamalainen 1979: 19). Inspired by the Russian revolution, they rebelled (Alapuro 1989: 155). And it was a war against Russian dominance and threat of annexation. De-russification as a movement had been strong since 1907 and dominated all political elites, including the Social Democrats (Alapuro and Allardt 1978: 124; Karvonen 2000: 131).

Regarding the demographic composition, Finland was the least ethnically heterogeneous of the successor states of the Russian Empire (approx. 10 % minorities in 1930, see Engman 1989: 122-123). There was a minor Russian minority but the victory of the White Guards in the civil war and the immediate purging of Russian sympathizers in the state apparatus consolidated the Finnish borders and the loyalty to Finland (Karvonen 2000: 133). Language was a significant cleavage line in the beginning of Finland’s independence, structuring some of the political competition between Swedes and Finnish people. The Swedish advantage in terms of education and economic resources also strengthened the development of different identities (Hamalainen 1979: 20). Particularly, the Åland Islands, inhabited by Swedes, continued being an issue of conflict as they demanded greater autonomy and feared Finnish chauvinism (Karvonen 2000: 132-133). However, conflict lev-
els were never high and only few Åland Islanders appealed to Sweden for help. Generally, conflicts between Swedes and Finns decreased from 1908-1918 and the Åland affair was largely resolved when the Finnish government granted cultural and political autonomy in 1920 and by a final resolution by the League of Nations in 1921 (Puntila 1975: 123-125; Alapuro and Allardt 1978: 124; Karvonen 2000: 144). Despite the continued conflictual potential of the Åland question, the majority of Swedes and Finns from this point on identified unreservedly with the Finnish state (Engman 1989: 124).

Examining the mechanisms

How does stateness and democratic stability co-vary across the four cases? This is fairly simple because the cases can, largely, be given a constant score of stateness throughout their democratic spell. The exceptions are Finland gaining a monopoly on violence from 1925 and citizenship agreement from 1921 as well as Czechoslovakia achieving its monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness in 1919. From a bird’s eye view, there seems to be a positive correlation between stateness and democratic stability: Germany and Spain were weak in terms of monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, and citizenship agreement, whereas stateness was much stronger in Czechoslovakia (monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness but citizenship disagreement) and Finland (monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, and citizenship agreement). In turn, we have reason to believe that stateness, on an overall scale, mattered for democratic stability in this frontier zone sample – indeed, given the weak explanatory power of other theories stateness may have been the decisive factor. But we also have reason to believe in different explanatory strengths of the three attributes. Citizenship agreement was thus weak in Czechoslovakia despite the survival of democracy.

I now use the more fine-grained knowledge of stateness in the four democracies to form expectations on which of the seven mechanisms in Figures 4.2 through 4.8 could (or should not) be observed in each case. The simplest set of expectations adhere to Spain, which had almost all-encompassing problems of stateness in the whole period – the only exceptions are the components of territorial penetration and resource supremacy (until 1936). Because the weaknesses of these two components are not sufficient to trigger any of the mechanisms, I could expectedly observe any of the seven mechanisms as causes of Spain’s democratic breakdown. Germany is different. Because of its unquestionably strong meritocracy in the administration, the mechanisms of elite and mass bias delegitimation should not be observed. Remember that these mechanisms would demand a system of widespread
political or patrimonial appointments. In the cases of democratic stability in Czechoslovakia and Finland, we have to turn the seven mechanisms on their head to be able to examine them. This means that democratic stability in Czechoslovakia could be achieved by either ‘anti-systemic containment’ (>authoritarian restoration), ‘security legitimation’ (>security delegitimation), ‘socioeconomic legitimation’ (>socioeconomic delegitimation), ‘elite impartiality legitimation’ (>elite bias delegitimation), or ‘mass impartiality legitimation’ (>mass bias delegitimation) except ‘citizenship peace’ (>citizenship violence) and ‘citizenship justices’ (>citizenship injustices). Democratic stability in Finland could be achieved by any of the seven mechanisms turned on their head.

In the analyses that follow, I prioritize the examination of the seven mechanisms in the democratic destabilization of Germany and Spain. This is followed by a shorter assessment of whether we can observe the positive versions of the mechanisms at work in the democratic stabilization in Czechoslovakia and Finland.

**Germany**

**Authoritarian restoration**

The mechanism of authoritarian restoration did not contribute to democratic breakdown in Germany. Hitler was invited to form a government as Chancellor, which opened up the possibility of seizing absolute power (see Linz 1978a: Ch. 4). Much has been said about the importance of the preceding indecisive and semi-authoritarian governments from 1930 to 1933 (of Brüning, Papen, and Schleicher, respectively) and the detrimental effects of President Hindenburg’s aging and weakening in these crucial years. But even prominent protagonists of these proximate explanations acknowledge that the democratic regime could never have collapsed if the armed forces had rallied to its defense (see e.g. Bracher 1970; Carsten 1973; Bermeo 2003: 41; Capoccia 2005: 12-15). They hold that Hitler needed the support of the *Reichswehr* for his circumventions and rewritings of the constitution in 1933 and 1934. It was these amendments, rather than Hitler assuming the Chancellorship as such, that effectively ended democracy (Silverman 1988). Security forces enabled the amendments by their ambiguous if not outright supportive stand towards the Nazis – something that should have been hindered if they had been fully protective of the Weimar constitution and governmental signals before 1933.

While it is true that democracy did not end with Hitler assuming Chancellorship on 30 January 1933 but rather with the Enabling Act of 24 March
that year, passing through the Reichstag and the hands of President Hindenburg in full accordance with democratic procedures, my evaluation of the role of the security forces must hinge on whether Hitler had persuaded them to support him on promises of concessions to their organizational power.

The Great Depression accelerated military and police defections from their duties in the sense that the implementation of anti-extremist laws, which had been in place since 1922 with the aim of targeting communist as well as SA extremism, was much less determined than hitherto (compare Waite 1952: 70 and Heiber 1993: 190; see also Capoccia 2005: 206). As Heiber (1993: 171, 190) notes, the emergency decree of 1930 giving security forces extra discretion and authority for public order provision remarkably only led to a further increase in political violence since the police and army passively observed right-left violence and even sometimes supported SA insurrections (see also Mann 2004: 199; McElligott 2014: 123). Particularly the police grew more passive from 1930 and simply watched while Papen attempted his coup in 1932, and the Ringväreine and other criminal organizations took control of whole districts of Berlin (Liang 1969: 172; Goeschel 2013: 68).

Throughout the 1920s, but particularly from 1930, the NSDAP infiltrated especially the lower and middle ranks of the security forces. On the political level, the SA was banned by Brüning in 1932 but von Papen repealed the ban when he formed a government in the summer of 1932 (Capoccia 2005: 206). But the military level led its own discussions on how to handle the SA. The army was paralyzed as symbolized by army general Gröner’s reluctance to support either Hitler or the incumbent government. Gröner wanted to protect the republic but was limited by the obvious admiration of Hitler and National Socialism within his ranks; there was thus no way that SA could be surpassed (Wheeler-Bennett 1953: 222, 232; Capoccia 2005: 206; McElligott 2014: 187). So, in 1932 two path-breaking events occurred: 1) The Reichswehr recognized the SA as a legal organization and 2) security forces in Prussia tacitly enabled an explosion of violence between communists and the SA resulting in Hindenburg’s emergency decree and dissolution of the Free State of Prussia (Carsten 1973: 331-335, 370).

The security forces’ autonomy from political pressures and their ambiguity towards democracy thus contributed to the electoral victories of NSDAP from 1928 and Hitler’s central political position in January 1933. Yet, their actions were not unconstitutional, and the army high command had not anticipated what was to come when Hitler became Chancellor. First, in January the army high command remained neutral in the negotiations of the Chancellorship. The generals were tired of the Schleicher-Gröner alliance increasingly involving the military in politics from 1930. They thus neither
backed Schleicher nor Hitler for their pursuit of the Chancellorship (Craig 1978: 567).

Second, it is true that it was old Reichswehr officers who consolidated Hitler’s rule during 1933 and 1934 by implementing his politically repressive laws with greater effectiveness than ever (Wheeler-Bennett 1953: 284; Carsten 1973: 386, 405; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992: 114; Arends and Kümml 2000: 210). However, the security forces did not support Hitler’s Chancellorship and enabling act because of concessions to their organizational power. Rather, the impression was that security forces wanted to retain their position above politics and would thus not be persuaded in any way by Hitler (Craig 1978: 567). Hitler tried to persuade the Reichswehr in early February that their powers would be intact under his reign but severe mutual suspicion remained between Hitler, NSDAP, and the army (Craig 1978: 571, 591). Many police officers tellingly had to be purged in February 1933 (Craig 1978: 572), and it was only after the enabling act, in the summer of 1934, when Hitler purged opposition military generals, including Römer, and the SA leadership, that the Reichswehr was brought in line (Bracher 1970: 236, 244; Carsten 1973: 309-310, 354-355; Mann 2004: 199-200). The security apparatus was definitely looking for a change in rearmament policies throughout the interwar period but instead of supporting NSDAP, it confided in Hindenburg to his death in 1934 (Mann 2004: 199). Thus, it would be a case of ex post judgement to present the democratic breakdown as an authoritarian restoration. There were no organizational concessions at play in Hitler’s takeover in February and March 1933. As Mann (2004: 199) notes, “in 1933 the army’s loyalty was not actually tested”.

Security delegitimation

The mechanism of security delegitimation was present. Despite a period of economic growth and relative public order from 1924-1928, Weimar Germany was facing an economic crisis and massive social upheavals that caused skyrocketing criminality levels and violence (Gerwath and Horne 2011: 494; Goeschel 2013: 58; McEligott 2014: 124). In the first years of the 1920s, the army and police were important stabilizing forces in dissolving violent demonstrations and veterans marching against Berlin, and in implementing the Wirth government’s anti-extremist laws following the assassination of Erzberger in 1921 (Snyder 1966: 45; Jones 1988: 157; Arends and Kümml 2000: 199). After the more peaceful period of 1924-1928, political violence again increased sharply as economic crisis hit. Regional cooperation with Bavaria had been improved and the Reichswehr and parliament had shared some years with stable and peaceful cooperation (Heiber 1993: 117). From 1927 when communist and SA fights relaunched, however, the police, includ-
ing the important *Schutzpolizei*, became accused of partisan biases (Liang 1969: 162-163). In fact, Liang (1969: 163-164, 168) notes how in key moments in the early 1930s the *Schutzpolizei* did not enforce law and order with the same rigidity as usual. Security was thus either weakly present for the common man, with serious risk of getting caught in street fights, or heavily biased against leftist insurgents and socialists in general with the appearance of the *Freikorps* and SA (see also Heiber 1993: 54-55). It was the professional autonomy of the police that ensured their discretion in, for instance, ‘cleaning the streets of Berlin’, and as a result their conservative-authoritarian values could be expressed as rightist biases (Liang 1969: 164).

Due to the ‘nazification’ of the bureaucracy from 1928 (see Muncy 1947: 490; Caplan 1988: 59-61; Jones 1988: 251, 304, 383) implementation of anti-extremist laws was slow, contradictory, or in outright opposition to political intentions. Court rulings contained this ambivalence. The court system, and most of the bureaucracy, never supported any attempts of a coup d’etat and actively hindered a communist revolution in 1918 and the Kapp Putsch in 1920, even though Kapp was in fact a Bavarian civil servant (Waite 1952: 146; Bracher 1970: 192). Still, in an act that later proved detrimental, Hitler’s jail sentence after the Beer Hall Putsch was softened by the judiciary, which consisted of the pre-WWI administrative elite (Shefter 1977: 428).

Importantly for the mechanism, the violence and lack of law and order in the streets was a vital motivation for many ordinary citizens to become members of SA and NSDAP or vote for NSDAP. Even though elections and electoral behavior were mostly about economic growth and unemployment, public order was a highly salient issue. Workers thus flocked to the Nazi party in a paradoxical move to end the violence, which was, to a large extent, created by the Nazis themselves (Mann 2004: 141). Already from 1920, the common German worker (both industrial and agrarian), the petty bourgeoisie, and the large estate owners had seen a strong state capable of maintaining public order at any cost, including civil rights, as vital and this kept on during the entire lifetime of Weimar (Mann 2004: 143) – Bermeo (2003: 36-37) even notes that there was a certain longing for law and order from the revolutionary upheavals of 1918-1919 resulting in substantial electoral defections from the bourgeois parties to the Nazis. More precisely, some reacted to police and SA repression of communists by voting for the extreme left and agitating for popular revolution, while the majority moved towards the extreme right and agitated for fascist (NSDAP, mostly from 1928) or military, Bismarckian dictatorship (conservative parties such as DNVP, mostly until 1930 when NSDAP captured many of their voters) (Elias 1996: 222; Goeschel 2013: 63).
Electoral support for the NSDAP also increased among security apparatus officials. While the high command deeply resented NSDAP and voted traditional conservative, many lower-level officers were easy recruits for the SA and among the NSDAP constituency – some regional units of the army even trained SA soldiers as a result of their common perception of the communist threat to public order (Carsten 1973: 72-74; Mann 2004: 199; McEligott 2014: 187; see also Huntington 1957: 112).

The paradox of this support for NSDAP is staggering. For ordinary middle class clerks and workers, the arbitrary behavior and sheer presence of the Freikorps and SA reflected a weak and contested state and political system incapable of providing basic security (Snyder 1966: 27-28; Gerwath and Horne 2011). But this did not primarily make them vote for extreme left revolutionaries. Thus, there was no coup attempt by leftist forces during the Weimar republic, only the revolutionary upheavals in 1918-1919. The Kapp Putsch of 1920 and the Beer Hall Putsch of 1923 were rightist (Waite 1952: 196-197; Bracher 1970: 192; Schumann 2009: 35). A major part of the infamous psychological persuasion of the Germans to support totalitarianism stems from the Nazis’ ability to frame such events and street fights between communists and SA as noble acts by protectors of public order and security (Elias 1996: 220). From 1928, the NSDAP adopted a strategy of staging street fights and terror acts in order to undermine the legitimacy of the government and the democratic system as such. They convinced many from the middle and lower classes that only the Nazis were capable of reestablishing public order, symbolized in a return to pre-WWI Wilhelmine Germany (Snyder 1966: 80; Elias 1996: 223). The perception of communists as a threat to public order was the key reason that Papen lifted the ban on SA in 1932 (Capoccia 2005: 207). Security delegitimation was thus present not as a military response to an attempted coup or rebellion but as an increase in public support for an authoritarian restoration of order. This was the base of the electoral success of NSDAP and thus Hitler’s way to power.

Socioeconomic delegitimation

The mechanism of socioeconomic delegitimation was present. The role of the civil service in providing socioeconomic goods, social reforms, and general economic management is hard to assess because the political signals from the government were often ambiguous or non-existing, and the sheer power of the ministerial bureaucracies makes it hard to discern the policy preferences of politicians from those of the civil service. However, the literature offers some guidelines for assessing whether poor implementation by the civil service of otherwise demanded policies existed.
At the central level, the ministries generally managed the economy as well as they could given the extremely difficult circumstances of war debts, unemployment, inflation, and mixed or simply missing political signals. This was even the case during the Great Depression (James 1981; Müller 2014). Moreover, despite upper class bias in the administration, the bureaucracy, led by the labor ministry, had a genuine wish to implement and strengthen welfare state services and use Keynesian policies to combat recessions (Abraham 1977: 232; Liu 1997; Hong 1998: 121). In fact, welfare policies, including assistance for the unemployed, were often more progressive in the bureaucracy than in the government, particularly during Brüning’s austerity-focused cabinet from 1930 to 1932 (Craig 1978: 420; Crew 1998). Also, the unsuccessful unemployment policies during the Depression were largely caused by Brüning’s miscalculations and his strategy of austerity, whereas Schleicher largely ignored unemployment (Wolffsohn 1981: 207-208).

Does that mean that the administration had no responsibility for the welfare state disintegration? True, under the strains of economic crises, Brüning’s policies and the Social Democratic Party’s ambiguous stance on how to authorize state welfare policies relative to the anti-poverty measures by private, often church organizations (see Crew 1998: Ch. 1, 8) should be blamed. But the largely conservative ministerial departments also had a share in this ambiguity. Junkers and old upper-class elites still enjoyed considerable influence in the political-administrative circles of the key ministries of agriculture, the interior, and in municipalities (Muncy 1947: 487-492). The German state personnel of the noble classes saw democracy, notably suffrage extensions, as a threat to their goal to strengthen Germany among the European nation states, but this vision was largely incompatible with the forces of social mobility following modernization (Holmes 1982: 672). The civil service thus continuously shut out labor and socialist interests from ministerial negotiations and exclusively involved bourgeois-liberal and Church interest groups. From the mid-1920s, big businesses were favored at the cost of ordinary workers, and during the depression, the local, noble administrators managed welfare benefits pitilessly, treating beneficiaries as servants rather than citizens (Hong 1998: 47-48, 123-124; McElligott 2014: 79, 93). As is the general judgement by German historians, the bureaucracy generally guided social change towards pre-WWI economic policies benefitting heavy industry as opposed to workers and farmers. This continued across the economic cycles of hyperinflation until 1924, stabilization until from 1924-1929, and depression from 1929 (Petzina 1985: 46, 55-56; Mommsen 1991: 83, 86, 90, 100, 111-112).

Furthermore, the court system, from top to bottom and from the federal to the regional and local courts, was highly politicized in favor of the old au-
authoritarian, Bismarckian order. As for the rest of the civil service, most Weimar judges had survived the revolution in office and thus represented the old pre-1914 law school (McElligott 2014: 101). Numerous judgments were in favor of the institutions of Wilhelmine Germany, including the Junkers, big business, and industries (McElligott 2014: 111, 118).

This conflictual environment of implementation between government, administration, and civil society and biases against workers caused performance illegitimacy of the regime. Even though this situation improved somewhat during the economic restoration years 1924-1929, the Depression in 1929 and Brüning’s centralizing civil service reforms reinvigorated the great difficulties of the central administration in coordinating and regulating the economy. Business elites and ordinary workers came to distrust all interventions by the state (Abraham 1977: 245; Caplan 1988: 90-95; Mommsen 1991: 92-93; Hong 1998: 163). As Crew (1998: 6-7, 67) notes, the social security offices of the welfare state were often the last step before homelessness. The legitimacy of the democracy thus depended on the functioning of these offices. However, from 1929 in particular social service systems were severely underfunded, and many people were lost in the complex system of often competing welfare providers (Crew 1998: Ch. 10). Workers, in particular, deeply mistrusted the civil service whom they believed were serving upper class interests (Frye 1965: 651; Caplan 1988: 72-73; McElligott 2014: 93-95). This led to a split between landowners and workers among the constituents of the structurally important German National People’s Party (DNVP), which strengthened the Brüning government and set the scene for the pattern of rule by emergency decree in the beginning of the 1930s (Muncy 1947: 485-486; Frye 1965: 646).

Moreover, the perceived inability of the administration to serve the interest of the common German and the parliament to produce results was a major reason for NSDAP’s electoral success from 1928, the deterioration of parliamentary politics, and voter defection from the liberal, pro-democratic parties (Abraham 1977: 234-235; Lepsius 1978: 44-46; McElligott 2014: 111, 118).

In sum, the electoral support for extremist parties continued through bad and good economic times and bourgeois and social democratic governments, as did the problematic relationship between the political executive and the bureaucracy. But the Great Depression was a necessary condition for the electoral support for NSDAP (Mann 2004: 201). This was because of an indeterminate or heavily rightist political leadership but, as a contributing factor, policy-making as well as implementation stalled and was biased to the right because of an unresponsive civil service. As Craig (1978: 419) notes, “the health and stability of the Republic were to suffer from faults of com-
mission and omission with respect to the Civil Service, the administration of justice”.

**Elite and mass bias delegitimation**

Elite bias delegitimation was absent and played no part in the breakdown. As there was no tradition of patrimonialism or political appointments to the civil service, we should not expect any centrifugal dynamic in parliament motivated by oppositional resentment of biased implementation. First of all, we may note that the party system only functioned well to make cross-party coalitions in limited periods, but coalitions were formed, party discipline was high, and MPs’ voting patterns were organized along a rather stable left-right scale (Lehmann 2010: 85, 90, 93-94). And despite the prominence of extremist parties from 1928 and the resulting centrifugal disintegration of the party system, Lehmann (2010: 98-100) finds that the extremist parties did not influence government coalition making after control for the economic crisis of the Depression.

Interparty polarization increased but whether centrifugalism existed as a result of increasing distrust between the parties is less clear. Two explanations complement this: First, the weakness of the center, left, and pro-democratic parties, which lost voters to NSDAP and the communists, is to be found in their own organizations, which splintered from the mid-1920s (Jones 1988: 4, 150, 251). The strategically important SDP split in continuous discussions from the Wilhelmine period on the relationship with Marxist thought and the practicalities of installing social democracy (Berman 1998: 79, 84). The problem of parties further rested with establishing stable constituencies (Hanson and Kopstein 1997: 261). Second, the basis for polarization lay in the pre-Weimar period since party politics was organized along a republican-democratic vis-à-vis national conservative cleavage line disturbing left-right politics. More than anything, it was the weakness of the republican-democratic camp that caused polarization (Lepsius 1978: 36, 44).

Just as elite bias was insignificant, so was mass bias delegitimation. As indicated, patrimonialism and political appointments to the administration were almost absent with the small exception of the *politische Beamten*. We should therefore expect no centrifugal polarization of the masses. However, a few points are worth noting. First of all, biased implementation did occur. As mentioned, economic and social policies generally favored heavy industry, not least because of the conservative economic thinking of the bureaucracy. Similarly, the judges ruled in favor of rightist forces in street fight crimes and the ‘nazification’ of the bureaucracy of course did not help this bias. But as is evident here, the bias did not stem from a lack of meritocracy but from a lack of responsiveness of the civil service to political signals. The result of semi-
loyalists’ defection to extremist camps is therefore covered by the mechanism of socioeconomic delegitimation. In any case, abandoning the middle meant voting for NSDAP while the communists of KPD remained a rather constant force even through the elections of 1928, 1930, and 1932 (Falter and Zintl 1988; see also Mann 2004: Chs. 4-5; Capoccia 2005: 9).

Citizenship violence

The mechanism of citizenship violence was absent. We should here remember that the mechanism demands actual violence between ethnic groups used to mobilize for an ethnocracy or a military dictatorship, which may contain the violent conflict. From the beginning of the 1920s and again after 1929, paramilitary right-wing organizations, notably the SA, committed hundreds of (reported) incidences of xenophobic political violence against Jews, Poles, and Slavic people (Schumann 2009: 251-252; Eichenberg and Newman 2010; Gerwath and Horne 2011).

However, the main combatants of political violence in the streets identified themselves as socioeconomic groups, primarily communists, revolutionary leftists, and right-wing nationalists (Rosenhaft 1983: 1-2). There was never an ethnic conflict since the attacks on Jews and other minorities were never countered – violence was a one-sided deal (Mann 2004: 141). No significant separatist movements or movements for ethnic cleansing emerged during the Weimar period. Even the Bavarians and Prussians, who trusted each other the least, never engaged in street fights or political violence against one another (Arends and Kümmel 2000: 186). NSDAP was of course a deeply xenophobic movement and their messages that Jews were allied with international Marxism eventually became appealing to many voters. Such messages were always combined with socioeconomic ones, just as Jews were always mentioned alongside communists (Mann 2004: 179-180). This was a deliberate strategy of Hitler because Germans, despite common resentment of Jews, were primarily concerned about socioeconomic conditions and could not be mobilized on hatred of Jews alone (Mann 2004: 184-185).

Moreover, from 1930-1933 increased violence and a growing number of NSDAP supporters in the ranks of the Reichswehr gave rise to serious considerations about martial law. These considerations were not provoked by a need to quell ethnic conflicts or secessionist groups but to pacify communist forces and far right revolutionaries (Wheeler-Bennett 1953: 222; Heiber 1993: 190). Nazism was obviously motivated by ethnic purification of the German Volk but the movement was totalitarian and never attracted to martial law as a political instrument (Bracher 1970: 21-26). Taking power hinged on a broader appeal that had little to do with a pattern of interethnic violence.
Citizenship injustices

To evaluate citizenship injustices, we should look for determinants of the parliamentary enfeeblement in 1928 and the electoral support for Hitler. Although many complicated political issues came together in the parliament’s complex of agendas that eventually led to its own destruction, and notably the inability of the liberal and social democratic forces to compromise on a labor-employer alliance (Luebbert 1991: 120), it is hard to ignore the cleavages linked to the fundamental legitimacy of the republic as the state system governing a weak German nation.

Strong nationalist-conservative forces and sentiments within the public clashed with the new social-liberal ideology of the Weimar constitution, and many conservatives resented the Weimar republic. These disagreements regarded the rules of citizenship. The foundational constitutional debates in 1918-1919 were more than anything about the German national identity and how to organize a state that could better integrate its people (Haffner 1973: Ch. 1). National identity was less directly debated after this, but sharp divisions in parliament between right-wing conservative, nationalist parties (DVP, DVFP, DNVP, and NSDAP) and left-wing socialist or revolutionary parties (KPD and USPD), the ambiguity and passivity of the Socialdemocratic or liberal parties (SPD, DDP, and DVP), and the large and increasing number of parties reflected how Germans, and party elites, sought different conceptions of citizenship. Leftists wanted citizenship attached to the status as a worker in a socialist state whereas rightists wanted to define the citizen as a natural bearer of German ethnicity (Haselbach 1998; Arends and Kümmel 2000: 186; Caldwell 2008: 41, 48, 54). This undermined parliament as a forum for negotiating and deliberating practical policies and blocked integrative and universalistic welfare policies (Crew 1993: Ch. 1).

Even though national solidarity was somewhat reinforced after the Ruhr occupation of 1923 (Jones 1988: 188), parliamentary workings were still distrusted and regionalization of parliament (especially via a Bavarian regional party) was strengthened throughout the 1920s, culminating in the installation of emergency decree governments from 1930 (Abraham 1977: 234-236; Schönwälder 1996: 50). Rather than redistribution between ethnic groups, the injustices that enfeebled parliamentary workings were thus more diffuse and regarded an all-encompassing disagreement on the purpose of the welfare state and the furthering of economic modernization: Why and how should the German nation advance in the world when it could not define itself? It is in this sense that the German state was worrisomely ‘detached from its own history’ (Craig 1978: 55).
We might stop here and accept Konrad Adenauer’s notion that the weakness of the Weimar German party system only proved detrimental to democracy because it had to build a state-nation in an ethnically heterogeneous territory (Breuilly 1990: 668-669). However, democracy did not decisively break down in 1930. We also need to explain the popular support for NSDAP (Mann 2004: 177). As indicated, questions of national identity, immigration, and integration were much weaker issues in terms of saliency than socioeconomic issues. Anti-Semitic messages often mixed with criticism of the Weimar system and international capitalists’ preying on German worker makes it hard to know on what grounds people voted for Hitler. What we know is that Hitler usually downplayed direct references to Jews in electoral campaigns but indirectly portrayed them as allied with capitalists, and his campaigns focused on telling the Germans that they were ethnically superior to other nations (Mann 2004: 178, 184). Probably, voters could not be mobilized on Jewish hatred or the promise of national integration alone (Mann 2004: 184-185).

The attraction of NSDAP was in that sense dependent upon a grand, national project with purification of the German race and the forging of a German identity via conquest as vital components. The median German, who had learned of a glorious tribal German past, interpreted the defeat in WWI and democracy as the victory of minorities and the end of the German nation (Bracher 1970: 68; Schönwälder 1996: 50). This led to a deep-felt ethnocultural illegitimacy of the republic and democracy which left open a sphere of cultural authority to be occupied later by the Nazis. To gain votes, Hitler could simply appeal to existing yet often oppressed racist views of the German public (McElligott 2014: 144, 196). Mann (2004: 189) notes that electoral support for NSDAP was relatively equally distributed between the Protestant Northern and Catholic Southern regions of Germany in 1924, but in 1932 that support was overwhelmingly Protestant and overrepresented in so-called ‘borderline’ territories of Schleswig-Holstein, East Prussia, and other borderline regions. The mechanism of citizenship injustices was therefore present.

Spain

Authoritarian restoration

Explaining Spain’s breakdown of democracy demands an account of two events: first, the attempted coup d’État by army generals on 18 July 1936 and the naming of Franco as head of state with dictatorial powers on 1 October later that year (Alpert 2013: 8). How was Franco motivated and what ena-
bled him to assume dictatorial power? Partly, answers must be sought within the military itself. As Mann (2004: 336) assures: “Franco never depended on votes, parties, or mass movements. Nor had Primo before him. They led army revolts” (see also, Eatwell 2006: 128). As will be shown, the mechanism of authoritarian restoration was indeed present.

The question is whether Franco and his military compatriots were motivated by concern for the military’s organizational powers. The classic works on Spanish history by Carr (1982) and Payne (1967; 2006) provide a solid account of the military role in the breakdown. Franco was deeply resentful of the republic on a personal level and motivated for action in July 1936: alienated from republican politicians by what he saw as their abandonment of the military in the defeat of the Moroccan forces in 1920, deeply conservative and shocked by the sudden democratization in 1931 and the reforms that closed his academy in Zaragoza, and pushed to the brink of rebellion but banished to the Canary Islands in February 1936 (de Blaye 1976; Payne 1967: 281-283, 315; 2006: 198). The other generals in the revolt, Mola and Goded, had also been expelled by the regime from leading posts. Mola, for instance, had spelled out an open and sharp critique of Azana’s military reforms (Carr 1982: 616). There is thus no doubt that the rebelling generals of the July coup were motivated by a contest with civilian politicians over their military organizational powers and autonomy. The February 1936 reductions of the military convinced them that they had to take action (Payne 1967: 315).

Not only were the generals motivated by military quests for greater autonomy. Their opportunity to continue the quest for power after the initial failure to complete the coup d’état in July was conditioned on a much broader appeal for their cause among the security forces. Accounts differ on the relative power distribution of republican and revolting forces (from an initial advantage of the republic, see Mann 2004: 341, to almost complete loyalty of the security apparatus to the revolt, see Brenan 1950: 314-316) but support of the regular Spanish army was crucial to prevent a repetition of Sanjurjo’s failed coup in 1932 (Carr 1982: 649). Gradually through the spring of 1936 but at much greater speed after the July coup attempt, they won support from most of the security forces (Brenan 1950: 314; Alpert 2013: 29-33).

The military supporters of the revolt were motivated by old military corporatism and resentment of reforms. They were anti-systemic but less opposed to democracy than to Azana’s reforms. As Linz (1978b: 143) notes, the number of pure monarchists or conservative authoritarian aristocrats in the Spanish army was considerably lower than in the German Reichswehr. But as military reforms progressed in February 1936, old ideas of military Carlism (support for Carlist monarchy) and national statism rose in the officer corps and enabled Franco to command the loyalty of the main army in the
South and around Madrid from the time of the assassination of Sotelo in mid-July 1936 (Payne 2006: 311-314; Alpert 2013: 29-33). The breakdown was thus caused by an initially small group of officers, who were personally motivated for revolt and managed to mobilize within the army itself on matters of greater military autonomy (Bernecker 2000: 419; Bermeo 2003: 47; Tardio and del Rey Reguillo 2014: 467).

Security delegitimation

Security delegitimation was not among the reasons for the breakdown of democracy in Spain. As is obvious from the developments of public order from 1931 to 1936, political violence and killings radicalized key constituencies (notably regionalists and workers) away from the republican parties (Payne 2006: 26-27). General strikes emerged in 1933 and the Esquerra government of Catalonia even attempted a coup d’état in 1934. One of the leading interpretations has been that the direct threat to the security, order, and existence of Spain motivated the generals’ revolt in July (see Linz 1978b: 142, 187, 198). However, in the spring of 1936 there was no pending threat to public order. The martial law had been lifted in 1935 (Payne 2006: 105), the election of the Popular Front brought greater stability and unity to the left-wing (Payne 2006: 168), and the majority of people still wanted a peaceful solution to civil conflicts as late as the summer of 1936 (Carr 1982: 302). Furthermore, the extensive political violence before 1936 that continued during the spring of 1936 was never a result of a lack of implementation on the part of state security forces. Surely, the quality of implementation of public order by the Civil Guards varied with the governments: the center-right government from 1934 was served much more diligently (Mann 2004: 316; Alpert 2013: 6; Tardio and del Rey Reguillo 2014: 467). However, as Mann (2004: 313-315) shows, the military or police were the perpetrators in more than half of all political assassinations during the Second Republic, which indicates that the threat to public order did not come from anarchists or fascists (of which there were only very few) but from the state itself. And they did so on orders from Azana’s leftist governments as well as the fascist CEDA-backed rightist government from 1934 (Lapuente and Rothstein 2014).

When the three generals agreed to cooperate in a revolt in April 1936, their motivations and the grievances of the military were, as indicated, personal and military-corporate. As Linz (1978b: 150-151) reveals (see also Casanova 2010: 145), it is hard to understand the revolt without acknowledging the atrocities and violence of the previous five years, but democracy certainly did not hinder the security forces from enforcing public order. Certainly, the popular front of February 1936 signaled a kind of finality to the fight against the right, which furthered an atmosphere of destructive resentment and in-
trigue and a perception of an actual threat from the left (Casanova 2010: 145; Alpert 2013: 8, 11). Yet, I must be able to show actual breaches to security as almost any military coup d’état will defend itself with reference to public order. This concern simply had no hold in reality. It is well known that the republican government and the electorate saw no need to support Franco for installing a military dictatorship to reestablish public order. Franco’s success in achieving executive power in October 1936 instead reflected the immediate state of affairs in a civil war.

**Socioeconomic delegitimation**

The mechanism of socioeconomic delegitimation was present. The scholarship on Spain’s interwar breakdown agrees that it was preconditioned at the most fundamental level by a deep socioeconomic divide in society to which democracy presented no viable solutions (see e.g. Linz 1978b: 154; Bernecker 2000: 421; Casanova 2010: 147). Even though the Great Depression never had as devastating consequences for the Spanish economy as in many other interwar European countries, it was indeed a destabilizing fact that politicians had to care about. The fall of the Peseta in 1929 followed by high inflation had made the army and key economic interests lose confidence in Riverra’s regime (Carr 1982: 588). At democracy’s inauguration in 1931, industrial production was in steady decline and at the end of 1932, 500000 were unemployed (de Blaye 1976: 29). Also, the Depression had ruined many agricultural export markets exacerbating old inefficiencies and grievances related to centuries of inequality between landlord and peasant (Brenan 1950: 243-244). At the same time, popular expectations to the republican project of agrarian reform skyrocketed in the early 1930s (Payne 2006: 8-9; Casanova 2010: 44-45). Therefore, agrarian reform was a vital component in the legitimization of democracy. As Mann (2004: 307) coins it, “if liberal institutions failed to deliver any redistribution of power and resources, in no country would popular movements have continued to support them”, and this was true for Spain.

Do we see dissatisfaction and anti-democratic mobilization because genuine agrarian reform proposals were mishandled by the administration? The Azana government in fact initiated a series of agrarian reforms in 1931-1932. According to Malefakis (1971: 175-176), these reforms, including their more detailed programming by a technical commission, were indeed path-breaking and contained all the right ingredients to satisfy a large majority of the population and secure legitimacy (see also Linz 1978b: 151): vast expropriation of large and medium-sized estates but with compensation to former owners and settling of peasant families, all strictly proportionate (Malefakis 1971: Ch. 8). However, administrative ineffectiveness caused poor imple-
mentation of the reform. Generally, the reform administration was incompetent and insufficiently equipped as it lacked technical advisors to implement the technical commission’s complex plan of distribution and the organizing capacity was low since the proposed line of hierarchical orders from the Madrid ministries down was permanently broken by questionably loyal local agents (Brennan 1950: 230; Carr 1982: 613; Mann 2004: 316). More specifically, implementation was skewed by the triangle of caciques, the Jurados Mixtos set to manage the redistribution of lands and disputes over contracts between peasant and landowner, and the latifundistas, large landowners (Malefakis 1971: 169; Moreno-Luzon 2007: 418). They either deliberately delayed the eligibility of estates for expropriation or information about this to the central authorities, or applied the law to secure higher maximum property limits (de Blaye 1976: 24; Blakeley 2001: 86).

The lack of progress on the agrarian reform was obvious. The then president of the Socialist Peasant Federation, Esteban Martínez Hervas, nicely summed this up by pointing out that the agrarian law was “a law in search of a government” (Malefakis 1971: 257). Because the peasants’ expectations to the agrarian reform were initially so high, this radicalized them and caused a significant switch in peasant support from U.G.T. (General Union of Workers) to the revolutionary and anti-democratic C.N.T. (National Confederation of Anarcho-Syndicalist Labors). Republican enthusiasm simply waned because of this (Casanova 2010: 12, 30-33).

General strikes and increased anarchism among industrial workers and peasants gradually employing more violent means followed (Malefakis 1971: 170-171; Bernecker 2000: 415). Anti-democratic sentiment also spread on the right side of the political spectrum, as conservative supporters were radicalized. With brutal repression of workers and the even more concerted reform effort by the Popular Front from 1936, it was clear to most conservatives and many swing-voters as well as key cadres in the military that the ‘middle road’ was impossible: Democracy seemed to either involve a radical shift to anarchy or extensive redistribution to the benefit of the lower classes (Brennan 1950: 259-261; Linz 1978b: 154; Carr 1982: 612). Franco’s falangists were from the start a fascist movement with a hint of economic statism (Mann 2004: 334; Eatwell 2006: 128). At the outbreak of the Civil War in July 1936, popular support for falangism increased and when Franco adopted the idea of an authoritarian-corporate economy he became increasingly capable of mobilizing key conservatives and CEDA elites and officers (Mann 2004: 339). These people reasoned that the popular upheavals could only be solved by a strong state that could satisfy leftists by forcing the land reform on landowners (Mann 2004: 327; see also Schatz 2001: 145-146; Casanova 2010: 147).
Elite bias delegitimation

Elite bias delegitimation was an important reason for the destabilization and breakdown. As indicated, apart from a generally high level of corruption and broken lines of command as well as rightist tendencies of some civil governors and security forces, both left and right governments managed to politicize and bias the administration. An account of government policies and political violence from 1931 to July 1936 reveals that elite polarization was at the core of regime destabilization and the motivation behind the coup attempt. Azana’s laws to maintain public order were intended for any anti-systemic movement but hit anarchists and demonstrating ordinary workers the hardest. The intention of the laws was to further civil rights but these were often disregarded.

Republican Assault Guards generally imposed Azana’s laws rigorously by arresting huge crowds of anti-republicans and conceivable anti-democrats (primarily anarcho-syndicalists) and eventually containing Sanjurjo’s rebellion in Madrid in 1932. The armed forces also fulfilled the minimum requirements of implementation of Prime Minister Azana’s strict anti-extremist decrees and laws (Brenan 1950: 254; Payne 2006: 23-24). But the Civil Guards remained hugely divided over the republic (Carr 1982: 615-616; Parra-Pérez 2013). The Republican Guards also operated locally with caciques thus reproducing unequal access to fair trials and the tendency to strike down violently on leftists and workers (Baumeister 1998; Blakeley 2001: 81-86; Casanova 2010: 48-49). Under the new center-right government of 1933, the Guards committed even more atrocities under more repressive policies (Payne 2006: 26-27, 66). A shift in government back to Azana’s seemingly more mild governance style in February 1936 could not hinder a further escalation of violent political conflict which, during the spring of 1936, came to incorporate peaceful pragmatists among socialists, liberalists, conservatives, and regionalists. It was this direct threat to the security, order, and existence of Spain that motivated the generals’ revolt in July (Linz 1978b: 142, 187, 198).

As we see here, the mixture of politicized civil governors and police forces amidst general ineffectiveness and a lack of meritocracy produced a similar mix of uncritical and, arguably, exaggerated imposition of political orders (dominating under the rightist government from 1933) alongside stalled and incoherent implementation (less prevalent under the leftist governments from 1931-1933 and during the Spring of 1936) (see also Mann 2004: 313-315). The biases of the executive against the left pushed republican legislators further leftward while other centrist politicians in fear of the leftist popular insurrections moved to the right. The political center was thus stripped
of power from the start of the republic. This polarization culminated in the spring of 1936 in leftist anarchism and rightist fascism or ultra-conservatism (Mann 2004: 307; Payne 2006: 42-43). Events in July 1936 capture the dynamic: First, the Socialist deputy, Ventosa, concluded that “the ‘enemies of the Republic’ are the people who daily provoke disorders and create the state of anarchy that is consuming the Republic” (Payne 2006: 249). Then, on July 12, the leader of the parliamentary right, Sotelo, was assassinated. This finally provoked Franco’s coup (Cornell and Lapuente 2014: 1291).

Mass bias delegitimation

Much like the mechanism of elite bias, mass bias delegitimation was an important dynamic. Stanley Payne (2006: 26-27, 66) notes how the atrocities committed by the Assault Guards following the Catalan and Anarchist insurrections in 1933 and 1934 sealed the fate of republican-democratic rule as it radicalized Catalan and Basque regionalists to align with anarchists and started the total polarization between right and left and foundational discontent with the politics of the Republic from conservatives and moderates to extreme leftists. In effect, a cycle of violence, with private militias and guerillas emerging on all political wings, began and accelerated from 1934 and was only temporarily contained by martial law provisions (Bermeo 2003: 46-47; Casanova 2010: 147). Because of recurring violence, socialists started to leave the parties of Azana’s republican coalition from 1934 (Mann 2004: 318).

Particularly biased court rulings were at the center of this delegitimation and radicalization of right and left wings (Brenan 1950: 258-259; Payne 2006: 267; Lapuente and Rothstein 2014: 14). A contemporary Barcelona journalist saw what happened in the spring of 1936 as a reaction to the non-existing government; “people begin to feel themselves fascist” (Payne 2006: 267). The biased court system not only let anarchy run loose in the spring of 1936, it also enabled the escalation of violent conflict in the critical months after the only half-successful coup in July. Effective prosecution of the generals failed completely because government bureaucrats already favored a violent confrontation with communism and a coming of military rule (Payne 2006: 363-364; Lapuente and Rothstein 2014: 14).

Citizenship violence

The mechanism of citizenship violence was absent. It should be noted that economic and ethnic divisions between industrially developed Catalonia and the alleged suppressors of Madrid tended to produce violence in Barcelona (Carr 1982: 435, 538; Payne 2006: 270, 343-344). As political violence in-
creased from 1934 and security forces were accused of being biased and employing repressive means against regionalists, Catalan leftists were radicalized and genuine Catalan armed squads developed (Brenan 1950: 283; Bermeo 2003: 46-47; Payne 2006: 87). With the entrance of the Popular Front, the creation of regionalist, secessionist movements (some violent, some non-violent) quickened as reforms for regional autonomy kept stalling (Linz 1978b: 187; Payne 2006: 271).

But violence between the ethnically antagonized groups was generally rare (Baumeister 1998; Payne 2006: 270). Only a handful Catalans or Basques were killed by Spaniards, and political violence was generally driven by orthodox right-left class cleavages (Bernecker 2000: 415; Bermeo 2003: 46-47; Mann 2004: 313; Casanova 2010: 143-144). Unlike in Weimar Germany, a strong nationalism was absent and never part of the motivation of Franco and the centrist voters and elites who turned right in 1936. Outright racist sentiments and xenophobic acts were therefore limited (Payne 1995: 263).

Citizenship injustices

The peculiar development of the mechanisms stemming from citizenship disagreement parallels that in Germany. Thus, while citizenship violence was relatively rare, citizenship injustices were inextricably bound to the democratic destabilization in Spain. Apart from being socialist, the Second Republic and democracy in 1931 was a regionalist, Catalan project awarding Catalonia its own parliament with legislative authority, civil and criminal law systems, and police forces (Carr 1982: 546; Andrés and Braster 1999: 75-76). Moreover, citizenship disagreement cannot be isolated from socioeconomic conflict lines since Catalonia was the most industrialized region and had a larger and better unionized share of industrial workers. Catalonia’s political leaders by implication saw the Castile association as an economic strait-jacket (Carr 1982: 538; Holguin 2002: Ch. 6). Throughout the lifespan of the republic, the conflict line between regionalists and centralists (notably those still hoping for a revived Carlist monarchy) obstructed parliamentary compromises and fueled the trenching of politics among elites. The regionalists were generally pro-labor, pledging for social and agrarian reforms and better labor protection, while the centralists were pro-employer, resisting these very policies (Linz 1978b: 155-156; Payne 1995: 263; Mann 2004: 299).

Two dynamics contributed to polarization between Madrid and Catalonia and internally in the Madrid Cortes on economic distribution between center and periphery. First, region was an important determinant of voting patterns and moderated, sometimes augmented, class effects. Second, while the Catalan assembly remained fairly unified on its claim for complete autonomy, the Madrid Cortes polarized on this question, disagreeing on the importance of
Catalonia to the Spanish economy, the concern of workers’ rights, and the core republican idea of regional autonomy (Bernecker 2000: 401; Holguin 2002: Ch. 6; Mann 2004: 307, 310; Payne 2006: 68). In this way, citizenship disputes polarized the party system and hindered highly demanded economic reforms (Linz 1978b: 144, 149, 156). The former centrist party, the Radicals, was driven to the right and formed governments with the fascist-inspired CEDA until 1936. Pro-democratic left-wing parties, which had always been weak, now gradually disintegrated into political apathy. Some instead intensified cooperation with more revolutionary regionalist parties such as Catalan Esquerra and communist and anarcho-syndicalist forces (Linz 1978b: 149; Carr 1982: 628-636).

This political situation marked el bieno negro, the black years from 1934-1936 when Castile-oriented governments put strict regulations on industry in Catalonia and rolled back many of the elements in the Autonomy Statute (Brenan 1950: 278; Carr 1982: 628). This led to numerous democratically destabilizing acts: The Basques and the Esquerra deputies withdrew from the Spanish parliament to form their own, and the left-wing Catalan leader, Companys, declared the independent Catalan State (Brenan 1950: 280-282; Linz 1978b: 160). These acts, especially Company’s declaration, contributed further to the polarization of the party system and the alienation of conservative centralists, including the army, which dissociated itself from anything democratic because it was associated with the republic (Brenan 1950: 60, 283; Linz 1978b: 156).

Although the Catalan or Basque questions were not direct sources of the attempted coup in July and the naming of Franco as dictator in October (Alpert 2013: 8), this situation was a major motivation for officers participating in these acts (Payne 2006: 272). They simply saw the secessionist claims as the failure of democracy and wanted to reinstall a strong authoritarian center in Madrid (Linz 1978b: 155; Bermeo 2003: 46-47), reflected in the nascent Franco dictatorship’s slogan, “Una Patria, Un Estado, Un Caudillo” (“One Fatherland, One State, One Leader”) (Basilio 2002: 69).

Democratic stabilization in Czechoslovakia and Finland

As in Germany and Spain, the stabilization of democracy in Czechoslovakia and Finland was an urgent task for the political leadership during most of the democratic spell. I will show that Czechoslovakia and Finland shared one important mechanism for stabilization: anti-systemic containment. The mechanisms of security and socioeconomic legitimation and mass and elite impartiality legitimation to some extent contributed to stability in Finland. This was not the case in Czechoslovakia as the country was mired in severe
citizenship disputes at the elite and mass levels, which only increased during the 1930s despite attempts to mitigate them.

It is difficult to account for the survival of democracy in Czechoslovakia and Finland without reference to the determinate use of anti-extremist legislation (Capoccia 2005: 72, 140). Much more than accommodation of extremist forces, which was not successful in Finland (Capoccia 2005: 140) and eventually failed in Czechoslovakia (Capoccia 2005: 80), militancy and sometimes even questionably legal repression were the vital tools (see Capoccia 2005: 161; Bugge 2006/2007: 10-12). As in Spain and Germany, violent conflicts between communists and fascists were part of everyday politics and street life from the very inauguration of democracy – indeed, it was born out of such conflicts in the civil war – and accelerated with the Great Depression. Fascism was very much a reaction to communism, and not the other way around, but fascism manifested itself in the Lapua movement, which consisted of impoverished peasants who were explicitly motivated by defending the Finnish nation against communists (Alapuro 1980: 680; Stubbbergaard 1996: 124-131). After the containment of the Lapua, Finnish fascism continued in the ILK party, which was a much less powerful organization even though it allied with the conservatives in the election of 1933; this was very similar to what happened in Germany at the time (Larsen 1990: 241, 246). In Czechoslovakia, there was less antagonism between communists and fascists and street fights and violence were much less prevalent (Zückert 2008: 327-329). However, coup plotting was an imminent threat in most of the period (Hrdina III 2005: 5) and the number of extremist parties in parliament (30 % at its highest in 1935) and, most importantly, the multiple and strong secessionist forces in parties and the electorate constantly threatened the stability of democratic governance (Bradley 2000: 97; Capoccia 2005: 37). Thus, anti-extremist containment was certainly needed if the two democracies were to survive.

Instead of aligning with extremist forces, the Czechoslovak and Finnish security forces stood by the democratic leadership on decisive occasions. In Czechoslovakia, one questionably subordinate soldier was General Gajda, who rose through the military ranks in the early 1920s and became chief of staff in 1924. His openly political messages and fascist inspiration worried the government as it feared the power of his appeal to discontent Slovakian officers. Consequently, he was transferred to Prague and under accusations of planning a coup d'état stripped of his duties by the military command on orders from President Masaryk (Mamatey 1973a: 131; Zorach 1976: 685-687; Kelly 1999). This not only indicates a continuation of the respect for a strong separation of politics and military affairs in the military itself. Gajda’s arrest was obviously also essential to democratic stability.
More concerted and preemptive steps toward containment of anti-systemic forces dominated Czechoslovak politics. The 1920-law of state of siege was repeatedly used in the 1920s and 1930s to dissolve demonstrations and movements of communists, Slovak secessionist oppositions, and ethnic minorities (particular Germans in Sudetenland) (Mamatey 1973a: 105-106; Capoccia 2005: 95; Zückert 2008: 336). It was also used to ban the Nazi copycats of DNSAP and DNP in 1933 (Capoccia 2005: 78), and the result was the establishment of the further radicalized and united Sudeten German Party, which was explicitly secessionist, inspired by Nazism, and mustered around 90% of all German votes (Broklova 1998: 188, 192). A series of new anti-extremist measures were initiated and effectively implemented: a ban on anti-republican or anti-democratic parties, limitations on movement of foreigners, and special protections of state institutions. They were renewed several times from 1934 to 1938, and importantly for my purpose, involved an increase in the discretionary powers of the police (Bradley 2000:103; Capoccia 2005: 92-94).

Police efforts were swift and efficient, enforcing public order in Sudetenland, conducting numerous trials for violations of the laws, and eventually banning Henlein’s party along with a strict enforcement of martial law in 1938 (Capoccia 2005: 98, 105-106; Wingfield 1989: 135). Even though efforts of containment were thus much more cohesive and determinate than in Germany (Bermeo 2003: 244), it is not plausible to explain their success without reference to the implementation by the police. Tellingly, it is the Austrian structures of the police and the quickly obtained loyalty to the Czechoslovak state project that here seem to contrast with the establishment of Freikorps and the disintegration of police ranks in Germany (Zückert 2008: 336). Henlein was forced to flee to Germany where he allied with Hitler and only under his immense military power marched into Czechoslovakia in 1939 (Hrdina III 2005: 21).

In Finland, both public and secret police repression was a vital part of the containment of anti-democratic threats. On numerous occasions, the police acted on the edge of legality to ensure a ‘white’ party hegemony, for instance by dissolving the congress of the Finnish Communist Party, SKP, in 1919 (Puntila 1975: 135-136; Capoccia 2005: 148, 150). However, such acts were never directed against the parliamentary left-wing parties. The Social Democrats notably also removed themselves from any communist association (Alapuro 1988: 158; Capoccia 2005: 143-147). The success of the anti-extremist measures was not coincidental. Even the secret police worked in close tandem with multiple governments through the 1920s and 1930s ensuring a smoothly coordinated containment. Also, communist infiltrations of the army never succeeded (Capoccia 2005: 151). In contrast to the Spanish
containment efforts, Finnish police and army thus acted as one, with one firmly established goal of protecting the Finnish state and democracy. They acted loyally in the service of shifting governments (Kirby 2006: 178, 205). The Finnish liberal hegemony has been particularly known as important for its democratic survival, but the hegemony was caused by factors outside the party system as such since polarization and fragmentation remained moderate to high until 1930-1932 when the communist parties were ousted from political society (Karvonen and Quenter 2002: 157). We should rather look to the outcome of the civil war as an important event enabling the alliance of the liberal government with the state apparatus (Sode-Madsen 2008: 210).

With the advent of the Lapua movement in 1929, there were instances where police and armed forces breached ranks and participated in paramilitary repression of communists (Larsen 1990: 251; Capoccia 2005: 155). More seriously, a significant overlap of persons between the Lapua movement and the Civil Guards contributed to a wave of political violence in 1929 (Larsen 1990: 251; Capoccia 2005: 154-155). Nonetheless, there was a neat co-variation between governmental compliance and civil guard behavior throughout the 1920s and 1930s (Stubbergaard 1996: 130-131). Whereas police repression was generally mild before 1931, the passing of the anti-extremist laws in 1930-1931 accelerated repression of the communist movement as expected and rooted out most secret policing (Capoccia 2005: 160-161, 169). And the state remained autonomous in relation to the Lapua movement. Even though many anti-extremist laws resembled the ideas of Lapua, the state and parliament formulated them before the Lapua movement was established (Stubbergaard 1996: 202).

In 1930, legislation to guard against the Lapua had been proposed. The most radical Civil Guards were brought into line in 1932 after an attempted coup d'état by the Lapua and former chief of staff of the army Wallenius in Mäntsälä, when president Svinhufvud appealed in a radio speech to the Civil Guards to reestablish public order (Stubbergaard 1996: 184-186). It has been suggested that Svinhufvud’s act was contingent and completely determinant of the democratic survival (e.g. De Meur and Berg-Schlosser 2002: 263). It is also clear that the Lapua movement enjoyed significant support among Civil Guards (Stubbergaard 1996). Yet, one must also account for the resonance of the appeal that made the difference for the majority of Civil Guards who were still basically loyal to the government and had no problem cutting their bonds to Lapua (Capoccia 2005: 167; for a similar account of Lapua, the Civil Guards, and repression, see Alapuro and Allardt 1978: 128-131; Siaroff 1999: 119; Karvonen 2000: 149, 154; Kirby 2006: 179). The Lapua movement simply overestimated its resonance among the security forces (Puntila 1975: 145). Its attractiveness was anti-democratic, bound to protection
against communists in the face of a seemingly inactive parliament, but it could not attract the necessary support. Tellingly, the anti-communist Mannerheim expressed sympathy with the Lapua cause, but he had been excluded from influence at this time by the military command (Sode-Madsen 2008: 206-207). More specifically, the acts of the judiciary, the military, and the police closely followed political signals in the years from 1929 to 1932 when communication between the government and the Lapua as well as legislative innovation to deal with the Lapua became intense (Stubbergaard 1996: 138-143). The fact is that there are no reported examples of dissidents from the army or police in the critical days around the Mäntsälä rebellion in 1932 (Stubbergaard 1996: 185).

In perspective, the reaction of the Finnish state apparatus and its politicians seems to involve more than Svinhufvud’s lucky hand. Rather, a united executive stood ready to react when Lapua crossed the line from protector to disturber of domestic peace. Even though the Civil Guard support for the democratic governments was ambiguous, the decision of the Civil Guards to support Svinhufvud’s government at this point contrasts neatly with Franco’s and the many other discontented Spanish generals’ and officers’ decision to rebel against democracy.

Performance legitimation of various sorts also contributed to survival in Finland. Alapuro and Allardt (1978) note how the democratic regime and liberal-peasant governments boosted their legitimacy as they contained communist threats and hindered extremist agitation – these were phenomena of the near past that were salient issues for the ordinary Finn. Specifically, this convinced the Social Democrats and their core constituencies to distance themselves from the communists (Allardt and Alapuro 1978: 129). The social democrats calculated that their political survival was dependent on condemning the attempts at communist revolution in 1917 (Siltala 2015: 16). Further, the determination against communism from the political center knit the bourgeois voters together and kept the majority of impoverished peasant voters from joining the Lapua movement in the first years of the Great Depression (Allardt and Alapuro 1978: 123, 128).

Legitimation via administrative effectiveness also finds support in the literature. The Red-Green Alliance, manifested in 1936-1937 with packages of unemployment protection similar to those of Sweden’s Saltsjöbaden, Denmark’s Kanslergadeforliget, and USA’s New Deal, is often mentioned as the condition that strengthened the political center and thus sealed democracy (e.g. Nousiainen 1988: 236, 244-245; Karvonen 2000: 150-151). Importantly, the backbone of this alliance was not only political willingness to compromise but also bureaucratic neutrality. The State Council, which consisted of ministers and their secretaries, led the central planning of the economy and
social reforms. Generally, the council was a neutral mediator of conflicts that was strongly affected by bureaucratic values (Nousiainen 1988: 229-232). Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, this body led policies that promoted a relatively equal distribution of resources, agrarian reforms, and an important countercyclical policy of state-led corporations and cartelization. The continued presence of senior civil servants in the council created a stable pattern of interaction between left and right parties characterized by mutual trust despite a certain right bias (Nousiainen 1988; Kuisma 1993). Comparing Latvia, Estonia, and Finland, Kasekamp (1999: 598-599) notes that Svinhufvud’s abstention from initiating a coup d’état to protect against the Lapua movement, in contrast to Päts’ and Ulmanis’ coups in Estonia and Latvia, respectively, was dependent on the impression of a strong executive power capable of initiating determinate policies. For this, the strength of state institutions was different. We see here the mechanisms of socioeconomic mass impartiality, and elite impartiality legitimation centered on the particularly Scandinavian success story of state corporatism (see Luebbert 1991; Knudsen and Rothstein 1994). The contrasts with Spain in this regard are clear (see Lapuente and Rothstein 2014).

However, it should be noted that the eventual compromise between employers and employees did not occur until 1936-1937, long after the height of the fascist threat to democracy (Larsen 1990: 256). It therefore seems most reasonable to conclude that the containment of extremist forces by the security apparatus was the key to democratic survival in Finland.

The mechanisms of citizenship peace and justice in Finland were less important, simply because ethnicity was much less salient in the period. It might be that the compromising ability of the left and right parties was conditioned on the settling of nationality questions on the Åland Islands or a general national unity but no such mechanism is mentioned in the literature. Larsen (1990: 251), for instance, notes that the ultra-conservative Swedish People’s Party, despite still agitating for independence in the 1930s, was never going to become ‘mainstream’ among the Swedish minority given its secured position. If anything, the settlement of language disputes in the public sphere in the University of Helsinki affair as part of the Red-Green Alliance in 1937 was preconditioned on intra-party disagreements rather than on unity over language policies (Karvonen 2000: 156). For voters, the Sweden-Finland conflict had been settled in 1921. It seems that social questions, the economy, and the international and internal threats of Russian communism were more important (see e.g. Allardt and Alapuro 1978). Tellingly, the Lapua movement did not deal with the language question (Stubbergaard 1996: 163).
Ethnicity was definitely politically important in Czechoslovakia. Citizenship issues did challenge democracy. Why did citizenship disagreement then not lead to democratic breakdown? Performance legitimation via monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness would seem to be obvious possible explanations but none of these mechanisms seems to hold.

The literature is full of praise for President Masaryk’s leadership and the executive policies and parliamentary compromises of the Castle and Petka groups, respectively (e.g. Miller 1999; Capoccia 2005; Orzoff 2009). These bodies focused almost entirely on quelling and/or accommodating extremist movements in Sudetenland wherefrom the main threat came. As a result, many socioeconomic policies such as tax exemptions and increased public works contracting for German workers (Capoccia 2005:99-100), nourishment and milk programs during the Great Depression (Wingfield 1989: 106), and the introduction of an 8-hour working day were temporarily initiated and quelled some resistance. The implementation of these measures was prudent at both central and local levels, and permanent bureaucrats (although a vital share of the Castle group was politically appointed by the President) helped forge compromises and stable, coherent policies (Hendrych 1993: 42; Miller 1999: 194; Bradley 2000: 98). In fact, it is noted (see Janos 2000: 110-111) that the powerful Czech bureaucracy undertook many policy functions itself. This was gradually developed by the emergency and anti-extremist laws of the 1920s but were also preconditioned and formed by the bureaucracy itself owing to its position above politics. Also, the Czech bureaucracy’s autonomy and actions of financial prudence in the 1930s is compared with Japan’s MITI a generation later – it is even recognized that the bureaucracy took over in macroeconomic and security-related policies on important aspects where politicians abstained (Janos 2000: 112-113). It would thus be highly presumptuous to give all credit for successful combatting of extremism to the Czechoslovak politicians.

The radicalization of the German population nevertheless increased through the 1930s. As Zückert (2008: 340-341) notes, the measures implemented in the early 1930s, however gracious, were simply insufficient in the face of the major integrationist challenge. Even the Slovaks grew more and more resilient to Czech rule and their claims for autonomy approached secessionism (Mamatey 1973a: 149). The fact remained that in 1938, at the brink of German occupation, German unemployment rates were twice as high as in the rest of Czechoslovakia (Wingfield 1989: 139). For all its graces, the Czech bureaucracy did not open up to Slovak officials with, for instance, only 1.6 % Slovaks employed in the central ministries in 1938 (Janos 2000:113). Citizenship justices were thus not responsible for democratic stability in Czechoslovakia. Anti-extremist legislation was also diligently im-
plemented but there was, as indicated, no threat to public order and thus no security legitimation.

To sum up the Czechoslovak case, it would seem that its democracy, despite strong tendencies of Sudeten German and Slovak defections from 1935, was resilient to citizenship disagreements because of the combination of determined political leaders, a well-functioning political system forging compromises, clear executive orders, and a strong, cohesive, and subordinated security apparatus.

A comparative prospectus

The above analysis offers three lessons of value to the study. First, the disaggregation of stateness into three attributes, each with a number of components, and seven mechanisms to cover the state-democracy nexus proved useful in explaining a concrete puzzle of democratic stability and breakdown in interwar Europe. Stateness correlated positively with democratic stability. But this notion needs refinement since only monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness drive this correlation. At least from this small sample, one cannot support the view that citizenship agreement is a truly necessary condition for democratic stability, which is otherwise the theory of Linz and Stepan (1996). Citizenship disputes were important contributors to breakdown in Germany and Spain but while they destabilized matters in Czechoslovakia, they did not lead to breakdown.

The possible mechanisms of monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness are multiple and thus need qualification. Comparing the role of the state in interwar Czechoslovakia and Finland with Germany and Spain reveals that none of the mechanisms explains their different democratic fates. Authoritarian restoration and socioeconomic delegitimation come closest. Anti-systemic containment certainly protected democracy in Czechoslovakia and Finland, but whereas authoritarian restoration occurred in Spain, it did not in Germany due to the manner of Hitler’s takeover. Socioeconomic delegitimation played an important part in the downfall of democracy in both Spain and Germany, whereas Finland benefitted from the opposite because of complacent and competent civil servants. Yet, despite many seemingly accommodative socioeconomic policies and effective implementation, support for Sudeten German independence only grew stronger and culminated in 1935. From this point, almost all Sudeten Germans were anti-democratic (Bruegel 1973: 178), and even though there may have been some hope of a peaceful solution to the Czech-Sudeten conflict (see Seton-Watson 1945: 287), this possibility was never tested. This does not mean that monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness do not explain demo-
cratic stability in the four cases, only that we must be careful how we interpret such a finding.

Finally, the study directly informs the conduct of the next empirical examinations. Most importantly, all seven mechanisms gave valuable insights into the diversity of processes of stabilization and destabilization. Indeed, the strength of the mechanisms of Chapter 4 is their ability to capture very different types of stateness problems and processes of destabilization, as witnessed in Germany and Spain. As the only mechanism, citizenship violence was not relevant in any of the cases, but given the supposedly general relevance of citizenship disputes in interwar Europe (see Hobsbawn 1994) and particularly in the post-WWII period (see Gleditsch, Hegre, and Strand 2009), I have no reason not to examine the mechanism further. Finally, no mechanism showed up unexpectedly. For instance, as expected neither elite nor mass bias delegitimation was present in Germany where meritocracy was in place. In terms of building mechanisms for analyses of a broader sample of cases, the controlled comparison indicates that the seven mechanisms of Chapter 4 capture the range of possible stateness mechanisms.

Summing up, the seven mechanisms are relevant for a broader empirical examination and they seem likely to capture the entirety of possible mechanisms between stateness and democratic stability. First, however, we need to set up the dataset of democratic stability and breakdown covering all three periods. This is the purpose of the next chapter.
Chapter 6.
Constructing a Dataset of Causal Process Observations

Stateness through different combinations of the seven mechanisms provides essential insights into why democracy broke down in affluent and relatively egalitarian Germany while it survived in Czechoslovakia and Finland, and why the relatively mild consequences of the Great Depression led to breakdown in Spain but neither in Finland nor in crisis-ridden Czechoslovakia. Based on purely correlational evidence, one may preliminarily conclude that citizenship agreement is less important, whereas, as expected, monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness were weak in Germany and Spain but strong in Czechoslovakia and Finland. However, investigating mechanisms questioned and substantiated this conclusion: None of the mechanisms stemming from monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness were present in all four cases. Since security delegitimation was present in all four cases, the mechanisms analysis indicates the particular importance of monopoly on violence. This account demonstrates that we need to be careful when making causal interpretations based only on correlational knowledge of the state-democracy nexus.

The following chapter sets up a dataset of causal process observations (CPO) that consists of two tiers of data: 1) the status of each case of democratic breakdown and stability on the three stateness attributes (and components) and 2) the status of each case of democratic breakdown on the seven mechanisms. The statistical analysis in Chapter 7 capitalizes on the first tier while Chapters 8-10 employ both tiers. Overall, building such a dataset helps examine the preliminary conclusions of Chapter 5 on a larger sample of democracies from 1918 to 2010.

First, I identify the democratic spells (1918-2010). This involves yearly dichotomous codings of whether a given country had a democratic or autocratic regime. I employ the coding rules of Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2012), which give me a consistent measurement of the dichotomy between democracy and autocracy. I briefly discuss the advantages and disadvantages of other datasets. Indeed, even if a dataset differs from my preferred baseline concept of electoral democracy, there might be other advantages to using it. Having established that Boix, Miller, and Rosato’s dataset provides the highest level of concept-measure consistency, I discuss borderline cases as well as the exclusion of consolidated democracies from the dataset.
Second, the chapter describes and discusses how I code the three attributes of stateness and the seven mechanisms. Regarding the stateness attributes, I discuss extant measures of the attributes and conclude that they suffer from limited coverage, problems of validity and reliability, or a certain ‘democratic’ bias when features of democracy are conflated with those of stateness. I attempt to mitigate these concerns by coding stateness myself based on the components presented in Figure 2.1 (for further specified coding rules, see Appendix I). As a particular analytical approach, I generally trace the development of stateness from the pre-democratic to the democratic period in each case. This involves assessing stateness across four major global interruptions of state- and nation-building in the 20th century: WWI, the end of WWII and decolonization, and the fall of the Berlin Wall at the end of the Cold War. As a consequence, the codings enable examinations of the possible confounders of contingency and democratic legacy. I take up these discussions in the study’s concluding chapter. Regarding the coding of mechanisms, I adhere to the observable implications of the mechanisms presented in Chapter 4.

Lastly, I present my general way of searching source material for coding stateness and the mechanisms. The online appendix contains in-depth discussions of the codings of each case31 while Appendix I presents the list of search and coding criteria as well as the discrepancies between my codings and those of the research assistant I hired to do an inter-coder reliability test. The randomly selected cases for this test and my coding decisions in case of threshold ambiguities are also reported here.

Before delving into the dataset, it is important to note the basic analytical assumption of setting up the dataset of CPO, namely that CPO will actually inform our knowledge of the hypotheses of this study. Let us reiterate the two hypotheses presented in Chapter 3:

*Hypothesis 1: High levels of monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, and citizenship agreement decrease the probability of democratic breakdown*

*Hypothesis 2: The effects of monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, and citizenship agreement on the risk of democratic breakdown differ substantially in terms of significance or size*

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The statistical examinations of hypotheses 1 and 2 give average effects of the three stateness attributes on democratic stability. While the CPO analysis of the democratic breakdown cases does not produce any probabilities of breakdown, it gives an impression of the explanatory importance of stateness by indicating a number of breakdowns caused by a given mechanism (see Haggard and Kaufman 2012). That is, given a negative, significant effect of, say, citizenship agreement on the risk of democratic breakdown found in the statistical analysis, we should expect the mechanisms of citizenship violence and injustices to be commonly observed among the breakdown cases. As the CPO method is based on single case inference and only regards breakdown cases, we cannot easily compare the explanatory importance of each attribute here with the average effect size and significance of the statistical analysis. But the number of observed mechanisms among the breakdowns should correspond with the given attribute’s general effect on democratic stability. The CPO analysis also improves our ability to interpret a given effect of the state on democratic stability. For instance, we would be able to see whether the importance of administrative ineffectiveness for democratic breakdown is due to socioeconomic delegitimation or elite or mass bias delegitimation.

Democratic stability and breakdown from 1918 to 2010

Boix, Miller, and Rosato’s (2012) (‘BMR’ in this chapter) conception of an electoral democracy is my baseline concept for distinguishing in a dichotomous fashion between democracies and autocracies, in turn enabling a distinction between democratic survivors and breakdowns. Recall from Chapter 2 the operational definition of democracy as a regime in which the key government offices are filled through free and fair elections in which at least half of the male population is allowed to participate. Explaining democratic stability thus means identifying the conditions that increase the likelihood of the prevalence of continuous democratic elections.

BMR provide codings of democracy and dictatorships from 1800 to 2010 based on their criteria for electoral democracy (see Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2014). I choose their codings because they provide the best concept-measure consistency (see Munck and Verkuilen 2009; Møller and Skaaning 2012). There are three challenges to a valid dissemination of data on a given variable: explicating the theory concerning the relationship between the components of the concept (conceptualization), choosing appropriate indicators capturing each component as closely as possible (measurement), and choosing aggregation rules that correspond with the interrelationships between the components (aggregation) (Munck and Verkuilen 2009). These three
challenges are often intertwined, but since measurement and aggregation are separate tasks that often involve compromising the concept, the content of the components may be only inaccurately captured. Indeed, concept-measure inconsistencies are common among cross-national measures of democracy (Møller and Skaaning 2012: 235). Therefore, datasets of electoral democracy with a better concept-measure consistency than BMR’s may be available.

For comparisons with BMR, I choose the datasets with coverage of the interwar, Cold War, and post-Cold War periods. But the potential datasets also need to have a dichotomous understanding and coding of democracy and autocracy based on the characteristics of electoral democracy. Apart from BMR, this involves Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock’s (2001) coding of democratic breakdowns from 1913 to 2010 (‘BNR’). Other possible datasets are Vanhanen’s (2000) index of democratization covering 1810 to 2012, the Polity IV by Marshall et al. (2010) covering 1800 to 2013 (‘Polity IV’), and the Varieties of Democracy data by Coppedge et al. (2015a) covering 1900 to 2012 (‘V-Dem’).

These five datasets basically share the base concept of electoral democracy and its components as they all take their outset in Dahl’s concepts of contestation and participation. BNR employ ‘polyarchy’ as term but only the minimal conditions surrounding an election and they demand universal suffrage (Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock 2001: 783). As indicated, I prefer to lower the demands for suffrage to 50% male suffrage for purely analytical reasons even though this, in principle, is a restricted type of contestation, according to the concept of polyarchy.32 The V-Dem employs a thicker concept of “electoral democracy in its fullest sense”, including the full battery of political rights of polyarchy (Coppedge et al. 2015b: 29). Vanhanen’s (2000: 253) choice of actual electoral participation and largest party vote share as indicators is arguably a more fundamental deviation from electoral democracy. Both of his indicators can be construed as outcomes of processes related to but not integral parts of participation and competition, respectively. Polity IV conflates contestation and participation in their indexes, which particularly clouds the extent of suffrage (in fact, it does not code suffrage levels at all) (Marshall et al. 2010: 14, 21-27).

More importantly, the common trait of V-Dem, Vanhanen, and Polity IV is that they do not make a clear dichotomous distinction between democracy and autocracy. As noted by Goertz (2006) and Munck and Verkuilen (2009)

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32 For pragmatic reasons, BNR lower the bar to include ‘near polyarchies’ of Latin America and USA with suffrage restrictions of literacy, but this is an exception from their general coding rule.
and reiterated by Møller and Skaaning (2012: 236-237), when contestation and participation are seen as each necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of democracy as in the theory of polyarchy (or electoral democracy) (see Dahl 1973), the distinction between democracy and autocracy should in theory and practice be dichotomous. For my purpose, a dichotomous distinction is thus *sine qua non*. I therefore only compare BMR with BNR.

Beyond their conceptual differences, an additional difference between BMR and BNR concerns coverage. They both fulfill the minimum requirement of coverage of the three analytical periods of this study. But coverage of smaller states may also be a relevant concern. It is worth paying attention to the small island states, which are often former British colonies and more likely to be democratic (see Anckar 2002; Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004). BMR include both ‘de facto’ and de jure sovereign states of minimum 500000 inhabitants whereas BNR (2001: 783) include only de jure sovereign states with no mentioning of any limit of inhabitants for inclusion. A threshold for inclusion set at de jure sovereignty is not fruitful for me since neither of the theories to be assessed restricts its arguments to de jure state sovereignty. What is at stake is instead the actual, substantial levels of stateness. I thus stick to BMR’s coverage rule.

Regarding measurement levels and aggregation rules, BMR and BNR are equal as they conceptualize their subcomponents as either-or conditions (nominal measurement level) and employ the aggregation rule of ‘weakest-link-sets-the-score’ (minimum). This aggregation rule makes sense since the existence of free and fair elections and the extent of suffrage do not condition each other in the assessment of whether a given election was democratic (the components of contestation and participation are non-interactive). Besides, the choice between multiplication (suitable when components are interactive) and minimum aggregation is insignificant when subcomponents can be seen as either-or conditions (that is, with values of either 0 or 1). BNR and BMR in this way have consistent uses of measurement level and aggregation.

In conclusion, the BMR measure seems most fruitful. Since it achieves the concept-measure consistency alongside BNR, the small but significant differences in the concept of electoral democracy make the difference: BNR’s suffrage and sovereignty restrictions make it less analytically useful for my purpose. In any case, it would raise concerns of reliability if the people doing the conceptualization were different from those doing the actual case classifications.

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33 BMR do not provide criteria for when a country achieves de facto sovereignty.
Democratic spells, borderline cases, and consolidated democracies

Table 6.1 presents the full list of democratic spells globally from 1918 to 2010 based on the conceptualization and measurement of BMR (2012). A democratic spell is defined as the period of years during which democracy was in place. The spells, as presented in the table, comprise the first democratic year ending with the year of democratic breakdown. Since explaining democratic stability entails analysis of the risk of democratic rather than autocratic breakdown, years of autocratic rule are not of interest in this study. A given country is thus excluded from the dataset when it is autocratic (except the year of democratic breakdown). The codings of BNR are not reported. The only substantial difference between the codings of BMR and BNR relates to the higher suffrage demands of BNR, which, for instance, exclude Italy, France, Chile, and Argentina as interwar democratic spells in BNR’s count.

Let me clarify five specifications of the categorization of democratic spells. First, I have excluded more mini-states than BMR by extending the lower threshold of inhabitants to 1000000 instead of 500000. This is due to pragmatic reasons to ensure sufficient access to data on stateness and the processes of democratic breakdown.34

Second, some democratic spells are interrupted by foreign occupation and thus not counted as democratic breakdowns. Foreign occupation is widely accepted as an exception to breakdown (see e.g. Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock 2001: 783; Capoccia 2005: 6-15). Also, foreign occupation violates the assumption of de facto sovereignty as criterion for inclusion. BMR adopt this argument too. It seems theoretically tenable to accept this because sheer power by outside forces is not of interest here. Indeed, German military annexation of European countries during the interwar period and the Soviet ditto in the Cold War period should not be blamed on any inadequacies of the occupied state’s apparatus in protection of democracy. Cases of interruption by foreign occupation (but not democratic breakdown) count Belgium (1940-1944), France (1940-1945)35, and Czechoslovakia

34 The full list of excluded mini-states is: Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & Grenadines, Antigua, St. Kitts & Nevis, Belize, Monaco, Liechtenstein, Andorra, Vatican state, Suriname, San Marino, Malta, Cap Verde, Sao Tome, Comoros, Maldives, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Fiji, Tonga, Nauru, Marshall Islands, Palau, Micronesia, West Samoa.

35 BMR code France as a case of breakdown from 1940 and occupation from 1944-1945 (probably counting the Vichy regime in Southern France as independent until 1944) but this seems untenable since the French government was forced to resign under German military pressure in June 1940 after which the Nazi-friendly Pétain could install the Vichy regime (see Dobry 2000: 157; Jackson 2003: 38).
(1939-1944) as well as the Serbian/Yugoslavian occupation of Bosnia (1992-1995).

Third, some spells are interrupted because the country in question ceases to exist. These cases are neither counted as breakdowns since regime survival should not be equaled to state survival. It may be true that modern, representational democracy is only meaningful in a modern state (see Held 2006: Ch. 3) but this does not mean that it is analytically fruitful to count territorial split-ups as democratic breakdowns. Where territorial split-up does not coincide with a democratic breakdown, I analyze the spell as ended but without breakdown. This was the case with Czechoslovakia, which split into Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993, and Serbia & Montenegro, which split into the two independent countries of Serbia and Montenegro, respectively, in 2006.

Fourth, as in any cross-national classification process there are borderline cases – arguments that some cases should be included as democracies instead of being excluded as autocracies or coded as democratic breakdowns instead of survivors. Since the purpose of this study is not centered on the classification of democracies, I accept all codings of BMR with the small amendments already mentioned. As discussed in Chapter 5, Finland and Czechoslovakia are notable borderline cases but it may be argued that Czechoslovakia succumbed to foreign occupation and, despite civil rights limitations and weak executive accountability, lived up to the standards of free and fair elections with direct consequences for parliament and president. Finnish anti-extremist legislation was similarly directed at unambiguously anti-democratic forces. France is another borderline case (see Dobry 2000) that may, however, be seen as a democracy interrupted by foreign occupation (see Jackson 2003: 38).

An additional borderline case regards the coding of Czechoslovakia from 1990 to 1992. Should this be coded as a democratic breakdown or an interruption by territorial split-up? According to Olson (1997: 155-157, 162-164), Czechoslovakia was a functioning polyarchy despite gross problems of integration of Slovaks and Czechs until it ceased to exist. It is often assumed that Czechoslovakia would have erupted in violence if the separation had not materialized (Musil 1992: 181-185; Hislope 1998: 78-81). Yet, violence never erupted before the separation of January 1, 1993. Coding it as democratic breakdown would thus be ex-post judgment. Rather, the election of June 1992 merely produced a two-party system that hindered government formation in the autumn of 1992. Moreover, no coups d’état were attempted and separation was a solution to an isolated governmental crisis (Olson 1993).
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Note: **Spell interrupted by foreign occupation (=no breakdown). ***Spell ended by turnover to status of democratically consolidated (=no breakdown). ****Spell interrupted by foreign occupation but consolidated democracy at liberation. *****Spell interrupted by dictatorship but consolidated democracy at the following democratization. *****Country ceases to exist (=no breakdown).
As is clear, borderline cases are particularly prevalent in the interwar period. There is considerably larger scholarly disagreement on the classification of democracy and autocracy here. This notably regards the fairness of elections (for which information is scarcer than in later periods) and the attempts of military, royal, or other unelected intervention in parliamentary government (of which there was a lot even in cases that normally safely pass the threshold of free and fair elections). Some of the most significant examples of these classification problems are Romania and Bulgaria (which could, arguably, be included as democracies), Yugoslavia (which could contain several breakdowns), and Portugal (which could be excluded as an autocracy throughout the interwar period) (Møller and Skaaning 2015). One may even include Japan as a possible democracy between 1918 and 1932 (Takenaka 2014: 44). These amendments may well be correct but I am not inclined to engage in such case-specific changes since this would decrease the reliability of the rest of the codings.

Fifth, and most centrally, some democracies are excluded from the dataset because they become consolidated. As indicated in Figure 3.1, high-level development democracies are likely consolidated and thus arguably outside the scope of stateness theories. To avoid biased conclusions, I exclude these cases from the analyses. My study is about democracies at risk but to avoid selection biases, I of course need to show solid and systematic criteria for excluding democratic consolidation cases and finally show that the remaining sample still has large and meaningful variation of democratic breakdown and stability.

Employing some absolute threshold of economic development across the whole case universe would be most consistent in aligning with the theoretical framework of the study but this comes at its own cost. Using Przeworski et al.’s (2000) threshold value of GDP/capita to distinguish those outside from those inside the risk zone of democratic breakdown is one possible way of operationalizing consolidation. However, as it is based on a small sample of post-WWII democracies it would tend to exclude too many democracies, particularly of the post-Cold War period when global wealth levels are much higher than previously, that are otherwise highly unstable and have even experienced breakdown. As there is thus no valid development threshold for the 1918-2010 period, I am forced to rely on the admittedly more shaky foundation of qualitative assessments of democratic consolidation as they have been conducted in isolated or small samples of cases.

Knowing consolidation when one sees it is not easy since the definition of democratic consolidation is widely disputed (see Schedler 1998). One of the most used is Linz and Stepan’s (1996: 5-6) notion that democracy must be the ‘only game in town’ as constituted behaviorally, attitudinally, and consti-
tutionally. Alexander’s (2002b: 56) is simpler but at its core similar in stating that consolidation is marked by reliable support for democracy as a system in the foreseeable future. Capoccia (2005) and Mann (2004) focus on the distribution of democratic vis-à-vis autocratic supporters in the political system. Finally, in Svolik’s (2008; 2013) understanding democratic consolidation depends on the evolving perception among the voters of the accountability of the democratic representatives as formed by government performance, particularly economic, over time. Regardless of which definition we use, the criteria are hard to operationalize and apply precisely, particularly across three analytical periods during which the meaning of democracy has gradually changed (compare Dahl 1989; O’Donnell 2010; Schumpeter 2010). Generally, judgements have a particularly high risk of being ex-post or rely on unreliable subjective statements by the very actors whose preferences are supposed to be measured. Additionally, Svolik’s operationalization of expectations of accountability would principally demand survey data, which is generally not available back in time.

Nevertheless, in particular Svolik’s, Mann’s, and Capoccia’s definitions align quite well with the theoretical assumptions of the framework put forward in Chapter 3 focusing on post-transition containment and crisis management as determining systemic support. Mann’s and Capoccia’s conception of the distribution of democrats and autocrats is easily conceived as dependent on their view of the accountability of the representatives. As a pragmatic strategy, I thus wish to use some more steady structural criteria that would expectedly correlate with these definitions. My measurement of consolidation follows the following rules: The democracy must have a relatively high level of economic development combined with a long-term legacy of liberal democratic rule. These two conditions together likely form the political accountability that is at the core of democratic consolidation. Liberal democracy exhibits the spectrum of civil and political liberties: civil liberties, political rights, freedom of association and assembly, press and expression, and rule of law (see Held 2006: 62-65, 79-81). Note, however, that actual implementation of the rule of law, in particular, has varied considerably over time. This is where high levels of economic development becomes relevant as it makes the rule of law economically rational for the actors involved and thus safeguards against violations of it (see Weingast 1997; Przeworski 2005). Liberal democratic rule before 1914 has been used as criterion for distinguishing risk-prone from home-safe democracies in the interwar period but as I want to be able to identify whether some democracies consolidate after the interwar period, I do not use a particular year specification.

Employing the two criteria, I identify a list of consolidated democracies exclusively consisting of the ‘usual suspects’ in North-Western Europe and
Neo-Europe including a few Southern European democracies after some time. 12 democracies safely pass the criteria throughout the 20th century (Mann 2004: 38; Capoccia 2005: 7; Møller 2013): USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Iceland. They had high levels of economic development and a liberal democratic legacy already in 1918 and are accordingly excluded from the dataset over the entire time series. Sweden is a special case as it introduced its first universal male suffrage elections as late as in 1911 (see Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2014). However, general elections took place systematically from the mid-19th century and, unlike in the contemporary Latin American democracies, for instance, these elections were free and fair and the rule of law was secured.

Besides Sweden, a number of borderline cases are worth discussing – some that, as I will argue, consolidated during the interwar period (or rather WWII) or the Cold War period, and some that have long and stable reigns of democracy but are nevertheless not consolidated in my understanding.

The first group includes only European countries. The democracy of West Germany from 1949 to 1990 (and, as a consequence of the dominance of West Germany over BDR at the fall of the Berlin Wall, also unified Germany from 1991) is considered a case of consolidation and thus excluded. In 1945, Germany had a liberal-democratic legacy of 14 years from the interwar period. This was only interrupted by the now highly delegitimized Nazi regime. Beyond this, however, establishing accountability of politicians and thus a true implementation of the liberal promises of the 1848 and 1918 constitutions in postwar Germany was directly dependent on the purging of leading Nazis and the wider societal counter-reaction to the Nazi past. Moreover, accountability was only strengthened by the quick reimbursement of the industrialized economy by inclusion in the Marshall Plan. Some anti-systemic communist movements rose in the 1960s and 1970s but democracy was never seriously threatened by them (Crawford, Brady, and Wiliarty 1999: 8). Much the same could be said of post-WWII Austria (1955-) even it was, arguably, less active in facing up to its Nazi past (Beller 2006: Ch. 6).

Ireland (1946-), Belgium (1945-), and France (1958-) are also excluded as consolidated democracies. Even though an Irish democracy was under the wings of the Westminster parliamentary system for centuries, such a regime was a completely new idea in the interwar period. No surprise, it was strained because minority, secessionist, and religious rights movements tended to fuse into anti-systemic movements that mired the country in civil war, extremism, and political instability (Coakley 1986: 182; Kissane 2007). It was only after the postwar industrialization that Ireland rose to a European standard of development. The accommodation of Fianna Fail in the gov-
erning coalitions from 1933 increased political accountability of democracy to a level where secessionist claims were separated from the question of democratic legitimacy (Coakley 1986: 200; Alexander 2002b: 15).

Belgium and France are similar cases where interwar democratic-autocratic conflicts prevailed despite high levels of economic development but were frozen by German occupation. Regarding Belgium, some (e.g. Kalyvas 1998: 306) would argue that democracy was consolidated from 1879 when the important Belgian Catholics shifted away from the religious radicals. However, secessionist forces were the main threat to political accountability in the interwar period. With the eventual Catholic commitment to the socialist and liberal coalition and the Allied liberation during WWII, the antidemocratic Rexist Party ceased to exist, and liberal hegemony was established. The postwar support from the Marshall Plan only consolidated this (see Capoccia 2005: Ch. 5).

The same combination of factors was vital for France. Having been a functioning democracy since 1870 (Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2014), France’s liberal-democratic legacy was arguably one of the strongest of all cases. Nonetheless, systemic changes – from one republican constitution to another – are also infamous traits of the French case. Tellingly, in post-WWII France elements among the peasantry and small businesses were wary of their economic benefits of democracy, the communists were bitterly isolated, and President de Gaulle’s right was an authoritarian threat while the four center parties, keen on democracy as a means to install a welfare state, were deeply divided on clerical and other issues. The framework, which demanded coalitional governments, therefore produced unstable governments (Wall 1991: 3).

These strains were removed one by one during the 1950s. With assistance from the Americans, communists were quickly ousted from government and labor organizations (Wall 1991: 4; Alexander 2002b: 220). Moreover, American financial assistance and Monnet’s French modernization plan created industrialization in the rural South, which increased the belief in the fortunes of democracy for the peasants there (Wall 1991: 5). It also persuaded the remnant conservatives of Vichy France that democracy was no threat to their position. Still, democracy was shaken during the 1950s by the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962), which led to a fundamental constitutional crisis in May 1958 with a coup attempt in Algiers. The constitution was revised in a public referendum in 1958, the Fifth Republic replaced the Fourth, and a new constitution with greater presidential powers that ensured greater government stability consolidated the liberal-democratic system (Alexander 2002b: 221).
I code Finnish democracy as consolidated from 1945 onwards and it is thus excluded from the dataset for that period. The relatively highly economically developed country underwent emergency legislation in the immediate post-WWII period because of a rumored communist coup d’état as had been seen in many Eastern European democracies. This bolstered the Red-Green Alliance which had been the only viable and legitimate coalition in Finnish politics from the late 1930s (Kirby 2006: 234-236). The emergency legislation was lifted in 1950 when Paasikivi comfortably won the presidential election, included the communists in the government, and confirmed the control of the secret police. It thus seems fair to assume that the liberal constitution of 1919 was the ‘only game in town’ already from 1945.

Finally, the Southern European countries, dominated by fascist or semi-fascist authoritarianism, only consolidated in the last two decades of the Cold War period. I code Spain, Italy, and Portugal as consolidated from 1982 onwards and Greece from 1981 (Diamandouros, Puhle, and Gunther 1995: 390). All Southern European countries are typically assumed to be consolidated by the early 1980s because of massive industrialization and middle-class growth during the autocratic regimes, which increased popular trust in politicians and the democratic political system. As radical leftism was eradicated, conservatives were less fearful of democracy and could thus safely return to their liberal traditions of the 19th century (Fishman 1990; Alexander 2002b; for a separate Italian analysis, see also Giner 1986).

The second group includes Japan, Israel, and India, which are unconsolidated and thus included in the dataset. Whereas a liberal democracy has been in place in Israel since 1948 and since 1952 in Japan and a polyarchy has ruled India since 1950, they are for different reasons unconsolidated. Israel and Japan have gradually attained high levels of economic development during their democratic spells. Yet, their liberal-democratic legacy is arguably less robust than in Europe and the Neo-Europes. The dominance of Confucianism in Japan is compatible with democracy (Fukuyama 1995). However, the Japanese liberal tradition has been and remains weak since the failure of the Meiji Restoration system in the 1920s (Takayoshi 1966; Scalapino 1975: Ch. 6). Japanese democracy has thus been a special case where one party has ruled in close cooperation with bureaucracy aided by a weak civil society (Hirata 2004).

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36 Cyprus is analyzed as a part of Greece and thus not included in the dataset. Cyprus became independent in 1960 and held its first democratic elections in 1977. Yet, Cyprus may be viewed as Greece since the democratic elections were driven by Greek-Cypriot parties. Also, Turkey invaded half the island from 1974. Finally, the population size of the island never passed one million in the period of interest.
Moving on to Israel, Judaism is normally considered favorable to liberalism via the belief in the human advancement of social justice (Liebman and Cohen 1996: 51). But because of the peculiar exclusion of the Arab minority from influence over the state apparatus, Israel’s otherwise liberal democracy may better be characterized as an ‘ethnic democracy’. That is, the political accountability largely only applies to the Jewish part of the population. Just as in interwar Czechoslovakia, this is a highly salient, problematic, and conflictual state of democracy that threatens its very existence (see Smooha 2002; compare with Kopstein and Wittenberg 2010). Regarding India's democracy, it is hard to argue that political accountability is generally high. The country has still not achieved sustained economic development, and poverty, corruption, and injustices in the economic distribution of the resources prevail. India’s democratic exceptionalism may be attributed to how power redistribution in society is successfully and continuously negotiated conditioned on certain leadership strategies and institutional designs inherited from British colonialism. This makes democracy viable despite many different, and some of them anti-liberal, political ideologies (Kohli 2001: Ch. 1; Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011: Ch. 2).

With these classifications in place, let us now look at the democratic spells as they appear including the patterns of democratic stability and breakdown. The first impression is that despite the spread of breakdowns and the exclusion of consolidated democracies, there are still many cases of democratic stability in terms of both countries and spells existing in all regions and periods. Next, based on the regional categorizations of BMR, unconsolidated democracy is today widespread in all regions of the world (except Oceania and North America, which consist of consolidated, ‘Neo-European’ democracies): Europe (including Eastern Europe and many post-communist regimes), Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Historically, Latin America and Europe have had most democracies but many of these have also been unstable and have indeed, as is seen in my count, experienced numerous breakdowns. Latin American breakdowns seem to become much rarer in the post-Cold War period whereas the Central and Southern European breakdowns already vanished during the Cold War. Democracies in the interwar period were only found in Latin America and Europe. During the Cold War, many Asian and African countries democratized as well but many of them quickly broke down. This resembles Huntington’s (1991) counting of democratic waves and reversal waves and thus testifies to the validity of the BMR measure (see also Møller and Skaaning 2013).
Table 6.2: Democratic survivors and breakdowns in the three analytical periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spells*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survivors**</td>
<td>8***</td>
<td>26****</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breakdowns</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breakdowns by country</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Period spells are not counted as this would lead to arbitrary classifications of spells extending across periodic boundaries. **Counted as a country where democracy does not break down (consolidated democracies are not included in this count). ***Czechoslovakia (1945-1947), Greece (1944-1967), and Uruguay (1942-1973) are excluded as their one, two, and four-year interwar survival spells, respectively, could hardly have been affected by any interwar dynamics. Cuba (1940-1953), Chile (1934-1973), and Colombia (1937-1948) are included as interwar survivors. ****Poland (1989), Philippines (1986), South Korea (1988), and Pakistan (1988-1999) are excluded as they could hardly have been affected by any Cold War dynamics.  

Table 6.2 presents descriptive data on democratic stability and breakdown in each of the three analytical periods and thus deepens the assessment of the validity of the BMR measure. A direct comparison with Huntington’s waves is not possible because of my exclusion of consolidated democracies.\(^{37}\) Yet, at least in terms of unconsolidated democracies a comparison may give an impression of the compatibility of the codings.

The number of breakdowns in total and by country is largest in the Cold War period, which seems to contradict the generally accepted impression of the interwar ‘first reverse wave of democratization’ as the strongest of all. However, in line with the logic of the waves of democratization and democratic reversals one should look at the number of breakdowns relative to the number of survivors. The usual impression (see Huntington 1991; Møller and Skaaning 2013) is generally certified here. 14 of 21 of the unconsolidated democratic countries broke down during the interwar period. Excluding the consolidated democracies of North-Western Europe reveals that the risk of breakdown was higher than typically assumed (by the notion of stability in half of the democracies, see Skaaning 2011). Although the Cold War period

\(^{37}\) It should also be mentioned that there are some overlapping spells between the periods such that survivors in one period may be counted as breakdowns in the next period. This is a deliberate, theoretical choice to appreciate that some democracies survived in one international order while they broke down in another.
contains the most breakdowns, many countries experienced more than one breakdown. Further, the Cold War period is considerably longer than Huntington’s second reverse wave (1958-1975) and, as is seen in Table 6.1, involves numerous breakdowns beyond this reverse wave period. Comparisons should therefore be used with caution, and there is a rather simple explanation of strained comparability for the differences between Huntington’s and BMR’s codings. If anything, one is left with the well-known impression of the interwar and Cold War periods as particularly anti-democratic (see Boix 2011: 823). The data further supports the usual understanding of the post-Cold War period as the age of democracy (but only clearly in certain regions). Even though many of the surviving democracies were installed already during the Cold War, there are considerably more survivors than breakdowns so far in the post-Cold War period – that is, the tendency of the interwar and Cold War periods has been reversed. Additionally, the post-Cold War democratic breakdowns have been distributed across much fewer countries.

Measuring stateness and mechanisms: causal process observations

So far, the dependent variable has been coded as a time series of yearly observations of democracy interrupted by breakdown. The coding of stateness and mechanisms must be carried out by the same basic rules.

The coding of stateness adheres to the framework of Figure 2.1. This entails the coding of eight different components across the three attributes: resource supremacy, cohesion, and subordination of state security forces are necessary and jointly sufficient for monopoly on violence; territorial penetration, meritocracy, and responsiveness of the state administration are necessary and jointly sufficient for administrative effectiveness; and mutual acceptance between ethnic groups and state legitimacy are necessary and jointly sufficient for citizenship agreement.

I choose to code these matters of stateness myself because existing measures of state capacity and proxies of citizenship agreement are generally limited in coverage and suffer from low concept-measure consistency and/or unreliability (see e.g. Hendrix 2010; Giraudy 2012; Saylor 2013). Some studies, notably of civil war and autocratic stability, treat GDP/cap. as a measure of state capacity (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hanson and Sigman 2013: 34-36). This is not a viable solution since it obviously far from captures the components of stateness and because it conflates state capacity with economic development, which I wish to use as control. One of the most frequently used proxies of state capacity is total taxes/GDP. It has a relatively high coverage compared to many other readily available indicators (1960-2005, see Ar-
betman and Kugler 1997). As Hendrix (2010: 283) has pointed out, no single variable is likely to adequately model state capacity but taxes/GDP is the indicator that, theoretically and empirically, passes as the most valid general measure of state capacity. One may argue that it taps into both monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness.

Two other indicators may capture the distinction between monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness. As a proxy for monopoly on violence, one may use (logged) military expenditures/capita (based on the Correlates of War project covering 1816-2007), which is the most frequently used in the literature. Other alternatives are measures of crime rates but these generally capture patterns of public dissent, which is closely related to regime illegitimacy, rather than states’ monopoly on violence. Second, to gauge administrative effectiveness one may use the Bureaucratic Quality indicator (1984-2012) from the ICRG dataset compiled by the Political Risk Services (2013). This indicator is experts-based and measures the bureaucracy’s autonomy from political pressure and the extent to which established (that is, merit-based) mechanisms for recruitment and training exist. Alternatives are Rauch and Evans’ (2000) measure of bureaucratic quality and the World Bank’s Government Effectiveness indicator (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009).

These measures are far from unproblematic. Taxes/GDP does not necessarily tell us whether tax extraction efforts are efficient and managed by the state, and the potential for tax extraction varies considerably from country to country (Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson 2007). Likewise, military expenditures do not necessarily indicate effective policing of a given territory but might simply reflect a bloated or disloyal military apparatus. Furthermore, expenditure level does not capture the component of subordination of the security forces or the cohesion of the military and police organizations. Finally, the bureaucratic quality scores have been criticized for lacking transparency, being based on subjective assessments by a single coder, and for their biased and limited country coverage (Van de Walle 2005: 15-16). Notably, the ambiguous focus on ‘autonomy from political pressure’ leaves open the suspicion that the measure taps into the strength of bureaucracies as autonomous organizations nurturing their own interests at the expense of implementation of government policies.

The measurement problems associated with citizenship agreement are of a different kind. There is only one source that explicitly claims to measure citizenship agreement: BTI. In their measurement of stateness, one component, as indicated, measures the following: “To what extent do all relevant groups in society agree about citizenship and accept the nation-state as legitimate.” The ambiguous notion of a ‘nation-state’ makes it unclear whether
state nations are considered as cases of citizenship agreement, yet it seems generally valid in terms of my components of citizenship agreement. However, BTI’s indicators are only available from 2003 and in two-year intervals. Also, it only includes non-OECD countries. The widely used data on ethnic fractionalization by Alesina et al. (2003) is an alternative based on population data for 215 countries and territories usually measured in 2001 or the 1990s. It contains data for only one year for each country. One could argue for the fruitfulness of this measure because demographic variables change very slowly. However, it is problematic in at least two respects. First, the focus on ethnicity captures objective differences whereas it leaves out considerations of the subjective attribution of legitimacy to the state. Populations might be ethnically homogenous but share no notion of citizenship that legitimizes the state as a common symbol. Such a static analysis of stateness was not Linz and Stepan’s intent when concept was developed (see Linz and Stepan 1996: Ch. 2). Second, the focus on fractionalization biases against state nations since the underlying theory of ethnic fractionalization is that differences inhibit citizenship agreement. However, as mentioned in Chapter 2, many countries are state nations because of ethnically fractionalized populations.

Finally, the V-Dem project, which contains yearly observations of a global sample from 1900, has a few indicators on the effectiveness, including the impartiality, of implementation in the civil service and judiciary as well as some potentially usable ones for monopoly on violence and citizenship agreement. The dataset is, however, focused on measuring democracy and thus sometimes mixes in considerations of regime traits. The indicators also do not capture all components of administrative effectiveness. Notably, the degree of meritocracy is not measured directly (Coppedge et al. 2015a: 217). The indicators of “State authority over territory” and “State authority over population” may be seen as measuring monopoly on violence and citizenship agreement, respectively. But state authority over the territory only measures the effective control of the state without specifying the qualities of the security apparatus as I am interested in. Finally, state authority over the population only measures effective state control and not legitimacy or interethnic acceptance (Coppedge et al. 2015a: 237-238).
It should thus be clear that certain insufficiencies of extant measures demand a new, qualitative coding of stateness. Figure 6.1 clarifies the general setup of the measurement. A specific vulnerability of coding stateness developments during the democratic spell of a country is the possibility of reversed causality, that is, the risk that developments in stateness are in fact determined by democracy. This is only partly mitigated by the uniqueness of the observable implications. Across all cases, however, reversed causality is better addressed in the statistical analysis. A more relevant concern for the coding of stateness is the risk of overlooking the ability of actors to manipulate stateness in the short term. While actor effects cannot be rejected completely without more in-depth case studies, I mitigate the problem by addressing two particular critical junctures (WWI and the end of the Cold War) during which existing accounts indicate that actors may have been at least partly free of structural or institutional constraints, including those of stateness. I thus measure each of the eight components of stateness before and after the critical junctures. I may then compare stateness across the two periods. As the two periods often coincide with, first, an autocratic and then a democratic regime spell, I may also compare them to endogenize an exam-
ination of reversed causality. In some cases where paths of state- and nation-building have been laid previously, the evaluation may extend decades or even centuries back in time depending on when the current path of stateness was established. In other cases, states gained independence at the same time as democracy was inaugurated such as in Finland or Czechoslovakia of the interwar period. In such cases, the evaluation must focus sharply on possible patterns of state- and nation-building before independence (legacies from the previous state to which the now independent state belonged) and the contingent circumstances in the phase of state-making and constitutional writing. This raises the belief that stateness developments during the critical juncture were incremental changes preconditioned by earlier patterns of stateness.\(^{38}\)

The measurement of stateness ends when democracy breaks down or, in the case of democratic stability, if the spell reaches 2010, if the democracy consolidates, or if the state ceases to exist. If the country is under foreign occupation, the coding of stateness is suspended (it is simply excluded from the dataset) until the country reaches de facto sovereignty again. In these cases, I rely on the codings of foreign occupation by BMR (2014) with my aforementioned amendments.

As a general rule, the criterion for coding each of the eight components as present in a given year is whether it was predominantly strong or weak in that year. This is of course a qualitative judgment that can only be made from case to case. But it has the specific advantage of excluding the possibility of basing the coding of stateness on matters in December when the democratic breakdown in that case occurred earlier in the same year. This would turn the sequencing of stateness and democracy upside down and inhibit meaningful inference.

Some parts of the literature on state-building are skeptical of transferring analytical categories and concepts developed from European cases directly onto non-European contexts. This critique has particularly fared among Africanists who hold that the concepts of state and neo-patrimonialism, for instance, are Eurocentric lenses that risk describing what is not instead of what is and thus neglect the sui generis features of African stateness (e.g. Schatzberg 2001; Mkandawire 2011). I argue, however, that we cannot compare and understand differences or similarities in stateness or politics more generally between European and non-European countries without employing the same concepts in every case (for a similar argument, see Young

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\(^{38}\) The dataset only reports the codings of stateness during the democratic spells. The pre-junctural codings of stateness are highlighted in the case analyses in the online appendix and discussed in Chapter 11.
Indeed, differences have been established in this way in numerous of the most cited analyses (e.g. Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Bratton and Van de Walle 1994; Herbst 2000). What often seems to be at stake in the critique is not so much the application of the concepts as indicators for description but a wariness of the explanatory models that may follow. For instance, it has been discussed whether Tilly’s ‘war made the state, and the state made war’ explanation for state-building travels to Latin America (see Kurtz 2013), Africa (see Herbst 2000), and Southeast Asia (see Slater 2010), or whether nation-building precipitates a similar logic everywhere as in renaissance Europe (see Englebert 2000; Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011). While explanations for stateness seem to differ between regions, being bound to a specific set of conditions at a specific point in time, the purpose of this study is not to explain stateness. Antecedent conditions may deepen our understanding of the findings of this study but they do not change the validity of stateness as the driver. Only confounders, antecedents which also affect the validity of stateness as the driver, may do so.

The coding of the seven mechanisms is based on the observable implications presented in Chapter 4 and summarized in Figures 4.2 through 4.8. In contrast to the coding of stateness, it starts at the moment when democracy is inaugurated. Indeed, this should be the case no matter how many years before the breakdown occurs because we do not know a priori the duration of the mechanisms. The measurement of mechanisms further only takes place in the breakdown cases and it thus ends when the breakdown occurs. For pragmatic reasons, I only measure the mechanisms in the breakdown cases. Literature on dynamics in events such as democratic breakdowns is usually much more prevalent than for non-events such as stability – not least because mechanisms are much easier to detect in event-cases. CPO are, tellingly, typically only used for event-cases (see e.g. Ross 2004; Brady 2010; Haggard and Kaufman 2012).

The measurement of the mechanisms involves two elements. First, as indicated in Chapter 4, all elements of the mechanism must be observed by one of its observable implications to lend empirical support for the mechanism. Typically, the empirical evaluation of the presence of the mechanism starts from the breakdown and connects effect with cause backwards to the stateness attribute. Not only is this often the intellectual process of theorizing mechanisms, it is also a fruitful way of identifying and presenting them: One begins with the actors carrying out the coup or rebellion immediately responsible for the breakdown and then deduces backwards asking how they were motivated and enabled. Second, the sequencing between the stateness attributes and mechanisms should be correct. Logically, I cannot infer that a
given mechanism was present in a year when the relevant stateness attribute was strong.

Use of sources

Some final words on the use of sources to code stateness and the mechanisms are in order. In all coding decisions, I have strived to follow the theoretical criteria as stringently as possible given the information available. Primarily, I have used second-hand material for the coding. First-hand material has a certain ecological validity but is also a more subjective type of source, which is not equally available in all cases. Given that I strive for comparability across multiple cases, this unreliability of first-hand material makes it less attractive.

Second-hand material typically takes me to historical single-case studies. Historians usually favor comprehensive explanations that tend to focus on a chain of events, thus amounting to a list of necessary conditions for the democratic breakdown, which, when taken together, are sufficient to explain the breakdown. The mechanisms as theorized are chains of necessary links conditioning each other. In this sense, historians’ work is beneficial but their tendency to couple factors of very different theories in a conjunctural explanation might not always be fruitful. CPO are, however, neither meant nor built to deal with this problem. The method can only focus on one mechanism at a time. There is no systematic way of excluding the influence of other factors other than what can be excluded by the uniqueness of the observable implications. As indicated, Chapter 7 helps, via the introduction of confounders, distinguish between redundant and significant mechanisms. The CPO employed in Chapters 8-10 then provide evidence of whether the relevant mechanisms are present or not.

The process of searching source material is the following: First, I have a list of search criteria that I use to search google scholar and google books in every case. If there is a contemporary study of the case at hand, I complement this by checking its list of references. Both methods may lead to snowballing whereby I search the sources’ list of references. These steps ensure that I cover the entirety of information on the stateness components and mechanisms. They also give an impression of the leading sources: which ones are most cited on google, and more importantly, which ones are typically referred to. To supplement the searching process, I visit historical-comparative accounts to verify the general validity of the codings and avoid biased and unbalanced readings. Second, I initially choose every source coming out of my searches to avoid arbitrary selection of sources. I then glance at them and pick those that mention of any of the stateness components or
mechanisms. Third, I build a note system on each stateness component and mechanism in which every relevant source is presented. This enables me to track the patterns in the sources and thus condense the information to a list of the most cited accounts (the accounts that seem to be accepted as representing a definitive interpretation of the subject matter) that go to the point on the stateness components and mechanisms. Rather than erasing scholarly disagreements from this process and the subsequent presentation, I openly present them in the case analyses in the online appendix. What is important here is that the determination of the eventual coding in case of scholarly disagreement is based on the number of citations for the opposing arguments.

To sum up, this chapter has elaborated the coding criteria of democratic stability and breakdown to be used in the statistical analysis and the mechanism analyses. I have argued for excluding consolidated democracies on the basis of political accountability as indicated by a relatively high level of economic development and a liberal-democratic legacy. Despite the exclusion of consolidated democracies, there are still numerous cases of democratic stability distributed across the regions and periods in the dataset. Because of their separate status in the literature and close overlap with international orders of the 20th century, I have organized Chapters 8-10 in the interwar period 1918-1945 (Chapter 8), the Cold War 1946-1989 (Chapter 9), and the post-Cold War period 1990-2010 (Chapter 10). The next chapter uses the dataset to conduct statistical examinations of the two hypotheses.
The great bulk of historical regimes have fallen into the low-capacity undemocratic sector. Many of the biggest and most powerful, however, have dwelt in the high-capacity undemocratic sector. High-capacity democratic regimes have been rare and mostly recent. Low-capacity democratic regimes have remained few and far between (Tilly 2007: 18).

Many of today’s least developed countries hold democratic elections despite weak stateness. One might therefore wonder why stateness should be important for democratic stability. The current literature on the state-democracy relationship tends to focus on single case studies or medium-n configurative analyses coupling attributes of stateness with the instance of democracy. Tilly’s book Democracy is an example of the latter. It holds a basic truth in pointing to the strong clustering of high state capacity alongside democracy and multiple interesting pathways of state capacity and democracy that countries such as Spain, Russia, Venezuela, or present-day Jamaica and Kazakhstan have taken (Tilly 2007: 15-24, Chs. 6-7). Tilly’s analysis illuminates the importance of extending the look on the state-democracy relationship back in time. However, it also illustrates the typical lack of large-n appraisals that disaggregate the state concept. For instance, we would like to know more about actual effects of different dimensions of state capacity on democracy (or democratic stability) for a global, historical sample beyond the cases Tilly has chosen. As discussed in Chapters 2-3, all three attributes of stateness are likely to yield different effects for different reasons, in different countries and contexts.

This chapter conducts a series of statistical analyses. The technique is time-series cross-sectional logistic regression because the dependent variable, democratic breakdown, is dichotomous. Logistic regression enables calculation of probabilities of democratic breakdown as opposed to the non-event of democratic stability. The analyses build on the extensive dataset of democracies and stateness attributes from 1918 to 2010 presented in Chapter

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39 As mentioned in Chapter 2, the analysis by Bratton and Chang (2006) is one important exception.
6. I first present descriptive investigations into the multidimensionality of stateness and the development of the attributes of stateness over time as well as within region. I then examine the hypotheses presented in Chapter 3: 1) there should be positive effects of monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, and citizenship agreement on democratic stability when potential confounders such as economic development are included; 2) these effects should differ substantially in terms of significance or size. The chapter is therefore a general, statistical appraisal of the relationship between stateness attributes and democratic stability.40

The results of the analyses seem to support the theoretical propositions presented in Chapter 3. They indicate that all three stateness attributes significantly stabilize democracies but also that they are only weakly correlated and have markedly different effects. The effect of monopoly on violence is most robust and strongest followed by administrative effectiveness. Among the democracies of the dataset, citizenship agreement develops separately from monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness and exerts a much weaker positive influence on democratic stability than monopoly on violence.41

Stateness disaggregated, over time, and in regions

Does it make sense to disaggregate stateness into the attributes and components that I have proposed? And how do they develop in democracies over time and across regions? These are essential descriptive questions to answer if we want to better understand the basic features of the state-democracy nexus. Surprisingly though, they tend to be neglected in the comparative politics literature. The exceptions either focus on specific regions or specific historical periods (see e.g. Ertman 1997; Herbst 2000; O’Donnell 2010) or employ rather abstract conceptualizations of states and its dimensions (see e.g. North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009; Mann 2013).

In the forthcoming descriptive and explanatory statistical analyses, the stateness attributes and components are coded dichotomously as 0 if they are absent and 1 if they are present. Table 7.1 first looks at simple correlations between monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, and citizenship agreement. Disaggregation seems to be a valuable approach: The correlations are generally quite low but all positive. This lends support to the basic conceptual argument in Chapter 2 in that the three attributes are empirically distinct but possibly related to the same overall concept. There is al-

40 Empirical case examples are based on the discussions in the online appendix unless otherwise indicated.

41 The data and do-files for all analyses in this chapter are available upon request.
so an interesting distinction to be made between the state capacities of monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness (the correlation between them is moderately strong) and citizenship agreement (the correlations with monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness are both relatively weak), which gives credibility to the stipulation in Chapter 2 that citizenship agreement is the ‘odd one out’, capturing variation from societal actors as opposed to the state apparatus as such. As we see in Tables 7.2-7.4, the correlations reflect that most cases lack monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness whereas cases of citizenship agreement and disagreement are more evenly distributed.

Table 7.1: Correlations between stateness attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Monopoly on violence</th>
<th>Administrative effectiveness</th>
<th>Citizenship agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monopoly on violence</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>0.511</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship agreement</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Pearson’s r correlations. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 (twosided test). N for all correlations = 2491.

Table 7.2: Observations of monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Administrative effectiveness</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monopoly on violence</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1531</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>960</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.3: Observations of monopoly on violence and citizenship agreement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Citizenship agreement</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monopoly on violence</td>
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<td>917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1531</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>960</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 201
A look at the attributes over time reveals the differences between their developments and shows that the differences are to some extent temporally bounded. Figure 7.1 plots the world average among the democracies in the dataset of all three stateness attributes for each year from 1918 to 2010. As the data only comprise non-consolidated democracies, the observed development trends are not universal. Selection in and out of the sample of different regions and the fact that some (typically the earlier) years in the sample contain relatively few democracies are general concerns that demand conservative interpretation of time trends. However, as the three attributes are observed for the exact same cases, comparing their time trends is less problematic. The data in any case indicate when and where stateness averages were high and low and thus when and where we should expect an increased risk of democratic breakdown.

Figure 7.1: Global development of the stateness attributes, 1918-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative effectiveness</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1014</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>1844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1315</td>
<td>1176</td>
<td>2491</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The average levels differ between all three attributes but whereas monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness basically followed the same trend, citizenship agreement developed in its own fashion. Let us first look at each of them in turn. Monopoly on violence took a sharp but short downturn after WWI but recovered dramatically through the interwar period until the very late 1930s. From then, it decreased equally dramatically through to the mid-1940s. We here clearly see that the twists and turns of monopoly on violence among democratic regimes were demarcated by the world wars. This only seems natural. During the Cold War, the democracies experienced ups and downs in monopoly on violence typically from one decade to the next. Most remarkable are the upturn in the 1960s and the downturn in the 1980s. Since the Cold War sector in the figure (marked by the vertical, dotted lines in 1945 and 1990) involves the exit of many European countries and the arrival of new African and Asian decolonized ones, we should be careful in interpreting such a time trend. I deal with the problem of selecting new countries into the sample later, but for now it suffices to say that the world average of monopoly on violence among the less developed democracies in the Cold War was generally very low. The upturn in the 1960s reflects how recently decolonized democracies in the 1950s and 1960s gradually improved their state apparatuses. The downturn in the 1980s was experienced by many of the same countries as economic crises of the 1970s consolidated, and inequalities, particularly between ethnic groups, became more politicized. Moving on, monopoly on violence improved sharply and continuously from the late 1980s through 2010, which might reflect that the heavy use of foreign interventions for state-building in the fragile democracies of the post-Cold War order at least for military and police buildup was more effective than often stipulated.

Administrative effectiveness rose steadily in the interwar democracies, although with a few bumps on the road. The time trend is remarkably similar to that of monopoly on violence with a sharp upturn through the 1930s followed by an equally sharp downturn from around the beginning of WWII. The development patterns of monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness were also similar in the Cold War although the upturn in the late 1970s and the downturn in the 1980s were less dramatic. However, they diverged from the late 1980s because the downward spiral of administrative effectiveness stabilized and remained at a constant level throughout the post-Cold War period. Although the level of administrative effectiveness was as low as monopoly on violence during the Cold War Years, the two state capacities should not be conflated. Apart from the diverging development from the late 1980s, administrative effectiveness was notably less frequent among the interwar democracies as well. It thus seems that for non-consolidated de-
mocracies, the more sophisticated administrative capacity of the state was markedly harder to build than the coercive capacity type.

The interwar years also saw a steady though less poignant rise in citizenship agreement among democracies. With many democracies emerging from WWI as either wholly new state entities or with border areas in need of reconstitution, the initial, sharp decrease is logical. Citizenship agreement then improved through ups and downs in the late 1920s, the 1930s, and, surprisingly, through WWII. This more societal dimension of stateness stabilized at a medium level during the Cold War years until a sharp decrease from the 1970s followed by a partial resurgence. The picture of relative stability continued after 1990 resembling the post-Cold War time trend of administrative effectiveness. In non-consolidated democracies, citizenship agreement thus generally diverged sharply from the two state capacities in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods in terms of time trend and average level.

These patterns cover regionally specific trends and divergence. There were particularly few European democracies during the Cold War. For instance, there are no democratic observations in Europe from 1982 to 1988. Also, comparisons across all periods are only available for Europe and Latin America because democracies only emerged in Africa and Asia after WWII. However, it is possible to assert some regional specifics. Latin American democracies generally were much more strained in terms of monopoly on violence from 1945 than the other regions and thus bring down the world average level. It is perhaps surprising that the monopoly on violence was generally much stronger in African states than in Latin America and even beat the record in Asia in some periods.

The Latin American cases similarly pulled down the global average of administrative effectiveness after 1945. Whereas Africa took a medium position among the regions, Asia was the most administratively effective region. In terms of the two state capacities, African democracies thus rank in the middle rather than in the extreme low end. This goes against the literature to some extent because it tends to assume that Africa is the region with the least strong and most patrimonial state apparatuses (see e.g. Herbst 2000; Young 2012). My coding instead points out that bureaucracies of Spanish or Portuguese descent were prominent among Latin America’s democracies and gave much less favorable legacies at democracy’s inauguration than bureaucracies (many of British descent) in African democracies.

In terms of citizenship agreement, the regions followed one another relatively closely after 1945 even though African democracies experienced improvements through 1989 and gradual weakening afterwards as opposed to Asian and Latin American ones. The much lower level of citizenship agree-
ment in Asia than in Africa and Latin America, particularly after 1990, constitutes another regional difference.

These regional differences aside, the trends for all four regions resemble the worldwide Figure 7.1 although all regional developments were of course more abrupt due to fewer cases. But the developments after 1945 were quite similar across the regions. In particular, no regional differences explain the different levels or time trends between the attributes globally. Figure 7.1 thus gives a rather clear impression that disaggregation between all three attributes, most notably between the state capacities and citizenship agreement, is justified globally among the interwar, Cold War, and post-Cold War democracies alike.42

Unpacking the attributes

The components comprise information that may substantiate the time trends of the attributes. It should be beneficial to measure each attribute by multiple components since more indicators of a given variable reduce random measurement errors. But the co-variation of the components also indicates whether it makes empirical sense to separate them.

Table 7.5: Correlations between components of monopoly on violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cohesion</th>
<th>Subordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subordination</td>
<td>0.545***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource supremacy</td>
<td>0.369***</td>
<td>0.225***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2491</td>
<td>2491</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Pearson’s r correlations. ‘ p < 0.1, “ p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 (two-sided test).

Table 7.5 shows that the components of monopoly on violence – resource supremacy, cohesion, and subordination – correlate relatively weakly but positively. On the one hand, this indicates that it makes sense to distinguish between them; on the other hand, it points to a common denominator. The stronger correlation between cohesion and subordination as opposed to when they are pitted against resource supremacy draws an interesting parallel to what we find for the components of administrative effectiveness. Table 7.6 thus shows that the correlations between territorial penetration and the two other components of meritocracy and responsiveness are relatively weak whereas the correlation between meritocracy and responsiveness is in fact quite strong. We may first note that this latter correlation is far from perfect,

42 Appendix II contains regional plots for all three attributes with yearly regional averages from 1918 to 2010.
meaning that a distinction between them is at least in principle justified. But
the table most importantly indicates that territorial penetration is a marked-
ly different quality of state administrations than the other two. As for the
components of monopoly on violence, this difference seems sensible sub-
stantially. Resource supremacy and territorial penetration are both about the
authority and extension of the state onto territorial areas and population
groups. These can be obtained by pure coercion and pecuniary measures
whereas cohesion, subordination, meritocracy, and responsiveness are all
organizational qualities that often require high amounts of human capital
and organizational knowhow alongside money and effort. Subordination and
responsiveness in addition typically require some measure of legitimacy
among security sector and bureaucratic elites, respectively.

Table 7.6: Correlations between components of administrative effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Meritocracy</th>
<th>Responsiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness</td>
<td>0.734***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial penetration</td>
<td>0.371***</td>
<td>0.429***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2491</td>
<td>2491</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Pearson’s r correlations. ‘’ p < 0.1, ‘’‘ p < 0.05, ‘’’’ p < 0.01 (two-sided test).

Figures 7.2 and 7.3 vindicate this interpretation. Territorial penetration and
resource supremacy were consistently more prominent among the democracies
from 1918 to 2010 than their constituent concepts of meritocracy and
responsiveness and cohesion and subordination, respectively. The organiza-
tional qualities of cohesion and subordination moved in tandem and at simi-
lar levels with subordination typically lagging behind a bit (see Figure 7.2).
The same can be said of the counterparts of administrative effectiveness:
meritocracy and responsiveness (see Figure 7.3). Their co-variation was even
stronger but whereas cohesion and subordination gradually improved among
the post-Cold War democracies, meritocracy and responsiveness decreased
and stabilized at very low levels in the 1990s and 2000s.
Figure 7.2: Global development of the components of monopoly on violence, 1918-2010

Figure 7.3: Global development of the components of administrative effectiveness, 1918-2010
Notable distinctions can thus be made between the components of the two state capacities. As Table 7.7 shows, the components of citizenship agreement – mutual group acceptance and state legitimacy – by contrast correlate quite strongly and positively although far from perfectly. A look at their development over time in Figure 7.4 only lends further support to this. Among the democracies, they typically moved in tandem despite a notable discrepancy from the 1930s to the early 1940s when state legitimacy remained at a medium level while mutual group acceptance rose dramatically.

Table 7.7: Correlations between components of citizenship agreement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mutual group acceptance</th>
<th>0.735***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State legitimacy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2491</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Pearson’s r correlations. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 (two-sided test).

Figure 7.4: Global development of the components of citizenship agreement, 1918-2010

The interpretation of the time trends of the components is subject to the same reservations as the attributes due to low levels of democracies and breakdowns in some contracted periods and regional differences. But they do not disturb the overall impression. The descriptive reality based on my codings thus points to three major patterns. First, among the democracies from
1918 to 2010 all three attributes went through small as well as major ups and downs but were generally not very prominent. Second, it makes sense to disaggregate stateness into the three attributes, distinguishing particularly between monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness on the one hand and citizenship agreement on the other. Third, variations between the components of each attribute reveal the differences between extending state power and territorial control on the one hand and improving the organizational quality of this power and control on the other hand. Since the latter components are generally much less prevalent than the former, these are responsible for lowering the levels of administrative effectiveness and monopoly on violence.

Variables and models

I now move on to the explanatory part of the chapter and present the regression models and their variables. The dependent variable in all models is the instance of democratic breakdown. It takes the form of a binary indicator where 0 is given for years with democracy and 1 for the breakdown year.

I first present what I call ‘base models’ including the stateness attributes as predictors and the level of economic development, indicated by the logged level of GDP per capita with data from the Maddison project (Bolt and van Zanden 2014), as the only potential confounder. The reason I show these models is that economic development takes a special place in my study as the main competing explanation for stateness. The models thus give a clear indication of the effect of the stateness attributes on democratic stability when we only take account of economic development levels. Economic development is the most prominent predictor of democracy and intimately connected with levels of state capacity (as well as other antecedents, such as educational levels, which tap into state capacity) and ethnic conflict.

The base and all other models comprise four sub-models: one with all stateness attributes functioning as controls and three with only one attribute in each. When all attributes are included, I test the independent effect of each attribute when the other two are held constant. This is pertinent since they are probably mutually reinforcing to some extent. However, since the attributes may still suppress each other’s effects, I include them one at a time without the other two to capture their cleanest effect.

43 Note that all models include cubic time polynomials (t, t², t³) of the time since the last democratic transition observed for each country to take account of accumulated years of democratic rule. This takes account of different types of time trends in the non-linear relationships between the stateness attributes and the risk of democratic breakdown (see Carter and Signorino 2010).
We also need to handle that democracies with weak stateness and regime instability are likely to be different from stable democracies with strong stateness on a range of other confounding characteristics. As the most extreme contrast, this calls attention to the differences between the typical conflictridden postcolonial countries and a number of regional top-performers such as Japan, Uruguay, Botswana, and Slovenia.

I thus build a set of ‘main models’ that comprise a battery of the most usual predictors included in regressions of democratic stability (see e.g. Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock 2001: 792; Svolik 2008: 161; Teorell 2010: 142-144). First, economic growth rates in GDP per capita (data from the Maddison project) measure the fluctuations in the economy that, as indicated in Chapter 3, may trigger democratic breakdown. Next, population size (logged) is added with data from the Maddison project as well since there may be benefits to democracy as well as stateness, notably citizenship agreement, of having a small population. Other country-specific characteristics that I include are the type of government and colonial legacy. The type of government is either presidential or parliamentarian, for which I employ the coding of chief political executive (title_ce) from the PIPE dataset (Przeworski et al. 2013).44 The debate on the detrimental effects of presidentialism on democratic stability is a long-standing one that I need to take account of since I do not employ fixed effects.45 Colonial legacy, which can take either of three values: non-colonized, British, or non-British colonial master (coding primarily based on Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004: 228). A British colonial past has been shown to provide superior institutional legacies for building and maintaining democratic rule, and a colonial past, whether British, Spanish, or otherwise, has been shown to weaken the likelihood of democratic survival (see Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004: 240).

As the descriptive statistics above indicate, there may be regionally specific trends in the data. I therefore include regional dummies distinguishing between Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa. The international level is increasingly included in regressions of democratic stability. Basically two international factors may explain both democratic stability and stateness. Diffusion from neighboring countries likely affects regime developments, and interstate power politics may provoke the buildup or destruction of coercive and administrative capacities or trigger ethnic conflict by moving or ques-

44 Other types of government than presidentialism and parliamentarism, such as absolute monarchy or semi-presidential systems, are coded in a separate category to maximize case coverage. I fill out missing information from PIPE based on the latest observation and extend the data to 2010.
45 I do not employ country-fixed effects because there is limited variation in the stateness attributes over time within each country.
tioning state borders. Diffusion is measured by average regional democracy levels based on the V-Dem regional-political divisions (Coppege et al. 2015a). The pattern of great power politics, another international factor, may push for a general zeitgeist towards democracy or, by contrast, pressure leaders to build stronger and more authoritarian systems of command. I include time period dummies distinguishing between four international systems to indicate the orders favoring democracy (1900-1932 and 1992-2010) and non-democracy (1933-1945 and 1946-1991), respectively (based on Boix 2011: 823). All time-varying covariates are lagged one year to ensure the right sequence between explanan and explanandum.

Attributes of stateness as explanations of democratic stability

I am now ready to examine the two overall hypotheses of the study: first, that high levels of monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, and citizenship agreement decrease the probability of democratic breakdown; second, that the effects of the three attributes differ substantially in terms of significance or size.

Table 7.8 includes the base and main regression models. Starting with the base models that include GDP/capita as control, we first note that in most models all three stateness attributes exert a significant negative effect. This indicates that stateness stabilizes democracies regardless of the level of economic development. The effect of stateness is genuine and not just endogenous to the countries’ modernization degree. Citizenship agreement and administrative effectiveness are, however, insignificant when monopoly on violence is included but turn significant when the other two are excluded. It is thus not the level of economic development that explains the differences but rather the other two stateness attributes. This further questions any simple notion of subsuming state effects under the heading of modernization theory.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Base models</th>
<th>Main models</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Mon. on. viol  
\*         | -3.320*** | -3.676*** |       | -3.117*** | -3.968*** |       |       |       |
| (1.078)                | (1.069)  | (1.219)  | (1.263) |       |       |       |       |       |
| Adm. eff.  
\*         | -1.053  | -1.908*   |       | -2.612**  | -3.781*** |       |       |       |
| (0.824)                | (0.863)  | (1.222)  | (1.349) |       |       |       |       |       |
| Cit. agree.  
\*         | -0.351  |       |       | -0.597**  | -0.553*   |       |       | -0.773*** |
| (0.239)                | (0.270)  | (0.334)  | (1.349) |       |       |       |       | (0.262) |
| GDP/Cap. (log)  
\*         | -0.660*** | -0.679*** | -0.721*** | -0.720*** | -0.437  | -0.501  | -0.643**  | -0.599** |
| (0.163)                | (0.169)  | (0.170)  | (0.173) | (0.323)  | (0.306)  | (0.317)  | (0.304)  |       |
| Economic growth  
\*         |       |       |       | -0.060*** | -0.063*** | -0.064*** | -0.068*** |       |
| (0.023)                | (0.022)  | (0.023)  | (0.023) |       |       |       |       |       |
| Population size (log)  
\*         | 0.124   | 0.200*   | 0.129  | 0.155   |       |       |       |       |
| (0.097)                | (0.106)  | (0.107)  | (0.107) |       |       |       |       |       |
| Government type        |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Presidentialism  
\*         | 0.081   | 0.052  | -0.173  | 0.394   |       |       |       |       |
| (0.427)                | (0.471)  | (0.443)  | (0.481) |       |       |       |       |       |
| Other types  
\*         | -0.038  | -0.008  | 0.001   | 0.366   |       |       |       |       |
| (0.459)                | (0.477)  | (0.468)  | (0.544) |       |       |       |       |       |
| Colonial legacy        |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| British  
\*         | -0.467  | -0.501  | -0.426  | -0.324** |       |       |       |       |
| (0.399)                | (0.397)  | (0.420)  | (0.380) |       |       |       |       |       |
| Non-colonized  
\*         | -0.450  | -0.186  | -0.416  | -0.310  |       |       |       |       |
<p>| (0.878)                | (0.784)  | (0.776)  | (0.777) |       |       |       |       |       |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Regional democracy level(_i)</th>
<th>(t)</th>
<th>(t^2)</th>
<th>(t^3)</th>
<th>(t^4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>-1.317</td>
<td>0.915</td>
<td>0.725</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.021)</td>
<td>(0.909)</td>
<td>(0.934)</td>
<td>(0.889)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>-0.620</td>
<td>0.405</td>
<td>0.342</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.002)</td>
<td>(0.841)</td>
<td>(0.800)</td>
<td>(0.785)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>-0.155</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td>0.442</td>
<td>0.887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.060)</td>
<td>(0.923)</td>
<td>(0.928)</td>
<td>(0.887)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-democratic international order</td>
<td>1.341(^{***})</td>
<td>1.207(^{***})</td>
<td>1.309(^{***})</td>
<td>1.271(^{***})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.373)</td>
<td>(0.383)</td>
<td>(0.396)</td>
<td>(0.416)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.874</td>
<td>1.905</td>
<td>2.347</td>
<td>2.370</td>
<td>1.476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.197)</td>
<td>(1.236)</td>
<td>(1.245)</td>
<td>(1.231)</td>
<td>(3.081)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2191</td>
<td>2191</td>
<td>2191</td>
<td>2191</td>
<td>2126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of countries</td>
<td>95</td>
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<td>95</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>88</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of breakdowns</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time polynomials (t^4)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \(p < 0.1, \quad \text{\(p < 0.05, \quad p < 0.01\)}\) (two-sided test). Reference category for colonial legacy = any other colonial legacy than British. Reference category for government type = parliamentarism. Reference category for region = Europe.
The finding that all three attributes exert a negative effect on the probability for democratic breakdown is also in line with the first hypothesis. As expected, however, their effects also differ substantially in terms of significance as well as size. Monopoly on violence constantly exerts the most significant and largest effect as suggested by its higher level of statistical significance and nominal value of its coefficient, respectively. While administrative effectiveness and citizenship agreement are both much less consistently significant and have smaller effects, citizenship agreement is the least important attribute of the three. The preliminary examination so far thus vindicates the two hypotheses: All three attributes significantly lower the risk of democratic breakdown but their effects also differ substantially. Monopoly on violence seems to be more important as it undermines the effect of the other two attributes.\footnote{I run three models where only one attribute is excluded and compare with the results of Table 7.8. The significance of citizenship agreement and administrative effectiveness only changes markedly when monopoly on violence is excluded. This indicates that it is in fact monopoly on violence that undermines the effect of the other two attributes.}

The next four main models include the standard set of controls as outlined above. The only marked differences from the base models are that monopoly on violence loses some significance in model 5 where all attributes are included whereas administrative effectiveness and citizenship agreement now pass the threshold of significance in that model. In the models where they are included alone, the results are largely the same as those of the base models: All three stateness attributes have a negative, significant impact on the risk of democratic breakdown. The main models thus also lend support to the two hypotheses and we may add that the undermining by monopoly on violence of the effect of the other two attributes seems to be a robust finding.\footnote{Rerunning the main models with only one attribute yields the same results as the base models.} The specific colonial legacy and government type of the countries, both classic predictors of democratic stability, yield no substantial confounding influence on the attributes. The stabilizing effect of stateness on democracies is not just an artefact of how legacies of political rights serve state- and nation-building in turn securing their own survival. The lack of confounding influence of economic growth strengthens the initial assumption that the effect of stateness is independent of the status of the economy. The stabilizing effect of stateness finally seems to exist across different regional and international contexts.

However, coefficients in logistic regressions should be interpreted with care. Predicted probabilities are more reliable indicators of the substantive effects of the stateness attributes on the risk democratic breakdown. They
give us a better idea of the exact effect differences and thus the importance of disaggregation. Table 7.9 shows changes in predicted probability for experiencing a democratic breakdown contrasting a democracy with a given stateness attribute and a democracy without it.48

Table 7.9: Substantive effects of the stateness attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stateness Attribute</th>
<th>All Stateness Attributes Included</th>
<th>Only Monopoly on Violence</th>
<th>Only Administrative Effectiveness</th>
<th>Only Citizenship Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monopoly on violence</td>
<td>Δ-0.038</td>
<td>Δ-0.051</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(95.0 %)</td>
<td>(97.9 %)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative effectiveness</td>
<td>Δ-0.033</td>
<td></td>
<td>Δ-0.046</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(91.8 %)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(97.4 %)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship agreement</td>
<td>Δ-0.015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Δ-0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(39.3 %)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(51.5 %)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Predicted probability percentage point changes (percentage changes). Only significant effects reported. Regressions based on main model.

When all stateness attributes are included in the main regression models, comprising the standard set of covariates, we can derive meaningful predicted probabilities for each significant effect. Democracies with monopoly on violence have a 0.038 percentage point smaller risk of democratic breakdown than democracies without monopoly on violence. This seemingly tiny effect reflects that the added explanatory leverage of monopoly on violence to a relatively comprehensive but realistic model of explanans of democratic stability is small. However, it still makes a great difference for a democracy to have monopoly on violence. Democracies with monopoly on violence on average have 95 % lower probability of breaking down than those without. In other words, there is an enormous increase in the risk of breakdown for democracies without a monopoly on violence. Much the same can be said of administrative effectiveness, which in the same model gives democracies a 0.033 percentage point smaller breakdown risk, corresponding to a 91.8 % lower probability of breakdown than if the administration was ineffective. The equivalent numbers for citizenship agreement are much smaller though still substantial (-0.015 percentage points and -39.3 %) thus vindicating the pattern from the regression that citizenship agreement is clearly the least important factor for democratic stability.

48 The remaining independent variables are set at their observed value (see Hanmer and Kalkan 2013). Instead of calculating predicted probabilities for a case with average values on the remaining predictors, this approach calculates probabilities for all cases given the observed values on the remaining predictors and then averages these probabilities.
Much the same can be said of the predicted probabilities when the attributes are treated separately. The probability decreases for monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness are 0.051 and 0.046 percentage points, respectively, or what amounts to 97.9 and 97.4%. The two state capacities thus seem to yield almost the same effect on democratic stability. The difference to the predicted probability changes of citizenship agreement is much larger. Citizenship agreement has a much smaller effect of 0.022 percentage points or 51.5% decreasing probability of breakdown. This is still a substantial change but the substantive effects augment the overall impression that for democratic populations and elites who wish to maintain democratic rule, it is a clear benefit to have any of the three stateness attributes, but the two state capacities are much more effective.\textsuperscript{49}

The main models exclude some frequently employed controls such as ethnic fractionalization, which are either partially overlapping with the stateness attributes on the conceptual level or have low data coverage in the period under study. However, they also exclude potential confounders that are less frequently employed but may nevertheless be relevant. I include these confounders in extended models. This involves variables of ongoing intrastate and interstate conflicts, respectively. In particular intrastate conflicts are likely so intimately connected with stateness and democratic stability (see Brecke 1999), indeed conceptually overlapping with some aspects of them, that including them in the main models would provide unreasonably conservative estimates of the stateness effects. Democratic stability and stateness may also depend on how democratic the regime was in the first place. I thus include the level of electoral democracy as control taken from the V-Dem dataset (Coppelge et al. 2015a). The results of the main models and ‘extended models’, where all these more demanding confounders are included, are basically the same.\textsuperscript{50} Most importantly, this indicates that the effects of stateness are not just artefacts of reversed causality by which prior levels of democracy determine both stateness and democratic stability.

Including a very comprehensive set of controls is a particularly conservative test of the hypotheses. Another test is to delve further into the structure of the data. Simple tabulations of the three attributes against democratic breakdown indicate that the two state capacities are almost sufficient conditions for democratic stability since only 1 case with monopoly on violence and 4 with administrative effectiveness experience democratic breakdown. I would argue that this reflects the realities of the cases at hand rather than

\textsuperscript{49} The predicted probability changes for the base models give the same results. These are presented in Appendix II.

\textsuperscript{50} The results for the extended models are presented in Appendix II.
trivial causes or artefacts of restrictive measurement criteria. First, as the variation in monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness is substantial (see Table 7.2), we are not faced with trivialness since far from all cases lack the two state capacities. The negative effects of the two state capacities are merely particularly strong in one end of the spectrum. Second, there are strong reasons to believe that the codings of administrative effectiveness in the breakdown cases of Czechoslovakia (1947), Austria (1933), and Sudan (1958, 1969) and monopoly on violence in the breakdown of Estonia (1934) are genuine. They find clear support in the case-specific literature and none of the cases have been object of inter-coder disagreements.\textsuperscript{51}

Even if the results in Table 7.8 are substantially correct, the near-sufficiency of the two state capacities likely makes the regression coefficients more fragile than usual because they are based on a probabilistic logic. This points to a potential aggregation problem. It may be that my minimum logic of aggregating components into attributes is too demanding and thus artificially drives the relationships toward sufficiency. The minimum aggregation of components into attributes, however conceptually meaningful and stringent, is particularly constraining of the variation within each attribute since the criteria for observing them become so demanding. As some components are particularly unlikely to exist when democracies break down,\textsuperscript{52} they might in this way lead to near-deterministic correlations. In this way, a statistical examination of the hypotheses can only take us so far.

Alternative aggregation methods have, however, been proposed in the literature. The most notable one (see e.g. Bhuta 2012) regards the stateness components as mutually substitutable for the given attribute and advocate aggregation by addition. This might increase the variation of democratic breakdowns across the values of the attributes and substantially change the results. I have changed the aggregation method from minimum to addition by which monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness become four-point scales from 0 to 3 and citizenship agreement becomes a three-point scale from 0 to 2. These recodings produce a more gradual decrease in the number of democratic breakdowns as the value of the attributes increases (although the shape is rather skewed u-shaped for monopoly on violence and citizenship agreement), but the results are basically equivalent to those with the minimum aggregated variables. The two hypotheses stand the test.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{51} For the coding decisions for these cases, see Appendices I and II.
\textsuperscript{52} For instance, subordination and responsiveness are each observed in only seven country-years with democratic breakdown.
\textsuperscript{53} I here assume that the effects on democratic breakdown are uniform across all levels of the stateness attributes. Tables with observations of the three attributes and democratic
What drives the results?

The component information further enables us to look into the underlying qualities of the attributes that drive their negative effects on democratic breakdown as we have observed them in Table 7.8. Is the stabilizing effect of monopoly on violence primarily a matter of pure coercion – the benefits of ‘militant democracy’ – or is it due to military professionalism or harmonious civil-military relations? Is it more important that administrations are meritocratic than responsive or capable of providing public goods to peripheral (and relatively deprived) areas? Should political leaders primarily focus on settling ethnic disputes or strengthening the state as a national symbol to save democracy? Answering these questions will further give clues about the drivers of the mechanisms that lead to democratic breakdown.

Table 7.10 focuses on the three components of monopoly on violence included in the same sequence as the attributes in the base and main models. They are all negatively related to democratic breakdown in all models. When analyzed together, however, the effect of resource supremacy loses its significance while it decreases for cohesion. Subordination thus yields the most robust negative effect on democratic breakdown with high levels of significance even when a standard set of controls is included. This reflects that harmonious civil-military relations are most intimately connected with democratic stability among the components of monopoly on violence and furthermore a generally important stabilizer of democracy. Subordination drives the effect of monopoly on violence and overrides the effect of resource supremacy. Cohesion within the security forces remains important for democratic stability, however. Its effect of cohesion is significant in most models but generally more fragile. Even though resource supremacy yields the least robust effect of the three components, it is undoubtedly correlated with democratic stability. Pure force thus matters, but it seems logical that the organizational qualities are more important since they affect the game of politics more directly.

Table 7.11 repeats the same analysis for the components of administrative effectiveness. The stabilizing effect of administrative effectiveness on democracies is more exclusively a matter of having achieved a bureaucracy capable of reasonably swift and accurate implementation as indicated by responsiveness. But its effects are generally less significant than those of subordination across the base and main models. This probably reflects that the overall effect of administrative effectiveness is weaker than that of monopoly on violence. We should thus not exaggerate the influence of responsiveness.

breakdown as well as regressions with the additive versions of the stateness attributes in the base, main, and extended models are presented in Appendix II.
Territorial penetration is insignificant even in their separate models and the direction is not consistently negative (see model 1). Meritocracy is only weakly significant in most of its separate models. This parallels the effect of cohesion. The crudest dimension of administrative capacity, the extension of state infrastructure, is thus the least important one for democratic stability, which parallels the findings for monopoly on violence. Most markedly, the results lend rather weak support to the notion that meritocracy on average stabilizes democracy when the other two components are included.

The final Table 7.12 regards the components of citizenship agreement. Given their larger empirical overlap, we would expect similar effects of mutual group acceptance and state legitimacy on democratic breakdown. Their effects, but particularly those of mutual group acceptance, are generally weakly significant. Mutual group assistance is furthermore highly fluctuating in terms of direction across the different model specifications. This is no big surprise as the general effects of citizenship agreement were the weakest among the attributes. But state legitimacy has a significant, negative effect in all models except one (model 4) and stands the test of including GDP/capita and the standard battery of controls when mutual group acceptance is excluded. Even though we should be careful in exaggerating the effect of state legitimacy, it is thus fair to conclude that state legitimacy is the main driver of the stabilizing effect of citizenship agreement on democracies. As for the organizational qualities of the two state capacities, the discrepancy of the components of citizenship agreement seems logical since state legitimacy is likely more closely connected with elite political bargains, regarding the use of power by the executive against other ethnic groups.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Base models</th>
<th>Mcin models</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource supremacy (_{s_1})</td>
<td>-0.066</td>
<td>-0.493(^*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.286)</td>
<td>(0.264)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohesion (_{s_1})</td>
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<td>-1.374(^*)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.309)</td>
<td>(0.313)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subordination (_{s_1})</td>
<td>-1.915(^*)</td>
<td>-2.226(^*)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.389)</td>
<td>(0.398)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/Cap. (log) (_{s_1})</td>
<td>-0.717(^*)</td>
<td>-0.678(^*)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.164)</td>
<td>(0.172)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic growth (_{s_1})</td>
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<td>-0.068(^*)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.022)</td>
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<td>(0.111)</td>
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### Colonial legacy

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<th>-0.758$^*$</th>
<th>-0.607</th>
<th>-0.592</th>
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<td>(0.370)</td>
<td>(0.447)</td>
<td>(0.371)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.756)</td>
<td>(0.740)</td>
<td>(0.816)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.389)</td>
<td>(1.366)</td>
<td>(1.526)</td>
<td>(1.344)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Region

| Latin America | -1.026 | -0.196    | -0.273 | -1.188 |
|              | (0.885)| (0.890)   | (0.845)| (0.940)|
| Asia         | 0.012  | 0.063     | 0.378  | 0.370  |
|              | (0.787)| (0.744)   | (0.730)| (0.801)|
| Africa       | 0.254  | 0.299     | 0.502  | 0.040  |
|              | (0.837)| (0.909)   | (0.838)| (0.884)|
| Anti-democratic international order | 1.161$^{***}$ | 1.142$^{**}$ | 1.220$^{***}$ | 1.089$^{***}$ |
|             | (0.341)| (0.405)   | (0.407)| (0.339)|

| Constant     | 2.405$^{**}$ | 2.208$^{*}$ | 1.864  | 2.625$^{**}$ |
|              | (1.123)      | (1.233)     | (1.158)| (1.161)      |

| N            | 2191         | 2191        | 2191   | 2191         |
| Number of countries | 95           | 95          | 95     | 95           |
| Number of breakdowns | 72           | 72          | 72     | 72           |
| Time polynomials $t^i, t^j, t^k$ | Yes         | Yes        | Yes    | Yes          |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. $^*$ $p < 0.1$, $^{**} p < 0.05$, $^{***} p < 0.01$ (two-sided test). Reference category for colonial legacy = any other colonial legacy than British. Reference category for government type = parliamentarism. Reference category for region = Europe.
<table>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.917)</td>
<td>(0.967)</td>
<td>(0.920)</td>
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</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 (two-sided test). Reference category for colonial legacy = any other colonial legacy than British. Reference category for government type = parliamentarism. Reference category for region = Europe.
Table 7.12: Components of citizenship agreement and democratic breakdown, base and main models

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<th>(3)</th>
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<td>Mutual group assistance $s_1$</td>
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<td>-0.301</td>
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<td>(0.342)</td>
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<td>(0.415)</td>
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<td>-0.611**</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.171)</td>
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<td>British $s_1$</td>
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<td>-0.764*</td>
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<td>(0.403)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-colonized</td>
<td>-0.257</td>
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<td>(0.760)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time polynomials t t² t³</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 (two-sided test). Reference category for colonial legacy = any other colonial legacy than British. Reference category for government type = parliamentarism. Reference category for region = Europe.
From overall patterns to mechanisms

The descriptive analyses and logistic regressions of this chapter both question and support Tilly’s notion that introduced this chapter. They indicate that state capacity is strongly associated with democratic stability across different regions and international orders and controlled for standard and comprehensive controls, including prior levels of democracy. But they also point out that state capacity has multiple dimensions with diverse effects on democratic stability. Tilly’s uniform focus on state capacity is also ambiguous in the sense that citizenship agreement separately, although less consistently, stabilizes democracies as well, which at least calls for a broadening of focus in this corner of state-democracy research.

There are, more specifically, three overall empirical conclusions that account for democratic stability from 1918 to 2010 despite regionally and temporally specific trends. First, disaggregation is a highly useful strategy as the attributes of stateness only co-vary weakly and exert substantially different effects on democratic stability. All three attributes are distinct but the state capacities of monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness together capture dimensions of stateness that contrast with citizenship agreement. Second, it is certainly possible to differentiate between the strength of the attributes’ effects. The attributes all significantly stabilize democracies and there are no signs that they have adverse effects on democratic stability. The attributes thus do not counterbalance each other’s effects but their importance certainly differs. Monopoly on violence clearly yields the strongest negative effect on democratic breakdown followed by administrative effectiveness and, lastly, citizenship agreement. Third, the effects of the attributes are only driven by some of their components. Monopoly on violence is primarily stabilizing because of security force subordination and, to some extent, cohesion. The stabilizing effect of administrative effectiveness is mostly driven by responsiveness and only weakly by meritocracy whereas territorial penetration yields no significant influence. These results reflect another descriptive pattern: Extending and strengthening state power and presence is a different matter than improving the organizational quality of that power and presence. Finally, the relatively weaker effect of citizenship agreement is best captured by matters of state legitimacy.

The next three chapters focus on the democratic breakdown cases of the dataset and analyze the mechanisms connected with their breakdown. The large-n patterns affect our initial expectations for the presence of mechanisms among the breakdown cases. The question is whether the presence of mechanisms supports the large-n results. We should thus expect the mecha-
nisms of monopoly on violence to fare most prominently followed by those of administrative effectiveness and citizenship agreement. The analysis of meritocracy’s average effect further shapes our expectations about the mechanisms of elite and mass bias delegitimation. The precision of the observable implications of these mechanisms makes it theoretically possible to observe the mechanisms in single cases but given the limited general effect of meritocracy on democratic stability, we should observe only a limited number of these mechanisms.
The inter-war period in Europe provides a unique setting [...] The time period is clearly demarcated by common events, the two world wars [...] All the cases considered here could be termed parliamentary democracies [...] They were all affected by a common external stimulus – the world economic crisis of the 1920s and early 1930s (Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell 2000: 1).

The incumbent takeover conducted by Prime Minister Ulmanis in Latvia in 1934 is less famous than the democratic breakdowns in Weimar Germany and Spain, which are peculiar examples of the detrimental effects of different state weaknesses on political systems balancing between democratic and autocratic majorities. Latvia, in contrast, surprised most observers by having democratized in the first place. The breakdown in 1934 was, by implication, merely a belated but expected outcome. Indeed, Ulmanis was a so-called ‘state elder’ with few democratic inclinations, who simply saw an opportunity to dismantle democracy in a political system with limited traditions of executive control. At least one important factor is, however, missing in this actor-based explanation. In order to ensure public and elite support, Ulmanis aligned personal, dictatorial ambitions with a pledge for a ‘Latvia for Latvians’. To this end, he activated existing dissatisfaction among the center-right and right parties and the security forces with government performance in handling regional and ethnic minority groups. The politics of minority protection was a particularly straining issue (Baron and Gatrell 2003: 78; Plakans 2011: 59). With the Great Depression, these conflicts, combined with the weak integrationist power of the party system, were augmented to severe grievances. Chauvinism and fascism rose on the far right while nationalists became more wary of democracy (Rothschild 1974: 375; Bleiere 2006: 162; Scerbinskis 2011: 195). This was the dominant motive that led the nationalist parties, the Farmers Union, the Agrarian Party, and eventually the army to support Ulmanis’ proposal for a constitutional amendment stripping parliament of power (Rogainis 1971; Rothschild 1974: 376).

As the Latvian case illustrates, Germany and Spain, despite their peculiarities of strong democratic movements, are merely examples of more general clusters of relatively similar cases of breakdown in the interwar period as described by Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell in the quote above. In fact, the
potential relevance of the state in explaining the interwar breakdowns is clear from De Meur and Berg-Schlosser’s pattern matching analysis. They (De Meur and Berg-Schlosser 2002: 253) here distinguish between “a breakdown occurring in a relatively highly developed but politically fragmented country where in a highly unstable and critical situation strong authoritarian and fascist forces concur in their endeavour to overthrow the regime” and a breakdown that “consists of an authoritarian military intervention and ensuing civil war in a less developed but also strongly fragmented country where fascist groups play only a minor role and the impact of external crises remains relatively weak”. Without getting caught in the multiple causality of their study, I contend that the factors they mention as common across different cases of breakdown are likely to be conditioned by matters of stateness. This is arguably the case for ‘stability’ and ‘fragmentation’ of the political system and the ‘strength of fascist (anti-systemic) forces’ and ‘authoritarianism of the military’, to which they add the bureaucracy (see De Meur and Berg-Schlosser 2002: 254-257).

This chapter focuses on these matters of stateness pointed out by Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell but zooms further in on the expectedly varied role of different stateness attributes across the interwar democratic breakdowns. Whereas previous chapters examined the effect of stateness on democratic stability in either a highly detailed or general fashion, this chapter (and the two subsequent ones) attempts to mitigate the teething troubles of these approaches.

First, the conclusions of the within-case analyses of Germany, Spain, Czechoslovakia, and Finland are confronted with the larger interwar sample. They showed that citizenship agreement was a less important stabilizing factor than monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness. This chapter focuses only on the breakdown cases and asks whether this finding is more generally true for the interwar period.

Second, the conclusions of the large-n statistical analysis are examined by within-case evidence. The statistical analysis corroborated the two hypotheses of the study by concluding that on the macro-level, all three attributes of stateness – monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, and citizenship agreement – do indeed stabilize democracies. This is robust across regions and international orders and to the inclusion of a standard list of confounders, including level of economic development. Hence, we cannot reject that there is such a thing as a ‘state effect’ separate from the level of modernization as understood in the distributionist model of democracy. Next, monopoly on violence followed by administrative effectiveness achieved the strongest level of statistical significance and the strongest substantial effect. The statistical results thus support the close process analysis
of the four interwar cases. What remains unknown is whether the robust effects of the stateness attributes stand the test of examining the observable implications of their causal theories across the three large international episodes. If any of the stateness theories are true, we must be able to observe the implications of their mechanisms over a substantial number of democratic breakdowns. This chapter moves on with this exercise for the 14 democratic breakdowns of the interwar period 1919-1945: Germany, Austria, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Yugoslavia, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina (as identified in Chapter 6).54

In what follows, I answer two separate but interconnected questions. First, to what extent are there weaknesses in the three stateness attributes in the breakdown cases? I discuss the pattern of development of each attribute of stateness during the interwar years. This provides initial descriptive inferences in the sense of identifying those cases of weak stateness where some or more of the mechanisms may be relevant. Second, are any of the mechanisms observable in the breakdown cases? For each attribute, I identify the mechanisms for each case and the total number of mechanisms across the cases. Connecting with the first step, this examination only focuses on the cases of state weakness (in one of the three attributes). That is, where a given stateness attribute is strong, the mechanisms attached are excluded from consideration. In both steps, I identify whether any temporal and regional clustering exists.

There are three main findings. First, all three attributes of stateness and the seven mechanisms are represented in several breakdowns. Thus, at least the isolated examination of interwar democratic breakdowns supports Hypothesis 1 and corroborates the statistical finding that stateness, in general, is important for democratic stability. Second, the results indicate that disaggregation of the state is fruitful. No case was fully weak or fully strong in all three stateness attributes and the stateness attributes were rarely all relevant in the same cases. This indicates that without disaggregation as based on my conceptualizations at least, we would not only arrive at imprecise predictions of the general effect of stateness but also infer inadequate single-case explanations of stateness in a substantial number of cases. The results also reproduce some but not all of the empirical lessons of the previous analyses. On the one hand, all three attributes seem important for explaining the interwar democratic breakdowns when we consider the number of present mechanisms among the breakdowns. On the other hand, the mechanism ex-

54 To assess reliability, the research assistant coded 5 of the 14 cases of democratic breakdown by random selection (Greece 1926-1936; Germany 1919-1933; Lithuania 1920-1926; Uruguay 1919-1934; Portugal 1918-1926). See Appendix I for an extended presentation of threshold ambiguities. For the case analyses, see the online appendix.
aminations reveal that administrative ineffectiveness is the most frequent destabilizing stateness attribute followed by a disputed monopoly on violence. This is closer to the conclusions of the comparative analysis in Chapter 5 than the statistical results in Chapter 7, which clearly placed administrative effectiveness as less important than monopoly on violence. The interwar pattern seems to diverge from the average effects of the statistical models. Third, the mechanisms of authoritarian restoration, socioeconomic delegitimation, and citizenship injustices were most frequent but, as indicated, the account shows that stateness likely influenced interwar democratic breakdowns in many ways. Beyond the lessons concerning the explanatory importance of the three attributes, we thus acquire substantial knowledge about the state-democracy nexus by examining mechanisms only.

The development of stateness

Table 8.1 shows the status of the stateness attributes and their components in the year of democratic breakdown. This is based on the assumption that observing a mechanism only makes sense if the relevant stateness attribute was weak preceding breakdown. I make sure that the codings reflect the status days or months before breakdown. The following section compares the development of stateness in the 14 breakdowns for each attribute in turn, starting with monopoly on violence.

Monopoly on violence

Focusing on the state weaknesses pertaining to monopoly on violence, 5 of 14 had problems with resource supremacy of the military and police forces. This is a relatively low number compared to the other two components of monopoly on violence in which no less than 10 and 12 cases had problems with cohesion and subordination, respectively. This discrepancy between the three components of monopoly on violence shows the importance of disaggregation: Based only on one of the three components, we judge monopoly on violence precisely in 6 of 14 cases but the remaining 8 cases lack one or two of the components while the remaining one(s) is present. This would have the consequence that we exclude cases from the analysis of mechanisms even though their state weaknesses may have been highly relevant for democratic breakdown. This problem mostly stems from the discrepancy between resource supremacy and the other two components. Cohesion and subordination of the security forces co-vary more closely as only 3 cases (Germany, Latvia, and Spain) experienced problems in one but not the other. Distinguishing between cohesion and subordination thus seems less relevant. Nev-
ertheless, a discrepancy of merely one case in principle justifies disaggregation.

More substantially, this points to the less surprising pattern that resource supremacy of the security apparatus was generally easier to achieve than to improve the quality, cohesion and subordination, of it. And, as a plausible extension of this interpretation, establishing resource supremacy, given the fundamentality of this task, stood prior to improving organizational sophistication. The workings of the components thus corroborate the conceptual suggestions in Chapter 2 and the statistical results in Chapter 7.

The weak quality of the security apparatus seems to be at the heart of the fact that only one case, Estonia, exhibited monopoly on violence. A comparison with developments in Finland is instructive in this regard: Emerging from WWI, the Estonian officers did come from a Russian military organization and education, like the Finnish officers, but the army was rapidly reorganized along French principles. The French model was deemed more practically effective than the very theoretical Russian one (Seene 2009: 100). From the start, Estonian officers were loyal to the idea of creating an Estonian state and were united under this one banner (Varrak 2000: 110; Brügge-man 2003). The pattern of internal military conflict and reform was similar to that in Finland, but in Estonia a standing army of educated personnel from military schools based on one military academy was established already in 1921 (Seene 2009: 100-101). Subordination was from the start less problematic than in Finland (see Varrak 2000: 121). Thus, there was no split between reds and whites internally in the army as reds were unitarily perceived as the enemy (see Minnik 2015: 44). The liberation wars in this way produced national solidarity and coherence between the political leadership and the military (see e.g. Graham 1927: 286; Kasekamp 1999: 589, 595; Minnik 2015: 44).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case (spell)</th>
<th>Resource supremacy</th>
<th>Cohesion</th>
<th>Subordination</th>
<th>Territorial penetration</th>
<th>Me'itocracy</th>
<th>Responsive-ness</th>
<th>Mutual group acceptance</th>
<th>State legitimacy</th>
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<td>Italy (1919-1922)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Chile (1918-1925)</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Poland (1918-1926)</td>
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<td>Portugal (1918-1926)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia (1921-1929)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Argentina (1918-1931)</td>
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<td>Estonia (1919-1934)</td>
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Moving on to the trajectories of the interwar years, 13 of 14 democracies (except Estonia) had a disputed monopoly on violence the year of their breakdown. This fact points to monopoly on violence as a widespread problem and potential cause of breakdown. Interestingly, only Spain experienced a decrease in monopoly on violence during the interwar years. Resource supremacy was lost during the spring and summer of 1936 as Franco’s forces entered Spain (Payne 2006: 168; Alpert 2013: 21) whereas the subordination of the military became problematic already from 1932 when the budget reforms and sidelining of the ordinary military by leftist Prime Minister Azana took hold (Payne 1967: 267, 274, 281-283). Another example, not recorded in my dataset, is Argentina, where security forces established resource supremacy in the 1880s and coherence in the early 1900s. Coherence was lost with Yrigoyen’s entry under democratic rule in 1916 as Yrigoyen undermined military professionalism by circumventing the regular army in containment matters (Goldwert 1972: 4). Otherwise, monopoly on violence remained constant in most cases, including notably the Latin American countries, which were largely untouched by WWI and the transition to democracy.

Where changes did occur, they were to the better. Quite a few cases started their democratic period with a disputed monopoly on violence, which then strengthened years before their democratic breakdown. This particularly concerned the establishment of resource supremacy and security force coherence. Lack of subordination was a somewhat more recalcitrant problem. The examples of improvements in monopoly on violence (Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Germany, and Austria) generally help us understand the dynamics of security apparatuses in the 1920s and 1930s.

Resource supremacy was established in 1920 in Latvia. Since the end of WWI, the Latvian army, created partly from the imperial Russian army, had engaged in continued fights with German troops. Only in the spring of 1920 was control obtained over the lower Livland and the Riga area with aid from allied troops (Graham 1927: 332). Similarly, the technicalities and raw man power needed to extend Estonian control of the, albeit, small territory of the Northern Baltic seemed almost insurmountable, and the process of setting up an Estonian army was an ‘improvisation’ (Graham 1927: 255; Smith et al. 2002: 1). Nevertheless, resource supremacy of Estonian security forces succeeded during wars against Russian Bolsheviks and German invaders from 1918 to 1920 (Parming 1975: 7; Smith et al. 2002: 1). The same situation was evident in Poland (Watt 1979: 150-151). In Germany, the Freikorps, despite their sometimes intimate relationship with the Reichswehr, were outside state control and were only detronized after the failed Beer Hall Putsch in 1923 (Waite 1952: 196-197).
Improvements of security force coherence in Latvia and Estonia in the early 1920s occurred for the same reasons: the building of state power on the grounds of pure functionality and survivability in successor states of the former Russian Empire. Austria also built up army coherence during the crucial post-war years of 1920-1921. Yet, as the German and Austrian experiences show, improvements in the components of monopoly on violence were not entirely a successor state phenomenon occurring in an anarchical context but built on a more general logic of state-building in the aftermath of war and in times of relative peace alike.

Administrative effectiveness

Moving on to the state weaknesses pertaining to administrative effectiveness, challenges to territorial penetration, the more sophisticated version of state control as evident in a functioning administrative infrastructure throughout the territory of the state, ensued in only 3 of 14 cases whereas 12 and 13 cases, respectively, lacked meritocracy and responsiveness. Again, as with monopoly on violence, disaggregation to the component level is fruitful: If we coded monopoly on violence as present based solely on territorial penetration as defined, we would reach imprecise conclusions in no less than 10 cases (Uruguay, Chile, Portugal, Latvia, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia). Compared to the weaknesses of monopoly on violence, a pattern seems to emerge that corroborates the conceptual distinctions of Chapter 2: Extending physical authority is less of a problem than building a reliable force of administrators that can take advantage of the physical structures to implement policies effectively.

The only democracy that achieved administrative effectiveness before its breakdown was Austria. A comparison with Germany shows how the factors of meritocracy and responsiveness, particularly responsiveness, was constantly threatened but could be maintained under the influence of strong path dependencies. In Austria as in Prussia, King Joseph II consolidated a professional officialdom by 1780. But he also granted tenure status to civil servants and outsourced disciplinary committee rulings to them. This made them very hard to fire. The next king, Francis, tried to reinstall bureaucracy as an obedient monarchical service but the bureaucrats resisted. Yet, in contrast to the Prussian bureaucracy the Austrian one never developed into the ‘bureaucratic authoritarian’ force that circumvented kings continuously. Instead, in the 1850s king Francis managed to order the lines of command by controlling the bureaucrats while the bureaucracy continued to manage its own staff on meritocratic criteria (Heindl 2006: 44-46). Until 1918, the bureaucracy developed a less statist but more action-oriented stance towards modernization that was more in touch with the basic wishes of the parlia-
mentary system than in neighboring Germany (see Heindl 2006: 47-48; Berger 2010: 380).

As the Austrian bureaucracy entered the democratic era as a strong, autonomous organization, there were worries, as in Germany, that it could not be managed by a weakly institutionalized party system (Gerlach and Campbell 2000: 52; Botz 2014: 125). However, government proposals of civil service wage cuts and layoffs were implemented stably, despite protests and strikes by railway workers (Carsten 1986: 54). Generally, the Austrian bureaucrats remained neutral servants of the state, beyond party politics, including their own corporate interests. They served social democratic as well as Christian socialist governments in relative harmony as a modernizing force (Berger 2010: 380).

As with monopoly on violence, administrative ineffectiveness was a widespread problem, which makes it a potentially important explanation for democratic breakdown. In 13 of 14 democracies (except Austria), administrative ineffectiveness existed before breakdown. No democracy experienced a weakening in any of the components. On the other hand, only two cases, Latvia and Estonia, experienced improvements. Territorial penetration in Estonia followed the lines of the dissemination of military resource supremacy obtained by the Treaty of Tartu in early 1920 – specifically, penetration could build on the administrative autonomy and unification of the major regions and towns of the Tallinn area and Northern Livland from 1905 (Smith et al. 2002: 9, 11, 13). The Latvian and Estonian state-building paths of the interwar period were very similar. As a general rule, Latvian developments were briefly delayed, around a year, relative to Estonia. This was also the case for territorial penetration, which was obtained in 1920 (see Hiden and Salmon 1991: Ch. 3; Lieven 1993: Ch. 3; Hope 1994). The short delay reflected a more strained path to a de facto functioning state than in Estonia. As fights with German troops continued through the spring of 1920, the process of territorial takeover ended with the Treaty of Riga in 1920 as Russians accepted Latvian independence and the Germans withdrew from the territory (Graham 1927: 335). In these small countries, administrative legacies were formed over centuries of occupation. Territorial penetration was thus never far away when a national army had achieved territorial control.

The Estonian and Latvian cases notwithstanding, we see a strong tendency that the states were mired in constant problems in achieving effective and impartial policy implementation. The distinction between meritocracy and responsiveness seems less relevant here since only one case, Germany, experienced problems in one component, i.e. responsiveness, but not the other. Otherwise, there is a perfect overlap between the remaining 12 cases showing problems of meritocracy and responsiveness alike. Still, the German case
alone in principle justifies disaggregation between meritocracy and responsiveness. Of more interest are the substantial differences in the type of problems of administrative ineffectiveness that are seen across the cases.

Problems were all-encompassing in Latin Europe and the offsprings in Latin America. Unresponsiveness was constituted by state employee corruption and persistent patrimonial structures locally as well as politically motivated hirings and firings in the central bureaucracy. This obstructed the stability of any meritocratic system. In Uruguay, one typical combination of such administrative problems crystallized in the 1920s and 1930s. All ministries were heavily politicized as they were intensely and almost exclusively organized around the distribution of administrative posts proportional to the election results (Lindahl 1962: 94, 114). However, politicization was never complete in one party’s favor between elections because the opposition party managed to reserve a sphere of influence over the civil service (controlling some offices in some ministries). As a result, politicization was followed by unresponsiveness (Bergara with Pereyra et al. 2004: 14; Calderón and Chong 2007: 593).

Whereas the problems in Uruguay stemmed from the dominance of old feudal structures and top-down politicization, the problems in Italy were slightly different. Since the landowners of the South were not part of the state bureaucracy at unification in 1871, the administration there had to be politicized to ensure their support for unification (Shefter 1977: 442-443). This installed the blocco storico by which governments survived by payment of patronage. An additional challenge of the unification was that no stable administrative links between the administration and civil society were established (Riall 1994: 27). This further strengthened the use of patronage and nurtured the infamous pattern of corruption in Southern Italy.

At the same time, trasformismo, a pork-barrel style politics where large shares of ministerial and local civil servants were substituted by party loyalists after elections, was installed and remained vibrant until at least the end of Mussolini’s reign (Warner 2001: 129; Elazar 2001: 34). However, trasformismo was less systematic than in Uruguay (Hopkin and Mastropalo 2001: 153) and even less successful in establishing a loyal administration.

For these Latin democracies, administrative ineffectiveness could be particularly damaging because the conditions for all three mechanisms – socio-economic delegitimation, elite bias delegitimation, and mass bias delegitimation – were all present. This is basically the same for the Baltic States although problems of politicization, patrimonialism, and corruption of civil servants were much less systematic and occurred within a much less bureaucratic framework (see e.g. Graham 1927: 405-406; Rothschild 1974: 378; Urbanovic and García-Zamor 2011: 182).
Citizenship agreement

The differences in the development of citizenship agreement to those of the two state capacities are not stark but nevertheless notable. Disrespect between ethnic groups as well as state illegitimacy existed in 9 of 14 cases. There is thus much less difference in the codings based on mutual acceptance between ethnic groups and state legitimacy. For instance, basing the coding of citizenship agreement on state legitimacy alone would result in problematic inferences about only 2 cases – a much smaller error rate than for the other two stateness attributes. On the one hand, this points out the intimate relationship between state legitimacy and mutual group acceptance. On the other hand, the partial overlapping of codings between the components does not entirely disqualify the idea of disaggregation. The cases of Austria and Greece exemplify how the two components developed and often conflicted with one another:

Mutual acceptance between ethnic groups was much easier to achieve in the First Republic of Austria than in the successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. WWI meant a loss of territories which had for centuries been controlled by Vienna. Austria thus became a diminished territory of the former German-speaking part of the Empire (6.5 of 10 million were German-speaking in the empire) – an undersized rather than an oversized state (Gerbach and Campbell 2000: 40). Only small minorities of Slovenes and Croats remained inside the territory after 1920 and these groups were quickly assimilated (Stadler 1966: 110).

The Austrian state of the First Republic was, however, illegitimate. As Edmondson (1978: 16) assures: “A state without a national tradition of its own, Austria was unique in postwar Europe. It became ‘the state that nobody wanted’”. This quote captures that greater attachment to Germany was much more legitimate than any Austrian national union (Jelavich 1987: 171; Gerbach and Campbell 2000: 40; Spohn 2003: 15; Botz 2014: 125).

In Greece, the discrepancy between the two components of citizenship agreement was the opposite: state legitimacy existed but mutual acceptance between ethnic groups did not. Greek national identity was built on the special role and destiny of the Greek in the Ottoman Empire – Christian orthodoxy and Hellenic authenticity, including liberal democratic virtues (see e.g. Koumandarakis 2002: 41; Koliopoulos and Veremis 2010: 99). In turn, the loss of Asia Minor to Turkey in 1922 only brought Greeks closer together for the idea of a Greek state (Clogg 1986: 121).

However, the war with Turkey over Asia brought 1 to 1.5 million Asia Minor refugees into Greek territory – a sizeable minority in the Greek population of 5 million. Whereas these refugees largely accepted assimilation, thus
ensuring state legitimacy, the Greek natives never accepted them as full members of Greek society but viewed them with disgust and hostility (Mavrogordatos 1983: 194; Koumandarak 2002: 44-45).

Looking instead at the overall pattern, we find citizenship agreement in 4 of 14 cases (Argentina, Estonia, Uruguay, and Portugal). And no democracy experienced a weakening in any of the two components. There are no obvious common factors between those four countries besides their citizenship agreement. Argentina and Uruguay exemplify violent nation-building as natives were slaughtered, driven to the territories’ outskirts, or brutally assimilated through marriage with the European settlers (Fossum 1967; Germani 1970: 323). Portugal’s road to nationhood was different as it resembles the much longer-term European path through the middle ages (Wheeler 1978: 5). Estonia’s nation was of course much younger, emerging as an idea in late 19th century and forming materially after WWI. State legitimacy was secured during 1919 and established in 1920 as German minorities abandoned their hope of a restoration of the German Kaiserreich. From this point on, they were more or less indifferent to the Estonian state being busier with political reforms and foreign policy issues (Coakley 1986: 191; Taagepera 1993: 51-52). In contrast to the other successor states, Estonia was ethnically homogenous with only 10% ethnic minorities, primarily Russians but also Germans (Rauch 1974: 82; Rothschild 1974: 369; Parming 1979: 242). Despite a lack of linguistic and ethnic conflict, minority protections in the constitution were only accepted gradually through the 1920s. The land reforms that originally pitted German landlords against Estonian peasants were fully implemented and appreciated by the Estonian population in 1926 (see Parming 1975: 25; Hope 1994: 46).

Still, 10 cases exhibited citizenship disagreement before breakdown. This corroborates the general impression of sizeable problems establishing citizenship agreement and a notable potential for explaining the democratic breakdowns. As far as monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness, path dependencies straitjacketed positive developments of nation-building although the legalistic pressure for minority protection, initiated with the Paris Peace Conference in 1918, was as large as ever. Citizenship disagreement in Spain was constituted by centuries of conflict between Castile Spain and Catalonia as well as the Basque Country. The series of liberal revolutions in the 19th century, Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship and the inauguration of true democracy in 1931 could not solve this conflict (de Blaye 1976: 16; Payne 1995: 252; Beramendi 1999: 80-81).

Alternatively, as in the successor states, WWI and the resulting border changes forged a new set of territorial ethnic cleavages. The most extreme example is Yugoslavia. The king of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was forged in
November 1918 when the Serbian army liberated Belgrade and saved many Yugoslav regions from civil unrest. Not only did this nation become Europe’s most ethnically complex (Rothschild 1974: 201-202), the coincidences of war gave leeway to Serbian dominance in the federal system, which exacerbated the ethno-religious differences (Djokic 2007: 2), particularly between Croats and Serbs, the two leading political forces (Djilas 1991: 59-60).

Overall patterns

The analyses of state weaknesses above point to regional patterns that largely corroborate extant theories of state- and nation-building in medieval (e.g. Ertman 1997) and 19th century Europe and Latin America (see e.g. Rothschild 1974; Shefter 1977; Silberman 1993; Ertman 1997; Kurtz 2013).

As we would expect, matters of resource supremacy and territorial penetration as well as both mutual group acceptance and state legitimacy were most problematic where states were young, as in the Eastern European successor states to the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires. Broadly speaking, stateness was stronger in older states. This is not surprising given the selection of strong states via mechanisms of war and inter-state competition. Also expectedly, problems of meritocracy and responsiveness of civil servants were all-encompassing in Latin Europe and the offsprings in Latin America. Feudalism weighed heavily on local administrations in Portugal, Spain, and Italy (and Greece in a less clear-cut fashion). This patrimonialism coincided with top-level politicization when the countries entered the era of mass politics in the 19th century. State-building in Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay, which only achieved independence after the French Revolution and the delegitimation of feudalism, brought along weaker limits on executive power and weaker patrimonialism but more streamlined politicization of civil servants. Thus, some old states never got rid of their stateness problems because they had become embedded as the logic of how politics functioned.

One case fits less neatly into the dominant models of state- and nation-building: Germany. That citizenship agreement was problematic in Germany is congruent with the literature on late state formation and the inadequacies of imperial rule for nation-building. Yet, the development of effective state administration in the 19th and early 20th centuries is much less accounted for in the comparative literature. Particularly, responsiveness was threatened and could sometimes be lost despite the existence of meritocracy. As argued, this leads to a misperception of administrative effectiveness in Germany.

Which overall lessons should we take on for the analysis of mechanisms? From within-case analyses of developments over time in the 1920s and 1930s, it is clear that stateness, whether in terms of monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, or citizenship agreement, was improving more
than degenerating. However, the most dominant observation is weakness and stability of the three stateness attributes. This is also evident from the cross-case count of state weaknesses in Table 8.1. As an overall observation, the more qualitatively demanding issues of personnel control and organization in the military and the civil service were particularly hard to reform. And ethnic cleavages stuck. The most dominant observation is of multiple problems of stateness in each democracy prior to breakdown. All three attributes of state weakness – disputed monopoly on violence, administrative ineffectiveness, and citizenship disagreement – are represented in more than two-thirds of the cases. This does not primarily reflect weaknesses in territorial penetration and resource supremacy. Weaknesses are most frequent in the components that we expect to be the most powerful determinants of democratic breakdown. All three stateness factors could thus be important explanations for the interwar democratic breakdowns.

Table 8.1, however, also points to the relevance of disaggregating the stateness concept. No democracy was strong in all three aspects: monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, and citizenship agreement. Only one case achieved monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness, respectively, four cases achieved citizenship agreement, and only Estonia achieved more than one attribute, namely monopoly on violence and citizenship agreement. Notably, more democracies had problems with monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness than with citizenship agreement, providing initial leverage for the two state capacity explanations. As for the components, it is instructive to see the ability of each attribute to predict the others: If we base the judgment on only one attribute, we will arrive at imprecise judgments of stateness 9 of 14 cases: Italy, Chile, Poland, Yugoslavia, Argentina, Germany, Latvia, Greece, and Spain. The remaining 5 cases are Portugal, Lithuania, Estonia, Austria, and Uruguay. They exemplify the essence of a justified disaggregation since our judgement of stateness differs between each attribute of it: They are weak (or strong) in one or two attributes of stateness but not in all three. Disaggregation at the level of the attributes is therefore arguably needed as a first step in classifying the democratic regimes correctly. Only disaggregation enables us to correctly assess the existence of any of the seven mechanisms and thus judge the explanatory importance of stateness. As a result, we cannot preclude the existence of any of the seven mechanisms based on the three state weaknesses as they are all represented among the breakdowns. At the component level, the fact that a lack of meritocracy exists in 12 cases further precludes any exclusion of the elite and mass delegitimation mechanisms.
The mechanisms of state weaknesses

So far, Table 8.1 has listed the cases that are relevant for an analysis of mechanisms. Table 8.2 lists all observed mechanisms. If, for instance, a case exhibits monopoly on violence, observation of the mechanisms of disputed monopoly on violence – authoritarian restoration and security delegitimation – is not considered. By contrast, the interesting count is the amount of mechanisms among the cases where they exhibit some form of state weakness. Remember also that the mechanisms are merely a number of sequenced observable implications of a more general theory based on the negative correlation between the strength of some stateness attribute and democratic breakdown. Based on Table 8.2, I now analyze the mechanisms of each attribute in turn. Lastly, I describe the overall importance of stateness and the relative strength of the attributes.

Monopoly on violence

Both mechanisms of monopoly on violence are represented among the cases: Security delegitimation is identified in 5 cases (Italy, Portugal, Yugoslavia, Germany, and Greece) and authoritarian restorations in 8 cases (Italy, Chile, Poland, Portugal, Lithuania, Argentina, Greece, and Spain).

There is a certain temporal order regarding the authoritarian restorations in that most of these breakdowns occurred early in the interwar period (between Italy’s breakdown in 1922 and Lithuania’s in 1926). The period between 1922 and 1926 was in many countries one of positive economic growth, although some cases were stuck in the financial instability of the immediate postwar-years (see Møller, Schmotz, and Skaaning 2015: 307). Although the mechanism of authoritarian restoration should be detectable in situations of economic crisis, it is among the few mechanisms that should be detectable in non-crisis years. It is therefore notable that it is the most frequently present mechanism in the growth years of the mid-1920s.

In most of these cases, there was actually an economic crisis at the time of breakdown but economics did not alter the politics of civil-military relations in all of them. Take the Polish democracy’s breakdown in 1926: General Pilsudski’s military coup d’état on 12 May 1926 was caused by a combination of civil-military and inter-military conflict over the proper organization and role of the military. These weakened structures of civil control made it possible for Pilsudski to mobilize a considerable army force behind his authoritarian claim (see e.g. Graham 1927: 518; Polonsky 1972: 128-129; Rothschild 1974: 54; Watt 1979: 216; Leslie 1980: 158; Holzer 2000: 345; Bermeo 2003: 30-31). Pilsudski was fed up with party skirmishes and government instability, in particular as these were the result of indecision on the matter of the
role of the military in politics (Graham 1927: 518; Bermeo 2003: 30-31). With the agreement in Locarno in 1925, which unsettled the Western borders of Poland and the German-Russo neutrality April 1926 directed against Poland, Pilsudski was convinced that the governmental system would lead Poland to destruction (Polonsky 1972: 138-139; Rothschild 1974: 54).

Pilsudski and his fellow legionnaires had been at odds with the governments since Pilsudski’s retirement, and Pilsudski remained in control of these forces, including other loyal army officers who saw him as the great liberator from WWI (Rothschild 1974: 33-34). It was these forces that Pilsudski eventually mobilized for the coup (Korbonski 1988: 174; Holzer 2000: 345). The way Pilsudski and they were treated at the constitutional negotiations outraged them. Some of them had been purged or otherwise sidelined by organizational changes in 1923 that put general Sikorski in charge of a strong civilian ministerial control over the military. They regarded themselves as a group with special privileges (Polonsky 1972: 128-129).

The Polish authoritarian restoration in 1926 thus shows a clear example of threats to democracy emerging within the sphere of civil-military relations, separate from economics, and evolving into a successful coup d’état. In other cases such as Portugal, inflation and other financial strains led to wage cuts and purges that eventually contributed to the mobilization of a coup alliance (see e.g. Wheeler 1979: 194; Pinto 2000a: 378). However, the fact that civil-military relations sometimes developed according to a separate political logic indicates that strained civil-military relations on their own may threaten democracies. It also echoes Stepan’s (1988) notion that military professionalism may often be a key factor behind civil-military conflicts and coups d’état against democracy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case (breakdown year)</th>
<th>Disputed monopoly on violence</th>
<th>Administrative ineffectiveness</th>
<th>Citizenship disagreement</th>
<th>Number of mechanisms in case</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Authoritarian restoration</td>
<td>Security delegitimation</td>
<td>Socio-economic delegitimation</td>
<td>Elite bias delegitimation</td>
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<td>Greece (1936)</td>
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<td>Spain (1937)</td>
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<td>Cases with mechanism</td>
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<td>Mechanisms by attribute</td>
<td>13</td>
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In addition to the temporal clustering, a regional pattern can be seen. Except for Poland and Lithuania, Latin European and American countries dominated among the cases with an authoritarian restoration. This is no surprise, as these countries have a history of military coups d'état (see e.g. Pion-Berlin 1992). In the 19th century, a habit of intervening militarily whenever politics failed or produced unwanted policies had developed. This habit most often reproduced in the interwar period as the inauguration of genuinely free, fair, and inclusive elections typically threatened the privileges of officer corpses. Portugal is a typical case here. Argentina, however, provides some nuances. Argentina’s democratic breakdown in 1930 is considered a case par excellence of a military coup d’état resting on problems of military autonomy (see e.g. Norden 1996: 21; Zagorski 1988). The active participants in the coup in September 1930 consisted of a few (1500) officers led by General Uriburu. The remaining security forces, including the rest of the army under General Justo (Norden 1996: 21), supported the coup by staying passive. But the rebels in the Argentinian army connected with General Uriburu’s intervention in 1930 were only antagonized from the regime by the policies of Presidents Yrigoyen and Alvear from 1916 and virtually all subsequent governments (see e.g. Romero 1994: 33; Deutsch 1999: 198).

Regarding the less frequent mechanism of security delegitimation, there is no clear regional pattern (Latin, Central and Eastern European countries cluster together) and cases are quite evenly spread across the interwar period. The last point could reflect that security delegitimization, more so than authoritarian restoration, takes time since anti-regime mobilization among the public usually matures over years of dissatisfaction. However, we should not make too much of this as there is really no clear temporal pattern concerning the time from transition to breakdown in the five democracies at hand. As an example, take the breakdown in Italy in 1922 after only three years of democratic rule. To explain why the Italian king was persuaded to let Mussolini form a government on 29 October 1922, one must explain widespread support from almost every marginalized social group for the fascist squads to protect them in a situation of anarchy (Tannenbaum 1969: 1185; Elazar 2001: 32-33; Mann 2004: 111, 113). Paradoxically, “fascism triumphed more through violence than the ballot box” (Mann 2004: 114) in the sense that rising support for fascism came from constituencies seeking protection from fascist squads. This was the trick of Mussolini’s fascist campaign; it was populist by pointing to pending security problems but manipulative by systematically fighting the regime and stripping it of the means to secure public order (Salvemini 1973: 132,308; Farneti 1978: 19; Lyttelton 2004: 54).

In 3 cases (Uruguay, Latvia, and Austria), no mechanisms were found although monopoly on violence was disputed. There are no clear similarities
between these three cases. In fact, they are quite different in many respects, including the specific problems of monopoly on violence. The breakdown in Austria illustrates the importance of considering every observable implication of the mechanisms with care. The Austro-fascist regime, which Chancellor Dollfuss initiated by dissolving the parliament on 7 March 1933, was supported by the army and police in its consolidation through 1933 and 1934 (Mann 2004: 213, 233). There is no doubt that Austria’s regular army was a conservative body along the lines of the German _Reichswehr_ (Jelavich 1987: 183). However, neither the army nor the police conspired with Dollfuss in his acts against parliament in March 1933. To the contrary, the democratic breakdown was almost singlehandedly planned by Dollfuss (Pauley 1980: 232; Bermeo 2003: 42). To the extent that there was outside pressure on Dollfuss to install dictatorship, it came from the governmental ally and paramilitary group _Heimwehr_ (Edmondson 1978: 168; Rabinbach 1983: 81).

Next, even though Hitler’s accession to power in January in Germany certainly signaled the possibility that Austrian Nazis with their SS and SA regiments could use terrorist acts to undermine the state’s legitimacy (Botz 2014: 130), security was not on the agenda when Dollfuss finally decided on an anti-parliamentary strategy in late February 1933. Rather, Dollfuss feared that the Nazis in Austria would copy their German counterpart in accessing state power via the electoral and parliamentary channel. Expecting a great electoral defeat at the elections in April, he wished to dissolve parliament (Gulick 1948: 1026; Edmondson 1978: 175-176; Rabinbach 1983: 82). The absence of imminent domestic security threats supports the notion that Dollfuss’ motivation was not security-related (Gerlach and Campbell 2000: 50).

The Austrian breakdown was thus neither a case of authoritarian restoration nor of security delegitimation: First, conservative military bodies did not push for autocracy everywhere. Second, security threats, if any strong ones in fact existed, did not always enter the agenda of the key actors with positions and resources to cause democratic breakdown. This shows the occasional inadequacies of the mechanisms that hinge on a disputed monopoly on violence. Overall, however, the mechanisms of monopoly on violence seem important. They apply to a varied group of countries, but the temporal and regional patterns of authoritarian restorations fit fairly well with the proposition that a disputed monopoly on violence can destabilize democracies under many different economic conditions. Taken together, authoritarian restoration and security delegitimization occurred 13 times in 10 different cases. This implies that when we take account of the hitherto unobserved implications of the mechanisms of monopoly on violence, we can give some more explanatory leverage to the statistical finding that monopoly on violence is robustly correlated with an increase in the probability that democracy is stable.
Administrative effectiveness

The three mechanisms stemming from administrative ineffectiveness are quite evenly and frequently present among the breakdowns: socioeconomic delegitimization in 7 cases (Chile, Poland, Portugal, Argentina, Germany, Greece, and Spain), elite bias delegitimization in 5 cases (Portugal, Yugoslavia, Uruguay, Greece, and Spain), and mass bias delegitimization in 5 as well (Italy, Yugoslavia, Argentina, Greece, and Spain).

Starting with socioeconomic delegitimization, there is neither a clear regional nor a clear temporal pattern. At least two cases, Argentina and Germany, fit the classic story of the Great Depression and democratic breakdown in the 1930s, with the addition that administrative ineffectiveness drove this negative effect. Curiously, this only seems to concern these 2 cases of the 6 breakdowns in the immediate period after the crash on Wall Street in 1929. In this count, I tentatively include the breakdowns in Argentina, Germany, Austria, Estonia, Uruguay, and Latvia from 1931 to 1934. 3 breakdowns (Chile, Poland, and Portugal) occurred in 1925 or 1926, which are normally categorized as growth years. This shows the importance of not restraining the examination of this mechanism to globally defined crisis years such as the Great Depression. We should also consider domestic economic crisis as well as, more generally, the social repercussions of crisis following years of recession.

The case of Chile illustrates the importance of being attentive to domestic economic conditions. In 1919, after WWI, a severe economic crisis hit Chile as the very important nitrate export sector almost collapsed. The collapse affected the whole economy, causing unemployment, public deficits, and cutbacks. The recession in exports lasted at least until 1923 but its repercussions continued (Haring 1931: 5; Nunn 1967: 1; Cavarozzi 1978: 253; Deutsch 1999: 72). The poor socioeconomic outcomes motivated a group of junior officers to stage a coup in September 1924, which put the system in political stalemate until early 1925. However, they also provoked a larger, mass-based wish for constitutional reform which was reflected in the popular support for the 1925 constitution and thus the undemocratic circumvention of parliament (Collier and Sater 2004: 207; Silva 2008: 66). Importantly, administrative ineffectiveness contributed directly to the social hardships and spurring of performance illegitimacy in two ways: First, implementation was both sabotaged and simply delayed or ineffective in the ministries (Silva 2008: 62-62, 67). Second, whereas most of the blame was put on the politicians, there was a widespread perception among the middle classes and educated, notably in the Radical Party, that socioeconomic problems had deeper causes...
in the oligarchic, ineffective state of the 1890 order, which largely remained in force after 1920 (Silva 1994: 282).

The two similar mechanisms of elite and mass bias delegitimation show no particular temporal ordering. Elite bias delegitimation does, however, apply exclusively to Latin countries and Yugoslavia. This is not surprising given Ertman’s (1997) classification of Latin Europe. What is interesting is that the problems of politicization and patrimonialism actually connected to one of the two bias mechanisms in most of the Latin democracies. Administrative ineffectiveness was more than a fact of life in these democracies; it seems also to have been consequential for democratic stability. One explanation may be the weak civil societies in Latin countries.

Uruguay is a typical example of elite bias delegitimation in Latin countries with less developed civil societies. The system of politicization and patronage was not particularly repressive of workers but did preserve a conservative economic modernization path. In consequence, party elites gained most while the system did not manage to incorporate and exploit new types of human capital and economic sectors (Filgueira and Rodriguez 1999: 2-3). The Blanco (now termed Nationalist) opposition led by Herrera openly complained about the system, particularly from the election of 1927: They claimed that Colorado control of the major ministries led to poor management of the economy and public resources as well as outright accusations of electoral fraud (Lindahl 1962: 128-132, 148-149). Similarly, the Nationalists had never been more than lukewarm supporters of the Council where policy coordination between Colorados and Nationalists took place (Martin 1933: 101).

During the 1920s, the Colorados and Blancos were increasingly antagonized and democratic opposition grew inside both parties – in the Blanco party because of perceived injustices stemming from the Council and in the Colorados as a counter-reaction to this radicalization and deteriorating environment of cross-party cooperation (Lindahl 1962: 172; Filgueira and Rodriguez 1999: 2). This process was augmented by the Depression and the strengthening of the Council system in the pork-barrel pact of 1930. The Nationalists accused the Colorados of excluding their constituencies from employment in public enterprises, which led to violent attacks on three interior ministers from 1931-1933 (Martin 1933: 101; Lindahl 1962: 150-151, 171, 173). The decade-long polarization and malfunctioning of the political system became a key component in Colorado President Terra’s opposition to democracy in 1932-1933. After attacks on his ministerial appointees, he hastened his coup plan in 1933-1934 (Lindahl 1962: 173,178, 184; González 1991: 37). The Uruguayan breakdown illustrates in very neat sequences how competition over state offices can create polarization and even anti-democratic
mobilization when resources for patronage become scarce, for example during an economic crisis.

Italy is an example of mass bias delegitimation. Italy had a much more developed civil society than the other Latin cases (see Ertman 1998), but it also demonstrates the political complexities that can arise when a populist mobilizes people based on politicization of the state administration. To constantly coopt and secure a strong alliance with landowners in the South and industry elites in the North (Salvemini 1973: 73; Elazar 2001: 33-34; De Grand 2001: 85, 100-101), the Italian democratic regime before WWI had refined politicization and patronage systems. This continued after WWI and resulted in passivity in peasant-landowner conflicts that generally favored the landowners (Elazar 2001: 52-53). Exacerbations of rural conflict in the South also occurred. Among other factors, this was nurtured by norms of occupying offices with sons of the gentry. Such mechanisms also dominated in the North, although less so (Elazar 2001: 32, 37). This polarized the vibrant civil society in anti-democratic (or rather oligarchic) conservatives and revolutionary, syndicalist socialists (Corner 2002: 29).

All conditions for economic and social reforms were present in 1919, but peasants and industrial workers would not wait for their implementation. Their high expectations resulted in immediate electoral support for the socialists but this waned within a few years in the face of continued parliamentary discussions and a lack of political ambition (Snowden 1972: 270; see also Salvemini 1973: 121-122; Baglieri 1980: 321; Corner 2002: 38). The fascist party persuaded these socialists that fascism would secure their property rights better by engaging in agrarian and social reforms (Wellhofer 2003: 102-103; Mann 2004: 97). Agrarian landowners and industrialists, notably of the North, turned against the republic and started supporting financially the fascist squads out of fear of the revolutionary syndicalists’ threat to their property rights (Elazar 2001: 78-79, 105). Thus, fascism was both a counterreaction to and the embodiment of the product of biased policies: revolutionary syndicalism.

No mechanisms of administrative ineffectiveness can explain the democratic breakdowns in the Baltics (Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia) even though all three countries experienced severe problems of administrative effectiveness. The Latvian and Estonian democracies broke down in 1934 after years of economic crisis following the Great Depression. However, Latvian economy actually recovered quite effectively in 1931-1932 and there was thus no crisis stratum from which to mobilize (Rogainis 1971; Scerbinskis 2011: 188). More generally for all three countries, politics was formed along ethnic rather than socioeconomic lines. Socioeconomic conflicts that were politicized, such as agrarian reform, were implemented quite effectively and to the
satisfaction of most people (see e.g. Graham 1927: 277, 335). The Baltic breakdowns thus show that we should be careful in inferring directly from economic crisis to socioeconomic delegitimization or elite or mass bias delegitimization.

With this in mind, the overall impression is that the mechanisms of administrative effectiveness are important. Just as the mechanisms of monopoly on violence, they apply to a varied group of countries. They occurred 17 times in 10 different cases. Again, this provides additional confidence that the statistically significant correlation between administrative effectiveness and democratic stability could be genuine.

Citizenship agreement

The two mechanisms of citizenship agreement, citizenship violence and citizenship injustices, are present in 2 (Italy and Yugoslavia) and 7 (Italy, Poland, Lithuania, Yugoslavia, Germany, Latvia, and Spain) cases, respectively. Citizenship violence thus seems less relevant than citizenship injustices, also compared to the other mechanisms.

Given the limited explanatory importance of citizenship violence, I limit myself to commenting on citizenship injustices. Whereas there is no clear temporal pattern, it is remarkable that the cases featuring this mechanism span across successor states and old European states alike (Spain and the admittedly special cases of Italy and Germany, which achieved federal union only in the middle of the 19th century). The mechanism of citizenship injustices thus shows no clear regional pattern as it applies to Latin, Eastern European, and Central European countries alike. We find most of the cases of citizenship injustices where democratic breakdown occurred by coup d’état.

Just as for monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness, there are important inadequacies regarding the mechanisms of citizenship agreement. In light of the lesser frequency of mechanisms of citizenship agreement, these inadequacies are even more important. In 3 cases with citizenship disagreement (Chile, Austria, and Greece), neither citizenship violence nor citizenship injustices can explain breakdown. These cases are different in many regards, including the type of citizenship problem. The Greek case exemplifies how actual violence should be observed to probe at citizenship violence. Despite conflicts between natives and refugees in Greece, confrontations between them were rarely violent (Koumandaraki 2002: 44). Similarly, any antagonized actor must be ethnic and politically important to probe at citizenship injustices. The prelude to Metaxas’ coup d’état in 1936 was the political fight between anti-Venizelist and Venizelist, who mostly disagreed about the proper regime: monarchy or republic (Legg 1969: 189;
Mavrogordatos 1983: 309). Along the same lines, Metaxas’ motivation for a coup in 1936 was a mixture of self-interest and restoration of the monarchy. His fascist ideas of ethnic purity developed later (Mavrogordatos 1983: 223, 272, 327; Kallis 2007: 234-236; see also Koliopoulos and Veremis 2010: 103-104).

Summing up on the importance of citizenship disagreement for the interwar democratic breakdowns, the mechanisms applied to a varied group of countries, 9 times in 7 different cases. Based on the observable implications of the theories of citizenship disagreement and democratic breakdown, we must thus maintain its general importance although it is markedly less important than monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness. As an important addition to the interwar context at least, we have good reason to focus on unequal distribution of goods between ethnic groups rather than interethnic violence in terms of explaining democratic breakdowns with citizenship problems.

Overall and relative strengths

Based on the analyses of mechanisms pertaining to the three attributes, we have strong indications that they were all important in explaining the interwar democratic breakdowns. We cannot reject any of the findings from the statistical analysis in Chapter 7. Table 8.2 shows 39 observed mechanisms from a total of 14 cases and 98 potential mechanisms. This means that there are on average slightly more than 3 stateness explanations for each interwar democratic breakdown. The next question is whether the diversity of state weaknesses and state strengths shown in the previous section amounts to different explanatory strengths of each attribute of stateness. This would increase the relevance of disaggregation. The first impression is that no such large differences are observable. 9 mechanisms stemming from citizenship disagreement are present regarding 7 cases. This makes this attribute the comparatively least important one. Disputed monopoly on violence and administrative ineffectiveness are present via 13 (10 cases) and 17 (10 cases) mechanisms, respectively. If anything, administrative ineffectiveness was thus the most important destabilizing stateness condition in the interwar democracies. This goes against the results of the statistical analysis to some extent. But it supports the results of the statistical and frontier zone analyses that point to a disaggregated approach and citizenship agreement as the least important stateness attribute.

To back this up further, the right column in Table 8.2 indicates a very varied influence of stateness on democratic breakdown in the interwar period. Noting, importantly, that Estonia and Austria cannot be explained by any
of the seven mechanisms, there are typically multiple mechanisms present in each case. In only 2 cases (Latvia and Uruguay) did 1 mechanism contribute to democratic breakdown, while cases such as Yugoslavia, Spain, Italy, and Greece can be explained by 5 of 7 possible mechanisms. This strongly indicates the explanatory relevance of state weaknesses for the interwar democratic breakdowns.

The correlation between the number of state weaknesses and number of mechanisms present across the cases is not particularly close. But it is still notable that Yugoslavia, Italy, and Greece were also among those cases where state weaknesses were all-encompassing and among the cases where democracy was typically regarded as particularly vulnerable. Again, this supports the validity of the mechanisms and indicates that stateness generally, rather than one or two attributes as opposed to the remaining, may be highly relevant.

There are thus important counter-arguments to disaggregation for the sake of analytical simplicity. However, we should take the explanatory differences in terms of mechanisms between the attributes seriously as we would the differences in the average effect sizes of the attributes. Moreover, since no case was fully weak or fully strong in all three stateness attributes and the stateness attributes were rarely all relevant in the same cases, we would not only arrive at imprecise predictions of the general effect of stateness but also infer imprecise single-case explanations of stateness in a substantial number of cases. For instance, if we measure stateness solely by citizenship agreement for Portugal, we would wrongly exclude the possibility of any destabilizing effect of stateness and thus miss the actual importance of no less than four mechanisms. If we base the measurement on monopoly on violence or administrative effectiveness, other scholars could interpret any effects as pertaining to citizenship agreement. Against this backdrop, it seems justified to conclude that a disaggregated measurement of stateness is fruitful. It leads to a more complex but also, arguably, more precise understanding of the state-democracy nexus in the interwar period.

**Stateness probably needed, disaggregation wanted**

The analysis certainly supports many of the propositions of De Meur and Berg-Schlosser regarding explanations for democratic breakdowns in the interwar period. This chapter has added leverage to many of their points by specifying observable implications of theories such as ‘fragmentation’ and ‘authoritarian intervention’. In this way, it also lends support to Bermeo’s (1997: 19) proposition that ‘state capacity’, ‘civic order’, and ‘rule of law’
would explain why some interwar democracies survived while others broke
down. Notably, the study of the interwar democratic breakdowns indicates
that it may indeed be meaningful to speak in general terms of a state-
democracy nexus unified by some influences of the state through contain-
ment and crisis management. But the nexus is much more rich in detail and
varied in explanatory power depending on the stateness attribute in ques-
tion. In turn, a lack of disaggregation would have led to imprecise descriptive
and explanatory inferences. We may conclude that based on the interwar
breakdowns and the statistical results, stateness is probably needed in ex-
planatory models of democratic stability, but disaggregation of stateness is
surely required to achieve more precise inferences.

Two issues still stand, however. First, the interwar analysis shows the
importance of analyzing mechanisms separately and refraining from infer-
ence based exclusively on correlational patterns. Indeed, cases such as Lat-
via, Chile, and Lithuania suffered from all-encompassing state weaknesses
but these only caused one or two of the destabilizing mechanisms. This war-
rants as many analyses of mechanisms as there are democratic breakdowns.
The interwar period likely gives an incomplete picture of the importance of
stateness mechanisms. The next chapter engages with new contexts in the
democratic breakdowns of the Cold War period. It zooms in on a new set of
cases in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Domestic conditions are different
and the context of state- and nation-building and regime trajectories changes
as they are formed by the emergence of a bipolar international system. The
question is whether the state remains relevant as a domestic democratic de-
stabilizer and, if that is the case, which of the three attributes drives the con-
nection.
Chapter 9.
Stateness and the Cold War
Democratic Breakdowns

The modern Third World was created in the shadow of American predominance, and many of the leaders of the newly independent countries looked to the United States for support and direction (Westad 2005: 110).

On 11 September 1973, Augusto Pinochet’s military junta closed parliament and forced Salvador Allende’s government to resign, thereby ending the four-decades-old democracy in Chile. The Chilean case is often held as a prime example of US interference in domestic politics of Latin American democracies by facilitating military coups against socialist leaders succumbing to communism (see e.g. Schmitz 2006: 73). As the quote from Westad shows, this type of US influence reached beyond Latin America to hinder socialist radicalism in virtually any country that obtained independence after WWII. It is even a widespread assumption that the rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union largely determined the pace of democratic developments during the Cold War, offsetting much of the effect of domestic factors such as stateness (see e.g. Dunning 2004; Schmitz 2006: 2-5). This chapter shows that stateness, as a domestic factor, is important in explaining most of the democratic breakdowns during the Cold War. While US and Soviet support and direction for military leaders in fragile democracies was often extensive, we should increase our focus on domestic conditions, in particular stateness, and not get carried away by persuasive accounts of the agency of external actors. Chile is illustrative of this.

The Chilean military had established close ties with the US already in the 1950s. A group of officers with extensive contacts to the Pentagon and CIA, had acquired praetorian attitudes and a belief that the Chilean governments yielded too much to communism (Kaufman 1988: 117, 121, 125). Despite ambiguous information on the matter, the CIA probably contributed to the escalating opposition to Allende from 1970 to 1973 by orchestrating assassinations and kidnappings. But the CIA did not directly support Pinochet’s faction of officers. The idea and planning of the coup and its timing was the Chilean military’s alone (Kaufman 1988: 116-125). Moreover, decisive support for Pinochet came from the mainstream officers who only grew wary of Allende from 1972 as his socialist and anti-US policies unfolded and a work-
ers’ militia was announced to replace the regular army (Goldberg 1975: 93; Oppenheim 1999: 97; Collier and Sater 2004: 356). External influence, as the US in Chile, thus usually cannot explain very well why the core of the military turned against democratically elected sometimes socialist governments. We instead need to look to the preceding pattern of civil-military relations or, more generally, matters of stateness.

This chapter analyzes the 46 democratic breakdowns of the Cold War period in 32 countries in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia as well as the four regional loners Greece, Czechoslovakia, Turkey, and Lebanon. The vast number of cases reflects the enormous momentum of democracy after WWII, which delegitimized fascist and imperial regimes and brought along a wave of decolonizations and democratizations. Many of the newly established democracies, which were also new states, ran into problems of governance. This resembles what happened in the interwar period, but WWII also resulted in an international bipolarity that changed the dynamics of regime change, including from democracy to autocracy. By reusing the analytical framework of Chapter 8, this chapter thereby examines whether and how domestically based stateness factors were still important for democratic breakdown.

I conduct the analysis in the same way as in Chapter 8 by first discussing the pattern of development of each attribute of stateness and then the cases where the seven mechanisms can meaningfully be observed. The results support the distinctions between monopoly on violence, in particular problems of subordination, on the one hand and administrative effectiveness and citizenship agreement on the other hand. The most important mechanism was thus authoritarian restoration. This goes against significant scholarship on democratic regime change in the Cold War and indicates that domestically driven civil-military conflicts were important in explaining the democratic breakdowns. Still, security delegitimation as well as citizenship disagreement and the attached mechanisms of citizenship and injustices were important too. In turn, the Cold War democratic breakdowns reveal different patterns of explanatory importance for the three stateness attributes. In compliance with the statistical results, disputed monopoly on violence was clearly most important for the democratic breakdowns. Administrative ineffectiveness was, however, less important than citizenship disagreement.

55 To assess reliability, the research assistant coded 5 of the 46 cases of democratic breakdown by random selection (Lebanon 1971-1976; Panama 1950-1951; Myanmar 1960-1962; Nigeria 1979-1983; Czechoslovakia 1945-1947). See Appendix I for an extended presentation of threshold ambiguities. For the case analyses, see the online appendix.
The development of stateness

Table 9.1 shows whether the stateness attributes and their components were absent in the year of democratic breakdown. As in the previous chapter, this provides the background for identifying any mechanisms. Let us first move to the attribute of monopoly on violence and the developments of its components.

Monopoly on violence

No case exhibited monopoly on violence according to my account. This underlines the fragility of the postcolonial states in the face of often highly charged populations undergoing rapid social change in a context where state authority changed hands. Looking at each component in isolation, the most pronounced problem was not resource supremacy although 19 of 46 cases had trouble mobilizing military and police forces in the immediate years before and after independence. One such case was Indonesia where an army was only established in 1947 as no viable colonial force was left to defend any postcolonial government (Vu 2007: 42). The new army was organized by Sukarno, but he was only able to mobilize some guerillas while other guerillas on the islands hindered him from establishing control (Mietzner 2009: 39). By contrast, a Korean state formed before colonialism and huge American investments during and after the Korean War ensured the rebuilding of a strong South Korean army (Kim 2006: 64-65; Brazinsky 2009: 71). The postcolonial societies were given different initial conditions for building resource supremacy dependent on precolonial state legacies and contingent matters such as the prevalence of external support.

The overall finding regarding resource supremacy is that it is much more prevalent than cohesion and subordination. This indicates the similarities with state-building after WWI: Resource supremacy was much easier to obtain or, as an alternative interpretation, postwar political leaders simply put more effort into establishing military authority before thinking of refining its organization. Building a unified, professional military and police organization was a much more politically complex process. Cohesion was thus only achieved in 10 of 46 cases. In a few countries, for instance Turkey, this was already established before WWII. But in most places, the postcolonial cases, ethnic diversity either characterized the army from the start or provoked a severe politicization of the army and police that undermined professionalism and military hierarchies.
Table 9.1: Cold War state weaknesses in the year of democratic breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case (spell)</th>
<th>Monopoly on violence</th>
<th>Administrative effectiveness</th>
<th>Citizenship agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia (1945-1947)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colombia (1937-1948)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Panama (1950-1951)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cuba (1940-1953)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guatemala (1945-1954)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan (incl. Bangladesh)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia (1955-1957)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Myanmar (1948-1958)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan (1956-1958)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laos (1954-1959)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>South Korea (1960-1961)</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Myanmar (1960-1962)</td>
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<td>Peru (1956-1962)</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Argentina (1958-1962)</td>
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<td>Guatemala (1958-1963)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador (1948-1963)</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Republic of Congo (1960-1963)</td>
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<td>Honduras (1957-1963)</td>
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<td>Brazil (1946-1964)</td>
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<td>Philippines (1946-1965)</td>
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<td>Nigeria (1960-1966)</td>
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<td>Argentina (1963-1966)</td>
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<td>Sierra Leone (1961-1967)</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
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<td>Somalia</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
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<td>Ghana</td>
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<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
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<td>Chile</td>
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<td>Lebanon</td>
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<td>Argentina</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
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<td>Bolivia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cases without component</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases without attribute</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For instance, the former British colonies in Africa were typically left with a professional officer corps. But in many cases, such as Sierra Leone, the ambition to gradually substitute the British, or British-educated, soldiers to indigenize the military led to rounds of politicization that undermined the officers’ professionalism and drove a wedge between junior and senior officers or between domestically mobilized but antagonistic ethnic groups (Cox 1976: 38, 61; Cole 2013: 153). In the French realm of colonialism, the Royal Lao Army initially constituted a unified military organization, but socioeconomic and ethnic conflicts eventually changed this. From 1958, the Pathet Lao insurgency movement was integrated in the army after a peace agreement with the government, but the former guerilla troops never acquired the organizational norms of the army (Champassak 1961: 58-59; Rust 2012: 116).

Among the older states, such as Peru, problems of cohesion persisted during and after WWII. A Peruvian General Staff School developed the officer corps from 1954 (Stepan 1978a: 130). While this increased the professionalism and forged a corporate identity, the military never, until 1962, succeeded in protecting itself from outside influence, which implied renewed politicization and allowed guerilla troops to infiltrate the officer ranks (Philip 1978: 40-41).

There is thus a discrepancy between resource supremacy and cohesion. Subordination is even less frequently observed (in only 2 of 46 cases). This reflects that there were immense problems of civil-military conflict in almost all cases. More specifically, the Cold War period is characterized by a remarkable weakness of concerted attempts to institutionalize civilian supremacy. There are some idiosyncratic cases such as Czechoslovakia where the military was occupied by the Red Army with its special adherence to communist ideology and regime change (see Bradley 1991: 5, 7). Where subordination was in place, such as in Lebanon and Sri Lanka, it was a surprising condition in a context prone for civil war. The relative absence of civil-military conflicts either resulted from a politically inactive military rather than strong civil-military institutions as in Lebanon (el Khazen 2000: 241; Barak 2006: 78) or the exceptional preservation of a British military professionalism and commando structure as in Sri Lanka (Senaratne 2003: 184-187).

Otherwise, the civilian and military spheres constantly conflicted because they saw a need to intervene in each other’s affairs by purging certain leaders instead of forging a permanent pattern of interaction. Among the most famous example are Argentina, Nigeria (Peters 1997: 176) and Uganda (Kasozi 1994: 164). Even in the cases with strong legacies of civil-military cooperation and the existence of national security councils to coordinate matters between generals and politicians, the Cold War at some point broke the peace.
In particular, the cases of Turkey and Uruguay show how increasing social mobility, communism as a radical counterideology to liberal democracy, and a highly charged international environment combined could create turmoil in even the most robust civilian supremacies (Dodd 1983: 23-24; González 1991: 43).

Across the three components of monopoly on violence, there are no strong temporal or regional patterns of development. Temporally, most cases did not experience developments in any of the components. In a few cases, one component improved; others experienced a decline in one component. Monopoly on violence only changed in Uruguay where subordination was lost in 1973. If anything, monopoly on violence seemed to weaken a bit during the Cold War. This corresponds well with normal description of the Cold War period as mired in political instability and broken development in the third world (see e.g. Westad 2005).

Similarly, there are no clear regional patterns. Resource supremacy, cohesion, and subordination are relatively evenly distributed across the African, Asian, and Latin American cases. Two points are worth emphasizing, however. First, none of African cases exhibited cohesion whereas more of the generally older Latin American states and the more orderly societies in Asia mustered professional, unified militaries. The more fragile postcolonial societies in Africa had greater difficulties building new, national armies. Second, younger states with recent histories of colonialism, such as in Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, typically had greater difficulties asserting themselves against society in terms of sheer military power. This seems logical given that state-building takes time.

To sum up, we see a similar pattern as among the interwar democratic breakdowns: a significant difference between the number of cases exhibiting resource supremacy, cohesion, and subordination, respectively. It thus seems fruitful to distinguish between these three components of monopoly on violence. They developed differently over the Cold War and were affected by political dynamics to different degrees and in different ways. If we do not distinguish between the components, we make imprecise claims of the existence of monopoly on violence in 30 of 46 cases. There is thus an increased risk of excluding potential mechanisms and thus monopoly on violence as a potential explanation.

Administrative effectiveness

Only a few countries exhibited administrative effectiveness. This resembles the story of monopoly on violence. Administrative effectiveness existed in only 3 of 46 cases and only in two countries: Sudan (1956-1958 and 1965-
1969) and Czechoslovakia (1945-1947). Czechoslovakia may almost be considered an outlier of the entire Cold War sample as a democratic ‘leftover’ in which President Benes tried to reestablish the interwar political order (Taborsky 1961: 3). This underlines that administrative effectiveness was indeed a rarity among the Cold War democratic breakdowns. The same logic of state-building, or lack thereof, seems to have been at work here as for monopoly on violence. Territorial penetration, which reflects the sheer presence of the state, existed in 24 of 46 cases. The variation of problems of extending state authority across the territory is less interesting from my point of view. Most of them, such as in the ethnically complex settings of postcolonial Africa or Southeast Asia, were constituted by regional strongholds – here, borders were only formal. A unification of tribal territories under one state banner had never really taken place (for general discussions of the problem, see Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Herbst 2000).


Regarding meritocracy, we must first of all note that only 4 countries (of the 6 cases) have a civil service system based on meritocratic recruitment and promotion. Turkey’s meritocratic administration was forged by domestic political actors alone, by Kemal Atatürk and his followers in the 1920s (Kazancigil 1994: 219-220). The meritocracy in Czechoslovakia was preserved after WWII as the power balance between the Czech and Slovakian parts continued (Bradley 1991: 5; Hendrych 1993: 43). Sudan and Thailand maintained a decent level of meritocracy through two of their democratic spells during the Cold War. Sudan’s administrative system was favored by a British legacy in Khartoum which, by way of the political power of the northern part of Sudan over the southern part, dominated the entire country (Bassil 2013: 120). However, British legacies did not guarantee meritocracy. After independence, concerns about ethnic representation sometimes undermined the work of the public service commissions. In Sri Lanka, a quota system introduced ethnically reserved domains in the administrations and was later reversed by sharp ethnic discrimination of candidates by the government (DeVotta 2004: 155).

Apart from these cases, most were postcolonial administrations inheriting organizational traits from the colonial power. As is well known from the
literature, the geopolitics of colonialism affected domestic conditions decades after independence. A comparison between Sudan and Somalia illustrates this. In Sudan, the power balance between subnational regions initially favored meritocracy. In Somalia, the northern part of the former British Somaliland also inherited a functioning Public Service Commission and an independent judiciary, which was maintained after independence. Yet, partly as a consequence of international agreements in 1950 with the UN, the northern part could never dominate the southern part politically. In more than half of the Somalian territory, that is the southern former Italian part, public administration was more inclined towards patrimonialism (Lewis 1980: 169; Issa-Salwe 1996: 74).

Otherwise, meritocracy reflects the usual dichotomy of between British colonial legacy and the rest; French and Spanish most notably. In the entire Latin American region, for instance, meritocracy was never an institutionalized or generally used principle of recruitment among the Cold War democratic breakdowns. In the 19th century, when most of these countries achieved their first period of independence, the inheritance from Latin Europe set them on a path of patrimonialism that was very hard to breach. Even in more modernized countries such as Chile and Uruguay where concerted efforts were made over decades from the 1930s, meritocracy remained reserved for a few highly autonomous agencies, typically banks and state-owned enterprises, and was always manipulable by strong presidents and parties in parliament (Bergara with Pereyra et al. 2004: 24; Lanzaro 2006: 30; Silva 2008: 106-107). Notably, Brazil’s Portuguese administration, which has otherwise been celebrated as the most Weberian administration in Latin America, entailed the same pattern of islands of excellence in a sea of ineffectiveness with strong meritocratic institutions in Petrobras and the National Development Bank. The Department of Public Service was established to protect civil servants but was quickly undermined after 1946 when President Vargas was ousted from power. In the minds of the Brazilian democratic politicians, electoral mobilization necessitated offering state jobs to clienteles (Geddes 1994: 43; Evans 1995: 61-63).

It was just as difficult to forge administrative responsiveness. Responsiveness and meritocracy tended to go hand in hand but not always. In cases such as Chile, Sri Lanka, and Sierra Leone, responsiveness existed amidst politicized recruitment; in Thailand and Turkey, administrative corruption remained pervasive despite largely professional civil services. Unresponsiveness typically originated in a lack of public service motivation and morale, which was obviously connected with the fact that most civil servants were recruited by certain politicians in competition with others and on a temporary basis. Most profoundly, this was the case in the Sub-Saharan African cases,
such as the Republic of Congo and Uganda where ‘big men’ in politics fought fiercely for control of the state (Kasozzi 1994: 153; Amphas 2000: 13, 16). Cases like Weimar Germany were rare, but in Turkey and Thailand unresponsiveness stemmed from a corporately unified administration deliberately acting against the will of multiple governments out of a conviction that the state bureaucracy ‘knows best’ (Bowornwathana 2001: 297-306; Coskun 2010: 44).

Summing up, we thus see some expected regional patterns, notably also between different colonial legacies. Yet, the difficulties in and the political dynamics surrounding the forging of territorial penetration, meritocracy, and responsiveness were more similar than not across regions. As the only regionally specific trait, territorial penetration was typically weaker in Sub-Saharan Africa. The account of the components of administrative effectiveness further shows that disaggregation may be fruitful, particularly between territorial penetration and the two other components of meritocracy and responsiveness. Relying on territorial penetration alone ensures the right coding of administrative effectiveness in 25 of 46 cases. This resembles the account of monopoly on violence. Only, we may add that there also seems to be important differences between having a cohesive as opposed to a subordinate military and police. But for both administrative effectiveness and monopoly on violence, distinguishing between the components that relate to organizational qualities (cohesion vs. subordination and meritocracy vs. responsiveness) may still be defended by reference to a few cases.

Citizenship agreement

15 of 46 cases obtained citizenship agreement sometime during their democratic spell and maintained it in the year of breakdown. This is a remarkable difference from the two state capacities. The relatively high number of cases with citizenship agreement substantively goes against the assumptions one may hold about ethnic relations in postcolonial societies (see Wimmer 2013). My thresholds for coding citizenship agreement may of course simply be slightly less demanding. However, I contend that, given my conceptualizations, which I find to be in line with the dominant framework of Linz and Stepan, ethnic groups were, in many places, basically working within the same understanding of the state and in cordial acceptance even though ethnic discrimination prevailed. This was particularly the case in some Latin American cases such as Peru and Ecuador. Here, large groups of indigenous people were brutally assimilated decades before democratic transition. This involved a strong pattern of ethnocultural discrimination and a correlation between being poor and indigenous. Nevertheless, the mestizo population
did not try to expel the indigenous from the territory of the state, but rather to use them as cheap labor in the domestic economy. It is thus hard to argue that they were not accepted as fellow citizens (excluding, as indicated in Chapter 2, any civil or political rights attached to citizenship). Moreover, the discrimination did not lead to indigenous rebellions or secessionism before the 1970s and 1980s because Indian communities were politically passive and ethnicity not a salient issue (Gerlach 2003: 63; Yashar 2005: 229, 235-236).

In one case, Thailand, we see the contours of a state nation in a crude sense since the Muslim minority in the southern provinces was appeased by patron-client-like co-optation from Bangkok (McCargo 2009: 1-2). But in the remaining cases, such as Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, South Korea, Greece, and Brazil, citizenship agreement was already achieved when they entered the Cold War, as they had benefitted from nation-building in preceding decades or centuries.

There is a minor discrepancy between mutual acceptance and state legitimacy. 21 cases exhibit mutual acceptance whereas slightly fewer, 17 cases, exhibit state legitimacy. As with responsiveness and meritocracy, the distinction between these two components can in principle be maintained but it has limited empirical leverage. Most cases with a discrepancy between the two components are found in Latin America where ethnic groups accepted each other as fellow citizens but still adhered to a common cultural symbol attached to the state. This was perhaps most clearly the case in Panama where the presence of American troops on Panamanian soil and the dominance of American interests in Panamanian businesses and the state apparatus, symbolized by the Panama Canal, caused great resentment from the indigenous labor force against the state (Weeks 1987: 771; Harding 2006: 70). Remarkably, Ghana is the only example of a country with state legitimacy amidst ethnic conflict. A common reference to and territorial continuation from the Ashanti Empire of the 19th century bolstered the Ghanaian postcolonial state’s cultural resonance, but this covered a multilingual society and did not hinder severe conflict about levels of administrative, economic, and cultural autonomy between the northern and southern parts (Anyidoho and Dakubu 2008: 141).

Weaknesses in citizenship agreement typically prevailed, as expected from the literature, in the cases that only achieved independence after WWII and had long histories of ethnic conflict and exploitation under colonialism. These factors notably select the Sub-Saharan African cases (Young 2012). As a prime example, Nigeria was early on unified by the British but the population never amounted to one nation. Tribalism and regionalism thrived and a north-south divide in particular weakened the legitimacy of the colonial
state. After independence, these problems only intensified as governments tried to force through political orders skewed to one ethnic side, causing strifes between Muslim Hausa in the north and the Christian Yoruba and Igbo in the south (Post and Vickers 1973: 1; Bah 2005: 15-16). My codings reflect this strong regional pattern. As we see in Table 9.1, no African case exhibits citizenship agreement. By contrast, there are several cases of citizenship agreement in Latin America and Asia. During the Cold War, citizenship disputes seem to be a particularly African phenomenon with its own political dynamics stemming from a special colonial history.

Overall patterns

Looking at Table 9.1, it becomes clear that stateness was a multidimensional phenomenon among the Cold War democratic breakdowns. Particularly, the extension of state power and control to all groups and across the territory was much more prevalent than the improvement of the quality of such power and control. The degree of state weakness and strength was rather stagnant throughout the Cold War years. If anything, stateness at an overall level weakened slightly. This reflects Huntington’s (1968) study of the postcolonial and developing countries, which pointed to the weakness of political institutions in the face of mounting social and, I might add, ethnic mobilization. This universal trait of the Cold War cases should not take away attention from the peculiarities of regions. Countries developed differently dependent on their colonial master and history. The African region was thus severely limited in nation-building relative to all other regions. But across regions, the political dynamics of nation- and state-building often converged around the same set of problems: Political leaders wanted to achieve the absolute loyalty of the people in times of social upheaval but also wanted to forge and economic development and stability in the longer term. These two overall goals often clashed with devastating results for both.

Moving on to the mechanisms, we first of all note that no stateness attribute can be excluded from consideration as there are a substantial number of cases with weaknesses in monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, as well as citizenship agreement. But disaggregating the eight components still raises the precision and mitigates some potential inferential problems. Disaggregating between the two state capacities of monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness and then citizenship agreement seems particularly important. Taken from the account of the attributes, the state capacities are likely to be significantly more connected with the democratic breakdowns. Finally, no case performs well in all three attributes. In turn, all cases are considered in the analysis of mechanisms.
The mechanisms of state weaknesses

Table 9.2 lists all observed mechanisms among the 46 Cold War democratic breakdowns. As in Chapter 8, mechanisms are only considered if the attached stateness attribute is coded as absent in the given case. In observing the mechanisms, I refer again to Chapter 4. I begin my analysis with the mechanisms connected with a disputed monopoly on violence.

Monopoly on violence

Adding across the mechanisms of authoritarian restoration and security delegitimation, there are 51 mechanisms of a total potential of 92. This indicates that problems of monopoly on violence were highly relevant for democratic breakdown during the Cold War. Most of them, however, relate to civil-military conflict. Remarkably, 35 of 46 potential cases were co-determined by an authoritarian restoration. Of these cases, close to all originated in a contracted civil-military conflict. 16 mechanisms of security delegitimation were observed.

Let us start with the most important finding of the analysis of the Cold War democratic breakdowns: Despite the general importance of the rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union for regime change during the Cold War and the particular tendency of the US to support right-wing dictatorship coalitions and manipulate or directly intervene in the politics of democratic regimes in the developing world, relations between the civilian, democratically elected governments and the military sphere seem immensely important in explaining the democratic breakdowns. I already noted the Chilean case as perhaps the most cited example of a US intervention, which still involves an exclusively domestic dimension of contention between Allende’s socialist government and Pinochet’s praetorian, right-wing project. But many similar examples exist.
### Table 9.2: Mechanisms connecting Cold War state weaknesses with democratic breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case (breakdown year)</th>
<th>Disputed monopoly on violence</th>
<th>Administrative ineffectiveness</th>
<th>Citizenship disagreement</th>
<th>Number of mechanisms in case</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Authoritarian restoration</td>
<td>Security delegitimation</td>
<td>Socio-economic delegitimation</td>
<td>Elite bias delegitimation</td>
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<td>Czechoslovakia (1947)</td>
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<td>Colombia (1948)</td>
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<td>Panama (1951)</td>
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<td>Cuba (1953)</td>
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<td>Guatemala (1954)</td>
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<td>Pakistan (incl. Bangladesh) (1956)</td>
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<td>Indonesia (1957)</td>
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<td>Myanmar (1958)</td>
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<td>Sudan (1958)</td>
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<td>Laos (1959)</td>
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<td>South Korea (1961)</td>
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<td>Republic of Congo (1963)</td>
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<td>Brazil (1964)</td>
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<td>Nigeria (1966)</td>
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<td>Greece (1967)</td>
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<td>Ghana (1972)</td>
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<td>Honduras (1972)</td>
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<td>Uruguay (1973)</td>
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<td>Chile (1973)</td>
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<td>Lebanon (1976)</td>
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<td>Argentina (1976)</td>
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<td>Pakistan (1977)</td>
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<td>Sri Lanka (1977)</td>
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<td>Bolivia (1980)</td>
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<td>Turkey (1980)</td>
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<td>Guatemala (1982)</td>
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<td>Thailand (1991)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cases with mechanism</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cases with mechanism by attribute</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mechanisms by attribute</td>
<td>51</td>
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</table>
In Cuba, democracy broke down on 11 March 1953 when military officer Batista conducted a coup d’état backed by the army. Batista is often portrayed as a US marionette put in place to safeguard against a socialist regime in the American backyard. Yet, this does not necessarily mean that the US contributed to Batista’s power grab in the first place. True, Batista was educated in the US, but he led the coup with the support of the Cuban army, and his grievances against the governments of Grau and Prio in the late 1940s and early 1950s built on previous domestic contestation over military autonomy. Since 1933, Batista had deliberately promoted officers with praetorian views and already in 1933 showed inclinations of praetorianism by leading an uprising of sergeants against the government of Machado. These younger officers viewed Batista as their patron, a caretaker of promotion, salary increases, and class privileges (Bonachea and San Martín 1974: 9). They supported Batista in 1953 in his bid to restore public order and enrich himself and his allies (Marquez-Sterling 2009: 30).

We see much the same pattern in the rest of Latin America. Even more notably, in the more modernized countries with greater levels of military autonomy and strength, such as Argentina and Brazil, the military acted more independently of US interests despite tacit or sometimes open support (Stepan 1988: Ch. 6; Rock 1993: 195, 210). This did not hinder factions the military from ousting the elected governments in the 1960s and 1970s.

This was seen in Southeast Asia as well where US had interests and interfered frequently. In South Korea, the US transformed the military to a large, dominant institution via financial assistance and the building of military schools between 1946 and 1960. The plan was to defend the country better against the communist neighbors China and North Korea, but the training naturally fostered a propensity for military rule (Brazinsky 2009: 71-72). The effect of this US support should not be underestimated. Yet, it hardly explains the timing of the coup d’état in 1961 or why the military leadership found it necessary. The democratic regime that ended Rhee’s patrimonial autocracy in a student revolution in 1960 brought about a very weak government in a context of economic crisis and continued threats of a communist invasion (Brazinsky 2009: 101). The military intervened because it was deeply concerned about the lack of economic progress (Seth 2010: 154) and the inefficiencies and corruptability of the government that it saw as inherent weaknesses of a democratic regime (Brazinsky 2009: 113). In addition, the junior officers that supported General Park’s intervention also feared for their future promotion path under a democratic regime that might interfere with military hierarchies (Seth 2010: 155).

Thus, we see important domestic determinants of civil-military conflict preceding and pushing towards democratic breakdown in some of the most
infamous examples of US-supported anti-democratic interventions. The US interfered much less with political matters in Africa but the Soviet Union sometimes did. In a few places such as Somalia, however, the US and the Soviet Union competed directly for control over the security forces. In the early 1960s, the US helped establish a police force, but from 1963 the Soviet Union massively supported the building of giant army (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 77-78; Adam 1992: 17). In 1969, Siad Barre, the highest ranking officer in the army, headed a coup against democracy (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 77). While the Soviets to some extent supported the coup in 1969, they did not engage in the planning of it. Siad Barre was motivated to end widespread corruption, ethnoregionalism, and clan disputes (Payton 1980: 500-501). Only as a contributing factor did Barre’s project involve a populist-progressive ambition to radically change society. The socialist project only crystallized in the years after the intervention in the Supreme Revolutionary Council (Samatar 1989: 115).

Civil-military relations thus seem highly important in explaining democratic breakdown even in the cases where the Soviet Union or the US acted as black knights. But the precedence of civil-military conflict did not guarantee the existence of an authoritarian restoration. Civilian actors took power from the government in Czechoslovakia before any coup coalition could mobilize when the Communist Party led by Gottwald initiated the plan to dismantle the liberal democratic institutions to install a ‘People’s Democracy’ in the autumn of 1947 (Taborsky 1961: 3). The Colombian military was hardly loyal to the government but did not contribute directly to the anarchical situation that constituted the democratic breakdown in 1948. It was rather a sheer lack of military powers against societal actors that sealed the fate of democracy (Roldán 2002: 24, 29).

Whereas authoritarian restorations seem to be important in all regions, the distribution of security delegitimation shows no particular regional overrepresentations. One may also note that security delegitimations were continuously present across the entire Cold War period. The security delegitimation in Peru in 1990 symbolically marked the entry to a new era where incumbent takeovers were more frequent. In the presidential elections of 1990, Fujimori, a political outsider, successfully appealed to the indigenous voters and the middle and lower classes, who despised the establishment and its handling of the civil conflict with the Shining Path (Levitsky 1999; Tanaka 2005: 261-262). The win gave Fujimori a platform to reestablish public order by undermining the rule of law and basic human rights and, more importantly, close congress (Levitsky 1999).
Administrative effectiveness

As opposed to the interwar period, the mechanisms of administrative ineffectiveness are relatively few. There are only 20 of 138 potential mechanisms. This is not a result of general economic growth and prosperity of the countries under study. Indeed, most postcolonial countries in Southeast Asia and Africa experienced all kinds of economic problems, including balance of payment deficits, hyperinflation, and a lack of industrial infrastructure and human capital to boost economic activity. Also, around the 1960s, the Latin American countries began to feel the limits of the import substitution policies that had kept their economies going for decades (see O’Donnell 1973; Gasiorowski 1995).

Yet, there are only few cases of socioeconomic, elite bias, or mass bias delegitimation. A variety of case-specific reasons seem to explain this since there is no tendency that mechanisms of administrative ineffectiveness fare more prominently where the other mechanisms are absent. Although based on counterfactual reasoning, one general explanation may be that military coups d’état often anticipated already mounting social tensions, for example in Indonesia where Sukarno established a ‘guided democracy’ that should contain mounting regional tensions (Slater 2010: 106). Another example is that even though military coup plotters were often motivated by economic recession or stagnation, coups, such as in Uruguay in 1973 (Weinstein 1975: 130), typically occurred out of fear of a communist revolution as such. Otherwise, economic problems were more often coupled with government stalemate, parliamantary deadlock, or political corruption rather than administrative incompetence, slack, or favoritism. This was the case in Honduras in 1972 when the military intervened against President Cruz’s indecisiveness in solving economic problems (Morris 1984: 43).

Socioeconomic delegitimation is represented by 10 cases, several of which are from Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Against some of the initial assumptions of my general theoretical framework, some of them occurred in countries with very low levels of economic development. For instance, in the Republic of Congo in 1963 democracy succumbed to a popular revolution of urban unemployed but educated people against a background of economic stagnation and predatory civil servants (Clark 2008: 69). Ghana in 1972 and 1981 similarly experienced public upheaval. The state administration was poorly equipped to find solutions to the deep, structural dependence of the monocrop economy while public funds were hollowed out by excessive corruption (Armah 1974: 166; Gocking 2005: 161). Even in these poorly developed countries, masses could organize and rise to move political power.
Elite and mass bias delegitimation are each represented by 5 of the 46 potential cases. Processes of party and mass polarization because of politicized and discriminatory administrations are thus relatively rare in relation to the Cold War democratic breakdowns. These mechanisms are typically most prominent where politics is most unstable, where democratic governments are most repressive, and where the outcome is most brutal – like a civil war. This was the case in Colombia, which resembles the interwar case of Spain. Rounds of politicization between governments of the Liberal and Conservative Party eventually eroded all confidence between the two parties and charged their constituencies to such an extent that militarized conflict ensued in La Violencia (Martz 1997: 53). Parties were less clearly pitted against each other in switching from government to opposition and back in Sri Lanka in the years leading up to the outbreak of anarchy in 1977. Rather, it was the persistent exclusion of the Tamil population and their party, the Tamil FP, from political influence, state offices, and the fruits of economic development that eventually caused a meltdown of parliamentary politics from 1972 and provoked the creation of the Tamil Tigers (DeVotta 2004: 144-145, 155). The few mechanisms are equally distributed across the main regions.

Summing up, we may fruitfully refer to the preponderance of quick military solutions to political problems during the Cold War to explain the limited number of mechanisms of administrative ineffectiveness. Elite and mass bias delegitimation are processes that take some time to unfold as administrative offices must first be politicized and then cause polarization and mistrust. Myanmar’s breakdown in 1958 exemplifies how some countries with only few years of independence often had no strong programmatic parties and became mired in ethnic conflict, which provoked military coups (Steinberg 2001: 49; Slater 2010: 264). Military elites in most other recently independent democracies quickly intervened against a presumed communist threat among urban labor and peasants that overshadowed all other concerns. This perhaps provides the neatest explanation for the quick application of military coups and the number of authoritarian restorations.

Citizenship agreement

Even though citizenship disagreements were relatively rarer than problems in relation to the two state capacities, it seems important in explaining the democratic breakdowns. 27 of a total of 92 potential mechanisms are observed. The importance of an attribute can be measured in the share of cases with a mechanism of all potential cases. In that sense, citizenship disputes were important. In many cases, the two mechanisms citizenship violence and
injustices go together, demonstrating that violence often followed inter-party disputes over distribution of resources across ethnic groups or vice versa. In the first decades of the Cold War, the mechanisms are concentrated in the late 1950s and early 1960s. This is probably accidental from a global point of view but accelerated by some diffusional logic. Indeed, the breakdowns in Pakistan (1956), Indonesia (1957), Myanmar (1958 and 1962), and Laos (1959) are regionally and temporally clustered. Sudan’s breakdown in 1958 is probably not directly related to these Asian cases.

Myanmar’s two breakdowns followed closely after one another and originated in much the same set of factors. From the early 1950s, the ethnic conflicts exploded and grew militant with the Karen and Kachin rebel groups. Myanmar was quickly contracted around its independence, Myanmar had never been a nation, and its ethnic groups fought bitterly from the beginning for political, economic, and cultural privileges (Slater 2010: 264-265). In 1958, the civilian government invited the military to intervene with a three-fold purpose: to end ethnic strife, bring public order, and organize a more effective political leadership (Steinberg 2001: 35). In 1962, the military took action against the same problems, which had only grown since 1958 (Steinberg 2001: 35; Holliday 2010: 31). In Indonesia, it was the failures of the Ali cabinet, a coalition of parties that cooperated poorly because of skirmishes over the national identity of the country, which finally provoked the military to take power in 1957 after years of regional rebellions and violent clashes with Sukarno’s guerillas (Lev 1966: 11). The situation in Laos (see Stuart-Fox 1997: 109) and in Pakistan (Malik 1997: 50; Ahmed 2013: 112) was very similar.

Sudan experienced breakdowns in 1958, 1969 and 1989. In all three cases, continued ethnic conflicts between north and south played a vital role. Yet, in contrast to the Asian cases, the religious component was absolutely central from the beginning but became the source of more and more radical solutions over the years. First, in 1958, violent conflict broke out immediately after independence between northern (Muslim, Arab) and southern (Christian, African) enclaves. Elections and government stalemate merely exacerbated the violence. Prime Minister Khalil, who was also defense minister, eventually persuaded the military to interrupt parliamentary proceedings and establish a caretaker government to end ethnic conflict (Niblock 1987: 217; Poggo 2009: 91-92; Cockett 2010: 61). In 1969, the conflict had grown in intensity and the political divisions on both sides had matured. Now, the military itself took power for the same reasons: to establish public order and a northern Arab hegemony. The Free Officers’ Movement, a radicalized group of soldiers inspired by Nasser’s Pan-Arab regime in Egypt (Niblock 1987: 235; Cockett 2010: 62), led the coup. Under the new dictator-
ship, the south was severely repressed. Eventually, a more organized uprising came from the southern province of Darfur. In the early 1980s, this led to outright civil war between Darfur and the government in northern Sudan (Bassil 2013: 157-158). This resulted in an even fiercer counterreaction by the north as the Muslim Brotherhood infiltrated the army and eventually led an Islamic military revolution in 1989 together with Turabi’s Islamist party (Cockett 2010: 84-85, 96). The Sudanese development illustrates how citizenship disputes are often constant across and sometimes even augmented by different regimes and continue to affect regime disruptions.

In most cases, citizenship violence and injustices go together but in quite a substantial number of cases (Pakistan 1956, Laos, Sudan 1969, Turkey, Nigeria 1983, Uganda 1985, Peru 1990), citizenship violence or citizenship injustices are observed without the other. Citizenship injustices exist in 13 and citizenship violence in 14 of 46 potential cases. Thus, they are equally important for the Cold War breakdowns.

Summing up, the mechanisms of citizenship disagreement were most frequent in Asia and Africa and not particularly common in Latin America. This seems logical given that citizenship problems were greater in Asia and Africa in particular. Despite the surprising robustness of citizenship agreement in the Cold War, we thus end up with the somewhat more expected finding that it is relatively important in explaining the Cold War democratic breakdowns. It shows that the observation of mechanisms in itself can amend certain conclusions based on the simplest pattern of congruence.

Overall and relative strengths

The most obvious conclusion from the analysis of this chapter is that domestic factors, in particular the issue of civil-military relations, were highly important for the democratic breakdowns during the Cold War. US and Soviet interference certainly played its part in many if not most of the breakdowns in Latin America and Asia and some in Africa. But it cannot explain the timing of the military coups d’état or the multitude of motivations that drove military officers from a constitutionalist to a praetorian stance. Anti-communism is only one among many motivating factors: Military dissatisfaction with government performance in security and economic matters as well as petty conflict with governments over military concessions are but two other important ones.

The analysis also strongly indicates that disputed monopoly on violence is much more important than administrative ineffectiveness and citizenship disagreement in contributing to the democratic breakdowns. It involves more than twice as many mechanisms and explains more than twice as many
cases with at least one of its mechanisms. This aligns well with the statistical results. We should take serious stock of problems of monopoly on violence but particularly the issue of forging an institutionalized pattern of civilian supremacy. Yet, we cannot ignore how it also affects the risk that a strong-man may legitimize himself in a bid for power to ‘restore public order’.

The relative rarity of mechanisms of administrative ineffectiveness is somewhat surprising. One might say that the great powers would play a more decisive role here by financial support to protect democracies from breaking down. This was evident in a few cases but generally not. The US mostly supported dictators in their attempt to build and stabilize strong states but withdrew support whenever democratically socialists broke trade agreements or signaled subversion to communism. More importantly, many cases exhibited economic crisis but broke down before any strong opposition to governments’ crisis management had mobilized.

This does not mean that we can reject that administrative ineffectiveness played any significant role for democratic breakdown during the Cold War. It merely suggests that it is probably less important than many other factors. By contrast, citizenship agreement should take a more prominent place among the Cold War explanations for democratic breakdown.

I have already mentioned that Fujimori’s incumbent takeover in 1990 in Peru marked a caveat to the future post-Cold War world in which the dynamics of democratic breakdown changed dramatically. In the next chapter, I analyze the post-Cold War democratic breakdowns with my mechanismic framework and ask whether and how the frequent incumbent takeovers were related to weaknesses of stateness. Closely related, it also examines whether the enormous importance of civil-military relations continued.
Chapter 10.
Stateness and the Post-Cold War
Democratic Breakdowns

The scope of state infrastructure and the delivery of welfare services have little impact on democratization. But the establishment of a rule of law—as experienced through improvements in personal security and the popular perception that leaders respect the constitution—is critical to building democracy (Bratton and Chang 2006: 1059).

After Alexander Lukashenko won the election in March 1994 in Belarus, he quickly stripped parliament and the opposition more generally of all meaningful means of executive control by monopolizing media information in his own hands and brutalizing all political opponents. Symbolically, this incumbent takeover was the first instance of democratic breakdown in the post-Cold War period. It thus marked an era in which the main threat to democracies in an age of liberal hegemony ceased to originate in the military. Instead, it allegedly came from ‘within’ – from presidents and prime ministers who were empowered democratically but then undermined the very institutions that had elected them (Levitsky and Way 2010; Svolik 2015).

While we may fruitfully look to parliamentary polarization or ‘normatively undemocratic’ leaders in isolation (see e.g. Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 2013), the Belarusian case exemplifies a more comprehensive explanation related to the management of economic crisis by the state administration: From the early 1990s, Belarus experienced a severe economic crisis, hyperinflation, and a significant drop in living standards. Feelings of relative deprivation and general dissatisfaction with government performance mounted as is usually seen in a process of polarization along socioeconomic lines. Yet, these hardships were clearly exacerbated by, and to some extent even originated from, extreme degrees of administrative corruption, which filled the pockets of crony capitalists at the expense of the broader population (Savchenko 2009: 167). The very foundation of Lukashenko’s electoral victory was skillful use of the administrative corruption and the public grievances it fed. He chaired a parliamentary committee that looked into corruption and thereby boosted his public image as a charismatic strongman, a purifier of corruption (Bekus 2010: 87-88). In early 1994, he ran for president and sidelined his opponent Kebich by accusing him of corruption (Beichelt 2004: 199). The Belarusian case illustrates a more general pattern of the post-Cold
War democratic breakdowns: that we should look at why ambiguously democratic incumbents can mobilize such popular support.

This chapter delves into the democratic breakdowns of the post-Cold War period, which comprises some of these infamous incumbent takeovers. It takes stock of the gradual demise of the Soviet Union from the late 1980s, which effectively ended the Cold War rivalry and its interference with domestic conditions, and the following twenty years in terms of stateness and democratic breakdown. I take my starting point in the analysis by Bratton and Chang (2006), which looks at the relationship between state-building and democratization. Although it is limited to the new democracies that emerged in Sub-Saharan Africa from the early 1990s, the conclusions are relevant for a broader scope of cases (see Bratton and Chang 2006: 1081). More importantly, as seen in the quote above, Bratton and Chang provide one of only few accounts and the most thorough one. It disaggregates state effects on democratic stability by using survey data to connect the macro-level relationships between a phenomenon such as rule of law with micro-level evidence such as improvements in personal security. However, despite the ingenuity of their analysis it remains unclear which state attributes connect with which micro-level dynamics and how these connections play out. Based on my conceptual and theoretical framework, this chapter conducts a similarly disaggregated analysis of all democratic breakdowns from 1991 to 2010 that, hopefully, does a better job by studying the connections between different attributes of stateness, their related mechanisms, and the 17 most recent democratic breakdowns globally: Belarus, Gambia, Niger (1996 and 2009), Albania, Guinea-Bissau, Pakistan, Russia, Ecuador, Central African Republic, Mozambique, Venezuela, Thailand, Bangladesh, Madagascar, Honduras, and Sri Lanka.

As in the previous two chapters, I first discuss the pattern of development of each attribute of stateness among the post-Cold War democratic breakdowns. This establishes the cases where the seven mechanisms can meaningfully be observed. Second, I ask whether any of the mechanisms are observable in the breakdown cases.

The previous chapter indicated a remarkable significance of civil-military conflict in explaining democratic breakdowns that occurred under the influ-

56 In fact, their measurement is more in line with the ‘degree of democracy’ but their language switches back and forth between notions of democratization, level of democracy, and democratic stability (see e.g. Bratton and Chang 2006: 1063-1065, 1069-1072).
57 To assess reliability, the research assistant coded 4 of the 17 cases of democratic breakdown by random selection (Guinea-Bissau 1994-1998; Bangladesh 1991-2007; Pakistan 1988-1999; Albania 1992-1996). See Appendix I for an extended presentation of threshold ambiguities. For the case analyses, see the online appendix.
ence of great power rivalry, especially by US sponsorship for right-wing dictatorships. The present chapter shows that as the Cold War rivalry ended the share of authoritarian restorations of the total number of democratic breakdowns decreased. Authoritarian restoration remained the most prominent of the seven mechanisms, but the mechanisms were rather evenly distributed across the three attributes. On balance, the general importance of stateness cannot be rejected but is less pronounced than what extant scholarship would lead us to believe. This applies in particular to citizenship disputes, which were less pronounced and less influential in democratic destabilization processes than expected. Moreover, disaggregation is still wanted. Disaggregation between monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness is less relevant but when we look at the discrepancy of stateness and mechanisms in individual cases, disaggregation is still highly fruitful. The chapter compares these results with those of the interwar and Cold War periods.

The development of stateness

Table 10.1 shows the status of the stateness attributes and their components in the year of democratic breakdown. As indicated, I need to establish the state weaknesses to be able to logically infer that any related mechanisms can be observed. The following section compares the development of stateness in the 17 breakdowns for each attribute in turn, starting with monopoly on violence.

Monopoly on violence

Monopoly on violence was first of all characterized by a remarkable strength of resource supremacy. In no less than 14 of 17 cases, the military and police commanded resource supremacy vis-à-vis society. There is a conspicuous discrepancy between this very low number of cases compared to the other two components of monopoly on violence, cohesion and subordination. Sub-ordination and cohesion were present in only 3 cases. Again, disaggregation of the issue of pure resources from those of the organizational qualities of the security forces is highly relevant: Based only on one of the components, we would arrive at imprecise codings of monopoly on violence in 15 of 17 cases (except the civil war-prone cases of Central African Republic and Niger 1999-2009). This would eliminate most potential cases from further analysis. The discrepancy between cohesion and subordination has less serious but still notable consequences as it results in imprecise inferences about 4 cases (Albania, Ecuador, Bangladesh, and Madagascar).
Table 10.1: Post-Cold War state weaknesses in the year of democratic breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case (spell)</th>
<th>Monopoly on violence</th>
<th>Administrative effectiveness</th>
<th>Citizenship agreement</th>
<th>Mutual group acceptance</th>
<th>State legitimacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resource supremacy</td>
<td>Cohesion</td>
<td>Subordination</td>
<td>Territorial penetration</td>
<td>Meritocracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia (1972-1994)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan (1988-1999)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia (1992-1999)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador (1979-2000)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela (1959-2005)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand (1992-2006)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bangladesh (1991-2007)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Honduras (1982-2009)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Niger (1999-2009)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases without component</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases without attribute</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Substantially, this repeats the finding of the interwar and Cold War analyses that resource supremacy of the security forces is easier to achieve than cohesion and subordination. The larger share of cases with resource supremacy may be explained by the relatively fewer radical changes to borders and interstate wars in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dismantling of the Soviet Union. Within the Soviet space, particularly in Eastern Europe, countries were allowed a degree of territorial and administrative autonomy. The peripheral territories were thus released from rather than dismantled by the Moscow center as the Soviet demise unfolded. And beyond the postcommunist countries, regimes rather than states tended to break down in the early 1990s (see e.g. Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). In a few cases, political elites, often helped or led by a UN mission or peace agreement, reorganized and improved the security apparatus before being able or willing to expand state authority by violent repression. Otherwise, resource supremacy preceded the forging of cohesion and subordination. Alternatively, all three were obtained simultaneously. This happened, for instance, in the Central American cases of El Salvador and Nicaragua in the mid-1990s after a decade of civil war but not in the similar case of Guatemala under the same pressure from an international agreement (compare Harding II 2001; de Leon 2006; Negroponte 2012).

However, there was no clear pattern of improvement of monopoly on violence in the cases of democratic breakdown. Honduras and Niger even experienced increasing threats to or outright loss of resource supremacy in the late 1990s and 2000s. At the most abstract level of explanation, this probably stemmed from the upsurge of global Islamism and terrorism and the repercussions from the Great Recession in 2008. Why did so few cases develop cohesion and subordination? As the problems of security force unity and civil-military conflicts are scattered across all regions, the explanation is probably universalistic. However, there does not seem to be any common dynamic in civil-military politics or organizational trends at the international level that can explain the deeply problematic attempts at forging cohesion and subordination despite many attempts. I believe that we are more likely facing a methodological issue here: by way of setting the analytical period to start in 1990, many cases, notably African ones such as Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic, and Niger, enter the dataset as they democratized in the early 1990s. Yet, these cases already had a history of militarism and guerilla warfare. This precludes any strong conclusions about the independent effects of the post-Cold War period beyond noting that this period at least did not provide improvements to cohesion or subordination.
Administrative effectiveness

Moving on to administrative effectiveness, territorial penetration existed in 10 of 17 cases, meritocratic administration in 2 cases, and responsive administration in 1. In all 10 cases that had achieved territorial penetration (Belarus, Gambia, Pakistan, Russia, Ecuador, Mozambique, Venezuela, Thailand, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka), disaggregation to the component level is vital since none of these cases was both meritocratic and responsive. In fact, this means that no case was administratively effective at all. Again, compared to monopoly on violence, extending administrative control was easier than achieving a reliable administration. However, areas where the state was absent or essentially contested were much more common than those where the state could not, theoretically at least, muster a force that would crush any societal force. In some cases (Niger 1993-1996, Albania, Guinea-Bissau, and Madagascar), the state thus did achieve an advantageous position in terms of arms and soldiers but was either forced out of certain areas of the territory by armed gangs such as in Albania (De Waal 2007: 13-14). Alternatively, the state was simply absent due to legacies of rudimentary state-building such as in Guinea-Bissau (Kovsted and Tarp 1999: 6). Extending territorial control was either too expensive or prone to spark a civil war.

Altogether, administrative ineffectiveness was a widespread phenomenon. Just as the frequent instances of disputed monopoly on violence, this makes administrative ineffectiveness potentially important for democratic breakdown. The main problem remained how to achieve meritocracy and responsiveness. Many reforms toward greater levels of meritocratic recruitment and ambitious anti-corruption campaigns were attempted by organizing new monitoring agencies, public service commissions, or even changing constitutions. But no case experienced substantial improvements. Sri Lanka, for instance, implemented a series of New Public Management reforms from the 1980s and a constitutional amendment in 2001, which were supposed to install judicial independence, strengthen meritocratic principles in recruitment, and fight corruption and nepotism. But as in other cases such as Russia, Ecuador, and Madagascar, these reforms largely failed due to vested political interests in patron-client ties. In Sri Lanka, the context of a severe ethnic conflict made it unattractive to abandon the quota system, which favored Sinhalese recruits (see Root, Hodgson, and Vaughan-Jones 2001: 1358-1360; DeVotta 2014: 150). It should be noted that no case experienced a weakening in administrative effectiveness. For instance, the strong bureaucracy in Thailand hindered Thaksin’s persistent attempts at politicizing the administration (Ockey 2004: 147-149). But the overall pattern is that administrative deficiencies were extraordinarily stable in the post-Cold War years among the
democratic breakdown cases. Highly profiled but ultimately failing administrative reforms were recurring phenomena. Additionally, unresponsiveness and various versions of non-meritocracy typically went hand in hand. In only two cases, Gambia and Thailand, did they differ. Meritocracy here existed without responsiveness.

As for monopoly on violence, there is no clear regional pattern in the distribution of the components of administrative effectiveness. Latin American, African, and Asian democracies alike suffered although the African democracies were probably farther away from achieving substantial improvements characterized by particularly sticky problems of territorial control and a culture of big man rule (see Herbst 2000; Hyden 2013). It is notable that only the unusual case of Madagascar committed to administrative reforms. Where meritocracy lacked, top-down politicization was strong but often in an unsystematic fashion. Few administrations had a one-sided, smoothly functioning spoils system. Hiring and firing rules (if any) were typically messy, and staffing was conducted as a mix of politicization (often ethnically discriminatory) of the top levels and hiring of family and friends at the lower levels such as Central African Republic (see e.g. Saba 2005: 183; Mehler 2005: 126). The most extreme cases were seen in the African ‘ethnic democracies’ but similar ethnic discrimination occurred in South Asian cases such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and India with quotas of castes and Hindus.

Citizenship agreement

Citizenship agreement was much more prevalent than monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness. Perhaps surprising in an age of increasing focus on ‘capacity-building’ and reforms towards ‘good governance’ amidst many ethnically based civil wars (see Carothers 2007; Gleditsch, Hegre, and Strand 2009), citizenship agreement fared well in no less than 6 of 17 cases. Conflict between ethnic groups existed in 8 cases whereas 8 states were illegitimate. The discrepancy between the components of citizenship agreement is thus smaller than for monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness. However, the separation of mutual acceptance between ethnic groups from state legitimacy still contributes with important nuances to the three cases of Belarus, Guinea-Bissau, and Ecuador where interethnic tolerance and disputes about the cultural symbol of the state coexisted. However, the specific characteristics of these three cases were different and do not constitute a temporal or regional pattern.

Belarus was ripe for ethnic conflict in 1989 with 78% Belarussians, 13% Russians, and other smaller minorities (Sanford 1997: 235) but there were no ethnic conflicts or serious cases of mistrust between ethnic groups in the
post-communist period (Eke and Kuzio 2000: 532-533). Importantly, however, the lack of ethnic conflict may in part have to do with the weak Belarusian national identity. Belarusians had great difficulties defining themselves ethnically, notably linguistically, as Belarusian was never a commonly spoken language but was sidelined by mainstream Russian. The country and the state’s claim to legitimacy was thus stuck between a Soviet and a European identity (Eke and Kuzio 2000: 525; Savchenko 2009: 16, 154).

While Belarus, put bluntly, was externally established as a nation but did not want to be one (see Fritz 2007: 232), Ecuadorians had a firm sense of independent nationhood. Yet, history weighed heavily on the state’s legitimacy as a common cultural symbol. Nation-building in the 19th and early 20th centuries had limited success. Economic repression of the Quechua-speaking Indians and the attempt at assimilating them around a mestizaje identity led to rounds of discrimination of the indigenous population (Collins 2004: 39). Despite socioeconomic discrimination, the Indians and the broad group of mestizos and whites accepted one another but the state was simply perceived as the property and symbol of the white or mestizo elites against the indigenous. A curious pattern emerged as the state gave admissions to the indigenous (Yashar 2005: 145, 150) after which the indigenous increased their demands (Pallares 2007: 146-150). Similar dynamics of mutual group acceptance and state legitimacy are seen in several other Latin American cases. This illustrates the fruitfulness of distinguishing between them.

If state illegitimacy in Belarus rose from widespread adherence to another state, namely Russia, there was no adherence to any state in Guinea-Bissau. Despite a lack of clear ethnic divisions in society or politics (Rudbeck 2001: 29), the population was not tied together by substantial ethnic or cultural markers. Many had tribal identities to which no state, however imperial, could successfully appeal. That at least seemed to be the case during the democratic spell (Kovsted and Tarp 1999: 9-11). Thus, Belarus, Guinea-Bissau, and Ecuador exemplify very different sources of state illegitimacy: adherence to a foreign state, tribal identities (adherence to no state), and the perception of an ethnically discriminatory state, respectively.

As the examples above also point out, any regional patterns are again curiously absent. We seem to be dealing with genuinely universal traits here. If anything, normal region-specific expectations do not find clear support here. For instance, the share of African cases with citizenship agreement is not, against the expectation, the smallest one. In fact, no Asian democracies exhibited citizenship agreement whereas nearly half the African and European ones and most Latin American ones did.

The surprising findings of citizenship agreement aside, 11 cases exhibited citizenship disagreement before breakdown. Thus, a majority of the break-
down cases can still be pooled among the potential ones for the observation of either citizenship violence or citizenship injustices.

Overall patterns

We have seen some expected and some surprising patterns in state strengths and weaknesses in the post-Cold War democratic breakdown cases. Expectedly, the organizational qualities of the security forces and the civil service, as measured in the components of cohesion, subordination, meritocracy, and responsiveness, were much harder to achieve than mere state authority, as measured in resource supremacy and territorial penetration. Also, the more recently decolonized countries, mostly in Africa, took the lead in terms of weak administrative infrastructures. In particular, this last result corroborates well Herbst’s (2000) analysis of power and space in Africa. Almost all cases similarly suffered from both non-meritocracy and unresponsiveness. The impression of weak qualities of the security forces and the civil service is almost total. This echoes the work of leading scholars pointing to the weakness of states today (e.g. Fukuyama 2014). My analyses illustrate that important piecemeal improvements in administrative effectiveness, which were often observed in the 1990s and 2000s, may not always have been sufficient for changing the overall or decisive points of performance of the administration. By contrast, the high number of cases with citizenship agreement is surprising. It possibly challenges the impression among some scholars (e.g. Linz and Stepan 1996) that the disruption of borders and ethnic communities after the fall of the Soviet Union led to massive state disintegration as well as problems of democratic consolidation.

In terms of the overall trends to include in the mechanism analysis, stateness among the post-Cold War democratic breakdowns was relatively constant, if not degenerating a bit. According to Table 10.1, all cases lacked monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness before breakdown, which means that we can give full attention to these two stateness attributes in the mechanism analysis. Yet, six cases fared well in terms of citizenship agreement, which limits the potential explanatory power of this attribute. In addition, disaggregation at the level of the attributes is likely to be highly relevant – at least between the two state capacities of monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness on the one hand and citizenship agreement on the other. Nevertheless, the most dominant observation is once again that all three attributes of stateness are weak. This combination is represented by close to two-thirds of the cases. In conclusion, we cannot exclude any of the seven mechanisms from consideration. Furthermore, since all cases had some weakness in stateness, we cannot exclude any case from consideration.
The mechanisms of state weaknesses

As in Chapters 8 and 9, I now use the information on the status of stateness (Table 10.1) to analyze the existence of mechanisms. Table 10.2 lists all observed mechanisms. Remember again the inferential logic. A mechanism is only considered in a case if the relevant stateness attribute is coded as absent. The other inferential notifications of Chapters 8 and 9 apply as well. Based on Table 10.2, I now analyze the mechanisms of each attribute in turn. Lastly, I describe the overall importance of stateness and the relative strength of the attributes.

Monopoly on violence

The mechanisms of a disputed monopoly on violence illustrate the continued relevance of civil-military conflicts for the risk of democratic breakdown. Both mechanisms of monopoly on violence are represented among the cases: Security delegitimation can be identified in 4 cases (Pakistan, Russia, Central African Republic, and Bangladesh) and authoritarian restorations in 7 cases (Gambia, Niger, Guinea-Bissau, Pakistan, Ecuador, Central African Republic, and Thailand).

As far as the temporal order of the mechanisms, the four cases of security delegitimation (Pakistan, Russia, Central African Republic, and Bangladesh) are relatively evenly distributed across the period; there are no clear regional patterns although Islamic terrorism played a special role in the two Southern Asian cases of Pakistan and Bangladesh (see Aziz 2008: Ch. 5; Quadir 2010: 66). However, the authoritarian restorations cluster in the first half of the period and then virtually disappear towards the end of the 2000s. Of course, the number of cases of limited, but this finding still coincides well with the notion that the military coup d’État as a political solution gradually became obsolete in the post-Cold War world (see Svolik 2015). The military did play a vital role in political processes in many of the cases at hand and a military coup d’État did take place as late as 2006 in Thailand. However, it is noteworthy that the breakdowns in Honduras, Bangladesh, Madagascar, and Niger all occurred after that in Thailand. They involved the military in obvious ways but not in ways that qualify them as authoritarian restorations according to my understanding. Instead, they more likely qualify as incumbent takeovers.
Table 10.2: Mechanisms connecting post-Cold War state weaknesses with democratic breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case (breakdown year)</th>
<th>Disputed monopoly on violence</th>
<th>Administrative ineffectiveness</th>
<th>Citizenship disagreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Authoritarian restoration</td>
<td>Security delegitimation</td>
<td>Socio-economic delegitimation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus (1994)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gambia (1994)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger (1996)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania (1996)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau (1998)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan (1999)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia (1999)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador (2000)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic (2003)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique (2004)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Venezuela (2005)</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thailand (2006)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bangladesh (2007)</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Madagascar (2009)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Honduras (2009)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Niger (2009)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka (2010)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases with mechanism</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases with mechanism by attribute</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanisms by attribute</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
First of all, the military in Honduras and Madagascar was subordinate in the years of breakdown. Yet, this is not the most interesting observation. In Honduras, the military removed President Zelaya on 28 June 2009 after his attempt to amend the constitution had caused political turbulence. The military clearly acted in the interest of the constitution as ordered by the Supreme Court. No military privileges were at stake and no concessions were made prior to or after the intervention (see e.g. Shifter 2009: 3; Farr 2010). The origins of Zelaya’s removal were his own attempts to monopolize political power. In November 2008, he announced a non-binding opinion poll on rewriting the constitution to diminish the assembly’s powers and make himself president for life. In May 2009, the Supreme Court declared the poll illegal. On 24 June, Zelaya fired the head of the armed forces as he refused to disobey the Supreme Court orders to annul the poll results. After having been accused of misconduct by the public ministry and having republished the polls in national newspapers, Zelaya was removed by the military on direct orders from the Supreme Court (di Iorio 2010: xiv; for an interpretation that gives more independent explanatory importance to the military, see Moody 2013: 61-76).

In Madagascar, civil tensions rose in 2009 provoked by a conflict between the former mayor of the capital city, Rajoelina, and President Ravalomanana. At the height of tensions, soldiers from one part of the military ousted the president and then transferred power to Rajoelina (Ploch 2009; Hauge 2011: 523-524). This seems to be a clear-cut authoritarian restoration by a disloyal military. However, this situation exemplifies the importance of observing concessions as well as being able to connect the processes around a breakdown with the particular realities of stateness. First, despite the apparent support for Rajoelina, who was more left-wing than Ravalomanana, there were no clear military privileges, economic or clearly ideological motives at stake (see e.g. accounts of Ploch 2009; Hauge 2011; Ratsimbaharison 2016). In addition, as there were no previous signs of insubordination of the military, it would lead to insensible inferences that my theoretical framework cannot account for.

Finally, the military in Bangladesh, which was not subordinate, played an obvious role in the democratic breakdown in January 2007: It consulted Western diplomats and asked President Ahmed to stop the Awami League’s rigging of the electoral process. After a declaration of a state of emergency, it installed a caretaker government (Alamgir 2009: 47; Ghoshal 2009: 68). Nevertheless, the military’s intervention was a blunt reaction to developments that did not threaten its institutional autonomy or privileges but rather constitutional stability (Quadir 2010: 66). More importantly, it was the president who initiated the state of emergency that delayed the upcoming
January elections indefinitely. This was against the wishes of the general staff, which attempted to protect the constitution by installing a caretaker government (Alamgir 2009: 49; Ghoshal 2009: 69). This is a clear borderline case. As indicated in Chapters 3 and 4, the question is not whether the military acted loyally towards democracy and what conditions would potentially constitute such loyalty. What I want to point out here is that the military at the end of the day merely chose between two evils: succumbing to Ahmed’s actions thus accepting democratic breakdown or intervening to protect the constitution possibly followed by political instability. Whether choosing the one or the other, the military can hardly be blamed for its actions as Ahmed was the one who lined up the two choices.

The authoritarian restorations are relatively evenly spread among Latin American, African, and Asian cases but Europe stands out as having no one. This is consistent with the usual assumption that militarism ended in Europe with the breakdown of the Southern European dictatorships during the Cold War. The breakdowns in Russia, Belarus, and Albania were driven by popular movements that either constrained leading politicians or were orchestrated these leaders. In Russia, for instance, Putin skillfully used the bombing of apartment buildings in Moscow in August 1999 as well as the general weakness of the democratic institutions and their leading representatives to mobilize the masses around reestablishing strong centralist control of security and public order and thus initiate an incumbent takeover (Sakwa 2004: 18-19).

The role of the economy does not alter any of the conclusions so far about the existence of mechanisms. Most cases experienced severe financial and economic crises. Tellingly, some of the authoritarian restorations occurred in two of the few cases, Guinea-Bissau and Thailand, where the economy was not in crisis in the year of breakdown. Similarly as expected, no security delegitimation occurred in these cases or in the only clear-cut case of economic progress: Madagascar.

In sum, the mechanisms of monopoly on violence are relatively prevalent with 11 mechanisms existing in 9 cases. Authoritarian restorations account for most of the mechanisms. In the post-Cold War period, civil-military conflicts thus continued to provide important insights into the processes towards democratic breakdown.

Administrative effectiveness

Since problems of administrative ineffectiveness were highly prevalent, it is notable that only few mechanisms can be observed. The analytical step of observing mechanisms thus contributes with more correct inferences. There
are relatively few cases of elite and mass bias delegitimation: 2 (Bangladesh and Central African Republic) and 3 (Pakistan, Venezuela, and Bangladesh), respectively. Socioeconomic delegitimation is present in 6 cases (Belarus, Gambia, Pakistan, Russia, Ecuador, and Venezuela).

There is no clear regional pattern for socioeconomic delegitimation. However, the mechanisms are skewed towards the first one and a half decade of the period under study. All democratic breakdowns in which socioeconomic delegitimation is observed occurred before the Great Recession from 2008, the last one being Venezuela in 2005. Nevertheless, one should pay attention to domestic and regional dynamics of economic crisis to be able to explain these breakdowns. Belarus and Russia both suffered prolonged problems of transforming socialist economies into organized capitalism; instead, crony capitalists, so-called oligarchs, rose to prominence as well as problems of financial regulation and poorly competitive industries.

Gambia had its own economic problems related to state debt and declining growth rates, which had raged since the 1980s and revealed the corrupt nature of the state bureaucracy in handling public goods and financial assets (Yeebo 1995: 8-22). This certainly delegitimized the government in the eyes of the broad population and alienated key officers in the military who looked to their Nigerian well-paid superiors with contempt when evaluating their situation against their own destitution. A group of junior officers acted on these motives in July 1994 in a coup d’état (Wiseman 1996).

Similarly, although in a different economic system, Venezuela’s economic crisis built up over decades from the oil price decline in 1983, which destabilized the fragile economy (Karl 1997: 161). It was this repercussion that delegitimized the traditional political parties and the increasingly corrupt state apparatus they led and brought Chavez to power in 1998 – in turn securing his gradual dismantling of democratic institutions. Just before the 1998 elections, the regional Asian Financial Crisis caused another decline in oil prices and bolstered Chavez’ claims (Coppedge 2002: 13). Pakistan and Ecuador were also directly hit by the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. In Pakistan, financial strains worsened the losses connected with imposed sanctions because of the country’s recent nuclear tests. Years of economic mismanagement by a corrupt and politicized bureaucracy continued to cause failure under this new economic crisis, which contributed to the military’s alienation from Sharif’s government (Cloughley 2014: 341, 384). In Ecuador, the specific Ecuadorian banking crisis of 1998 led to similar dynamics, alienating the indigenous population represented by the strong CONAIE organization as well as junior military officers (Solimano 2002: 1-4; Gerlach 2003: 156).

There does not seem to be any extraordinary circumstances in the few cases of elite and mass bias delegitimation. There is no particular regional or
temporal pattern. Politicized bureaucracies, incomplete spoils systems, biased implementation, and interparty polarization were frequent in many of the breakdown cases. That only few of these resulted in either of the two mechanisms is less obvious based on my theoretical framework. Only, one may note that party elites and conventional mass oppositions rarely staged coup attempts. For instance, in Mozambique the otherwise gravely suppressed Renamo party never successfully allied with the military or mobilized a popular rebellion in the late 1990s and early 2000s when the Frelimo government party increased politicization of the administration including electoral agencies to the point where democracy no longer functioned properly (Carbone 2003: 20).

Several cases cannot be explained by any of the mechanisms stemming from administrative ineffectiveness. There are no strong commonalities between them, and a host of different factors such as a highly personalized conflict between politicians or a distinct civil-military conflict dominate among these breakdowns. Nonetheless, the mechanisms of administrative effectiveness remain important as there are 11 in 8 different cases. As indicated, socioeconomic delegitimation drives much of this result as elite and bias delegitimations are rarely observed.

Citizenship agreement

In a set of spectacular cases, violence between ethnic groups was a frequent cause of democratic breakdown. Conversely, citizenship disputes were less important than expected. According to Table 10.2, the two mechanisms of citizenship agreement, citizenship violence and citizenship injustices, are present in 6 cases (Pakistan, Russia, Central African Republic, Thailand, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka) and 1 case (Ecuador). As for administrative effectiveness, there is a pronounced difference in the importance of the mechanisms. In contrast to both the interwar and Cold War periods, citizenship violence fares rather prominently in absolute terms (in 6 of 17 possible cases) and is more common than citizenship injustices.

Surprisingly, given the prominence of ethnic conflicts around the world after 1989, citizenship injustices can only be observed in Ecuador. We have recent examples resembling the dynamics of citizenship injustices that led to democratic breakdown in, for instance, interwar Spain. In Ecuador, politics had been polarizing gradually through the 1990s as ethnicity became more important than class in the structuring of parties and the political debate (Sanchez 2005: 1). The problem was the widespread perception among the indigenous that they were excluded from enjoying the benefits of growth in good times and from state protection in bad times. The structural migration
of indigenous from the countryside to the urban settings inhibited effective cooperation on the distribution of resources (McConnell 2001: 73-74). The banking crisis that hit the country in 1998 exacerbated the feelings of relative deprivation among the indigenous. The unusually active and politically influential indigenous organization the CONAIE once again mobilized against what it perceived as President Mahuad’s mestizo oligarchic elite marked by neoliberal policies (Zamosc 2007; Barraca 2007: 143). The CONAIE gathered large crowds of protesters outside the congress building in Quito and provoked friendly junior officers to occupy the building. As a consequence, the senior army leadership intervened in January 2000 and forcefully installed vice-President Noboa as president (Lucero 2001: 61-65).

The indigenous people in Venezuela and Honduras experienced much the same relative deprivation vis-à-vis a mestizo state elite but they did not have a movement as powerful and well-organized as the CONAIE. In other cases, it was simply not the economic distribution between ethnic groups that caused political conflict. For instance, the polarization between the secular Hindu Awami League and the Muslim parties BNP and JI, which culminated in the failure of agreement on a caretaker government in late 2006 to manage upcoming elections, did not concern socioeconomic distribution but the role of religion in politics and the handling of Islamic extremism, which was openly supported by the JI (Quadir 2010: 66). A similar lack of salience of socioeconomic distribution can be observed in the explosive cases of ethnic conflict in Pakistan, Russia, Niger, and the Central African Republic.

The cases of citizenship violence are concentrated around the turn of the century and its aftermath. A major source is the upsurge of global Islamic extremism and terrorism immediately before and after 11 September 2001. The most illustrative cases are probably Bangladesh and Thailand. A conflict between Muslim majorities in the southern provinces of Thailand and the Buddhist remainder of the population had been simmering for decades but effectively contained by compromises between the provinces and the Bangkok government. However, from the early 2000s the situation in the southern provinces again grew to extremities of violence and political volatility. This caused a sense of widespread insecurity in Bangkok – despite the relatively limited size of the insurgency. Politics in 2006 in and around elections and in the Privy Council in which Thaksin and the military were supposed to coordinate policy revolved around the situation in the south. The civil-military tensions were directly related to Thaksin’s security policies concerning the south and the military’s perception that the nation’s health was at stake (Ockey 2007: 133-136). Similarly, Russia’s complex ethnic conflict landscape was further nurtured by Islamic extremism in the conflicts over Chechnya and the Caucasian republics through the 1990s. Tellingly, however, it was
only in 1999 that terrorism by the Muslim freedom fighters reached Moscow in a series of apartment building explosions and paved the way for Putin’s bid for the presidency (Taylor 2011: 81-82).

The most significant finding about the mechanisms of citizenship agreement is perhaps the absence of mechanisms in the early and mid-1990s. Based on analyses such as Linz and Stepan (1996), we would have expected problems of disputes between ethnic groups and between them and the state to have caused breakdown in the many newly founded states that democratized in the early 1990s. I believe that this illustrates the importance of improving the conceptual precision in currently leading scholarship on the relationship between the state and democracy. If we narrow Linz and Stepan’s focus on the ‘problems of democratic consolidation’ and specify what they mean by stateness as ‘widespread dispute over citizenship rules and borders’, the notion that citizenship agreement is highly important seems to falter somewhat.

Summing up on the importance of citizenship disagreement for the post-Cold War democratic breakdowns, the mechanisms were regionally rather evenly distributed with an Asian overload. They occurred 7 times in 7 different cases. The general importance of citizenship disagreement in the post-Cold War period cannot be disputed based on this count but it seems that we must make significant amendments to the extensive scholarship that highlights citizenship disagreement as one of the most importance causes of democratic breakdown, particularly in the 1990s. Notably, citizenship injustices virtually disappeared as explanation.

Overall and relative strengths

Based on the analyses of mechanisms in the post-Cold War period, we have strong indications that disputed monopoly on violence and administrative ineffectiveness were important in contributing to the democratic breakdowns. Their mechanisms explained 9 and 8 cases, respectively, and a total of 11 mechanisms were observed for each attribute. Yet, only two mechanisms across these two attributes drive this effect: authoritarian restorations and socioeconomic delegitimations. Particularly, elite and mass bias delegitimations are rare observations. Next, the mechanisms of citizenship agreement are less prevalent being present via 7 mechanisms in 7 cases. Citizenship violence almost singularly drives the effect. This corroborates the previous findings that citizenship agreement is the least relevant of the stateness attributes for democratic stability. But we must also take stock of the limited explanatory power for the democratic breakdowns in the 1990s, which goes against much scholarship on the subject.
The general importance of stateness should, despite initial inclinations to the contrary, not be exaggerated. Table 10.2 shows 30 observed mechanisms from a total of 17 cases and 119 potential mechanisms. This means that there are on average slightly less than 2 stateness explanations for each post-Cold War democratic breakdown. This is of course still a notable amount of mechanisms and stateness can far from be excluded as explanation for democratic breakdowns in recent times. The spread of mechanisms across all regions also supports this. Yet, 5 of 17 breakdowns (Albania, Mozambique, Madagascar, Honduras, and Niger 2009) are left unexplained if we apply a model with stateness mechanisms alone. Especially pronounced is the absence of stateness mechanisms towards the late 2000s, the most recent years of the analytical period of this study and the years under the strains of the Great Recession.

The relatively strained explanatory importance of stateness is illustrated by the wide gap between the high number of state weaknesses noted in Table 10.1 and the limited number of mechanisms in Table 10.2. However, there is still a tendency that cases with a complete lack of stateness (no stateness attributes present) have the highest number of mechanisms, for instance Bangladesh and Pakistan with five each and Central African Republic with four.

On balance, the general importance of stateness cannot be rejected but is in some sense less pronounced than what the present scholarship would lead us to believe. Next, disaggregation is still wanted. Disaggregation between monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness seems less relevant but when we look at the discrepancy of stateness and mechanisms in single cases, disaggregation may still be highly fruitful. At least for my purpose of separating stateness in three attributes, inferential shortcomings emerge in 5 cases (Belarus, Niger 1996, Guinea-Bissau, Venezuela, and Thailand) if monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness are collapsed. The importance of disaggregation becomes even more pronounced if citizenship agreement is included and collapsed with the other two attributes.

Comparing democratic breakdowns across the three periods

We can now compare the mechanisms across the interwar, Cold War, and post-Cold War periods. Table 10.3 comprises shares for all seven mechanisms in the three periods as a measure of their relative and absolute importance, potentially moderated by periodic effects. Comparing the shares of cases with the mechanism yields results that rather clearly support the statistical findings of Chapter 7.
The mechanism of authoritarian restoration is by far the most prominent one in all three periods with shares of 57, 76, and 41% in the interwar, Cold War, and post-Cold War periods, respectively. These are remarkably high shares and point to civil-military relations as highly important for democratic stability in the 20th and early 21st centuries. The second-most important mechanism is socioeconomic delegitimation, followed closely by other mechanisms except the elite and mass bias delegitimation mechanisms, which lose prominence after the interwar period. In accordance with the statistical results, we thus find limited support for meritocracy as distinctly important for democratic breakdown with the notable exception of the interwar years.

When we add together the mechanisms under each attribute, the mechanisms of monopoly on violence are more frequently observed in all three periods. There is, however, no notable difference between the shares for the mechanisms of administrative effectiveness and citizenship agreement. Looking at the within-case level thus specifies the statistical findings: While the mechanisms clearly vindicate monopoly on violence as the most important stabilizer of democracy, the suggested average effect difference between administrative effectiveness and citizenship does not seem to hold up. Based on the democratic breakdowns alone, we would amend our conclusions slightly and recommend disaggregation of stateness mostly to be able to capture the superior effect of monopoly on violence. But distinctions between all three attributes are still worth pursuing since they reveal important differences in the types of state effects between individual cases. Distinguishing between their multiple mechanisms further improves our understanding of the processes and more specific substantive factors at stake.
Table 10.3: Share mechanisms across the three periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Disputed monopoly on violence</th>
<th>Administrative ineffectiveness</th>
<th>Citizenship disagreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Authoritarian restoration</td>
<td>Security delegitimation</td>
<td>Socio-economic delegitimation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interwar period</td>
<td>Share cases with mechanism</td>
<td>8/14=0.57</td>
<td>5/14=0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share cases with mechanism by attribute</td>
<td>10/14=0.71</td>
<td>10/14=0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share mechanisms by attribute</td>
<td>13/28=0.46</td>
<td>17/42=0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share mechanisms of total</td>
<td>39/98=0.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War period</td>
<td>Share cases with mechanism</td>
<td>35/46=0.76</td>
<td>16/46=0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share cases with mechanism by attribute</td>
<td>38/46=0.83</td>
<td>14/46=0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share mechanisms by attribute</td>
<td>51/92=0.55</td>
<td>20/138=0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share mechanisms of total</td>
<td>98/322=0.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War period</td>
<td>Share cases with mechanism</td>
<td>7/17=0.41</td>
<td>4/17=0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share cases with mechanism by attribute</td>
<td>9/17=0.53</td>
<td>8/17=0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share mechanisms by attribute</td>
<td>11/34=0.32</td>
<td>11/51=0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share mechanisms of total</td>
<td>29/119=0.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 10.3 finally indicates that there may be periodic effects due to changes in the international system. The share of mechanisms combined, which arguably shows the importance of stateness as such for democratic breakdown, decreases over time from 40% in the interwar period to 24% after the Cold War. With the interwar period arguably comprising international orders favoring democracy (until 1932) as well as autocracy (from 1933) and the unambiguously destabilizing Cold War bipolarity, these comparisons give no clear indication as to how the international level might moderate the effect of stateness. This question is beyond the scope of the present study, but the concluding chapter puts the results of the study in perspective in relation to recurring debates on modernization theory and the role of the state in today’s global wave of democratic regression. In addressing these questions, it also discusses how context-sensitive the effects of stateness are to moderations by international and economic factors.
Chapter 11.
Discussion and Conclusion

*It is the failure to establish modern, well-governed states that has been the Achilles heel of recent democratic transitions* (Fukuyama 2015: 12).

In March 2012, Mali’s twenty-year-old democracy was toppled by captain Sanogo and conspiring soldiers of the country’s army. This was one of the more dramatic examples of the wave of democratic regression that is a popular object of academic debate today (see Diamond and Plattner 2015). Many observers were surprised by the coup at first, pointing to Mali’s democracy as a success story. The country had been a democratic overachiever since 1992 compared to it being one of the world’s poorest. The Alliance for Democracy in Mali that took power in 1992 had been able to forge compromises across clans because the party was free of the straining past of Traoré’s dictatorship. As the party’s most significant achievement, numerous armed rebellions by the Tuareg in the north had been handled in ceasefire agreements over the years. Average annual economic growth rates of 4.8% in the 1990s also helped bolster the regime’s survivability (Smith 2001).

Another Tuareg rebellion in January 2012 grew out of control, however. The Tuareg were now part of a global Islamist movement, capitalizing on the politicization of religion in the Sahel Region more generally (Cline 2013; Boås and Torheim 2013). Observers now pointed to institutional weaknesses, integrated in the Malian political system, which had never actually been solved (e.g. Alozieuwa 2013). The state in Bamako notably never institutionalized peace with the Tuaregs. Under greater constraints from global Islamism, continued poverty and bloated state budgets, the decade-old corrupted power hold of Bamako state elites and regional clans could no longer pay patronage to the Tuareg armed factions and their rural support base in the north. It brought to the surface old problems of military professionalism and provoked a new pattern of conflict between the state’s army, which was desperate for equipment upgrades, and a reluctant civilian leadership. As the Touré government refused to increase military funding, Sanogo and his allies found it necessary to intervene to contain the Tuareg and restore military pride (Alozieuwa 2013; Boås and Torheim 2013).

Mali’s democratic breakdown illustrates a serious problem of democratic rule in many developing countries. As Fukuyama notes (in the quote above), many of today’s democracies remain fragile because they are yet to build strong and effective state apparatuses and forge national identities. The fail-
ure of state- and nation-building can be explained in a perfunctory manner by the extreme poverty of the country and its state apparatus, which eventually precluded the cooptation of rebels. However, this explanation overlooks that the mode of governance makes some democracies, like the Malian one, more prone to conflict in the first place. Comparably poor Malawi has, by contrast, not seen the same level of ethnic and military grievances and thus not been as vulnerable to economic fluctuations (BTI 2012: 5-6). Cooptation by payment of patronage in contexts of bad governance is a short-term strategy that is likely conflict-inducing in the long term. A more convincing reading of Mali’s democratic trajectory thus focuses on the failure to solve deeper structural impediments to democratic stability related to state corruption, ethnic antagonisms, and a factionalized and ambiguously subordinate military (see also Fukuyama 2004; 2014). These structural deficits are often activated when a fragile political equilibrium is pushed over by international and economic currents. This is one powerful explanation of democratic regression today.

My findings, I would argue, basically support Fukuyama’s proposition but contribute to specifying it. By taking up Munck’s (2011: 337-338) proposal to “grapple with the various ways in which the state [... ] might be considered as causes of democracy”, I have disaggregated the concept of stateness and investigated whether and how the different attributes of stateness have contributed to democratic stability over time and space. The empirical results can be summarized in the following way:

First, in state-democracy research there are good conceptual and theoretical arguments for disaggregating stateness in at least the three attributes of monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, and citizenship agreement. They likely coincide far from perfectly and have different effects on democratic stability. In fact, I have shown that the three attributes have developed at different paces and at different levels during the age of modern democracy – in my analysis compressed to the 1918-2010 period. Monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, and citizenship agreement seem to have a common core but there is a notably weak correlation between the former two ‘state capacities’ and the latter condition of citizenship agreement, capturing characteristics of the state’s population more than the state apparatus as such. But these divergences cover yet another set of divergences at the level of the attribute components. The extension of power and control of the state apparatus only coincide weakly with the organizational qualities of cohesion and subordination (monopoly on violence) and meritocracy and responsiveness (administrative effectiveness), respectively.

Second, the question of whether stateness stabilizes democracies can be answered in the affirmative. Monopoly on violence and administrative effec-
tiveness as well as citizenship agreement significantly stabilized democracies from 1918 to 2010. Disputed monopoly on violence, administrative ineffec-
tiveness, and citizenship disagreement systematically contributed to demo-
ocratic breakdowns in the interwar, Cold War, and post-Cold War periods –
that is, crossing the first and second reverse waves of democratization and
more recent cases of democratic regression. Despite this basic explanatory
uniformity, disaggregation is warranted. We are clearly able to rank the three
attributes in terms of their importance for democratic stability: monopoly on
violence is most important followed by administrative effectiveness and, last-
ly, citizenship agreement. While monopoly on violence exerts a very strong
and positive, significant effect on democratic stability even after control for
an extensive number of potential confounders, the effects of administrative
effectiveness and citizenship agreement are much more fragile to the inclu-
sion of confounders. In particular, their effects are undermined in the mod-
els where monopoly on violence is included, indicating that they are, to some
extent, byproducts of monopoly on violence. Similarly, the mechanisms of
monopoly on violence are most often associated with the democratic break-
downs and more consistently so over time and space than the other two at-
tributes.

Third, the question of how stateness stabilizes democracies needs a mul-
tifaceted answer that also indicates the importance of disaggregation. A pat-
tern of years of civil-military contestation puts democracies at particular risk
of breakdown. Thus, the mechanism of authoritarian restoration, connected
with a disputed monopoly on violence, is clearly and consistently the most
commonly observed among the breakdowns from 1918 to 2010. This was the
case even during the Cold War when US pressures for autocratic stability
could have undermined any influence of the state and during the post-Cold
War period when dictatorship was delegitimized. The number of observa-
tions of the remaining mechanisms differs widely from one region and peri-
od to another. For instance, elite and mass bias delegitimation are prominent
explanations for the interwar breakdowns but they lose most of their explana-
tory force after WWII. Citizenship violence is initially a rare explanation but
gradually becomes one of the most common ones.

These three findings give rise to two more general discussion points that
I deal with in this chapter: How can the developing countries of today esta-
lish modern, well-governed states? And how can state- and nation-building
be nurtured in an increasingly multipolar international order and under per-
sistent global pressures from economic fluctuations? I discuss my findings in
light of these questions and propose some research venues.
The state and today’s democratic regression

The notion that strong and legitimate states are important for democratic stability may be criticized in at least two ways. The first regards the potential trivialness of my findings, in particular the emphasis on monopoly on violence in the empirical analysis. One may argue that state strength and legitimacy and democracy are so intimately connected, indeed even conceptually overlapping, that meaningful explanation is precluded. My conceptual analysis points out that the state and democracy are fundamentally different concepts – the former being about exercise of power and the latter about access to power. The measurement criteria for the stateness attributes laid out in Figure 2.1 have arguably ensured concept-measure consistency but also sharp separation from any regime traits by focusing on military and police, civil servants, and the ethnic groups and ethno-cultural identity of the state. As can be seen in Appendices I and II, it was generally fairly easy to identify the relevant actors in historical as well as contemporary cases. In some instances when these state-related actors were also popularly elected, it was harder to uphold conceptual uniqueness in practice. But since this was not a general problem, the question is rather how close the empirical connection is between stateness and democracy.

It is worth recapitulating the finding of the statistical analysis that monopoly on violence is almost sufficient for democratic stability – or conversely, only very few democracies break down without a disputed monopoly on violence. However, we also saw that statistically this cannot amount to a trivial finding since several democracies in fact have monopoly on violence. More generally, the nature of monopoly on violence varies considerably between the democracies in the analysis. The near-sufficiency finding is likely driven by subordination of security forces to the civilian sphere, which is closely connected with democratic stability. But many democracies are installed and exist for several years despite civil-military contestation and, more importantly, there are democracies with subordinate security forces that break down. Indeed, authoritarian restorations did not occur in all democratic breakdowns as civil-military conflicts were sometimes ignored by political leaders or undermined by an incumbent takeover. This reflects that democracies do break down by other sources than civil-military conflict and, more generally, that building a reliable coercive apparatus is a different process than forging and stabilizing a democracy. In short, this is why civil-military conflict is still a meaningful and vital explanation for democratic breakdown.

Another substantial criticism may come from the sequencing debate (see Mansfield and Snyder 2007; Carothers 2007; Mazzuca and Munck 2014;
Møller 2015). While I have investigated the state-democracy nexus with the state as predictor and democracy as outcome, the state-democracy literature also comprises the opposite with democracy as predictor and state as outcome. This diversity covers substantial disagreement on which should come first. The traditional view has been ‘stateness first’. It notes that the European democracies are preceded by state-building in the Middle Ages, and that democratizations can be ‘out of sequence’ or ‘premature’ in the sense that they often lead to violent conflict if states are weak and nations contested (e.g. Fukuyama 2004; Mansfield and Snyder 2007).

While the historical, European part of the argument has been corrected by pointing out that state-building there often only happened later, in the 18th and 19th centuries, and after the advent of parliamentary systems and a stable rule of law (Møller 2015), others have criticized the ‘stateness first’ literature for being overly pessimistic. Democracy is not inherently bad and autocracy not inherently good for state- or nation-building. Autocratic leaders often abandon state-building for the good of the people and repress ethnic minorities to form a single national identity. For state- and nation-building to become conducive of liberal democracy, some popular constraints on executive power are probably needed. In any case, such executive constraints have proven effective in some recent democratic transitions (Carothers 2007; Mazzuca and Munck 2014; see also Møller 2015). Electoral democracy may strengthen and legitimize states because democratically elected leaders are more willing and better able to provide public goods such as those related to stateness (see Mazzuca and Munck 2014: 10-16).

My findings give no reason to close or abandon the sequencing debate. The statistical results indicate that the three stateness attributes, and notably monopoly on violence, cannot be rejected as explanations of democratic stability on grounds of reversed causality – prior levels of electoral democracy do not make the effects of stateness insignificant. The within-case analyses addressed this issue more directly by examining a series of observable implications that should ensure the right sequencing of state and democracy and increase confidence in a connection. In many notable cases such as South Korea, Taiwan, Chile, and Portugal, stateness strengthened under autocratic rule and prepared the countries for democracy. In many Latin American cases, stateness remained constant or weakened under democracy because democratization politicized suppressed ethnic groups and put clientelistic pressures on the impartiality of the state apparatus. The same dynamics were initially seen in much of Eastern Europe after the Cold War but mostly contained under the influence of the European Union. This indicates that state and nation exist and develop independently of the political regime and that we cannot convincingly claim that democratic regimes protected themselves
by establishing states and nations. Most democracies seem to experience the same or very similar kinds of problems related to stateness as under the previous autocratic regime.

One important strand in the ‘democracy first’ scholarship focuses on the likelihood that states as well as democracies could be crafted by ingenious politicians (see Linz and Stepan 1996; Carothers 2002; 2007). My data enable me to conduct a crude test, which, however, more generally illuminates whether the impact of stateness on the democratic breakdowns is not just an artefact of contingent actors and events. I capitalize on my codings of stateness in and around the two major critical junctures of WWI as well as the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Soviet Union. As transitions from autocracy to democracy often coincided with these junctures, looking at the development of stateness during these junctures at least examines whether changed immediately by a shift from one regime to another.

The ‘Great War’, WWI, may have been the historically contingent critical juncture that changed the stateness of countries in relatively unpredictable ways but also the prospects of democratic stability in the subsequent interwar period (Overy 1994; Holzer 2002). If stateness could be changed in the course of a few years of war, it was not the institutional constraint I expected it to be. The driver of the interwar democratic breakdowns is apparently to be found in the dynamics of WWI and the reactions of the political elites, rather than in stateness per se (see e.g. Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010; Weyland 2010).

Table 11.1 lists all 14 democratic breakdowns of the interwar period and shows whether the three stateness attributes changed from 1913 (the year before WWI) to 1919 (the year after WWI). As the share of cases in which stateness changed from 1913 to 1919 is around 50 % in all three attributes, it is fair to say that, generally, WWI had a strong impact on the status of stateness. But a substantial amount of variation in stateness is still unexplained by WWI. The level of economic development also does not explain the variation as both the relatively poor countries of Eastern Europe and the relatively rich ones in Central Europe changed.

Moreover, the 50 % share of change is likely exaggerated. The high number of changes is heavily influenced by a particular set of cases, namely the Eastern European, imperial successor states of Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Yugoslavia. Whereas the Polish state that appeared after WWI was partitioned among the German and Russian Empires in 1913, Slovenia and Croatia of the post-WWI Yugoslavian kingdom were subsumed under Austria-Hungary, and Serbia and Montenegro were independent kingdoms.
The Baltic States were parts of the Russian Empire in 1913. On the one hand, such cases are affected by WWI in obvious ways. On the other hand, exactly because the changes in territory and demography were so radical, one may stipulate that the entities in 1913 and 1919 are entirely different territorial and demographic units of analysis. It is, for instance, hard to compare Poland’s stateness in 1913 with the equivalent in 1919. We should thus exclude the successor states from the analysis. As a result, the shares are remarkably different: 2/9, 0/9, and 1/9 cases change in terms of monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, and citizenship agreement, respectively. In sum, the WWI explanation of stateness and democratic stability in the interwar period does not seem convincing.

Table 11.1: Stateness of the interwar democratic breakdowns before and after WWI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case (spell)</th>
<th>Change in monopoly on violence 1913 → 1919</th>
<th>Change in administrative effectiveness 1913 → 1919</th>
<th>Change in citizenship agreement 1913 → 1919</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy (1919-1922)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile (1918-1925)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland (1918-1926)*</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal (1918-1926)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania (1920-1926)*</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia (1921-1929)*</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina (1918-1931)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (1919-1933)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria (1920-1933)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia (1919-1934)*</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay (1919-1934)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia (1920-1934)*</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece (1926-1936)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain (1931-1937)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of ‘changed’ cases</td>
<td>7/14</td>
<td>5/14</td>
<td>6/14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * applies to countries that were only a politically dependent part of a larger empire in 1913. The changes in stateness can be positive as well as negative.

58 Weimar Germany is not considered a successor state in this regard as it was the core political and territorial unit of the German Empire. Similarly, Austria was a primary and largely politically independent part, alongside Hungary, of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
We can conduct a similar analysis of the impact of the end of the Cold War. The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the subsequent breakdown of the Soviet Union culminating in its dissolution in December 1991 speeded up the third wave of democratization by adding a host of new countries in new regions to the global count of democracies (Huntington 1991; Möller and Skaaning 2013: Ch. 5). But the breakdown of the Soviet Union also meant the dismantling of state structures and the upsurge of national claims in the communist world (Fritz 2007: 16-17). Rather than one event, the critical juncture should be considered as a short period of transition in states and regimes. If the critical juncture is operationalized as starting in 1989 and ending in 1991 consistent with the two most dramatic and symbolic events of the period, the result is even clearer than for the WWI analysis. It shows that only 2 of 17 cases changed in one of the three stateness attributes from 1988 to 1992. Russia’s monopoly on violence deteriorated in the period under consideration whereas neighboring Belarus experienced deterioration in citizenship agreement.59 The compressed period when the world system of communism broke down thus cannot convincingly explain stateness and democratic stability in the post-Cold War period either.

The above examinations indicate that countries entered their democratic spells with levels of stateness that were neither primarily driven by choices of contingent actors nor by regime change as such. However, the ‘democracy first’ perspective more generally seems to hold that subsequent free and fair elections rather than negotiations during the short transition period have the potential to strengthen state and nation. While it was never my purpose to examine this proposition or provide evidence of one perspective (state or democracy first) over the other, my results nevertheless show the need to specify the claims on both sides and revitalize the ‘stateness first’ notion by showing that low levels of stateness can be detrimental to democratic stability. This last point does not imply that democratization should be abandoned wherever governance structures are poor. But it does reiterate Mansfield and Snyder’s (2007: 5) prosaic ascertainment that only “transitional countries that were comparatively well-endowed with the prerequisites for democratic politics, such as relatively competent and impartial state institutions, were unlikely to detour into violence.” My findings thus support that when a country democratizes, we should be particularly alert of whether and how matters of stateness are handled. I may add, however, that rather than encourage a top-down intervention by international coalitions, we should encourage do-

59 This result stays the same both when we widen the period in each end and when we shorten the period around either 1990, 1989 (consistent with a focus on the fall of the Berlin Wall), or 1991 (consistent with focusing on the dissolution of the Soviet Union).
mestic actors to come together and work out a political compromise on how a state should be built and constrained. This is a core concern that preconditions the holding of free and fair elections. This is what failed in Mali and seems to be working in Malawi, although in a crude and fragile manner.

The discussion so far suggests that my three empirical findings are genuine. But they also raise an interesting puzzle. Why is it the case that stateness stabilizes democracies while many democracies have a hard time building states and nations? I propose that the forging of states and nations involves a set of political dilemmas that are hard to solve and become particularly accentuated under democratic rule because of democratic leaders’ decreased access to repression and increased reliance on popular legitimacy. This is not the same as saying that autocrats for sure will build strong states and democracies. Indeed, autocrats wrestle with their own political dilemmas and do not experience the same pressure for good governance that the public in democracies can muster. Nevertheless, democracy comes with its own set of problems for state- and nation-building.

The political dilemmas for democratic leaders and the problems they create differ somewhat across the three attributes. This is why Fukuyama’s proposition and the sequencing debate both need specification on the side of the state. For instance, the formation of a viable national identity can either be reached by forced migration to forge ethnic homogeneity, peaceful negotiation for consociationalism, or, more questionably, by tying different groups to the state via patronage and then gradually establish a national identity. The former likely comes at the expense of repression and human suffering as well as possible international sanctions. The consociational solution is typically not in the immediate interest of the major ethnic groups, and the patronage solution demands a sustainable source of wealth available for the state. Many cases in my sample also show dilemmas in improving the organizational quality of security apparatuses and civil administrations. While most democratic leaders would like to improve the competence of state officials to ensure state survival, economic development, and thus reelection, this is often a long-term project that strands in the short term when the need for swift action and clear commando lines emerges. As a consequence, cohesion and meritocracy are often sacrificed for subjective kinds of subordination and temporary responsiveness via politicization. But subordination and responsiveness may also suffer when cohesion and meritocracy are strong.

Even though there is a common core in the political dilemmas surrounding all three stateness attributes, the nature of the dilemmas varies substantially and the dilemmas occur in different contexts. More importantly, the existence and salience of the dilemmas may differ between the three attributes, thus explaining why one attribute is more likely than the others to
emerge in democracies. As indicated by the descriptive analysis in Chapter 7, more democracies had monopoly on violence than administrative effectiveness, particularly in the post-Cold War years. This may indicate that monopoly on violence is generally easier to achieve for democracies. Investigating why this is the case will further improve our understanding of the differences between coercive and administrative capacity and thus our ability to predict the prospects and course of democratic stabilization in a given country. But the investigation should go further. Likely, it is the component of security force subordination (and possibly also cohesion) that is easier to nurture under democracy while it seems plausible that resource supremacy is easier to establish under autocracy when the access to repression is greater.

To sum up, building stateness involves a specific set of political dilemmas that may explain why some countries are trapped in constant transitions back and forth between autocracy and democracy. This may be seen as the specific contribution of this study to the sequencing debate. A more specific research question may be why the majority of democracies have failed to build strong states and nations and only a few have succeeded. While some literatures (see e.g. Geddes 1994; Evans 1995; Trinkunas 2001) have investigated the dilemmas, there is, to my knowledge, no concerted effort that integrates the dilemmas and focuses systematically and comparatively on the politics surrounding them in democracies. Expanding this research venue to explaining state- and nation-building more generally but in a disaggregated fashion is likely fruitful. Whereas Møller (2015) is right that genuine state- (and nation-)building only began late, systematic research on how modern states and nations were formed in the ‘long 19th century’ in Europe under the new condition of mass politics and determined the course democratic development is relatively scarce. Tellingly, Ertman’s (1997) analysis of European state and regime developments stops with the French Revolution – the advent of modern, mass politics.

The study of political dilemmas in state- and nation-building is a promising research venue – especially but not exclusively in middle-income countries or countries that are rising economically. I believe we should approach this research venue with universalist concepts of stateness. My study has deliberately adopted a universalist, as opposed to regionally specific, conception of the state to be able to provide consistent analysis over time and space. While there may be specific Western biases in such a conception, my study has shown that the particular Weberian conception I use is fruitful. All three attributes and mechanisms capture essential parts of the explanation for many of the democratic breakdowns beyond the interwar period and in all regions of the world with a democratic record. The statistical analysis also tests for potential regional peculiarities but this does not change the results.
Of course, the state-democracy literature should be open to include relevant conceptual innovations of regionally specific studies but only if they inform a general understanding of the state-democracy nexus. It is important to bridge the gaps between region-specific literatures of the state-democracy nexus. A Weberian conception may provide one such a bridge.

The state and the distributionist model revisited

Besides democracy itself, the economy is a particular challenge to state- and nation-building as well as democratic stability. As indicated in the opening chapter, the distributionist model, building on modernization theory and indicated by level of economic development, is the most important competing explanation of democratic stability. The theoretical framework in Figure 3.1 built an understanding of the role of the state in democratic stabilization and destabilization at different levels of economic development and growth. By implication, the results of this study can be integrated in existing knowledge on the determinants of democracy and autocracy. While Figure 3.1 was not directly tested, the statistical analysis shows that stateness indeed stabilizes democracies in the period from 1918 to 2010 even when levels of economic development are taken into account. This does not imply that economic variables can be abandoned in future models of democratic stability. Rather, it suggests that we place the attributes of stateness, at least as examined in my study, on an equal footing with economic development in models of democratic stability. We should include them in quantitative models as well even though there is need for more debate on the quality of the measures of the attributes and how these measures should be handled statistically.

The role of the state in democratic (de)stabilization as I have proposed it in Figure 3.1 remains highly relevant in today’s democracies. The political dynamics that have unraveled since the Great Recession from 2008 reveal a return to conditions that resemble those in the 1930s’ Great Depression (Lindvall 2012). Support for radical parties has reappeared although radical right- and left-wingers today are concerned with other issues and represented by other types of parties than in the interwar period. To understand how democracies fare today, I propose that we regard economic development level as a baseline condition and stateness and economic growth fluctuations as dynamic factors that determine democratic stability.

Extant research consistently shows a connection between economic recessions and democratic breakdown (see e.g. Gasiorowski 1995; Przeworski and Limongi 1997: 167-169; Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock 2001; Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2003; Svolik 2008; Møller, Schmotz, and Skaaning 2015). Some democracies survive the strains associated with
economic recessions whereas others break down under similar or even less severe circumstances (Haggard and Kaufman 1997: 277; Przeworski et al. 2000: 116-117). Some democracies are more resilient to recessions than others.

A structural notion in solving this puzzle has been that high levels of economic development protect democracies that are undergoing economic crises (Przeworski and Limongi 1997: 167-169). Yet, it is far from always the wealthiest democracies that survive crises (Ertman 1998). Institutional factors such as party systemic characteristics and the configuration of legislative and executive power (parliamentarism or presidentialism) (see e.g. Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock 2001; Svolik 2008: 161) as well as particular political strategies and policy reforms given different class configurations (see e.g. Gourevitch 1986; Luebbert 1987; Capoccia 2005; Brambor and Lindvall 2014) have also been proposed. Common to all these studies is that stateness is not considered. My study suggests that stateness may be highly relevant for how democracies can handle economic recessions. As Przeworski (1991: 33) puts it, “whether or not democracy survives adverse economic conditions is a joint effect of conditions and institutions.”

Monopoly on violence becomes relevant as a stabilizer of democracies during recessions by increasing the probability that coup plotters or angry crowds are successfully contained. It also ensures that subordinate military elites are less inclined to take power even in cases where governments seem to fail in crisis management and praetorianism is appealing. Similarly, citizenship agreement implies a lower level of ethnic contestation, which means that socioeconomic hardships of economic recessions are less likely to develop into the particularly explosive types of conflict that involve socioeconomic and ethnic inequalities.

More importantly, however, extant research assumes that the state bureaucracy mechanically and without any changes transforms the wishes and orders of politicians into real-world outcomes. Even though studies deem state-related phenomena such as ‘corruption’, ‘ politicization’, and ‘inefficiency’ relevant as accelerators of anti-democratic mobilization, these effects are often only mentioned in passing and ultimately neglected in the explanatory models. Future studies could therefore benefit from focusing on administrative effectiveness as moderator of the effect of economic recessions in particular.

We should always assume an important role for the civil service during economic recession in democracies because it has a unique capacity to manage economic and social affairs within a state. Indeed, the implementing organs of the political system may conduct the crisis management that makes containment unnecessary (Przeworski 2003: 138-141; Rothstein 2011). One
The proposition to study may therefore be that the destabilizing effect of economic recessions on democracies is smaller for higher levels of administrative effectiveness. Administrative effectiveness, implying more competent, efficient, and autonomous civil servants, secures more prudent policies and more disciplined, swift, and impartial implementation.

Democracies with a more effective administration are thus more likely to survive economic recessions. This is not because such an administration shortens the period of economic recession. Effective administration shields the masses from certain hardships of recessions, notably impoverishment and unjustly rising inequalities, and thereby decreases mass incentives to mobilize against the regime (see Rothstein 2011; Svolik 2013). Whatever the political willingness to combat immediate poverty by reliefs and inequalities by redistribution of public goods (e.g. health care) and social benefits (e.g. protection schemes), an effective administration is needed to alleviate these hardships (see Haggard and Webb 1993; Evans 1998).

From this point on, the dynamics of regime contention relate to relatively more well-known interactions between elite groups (opposition, incumbents, and the military) in democracies. Put shortly, administrative effectiveness lowers the level of anti-systemic mass mobilization during recessions and thereby decreases the elites’ incentives and opportunities to stage a coup d’état (see Haggard and Kaufman 1997; Cornell and Lapuente 2014).

My study has identified a number of democratic breakdowns that may partly be explained by ineffective crisis management (socioeconomic delegitimation) and, to a smaller degree, discriminating crisis management (elite and mass bias delegitimation). But it has not examined the impact of crisis or any moderation by stateness directly. This would be yet another promising venue that could immediately improve our understanding of some of the more dramatic instances of democratic regression under the Great Recession and, if need be, further specify the distributionist model. One issue of particular interest for this research agenda concerns the state administration’s interaction with the political parties and government in and around social and economic policy-making and implementation. This interaction is heavily understudied in democratization research (for exceptions, see Cornell and Lapuente 2014). My proposition would be that policies are of course first and foremost products of effective party deliberation and extensive connections between the public and the political parties (see Brambor and Lindvall 2014). But, as indicated, the bureaucracy has a particular and often exclusive

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60 The proposition that administrative effectiveness moderates the effect of recessions on democratic stability is heavily inspired by my own working paper with Suthan Krishnarajan (Andersen and Krishnarajan 2015).
knowledge of the specific problems and solutions adhering to an economic crisis. Therefore, the appropriateness and timing of policies is in any case preconditioned on the quality of information from the bureaucracy.

**The state and today’s multipolar international order**

Part of the story of today’s democratic regression is likely the emerging multipolar order. Whereas the unipolar, US-led liberal hegemony of the 1990s ensured a general democratic zeitgeist and a willingness and ability to intervene in humanitarian crises and to the benefit of democracy in the developing world, later years have seen the upsurge of strong, autocratic powers on the international scene (Booth and Wheeler 2008). Such multipolarity, like the economics of the Great Recession, may take us back to the 1930s (see Boix 2011: 823). While there still does not seem to be a strong alternative to democracy other than what individual autocrats may make of their power, there is a risk that democratic governments may be more vulnerable to changes in their regional neighborhood than we have been used to (see Weyland 2010; for accounts of today’s world order, see Booth and Wheeler 2008; Sørensen 2016).

In this way, international multipolarity constitutes a second challenge to state- and nation-building as well as democratic stability. The challenge emerges by the influence that foreign black knights may lever. States never act independently from their immediate international context, particularly not in a globalized economy. This is why we need to take stock of the international factors, particularly black knight behavior. However, my study has shown statistically that international factors such as the type of international order (unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar) and regional diffusion of democracy do not generally condition the relationship between the stateness attributes and democratic stability. The mechanism analysis, despite employing slightly different periods, largely vindicates this. Monopoly on violence is consistently the most important explanation of democratic breakdown in the interwar, Cold War, and post-Cold War periods alike, implying that the ranking and genuine importance of the three stateness attributes are maintained under multipolar, bipolar, and unipolar international orders, respectively. Most notably, the Cold War rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union yields less influence on the state-democracy relationships than one might have assumed.

The international dimension of regime stability has been an increasingly popular research field for some years now. It has also made inroads into democratization research (see e.g. Levitsky and Way 2010; Boix 2011). At the
same time, however, the micro-level interaction between state elites, ethnic groups, and foreign powers is still rather poorly understood. Levitsky and Way (2010) looked at party elites instead of state actors while Boix (2011) focused on the macro-level interaction between development levels and international order types. Given the emerging multipolarity, more extensive research on the interaction between stateness and black knight interventions is needed. The guiding research question may be when and why state elites bolster democracies against black knight interventions.

But what initial expectations should we have in answering this question? The role of the state likely differs under different international orders. If one or more of the great powers are undemocratic or there is equal competition between democratic and autocratic great powers in the international system, anti-democratic movements likely strengthen as they are inspired and/or given the means to rebel and initiate coups d’État on notions such as sovereignty or an anti-democratic ideology. In less strong and less legitimate states, these forces prosper more and the ability to contain attacks on democracy is weaker. The stronger and more legitimate states likely have fewer anti-systemic forces and contain those that do arise. When democratic great powers dominate the international system, pressure groups are instead quelled by forces unrelated to stateness (see Boix 2011). Stateness is thus generally more likely to be important for democratic stability when the international order favors autocracy.

There are, more specifically, different expectations related to the three attributes in the handling of black knights. Monopoly on violence is very directly relevant. If, for instance, civil-military relations are generally harmonious, security forces are less likely persuaded to take bribes and accept promises of military organizational concessions from the black knight to support an uprising or a coup coalition. If the army is cohesive, it is less likely that the black knight can pit warring factions against each other and weaken the ability of the army as a whole to detect and contain mutinies.

Citizenship agreement can also be highly relevant here because it precludes some of the potentially most explosive cleavage lines that the black knight may try to activate. In times of great migrations and refugee flows threatening citizenship agreement across the globe, the illegitimacy of the state as an ethno-cultural symbol or pending ethnic conflicts can otherwise easily be lifted to become signs of government weakness or deliberate repression by the government. This, in turn, makes it easier to mobilize angry crowds and coup plotters.

Finally, administrative effectiveness is arguably less relevant since civil servants are probably less often approached by a black knight. Yet, they do maintain relevance in bolstering general regime performance, legitimizing
the sitting executive, and thus making it harder for the black knight to mobilize opposition against the government.

The future of state-democracy research

Future state-democracy research should take stock of this study’s general finding: Stateness stabilizes democracies but the effects of the three stateness attributes – monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, and citizenship agreement – differ substantially. One research venue is of immediate interest to examine the boundaries and contextual specificities of this finding. We should study the comparative politics of state- and nation-building in a disaggregated fashion by at least distinguishing between monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, and citizenship agreement and investigating the different dynamics surrounding their creation. A more process-oriented look at these dynamics than in extant research is fruitful.

Which actors are important in the establishment of states and nations? When do they gain particular relevance, and for what reasons? What challenges do they face, and how do they differ in different contexts?

The benefits of a disaggregated approach to the state are not limited to the study of democratic stability. Autocratic stability immediately comes to mind as another outcome. We may have good reasons to believe that different types of state capacity have markedly different effects on autocratic stability. For instance, there are indications that the dimensions of monopoly on violence capturing coercive capacity are connected with autocratic stability whereas administrative effectiveness only stabilizes democracies (Andersen et al. 2014).

But the disaggregated approach to the state can illuminate core variables of interest in comparative politics more generally. Studies of the impact of the state and nation on economic development live in relative isolation of one another depending on which state dimension is treated as the relevant explanan (compare e.g. Evans 1995; Alesina et al. 2003; Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno, and Robinson 2015). In turn, we do not know whether there are in fact some core features of state and/or nation that favor or hinder economic growth, or whether we can take the liberty of focusing on only one state dimension in furthering economic prosperity. The concept of human development – the welfare of the less advantaged citizens in a society – contains other central parameters in comparative politics such as health, education, poverty reduction, or welfare provisions more generally. But the studies explaining different levels of human development focus on different aspects of stateness that are not connected into an integrated research field (compare e.g. Rothstein 2011; Jensen and Skaaning 2014).
A better understanding of the diverse effects of stateness on economic and human development is not just beneficial for these literatures but is likely to feed back positively on state-democracy research by informing the distributionist model about the interaction between the state and the economy. Bringing matters to a head, the outlook for comparative politics should thus be state-centered but disaggregated.
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Appendix I:
Coding Rules and Ambiguities

This appendix presents a shortened version of the coding rules of the dataset. These rules provide the basis for my coding of the stateness components and the mechanisms for which there are substantial discussions in the online appendix. To increase inter-coder reliability, I have engaged a research assistant (student worker) to code 18 randomly selected cases: 7 from the interwar period; 5 from the Cold War period; 6 from the post-Cold War. This number of cases from each period was a deliberate choice to strengthen reliability of the interwar codings in particular as I assumed the literature on this period would be scarcest. I also deliberately chose to have 8 breakdown and 4 stability cases as the breakdown cases are more important in my study. Portugal (1918-1926) functioned as a pilot study. The table below provides a list of the cases:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Case (spell coded)</th>
<th>Democratic outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interwar</td>
<td>Greece (1926-1936)</td>
<td>Breakdown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Portugal (1918-1926)</td>
<td>Breakdown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uruguay (1919-1934)</td>
<td>Breakdown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lithuania (1920-1926)</td>
<td>Breakdown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Czechoslovakia (1918-1938)</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany (1919-1933)</td>
<td>Breakdown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finland (1918-1945)</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>Lebanon (1971-1976)</td>
<td>Breakdown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Panama (1950-1951)</td>
<td>Breakdown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Myanmar (1960-1962)</td>
<td>Breakdown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nigeria (1979-1983)</td>
<td>Breakdown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Czechoslovakia (1945-1947)</td>
<td>Breakdown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PostCold War</td>
<td>India (1950-2010)</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Korea (1988-2010)</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bangladesh (1991-2007)</td>
<td>Breakdown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pakistan (1988-1999)</td>
<td>Breakdown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Albania (1992-1996)</td>
<td>Breakdown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The research assistant has conducted the coding on the basis of my coding rules as presented in this appendix. That is, the research assistant has searched the material, read and written notes, and conducted the coding assessments without any intervention of mine. The appendix also presents the agreements and disagreements between mine and the research assistant’s codings and it presents some threshold ambiguities that were clarified along the way as a result of discussions of each case.

The process of searching and condensing material

The guidelines for searching and choosing material are:
- Search one case (=democratic spell) at a time.
- Search google scholar and google books on the web for every case using at least the following search criteria (‘AND’ = coupled with; ‘or’ = alternative
  - may be neglected from the search):

‘country name’ AND ‘state’ or ‘stateness’ or ‘state capacity’ or ‘state-building’ or ‘nation-building’
‘country name’ AND ‘monopoly on violence’ or ‘army’ or ‘military capacity’ or ‘civil-military relationship’ or ‘military professionalism’ or ‘police forces’ or ‘public disorder’
‘country name’ AND ‘administrative effectiveness’ or ‘bureaucracy’ or ‘bureaucratic development’ or ‘civil service’ or ‘meritocracy’ or ‘judicial independence’ or ‘bureaucratic responsiveness’ or ‘politicization’ or ‘patrimonialism’ or ‘clientelism’ or ‘corruption’ or ‘territorial penetration’ or ‘administrative infrastructure’
‘country name’ AND ‘citizenship agreement’ or ‘state legitimacy’ or ‘national identity’ or ‘ethnic minorities’
‘country name’ AND ‘democratic breakdown’ AND ‘year of breakdown’ or ‘civil-military conflict’ or ‘security crisis’ or ‘economic crisis’ or ‘party polarization’ or ‘polarization’ or ‘ethnic conflicts’
‘country name’ AND ‘history of’ or ‘politics’
*To these criteria, add the specific period and year if needed. Do separate searches on case-specific actors and events and modify the search criteria if needed. Specifically, cases may differ in terms of the terminology used by scholars. Move forward in a ‘trial and error’-fashion.

- For cases of democratic stability, only the stateness attributes and their components should be coded. The last search criterion on the list is thus not relevant for the democratic survivors.
- Check the list of references of the most recent sources which comprehensively cover the case in hand. Do this as a snowballing exercise to get an impression of the most cited accounts. Make notes on which sources are generally most cited.
- Visit a couple of leading studies of the subject matter that compare a number of cases (e.g. studies of state capacity in Latin America, democracy and dictatorship in interwar Europe, nationalism in post-colonial Africa).
- Choose every source coming out of the searches that seem to cover the relevant subject or case. Do not only choose those that appear on the first page of the google search result.
- As a rule, use second-hand material. First-hand material may only be used to get at the motives and thoughts of key actors involved in the breakdown of democracy.
- For the post-Cold War cases, I check my codings against the BTI country reports (2003, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012) which contain explicit, small descriptions of matters of stateness closely related to the components I have defined in Chapter 2.

Building a notes system:
- For democratic breakdowns: Write down notes for every source. To better make for an overview, each stateness attribute (monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, and citizenship agreement) and each mechanism (authoritarian restoration, security delegitimation, socioeconomic delegitimation, elite bias delegitimation, mass bias delegitimation, citizenship violence, and citizenship injustices) should have its own compound of notes.
- For democratic survivors: The same as for the breakdowns except the mechanisms should not be coded.

Availability of sources

Unless otherwise indicated in the case discussions in the online appendix, there were no serious lack of source material for the codings. Sub-Saharan African cases are typically least covered but, on an overall account, can be coded with reasonable certainty. As another general trait, the codings pertaining to the interwar cases are more uncertain than those of the Cold War and post-Cold War since sources are either relatively scarce or disagreeing to a greater level about certain facts in the cases. I have thus put particular effort in coding these cases and explicated the disagreements that exist. This is
why the case discussions in the online appendix are typically longer and contain more citations.

Criteria for qualified judgments

The dataset reports scores of the stateness attributes, their components, and the mechanisms. In the dataset, 1 = presence of attribute, component, or mechanism; 0 = absence of attribute, component, or mechanism. I handed out Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2 to the research assistant. After studying it, the research assistant discussed it with me. The following specifications were communicated to the research assistant:

monopoly on violence = resource supremacy AND cohesion AND subordination

Resource supremacy: More resources for violence than societal groups combined (or in cooperation).

Cohesion: Professionalism and functioning organization in the security forces.

Subordination: Substantial contestation between security forces and the government on the organizational powers of the security forces.
- There should be a sustained pattern of civil-military conflict over the autonomy, budget, or privileges of the military.

administrative effectiveness = territorial penetration AND meritocracy AND responsiveness

Territorial penetration: Basic administrative infrastructure throughout the territory of the state.
- The policies in focus are limited to the key sectors of economics and trade, finance, judicial affairs, interior affairs, and social and labor market policy.

Meritocracy: Civil servants recruited on the basis of merit via systematic civil service procedures.
- The opposite of such meritocracy is a patrimonial administration often observed by political interference in hiring and firing of civil servants, patterns of patron-clientelism, or inherited offices.
Responsiveness: Swift, accurate implementation of government orders disregarding content.
- Government orders may be reforms, policies, and laws. A telling indicator of responsiveness is the implementation of policies which go against the interests of the civil servants such as reforms of the civil service itself. Administrative corruption or sabotaged and interrupted implementations are often indicators of unresponsiveness.

citizenship agreement = mutual group acceptance AND state legitimacy
Mutual group acceptance: All significant, ethnic groups within the territory of the state accept communion.
- The opposite is often indicated by open conflict or violence between ethnically antagonized groups. An ethnic group is defined by its race, religion, or language.

State legitimacy: All significant, ethnic groups within the territory of the state see the state as the same ethnocultural symbol.
- An indicator may often be a common national identity (across the ethnic groups if more than one).

General criteria:
- The measurement starts with the first year of democracy and ends by including the year of democratic breakdown when democracy breaks down or, in the case of a democratic survivor, if the spell reaches 2010, or if the democracy consolidates (spell simply ends).
- If the country is under foreign occupation, the coding of stateness is suspended until the country reaches de facto sovereignty again.
- The criterion for coding the components as present in a given year is whether it was predominantly strong or weak in that year.

Regarding the mechanisms, I handed out Figures 4.2-4.8 in Chapter 4 to the research assistant. After studying them, the research assistant discussed them with me. Specifications could be given orally.
- The measurement starts at the moment when democracy is inaugurated until the year of breakdown. Yet, the presence of the mechanism is merely indicated by 1 (0 for absence) in the year of breakdown.
- There is no general upper limit of time between links.
- A mechanism cannot be present if the attached stateness attribute is present.
The results of the inter-coder reliability test

The inter-coder reliability test was conducted by meetings every three weeks on average about the coding of the given case. At each meeting, we compared and discussed our coding decisions. We agreed about most decisions – that is, yearly observations of the stateness components and the existence of the mechanisms. I recorded the disagreements and revised my own codings if need be. In any case, I specified my coding criteria continuously and announced the specifications to the research assistant for the purpose of improving the next case in the reliability test. The following threshold ambiguities reflect my continuous specifications based on our case discussions.

Threshold ambiguities

Resource supremacy:
1. Formal state attachment is the decisive criterion for differentiating state forces from non-state forces. Some armed groups may claim to represent the state but not answering formally to the political executive of the state. Other armed groups, paramilitary or guerilla movements, in fact operate in close cooperation with the state forces but not formally. Their cooperation is thus based on a particular political alliance. All such armed groups are not considered among the state forces. Home Guards are a special case. Where they are established and/or managed by the state, they are included as state forces. If they are neither established nor managed by the state, they are considered a civil society organization competing with the state for resource supremacy. Illustrative example: Portugal (1918-1926).
2. If international forces uphold law and order in the state territory, resource supremacy is broken. Illustrative example: Bosnia (1996-2010).

Cohesion:
1. The literature is often unclear about the level of professionalism and discipline among the state security forces. If a military school functioning along Prussian, French, or other normally effective principles of army organization is well-established and actually functioning, professionalism and discipline are considered in place. Professionalization often refers to the non-use of voluntary recruits. Whether the force is voluntary or not is not of concern for cohesion.
2. Factionalism is a separate problem in some cases. Army divisions and divisions between, for instance, army, police, and navy in terms of principles of organization and mission usually exist but factionalism only exists if the state security forces have a record of internal control and manage-
ment problems in coordinating behavior. Illustrative example: Bulgaria (1990-2010).

Subordination:
1. The decisive criterion for subordination is not formal civilian control of military affairs. Some security forces enjoy a great level of autonomy but are never in conflict with the political executive over this. It is thus the lack of contestation that determines subordination. Illustrative example: Finland (1918-1945).
2. Attempted coups d’état by the military often indicate a lack of subordination but such observations are not per se used as indicative. Rather, it is the political strains between the military and police as corporate groups and the political executive that decide whether subordination is achieved or not. More so than attempted coups d’état, failed political-military negotiations or sabotaged implementation of governmentally initiated reforms of the military are relatively good indicators of a lack of subordination.

Territorial penetration:
1. As this is a minimum condition which is seldom analyzed explicitly, the indicator most often referred to is territorial control by the state apparatus. This becomes highly visible in the aftermath of state reconstructions, liberation wars, and civil wars after which control usually is substituted for a focus on the quality of the administrative institutions in place. From this point, other typical indicators of penetration are the strength of the infrastructure, including transportation and communication systems. Illustrative examples: Czechoslovakia (1918-1938), Lithuania (1920-1926), Bosnia (1996-2010).

Meritocracy:
1. Coding meritocracy is not a matter of the competence of the bureaucrats. Rather, competence is the presumed consequence of meritocracy. Like cohesion among the security forces, the criterion for coding meritocracy hinges on the existence and effective functioning of a civil service recruitment system based on meritocratic hiring and firing. Contrarily, the literature will often convey how ‘ politicization’ was a ‘systemic’ or ‘widespread’ problem indicating a lack of meritocracy.
2. In principle, the meritocratic civil service system should function on all levels of government. However, such disaggregated information is often not available. As a pragmatic solution, I trust the most common assessments which ascertain the existence of meritocracy as a general organiza-
tional characteristic. Persistent politicization and the like at the local level ensue in some cases while the departmental levels are more meritocratic. These cases are coded as instances of no meritocracy. Illustrative example: France (1918-1957).

Responsiveness:
1. To code responsiveness, I can often make use of accounts of corruption but corruption must be a malfunctioning control by the political principal of bureaucratic agents.
2. As responsiveness regards bureaucratic behavior, it is often hard to weigh instances of unresponsiveness against each other in a given year. On the one hand, I do not allow responsiveness to cumulate in my measurement. What counts is responsiveness in a given year, not responsiveness in previous years. On the other hand, responsiveness often needs to be assessed across more than one year due to the complexities of policies or fluctuation in funds. Therefore, responsiveness is most often a product of how well a given policy has been implemented according to the political intentions – not in terms of societal outcome but in terms of the swiftness and precision of the administrative implementation.
3. Because the civil service has its own corporate interests in bureaucratized countries, one possible litmus test hinges on its implementation of reforms of their own organization. But poor implementation of such reforms is not sufficient. Illustrative example: Germany (1919-1933).

Mutual group acceptance:
1. Demographic structure (such as ethnic fractionalization or polarization) is only a preliminary hunch. Actual attitudes or behavior is the real criterion for acceptance. Acceptance in turn is a minimum condition which may be measured by the absence or rare occurrence of fundamental ethnic conflicts within the territory. Sometimes, the only available information regards more thick descriptions of mutual trust, solidarity, or community which logically subsumes acceptance and are strong indications of acceptance.
2. A complete absence of ethnic conflict is very rare. Therefore, the assessment must be based on a relative number of conflicts. This ultimately makes the assessment arbitrary but as a rule of thumb, ethnic groups of less than 5% of the total population are counted as insignificant minorities, and conflicts must be ‘widespread’, ‘general’, or ‘typical’ in a given year. Alternatively, one may look to the political significance of the minority group and the salience of its conflict with other groups. The latter cri-
terion, however, is much more prone to biased assessments, and I thus generally avoid it.

3. In some cases, ethnic minorities are heavily discriminated social and economically. If not directed at ethnic or cultural qualities, such discrimination is not indication of ethnic conflict. In any case, ethnic discrimination must be politicized but in some cases, this is not the so. Illustrative examples: Peru and Ecuador (Cold War spells).

State legitimacy:
1. As with mutual group acceptance, I employ a criterion of significance in terms of size to make a group relevant for state legitimacy. Otherwise, the threshold ambiguity regards whether a given symbol is common between the different groups.

2. In some cases, the literature clearly states that the population is historically attached to the state as a place of ethnic belonging through centuries. These cases are typically termed nation states, and their legitimacy is not questioned. In the other cases, national identity is a salient matter because it is highly disputed or because the nation is simply relatively young of age. In this judgment, I am relatively liberal in the sense that I wish to capture only the cases in which the state’s legitimacy is disputed by groups demonstrating against or openly conflicting with the state. I do not wish to focus on small differences between groups in their attachment to the state which may always be found to some extent. Illustrative examples: Ghana and Nigeria (Cold War spells).

Authoritarian restoration:
1. The judgment of whether the state security forces could actually contain dissatisfied and mobilized movements and eventually hinder an overthrow of the regime is conservative. Given that state security forces are most often much more well-equipped than any other group in society, the containment is often rather a question of political will or miscommunication between politicians and military commanders during a few critical days. Such coups are not counted as authoritarian restorations. Instead, it must be abundantly clear that a lack of cohesion in some version contributed to democratic breakdown. The empirical reality of such a situation is therefore often one of violent conflict between state forces and anti-democrats or outright civil war.

2. That the state military was motivated by a restoration of its organizational powers is often not clear as their motivation is typically multifaceted with corporate-organizational concerns and genuine concern for restoration of the economy of public order mixing in one core interest. However, histor-
ical narratives of the breakdown process with some kind of military involvement often focus on the existence of military grievances related to prior salary cuts, budget control, or withdrawal of organizational autonomy, which have antagonized the military from the political executive. A military-led coup d’état based on such motivations is an instance of authoritarian restoration. An incumbent takeover or bloodless coup protected by the military because of promises of military concessions also qualifies as an authoritarian restoration. Illustrative examples: Madagascar (2009), Honduras (2009).

Security delegitimation:
1. Whether the enforcement of the monopoly on violence is unsuccessful and thus credibly gives rise to public dissatisfaction is a matter of the degree of public order. Public order itself is a function of crime rates, including notably murders, assassinations, and violent demonstrations. One or a few murders, assassinations, or violent demonstrations are not enough. Monopoly on violence is unsuccessfully enforced if such incidents are ‘general’, ‘widespread’, or ‘recurring’. Additionally, there must be some indication that violence was spinning out of control of the security forces. Often, the sheer mentioning by historical scholars of violence as a significant factor in politics or in the history of the country indicates such problems. Illustrative example: Germany (1933).

Socioeconomic delegitimation:
1. Some inaccuracy and delay are always found in implementation processes – particularly when policies such as socioeconomic reforms are complex. Minor sabotage and interruption may even be expected if policies completely changes the equilibrium between socioeconomic groups to which civil servants belong. Delays of a few months or some other short period (depending on the nature of the policy change) or small deviations relative to the broad idea of the policy do not count. The administrative behavior must work systematically against the policy purpose. Illustrative example: Spain (1937).

Elite bias delegitimation:
1. The issue of what constitutes a biased implementation rests on the number and significance of deviations from an impartial administration of laws and policies. A biased implementation can have two sources: Either it stems from a formalized policy that is, however, secretly circumvented by orders from the government and implemented loyally by the bureau-
cracy, or it stems from a policy the content of which breaks with basic rules of law of the country in question, such as guarantees of a fair trial.

2. The discrimination must be systematically targeted against specific groups over a prolonged period of time. Illustrative examples: Spain (1937), Chile (1973).

Mass bias delegitimation:
1. The criteria for identifying mass bias are the same as for elite bias. The difference is that mass bias delegitimation regards the mass-level opposition, that is, opposition groups outside the party system. Illustrative example: Venezuela (2005).

Citizenship violence:
1. Similar to security delegitimation, citizenship violence must be a general phenomenon.
2. The relevant violent conflict must regard at least two ethnic groups but they may be attached to the state or not. Illustrative example: Russia (1999).

Citizenship injustices:
1. Polarization and factionalism are relative concepts. If citizenship disagreement tends to affect politics in general, there may be political analyses or descriptions in the literature revealing how different conflict lines interact and hinder policy compromises. Here, polarization and factionalism rise and cause ethnic conflict lines to cross socioeconomic ones and hinder socioeconomic policy compromises. However, rather than demanding certain levels of polarization or factionalism the criterion is simply that some socioeconomic reforms are systematically hindered by ethnic conflicts.
2. Whether these reforms are ineffective in the next step depends on the salience of the socioeconomic issue in a given economic situation. Illustrative example: Philippines (1965).
Figure II.1: Regional developments of monopoly on violence, 1918-2010
Figure II.2: Regional developments of administrative effectiveness, 1918-2010
Figure II.3: Regional developments of citizenship agreement, 1918-2010
<table>
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<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
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<td>-3.560</td>
<td>(3.888)</td>
<td>-0.917</td>
<td>0.361</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: 1734 | Number of countries: 69 | Number of breakdowns: 60 | Time polynomials: Yes, Yes, Yes

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 (two-sided test). Reference category for colonial legacy = any other colonial legacy than British. Reference category for government type = parliamentarism. Reference category for region = Europe.
Table II.2: Substantive effects of the stateness attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All stateness attributes included</th>
<th>Only monopoly on violence</th>
<th>Only administrative effectiveness</th>
<th>Only citizenship agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monopoly on violence</td>
<td>Δ0.043 (96.13 %)</td>
<td>Δ0.048 (97.3 %)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
<td>Δ0.034 (84.4 %)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Δ0.018 (43.4 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agreement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Predicted probability percentage point changes (percentage changes). Only significant effects reported. Regressions based on base model.

Table II.3: Country-years of monopoly on violence and democratic breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratic breakdown</th>
<th>Monopoly on violence</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1455</td>
<td>959</td>
<td>2414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1531</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>2491</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table II.4: Country-years of administrative effectiveness and democratic breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratic breakdown</th>
<th>Administrative effectiveness</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1769</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>2414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1844</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>2491</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table II.5: Country-years of citizenship agreement and democratic breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratic breakdown</th>
<th>Citizen agreement</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1263</td>
<td>1151</td>
<td>2414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1315</td>
<td>1176</td>
<td>2491</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table II.6: Attributes of stateness (add.) and democratic breakdown, base and main models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Base models</th>
<th>Main models</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mon. on. viol. (add.) a2</td>
<td>-0.753*** (0.139)</td>
<td>-0.767*** (0.118)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adm. eff. (add.) a2</td>
<td>-0.014 (0.170)</td>
<td>-0.372** (0.157)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cit. agree. (add.) a2</td>
<td>-0.033 (0.135)</td>
<td>-0.232* (0.132)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/Cap. (log) a2</td>
<td>-0.598*** (0.165)</td>
<td>-0.604*** (0.170)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.306) (0.310)</td>
<td>(0.296) (0.299)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth a2</td>
<td>-0.065*** (0.023)</td>
<td>-0.063*** (0.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population size (log) a1</td>
<td>0.136 (0.111)</td>
<td>0.150 (0.110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidentialism a2</td>
<td>0.090 (0.447)</td>
<td>0.118 (0.436)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other types a1</td>
<td>0.169 (0.500)</td>
<td>0.225 (0.489)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial legacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>-0.309 (0.424)</td>
<td>-0.644* (0.378)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-colonized</td>
<td>0.243 (0.765)</td>
<td>0.055 (0.731)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional democracy level a1</td>
<td>-1.256 (1.607)</td>
<td>-0.874 (1.503)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>-0.499</td>
<td>-0.486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.917)</td>
<td>(0.892)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.852)</td>
<td>(0.782)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>0.412</td>
<td>0.446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.940)</td>
<td>(0.874)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-democratic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>international</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>order</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.872</td>
<td>1.895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.174)</td>
<td>(1.189)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-2.686</td>
<td>-2.543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.189)</td>
<td>(3.164)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N               | 2'91     | 2191     | 2191     | 2'26     |
|                 |          |          |          | 2126     |
| Number of       | 95       | 95       | 95       | 88       |
| countries       |          |          |          | 88       |
| Number of       | 72       | 72       | 72       | 66       |
| breakdowns      |          |          |          | 66       |
| Time polynomials | Yes      | Yes      | Yes      | Yes      |
| $t^{1/3}$       |          |          |          |          |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ' $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-sided test). Reference category for colonial legacy = any other colonial legacy than British. Reference category for government type = parliamentarism. Reference category for region = Europe.
Table II.7: Attributes of stateness (add.) and democratic breakdown, extended models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mon. on. viol.</td>
<td>-0.722***</td>
<td>-0.817***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.222)</td>
<td>(0.199)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adm. eff.</td>
<td>-0.319</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.629***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.248)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.214)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cit. agree.</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/Cap. (log)</td>
<td>0.321</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>0.267</td>
<td>0.221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.368)</td>
<td>(0.387)</td>
<td>(0.350)</td>
<td>(0.389)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth</td>
<td>-0.102***</td>
<td>-0.099***</td>
<td>-0.103***</td>
<td>-0.099***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population size</td>
<td>-0.073</td>
<td>-0.059</td>
<td>-0.086</td>
<td>-0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(log)</td>
<td>(0.153)</td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
<td>(0.138)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidentialism</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>-0.120</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.505)</td>
<td>(0.497)</td>
<td>(0.537)</td>
<td>(0.544)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other types</td>
<td>-0.290</td>
<td>-0.259</td>
<td>-0.408</td>
<td>-0.414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.571)</td>
<td>(0.555)</td>
<td>(0.593)</td>
<td>(0.574)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial legacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>0.286</td>
<td>-0.087</td>
<td>0.755</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.580)</td>
<td>(0.483)</td>
<td>(0.579)</td>
<td>(0.503)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-colonized</td>
<td>0.285</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>-0.568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.764)</td>
<td>(0.696)</td>
<td>(0.804)</td>
<td>(0.782)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional democracy</td>
<td>0.286</td>
<td>0.767</td>
<td>-0.185</td>
<td>1.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>level</td>
<td>(1.809)</td>
<td>(1.697)</td>
<td>(1.809)</td>
<td>(1.550)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Standard Error</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Standard Error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>-0.418</td>
<td>(0.913)</td>
<td>-0.571</td>
<td>(0.867)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>0.791</td>
<td>(0.950)</td>
<td>0.775</td>
<td>(0.869)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>1.331</td>
<td>(1.070)</td>
<td>1.331</td>
<td>(0.994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-democratic international order</td>
<td>1.583***</td>
<td>(0.443)</td>
<td>1.521***</td>
<td>(0.424)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy level (_t)</td>
<td>-3.051***</td>
<td>(0.979)</td>
<td>-3.426***</td>
<td>(0.951)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrastate conflict (_t)</td>
<td>-1.143***</td>
<td>(0.326)</td>
<td>-1.067***</td>
<td>(0.322)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interstate conflict (_t)</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>(0.850)</td>
<td>0.248</td>
<td>(0.807)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.870</td>
<td>(3.574)</td>
<td>-3.915</td>
<td>(3.691)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N                    | 1734        | 1734           | 1734        | 1734           |
| Number of countries   | 69          | 69             | 69          | 69             |
| Number of breakdowns  | 60          | 60             | 60          | 60             |
| Time polynomials \(t\) | Yes        | Yes            | Yes         | Yes            |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * \(p < 0.1\), ** \(p < 0.05\), *** \(p < 0.01\) (two-sided test). Reference category for colonial legacy = any other colonial legacy than British. Reference category for government type = parliamentarism. Reference category for region = Europe.
Table II.8: Country-years of monopoly on violence (add.) and democratic breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratic breakdown</th>
<th>Monopoly on violence (by addition)</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>303</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>959</td>
<td>2414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>325</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>2491</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table II.9: Country-years of administrative effectiveness (add.) and democratic breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratic breakdown</th>
<th>Administrative effectiveness (by addition)</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>640</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>2414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>672</td>
<td>908</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>2491</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table II.10: Country-years of citizenship agreement (add.) and democratic breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratic breakdown</th>
<th>Citizenship agreement (by addition)</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>954</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>1141</td>
<td>2414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>993</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>1166</td>
<td>2491</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Summary

This study seeks to improve our knowledge of the state-democracy nexus by asking whether and how the state contributes to democratic stability. The main contribution is to disaggregate the state and examine, across a large sample of democracies from 1918 to 2010, whether conceptually distinct attributes of the state have different effects on democratic stability.

The study contains eleven chapters. The first chapter introduces the research field, identifies the main gaps in the field and presents the main contributions of this study. Research on the state’s effect on democratic stability is, on an overall account, characterized by conceptual ambivalence and conflation. In turn, we do not know whether the state actually stabilizes democracy and, if this is the case, which particular state element drives the effect.

In Chapter 2, I conduct a conceptual analysis of the state. I introduce the concept of stateness, the strength and legitimacy of the state, and show that scholars have defined it by different combinations of three attributes: monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, and citizenship agreement. I employ these in the study by examining their separate effects on democratic stability – the instance of either democratic survival or breakdown. Monopoly on violence is a product of the resource supremacy and cohesion of the state security forces (military and police) and their subordination on matters of organizational power to the political executive. Administrative effectiveness implies the territorial penetration of the state administration, a meritocratic civil service system, and responsiveness of the civil service. Citizenship agreement implies the mutual acceptance between the ethnic groups inside the state territory and the legitimacy of the state as a common, ethnocultural symbol.

Chapter 3 investigates the theoretical role of stateness in processes of democratic (de)stabilization. It integrates stateness in the dominating model of democratic stability: the modernization theory. I propose that if state institutions are not sufficiently strong and legitimate to actually enforce democratic rules and give credibility to the promise of sustained wealth and security for the vast majority of citizens, the integrity of democracy is threatened. Weak stateness thus likely leads to democratic breakdown. The chapter hypothesizes that all three attributes of stateness likely stabilize democracies but that their effects are likely to differ substantially.

Chapter 4 builds on the theoretical framework by explicating seven mechanisms and their observable implications. A disputed monopoly on violence may lead to democratic breakdown when the security forces decide to reestablish their organizational prerogatives in an ‘authoritarian restoration’
or when an inability to secure public order delegitimizes the democratic regime in terms of security provision. An ineffective administration may lead to democratic breakdown when its failures in implementation delegitimize democracy’s socioeconomic performance, when a politicized civil service creates centrifugal party politics, or when the masses are polarized via the same centrifugal dynamic. Citizenship disagreement may lead to democratic breakdown when ethnic groups in or outside the state apparatus engage in violent conflict or when a particular distribution of resources between ethnic groups enfeebles parliamentary compromises and nurtures extremism.

The theoretical propositions are examined empirically in a controlled comparison, in a statistical analysis of the effects of the attributes on democratic stability from 1918 to 2010, and in analyses of the presence of the mechanisms among the democratic breakdowns of the interwar, Cold War, and post-Cold War periods, distinctively.

Chapter 5 provides a comparative case study of the interwar democracies in Germany, Spain, Czechoslovakia, and Finland. It indicates the resonance of the mechanisms in the classic interwar setting for studies of democratic stability.

Chapter 6 presents the dataset of democratic breakdowns and survivals from 1918 through 2010 and thus prepares for a wider empirical application of the comparative case study. It shows how the stateness attributes and mechanisms are identified and how the theoretical propositions are evaluated using the dataset. Chapter 7 then conducts a statistical analysis including a descriptive and explanatory part. It shows that the attributes of stateness only co-vary weakly and exert substantially different effects on democratic stability. All three attributes are distinct but the state capacities of monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness together capture dimensions of stateness that contrast with citizenship agreement. The attributes all significantly stabilize democracies but monopoly on violence clearly yields the strongest positive effect on democratic stability followed by administrative effectiveness and, lastly, citizenship agreement.

Chapter 8 focuses on the mechanisms among the interwar democratic breakdowns. Chapters 9 and 10 repeat the procedure for the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, respectively. In each of these three empirical chapters, I analyze the development of state weaknesses among the breakdown cases and the frequency of the mechanisms. Across all three periods and regions of the world that are represented, the mechanisms of monopoly on violence are most often associated with the democratic breakdowns. Authoritarian restoration is clearly and consistently the most commonly observed mechanism.
Chapter 11 discusses and concludes on the empirical results. The study’s empirical results contribute to improving and specifying the understanding of the state-democracy nexus by pointing to diverse state effects and particular mechanisms. I finally point to some promising venues for future state-democracy research.
Dette studie forsøger at forbedre forståelsen af sammenhængen mellem stat og demokrati ved at spørge om og hvordan staten bidrager til demokratisk stabilitet. Hovedbidraget ligger i at disaggregere staten og undersøge, for en stor sample af demokratier fra 1918 til 2010, om forskellige statsegenskaber har forskellige effekter på demokratisk stabilitet.


Kapitel 4 ekspliciterer syv mekanismer med tilhørende observerbare implikationer. Et svagt voldsmonopol kan føre til demokratisk sammenbrud, når sikkerhedsstyrkerne beslutter sig for at genetablere deres organisatoriske privilegier i en ‘autokratiske genrejsning’, eller når problemer med at sikre den offentlige orden delegitimerer det demokratiske regime indsats for fred.
og sikkerhed. En ineffektiv administration kan føre til demokratisk sammenbrud, når implementeringsmangler delegitimiserer demokratiets sociale og økonomiske indsats; når en politiseret administration skaber polarisering imellem de politiske partier, eller når masserne ligeledes polariseres. Befolkningsslegitimitet kan føre til demokratisk sammenbrud, når etniske grupper inden for eller uden for staten indgår i voldelig konflikt, eller når en bestemt fordeling af ressourcer mellem de etniske grupper svækker partiernes kompromissvillighed og skaber ekstremisme.

Studiets teser eksamineres empirisk i en kontrolleret sammenligning, i en statistisk analyse af statsegenskaberneffekter på demokratisk stabilitet fra 1918 til 2010 og i analyser af mekanismernes tilstedeværelse iblandt de demokratiske sammenbrud i mellemkrigstiden, den kolde krig og efter den kolde krig. Kapitel 5 udfører et komparativt case studie af mellemkrigstidsdemokraterne i Tyskland, Spanien, Tjekkoslovakiet og Finland. Dette studie indikerer mekanismernes genklang i det klassiske mellemkrigstidsstudie af demokratisk stabilitet.


Kapitel 11 diskuterer og konkluderer på de empiriske resultater. Mit studies empiriske resultat bidrager til at forbedre og specificere forståelsen af sammenhængen mellem stat og demokrati ved at påvise statsegenskabers forskellige effekter og bestemte mekanismer. Til slut udpeger jeg loevende områder for fremtidens forskning om sammenhængen mellem stat og demokrati.