Do They Belong?
Host National Boundary Drawing and Immigrants’ Identificational Integration
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PhD Dissertation

Politica
It is not easy to settle in a foreign country. It is hard work; it takes will power and an open mind.

Many new Danes recognise this. They have worked purposefully to learn the language and Danish traditions. They have found work and they make sure that their children get a good start in life. They have established a solid foundation and feel at home in Denmark. They have become part of our community.

It is with good reason that they fear being hit by the scepticism which may arise when large groups of refugees enter the country, and when some people have trouble adjusting. But they should not be punished because others do not invest the same effort in becoming part of the Danish community.

Being part of the Danish community is immensely important ... It is where ‘they’ become ‘we’ and ‘them’ become ‘us’ – the Danes, us Danes!

What is it to be Danish? Do we need to be Danish? Does nationality have any meaning at all in a modern, industrialised world-society?

What a question to ask!

(Margrethe II, Queen of Denmark, excerpt from the New Year’s speech on December 31, 2016, translation from Danish)
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The first month of my PhD, I hated it. Or: maybe I did not exactly hate it but I definitely did not feel very good at ‘it’. The fact is that you are very much on your own with a PhD project; you are the only one to make decisions, take charge, make things happen – and that is difficult when you have never tried something like it before. Today, I love this fact: the dissertation that you have in your hands is the product of my decisions, me taking charge, me making things happen. That is not to say that I have been alone along the way. Here, I want to thank those people who have guided, encouraged, and pushed me, made me shake off disappointments, made me smile even bigger at moments of success and – for the absolute majority of the time – made me enjoy rather than hate it.

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Last but not least: Roman. Of all the surprises that come with a PhD, you were the greatest. Sharing the PhD experience with you has felt like an adventure, and even when I did not feel very good at it, you made me smile. Let’s make the next step an adventure too.
This report summarises and discusses the framework and contributions of my PhD dissertation *Do They Belong? Host National Boundary Drawing and Immigrants’ Identificational Integration*. The dissertation is the product of a PhD project carried out at the Department of Political Science, Aarhus University. The dissertation consists of this summary report and the following self-contained articles:


The summary report presents the overarching ideas of the project, explains the connections between the four articles and discusses the broader implications of the dissertation. For details on specific arguments, methods, measurement, and analysis, the reader should refer to the individual articles.
1. Introduction

Questions of national identity and belonging seem to be on everyone’s lips these years due to concerns about immigrant integration, and it is difficult to find anyone who does not have an opinion about the problem complex. Indeed, doing research in this area, I am constantly reminded of the salience and importance of the questions because of the intensity and polarisation of contemporary debates; these are questions that both politicians and ‘ordinary people’ really care about. The aim of this dissertation is to contribute with research-based insights to nuance and ground contemporary discussions.

In recent decades, Western states have received a growing number of refugees and immigrants, whose presence has increased ethnic, religious and cultural diversity in the receiving societies. Immigrants make up between six (Finland) and 44 (Luxembourg) per cent of the total population (2013 numbers from OECD’s databank), but irrespective of whether they are relatively few or many in number, immigrants have become a central object of debate across Western societies. A common concern permeating these debates is whether they can (ever) be part of the receiving communities.

This concern has two sides. First, it is questioned whether (particular types of) immigrants are capable of and willing to be part of ‘our’ society – for instance to be Danish, French or American. Is it possible for people who have not been born into the nation to feel the same kind of loyalties and attachments as we do? This question immediately begs another, namely **what does it mean** to be part of the nation? The concern about immigrants’ belonging is closely mirrored by efforts to define national character and national values. As such, the crossing of state borders has resulted in the (re)production of symbolic boundaries between immigrant minorities and national majorities. This feature of the immigrant question reveals the extraordinarily high stakes involved because it touches upon basic understandings of who we are.

It is obvious that individuals disagree about these boundary definitions, but there is also substantial cross-national variation in how ‘us’ and ‘them’ are defined. It is, for example, clear that Danish, French and American understandings of what it takes to be part of the national community differ markedly. Indeed, ‘the distinction between immigrants and nationals varies because it is part and parcel of different definitions of the nation’ (Wimmer 2013: 28). A growing body of research explores this cross-country variation in national boundary drawing, either with focus on core institutions such as citizenship (Brubaker 1992, Howard 2005, Goodman 2010) or, more recently,
public opinion on what defines ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Bail 2008, Kunovich 2009, Wright 2011, Bonikowski 2017). An underlying, and often explicit, assumption of this research is that cross-national variations in boundary drawing matter for immigrant integration outcomes, but few studies actually examine the potential effects. My dissertation goes one step further in analysing whether, and if so how, national boundary drawing affects immigrants’ sense of belonging.

National belonging is central for both the individual immigrant and for society. At the individual level, the feeling of belonging is theorised to contribute to ontological security (Skey 2010), that is, a stable experience of self and one’s surrounding environment. Studies have found that being denied a central and wanted identity can be psychologically damaging and lead to frustration, anger, sadness, loss of meaning in life and depression (Wang et al. 2012, Lambert et al. 2013, Stillman et al. 2009). With the centrality of the nation in contemporary Western societies (Billig 1995), ‘belonging without question’ is a resource which is connected to a feeling of worth and which invests agency and power in people (Skey 2010, Fraser 2000, Lamont, Beljean and Clair 2014), making it profoundly political. At the societal level, belonging to a common national identity is argued to contribute to better intergroup relations and increase people’s investment in society (Brubaker 2004, Gaertner and Dovidio 2000). On the flipside, individuals who do not identify with the greater community may detach from society and even engage in the development of counter-cultures (Rumbaut 2008, Portes and Rumbaut 2001: 148-149, 284-286). In this light, immigrants’ belonging to the host nation can be understood as a measure of integration. As such, the extent to which a nation makes it relatively easier or more difficult for immigrants to imagine belonging is revealing of its integrative capacities.

It is important to stress that my ambition is to examine the potential effects of national boundary drawing on immigrants’ belonging, not to give an exhaustive account of belonging. Thus, the many individual-level factors at play in the process of developing belonging do not receive much attention in the dissertation. Rather, studying the effects of boundary drawing means moving the analytical perspective from factors located at the level of the individual immigrant to the host nation as a context which sets limits on belonging (Crul and Mollenkopf 2012: 11). The focus is on the political and cultural, rather than, for example, the psychological conditions of belonging.

This approach to the question of immigrants’ belonging has the potential to inform contemporary public discussions. Much debate on the immigrant question is actually a debate about the debate, that is, a debate on whether the way we are discussing national identity and belonging may have counterpro-
ductive effects by pushing immigrants away rather than inviting them to belong. We know little about how immigrants perceive the boundaries being drawn against them and whether and how this matters for their identification with and attachment to the nation. While a growing body of scholarship studies national boundaries from the majority point of view, I argue that only by connecting this with analysis of immigrants’ belonging from their perspective can we come full circle to inform contemporary public and academic discussions about the consequences of the current (anti-)immigrant discourse. This entails studying not only how immigrants are affected by boundaries but also how they react and respond to the external categorisations they are met with from the host nation. With this integrated perspective on the interplay between boundaries and belonging, the dissertation sheds light on one of the strongest concerns in contemporary Western societies: How do immigrant minorities become part of the national community?

In the next chapter, I will present the theoretical framework of my project and develop a theoretical model which connects the host nation’s boundary drawing to immigrants’ sense of belonging. In Chapter 3, I present the overall research design of the dissertation and give an overview of the data and methods employed in each of the four articles. Chapter 4 presents the central findings. The summary report closes with a discussion of the contributions and implications of my project, both for the existing literature and for contemporary public debates.

Before delving into the theoretical framework of the dissertation, a few remarks about the central concepts are warranted. In this summary report and in the individual articles, I use the terms ‘host nation’, ‘host society’ and ‘host population’ to denote the members of a country’s population who have native ancestry. The term ‘host’ is used without any suggestions of moral privilege over the nation and without any normative implications about the kind of behaviour that the host should display. Rather, the term refers to the basic argument of the dissertation that immigrants’ experiences of in- or exclusion are shaped in consequential ways by the ‘warmth of the welcome’ (Reitz 1998) they are given. Defining host nationals with reference to native ancestry has as the additional consequence that the term ‘immigrant’ refers to migrants and to their children who are born on host national soil. This in is line with the widely agreed-upon use of the category of ‘second-generation immigrants’ in academic writing and with the observation that children of immigrants are often not considered indisputably ‘national’ in public and political debates. While using the term ‘second-generation immigrants’ involves a degree of ambivalence due to the stigmatisation experienced by some of these individuals, I use it here as an academic/professional category to denote an analytically
significant segment of the population (see in particular Article C). This is not to suggest the use of the term in colloquial discourse.
2. Theoretical background and development of framework

The imagined community and its concomitant boundaries

The theoretical framework of my dissertation starts by defining the nation as an imagined political community (Anderson 1991). The nation is *imagined* ‘because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion’ (ibid.: 6). This definition involves the view that nations exist first and foremost through them being imagined and believed in by their members – a belief which has behavioural consequences (making people act e.g. ‘as a Dane’, die for their nation, and treat people of their own nationality in a different way than people from other nations).

The notion that the nation is a *community* means that it is imagined ‘as a deep, horizontal comradeship’ overriding other internal divisions or inequalities and creating a deep sense of common destiny. This community, however, is *limited*; no one imagines a nation for all people in the world; indeed the nation is by definition for a certain People. As a consequence, nations are experienced as bounded entities, and it is this feature (together with the notion of national self-determination) which is responsible for the political character of the national community, as boundedness necessarily involves processes of in- and exclusion.

While it is a common view that immigrants’ prospects for integration into the nation depend on how similar they are to the majority population, the above definition implies that what matters is how differences and similarities between immigrants and natives are constructed and made important (Wimmer 2013: 29). The question of immigrants’ integration into the national community must be answered with a focus on the way that community is imagined – and thus on how the boundary between nationals and non-nationals is defined (Barth 1969: 15).

Following Michèle Lamont, I distinguish between social and symbolic boundaries with the latter referring to ‘conceptual distinctions that we make to categorise objects, people, practices, and even time and space’ (Lamont 1992: 9). For instance, categorising an individual as child or adult, student or
teacher, woman or man involves placing that person on one side of a boundary that matters for how we think of him/her. These examples of everyday categorisations illustrate that symbolic boundaries are the central medium through which human beings perceive and experience social reality – they organise the world and make it possible to navigate what would otherwise be an incomprehensible chaos. While often invoked unconsciously (rather than deliberately strategically), symbolic boundaries may (re)produce social boundaries – that is, unequal access to group membership, status and resources – because they guide us to treat people of different categories in different ways. Whether symbolic boundaries have such effects depends on them being widely shared as intersubjective schemes of categorisation (Lamont and Molnár 2002: 168-169), for instance in accepted understandings of who belongs to the nation, and who does not.

While the notion of boundaries as divisions of the world into groups of ‘us’ and ‘them’ bears resemblance to the notions of ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’ in social identity theory (SIT) (Tajfel and Turner 1979), theories of national boundary drawing excel in providing nuance and context to the analysis of group divisions. First, while SIT suggests that everyone who is not in the in-group is part of the out-group, boundary drawing theory is more sensitive to the particular ways in which ‘us’ and ‘them’ are constructed. For instance, it is obvious that some groups become more salient objects of out-group sentiments than others in particular empirical cases, and that the degree of rejection of out-groups varies across different societies. Thus, while the above definition of the nation implies that all nations need boundaries (and therefore an out-group), the central insight is that the manner in which boundaries are drawn varies across nations, with important implications for the central question of this dissertation. Second, while SIT focuses on the psychology of inter-group behaviour, boundary drawing theory offers a stronger account of the cultural-contextual factors which may shape understandings of ‘us’ and ‘them’. For these reasons, I prefer the boundary drawing perspective as a theoretical frame of the project.

Variations in national boundary drawing and potential consequences

Scholars of national boundary drawing have approached the study of accepted understandings of national membership from two angles; as expressed in central political institutions, and as expressed in public opinion, respectively.

The institutional point of view takes citizenship and integration regimes as expressions of deeply rooted understandings of national membership. In
turn, the researcher can ‘read off’ these understandings in their institutionalisation and formalisation, for example in citizenship rules. Central here is Rogers Brubaker’s famous study comparing the significant differences in French and German citizenship regimes, which he argues must be understood as a result of different national identities (Brubaker 1992). In terms of resident foreigners’ (e.g. labour migrants) access to social and economic rights, and to residence on the territory, citizenship has lost its exclusionary power, claims Brubaker, and thus it matters little in material terms whether the state grants citizenship to them or not. Instead, what is at stake is of a more symbolic nature: ‘The politics of citizenship today is first and foremost a politics of nationhood. As such, it is a politics of identity, not a politics of interest ... The central question is not “who gets what?” but rather “who is what?”’(ibid.: 182, italics in original). This, according to Brubaker, explains the relative stability of and continued cross-national variation in citizenship regimes, despite pressures toward harmonisation or convergence.

Similar notions of stability and rootedness are found in Favell’s concept of ‘philosophies of integration’ (1998), which covers the idea that approaches to immigrant integration vary considerably across immigrant-receiving countries (in Favell’s analysis: France and Great Britain) because of the connection with national self-understandings. In a US-Europe comparative perspective, Alba (2005) looks at the institutionalisation of boundaries in key domains of citizenship, religion, language, and race, and concludes that different histories (shaping different ‘materials available in the social–structural, cultural, legal, and other institutional domains of the receiving society’, p. 41) have led to the formation of a ‘bright’ (i.e. unambiguous) boundary drawn against Muslims in Europe, while the boundary against Mexicans in the US is better understood as ‘blurred’ (i.e. less clear). The understanding that different nations approach citizenship and immigrant integration in consequentially different ways informed by nationally distinct ideas and ideals has been challenged by Christian Joppke’s convergence argument (2007). However, recent tests of convergence in statistical studies have demonstrated that nations still differ in their approach to citizenship, if not in kind then in degree (see e.g. Howard 2006, Goodman 2010).

Moving from the institutional perspective to research on public opinion, recent scholarship has taken up the question of cross-national differences in the boundary drawing of ‘ordinary people’. Utilising survey data, scholars have shown significant differences across national majority populations in the relative salience attached to different understandings of national membership (Bail 2008, Kunovich 2009, Wright 2011, Bonikowski 2017). Thus, while there are individual variations in the importance attached to different criteria of national membership (e.g. language, citizenship, ancestry or birthplace), there is
a significant national component to this which means that different nations are indeed imagined in different ways when we look at the aggregate or mean of public opinion. In parallel to the notion of rootedness in institutional studies of national boundary drawing, cross-national differences in ‘ordinary people’s’ boundary drawing are often explained by historical factors, which are thought to shape the available cultural repertoire for understanding group membership (Lamont 1992).

As pointed out above, the value of the boundary drawing perspective as compared to SIT is that it provides better ground for analysing the particular ways in which national membership is defined. This sensitivity should, in turn, provide for a better understanding of when and why it is relatively easier or more difficult for immigrants to be included in the imagined community. Indeed, as Alba states, ‘boundaries do not have the same character everywhere; and though invariably they do allow for some assimilation to occur, the terms under which this happens vary from one societal context to another’ (Alba 2005: 41). The understanding that cross-national differences in boundary drawing should matter for integration outcomes is shared in the literature. In addition, several studies on public opinion demonstrate that conceptions of nationhood among members of the national majority population are associated with attitudes toward immigrants (Wright 2011, Kunovich 2009, Bonikowski 2017), suggesting potential effects on social interaction and group behaviour. Still missing, however, are studies which take the analysis one step further to investigate the proposed consequences for immigrants. This dissertation contributes to filling in that central gap.

**Immigrants’ national belonging**

The dissertation focuses on immigrants’ feelings of national belonging as the central outcome, because this is what is directly targeted in contemporary debates about immigrants’ place in Western societies. While other themes, such as immigrants’ contributions to the country’s economy, are also salient, what is ultimately at stake is the question of whether immigrants are part of the national community.

I speak specifically of ‘belonging’ rather than ‘membership’ or ‘identity’ to signal a) that it concerns the subjective feeling of being part of a community, and b) that it moves beyond self-categorisation by not only involving identification but also feelings of attachment to the social group that is the object of identification (Crowley 1999, Kannabiran et al. 2006, Yuval-Davis 2006). These feelings are conceptualised in the literature with terms such as ‘safety’, ‘naturalness’, ‘familiarity’, ‘comfort’, and ‘home’ (Lähdesmäki et al. 2016, Yuval-Davis 2006, Duyvendak 2011, Skey 2013, Antonsich 2010).
Importantly, while belonging may be experienced as natural and almost automatic, formal membership of a group (e.g. being a citizen of a country) may neither be a necessary nor a sufficient condition for developing belonging. Nor does it mean that belonging is a stable, immutable feeling, and in the case of immigrants’ host national belonging it must necessarily develop in a ‘process of becoming’ (Kannabiran et al. 2006: 190). The present dissertation examines how the host nation’s boundary drawing may condition this process. Below I sketch a theoretical model of the process, but first it is warranted to take a step back and consider a central premise of the dissertation: that belonging matters. I argue that belonging matters on two levels: for the individual immigrant, and for the host society.

Studies in social psychology have demonstrated that group belonging is a basic human need (Baumeister and Leary 1995), and that a sense of belonging enhances individuals’ sense of meaning in life (Lambert et al. 2013), while experiences of social exclusion lead to a loss of purpose, lower self-worth, and meaninglessness (Stillman et al. 2009). While these studies provide a starting point for thinking about how existentially essential group belonging is for human beings, they do not address whether and why national belonging should be particularly important.

In fact, arguments proposing the diminishing relevance of national attachments are often voiced with reference to globalisation and the increasing number of people, goods and ideas crossing state borders. In response to these arguments, I argue that the nation is (still) central because it gives form to people’s everyday life. While we may not realise it, the nation is with us in many banal ways which make us take a national lens for granted in our experience of the social world (Billig 1995). Examples are the way the world map is divided into bounded and discrete entities, the way we are presented with news which address a ‘we’ and a ‘here’ which without doubt refer to the national ‘we’ and the national ‘here’. It applies to how we watch sports and identify with the victory or loss of ‘our’ national team, and it applies to the naturalness with which the weather report provides us with the forecast for ‘our’ country (and stops there), although we may be closer to a neighbouring country’s territory than to the capital city or a remote region of our own country. In all these, and many more, ways, ‘the nation is so consistently represented and, in many cases, experienced, as a bounded and coherent socio-political and territorial entity’ (Skey 2013: 88). This makes the nation a special object of belonging because it – more than any other contemporary community – establishes (political, territorial, temporal, social, cultural, and so on) boundaries which ‘make both individual national spaces and the globe as a whole knowable and, in setting limits, manageable’ (ibid.: 88).
These properties of the nation provide individuals with a degree of ontological security, understood as the ability to rely on things (people, objects, places, meanings) to be more or less the same tomorrow as they were today and the day before (Giddens 1984, Skey 2010: 720). By routinizing and organisimg the world, the nation makes it possible for people to escape the uncertainty which would otherwise be associated with needing to make sense of oneself and one’s surroundings over and over again. The flipside of this is feelings of alienation and displacement in the lack of belonging (Antonsich 2010: 649).

In addition to the basic security that it provides, national belonging is associated with a certain sense of status. Because the national community is imagined as inherently limited, not everyone can belong, and thus being recognised as someone who belongs involves feelings of worth, legitimacy and dignity. This moves beyond having access to a wanted identity; the status that is granted is the status of being considered a full partner for social interaction. By implication, being misrecognised is a form of subordination (Fraser 2000). I argue that belonging should be seen as a resource the unequal distribution of which may have consequences that parallel those of economic inequality (see Fraser 2000 and Lamont, Beljene and Clair 2014: 12 for similar arguments). Indeed, borrowing from Bourdieu, Ghassan Hage (1998) speaks of ‘national cultural capital’ as a commodity ‘owned’ by those people who are perceived to belong in the nation ‘without question’ (Skey 2013). Having more national cultural capital gives power and a sense of agency, both to claim one’s own legitimate belonging and judge other people with a more insecure status.

In sum, I argue that national belonging is important for people’s sense of ontological security and status. These are obviously context-dependent arguments but given the centrality of the nation for social organisation in contemporary Western societies, there is reason to expect immigrants to strive for national belonging in their new country and to feel alienated and powerless in the face of hindrances toward that end. While most people – those who belong ‘without question’ – may not be aware of the resources offered by the nation as a locus of belonging, this is likely to be more obvious to those who cannot take belonging for granted.

From the point of view of society, national belonging is also important. Given the centrality of group belonging for the individual and the negative effects of social exclusion discussed above, some theorists hypothesise the development of counter-cultures in response to blocked identity aspirations, as denoted with the concept of ‘reactive ethnicity’ (Rumbaut 2008, Portes and Rumbaut 2001: 148-149, 284-286). If such reactions become widespread, it could lead immigrant minorities to establish ‘parallel societies’ rather than be-
ing incorporated into the majority society. On the positive side, a common na-
tional identity should contribute to community cohesion and encourage coop-
eration between different groups in society because identification fosters com-
mitment and engagement (Brubaker 2004, Gaertner and Dovidio 2000). In
this light, immigrants’ national belonging can be understood as a dimension of integration.

Research in immigrant integration has until recently devoted very little at-
tention to immigrants’ identificational integration. Instead, there has been a
strong focus on functional and objective measures – in particular concerning
immigrants’ incorporation in the labour market and other socioeconomic di-
mensions (Reeskens and Wright 2014, Wu et al. 2012). While American scholar-
ship has examined questions of identity, the focus has been on *ethnic* iden-
tity (e.g. Portes and Rumbaut 2001, Zhou and Xiong 2005, Jiménez 2010),
and research in immigrants’ identification with and attachment to the host
nation has received much less attention (Schneider et al. 2012: 232). This dis-
sertation contributes to an emerging agenda which advocates for a more seri-
ous consideration of national belonging as a measure of the subjective experi-
ence of integration (see e.g. Reeskens and Wright 2014, Wu et al. 2012, Max-
well and Bleich 2014, Slootman and Duyvendak 2015).

At this point we are ready to return to the starting point of the present the-
ory chapter and connect the study of boundary drawing with that of belonging.
The literature underscores that while belonging is subjectively felt, it is never
‘just’ a private feeling. Rather, it is constrained and enabled, accepted, claimed
and negotiated in the context of the ‘politics of belonging’, that is broader so-
cietal definitions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Yuval-Davis 2006, Crowley 1999, An-
tonsich 2010). This argument reflects a basic point of sociological identity the-
ory (Jenkins 2014), namely that one can never escape seeing oneself through
the eyes of others: self-identification happens in interplay with the categorisa-
tion made by others. By marrying the literature on boundary drawing with the
literature on belonging I aim to capture this process. To connect the two liter-
atures, I propose the concept of boundary perceptions as the mediating link
between external boundaries (drawn by the host nation) and immigrants’ be-
longing. I define boundary perceptions as immigrants’ understandings of how
‘us’ and ‘them’ are defined by the host nation, including where immigrants fit
between those definitions.

In addition to providing a useful framework for the dissertation, this the-
oretical synthesis fills in gaps in how most empirical research has been con-
ducted within each of the frameworks separately. Indeed, while studies on be-
longing have mainly examined the influence of the politics of belonging indi-
rectly (looking at the references people make to external categorisations in ac-
counting for their own identity work), the literature on boundary drawing has,
as discussed above, not taken the step to investigate the assumed identificational consequences of different types of boundaries. Introducing the concept of boundary perceptions, the dissertation contributes to illuminating the extent to which external boundary definitions ‘travel’ from the majority population to the minority, in turn shaping the minority’s understanding of the relative ease or difficulty of being seen as belonging on the inside of the boundary.

Connecting boundaries and belonging: the theoretical model

The proposed theoretical model of the dissertation is illustrated in Figure 1. In the four articles that comprise the main part of the dissertation, I operationalise the host nation’s boundary drawing in different ways, as is the case for boundary perceptions and feelings of belonging. These operationalisations are given in the boxes of the figure.

As expressions of boundaries, I look at citizenship policy (Article A) and public opinion (Article A and Article B) as proposed in the literature. In Article D, I add to the level of politics that boundaries are not only drawn and signalled through policy but also through political discourse, as has indeed been witnessed in recent years with increased salience of anti-immigrant rhetoric voiced by politicians and the growth of anti-immigrant parties.

I operationalise boundary perceptions as the criteria thought to in- or exclude from national membership, that is, characteristics, skills and behaviours which are thought to be decisive for one’s position in relation to the boundary (Article C and Article D). Another expression is the degree to which immigrants believe that it is possible to cross (i.e. move from the outside to the inside) or expand (i.e. redefine) the boundary (Article C). Finally, in Article B, I look at perceived discrimination as a form of boundary perception, since discrimination involves the experience of being marked as an ‘Other’.

As expressions of belonging, I study feelings of closeness to the host nation (Article A). In Article C, I nuance this view with a distinction between feeling ‘at home’ in the nation and identifying as a national. Finally, Article D examines political belonging, understood as immigrants’ sense of being included in the national political community.

The arrows in the figure indicate the causal links being studied in each of the articles (denoted with letters A-D).
Figure 1. Theoretical model

Host nation

**Boundary drawing**
- Citizenship policy
- Public opinion
- Political rhetoric

Immigrants (1st and 2nd gen)

**Boundary perceptions**
- Perceived discrimination
- In-/exclusion criteria (boundary markers)
- Room for boundary crossing/expansion

**Feelings of belonging**
- Closeness to host nation
- Home versus identification
- Sense of political inclusion
3. Research design

The dissertation is characterised by three key design orientations: it is **comparative** in nature, it is interested in **subjective** outcomes, and it combines **quantitative and qualitative data**. This chapter presents the rationales behind each orientation, including how they inform and unite the individual articles constituting the main body of the dissertation. The chapter closes with an overview of the data and methods of analysis for each article.

The comparative logic

Analysing whether and how host national boundary drawing affects immigrants’ sense of belonging requires a comparative perspective. Only by comparing central boundary characteristics (across space and/or time) is it possible to draw conclusions about the effects of those same characteristics. For example, in order to determine whether easier access to citizenship makes immigrants feel a greater degree of inclusion in and attachment to the host society, it is necessary to know how immigrants feel in contexts where citizenship laws are more restrictive. This basic methodological point also has a substantial corollary: comparison is essential for drawing lessons from the experience with immigration in diverse societies. Comparison helps bring into relief what works and what does not, insights which in turn can help inform the development of policy and practice in order to promote immigrants’ host national belonging.

Recently, such a comparative agenda has been advocated in the field of immigrant integration research with the ‘comparative integration context theory’ by Crul and Schneider (2010). While subscribing to the same comparative logic, studies within Crul and Schneider’s framework have focused rather narrowly on institutional arrangements thought to affect various integration outcomes, thus providing for a more limited assessment of the effect of boundaries than is called for in this dissertation. In addition, relatively few countries are compared, making it difficult to disentangle the potential causes of cross-national variations in the outcomes of interest (i.e. a problem of ‘too many variables, too few cases’). This dissertation distinguishes itself by examining the effect of informal modes of boundary drawing expressed through public opinion and political rhetoric, in addition to the formal and institutionalised mode of boundary drawing expressed in citizenship policy. Furthermore, in the statistical parts of the dissertation, the number of countries included in
analysis reaches levels enabling the inclusion of country-level controls, thus strengthening trust in the claimed causal relationships.

The comparative logic informing the dissertation project plays out differently in the four articles. Articles A, B and D employ statistical multilevel regression models on survey and country-level data from 18-19 Western democracies and two to six different points in time. Articles B and D compare Western European countries, and Article A also includes the settler countries of the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. As the interest lies in isolating the potential effect of host national boundary drawing on immigrants’ boundary perceptions and belonging, I employ a multilevel model with random intercepts (Snijders and Bosker 2012, Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012) in all three articles. Where ordinary least squares regression models employ only one residual term (and treat observations as independent), this statistical model introduces a higher-level residual term to account for the expected issue that observations (here: immigrants) within the same group (here: country) will tend to have correlated outcomes. In addition, the model allows for estimating effects pertaining to the country level and thus enables the test of hypotheses concerning the influence of host national boundaries while controlling for other potentially important individual- and country-level factors. Thus, the comparative logic embedded in this statistical design seeks to isolate the boundary effect from other sources of variation in belonging that vary by country. In turn, this enables ‘all else being equal’ conclusions about the effect of host national boundaries.

In contrast to these large-N studies, Article C is a case study, utilising interview material from Denmark. While case analysis is strictly speaking not a comparative technique, the notion of a case is inherently comparative as it refers to a wider class of which the case is an example (Hague and Harrop 2007: 89). The comparative logic of the dissertation project thus also clearly informs Article C, where notions of national membership in relation to Muslim/Middle Eastern immigrants in Denmark are treated as a case of bright boundary drawing. The study is based on interviews with 20 second-generation immigrants of Middle Eastern descent. The focus on Middle Eastern backgrounds is motivated with reference to the particular focus of Danish boundary drawing, meaning that the sample constitutes a ‘most likely’ group for experiencing the boundary as bright and difficult to cross. Although the single case study implies that there is no variation in boundary drawing, the conclusions drawn on the basis of the analysis in Article C are claimed to have comparative significance for other cases of bright boundary drawing, even if the question of how far the insights travel necessarily requires further studies on other, comparable cases. In particular, the hope is that other scholars will apply (and
maybe adapt) the concepts of national belonging developed on the basis of the article’s analysis.

Also Article D includes a Danish case study (in addition to the statistical cross-national study mentioned above). On the basis of a qualitative description of the Danish political debate and utilising quantitative data on the salience of anti-immigrant political rhetoric, it is argued that Denmark constitutes an extreme case in comparison with other Western European countries. The case study is based on five focus group discussions with immigrants of non-Western backgrounds. With this selection of focus group participants, the case is argued to provide a ‘most likely’ scenario for seeing effects of political rhetoric. Studying immigrants’ boundary perceptions and belonging in such a context serves as a basis for formulating hypotheses to be tested in the statistical analysis which employs cross-national data from countries that vary on the salience measure of anti-immigrant political rhetoric. Here, the comparative logic both informs the selection of the case for the initial study and is carried through as an analytical technique in the subsequent statistical study (cf. above).

The empirical universe to which the comparative logic extends in the dissertation is immigrants in modern Western democracies. While I suspect that the boundary processes analysed in the dissertation may be of a more general nature and apply to other minority groups and to non-Western communities, I also acknowledge the specific context in which the research question is embedded. This concerns the scale of immigration to Western nation-states, the centrality of the nation as a locus of belonging in this part of the world, and the salience of national symbolic boundary drawing against immigrants at this historical time. Thus, while I welcome engagement with the arguments on a wider set of cases, the claims to comparative significance made in this dissertation extend first and foremost to the empirical universe specified here.

Asking immigrants themselves

Arguing the importance of giving serious consideration of national belonging in the study of immigrant integration, this dissertation requires access to immigrants’ subjective experiences and feelings. Thus, the data generation methods employed in the different articles all involve asking questions of immigrants about how they perceive boundaries and identify themselves vis-à-vis the host nation. This applies to utilising existing survey data (Articles A, B and D), and to conducting focus group discussions (Article D) and in-depth interviews (Article C).
The strength of these kinds of data is that they provide insight into whether and how the host nation’s boundary definitions travel to the objects of boundary drawing, in turn affecting the possibilities of belonging. While the research question and the theoretical framework of the dissertation emphasise the power of the host nation in setting the terms of boundary drawing, the use of subjective data on immigrants’ experiences works as an important reminder that immigrants are not just passive receivers but active agents who may challenge, negotiate or disregard certain boundary definitions and external categorisations (Massey and Sánchez R. 2010: 16).

Asking immigrants about their boundary perceptions and their identifications is not completely unproblematic, of course, as being asked may in itself have certain effects on those perceptions and identifications – or at least how they are reflected upon and given expression. It is not clear, however, whether this would lead to weakened or strengthened claims to belonging, and it is likely that the potential effect goes in opposite directions for different kinds of people. While the potential bias involved with interviewing and surveying people should be acknowledged, there is no obvious way of getting around the issue. Nor is there – with respect to the particular research question for this dissertation – a clearly better alternative to actually asking immigrants themselves what they think and feel. In addition, the situation of being asked the questions in focus of this dissertation is in many respects not much different from immigrants’ exposure to similar questions in everyday life, from the media and in political messages (a point which is reflected in the in-depth interviews and focus group discussions conducted for Articles C and D).

Combining quantitative and qualitative data

The final key design orientation of the dissertation is the combination of quantitative and qualitative data. While Article D is the only of the four articles which employs a mixed methods design, the dissertation as a whole is inspired by the mixed methods logic. Thus, in taking advantage of the different strengths afforded by quantitative and qualitative data, the aim is to integrate the different types of insights gained from each study in order to give a fuller answer to the research question as well as provide more nuance than is possible without data combination.

The value of using quantitative data to examine the research question lies in the possibility of examining the links between the central variables of the project across countries. As discussed above, the statistical approach employed in Articles A, B and D enables control for individual- and country-level variables and thus makes it possible to isolate the effect of boundaries from other potentially important factors influencing the outcome. Furthermore,
providing an overview of how a substantial number of countries score on relevant boundary measures, the parts of the project which use quantitative data are also informative for case selection decisions in the qualitative parts. As mentioned above, this is the case for Article D. In addition, information from Article A on public opinion concerning valued boundary markers is utilised in Article C to place the Danish case in its comparative context.

While establishing patterns and isolating causes is crucial for answering the question about boundary effects, the analysis of qualitative data provides insight into the micro-processes which are likely to account for correlations found in the quantitative studies. In turn, this strengthens the trust in the causal relationships. For example, the qualitative study in Article C contributes to filling in the potential causal chain that accounts for the statistical relationship found between host national boundary drawing and immigrants’ belonging in Article A (a point which will be elaborated in Chapter 4). This also relates to the fact that qualitative data are better at giving insight into how boundaries are felt, reacted to, internalised and challenged – that is; the lived experience of the processes under study.

Finally, an important value of utilising qualitative data is that it has contributed to the development of central theoretical concepts. This applies to the concept of boundary perceptions, which I introduced in an effort to marry the literatures of national boundary drawing and belonging, cf. Chapter 2. As the concept was empirically unexplored Articles C and D have contributed importantly to sharpening and informing it. Furthermore, the inductive analysis of interview material in Article C led to a reconceptualization of the concept of belonging – a finding which I regard as an important contribution to the literature, and which would not have been revealed without the use of qualitative data and inductive analysis (see also Chapter 4).

In sum, while analysis of quantitative data provides the best grounds for examining whether boundaries have an effect, analysis of qualitative data excels in giving insight into how boundaries work to bring about the outcomes in focus. By combining and integrating the two data sources and methods, the dissertation is able to both demonstrate broad patterns and delve into lived experience. Without both legs, it is my conviction that the dissertation would stand less strong, missing important parts of the full picture informing the research question.

Overview of data and methods for the four articles

Table 1 gives an overview of the core research question, data and methods employed and countries studied in each of the four articles. The results from each article, and the links between them, will be presented in the next chapter.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article</th>
<th>Core research question</th>
<th>Data sources</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Does host national boundary drawing, in the form of citizenship policy and public opinion, affect immigrants' belonging?</td>
<td>Two rounds of the International Social Survey Programme, 2003 and 2013. Citizenship Policy Index and MIPEX 'Access to Nationality Index'.</td>
<td>Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States.</td>
<td>Random effects multilevel regression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>What is belonging for second-generation immigrants, how do they perceive the national boundary, and how do these perceptions affect belonging?</td>
<td>Semi-structured qualitative interviews with second-generation immigrants of Middle Eastern backgrounds.</td>
<td>Denmark.</td>
<td>Systematic qualitative content analysis (inductive start-point).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Public opinion matters, policy does not

As identified in Chapter 2, national boundary drawing has mainly been studied in the form of citizenship policy and public opinion, respectively. In Article A, the suggested belongingness effect of these two modes of boundary drawing is tested. The study utilises cross-national survey data from two rounds of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) (2003 and 2013), which contains information allowing for the construction of an immigrant sample.¹ The measure of belonging is constructed from a question which asks the respondent how close (s)he feels to the host country (with four response categories, ranging from ‘very close’ to ‘not close at all’). By underscoring subjectivity, feelings and attachment, this question touches upon the important elements of the theoretical concept, cf. Chapter 2.

The inclusivity of citizenship policy is measured with two different policy indices (the Citizenship Policy Index and the MIPEX ‘Access to Nationality Index’), as no index covers both years being studied. The hypothesis is that immigrants will find it easier to belong in countries where the official requirements to become a member of the nation are lower or less restrictive, because easier access to the citizenry can be seen as a signal inviting outsiders to belong.

To construct a measure of the host population’s boundary drawing, I utilise the residual sample of respondents from the ISSP after extracting the immigrant respondents. Based on factor analysis of a battery of questions asking respondents to rate the importance of eight different criteria of membership of their nation, I find that the criteria cluster in two groups – a group of ‘attainable’ and a group of ‘ascriptive’ boundary markers. This grouping gives basis for the construction of two indices (see Figure 2) on which each majority respondent is given a score reflecting the total importance ranking of the four items constituting the relevant index.

¹ Due to data limitations, it is not possible to distinguish between first- and second-generation immigrants. Therefore, the results from the regression models in the study are mean effects across the two generations.
Figure 2. Boundary markers in the attainable and the ascriptive indices

Note: Indices based on factor analysis of survey data from the ISSP. All non-immigrant respondents receive a score on each index, summarising the importance ratings of the boundary markers in the relevant index.

Generating country means from individual respondent scores on each of the indices, I arrive at two measures of boundary drawing in public opinion. The hypothesis is that if the host nation attaches great importance to attainable criteria of national membership, it can be understood to reflect a readiness to include immigrants on the condition that they acquire the relevant markers. In turn, this should inspire immigrants to feel greater belonging. Conversely, high prioritisation of ascriptive markers makes for a rigid and bright boundary as it is practically impossible for immigrants to live up to them. This, in turn, should make it more difficult for immigrants to develop belonging.

While it is obvious that citizenship policy is a country-level variable, the fact that the country scores on the two attitudinal indices are constructed from individual-level data warrants a few remarks. The logic behind treating this measure as a country-level variable rests on the assumption that the country mean expresses the dominant conception of boundaries in the host population. Thus, while there is naturally within-country variation, the country mean gives the ‘balance’ of boundary conceptions confronting immigrants in the country. Note that the means vary quite substantially across countries (while the within-country variation over time – from 2003 to 2013 – is rather small), indicating the quality of the measure as a country-level variable. In addition,
the cross-national variation on both these and the citizenship measures testifies to the appropriateness of the study design for testing boundary hypotheses.

Regressing belonging on these boundary measures (controlling for relevant individual- and country-level variables) in random effects multilevel models suggests that only one of the hypothesised modes of boundary drawing matters. While citizenship policy appears ineffectual for promoting (or discouraging) immigrants’ belonging, the boundary drawing of the majority population has a statistically significant effect on immigrants’ feeling of closeness to the host nation. In particular, in nations where the host population places relatively more weight on attainable criteria, immigrants display significantly higher levels of belonging, all else being equal.

The somewhat surprising null-effect of citizenship policy – at least in light of the strong arguments made in the literature about the importance of the symbolic dimension of citizenship regimes – should be considered against the fact that the study provides a conservative test given the few degrees of freedom in the model and therefore rather low statistical power. However, a robustness test of the policy hypothesis on another dataset also finds no statistical effect (see Appendix 3 for Article A). Finally, the present findings resonate with one of the only other large cross-national studies of the effect of tighter citizenship regulations on social integration (operationalised in terms of social trust and minimised perceptions of discrimination), which also arrives at a null-finding (Goodman and Wright 2015). Importantly, this result does not imply that acquisition of citizenship may not contribute to belonging at the individual level – indeed, as demonstrated by Hainmueller, Hangartner and Pietrantouno (2017), citizenship acquisition has a positive causal effect on immigrants’ social integration in Switzerland, and in Article B, I show that having host national citizenship correlates with lower levels of perceived discrimination among immigrants. The argument being made in relation to the null-finding in Article A does not go against these findings but points to the lack of a symbolic/policy-signalling effect of citizenship that works beyond individual acquisition of citizenship.

A possible interpretation of the null-finding for citizenship policy held up against the positive effect for public opinion concerns the fact that immigrants are likely to be confronted with the boundaries drawn in public opinion more frequently and more directly than with the boundaries drawn in citizenship policy. Thus, while immigrants do not face the formal boundaries of citizenship policy on a daily basis, the boundary conceptions of members of the majority population are likely to influence everyday encounters and through them crucially impact on immigrants’ sense of inclusion.
This interpretation draws a line between formal and informal modes of boundary drawing and suggests that immigrants are mainly affected by boundary messages communicated informally in everyday meetings with the majority population. These findings and the suggested distinction constitute an original contribution which demonstrates the need to consider different modes of boundary drawing when examining identity effects. Indeed, while I find support for the notion that national boundaries at the policy level have lost their causal significance (supporting Joppke’s (2007) convergence argument with respect to the effect of institutional boundaries), I demonstrate the need to look more closely to the boundaries drawn by ordinary people in the course of everyday life. If we look there, national boundaries seem far from insignificant and ineffective. In fact, Article A demonstrates that it matters a great deal which national community immigrants arrive to, since communities differ with respect to how welcoming they are of immigrants and how much room there is for newcomers in the imagined community of the host nation.

In addition to this central result, the article examines the notion that the material for boundary drawing – the available cultural repertoire (Lamont 1992) – is historically dependent. Stepwise regressions of historical conditions and the attainable boundary marker index on immigrants’ belonging shows that settler nations (i.e. nations based on an immigrant population) and nations which experienced early democratisation (before the nineteenth century) are better at promoting immigrants’ belonging because these historical conditions have led to a higher prioritisation of attainable boundary markers. Indeed, the effects of both these historical conditions are completely mediated by higher prioritisation of attainable criteria of national membership in the host population.

In sum, the results of Article A attest to the importance of informal boundary drawing (and the ineffectiveness of citizenship policy) in promoting immigrants’ identificational integration. In addition, the historical analysis supports the notion that boundary drawing is path-dependent.

Boundary drawing forms immigrants’ perceived discrimination

Article B extends the insight from Article A that the boundary drawing of the host population matters for immigrants. However, Article B moves one step back in the causal chain and examines perceived discrimination, rather than belonging, as the outcome. I consider perceived discrimination a form of boundary perception, since the idea of being discriminated against involves attributions to the (supposed) discriminator’s prejudice. Discrimination is tied to the notion of being treated as an ‘Other’ and denied recognition as
someone who deserves the same respect as people who belong on the inside of the relevant group boundary.

Perceived discrimination has been found to weaken national identification (Branscombe et al. 1999, Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007, Jasinskaja-Lahti et al. 2009, Molina et al. 2015), and the study in Article B can therefore be considered as a contribution to spelling out a potential mechanism through which the results of Article A are generated.

The study of discrimination has traditionally been the domain of social psychology, with a focus on individual-level drivers of the phenomenon. In Article B, I argue that serious consideration of the normative social context is needed, since the motivations of discrimination rest in the in-group’s negatively biased stereotypes toward the out-group. Therefore, I build on the insight from national boundary drawing theory that host populations are not equally biased toward the immigrant out-group. I hypothesise that immigrants pick up boundary signals from public opinion, and that this matters for the extent to which they feel discriminated against. Thus, immigrants’ perceived discrimination should be higher in nations where the host population draws exclusive boundaries than in nations where the host population is more inclusive.

The study utilises survey data from six rounds of the European Social Survey (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012), which contains information enabling the construction of an immigrant sample. The measure of perceived discrimination is dichotomous; it is coded 1 if the respondent declares to be member of a group being discriminated against in the country on grounds of colour/race, ethnicity, nationality, religion and/or language. Limiting the measure to these (perceived) grounds of discrimination underscores the idea that what is relevant to the study is discrimination linked primarily to the respondent’s immigrant background (and thus relating to feelings of exclusion from the host national community).

For the host population’s boundary drawing, I utilise the residual sample of respondents after extraction of the immigrant sample (in parallel with the procedure in Article A). The measure of boundary inclusivity is constructed from three questions which ask respondents to indicate on an eleven-point scale whether immigrants have a positive or negative effect on the country’s economy, the country’s cultural life, and how it is to live in the country. As in Article A, country means are calculated from individual scores on this index. While the index does not ask about boundary markers, and is thus in some sense less sophisticated than the boundary measure from Article A, it does tap directly into the host population’s relative appreciation of immigrants as members of the host society.
Results from multilevel logistic regression with random intercepts (controlling for relevant individual- and country-level variables) support the hypothesis that relatively more inclusive host nations reduce immigrants’ probability of perceiving discrimination, all else being equal. The study also tests a moderation hypothesis. One of the central and consistent findings in social psychology studies of perceived discrimination is that strong identification with the out-group increases the likelihood of perceiving discrimination (Schmitt and Branscombe 2002, Sellers and Shelton 2003, Brondolo et al. 2005, Molina et al. 2015). However, the study in Article B shows that this is a qualified truth. The results are illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Average predicted probability of perceived discrimination as a function of inclusivity of national self-image for ethnic minority identifiers and non-identifiers

Note: Illustration of results from multilevel logistic regression with random intercepts. N = 19,540.

In line with social psychology studies, the analysis shows that ethnic minority identifiers are indeed more prone to perceive discrimination than immigrants who do not consider themselves part of an ethnic minority group. However, the inclusivity of the host national boundary matters for the degree to which ethnic minority identification is an obstacle to feeling like an equal and valued member of the national community. The average predicted probability of perceiving discrimination is 45 per cent for ethnic minority identifiers in the most exclusive nation observed in the sample (Greece in 2010) compared to 20 per cent in the most inclusive nation observed (Sweden in 2010). Such a difference (25 percentage points) is substantial and remarkable, and it underscores the conclusions from Article A that the host population’s openness to immigrants
crucially affects immigrants’ sense of inclusion and belonging. The moderation effect from Article B adds the nuance that individual characteristics do not ‘work’ in the same way in normatively different social contexts. While identifying as a member of an ethnic minority group seriously curbs the feeling of being included in exclusive national contexts, it is less of an obstacle in more inclusive contexts. This underscores the point highlighted in boundary drawing theory that what matters for immigrants’ inclusion in the imagined national community is not so much objective cultural similarity but rather how differences and similarities are constructed and made important (Barth 1969, Wimmer 2013).

Boundary perceptions affect belonging with but not belonging in

Integrating the insights of Article A and Article B provides support for the proposed theoretical model in demonstrating that the host nation’s boundary drawing affects both boundary perceptions, in the form of perceived discrimination, and immigrants’ feeling of belonging. Two central questions are still left unanswered, however. First, how do immigrants form their perception of the boundary? And second, how do these boundary perceptions translate into feelings of belonging? Article C offers answers to these questions, building on qualitative content analysis of in-depth interviews with young second-generation immigrants of Middle Eastern backgrounds in Denmark.

I argue that second-generation immigrants are a particularly central group for understanding how boundary perceptions affect belonging. On the one hand, they possess many of the traditional markers of national membership; they are born on the country’s soil, they have been socialised in national institutions, they speak the language fluently, and have (in the present case) national citizenship. On the other hand, they carry markers of difference which may produce an experience of not being seen as part of the national community; they lack national ancestry, they may be visibly different from majority members, they may be of another religion than most, and so forth. The first set of factors means that a lack of belonging among second-generation immigrants cannot stem from being unfamiliar with the host society (as is sometimes the case for the first generation). The second set of factors constitutes elements which may figure in the host nations’ boundary drawing and thus mark second-generation immigrants as ‘Others’. This combination means that second-generation immigrants occupy a position which highlights the symbolic (rather than the practical/material) dimensions of boundary drawing.

As discussed in Chapter 3, given their Middle Eastern descent, this particular sample is thought to constitute a ‘most likely’ group for experiencing the
boundary as bright and difficult to cross. This is confirmed in the first part of the analysis which focuses on the interviewees’ boundary perceptions. In particular, all interviewees said that it is difficult to be included in the Danish nation, mentioning three criteria of exclusion: being a (practising) Muslim, speaking other languages than Danish – primarily Arabic – or speaking with an accent, and having a ‘non-Danish’ appearance. These criteria were often mentioned spontaneously and with great conviction, suggesting that interviewees have an underlying awareness of the boundary which does not require much reflection for them to describe. The three boundary markers were mentioned throughout the interviews, often in connection with describing experiences with not being seen as Danish. However, the cues on which interviewees based their boundary perceptions were often subtle, for instance being looked at in a certain way or being praised for having good Danish language skills. This finding is in line with the interpretation of results from Article A in that interviewees mentioned everyday encounters with members of the Danish majority population as evidence of the boundary while no interviewees mentioned citizenship policy as a source of boundary impressions.

While there was wide agreement about the experience of a bright boundary, the analysis reveals substantial variation across interviewees in their degree of national belonging. In the article, I develop four categories that can be placed on a continuum of belonging: identifiers, ambivalent identifiers, non-identifiers, and dis-identifiers (see Figure 4). The fact that most (13/20) interviewees had reservations against identifying as Danish indicates support for the hypothesis that bright boundaries complicate the development of belonging. At the same time, the analysis adds the nuance that what matters for interviewees’ degree of (not) belonging is how they understand their position in relation to the boundary. This understanding largely depends on whether interviewees see themselves as possessing the excluding markers.

Figure 4. Continuum of feelings of belonging

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identifiers</th>
<th>Ambivalent identifiers</th>
<th>Non-identifiers</th>
<th>Dis-identifiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘I feel Danish’</td>
<td>‘I don’t always feel Danish’</td>
<td>‘I’m not Danish’</td>
<td>‘I’m NOT Danish’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘I don’t feel completely Danish’</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Classification scheme based on qualitative content analysis. Quotes indicate typical statements by interviewees in the category. Numbers in parentheses indicate how many interviewees fall in the relevant category.
The ambivalent identifiers felt that they live up to many of the criteria for being Danish, in particular through ‘behaving like Danes’ (i.e. going to parties, drinking alcohol and having ethnically Danish friends). For them, the primary, and often sole, reason for being insecure about their Danishness was the feeling of being looked at in a way which tells them that they are not Danish because they look different. Moving further to the right on the continuum (and thus further away from the boundary to the Danish nation), the non-identifiers could not claim that they ‘behave like Danes’, not least because they felt they receive mixed signals of what that entails. On the one hand, they cited minimalistic criteria such as citizenship and wanting to live in Denmark, and on the other hand they were of the impression that being Danish requires eating pork, ‘loving the Queen’ and celebrating Christmas. Thus they felt like being led to think that they have a ‘foot inside’ but are then pushed even further away from belonging because of the impossibility of living up to the ascriptive criteria. On a side-note, the mixed signals appear to be consistent with evidence from Article A, which shows that the Danish majority population places relatively high priority on both achievable and ascriptive criteria of national membership. Finally, the dis-identifiers referred to the discourses of Danish (social) media and politics as additional sources of boundary information which push them so far away from the Danish nation that they actively distance themselves from the Danish ‘ideal’.

Turning to the identifiers, the analysis reveals two routes to a secure sense of belonging: boundary crossing and boundary expansion. Boundary crossers are individuals who do not possess the excluding markers mentioned above and who have therefore been free from ‘the gaze’ which gives the other interviewees reservations against taking on the Danish identity label. Importantly, their claim to Danishness rested on the very same boundary markers which had an excluding function for the other interviewees (e.g. claiming to be Danish because they are not (practising) Muslims). Connecting this result to Article B, this group of interviewees would be those who do not identify as members of an ethnic minority group in the country and therefore do not feel excluded by the boundary drawing of the host population.

In contrast, boundary expanders identified as Danish while acknowledging that they possess the excluding markers (look visibly different than ethnic Danes, are practising Muslims). Experiences of acceptance of their difference by members of the Danish majority population have been crucial for their development. This in turn has given the interviewees in this group a sense of agency to negotiate the terms of boundary drawing and expand the boundary to include Muslims.

The analysis is illustrated in Figure 5. Most interviewees perceived the boundary as the solid, thick angle. The varying distance at which they are
placed in relation to the boundary indicates their personal understanding of how far or close they are to becoming Danish. Only the boundary expanders understood their Danishness in relation to another boundary – the one they have been able to redefine (indicated by the dashed angle).

Figure 5. Interviewees’ self-positioning in relation to the Danish national community and associated boundary perception

Note: Angles indicate boundary perceptions. Arrows indicate potential movement (to the right: movement of boundary, to the left: movement of individuals). Categories of belonging are taken from Figure 4; ‘Identifiers’ are divided in two analytically separate groups (boundary crossers and boundary expanders).

In sum, the broad consensus concerning boundary perceptions demonstrates the power of boundaries as intersubjective frames that affect individual lives by restricting the possibilities of imagining belonging. For most interviewees, information about the boundary came from everyday encounters with people from the majority population, which strengthens the interpretation of Article A’s results. At the same time, Article C adds nuance to the proposed theoretical model and the straightforward interpretation of the statistical results. Indeed, boundary perceptions are not unconditionally translated into (lack of) belonging but are mediated through personal notions of one’s position in relation to the boundary, determining the degree of felt distance to the host nation. Finally, the boundary expanders show that despite awareness of a bright boundary, it is possible for immigrants to resist, challenge and negotiate the host nation’s boundary definitions. Importantly, however, such agency appears to depend on personal experiences with acceptance from members of the national majority population.

A final important finding from the analysis in Article C is that belonging is not a one-dimensional concept as otherwise defined in the literature. On the
basis of inductive analysis of the concept of belonging in the interview material, I found that feeling ‘at home’ and feeling ‘Danish’ figure as two crucially different notions of belonging for the interviewees, rather than being part of the same concept as defined in the literature, cf. Chapter 2. Indeed, almost all interviewees said that they feel at home in Denmark – despite the variation demonstrated above in (not) identifying as Danish. To give analytical meaning to this, I suggest a distinction between belonging in and belonging with. Among the interviewees, belonging in was experienced as a secure and self-evident feeling which does not depend on the host nation’s boundary drawing but rather on being socialised into Danish society. It is about being born and growing up in Denmark, about knowing Denmark inside out, about thinking in Danish and feeling like a fish in the water. It also involves not wanting to live according to any other values than those that prevail in Danish society. These things together provide a sense of safety and comfort. Belonging with, on the other hand, crucially depends on boundary perceptions – that is, the idea that others think that you belong with them. It is the experience of being seen as not truly Danish which prevents many of the interviewees from seeing themselves as Danish – despite feeling at home in Denmark.

I argue that the distinction is important for second-generation immigrants in claiming (some form of) belonging and gaining a sense of entitlement and agency, even in the face of a bright national boundary. It helps them handle the peculiar situation they find themselves in: being in-between attachment (to Danish society) and othering (by the Danish community). While the concept pair is developed on the basis of a case study, I believe it can be informative for the experiences of other nationally marginalised minority groups who are objects of bright boundary drawing. In particular, I suspect that it can illuminate the experiences of many second-generation immigrants in contemporary Europe. However, the comparative significance of the distinction must be determined in future studies.

Politics matters after all

Article A found that the boundary drawing signalled and performed in citizenship policy does not seem to affect immigrants’ belonging. This does not mean that politics in a more general sense of the term does not have an effect on immigrants’ experiences of in- and exclusion and thus potentially on belonging. Indeed, the analysis in Article C demonstrated that dis-identifiers referred to political discourse as an important source through which their sense of being pushed away from belonging was formed. Article D takes its point of departure in the observation that issues of immigration and integration have received much negative attention on the political agenda in many European
countries in recent years. The central question is whether this has had any effect, that is, whether boundary drawing in political rhetoric has consequences for immigrants' belonging. With this focus, the article adds a new perspective to the conceptualisation of host national boundary drawing which is placed in-between policies and public opinion.

The specific outcome of interest in Article C is immigrants' political belonging, understood as the extent to which immigrants feel included in the political community of the host country. This outcome touches upon concepts of political legitimacy, as the raison d'être of modern democracies is that they – as a minimum – give all citizens an experience of being heard and taken into account, even if they are not part of the political majority (Young 2000).

The question is examined in a mixed methods study. On the basis of qualitative content analysis of focus group discussions with first- and second-generation immigrants in Denmark, I formulate a set of hypotheses which are subsequently tested on cross-national survey data from the European Social Survey in random effects multilevel regressions. My ambition is to use qualitative and quantitative data and methods to provide grounded insight into how political rhetoric may (not) link with political belonging, and to be able to speak to the potential generalisability of the suggested mechanisms.

As argued in Chapter 3, the Danish case is treated as a 'most likely' scenario of seeing effects of anti-immigrant political rhetoric, which makes it ideal for the formulation of hypotheses about potential mechanisms. From the analysis of the focus group discussions, I found that immigrants are very aware of the negative images being voiced by politicians – indeed the impression was of an overwhelmingly immigrant-critical political debate with practically no positive voices. In turn, participants referred to this impression of the political debate as a reason to experience low political responsiveness, have only little trust in politicians and – most seriously – to have lost faith in democracy. Indeed, a common notion was that 'democracy is not for us' because Danish politicians only cater to 'the Danes' at the expense of immigrants. On this basis, I expected to find a negative effect of anti-immigrant political rhetoric on immigrants' political belonging in the statistical study.

The statistical test supports this expectation, showing that – all else being equal – anti-immigrant political rhetoric (measured on the basis of manifesto data) has a statistically significant and negative effect on immigrants' political trust and faith in democracy.

In addition to this general expectation, I formulated a number of moderation hypotheses (based on the qualitative analysis) relating to religious background, political interest, age/generation, and education. The statistical analysis supports two of these hypotheses: For both political trust and faith in democracy, Muslims are significantly more affected by political rhetoric than
non-religious immigrants and immigrants of another religion (see Figure 6 and Figure 7). This resonates with the idea that Muslims are specifically targeted in and thus more affected by contemporary anti-immigrant discourses in Western Europe. The finding also connects to results from Article C where the three boundary crossers found protection in not being (practising) Muslims.

Figure 6. Political trust

Note: The figures display the marginal effect of negative political rhetoric on the relevant outcome across three different religious groups. Bands indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 7. Satisfaction with democracy

The other moderation hypothesis finding support in the statistical analysis concerns education. For both outcomes, the negative effect of anti-immigrant political rhetoric diminishes with longer education, turning statistically insignificant for immigrants with very long education (above 16 years for political trust, and above 18 years for satisfaction with democracy, see Figure 8 and
Figure 9. In the article, I offer two possible interpretations of the education effect which both find some evidence in the focus group material. The first interpretation points to a mediation effect of education, suggesting that children of parents with higher socio-economic status typically fare better in school and obtain higher status in socio-economic (including educational) terms. These individuals are likely to have ‘lived up to’ fewer of the negative immigrant stereotypes that dominate political rhetoric and may thus feel less as targets of negative messages. In this explanation, education is not an independent factor but rather a proxy for a status which protects against negative political rhetoric.

Figure 8. Political trust

![Figure 8. Political trust](image)

Figure 9. Satisfaction with democracy

![Figure 9. Satisfaction with democracy](image)

Note: The figures display the marginal effect of negative elite rhetoric on the relevant outcome across the observed range of years of full-time education. Dotted lines indicate 95 % confidence intervals.
The other possible – and compatible – explanation that I offer considers education as a socialisation arena. Immigrants in higher education are likely to be less exposed to encounters of a blatantly racist character because higher education is found to socialise people into more liberal and tolerant norms (e.g. Stubager 2008). In this explanation, education has a sorting function as it affects who immigrants socialise with. Meeting more host nationals with a tolerant mindset may function as a buffer against internalising negative political rhetoric.

These moderation effects serve to qualify and contextualise the argument about the damaging effects of elite rhetoric, as the groups most in focus of negative elite messages (Muslims and immigrants of low socio-economic status) appear to respond in the greatest measure with negative judgements.

In sum, Article D expands the examination of boundary effects to the area of political rhetoric and political belonging. The mixed methods study shows that politics matters after all. Immigrants appear to be very aware of how they are portrayed by politicians, and this affects their evaluations of the national political community and their sense of inclusion. In line with the results from Article A, however, there were very few mentions of concrete policies in the focus group discussions, underlining the notion that boundaries are most effective at the informal and discursive levels when it comes to affecting immigrants’ sense of belonging.
Do they belong? Taken together, the studies in this dissertation demonstrate that the answer to the question in the title of this dissertation depends in consequential ways on how the host nation defines the terms of national membership. In synthesis, the findings of the four articles offer a nuanced account of the interplay between boundaries and belonging which I believe constitutes a contribution both to the academic literature and to broader public debates on the topic. In this final chapter of the summary report, I discuss these contributions in turn.

Academic contributions and implications

The starting point of the dissertation was to take the consequence of theories on national boundary drawing and develop a theoretical model for the proposed effects of boundaries on immigrants’ identificational integration. The four articles test this model in a variety of ways on different empirical material. Not only do the empirical studies in the dissertation establish that boundaries affect belonging, they also provide evidence speaking to the question of how immigrants are affected.

First, the studies in the dissertation all point to the importance of boundaries at the informal level. While much of the writing on national boundaries has theorised the centrality of citizenship policy (and immigration and integration policy more broadly), the findings of this dissertation suggest that boundaries at this formal level are less consequential for immigrants’ sense of inclusion and attachment to the host nation than the boundaries they are met with in public and political discourse. This is not to say that citizenship policy does not affect immigrants’ lives and opportunities – for instance by enabling or limiting their political participation – but in terms of identificational integration, this mode of boundary drawing appears less influential. What matters, instead, is how the host population and their politicians define who is ‘us’ and who is ‘them’, including what it takes to become part of the former category. The qualitative and quantitative evidence in the studies show that immigrants are aware of how they are seen and talked about in relation to the host nation, and that their observations of the boundary affect their sense of host national belonging. As an implication, future research should devote more at-
tention to analysing the informal and sometimes subtle ways in which boundaries are drawn, including why this form of boundary drawing appears to be most consequential for immigrants’ boundary experiences.

Second, the dissertation demonstrates that immigrants are not just passive receivers of boundary messages from the host nation but that they react – accept, challenge, and negotiate the boundary – in different ways. This point is reflected in particular in the qualitative parts of the project which show that some immigrants use even a bright and exclusive boundary to claim belonging (as expressed by the boundary crossers in Article C), while others manage to redefine the boundary, at least in their personal conception of it, to make room for belonging (as expressed by the boundary expanders in Article C). In addition, while frustration and a sense of unfairness make some immigrants turn their back on the host nation (as expressed by the dis-identifiers in Article C and by some focus group participants hinting at giving up on democracy in Article D), this can be seen not only as a desperate reaction but also as a provocative action aiming at regaining a form of control by rejecting any wish to belong. While the statistical analyses offer evidence of the broad patterns that testify to the effect of boundaries, these qualitative findings are a reminder that there is some room for manoeuvre within those broader patterns.

However, despite the room for manoeuvre, an important point of the dissertation is to underline the dimensions of power involved in boundary processes. I have both argued and shown that belonging is not just icing on the cake or something that is nice to have; rather it is a status that matters for people’s sense of agency. In this respect, the studies in the dissertation illustrate that immigrants experience the host nation as having the upper hand in setting the terms of boundary drawing and that immigrants’ room for manoeuvre is significantly restricted when they are faced with a narrow definition of national membership. This is given expression in feelings of powerlessness, including frustration, anger and sorrow. It is also expressed in perceptions of discrimination, that is, perceptions of not being treated like others in society. The privilege of belonging is easy to forget when one’s status as a member of the nation is not questioned, but for many of the people I have talked to it is an asset that they long to have. Not being recognised as someone who belongs involves losing out on the basic sense of worth and entitlement to have a say which comes with being considered an equal member of the national community. This dimension of power in belonging has so far mostly been theorised, but in my opinion, future empirical studies must devote much more attention to it as it has important political implications. In particular, the loss of agency experienced in a context of bright boundary drawing may develop into withdrawal from or rejection of engagement in society. This perspective involves a much stronger role of political science in the study of belonging.
This discussion connects to the distinction between **belonging in** and **belonging with** which I developed on the basis of inductive analysis of interview material in Article C. While the existing literature treats national belonging as a one-dimensional concept, subsuming national identification and a feeling of home supposedly generated from such identification (Yuval-Davis 2006, Antonisch 2010, Skey 2013, Duyvendak 2011), I show that for many second-generation immigrants these are two different phenomena. In a power perspective, the conscious distinction being made between home (**belonging in**) and national identity (**belonging with**) can be understood as a way to reclaim agency. When **belonging with** is challenged or out of reach, the insistence on **belonging in** creates an avenue for holding on to a sense of entitlement to belong. In addition, it provides a space for making sense of feelings of attachment to the nation that otherwise would have nowhere to go. I believe that this distinction between two forms of national belonging is important if we are to grasp the ways in which belonging can be denied and claimed at one and the same time. Indeed, although the existing literature is careful in theorising the potential limits on belonging for minority members, my results suggest that the one-dimensional conceptualisation of belonging has an unfortunate bias toward the majority (for whom ‘home’ and ‘national identity’ are two sides of the same coin). This bias risks portraying minority individuals as helpless or impotent because it suggests that there is only one way to belong to the majority society. Instead, I suggest that we should ask how immigrants – and other minority groups – find ways to **belong in** the majority society when their access to **belonging with** seems blocked.

In sum, the central contributions of the dissertation are the development of a theoretical model which connects the study of national boundaries to the study of immigrants’ identificational integration, including the development of new concepts to make sense of boundary processes. In particular, the concept of boundary perceptions has been fruitful for the analysis of how external boundary definitions travel to the objects of boundary drawing and affect their sense of inclusion. In addition, the distinction discussed above between **belonging in** and **belonging with** underscores the value of asking immigrants what belonging means to them, as established notions of the concept seem to be biased toward majority understandings. I expect the model and these new concepts to have broader significance, and I hope other scholars will apply and nuance them in future studies – both of immigrants’ belonging in Western democracies and of other minority groups in other contexts. Indeed, while this dissertation has focused on the situation of immigrants, I believe that the boundary processes documented may be of broader comparative significance for understanding the dynamics of belonging for minority individuals in the face of the majority’s boundary drawing.
As for the empirical contributions discussed above, the dissertation provides evidence of the effect of boundaries and how they work – findings which also have implications for broader public debates in contemporary Western societies.

Implications for contemporary public debates

As noted in the introduction of this summary report, the dissertation engages with questions that are of concern for both politicians and the broader public. Here, I want to highlight three contemporary debates which can be informed from the insights of the dissertation.

The first debate links to the ‘culturalisation of citizenship’ (Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016) which has marked many European societies within the past decade and which entails requiring of immigrants that they demonstrate their loyalty and attachment to the nation. The demand, voiced by politicians and broad segments of the public, that immigrants show that they (want to) feel part of the national community rests on an underlying suspicion of immigrants’ will and ability to belong (Slootman and Duyvendak 2015). This dissertation shows that many immigrants do feel attachment to the host nation (in particular in the sense of ‘home’) and want to belong but feel blocked by the boundaries they meet. In other words, the majority society also has a role in making belonging possible. In particular, if the demand to immigrants that they demonstrate their belonging is not followed up by openness to imagining the national community in more inclusive ways, immigrants are likely to lose motivation to demonstrate their belonging. Since the boundary cues that immigrants take are often of a subtle nature, it is likely that host nationals are not always aware that they draw boundaries. If we want immigrants to belong, this dissertation should serve as an eye-opener, making us more sensitive to the potentially unintended ways in which immigrants are marked as ‘Others’. This is not to suggest that national imaginings should be all-encompassing; a central point of departure of the dissertation is that all nations need boundaries. But some boundaries are drawn in more inclusive and inviting ways than others. Indeed Article A shows that attainable boundary drawing contributes to immigrants’ belonging, and Article B demonstrates that where immigrants are appreciated as contributing members of society, they perceive less discrimination. As such, the dissertation is a reminder that integration – also in its identificational form – is a two-way street and that immigrants cannot do it alone.

A second debate informed by the dissertation concerns the different approaches to citizenship policy in Western democracies. Citizenship requirements are, for instance, relatively liberal in Portugal, Sweden and Germany
and much more restrictive in Austria, Switzerland and Greece. Different approaches to granting citizenship to immigrants reflect different understandings of the role of citizenship in the integration process. The first set of countries see citizenship as a door (that must be opened by the host society) to initiate the integration process; the second set of countries see citizenship as a prize that immigrants should only earn upon completed integration (Bauböck et al. 2006: 24, Simonsen 2017). These opposing views are engaged in discussions on the right approach to citizenship between government representatives of different nations – especially within the EU (where citizenship in one country gives access to the other member states). This dissertation suggests that in terms of immigrants’ identificational integration, there appears to be no difference between the most restrictive and the most liberal approach. In other words, belongingness arguments used as legitimation for tightening immigrants’ access to citizenship cannot find backing in the present findings. While citizenship regimes may above all be a ‘politics of identity’ (Brubaker 1992: 182), the identity signals sent through them are likely to matter more to the host population than to the immigrant population (Goodman and Wright 2015, Simonsen 2017).

Finally, the dissertation has implications for the debate about the debate. As right-wing nationalist parties are on the rise in many European countries, and as similar sentiments were also central in the 2016 American election campaign, a meta-discussion about the potential consequences of the increasing salience of anti-immigrant elite rhetoric is unfolding. While many of the relevant politicians hold that it is necessary to say what is being said and to point out the problems imposed on society by increased immigration, other politicians and debaters argue the detrimental effects of the harsh rhetoric. My dissertation shows that it does indeed matter how politicians talk about these issues, and that the negative tone of the debate risks producing alienated individuals who withdraw from the democratic conversation. Politicians must be conscious that their words have these effects. This does not mean that important issues with immigrant integration cannot be addressed in political debate. Rather, the wish from the individuals I have talked to is to be taken seriously in these debates as people with capacities and resources, that is, to be allowed a voice in matters on which they are ‘everyday experts’.

The meaning of nationality in a modern, industrialised world-society

In closing, I want to return to the more abstract, underlying question of the dissertation, which was formulated by the Danish Queen Margrethe II in her
2016 New Year’s speech: Does nationality have any meaning at all in a modern, industrialised world-society? This dissertation answers – as did the Queen – in the strong affirmative. First, nationality – what it means to be part of the nation – matters a lot to many people. Both citizens and politicians engage, on an everyday basis, in defining national character and national values – including whom and what cannot be counted as part of the nation. Second, nationality matters to immigrants because it is a status which is important for inclusion on equal terms in contemporary Western societies. National belonging is not just important for making sense of the self and the surrounding world, ‘it has real consequences for what we can do’ (Blackwood, Hopkins and Reicher 2013: 1101) because it is associated with a sense of agency and power. By attending to both sides – the host nation and the immigrant population – this dissertation gives a fuller account of the challenges and possibilities relating to one of the most central concerns of contemporary Western societies: how can immigrants come to belong? I hope that my dissertation will inspire further academic as well as public debate on this question.


One of the most debated and most politicised issues in contemporary Western democracies is immigrants’ place in the receiving national societies. With the inflow of newcomers, discussions about what it means to be part of the nation have intensified, inevitably resulting in demarcations between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The particular ways in which these categories are defined – and the boundary between those who belong and those who do not is drawn – varies considerably across nations, as demonstrated in the literature on citizenship requirements and in recent public opinion research. While both strands of literature expect these cross-national differences to matter for immigrants’ integration, there is a lack of research which actually examines that expectation. This dissertation contributes to understanding the effects of national boundary drawing by analysing whether, and if so how, it affects immigrants’ sense of national belonging.

To answer this question, I develop a theoretical model that links the host nation’s boundary drawing with immigrants’ belonging through the concept of boundary perceptions. This model is examined using quantitative and qualitative data and methods. The first contribution of the dissertation is to demonstrate that it matters to immigrants how ‘us’ and ‘them’ are defined in the receiving society. Indeed, immigrants are aware of how they are viewed by the host population, and this in turn affects their perceptions of discrimination, their notions of how easy or difficult it is to be seen as a national, and their feelings of closeness to the host nation. However, while the literature expects the formal boundaries drawn through citizenship policy to be important signals of inclusion or exclusion, I do not find any effect of this mode of boundary drawing on immigrants’ belonging. Holding this null-effect up against the effects of the boundary drawing performed through public opinion, I conclude that immigrants are most affected by the informal and often subtle ways in which members of the host population express their conceptions of national membership.

A second contribution of the dissertation is to show that although citizenship requirements may not affect immigrants’ sense of belonging, politics matters in another way. Indeed, immigrants’ sense of political belonging is significantly affected by negative political rhetoric, and the effect is strongest for immigrant groups which are the main targets of contemporary anti-immigrant messages, that is, Muslims and those of lower socio-economic status. This finding underlines the importance of informal modes of boundary drawing for immigrants’ sense of inclusion and attachment to the host nation.
Finally, the dissertation contributes to nuancing the very concept of belonging. On the basis of in-depth interviews with second-generation immigrants, I find that belonging should be conceived of as a two-dimensional rather than one-dimensional concept. I propose to understand these two dimensions through a distinction between belonging in and belonging with. I show that while belonging with is affected by boundary perceptions, belonging in is not, and this has important implications for our understanding of boundary processes. In particular, while host national boundary drawing may make it difficult for second-generation immigrants to identify as nationals, most of them manage to claim their place in the national society. This shows that immigrants are not just passive receivers of boundary messages but react to, negotiate and challenge boundaries in different ways.

In synthesis, the dissertation gives a nuanced account of the links between boundaries and belonging and attests to the dimensions of power involved in constraining and claiming national membership in contemporary Western societies.
Dansk resumé

Indvandreres plads i de modtagende nationale samfund er et af de mest debatterede og politiserede emner i vestlige demokratier i dag. Diskussioner om, hvad det vil sige at være en del af nationen, er intensiveret med tilstrømningen af nytilkomne, og det har uundgåeligt resulteret i afgrænsninger mellem "os" og "dem". Måden, hvorpå disse kategorier defineres – og grænser trækkes mellem dem der hører til og dem der ikke gør – varierer på tværs af nationer, som det er blevet demonstreret i statsborgerskabsliteraturen og i forskningen i majoritetsbefolkningens holdninger. Mens begge forskningsgrene antager, at disse tværnationale forskelle har betydning for indvandreres integration, er der en mangel på forskning som faktisk undersøger denne antagelse. Denne afhandling belyser effekterne af national grænsedragning ved at undersøge om, og i så fald hvordan, grænsedragning påvirker indvandreres følelse af at høre til.


Afhandlingens andet bidrag er at påvise, at politik alligevel betyder noget, selvom statsborgerskabspolitikken ikke synes at påvirke indvandreres følelse af nationalt tilhørsforhold. Jeg viser nemlig, at indvandreres oplevelse af politisk tilhørsforhold påvirkes af negativ politisk retorik. Denne effekt er stærkest for de indvandrergrupper, som der er mest negativ politisk opmærksomhed omkring, nemlig muslimer og indvandrere med lav socioøkonomisk status. Dette resultat understreger betydningen af uformelle former for grænsedragning for indvandreres følelse af inklusion i værtsnationen.
Slutteligt bidrager afhandlingen til at nuancere begrebet om nationalt tilhørsforhold. På baggrund af dybdegående interviews med andengenerationsindvandrere finder jeg, at nationalt tilhørsforhold bør behandles som et todimensionelt snarere end éndimensionelt begreb. For at forstå disse to dimensioner foreslår jeg, at vi sondrer mellem at høre til i og at høre til med. Jeg viser, at følelsen af at høre til med påvirkes af grænseopfattelser, mens følelsen af at høre til i er upåvirket af værtsbefolkningens grænser. Dette er vigtigt i forhold til at forstå grænsedragningsprocesser, da det viser, at mange andengenerationsindvandrere formår at gøre krav på en plads i det nationale samfund, selv i sammenhænge hvor værtsnationens grænsedragning kan gøre det svært at identificere sig med nationen. Med andre ord er indvandrere ikke blot passive modtagere af grænsebudskaber; de reagerer, forhandler og udfordrer grænser på forskellige måder.

Alt i alt giver afhandlingen en nuanceret forståelse af forbindelserne mellem grænsedragning og tilhørsforhold og illustrerer de dimensioner af magt, som er involveret i henholdsvis at begrænse og gøre krav på nationalt medlemskab i vestlige samfund i dag.